

PHYSICAL PLANNING OBJECTIVES AND
STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING EXCLUSIVENESS IN RESORT
AREAS IN JAMAICA

by

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
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
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DEDICATED TO

Bertie and Lydia
Peter, Albert, Michael and Faith
Marlene

and to
my fellow citizens of Jamaica.

PHYSICAL PLANNING OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING EXCLUSIVENESS IN RESORT AREAS IN JAMAICA

Floyd A. Graham

Submitted to the Department of Architecture on January 20, 1975 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Architecture in Advanced Studies.

ABSTRACT

This thesis deals directly with the problem of exclusiveness within the tourist resort areas in Jamaica. In dealing with this problem the author does not feel that a mere discussion of the problem is merited, but feels that if this thesis is to be of any vital importance to this subject then strategies for minimizing the problem ought to be presented.

It was not possible for a comprehensive set of strategies for minimizing exclusiveness to be presented in this thesis. Consequently, only physical planning strategies are presented but, as the author mentions, there need to be other aspects of planning (such as economic planning) for aiding in the minimizing of exclusiveness.

In the first chapter of this thesis a discussion of the historical development of the tourist industry in Jamaica is presented. Some reference is also given of the historical development of the tourist resort areas.

Some evidence of exclusiveness within Jamaica's resort areas is presented in the second chapter. In this chapter the term "exclusiveness" is also defined.

For this thesis to be of any significance reasons have to be given for identifying exclusiveness as an important topic for discussion. In Chapter Three reasons from educational, sociological and economic standpoints are presented for minimizing exclusiveness.

In Chapter Four a description of a resort city, Montego Bay, is given for which a recent plan has been developed.

This contemporary plan which is geared towards resort development is herein unveiled and some evidence of exclusiveness is given. The reason for including this chapter is to show that some reputable planners today are still designing resort areas which are inherently "exclusive".

The final chapter is a presentation of some physical planning strategies which are stated quite generally and are geared primarily for virgin areas or areas cleared through, for example, urban renewal. How some of these strategies can be employed and implemented in one of Jamaica's existing resort areas, Montego Bay, conclude the chapter.

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INTRODUCTION

Jamaica is an independent country which is located about ninety miles south of Cuba in the Caribbean Sea. It is the largest of the English-speaking Caribbean islands having a total land area of approximately 4,411 square miles. Its two million people are governed under a democratic political system which is patterned quite closely to that of Britain which ruled it for over three hundred years while it was a colony.

This West Indian island is one of the most popular of the tourist resort countries in the Caribbean being among such perennial leaders as the Bahamas, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. It has managed to hold such popularity among North Americans although, unlike the tourist industries of the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands which receive significant economic gains from the influence of Florida and Puerto Rico respectively, its tourist industry operates without any significant contribution from the other Caribbean islands.

This thesis may be viewed superficially as an echo of the protests being made by those victims of the policies which alienate them from tourist areas but goes much further in offering recommendations for the amelioration of

the problem. Furthermore, this thesis should not be viewed as being useful only to Jamaica but to the other tourist resort islands of the Caribbean whose citizens have been voicing the same type of protest as Jamaicans.




FIG. A JAMAICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

CHAP. 1: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TOURISM IN
JAMAICA.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TOURISM IN JAMAICA.

It cannot be stated with any degree of certainty when the tourist industry commenced in Jamaica as colonialists were visiting the island ever since the Arawaks discovered it. In the years prior to 1890 there was no formal organization of the tourist industry although there were a few lodging houses and inns at that time for off-island tourists. Soon the demand for tourist accommodation began to outstrip the supply. It was around this time (1890) that there was official recognition of this fact. Then, the Governor of Jamaica, Sir Henry Blake, made the following remarks:-

"The only accommodation for travellers was the hospitality freely offered by the country gentlemen to those who were fortunate enough to obtain introductions"¹.

It was in 1890 that the first sign of an effort appeared to alleviate the disparity between the supply and demand. With the staging of the Jamaica International Exhibition the following year, the Government passed the Jamaica Hotels Law which provided an incentive to hotel construction in the form of low interest rates (3%)² on the capital which it guaranteed.

Before the end of the nineteenth century, hotels

were springing up in such towns as Kingston, Spanish Town, Moneague, Mandeville, and the cradle of Jamaica's tourism, Port Antonio, which was graced by a magnificent hotel called the Titchfield (see Figure 1.1). Still, there was no businesslike coordination within the industry.

The informal and laissez faire operation of the tourist industry changed, to some extent, in 1922 when the Government established a coordinator and promoter called the Tourist Trade Development Board.³ The Board was annually given a small grant to disseminate information about the island's tourist facilities and make arrangements with hotels and shipping companies. Foremost among the latter was the United Fruit Company which was responsible for transporting Jamaica's banana export to the United States. It was a catalyst in the expansion of tourism as it encouraged Americans to utilize the empty spaces on board its ships travelling to Jamaica. So, in a sense, the Board functioned similarly to a travel agency.

It was a little after the establishment of the Tourist Trade Development Board that Montego Bay began to develop as a resort area. The other principal resort area in Jamaica at the present time, Ocho Rios, did not show its face until about 1948. It was then that another




FIG. 1.1 EARLY RESORT TOWNS

beautiful hotel, Tower Isle, was opened there.

The major change in the island's tourist industry occurred in 1955 when the Government replaced the Tourist Trade Development Board with the Jamaica Tourist Board which is still in operation today. Besides getting annual grants from the Government for its operation, the Tourist Board was given special powers to borrow money. With jet travel becoming firmly established and the equipping of two airports strategically located with respect to the resort areas to accommodate the jetliners, the Tourist Board began a campaign to tap the tourist market in foreign centres. Consequently, offices were set up in New York, Miami, Chicago, Washington, Los Angeles, London, and Toronto.

Accompanying this development was a revision of the Hotels Aid Law which made it easier for investors to build hotels. This law was another injection into the economic bloodstream of the industry as the expansion of tourist accommodation was encouraged through the tax incentives provided by the Government.

Since its inception, the Tourist Board has been growing in strength. Its annual grant grew from J\$100,000⁴ in 1955-56 to J\$6.7 million in 1972-73.⁶

Furthermore, partly through the work of the Tourist Board tourist arrivals here increased from 161,400 in 1956⁷ to 493,488 in 1972.⁸ Concomitantly, tourists' expenditures rose from J\$17.8 million⁹ to J\$107.9 million¹⁰ during the same period. Figure 1.2 further illuminates the picture.

Tourist accommodation shows a similar pattern of growth. The number of beds reported for 1956 was 3,600¹¹ and according to the Tourist Board this figure grew steadily to 17,944 in 1972.¹² The annual growth in tourist accommodation is depicted in Figure 1.3.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HOTELS

It has been mentioned previously in this chapter that hotels were initially located in Kingston, Spanish Town, Moneague, Mandeville, and Port Antonio. Observation of Figure 1.1 shows that all these towns, with the exception of Kingston and Port Antonio, are inland.

There was no strong importance attached to beaches at the inception of the tourist industry, thus hoteliers found it much more profitable to locate within or near to the existing principal towns. Besides, in an era when transportation was limited due to a lack of enough roads and motor vehicles, there was no incentive for the hote-




FIG. 1.2A TOURIST ARRIVALS





FIG. 2B **TOURIST EXPENDITURES**

FIG. 1.3

TOURIST ACCOMMODATION



lier to locate their hotels any place else but the popular towns. Generally though, hotels were not located in the heart of the towns but on prominent sites where the view was all-encompassing and at some comfortable distance from the hub of the towns.

The hotels in themselves were epitomes of exclusiveness. Since they were built with a rich clientele in mind, the Jamaican of average or even above average income could not afford to spend even a day there. At that time most Jamaicans did not know what the inside of a hotel looked like except for the domestic workers who were employed by the hotels. Furthermore, at that time, social and colour prejudice was at its height and therefore the management of a hotel would find ways of maximizing the separation between its guests, who were usually affluent whites, and its employees, who were mostly Blacks of low income.

Hotels were always designed to satisfy all the general needs (i.e. sleeping and eating) of its guests. There was no need at that time to spend a lot on recreational facilities as most of the guests were middle-aged and preferred to sit, read, and converse with fellow guests. The desire to go beyond the hotel grounds was not as strong as today.

Hotels were designed in the architectural tradition of the time and as a result did not stand out militantly but were an integral part of the total environment. They were much more tropical and intimate in design than is the present case.

It was not until after World War II that a definite change in terms of location and design occurred in Jamaica's hotels. It was also around this time that resort areas developed--when tourist facilities were grouped together. No longer did hoteliers find inland towns most attractive for siting their hotels but preferred the coastal areas which were graced with graceful beaches. Tourists were no longer stressing only facilities for sleeping, eating, and quietude. Beach facilities became quite an important priority.

Resort areas developed primarily because the hoteliers were scrambling for the best beaches and the economic benefits of conglomeration were lucrative due to the subsequent economies of scale. Figure 1.4 shows the present location of Jamaica's resort areas. If this is compared with Figure 1.1 then the locational change becomes evident.

The rapid development in transportation allowed hotels to be located outside of towns, The North Coast is an ex-




FIG. 1.4 PRESENT RESORTS

ample of such location as hotels are sited in the interstitial spaces along the coast between the coastal towns.

THE TOURISTS

Due to the close proximity of Jamaica to the United States of America, it is not surprising to realize that most of the island's tourists are permanent residents of that country.

Table 1.1 shows that during the period between 1968 and 1972 ¹³ no less than 77.2 per cent of Jamaica's long-stay" tourists¹⁴ were permanent residents of the United States. Although the Tourist Board has recently embarked upon a campaign to promote Jamaica in European cities there has not been any solid growth in tourist arrivals from there. However, there is still optimism and this optimism is rising principally because the national airline, Air Jamaica, has just opened a direct route from London to Montego Bay and Kingston.

The general trend seem to suggest that the tourist population constitutes a much higher percentage of young people than in previous years. Table 1.2 indicates the declining trend (in terms of percentage) of tourists thirty-six years and over in age.

TABLE 1.1: AGE DISTRIBUTION AND SEX OF STOP-OVERS

<u>AGE</u>	<u>1970</u>		<u>1969</u>		<u>1968</u>		<u>1967</u>		<u>1966</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Under 20 years	35,594	11.6	28,967	11.0	24,092	9.7	20,823	9.1	19,624	8.6
20- 35 years	103,574	33.8	86,681	32.8	81,763	32.8	72,316	31.6	70,968	31.1
36-'45 years	62,879	20.5	55,132	20.9	52,074	20.9	49,618	21.7	51,096	22.4
46- 55 years	58,284	19.0	50,925	19.3	49,231	19.8	46,401	20.3	46,744	20.5
Over 55 years	46,224	15.1	42,527	16.1	42,071	16.9	39,681	17.3	39,709	17.4
	<u>306,555</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>264,232</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>249,231</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>228,839</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>228,141</u>	<u>100.0</u>

<u>SEX</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
MALE	163,269	53.3	139,228	52.7	128,809	51.7	118,874	51.9	118,025	51.7
FEMALE	143,286	46.7	125,004	47.3	120,422	48.3	109,965	48.1	110,116	48.3
	<u>306,555</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>264,232</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>249,231</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>228,839</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>228,839</u>	<u>100.0</u>

NOTE: 1. The above figures exclude arrivals by air charter on which these data were not available

SOURCE: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics, 1972

TABLE I.2: COMPOSITION OF TOURISTS BY PERMANENT RESIDENCE (1968- 1972)

	<u>LONG STAY</u>									
	<u>1968</u>		<u>1969</u>		<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>		<u>1972</u>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Americans	186,887	77.9	197,401	77.2	224,035	80.0	269,579	81.4	290,986	77.7
Canadians	23,472	9.8	25,828	10.1	23,775	8.4	26,843	8.1	36,674	9.8
Europeans	14,221	5.9	13,495	5.3	14,533	5.2	14,445	4.4	23,422	6.3
Others	<u>15,381</u>	6.4	<u>18,957</u>	7.4	<u>19,273</u>	6.4	<u>20,219</u>	6.1	<u>23,543</u>	6.2
	239,961	100	255,681	100	281,616	100	331,086	100	374,623	100
	<u>SHORT STAY</u>									
Americans	14,903	80.6	16,739	78.8	21,654	78.7	22,881	81.0	25,205	75.9
Canadians	1,054	5.7	1,273	6.0	1,389	5.1	1,322	4.6	1,657	5.0
Europeans	813	4.3	923	4.3	1,410	5.1	1,220	4.3	1,777	5.5
Others	<u>1,729</u>	9.4	<u>2,313</u>	10.9	<u>3,053</u>	11.1	<u>2,814</u>	10.1	<u>4,542</u>	13.7
	18,499		21,248		27,506		28,237		33,181	

SOURCE: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics, 1972

Most of the tourists visit Jamaica when the winter descends on their home countries. As a result, Jamaica's tourist industry suffers economically from the "seasonality". The tourist season manifest two peaks--a short one which commences in July and lasts for two months, and a longer period which begins in November and ends in April. Refer to Table 1.3 which displays the seasonality of tourism.

Between 1967 and 1972, most of the tourists would be classified as "long-stay" visitors as most of them remained for over seven nights.¹⁵ Table 1.4 shows a monthly breakdown of the average duration of tourists visits.

Jamaica has had a reputation of attracting almost exclusively wealthy tourists.¹⁶ Although there is some change in the economic status of the tourists arriving in the recent past, there is still a relatively significant percentage of affluent visitors. There are no real data to confirm this in Jamaica's case but realizing that the type of tourists to the other Caribbean islands is no different from Jamaica, Table 1.5 may be offered as corroboration.

TABLE 1.3

HOTEL: ROOM AND BED NIGHTS SOLD AND PERCENTAGE OCCUPANCY BY MONTH, BY AREA

J A M A I C A

	<u>ROOM NIGHTS SOLD</u>					<u>BED NIGHTS SOLD</u>					<u>PERCENTAGE OCCUPANCY</u>									
	<u>1972</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>ROOMS</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>BEDS</u>	
Jan.	95423	83343	81920	92420	87118	175022	149120	147296	170731	158041	54.7	50.7	61.4	73.5	73.8	51.1	46.4	56.9	70.4	69.7
Feb.	117541	111004	100634	91124	88927	218891	204283	187466	169870	164580	70.0	73.5	80.9	89.5	91.6	66.2	69.4	77.5	86.2	88.4
Mar.	109674	95535	94831	79872	78443	205047	171874	177136	146830	145613	59.8	57.4	68.2	77.8	79.4	57.1	52.6	65.0	74.1	76.7
Apr.	92536	90916	68362	82169	65231	173303	172442	119460	152615	122583	51.0	56.6	50.7	65.0	67.0	48.5	54.7	45.1	62.7	65.7
May	67317	73030	57090	46196	67754	119645	126288	97189	79455	119120	35.7	44.2	41.0	48.7	60.6	32.3	38.9	35.7	43.7	55.3
June	66817	64800	56859	42724	48425	124486	113239	96734	75348	86284	37.4	40.7	38.5	45.2	56.6	34.4	28.4	33.6	41.4	52.4
July	91387	94065	71832	72054	77857	171941	172658	139099	132412	143176	48.2	57.2	46.7	59.2	69.5	46.1	53.4	46.5	56.4	66.2
Aug.	105156	103197	81126	67091	69863	198358	194639	148005	124985	130481	55.7	62.1	52.6	68.0	76.4	53.3	59.6	49.4	65.8	73.9
Sept.	60762	54509	52942	40022	37399	103828	87181	87908	68402	62424	33.3	34.4	35.4	43.5	43.1	28.9	28.0	30.3	38.8	38.5
Oct.	67678	59536	53505	57885	51887	116020	102295	90439	100216	88075	35.8	35.9	34.3	49.3	47.0	30.9	31.6	29.8	44.5	41.7
Nov.	97481	84533	72134	62963	65539	168971	147749	124303	100925	115690	53.0	52.4	47.0	60.3	69.4	46.2	46.7	41.4	55.2	63.5
Dec.	103551	91430	85114	86084	66035	192192	171739	159368	161844	122700	54.6	53.6	52.4	60.1	67.4	51.0	51.4	50.0	58.6	64.7
YEAR	1077323	1005948	876349	820604	804478	1967704	1813507	1574403	1493633	1458767	48.9	51.5	50.1	62.1	66.8	45.3	46.3	46.2	58.7	63.0

Source: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics-1972.

T A B L E 1.4
AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY (NIGHTS)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1967</u>
January	8.3	9.2	9.5	9.7	9.6	9.3
February	8.4	8.1	9.0	9.6	9.4	10.0
March	8.6	8.4	9.0	10.1	9.8	10.0
April	7.6	8.3	8.2	9.3	9.2	9.8
May	7.0	7.1	6.8	8.4	7.7	8.5
June	7.1	7.1	6.8	7.2	8.0	5.2
July	7.9	7.9	7.9	8.2	7.8	8.3
August	9.3	8.3	9.3	10.0	8.9	9.1
September	9.2	8.4	8.8	6.0	9.3	10.7
October	6.4	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.8	6.6
November	6.4	8.6	6.0	6.6	7.0	7.2
December	7.7	7.8	7.7	8.1	8.5	8.1
YEAR	7.9	8.1	8.1	8.5	8.5	8.6

SOURCE: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics-1972

Table 1.5: Characteristics of the Caribbean Travellers
of American Airlines' Routes

	Mainland-San Juan, Puerto Rico ^(a)		Netherland Antilles & the Virgin Islands	
	1972 Summer	1973 Winter	1972 Summer	1973 Winter
Family Income (before taxes)				
Under \$10,000 ^(b)	29%	13%	24%	9%
\$10,000-\$14,999	19	20	19	16
\$15,000-\$19,999	19	15	18	16
\$20,000-\$29,999	19	22	21	23
\$30,000 and over	14	30	18	36
Occupation				
Executive/Managerial				
	12	23	15	25
Professional	18	17	17	16
Housewife	8	15	13	20
Student	16	9	13	6
Teacher/Professor	10	9	15	10
Office worker	19	10	9	7
Crafts/Mech./ Service	5	4	6	4
Government/Mili- tary	4	3	3	2
Retired	1	2	2	3
All other	7	8	7	7

(a) Excludes Puerto Rican "ethnic" travellers

(b) In United States dollars

Source: D.E. Lundberg, "Caribbean Tourism: Vital to the Economy but Mismanaged?" in The Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, February 1974, p. 38.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TOURISM TO JAMAICA'S ECONOMY

The tourist industry earns the highest amount of foreign exchange for the island after the bauxite industry. In 1968, for example the tourist industry earned J\$73.2 million while the bauxite industry earned J\$88.8 million for the same year.¹⁷ Table 1.6 shows that the earnings of the tourist industry rose from J\$28.8 million in 1966 to J\$107.9 million in 1972.¹⁸ Though not all of these earnings remain in the island--the Tourist Board has estimated that only sixty-six per cent remain--they represent quite an important percentage of the income the island makes from its exports.

The earnings of foreign exchange is very important and especially so when there are so many fluctuations in the international monetary system as is the present case.

Tourism goes a long way in alleviating some of the severity of Jamaica's unemployment problem. The unemployment rate has risen from 13.5 per cent in 1960 to 22.5 per cent in 1972 and as Professor Norman Girvan has noted:-

"...While the growth of Jamaica's national income has been spectacular, it has not resulted in proportional increases in the number of jobs; and this in spite of the breathing space afforded by enormous mi-

TABLE 1.6: TOURIST EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF EXPORT EARNINGS

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Year	Tourist Expenditures (J\$million)	Export Receipts (J\$million)	Column (2) as a Percentage of Column (3)
1955	13.4	66.6	20.4
1960	28.8	113.4	25.5
1965	46.4	153.0	30.3
1966	56.0	196.2	28.6
1967	57.8	196.8	29.4
1968	73.2	207.1	35.4
1969	77.9	243.7	32.0
1970	79.6	283.1	28.2
1971	90.8	283.9	32.0
1972	107.9	300.3	27.8

- Source:
1. National Planning Agency, Economic Survey, Jamaica 1972.
 2. Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics 1972.
 3. Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica.

gration to Britian".¹⁹

Thus, the employment picture seems to be getting dimmer and dimmer every passing moment.²⁰

According to a recent Government survey, 9,580 persons were directly employed in hotels, guest houses, cottages and apartments,²¹ This figure, though small in comparison to the sugar industry,²² is much higher than that in the bauxite-alumina industry. Furthermore, according to the same survey, the direct employment in the tourist industry represents about 1.5 per cent of the nation's total employed labour force.

Though the direct employment generated by tourism seems minimal according to the figures cited, tourism provides employment in regions away from the capital city. Thus some of the migration from the rural areas is being absorbed by the resort areas which because of their strategic locations (see Figure 1.4) also serve to distribute employment and hence income.

Besides direct employment, the industry includes indirect employment. The indirect employment is difficult to measure. Various figures are given for the ratio between direct and indirect employment in the industry. One source says there is a 1:1 ratio,²³ while another be-

believes that this ratio is more of the order of 2:3.²⁴ Furthermore, it has been reported that at the present time there is an average of 1.2 employees for every hotel room.²⁵

This means that the tourist industry probably indirectly employed between 12,370 and 19,160 persons during the 1972 season.²⁶ This indeed is a significant number and is of more relevance than the direct employment figure in an analysis of the degree of employment generated by the industry.

Inducing indirect or external employment is an important economic effect of tourism because those persons who are underskilled or overskilled to work directly in the tourist industry or whose occupational skills (as far as direct or internal employment is concerned) are irrelevant can benefit through associated employment. Thus, roads leading to or within resort areas have to be built and maintained which means that civil engineers, contractors, manual labourers, and others are employed. Electricity and water have to be supplied. These needs open jobs for such individuals as electricians, plumbers, etc. Environmental quality needs to be achieved resulting in the employment of gardeners, sanitation employees, and others including store operators who may supply items such as

gardening tools. Additionally, people who would never make a decent livelihood if tourism did not exist, such as craftsmen and artists, would have to translate their vocation into an avocation.

Tourism further fuels the economy as it is a source of tax revenues. Each tourist pays direct taxes on his or her hotel room. Indirectly (s)he pays taxes also on every item of consumer good (s)he purchases. It was estimated that in 1972 room tax and the indirect tax amounted to J\$887,000 and J\$665,000 respectively.²⁷

As far as the future economy of the island is concerned, tourism, if it continues to grow at its present rate, may reap even a higher percentage of the total receipts from exports since the various agricultural industries have been declining. Although the bauxite-alumina industry will through new progressive Governmental legislation increase its receipts from approximately J\$25 million in 1973 to just over J\$200 million this year, partly because of the recent formation of the International Bauxite Association,²⁸ tourism will still be important and probably even more so.

It has been predicted (based on reports furnished by the various bauxite companies) that Jamaica's bauxite will

be exhausted within the next fifty years--that is, within the next two generations. This means that Jamaica cannot afford to stand idly by and allow the tourist industry to decline, especially at a time when there is every indication of a bright and prosperous future.

There are strong indications that international tourism will continue to grow. Although tourism is affected by wars, civil strifes, and economic recessions and depressions, the painful blows most likely would not last indefinitely because modern man is becoming more and more mobile. One reason for this is the relatively low cost of travel on international airlines.²⁹ International travel is viewed in the technologically more developed societies as some event which everyone should experience at least once during his or her lifetime.

According to the most recent study published, Jamaica's tourist industry should grow from its annual reception of 374,700 long-stay tourists in 1972³⁰ to over two million long-stay tourists in 1990.³¹ In this study it was further announced that:-

"...With the present long-stay tourist/bed ratio of 25.1 this would require 88,900 tourist beds--the equivalent of 44,250 hotel rooms--eight times the present accommodation.

Although the above forecasts of tourist arrivals and accommodation requirements over the next twenty years may seem far-fetched at present, examination of the combined private and public proposals for major new tourism projects in Jamaica demonstrates that six known major schemes could, at the time of full development, provide a total of 86,000 tourist beds.

It seems very clear...that Jamaica already has a generous reserve of land for tourism and this reserve will probably be more than adequate for the next twenty years".³²

As far as employment is concerned, the same report predicts that about 65,000 additional jobs would be generated by the growth in tourism in 1990.³³ This figure was based on the assumption that the then present (1969) direct hotel employment ratio of 1.2 employees per hotel room would decline to 0.7 by 1990 but that the ratio of external employee to internal employee for direct employment would remain 1.5.³⁴

CHAP. 2: EVIDENCE OF EXCLUSIVENESS IN THE RESORT AREAS

Now that the historical development of Jamaica's tourist industry has been traced from its infancy to the present time when it is a full-fledged industry, Jamaicans should not be overly confident about its future. One reason for saying this is that there is a disturbing characteristic which is haunting the industry. This characteristic is "exclusiveness" and it will be the topic of concern in this chapter.

In order to delimit or eradicate any confusion in the discussions of this chapter, it becomes appropriate for a definition of "exclusiveness" to be made.

In this thesis "exclusiveness" is defined from two angles: (1) exclusiveness in terms of exclusion, voluntary or involuntary; (2) exclusiveness in terms of privilege. Therefore, in the first case "exclusiveness" is to be interpreted as having the tendency or power to exclude a segment of a society, the poor, from the tourist areas and facilities which it would like to experience. In the second case, "exclusiveness" is making the tourists, in contradistinction to the average Jamaican, a privileged group. For example, if the needs of the tourists always or most often override the similar needs of the citizenry, or if the best habitable areas (in terms of scenery, tran-

quility, accessibility, etc.) are reserved for tourists, then the tourists are undoubtedly the privileged ones.

The question of exclusiveness is important as a topic of concern as many citizens of Jamaica and of many other Caribbean resort countries have been complaining about this problem. As a result their behaviour towards the tourists is not as commendable as in years gone by.

The tourist industries in some of the Caribbean countries have been significantly affected economically because of the attitudinal behaviour of the citizens. Lundberg mentioned the cases of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Bahamas in this respect.¹ Jamaica is no exception.

In reviewing a number of the reports describing the mistreatment of tourists, it appears that exclusiveness is one of the principal causes for the mistreatment.² One would be led by these reports to believe that there is a direct link between mistreatment of tourists by hotel employees and exclusiveness.

Although the hotel employee is oftentimes justified in the way (s)he feels, the tourist is not to be blamed in every instance. However, exclusiveness sometimes result in the prostitution of the residents of the resort area simply for the sake of getting the tourist dollars.

By no means should this prostitution be condoned. Even though the tourist dollar is a very important fuel to the Jamaican economy (as it has been shown in Chapter 1), the economic benefits can be gained without the prostitution of the hotel workers and other citizens simply because they are not mutually exclusive.

Through exclusiveness some of the educational, sociological, and economic values resulting from tourism become undermined. For example, (1) the educational fruits of tourism cannot be fully harvested because exclusiveness hinders open communication between the tourists and the local residents; (2) inhospitality and violence erupt because of the privileges which are granted to the tourists but denied the local citizens; (3) the ensuing inhospitality and violence threaten and negatively affect the tourist industry because of the bad publicity given to the country by disgruntled and victimized tourists. In the following chapter a detailed description is given of the deleterious effects of exclusiveness from educational, sociological, and economic standpoints.

In this chapter, the aspiration is to show that the typical tourist zones in Jamaica's resort areas are exclusive. The average citizen is denied the right to enter

these zones through covert or overt official policies which may induce sociological, economic, or psychological deterrents. Whether these deterrents are derived from official or unofficial policies or not, it does not matter. This is not an issue here although the more official the policy the more serious is the situation.

A macroscopic view will be taken in reporting the degree of exclusiveness in resort areas. Thus, the physical manifestations of exclusiveness will not be the only aspect to be discussed.

Resort areas are economically and socially exclusive, and maintained so, through a variety of ways. These include:-

- (a) High prices and price differentials
- (b) Non-local constitution of tourist facilities
- (c) Isolationist spatial patterns

PRICES

High prices are one of the instruments which make the tourist zones in Jamaica's resort areas exclusive environments.

Considering the fact that Jamaica's tourist industry developed from a wealthy clientele, the whole industry has

been designed to cater exclusively to this class. Although other less wealthy tourists and others of a more average economic standing are visiting the country in greater proportions, most of the tourists may still be classified as wealthy. Table 1.5 gives the financial characteristics of American tourists visiting Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Netherland Antilles. This sample is offered her in lieu of one showing the financial characteristics of tourists to Jamaica as this is momentarily unavailable. However, there is hardly any difference in these characteristics for each of the Caribbean Islands as North America generates most of their tourists.³

Having been designed to cater exclusively to a rich clientele--, "...Jamaica gained some reputation as an exclusive resort attracting mainly a wealthy and famous clientele"--the financially average Jamaican becomes priced out. As much as (s)he would like to, the meagre income⁴ of the financially average Jamaican cannot allow the satisfaction of spending a vacation at one of the hotels without excessive economic sacrifice.

Hotels are much more expensive than the inns and guest houses and, according to the most recent figures furnished,⁵ the price of accommodation under the Modified

American Plan at most inns range from J\$45.00 to J\$130.00 in Montego Bay and in Kingston from J\$49.00 to J\$60.00 for four days-three nights single occupancy.

If the prices for cottages are examined, then the same exclusionary prices are evident. The following sample⁶ which represents the average cottages is offered:-

Montego Bay region

"Four bedrooms, four bathrooms, overlooking golf course, maximum eight persons. J\$400. per week".

"Three villas--each one air-conditioned bedrooms, one bathroom, on beach. Two adults, two children. J\$135 weekly".

Ocho Rios region

"Three bedrooms, three bathrooms, swimming pool, magnificent views. Six persons. J\$200 per week".

"Four bedrooms, three bathrooms, lush tropical garden and view. J\$260. weekly".

These prices are seen in a brighter light when one realizes what the incomes of Jamaicans are.

Choking under the grip of an unemployment rate which has been fluctuating and was 17.2 per cent in October 1969, 23.2 per cent in April 1972. and 22.5 per cent in October 1972,⁷ a lot of Jamaicans are living "from hand to mouth".

In the urban areas the unemployment situation is even more severe. The already ugly unemployment picture is even uglier than what appears superficially as, on the average, about one in every four employed men have been underemployed.⁸ In other words, about twenty-five per cent of those men employed worked for four days or less per week.

A sample of the wages hotel employees received in 1970 is presented in Table 2.1.

A more comprehensive picture is given by Table 2.2. This shows that the National Income per capita which was J\$370.5 in 1968 increased at an average of 9.7 per cent per annum.⁹ The personal Income per capita and the Personal Consumption expenditure per capita increased over the four-year period since 1968 at annual rates of 10.7 per cent respectively.¹⁰

Now from the evidence presented one can see how difficult it is for most Jamaicans to vacation at the hotels. In general, the accommodation rates are beyond the shallow pockets of the average Jamaican.

High prices are not only evident in the accommodation within inns and hotels but also within night clubs, restaurants, and shops.

TABLE 2.1: WAGE RANGE SAMPLE FOR SOME
CATEGORIES OF WEEKLY PAID
HOTEL EMPLOYEES (1970)

EMPLOYEE CATEGORY	WAGE RANGE (J\$)
Room services	12.30-25.50
Housekeeper	20.40-40.00
Dining room	11.80-41.00
Bar	12.00-40.00
Kitchen	11.00-62.30
Maintenance	12.20-43.50
Security	12.00-26.85
Miscellaneous	12.10-28.20

SOURCE: Jamaica Tourist Board, Our Tourist Industry, p.9

TABLE 2.2: JAMAICA'S INCOMES PER CAPITA (J\$ million)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
National income p.c.	370.5	406.4	449.6	475.9	514.5
Personal income p.c.	341.1	369.7	421.6	444.7	486.5
Personal consumption expenditure p.c.	311.0	346.7	384.1	423.8	462.4

SOURCE: National Planning Agency, Economic Survey: Jamaica 1972, Government of Jamaica (1972), p.134.

In my many conversations with residents of Montego Bay (i.e. middle-income and low-income), I learnt that most of them feel that the tourist facilities there are without doubt exclusionary. A general sentiment among the residents is that although they would like to experience what the tourists revel in, they cannot because of the excessive prices. For example, at the two best night clubs, the price of a bottle of Coca-Cola--not to mention the admission charge which is exorbitant--is approximately five times the average price within the area.

How can the average Jamaican go there? Besides, having to pay a relatively exorbitant amount in order to be admitted, the refreshments are priced outside of his economic range.

Aggravating this socio-economic situation and intensifying the degree of exclusiveness is the increasing number of in-bond stores. In-bond stores are those which offer duty-free shopping. In other words, no duties and no purchase taxes are paid on the commodities purchased by the shopper.¹¹

The historic Charles Square which has been the commercial focus of Montego Bay over the years abounds with in-bonds stores. The same situation occurs around the

Sheraton, the Pegasus, and the Skyline hotels in New Kingston. Almost all the hotels in Jamaica have in-bond shops.

The fact that prices are reduced in the in-bond stores because the buyer does not pay duties or sales taxes seems contradictory to the argument of this paper which says that high prices promote exclusiveness in the resort areas. The truth comes out when it is told that shoppers can only buy if they are leaving the country. Once a purchase is made in an in-bond shop the commodity can be retrieved only at the airport on the presentation of an airline ticket. Thus, these consumer goods are only available to those Jamaicans who travel a lot, namely the "well-off".

Both the question of prices and that of to whom the hotels, restaurants, stores and night-clubs cater are closely interrelated as means of realizing exclusionary tactics. Because of the exorbitant prices in those facilities which are highly patronized by tourists, these facilities do nothing else but cater to the appetites of tourists and upper class Jamaicans and exclude the "have-not" Jamaicans. The reverse is also true: having decided to cater primarily to tourists will inevitably exclude the

"have-not" Jamaicans as the high purchasing power of tourists will inflate prices and the demands of the tourists will definitely be for luxury goods.

CONSTITUTION OF TOURIST FACILITIES

Tourist facilities are so constituted that they cater predominantly to the tourist to such an extent that almost all the residents whom I have conversed with in Montego Bay and Ocho Rios say that they, at some time or other, feel ostracized and discriminated against.

As far as the restaurants are concerned, almost all of them specialize in international cuisine which many Jamaicans dislike, rather than the local dishes. Many Jamaicans have complained that they have found it quite embarrassing and inappropriate when they are told that the local dishes they order are unavailable. This persists most in the hotels. Most times when they are appeased they have to suffer the pain of waiting.

Hoteliers find that their hotels are more lucrative when they are planned individually as a "total environment", and that is from the standpoint of tourists. The aim of a "total environment" is to satisfy the primary needs (i.e. sleeping and dining, recreating, and duty-free

shopping) of the tourists. Although the needs of the Jamaican vacationing within this type of environment are generally the same as those of the tourists, satisfying the needs of the tourist is satisfying those of the Jamaican. Most hotels are not comprised of facilities which cater to the needs of Jamaicans.

SPATIAL PATTERNS OF EXCLUSIVENESS

One tourist facility which is most popular to the Jamaican is the beach. Yet, beaches are not really accessible to the average Jamaican. A recent Governmental survey¹² reported that about seventy-four per cent of all the beaches having facilities (e.g. changing rooms) on the North Coast belong to the hotels, most of which require one to book there in order to enjoy the beaches.¹³ The best beaches in the island are occupied and controlled by the hotels. In Montego Bay, the internationally famous Doctor's Cave is open to all tourists registered at a hotel in the area free of charge. Yet on the other hand, Jamaican residents find it quite difficult to gain admission. Whenever they are admitted they always have to pay more than a nominal sum.

It has been reported that there are 32,631 feet¹⁴ of beach frontage which the nation's hotels occupy while pub-

lic bathing beaches and seaside parks constitute about 75,241 feet.¹⁵ This means that there are approximately 1,820 feet of beach reserved for each one hundred hotel beds while there are a minute 3.8 feet of beach available for every one hundred citizens.¹⁶ This is an example of how privileged the tourists are.

These calculations even make the situation better than it really is as it is declared that "there are many (beaches) which are in private ownership adjacent to beach cottages, resort subdivisions of farmland".¹⁷ This may be interpreted to mean that there is really more than 32,631 feet beach frontage available to "private" individuals.

The recent wave of speculation also serves to aggravate the problem as Brian Hudson mentioned that the beach lands are being gobbled up by the upper classes, local and absentee alike.¹⁸

The fact that tourist facilities are physically isolated from those facilities which are frequented by the local residents adds to the degree of exclusiveness within Jamaica's resort areas.

This physical isolation is blatantly visible, particularly in Montego Bay and the Ocho Rios area.

Stretching from Oracabessa to Montego Bay one discovers that the principle road along the North Coast acts as a line of demarcation between tourist zones and the local communities. These tourist zones are not really inviting to someone travelling along the road as these zones (hotel compounds) seem to be designed against intruders. They are oftentimes guarded silently by iron gates and in some cases barbed wire fences or stone walls.

The main road is the most prominent line of demarcation on approaching the hub of Ocho Rios from the east. At this point the traveller sees a startling juxtaposition. On one side there is the sprawling luxury of the hotels sitting in the poetic brilliance of the tropical verdure and, on the other, the naked truth of congestion and poverty among the squatter vendors of handicrafts.

Instead of making these booths and the vendors a part of the hotel areas, they are moved to positions outside of the hotels' protective walls. There is no mixing between tourists and the common folks, neither is there any reciprocity as the tourists can go in and out of the hotels' gates while the common vendor feels that (s)he cannot go in.

A prominent Jamaican architect described how hurt he


felt at seeing a jerk pork vendor losing his large clientele of tourists. This vendor used to sell his delicacy just outside the hotel compound at a point where he was easily visible and accessible from both within the hotel compound and outside of it. However, for some reason or the other, a wall was constructed resulting in his economic deprivation.

Other instances of economic deprivation have been seen in the new development plans for both Montego Bay and Ocho Rios. In these plans which will be implemented, a fishing village has been eliminated in Montego Bay and two others in Ocho Rios in order to accommodate exclusive tourist facilities. To make matters worse, none of these fishing villages have been relocated but totally eliminated. The tourists are a privileged group indeed. Again, the poor Jamaican is relegated to the bottom of the list of priorities.

A map of Montego Bay, Figure 2.1 shows the physical isolation of the tourist zone. There is no significant degree of local activities or facilities heavily patronized by locals within the tourist zones. Thus, the local residents will not be found in the tourist zones in great numbers (except as hotel employees) as there is hardly any-

FIG. 2.1

MONTIGO BAY



TOURIST ZONE

thing there which would attract them.

All tourist facilities are grouped together in highly concentrated patterns. This is most evident in the case of Montego Bay as manifested in Figure 2.1. In an area which has so many hotels (as in the case of Montego Bay and the Ocho Rios region) this concentration and large occupancy intensify the degree of exclusiveness as the ratio of locally patronized facilities to tourist facilities is decreased to the extent that the incidence of local activity in tourist zones becomes significantly minimal.

The best scenic spots in Jamaica's resort areas are taken by hotels. Thus, the hotels have the best views and easiest accessibility to the silvery sanded beaches. Because of their locations, the hotels on the North Coast form a wall which makes visual access to the sea impossible for people who are outside of the hotel compounds. The reason why the hotels in Montego Bay do not display as great a concentration on the beaches as in the Ocho Rios region is due to the fact that there are fewer quality beaches there. However, to make up for this hotels enjoy the most scenic spots on the hills overlooking Gloucester Avenue and the Queens Drive.

CHAP. 3: REASONS FOR MINIMIZING EXCLUSIVENESS IN THE
RESORT AREAS

Minimizing exclusiveness within a resort area is synonymous with maximizing social interaction between the tourist and the citizenry. The benefits of minimizing the exclusiveness or maximizing the social interaction far outweigh the detriments.

In this chapter a discussion of the implication of exclusiveness from economic, sociological and educational standpoints will be given.

THE EDUCATIONAL STANDPOINT

Some tourists travel primarily to augment their knowledge, clarify some preconceptions they entertained, or to be able to justifiably dispel some of the myths which becloud their minds and obstruct their comprehension. On the other hand, those tourists who incidentally constitute the majority and who decide to take a trip for other reasons, such as simply to relax, find that the educational gain, although incidental, ineluctably occurs.

Tourists may learn more than a people by being immersed in the cultural environment of that people. If one wants to genuinely understand a people--their culture, their behavioural attitudes, and other aspects of the people--one can gain much more on a vis-a-vis basis

than going to libraries and reading the relevant books or staying in hotels. There is nothing quite like first hand, vis-a-vis approach and this is where tourism can be beneficial.

The educational effect of the recent detente developed between the western world and the Communist bloc cannot be denied. As Gray observed:-

"...The entry of communist countries into the world travel market has had the effect of reducing the ideological and informational gaps between communist travel exporters and the western world. The need to cater to tourists' requirements has, in both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, forced the travel exporters to permit the influx of foreign cultural and informational influences, for example, magazines, movies and music. Any trade with the western world by communist nations necessarily undermines isolationism and it may be surmised that, per dollar of export receipts, (sunlust) tourism does more to destroy ideological barriers than any other type of foreign trade".1

Lundberg seem to have made similar discoveries in his study.

He said in part that:-

"Travel exposures and experiences can provide new standards, art forms, and even new systems of belief. By viewing a range and diversity of societies, the person is likely to develop a wider tolerance for cultures other than

his own culture, perceptions are often sharpened and the personal 'data bank' enlarged".²

Though the statements cited here give the impression that the educational values of tourism are reaped only by the tourists, it must not be assumed that this is the case. The hosts (that is, the citizens of the country which the tourists are visiting) also reap some of the educational benefits as they too simultaneously learn of the guests.

The reciprocity, in terms of the educational gains, aids in nurturing the possibility of a fraternity of nations. In these times when the dark clouds of the Cold War seem to be thinning through detente and international rapprochement, tourism is one of the most potent (if not the most potent) catalysts in furthering international understanding and world peace.

Establishing exclusive resort areas--resort areas in which the links of communication between guests and hosts are very limited--denies tourism of the educational quality. In this climate of exclusiveness the winds of ignorance descend and blow away a valuable seed of international understanding and cultural respect.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

The social ramifications resulting from the condonation or promotion of exclusiveness in a resort development can lead to very disastrous consequences.

Gray recommends that this is a negative aspect of tourism development that "every government desirous of developing a travel export industry should face squarely".³ Continuing he said:-

"...Because of wide differences in income levels between the mass of local residents and the visiting foreigners, the travel industry runs the risk of creating an enclave in which affluent foreigners are catered to and use resources which are not available to the mass of the domestic people".⁴

Exclusiveness arises from creating an enclave of luxury for tourists in a country in which poverty is rampant. Jamaica may be classified as such a country. Such a dualistic environment "may exacerbate any feelings of resentment toward foreigners which local people may already possess...The lack of courtesy and consideration of some tourists toward their hosts is also likely to aggravate feelings of resentment".⁵

When tourists revel under the cloak of exclusiveness, the local residents, who do not have the freedom to share

in the revelry for economic reasons or whatever, develop an attitude of animosity towards their guests. As Lundberg noted:-

"...(the citizen) cannot afford to eat in the new restaurant or buy at the boutique. The native who receives a marginal income can only observe; (s)he cannot participate. His (or her) position vis-a-vis the tourist accentuates his poverty and may lead to violence".⁶

Incidents of violence have been reported and there seems to be an upsurge in the resentment that some local residents hold for the tourists. The gaining of independence⁷ from Britain has resulted in the disappearance of some of the cobwebs spun by colonialism which blinded the vision of the colony's residents and mesmerized them into servitude. With the repaired vision, Jamaicans could see quite clearly the extent of exclusiveness which the tourist industry condoned. This obviously contributed to the upsurge of resentment during the 1960's. The Black Power movement in the United States also constituted a contribution to clarifying the situation.

Nothing is unique about the reactions of the residents towards the tourists. It is simply human proclivity to harbour a disdainful feeling when they know that having worked hard to promote themselves, their families, and

their nation, they cannot enjoy the natural beauty of their own country. Yet people (tourists) who have not consciously worked for the development of the country suffer no difficulty in enjoying the beauty spots of the country as they please.

What is implicit in this situation is that tourists are given special privileges or first preferences over the citizens who by right are the heirs of this legacy.

A similar situation becomes evident when a parent offers a beautiful present to one of his or her children without giving a gift to the other(s) after provoking the desires of the latter. In this case jealousy results. However, in the case of the tourists and the citizens a different malady is aroused. This malady is termed frustration. It occurs because the frustrated individual, in this case the citizen, feels that (s)he has been deprived of a right which (s)he has worked for with expectation.

The social process does not terminate when frustration appears but runs its natural course until all the deleterious consequences, such as violence, materialize. Ilfeld states that "frustration and situational variables are most visible as contributors to violence".⁸

He further declares that frustration is born out of

social discrimination, and political and economic impotency.⁹

Frustration is not a result of indolence. Frustrative levels seem to be attained according to Newton's Third Law which states that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Therefore, the level of frustration is higher for someone who has made a sacrificial input because (s)he is expecting a commensurable output. Frustration occurs whenever an individual's expectations are denied or whenever there is an interference of his or her "ongoing, goal-directed activity".¹⁰ Consequently, the higher the goal desired or the expectation, the greater will be the degree of frustration if there is a denial of that goal or expectation.

When the citizen works diligently to achieve social mobility so as to be able to enjoy some of the trappings of affluence and is unsuccessful, (s)he is led to violence when (s)he realizes that the tourist is never seen labouring yet is able to enjoy the trappings of affluence. While this is not the fault of the tourists, this fact is still evident.

Concomitant with the inducement of violence is the intensification of class division, class rivalries and pro-

bably racial animosity.

Class divisions and rivalries occur because the society draws an indelible line of demarcation between the "haves" and "have-nots". This line seems even more marked in resort areas which are themselves pockets of luxury. As if the legacy of colonialism is not steeped enough in socio-economic prejudice, the exclusiveness of resort areas further exacerbates the situation. Exclusiveness may be equated with a denial of social rights to the majority of the citizenry--the "have-nots".

Racial animosity is an issue because over ninety-five per cent of Jamaica's population is black while most of the tourist population is white. Therefore the tourists can be easily identified as a group which appears to be responsible for denying the citizens of Jamaica the opportunity of enjoying the beauty of their own country.

Over recent years there have been reports of overt expressions of animosity by the local citizenry towards the tourists.¹¹ The fact that this is not occurring only in Jamaica but in other Caribbean resort countries in which Gardens of Eden are created for the exclusive use of tourists further supports the contention that exclusiveness is the cause for the animosity. Incidents of disturbing pro-

portions have been reported in Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, the Virgin Islands, Bermuda, and Curacao, and it has almost always been mentioned that these incidents evolved because the local residents in these various countries felt that they were excluded from the pleasure of tourism through beaches, hotels, and other tourist facilities.

THE ECONOMIC STANDPOINT

Hostility

Having already alluded to the sociological reasons that show why condoning exclusiveness is a bad policy, the author will attempt to show some of the detrimental economic effects which result because of the condoning of exclusiveness.

It was mentioned that resentment and sometimes violence become psychological off-springs of exclusiveness. Violence, in the form of riots, have had some deleterious effects on the economy.

In the 1961-63 period there was a well marked decline in the number of tourists visiting Jamaica. One may attribute this to a significant pull-out of British nationals during this period, however there was no such pull-out. This was a period of extreme violence and resentment and

the marked decline may have been a result of this hostility.

In 1961, the year prior to the granting of its Independence, Jamaica recorded a 1.1 per cent drop over the previous year's tourist arrivals.¹² The over-all percentage drop with respect to 1960 for the two subsequent years (1962 and 1963) was 9.7 per cent and 12.2 per cent respectively.¹³

The other period of violence was 1967. In that year statistics show that there was also a concomitant drop in the number of tourists to Jamaica. There was a 3.8 per cent decline under the preceding year's level.¹⁴ Refer to Table 3.1 for an overview of the situation.

It should not be interpreted as the author's belief that violence erupting from tourism was the only cause for these declines in tourist arrivals. This, besides, is not the real issue. What the author would like to be interpreted as saying is that violence per se within the resort areas has deleterious economic effects on the tourist industry.

Thus it would be senseless not to placate potentially volatile situations as one such situation may trigger another and cause a chain reaction to occur. Thus it would

TABLE 3.1: ANNUAL TOURIST ARRIVALS (1957-1972)

Year	Tourist Arrivals(thousands)
1957	160.7
1958	169.4
1959	191.3
1960	226.9
1961	224.5
1962	206.8
1963	202.3
1964	232.2
1965	300.3
1966	345.3
1967	332.8
1968	396.3
1969	407.1
1970	414.7
1971	448.6
1972	493.5

Source: (1) Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics: Jamaica 1972, p. 4.

(2) Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies (1972), p. 174.

also be senseless not to minimize exclusiveness, a potentially volatile situation, within tourism.

Other Caribbean countries having a tourist industry of great economic significance have shown evidence of how violence-contributing situations have had similar detrimental economic effects. Trinidad and Tobago is a case in point. Reference to Table 3.2 shows that in the case of both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago there was a decrease in their share of the tourism pie between 1962 and 1963.

One reason for this may be due to the riots and threatening Black Power outcries that characterized Trinidad and Tobago during that period. It seems more than mere coincidence for these two countries to experience declines when all of the other Caribbean countries recorded an increase. One may not blame this decrease in the case of Trinidad and Tobago to its being further from the United States. Such an explanation would be groundless as three next-door neighbours of Trinidad and Tobago, namely Barbados, Grenada and St. Vincent, have reported growth rates in tourist arrivals for the 1962-68 period of 17.3 per cent, 18.9 per cent, and 23.0 per cent respectively.¹⁵ Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, on the other hand, evinced growth rates of 3.8 per cent and 4.6 per cent respectively.¹⁶

TABLE 3.2: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF TOURIST ARRIVALS
(expressed as percentages of total arrivals)

	1962	1968
	%	%
Windward Islands*	2.5	4.0
Leeward Islands**	4.1	4.2
Barbados	5.3	6.7
Northern Group***	1.2	2.2
Jamaica	24.9	15.1
Trinidad and Tobago	8.4	5.3
Bahamas	53.6	62.5
Total	100.0	100.0

* These islands are St. Vincent, Grenada, Dominica, and St. Lucia.

** Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Antigua comprise this group.

*** This group is made up of the Turks and Caicos Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the Virgin Islands.

Source: John M. Bryden, Tourism and Development: A Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Cambridge University Press(1973), p. 101.

When there are recurring incidents of violence there is usually a subsequent decline in repeat visitors. The immediate economic loss may seem obvious in this situation but it is even more intensified as such a situation means that promoters of tourism have to increase their tourist promotion budget.¹⁷ When visitors return to their home countries they often promote a resort area if they enjoyed their vacation there. If not, they sometimes paint horrid pictures which may dissuade any potential visitor.

Low Occupancy Rates

The exclusiveness of Jamaica's tourist facilities has resulted in a lack of diversification in the types of accommodation. Accommodative facilities are designed exclusively for a wealthy clientele which the industry has historically been built upon.¹⁸ As a result of this, such facilities are expensively and elegantly furnished and therefore for them to be economically viable prices of accommodation have to be high.

Seeing that Jamaica's wealthy clients visit mostly in November-April when it is bitterly cold in their countries, a seasonality develops which is characterized by low occupancy rates of hotels during the remaining months except

July and August.¹⁹

Table 3.3 reflects the extent of hotel occupancy on a national level.

Looking at the national picture, one would marvel at the diseconomies introduced by low occupancy rates. For example, during the 1965-72 period the tourist industry potentially lost from J\$20.3 million to J\$112.8 million (See Table 3.4). This means that Jamaica could have earned approximately J\$220.7 million in 1972 which is more than double its earnings for that year. This figure would be even more economically significant as hotel operators would get a higher proportionate profit when their hotels are full or near full to capacity. In other words, hotel operators would benefit from the economies of scale which would occur then when they are operating at a full or nearly full occupancy.

Table 3.5 which exemplifies the case of Antigua shows that with rising occupancy rates the ratio of revenue to cost increases from 1.4 at a 45.0 per cent occupancy to 1.6 at a 65.0 per cent occupancy. There is no constantly proportionate increase between the total revenue and the total expenses for the twenty per cent increase in the occupancy rate as total expenses outpace total revenue.

TABLE 3.3: OCCUPANCY OF HOTEL ROOMS (1965-1972)

Year	Occupancy (%)
1965	69.6
1966	68.0
1967	65.0
1968	66.8
1969	62.1
1970	50.1
1971	51.5
1972	48.9

Source: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics: Jamaica 1972.

TABLE 3.4: REAL AND PROJECTED TOURIST EXPENDITURES (1965-1972)

Year	Tourist Expenditure at Existing Occupancy	Tourist Expenditure at Full Occupancy*
	(J\$million)	(J\$million)
1965	46.4	66.7
1966	56.0	82.4
1967	57.8	88.9
1968	73.2	109.6
1969	77.9	125.4
1970	79.6	158.9
1971	90.8	176.3
1972	107.9	220.7

*These figures are the author's projections

Source: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics: Jamaica 1972.

TABLE 3.5: STRUCTURE OF REVENUES AND COSTS AT DIFFERENT OCCUPANCY LEVELS: A 100-room hotel project in Antigua.

	Revenue and Costs (US\$thousands) at the following occupancy rates:	
	45%	65%
<u>Revenue</u>		
Rooms	447.6	600.7
Food	234.6	333.0
Beverages	119.3	172.8
Laundry	4.2	6.0
Other	8.8	11.6
Total	814.5	1,124.1
<u>Expenses</u>		
Cost of sales	130.9	176.7
Administration payroll	36.3	42.0
Other payroll	101.0	121.1
Administration and other costs	43.9	50.8
Advertising	44.8	60.0
Heat, light, power	36.4	43.6
Repairs and maintenance	23.6	28.8
Other inputs	162.0	190.0
Total	578.9	713.0
Net income before fixed charges	235.6	411.1

Source: John M. Bryden, Tourism and Development: A Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Cambridge University Press (1973), p. 126.

From another angle, Bryden in his very exhaustive study of tourism development in the Caribbean discovered that capital gross output ratio decrease with increasing occupancy rates.²⁰

The lack of diversification because of the obdurate promotion of exclusiveness (where the tourist industry caters primarily to a wealthy clientele) is one of the factors responsible for the low occupancy rates as the more economically modest foreigners who wish to visit Jamaica during the off-season discover that the hotel rates are too high. Now with the decrease in cost of a summer vacation in Europe, many Americans prefer to visit Europe. The high rates of Jamaica's luxury hotels make any competition with the European resort areas difficult.

Leakages

Another deleterious economic consequences of exclusiveness is "leakages".²¹

It has been shown in a previous paragraph that one aspect of exclusiveness results in the construction of high-cost luxurious hotels. This means that the vast capital outlays necessary for such construction limits the extent of Jamaica ownership to the rich. Thus, as one reads on to the end of this chapter it will be apparent to the reader

that there is an indirect link between leakages and exclusiveness.

Owen Jefferson in his study of the tourist industry²² found that leakages through remittance of profits to foreign investors in the industry was quite substantial. The reason for this kind of leakage is due to the relatively high percentage of hotels owned by foreigners. He reported that in 1968 the breakdown of hotel ownership was as follows:-

Hotels locally owned	52.7%
Hotels foreign owned	30.7%
Hotels under mixed ownership	8.6%
	<u>100.0%</u>

These figures,²³ Jefferson pointed out, although helpful in understanding the situation, are a bit misleading as foreign ownership tends to be more pronounced among the larger hotels. However, when ownership was examined in the light of capacity in terms of the number of beds, it was discovered that 55.6 per cent of the hotels were owned by foreign citizens.²⁴

The figures for guest houses, apartments and villas are unavailable and thus a better overview of the situation cannot be given. However, this did not stop Jefferson from stating that "foreign ownership of capital in the industry--including other facilities such as car rental agencies

cies-- is substantial".²⁵

The results of these findings indicate that some of these leaking channels could be plugged if there was a greater incidence of local ownership. Though it is impractical to reduce the import propensity to zero, at least a higher proportion of salaries and profits could remain within the country if there was total ownership by citizens.

The question of local ownership needs further examination as the present situation suggests that enhancing local ownership is not enough although it is indeed a beginning.

Because of the fact that local hotel owners are rich by Jamaican standards, the profits derived from the operation of the hotels accrue to the "well-off" class. Such an occurrence furthers the cause of economic disparity--it drives a bigger economic wedge between the "haves" and the "have-nots".

Having the profits accruing to the rich Jamaican hotel owners is almost synonymous to that of having the profits accruing to foreigners. The reason being is that it is said that it is now the common practice for rich Jamaicans to open bank accounts in foreign countries in order to evade some taxation.²⁶ When this happens it is the same as

increasing the import propensity through leakages. Furthermore, the final effect of this picture stifles the beneficial multiplier effects resulting from the receipt of the tourist dollar.

CHAP. 4: A CONTEMPORARY PLAN FOR A RESORT CITY
(MONTEGO BAY) AND THE EVIDENCE INHERENT OF
EXCLUSIVENESS

Evidences of exclusiveness have been mentioned in Chapter 2. Although the resort areas in Jamaica began decades ago there seems to be no change in the attitudes of planners with respect to resort development. Contemporary plans still expose factors which generate exclusiveness. The plan for Ocho Rios done by a reputable firm, the Shankland Cox Partnership, is one example of a contemporary plan which induces exclusiveness; so does the plan for Montego Bay done by the same firm. Because of the almost identical treatment for both towns, only one of these plans will be examined. It will be that for Montego Bay. However, before focussing on the prescribed plan for Montego Bay and its attendant exclusiveness, it is necessary for an introduction to the area, namely Montego Bay, be given in order to see the plan in its proper perspective.

MONTEGO BAY AND THE INCIDENCE OF TOURISM

Montego Bay is the second largest city in Jamaica and the largest on the north coast. With a present population of over 42,000 people, it manifested an annual growth rate of approximately 6.1 per cent between 1960 and 1970 when censuses were taken.¹ This population

growth rate made it the third fastest growing urban area in the island.²

Considering its location by the sea, Montego Bay is a city with varied and dramatic topography. Its undulating hills slope gently down to kiss the blue-green Caribbean Sea in most areas, although most of this urban centre is below five hundred feet³ above sea level. The western flange of the city is given additional visual relief by the expansive plantations of sugar cane.

Accessibility

Montego Bay, although about one hundred and twenty miles from the country's capital, Kingston, is easily accessible from other towns as all are inter-connected by asphalted roads. Besides, there is a public railroad which runs twice daily along the length of the country linking strategic points between Kingston and Montego Bay (see Figure 1.1). Buses are another source for public transit which offer much more flexibility for the passengers than automobiles. For the well-off businessman in a hurry, there are international jetliners at his disposal linking Montego Bay and Kingston and also small aircrafts which service (besides Montego Bay and Kingston) Mandeville, a centrally located urban centre, and Port Antonio and Ocho

Rios on the north coast.

Climate

Montego Bay is blessed with a salubrious climate which is an asset to its tourist industry. There are no threatening seasonal changes in the temperature but the highest temperatures occur between June and September when the mean maximum is over 90°F and the mean minimum between October and May when the temperature varies between seventy and seventy-five degrees fahrenheit.⁴ The alternation of land and sea breezes which occur daily add to the salubrity of the climate. As far as rainfall is concerned, Montego Bay does not get an excessive amount. Rainfall is at its highest levels in May and October. In those months it hovers around seven inches per month.⁵ The relative humidity is fairly high at an annual range of 71° to 77°.⁶ The daily variation is usually about ten to twenty per cent higher in the morning.⁷

Popularity Rise

Montego Bay's harbour was the nucleus for its urban growth as this harbour was the principal northern port for the dispatch of exports comprising of mainly agricultural commodities. Although being second only to Kingston in

terms of population, Montego Bay is the mecca of Jamaica's tourism. It had not enjoyed this stature at the inception of the tourist industry but with the decline of Port Antonio as a town, Montego Bay displaced it at the top of the resort ladder. One reason for Montego Bay's comparatively rapid growth as a resort centre may be attributed to the fact that it is the gateway to the island for most tourists and it is strategically located with respect to the island's best beaches and other resort facilities particularly on the North Coast.

Between 1965 and 1972, the annual number of "longstay" tourists⁸ has shown a steady rise. In 1965 the total was 132,777 and seven years later it was at 263,305.⁹ This represents an average annual growth rate of about 10.5 per cent which when compared with the growth rate of resident population seems remarkable.¹⁰ Similar growth rates are also evident in "short-stay" tourists and "stop-overs".¹¹ A specification of the figures is represented in Table 4.1. The comprehensive growth rate for total tourist influx into Montego Bay is 16.0 per cent.¹²

Tourist Accommodation

Hotel accommodation has shown a corresponding growth.

TABLE 4.1: TOURISTS BY AIR AND SEA (1965-'72)
MONTEGO BAY

<u>Year</u>	<u>Long-stay</u>		<u>Short-stay</u>		<u>Stop-overs</u>	
	<u>Air</u>	<u>Sea</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Sea</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Sea</u>
1965	132,777	-	6,895	-	119,672	-
1966	137,706	-	6,920	-	144,626	-
1967	142,402	-	7,151	-	149,553	-
1968	153,275	-	8,743	-	162,018	-
1969	168,798	-	9,092	-	177,890	-
1970	184,221	-	12,639	-	196,860	-
1971	194,766	-	15,924	-	210,690	-
1972	263,305	-	16,220	-	279,525	-

Source: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics, Jamaica 1972, p. 12.

Although there have been declines in certain categories of accommodation, the comprehensive picture portrays one of a steady annual growth. Between 1968 and 1972 there has been an increase of 1,377 rooms¹³ in terms of tourist accommodation which represents an annual growth rate of approximately 21.1 per cent. At the end of 1971 Montego Bay had an accommodation of 3,572 tourist rooms.¹⁴

Table 4.2 reflects the average capacity of hotels in Montego Bay and the percentage occupancy between 1968 and 1972. One of the facts which emanate from this presentation is that while capacity has increased annually a downward trend is occurring in terms of the percentage of rooms or beds which have been occupied. It should be noted that this does not mean that the total number of tourists arriving in Montego Bay has been declining. What really has been happening is that tourist accommodation has been outgrowing the number of tourist arrivals during the 1968-'72 period.

Employment Through Tourism

It is very difficult to accurately estimate how many workers a tourist industry employs because of second and other subsequent generation of employment resulting from the multiplier effects of tourists' expenditures. However, the Tourist Board reported that in 1971 and 1972 there were

TABLE 4.2: AVERAGE CAPACITY, CAPACITY SOLD, AND PERCENTAGE OCCUPANCY OF MONTEGO BAY'S HOTELS (1968-'72)

<u>Year</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
<u>Ave. Capacity</u>					
Rooms	1,429	1,626	2,139	2,512	2,883
Beds	2,841	3,230	4,285	5,018	5,762
<u>Nights Sold</u>					
Rooms	349,436	361,430	393,320	483,758	536,057
Beds	661,778	684,345	751,940	925,520	1,036,971
<u>Ave. House Count</u>	1818.1	1844.6	2060.1	2535.7	2833.2
<u>% Occupancy</u>					
Rooms	67.2	59.9	50.4	52.8	50.8
Beds	64.0	57.1	48.1	50.5	49.2

Source: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics, Jamaica 1972, p. 20.

4,520 and 4,545 persons respectively employed directly by the tourist industry in Montego Bay.¹⁵ These figures suggest an employee/"hotel" room ratio of between 8:5 and 9:5.¹⁶ It has been reported, also, that the present trend in this industry shows that for every direct or "internal" employee there are 1.5 indirect or "external" employee on the average.¹⁷ Therefore, for the years previously cited, namely 1971 and 1972, the total employment generated in Montego Bay was about 6,780 and 6,817 persons respectively.

Future Projections

A team of experts from the United Nations made projections concerning the growth of tourism on a national level in Jamaica. The projection at the time of its announcement covered a period of twenty years (1970-1990) into the future. It is my view that any such projection has to be considered dubious especially when one realizes the instability of a tourist industry, especially one of the nature of Jamaica's which is characteristically mono-cultural. The unforeseen energy crisis caused by the rallying of the Arab oil producers under the banner of OPEC¹⁸ and their subsequent oil embargo has resulted indirectly in a lessening of the predicted tourist tidal wave in Jamaica as fewer Americans

are willing to accept the inflated cost of foreign travel.

In the twenty-year projection, the figures stated for Montego Bay are unrealistic as an increase of 3,900 rooms is predicted.¹⁹ This means that over this period there would be an increase of about 92.4 per cent in tourist accommodation. In the proposal (which will be later delineated) there are approximately 1,700 rooms suggested in an already high-density development.

Montego Bay does not have an abundance of virgin coastal land or other types of land suitable for resort development. If there is going to be an expansive increase in resort development, then it will take place principally in the Negril area. Negril is west of Montego Bay and is blessed with some of the most beautiful beaches in Jamaica which are so far untouched by resort development. (See Figure 1.1). At the present time there is only one small hotel there.

The only way in which Montego Bay can physically support an additional 3,300 rooms for tourists is if more land is reclaimed from the sea. However, such a modus operandi could only be economically feasible through a high-density proposal as the cost of reclamation is quite

high. A high-density development would impose a social pressure of such magnitude that the present infrastructure (or any modification of it) would result in total chaos. The traffic in the city is already a congested problem.


THE PLAN

The target area for which the contemporary plan was developed represents a high percentage of land reclaimed from the Caribbean Sea. This area is now an appendage to the existing resort area of Montego Bay as it stretches from the famed Doctor's Cave Beach Club on its northermost tip to the historical centre of Montego Bay in the south. In all, this target area is comprised of approximately sixty-four acres.

The following map, Figure 4.1, gives some idea of the location of the target area within the urban framework of Montego Bay.

In expanding the Montego Bay resort area, the Jamaican government commissioned the services of the Shankland Cox Partnership, to make studies and finally prescribe a plan for the development of the city's waterfront. Figure 4.1a represents the plan which this firm developed.

FIG. 4.1 TARGET AREA






FIG. 4.1A SCP PLAN

On the sixty-four acres of reclaimed land, the Shankland Cox Partnership proposed a mixture of tourist facilities. They improved on the traditional recipe for a resort area by including offices, apartments, and a park among the traditional ingredients of hotels and shops. The proposal embodies a total of:-


- 95,000 square feet of shopping
- 19,600 square feet of space devoted to bars, restaurants, and clubs
- 77,800 square feet of office space
- 13 studio apartments
- 34 two-bedroom beach houses
- a two-acre park
- 1,619 hotel rooms

Heights of buildings go from a single storey to twelve stories. As a matter of fact, five of the six proposed hotels are no lower than ten stories.

An examination of Figure 4.2 shows that the Shankland Cox Partnership proposed the division of the target area into four portions thus somewhat isolating some of the functions. One portion comprises Lots #1-7 inclusively, another Lots #8-14, the third of only Lot #15, and the last of Lot #16. The first eight lots (Lots #1-7) are to be totally designed as tourists' residences. Lots #8-14 which collectively are called the St. James Centre describe the recreational and commercial sector of the

APPORT FOR RECLAIM AREA

CONTENT	DENSITY BEES PER ACRE	PARKING SPACES	HEIGHT LIMITS IN STOREYS
Hotel 310 Bd Km 610 Beds	50	150	10 - 12
34 Beach Houses 2 Bd Km 333 Beds	25	80	2 - 3
60 Apts 2 Bd Km 240 Beds	8.0	80	2 - 4
Hotel 200 Bd Km 400 Beds	200	150	10 - 12
Hotel 180 Bd Km 360 Beds	120	80	10 - 12
Hotel 277 Bd Km 550 Beds	150	150	10 - 12
Hotel 472 Bd Km 945 Beds	160	230	10 - 12
Public Beach Clubs	55		
Offices 34,200 sq ft	8.0	1.3	
Shops 28,000 sq ft			
Offices 4,400 sq ft	120	1.2	
9 Apts 7 Bd Km 26 Beds			
Shops 32,400 sq ft	110	1.2	
Hotel 80 Bd Km 160 Beds	40		
Shops 14,000 sq ft	1.6	1.2	
20 Apts 2 Bd Km	2.4		
4 Studios 84 Beds			
Clubs Bars & Restaurant 15,000 sq ft	20		
Crafts Market 20,000 sq ft	6.6		
Offices 12,000 sq ft	4.6	1.2	
19 Apts 2 Bd Km	28		
9 Studios 125 Beds			
Restaurants & Clubs 42,000 sq ft			
Shops			
Park			
TOTALS BLOCKS 13			
also Crafts Market 20,000 sq ft			
11 Total			
also entertainment facilities			
1 & Restaurant 15,000 sq ft			
19 & Entertainment total 112,000 sq ft			
280 m			
bees			
745 bees			
80 sq m hotel 100 beds			
bees per acre			



SUBDIVISION

FIG. 4.2

plan. The last two lots, namely Lot #15 and Lot #16, are devoted respectively to shops and a park. Reference to Table 4.3 will give a summary of the facilities prescribed by the firm.

The following excerpt from the Shankland Cox Partnership report which was prepared for the Governmental agency in charge of the execution of this proposal, the Urban Development Corporation, will give some intimate insights into the proposed environment:-

Resort Area

This sector comprises the three new beach area of Close Harbour, Fortress and Gun Point Beaches. Close Harbour Beach is the major hotel zone containing four new hotels. The hotels face directly on to the beach the depth of which would be up to one hundred feet. Each hotel will have individual landing facilities for small craft.

The access into the area is from the town boulevard. Fortress and Gun Point beaches consist of apartments and beach houses. The buildings will be kept low with their roof lines below Gloucester Avenue so that the existing view of the harbour from the Queens Drive slopes will not be spoiled.

St. James Centre

The reclaimed land immediately west of the existing town centre is to be developed as a commercial, shopping, and entertainment centre. There will be ample restaurant and refreshment facilities overlooking

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT - Table 4.3

Lot number	Area in acres	Land use	Sq. ft. of space	Number of beds	Beds per acre	Parking spaces	Number of storeys
1	4.12	Hotel - 310 rooms		620	150	150	10 - 12
2	5.5	34 - 2 bedroom Beach houses		136	25	68	2 - 3
3	3.0	60 - 2 bedroom Apartments		240	80	60	2 - 4
4	3.0	Hotel - 300 rooms		600	200	150	10 - 12
5	3.0	Hotel - 180 rooms		360	120	90	10 - 12
6	3.7	Hotel - 277 rooms		554	150	150	10 - 12
7	6.3	Hotel - 472 rooms		944	150	236	10 - 12
15	0.5	Shops					1 - 2
16	2.0	Park					

ST. JAMES CENTRE (LOTS 8 - 14)

8	3.5	Public beach club				55	
9	2.08	Offices	54,200			90	1 - 3
10	2.5	Shops	28,000)120	1 - 2
		Offices	6,400				
		9 - 2 bedroom apartments		36			
11	2.45	Shops	33,400			110	1 - 2
12	2.14	Hotel - 80 rooms		160	80	40	2 - 3
13	4.82	Shops	14,400			56	1 - 2
		20 - 2 bedroom & 4 studio apts.		84		24	2 - 3
		Clubs, bars & restaurant	15,400			20	1
		Crafts market	20,000			66	1
14	3.7	Offices	17,200			46	1 - 2
		29 - 2 bedroom & 9 studio apts.		125		20	2 - 3
		Restaurant and clubs	4,200				1 - 2
Total shopping space including crafts market			95,800				
Total bars, restaurants and clubs			19,600				
Total office space			77,800				
Total apartment beds				245			

the harbour and also certain cultural uses such as a Jamaican arts and craft centre.

The centre will be developed as a series of landscaped pedestrian plazas and malls, each one with a different atmosphere and character.

The principal pedestrian mall links the new waterfront, through to Charles Square, in the old town. Good vehicular and pedestrian links between the centre and the old town are an important design objective.

Pedestrian ways across the north gully will be provided by foot bridges connecting the entertainment and shopping plazas and the large public beach.²⁰

EVIDENCE OF EXCLUSIVENESS IN THE SCP PLAN

It has already been shown that exclusiveness exists within Jamaica's principal resort areas. Now, there does not seem to be any ameliorative proposal afoot in this report. For example, the plan²¹ created by the Shankland Cox Partnership (SCP) for the further development of Montego Bay as a resort area makes very little effort to minimize exclusiveness.²² There are aspects of the SCP plan which will result in Montego Bay continuing along the path of exclusiveness. The following are some of the more prominent evidences.

Evidence 4.1: The tourist, once (s)he is within a

hotel is not induced enough to get outside of his (or her) immediate environment and mingle with the local people.

In the absence of commercial facilities²³ which would encourage a high level of human interaction and aid in bringing tourists out of their hotels, landscaped pedestrian walkways could be a tool for inviting tourists to areas outside of their immediate environment and directing them to areas of interest to the tourist. The landscaped promenades, as depicted in Figure 4.3, do not continue into the hotel area but stop just outside of the hotel which is closest to the hub of the town. Thus, there are 2,510 hotel beds which are deprived of being linked to the activity centre of the town. This number represents an astounding 96.9 per cent. In other words 96.9 per cent of tourists are deprived of this linking tool--deprived of strolling into town along landscaped paths.

Furthermore, because of the absence of integration between the proposed landscaped promenades and the hotels, the majority of the tourists will ineluctably decide to take a taxi-cab into town. This procedure exacerbates the situation as the tourist is relatively isolated from a wider spectrum of the local citizenry until (s)he gets to




FIG. 4.3 PROMENADES

his (or her) destination.

Evidence 4.2: Most of the hotels are planning to have private beaches which therefore will not be freely open to the general public. To be more specific, 89.5 per cent of total tourist accommodation will enjoy the luxury of private beaches. The strip of private beaches in contrast to the lone public beach open to non-tourists in Figure 4.4 emphasises the disproportionality.

This planning strategy serves to intensify the degree of exclusiveness as hotels become more self-supporting and independent. The incidence of local residents is reduced to such an extent that there almost may be no social interaction between tourists and the resident populace.

Evidence 4.3: The allocation of almost all of the coast to private use in accordance with the SCP plan represents an affront to the resident populace as the coast line is freely accessible to all.

Such an allocation will certainly cause the local citizen to despise the tourist in ways presented in Chapter 3.




FIG. 4.4 BEACHES

The fact that tourists are treated as a privileged group (according to the SCP plan) in contradistinction to the residents is in itself evidence of exclusiveness.

Evidence 4.4: The new proposal will deny the residents the scenic views they presently enjoy from Gloucester Avenue and Fort Street. (Refer to Figure 2.1). No longer will they be able to walk or drive along these streets and see the white-crested waves racing into land or the illumination of the sea by the sun or the moon.

All these deprivations will ensue if the SCP proposal is adopted since the beaches will become relatively inaccessible to the residents and most of the hotels will go beyond ten stories.

Evidence 4.5: There are indications that the hotels are not planned with the common folks in mind. There are no innovative planning strategies employed which will serve to invite the average citizen to utilize their facilities.

The hotels are planned with only the foreign tourist in mind.

Evidence 4.6: All the hotels are planned in such

ways that they, to some indubious extent, will be architecturally alien to their environment.

There will be no respect for architectural scale, Hotels will be built along the beach in a way reminiscent of the towers of Miami Beach stretching up competitively to the sky. It seems as if the planners showed no sympathy for the backdrop of beautifully rolling hills because the hotels are planned as if these hills were non-existent.

In their plans for the Kingston waterfront and Ocho Rios, the Shankland Cox Partnership made the same proposal--a wall of high-rise buildings along the coast--even though these areas are flat in topography.

There is no other structure which is ten to twelve stories high within the heart of the town.

Evidence 4.7: There is no diversity in hotel types intermingled together to promote social interaction between tourists and the residents, and between all socio-economic levels.

Evidence 4.8: The hotels planned are not intermingled with active local facilities (i.e., facilities

which generate a high level of communal participation). As a matter of fact, the hotels are divorced from these facilities.

Evidence 4.9: Because of the fact that most of these hotels are not within a comfortable walking distance of local amenities and Charles Square, the hub of Montego Bay, the tourist will probably take a taxi-cab--an isolation-producing transportational mode--when (s)he wants to go into town.

Evidence 4.10: Exclusiveness is further encouraged by the total absence of community spaces within the hotel environment (i.e., within those areas between hotels and other tourist facilities) where residents may, for example, sit, chat and play dominoes.

Evidence 4.11: No substantive strategy has been employed to mitigate vehicular congestion to a level where social interaction may be maximized.

Vehicular congestion is a problem at present and it will be a greater problem with the construction of hotels with more than 3,850 tourist beds.

Evidence 4.12: An SCP report proudly declares that

"each hotel will have individual landing facilities for small craft".²⁴ This strategy, without doubt, will serve to intensify the degree of exclusiveness as tourists will not have to come into contact with local residents on his way to the hotel after departing from the airport. These aircrafts will certainly not be serving the local residents.

Evidence 4.13: No effort has been made to promote local facilities which are already present through increased tourist participation or increased tourist incidence within local area.

Although there is some amount of integration between the proposed St. James Centre--the commercial portion of the proposal--there is no significant integration, if any, between the hotel zone and the existing facilities of Charles Square, St. James Street, and other prominent commercial areas.

The Jamaica Railway Corporation terminus represents one example of a local facility which has great potential for development which is beneficial to both tourists and residents alike, yet this facility is left untouched by the SCP proposal.

Evidence 4.14: There is no significant integration of the tourist zone en masse with the existing community. The interphase between the tourist zone and the community is starkly defined.

A plan which so powerfully draws a thick line of demarcation between the tourist zone and the rest of a community, to some extent, implies a certain degree of isolation between the tourists and the local residents which could be sociologically detrimental to both groups in such ways as those mentioned previously in Chapter 3.

CHAP. 5: PHYSICAL PLANNING OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES FOR
MINIMIZING EXCLUSIVENESS IN NEW RESORT AREAS

INTRODUCTION

The strategies which will be unveiled in this chapter must not be interpreted as a sweeping panacea for eliminating exclusiveness within resort areas. These strategies are limited since they aim at only ways to minimize exclusiveness through physical planning. Other aspects of exclusiveness may be reduced through economic policies. However, only through a combination of both physical planning and economic planning can there be any hope for anything close to a total reduction of exclusiveness.

The strategies described in this chapter are offered as guidelines for the planning and design of Jamaica's resort areas, particularly the target area described in Chapter 4 so that the designed environment becomes a more satisfying resort area to both residents and tourists alike.

While some of the strategies may seem almost unattainable with present-day technology, there is no reason why they should not be listed. Through constant reflection on the part of architects and planners, it is conceivable that these strategies may bear fruits in the future. On the other hand, just getting those architects and planners

and the other professionals who are involved in resort development to think along the lines implied by the strategies with relentless determination to develop methods for realizing the relevant objectives is in itself constructive in the pursuit of minimizing exclusiveness.

It must be realized that these strategies do not serve to rebuild those structures which already exist and are in defiance of the strategies but to serve those structures which have yet to be built. These strategies are developed primarily for those resort areas where there is enough virgin land available through urban renewal or land reclamation for an impression to be made in terms of minimizing exclusiveness.

DEFINITIONS

In order to aid in understanding the strategies presented in this chapter, it is necessary that some of the terms be clearly defined. The terms which may be ambiguous are:-

- (a) hotel
- (b) tourist facility
- (c) community facility

Hotel group: A "hotel group" is a group of such facilities as hotels and tourist facilities. The group may be comprised of only hotels providing for the two basic needs of sleeping and eating and spatially arranged so as to effect intense interaction between the different components.

Cultural group: A "cultural group" is comprised of facilities which serve as vehicles for cultural expression. Examples of these facilities are:- theatres, dance workshops, various art workshops, and museums. These facilities are spatially arranged to effect intense interaction between themselves.

Community group: This kind of group is formed by community facilities. Some of the components of a cultural group may also be included in a community group. Tourist facilities are not debarred from this group so long as the group in toto is patronized overwhelmingly by the residents rather than the tourists.

Resort group: A "resort group" describes the combination of a hotel group(s), cultural group(s), and community group(s) which in toto is self-supporting as the groups complement each other.

THE OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES: THE HOTEL

Objective I: A hotel should be designed to be comfortable yet it should induce its guests to participate in activities outside of its grounds.

Reason I: Any hotel which satisfies its guests' needs totally on site may lead to a promotion of exclusiveness rather than a minimization of it. Some tourists may prefer under the circumstances to remain within the hotel instead of going outside its boundaries and be introduced to a different culture.

Strategy I-1: No hotel must be designed with facilities which satisfy all the basic needs¹ of the tourists.

Strategy I-2: The hotel which is isolated² and constructed away from the town's principal commercial districts (i.e. outside of a one hundred-yard radius of these commercial districts) should be equipped with a dining facility.³ However, if it is located within one hundred yards of any of the town's primary commercial districts, it should not have a dining facility (assuming there are adequate dining facilities in the town).⁴

Strategy I-3: The hotel which is located within any

of the town's foremost commercial districts should not provide in-bond shopping.

Objective II: No hotel should cause anyone to be excluded from enjoying scenic spots of psychological and historical significance and cherished natural environmental elements.

Reason II: The natural and irreplaceable elements of a country should not be isolated from its citizens. Neither should these elements be isolated from tourists as God created natural elements for all to enjoy. Sites made significant by historical events are almost in the same category.

If the scenic and historical spots are not made public then some segment of the populace will definitely be excluded from spiritually experiencing these spots.

Strategy II-1: All beaches must be public in terms of ownership and usage.

Strategy II-2: The boundary of any private hotel land must be located at least one hundred and fifty feet from the high tide level of any beach.

Strategy II-3: No hotel should be located where it would block such views which have been cherished by a significant proportion of the populace.

Strategy II-4: In cases where a hotel can enhance the view it may be so located (but without opposing Strategy II-2) providing the management makes the view accessible to the general public by allowing free sight-seeing.

Strategy II-5: No hotel should be located on historical sites unless it is going to make sight-seeing free to all.

Strategy II-6: Any hotel built on a historical site must be designed to be sympathetic to the site and historical elements which may be on the site. Such a facility must not be designed as if the historical elements were absent.

Strategy II-7: Important historical elements (such as churches, forts, etc., which have been recommended by the Historical Society and the National Trust as significant historical elements) should not be demolished or removed in order to accommodate a hotel.

Objective III: A hotel in a congested area⁵ must not increase on-street congestion (to levels which are harmful to human interaction) or must provide relief to motorists.

Reason III: Vehicular traffic if not controlled may produce severe congestion which reduces social interaction between people. People become more aware of the motor vehicles rather than the people around them and seek to avoid them.

Strategy III-1: Convention hotels should provide parking spaces in the ratio of 3:4 (i.e., three spaces for every four hotel rooms) within its property. A motel should have 1:1 ratio, and other types should have at least a 1:2 ratio.

THE OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES: THE HOTEL GROUP

Objective IV: Social interaction between tourists and the local citizenry, and between people of all socio-economic levels should be promoted.

Reason IV: Without social interaction between tourists and the local citizenry, and people of all socio-economic levels, the attempts to minimize exclusiveness will be futile. Such social interaction is necessary if

the barriers of exclusiveness are to be significantly lowered.

Strategy IV-1: Hotels of different types should be grouped together so as to be complementary to each other in terms of services--satisfying all the basic demands of the tourists. (See Planning Diagram.)

Strategy IV-2: Include among hotels such facilities as locally-operated restaurants and small retail shops. (See Planning Diagram.)

Strategy IV-3: Two hotels which together supply all the basic needs of the tourists should not be placed adjacent to each other as paths of communication may become short-circuited. (Refer to Planning Diagram.)

Strategy IV-4: There must be ample space (as part of the hotel group) for communal and public use which should be central and the hub which integrates the components of the group. (See Planning Diagram.)

Strategy IV-5: The communal spaces must be for all to use and should not be left-over spaces but designed to be active with the possibility for people to use them at nights.

FIG. 5.1 S.IV-1




FIG. 5.2 S.IV-2

- HOTEL
- SHOPS, RESTAURANTS, BARS, etc.







FIG. 5.3 S.IV-3

○ HOTEL (of different types viz.
motels, convention hotels, etc.)





N.B. The two hotels on the lower left offer the most services and are most complementary thus there is very intense interaction between them rather than with the others.

FIG. 5.4 S.IV-4



There must be care taken in making this an active hub of human interaction as if too much space is assigned to this area then it may decline into dullness.

FIG. 5.5 S.IV-6



Strategy IV-6: Vehicular traffic must be limited within the hotel group. (Refer to Planning Diagram.)

Strategy IV-7: The principal mode of vehicular transportation within the hotel group area must be mini-buses. Private cars and taxi-cabs rate low as vehicles which promote social interaction in the Jamaican society.

Objective V: The hotel group must be a cohesive and viable entity.

Reason V: There is definitely no sense in promoting strategies for planning and designing resort areas if those strategies will serve to erode the viability of the project. If in one's avid pursuit of minimizing exclusiveness viability is not achieved, then one's efforts will be all for nought as exclusiveness cannot be attained in a dead project.

The planner should not sacrifice the opportunity of attracting tourists and making them comfortable in his or her stubborn pursuit of minimizing exclusiveness when both goals can be accomplished simultaneously.

Since it is advocated in this thesis that hotels should be incomplete, then completeness which is necessary

to viability must be attained in some other way. Therefore, the incompleteness of the individual hotel must be transformed into completeness by the grouping of hotels to form the hotel group.

Strategy V-1: Other tourist facilities which may be necessary in making the hotel group complete may be included within the group. Bars, restaurants, and night clubs are some examples of these facilities.

Strategy V-2: A hotel group must be in juxtaposition with local facilities and there must be strong links of dependency. (See Planning Diagram.)

Strategy V-3: Covered walkways between the components of the hotel group (assuming there are other facilities besides tourists¹) must be incorporated so as to ensure against operational breakdown through climatic adversities. (See Planning Diagram.)

Strategy V-4: There must be inter-linking covered walk-ways between the hotel group and the adjacent local facilities. (See Planning Diagram.)

Strategy V-5: Environmental quality must be ameliorated through good landscaping which must emphasize the

FIG. 5.6 S.V-2



HOTEL



LOCAL FACILITY (eg. fruit shop)




FIG. 5.7 S.V-3






FIG. 5.8 S.V-4



tropical environment. Lily ponds for ducks and tropical "feeding trees" for birds should be part of the environment. Hotel grounds must be in themselves a mini-park.

THE OBJECTIVE AND STRATEGIES: THE CULTURAL GROUP

Objective VI: Informally teach what the Jamaican culture is all about.

Reason VI: It is felt that understanding a culture, whether through exposure to it or whatever, will lead to a greater understanding of and respect for those people of that culture. This subsequently will open the lines of communication between tourists and the citizens.

Communication between the citizens and the tourists is a necessary step in breaking down the barriers of exclusiveness.

Strategy VI-1: Facilities which are local vehicles for cultural expression (such as art studios, theatres, museums, etc.) may be included as components of the hotel group.

Strategy VI-2: Cultural facilities may be linked together to form a cultural group and located within

one hundred yards of hotels.

Strategy VI-3: Each cultural group must have a central open-air court--the hub of the group which should be designed as a flexible space for theatrical performance or any other form of cultural exposition. (Refer to Planning Diagram.)

Strategy VI-4: The cultural group(s) must be easily accessible to all. (See Planning Diagram.)

THE OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES: THE RESORT GROUP

Objective VII: There must be a strong relationship between the hotel group(s) and the cultural group(s).

Reason VII: A strong relationship between the hotel group(s) and the cultural group(s) is necessary if the resort group is to be (as is intended) the foremost expression of minimal exclusiveness.

Strong links are the arteries which vitalize and nourish the resort group--the epitome of minimal exclusiveness.

Strategy VII-1: Those strong links must be public-oriented with strong community (residents of all socio-

FIG. 5.9 S.VI-1



WORKSHOP



RESTAURANTS, SHOPS




FIG. 5.10 S.VI-3






FIG. 5.11 S.VI-4



economic levels) participation.

The links may be constituted by small retail shops and boutiques owned and operated by the local resident and providing the consumer goods for the needs and tastes of the citizen. (See Planning Diagram.)

Strategy VII-2: The shops and boutiques must be spatially dispersed so that no shop or boutique selling primarily the same goods are placed adjacent to each other.

Strategy VII-3: Seats should be provided away from traffic where pedestrians may sit and communicate, and enjoy an overview of the scene.

Strategy VII-4: The links should provide protection from the elements. Hence, in the case of shops and boutiques, overhangs would be appropriate.

Strategy VII-5: Cultural and/or community groups may be used as links.(See Planning Diagram.).

Objective VIII: Resort group(s) must be designed to make use of existing facilities within the town.

Reason VIII: Costs could be lowered since adherence

FIG. 5.12 S.VII-1

- HOTELS, WORKSHOPS
- SHOPS, BOUTIQUES





FIG. 5.13 S.VII-S

○ HOTEL, WORKSHOP

○ SHOP

└ TOWNHOUSE



to this objective would minimize the chances of unnecessary duplication of facilities and services. Finally this objective would result in making the new design more integral with, or complementary to the existing urban fabric thus minimizing the risks of creating alienation and exclusiveness.

Strategy VIII-1: New facilities must be located in accordance with the prevailing land-use patterns so as not to create detrimental externalities. Hence noisy facilities should not be placed adjacent to areas which cherish quietude such as hospitals.

Strategy VIII-2: New facilities must not be located so as to disrupt vital community patterns ensuing from various facilities.

In the SCP Plan for Montego Bay two churches (St. John's Methodist Church and Holy Trinity Church) and the city's market place will be demolished.

Strategy VIII-3: Re-zoning may be done in areas where it will enhance the prevailing situation from the viewpoint of the residents.

SOME APPLICATIONS

Some of the ways in which the developed strategies may be applied to the existing characteristics of Montego Bay are as follows:-

1. Re-route traffic from Charles Square
2. Close some of the streets in the central business district to vehicular traffic.
3. Re-examine and improve the public transportation systems.
4. Assign areas for parking.
5. Integrate some of the more significant areas existing (such as Charles Square and the railroad terminal) with the target area.

Re-routing Traffic

With all the new development which is to take place soon in Montego Bay via the target area (described in Chapter 4), it is most conceivable that vehicular traffic is going to be much more congested within Charles Square. Presently, studies are being made for alleviating this situation because it is proving stifling to commercial activity particularly in the Square. While some degree of congestion is desirable for enhancing human interaction, too high a degree serves to reduce this interaction as people

begin to avoid such an area. This is what may happen to Charles Square. Consequently, it becomes imperative for vehicular traffic to be diverted from Charles Square.

Closing of Streets

Accompanying any plan for diverting vehicular traffic from Charles Square should be the closing of the Square itself to vehicular traffic.

Public Transportation System

Eliminating some of the streets require some examination on the part of the planner of ways for at least maintaining good public transportation systems.

One way of attacking this problem is to redesign bus routes and the direction of vehicular flow on streets. For example, (a) new bus routes may become necessary in some areas because of the inconvenience that may be caused from closing some streets; (b) some streets may need to be converted into one-way streets because of the subsequent overstocking resulting from the closing of some streets.

Enough information is not presently available to the writer for any recommendations to be made in terms

of an architectural plan.

Parking Areas

Amenities have to be provided for people to park their cars. Motor vehicles have been parked, for example, within Charles Square. Since it is recommended that this area be closed to all vehicles, then patrons need some place to park their vehicles. Thus, one recommendation is that parking garages (not surpassing three stories) be constructed as close as possible to areas of relatively high commercial activity.

Integration of Some Existing Areas

With respect to Charles Square, its commercial character could be continued in a very integral way into the designed target area. This attempt would serve not to isolate such an important area of this resort city (Montego Bay).

Besides integrating Charles Square with the designed target area, since vehicular traffic is barred from it there will be an empty central open space which could be enhanced to be an area full with vitality. This central space could become an open-air market place where craftsmen, artists, fruit vendors, etc., may sell their

merchandises under colourful umbrella-like structures which serve mainly to protect the vendors from sun and rain but simultaneously add a sparkle of colour to what may otherwise be a drab area. Some of the existing shops surrounding the square may provide open-air eating also by extending (under permission granted by the authority concerned) into the central area.

South of Charles Square is the terminus of the Jamaica Railway Corporation. This is the terminal point for trains running between Kingston and Montego Bay. This is an amenity which could be integrated into the tourist atmosphere of Montego Bay.

Example: According to many reports and studies, it seems apparent that many tourists would like to see quite cheaply and reliably what areas outside of the resorts are like. Encouraging tourists to ride these trains would serve to minimize exclusiveness and the educational value described in Chapter 3 could be realized.

One big reason why tourists are reluctant to try this mode of transportation is due, in addition to this mode not being advertised, to the squalid conditions which depict the area around the terminus.

One method of integrating such a vital element is by rejuvenating the area surrounding the terminus by constructing new passenger waiting rooms, shops, restaurants, offices, etc., (and probably a new market place typical of those in Jamaica's past where fresh agricultural products were sold) and linking them directly via the existing commercial strip along St. James Street to Charles Square. So, in a sense, Charles Square and this new terminus would be the nuclei of a commercial strip between these two points.

IMPLEMENTATION

In order to make these strategies useful, it is necessary that provisions be made for their implementation. There needs to be a body or agency sanctioned by the Government and given full powers as the only authority for deciding what may or may not be implemented within or as a resort development.

Figure 5-14 charts the different processes involved in the approval-implementation process. The developer will be required to employ an architect to prepare preliminary design drawings for submission to the committee. This committee will be comprised of five professional

experts from the staff of the existing Town Planning Department and the Urban Development Corporation--three architect-planners, one regional economist, and one structural engineer. Assisting this committee is an ancillary staff of secretaries who will communicate the committee's recommendations with respect to the submission(s) to the architect. Acting upon these recommendations the architect will incorporate the necessary items into his final presentation drawings and submit them to the Approval Committee. If the Approval Committee is not satisfied with the development as described by the presentation drawings, it will inform the architect of what corrections are necessary for approval. On rectifying these drawings the architect will re-submit them to the Approval Committee. If the drawings are approved then the architect will be instructed to proceed with his working drawings. These working drawings will go the same route as the presentation drawings in order to obtain final approval. If the working drawings are not passed by the Approval Committee, then they will be returned to the architect with a list of directions and recommendations from the Committee. The architect must make the necessary changes before re-submitting his working drawings. When the Approval Committee grants the final approval


it will inform the architect (who, in turn, will inform his client) and the Urban Development Corporation for that body to see to it that the project is constructed according to the working drawings which were finally approved.

After studying the approval-implementation process, it should be obvious that approval of individual projects may be deleterious to the physical development of a resort area in the long run. The reason behind this statement is due to the microscopic view that the Approval Committee would be employing. In other words, the committee would be examining individual proposals or parts without any concept of the whole. Thus in order to rectify such a situation, the Planning Committee will be an ad hoc committee charged by the Government with the responsibility of developing master plans based on the physical planning strategies described in this chapter for various resort areas throughout the island. The Approval Committee will require that every proposal submitted to them must comply with the master plan for its region.

The Planning Committee will be comprised of the Government Town Planner (of the Town Planning Department), the senior architect-planner of the Urban Development Corporation, and three other architect-planners from the private

sector. The chairman of this committee will be one of the three architect-planners from the private sector. An ancillary staff of civil engineer, draftsmen, and one or two secretaries will be part of the Planning Committee.

Because of the fact that both the Town Planning Department and the Urban Development Corporation presently exist and are Governmentally empowered to approve real estate developments--the Town Planning Department is responsible for proposals which fall in or within and around towns of cities and the Urban Development Corporation for those proposals which fall into areas owned by it--it becomes politically necessary that neither of these agencies be given the upper hand in the process described in Figure 5-14. It is also economically necessary that a new agency for planning, approving and implementing is not created as unnecessary duplication will exist. These explanations clarify the reason for drawing senior experts from both the Urban Development Corporation and the Town Planning Department. It is only in the area of implementation that one of these agencies occur. The Urban Development Corporation has been functioning from its inception as the regulatory body for major urban and regional developments within the island and especially in resort areas. Therefore, making the Urban Development Corporation solely



FIG, 5.14

PLANNING PROCESS

responsible for implementation should not result in any tipping of the political balance. Besides, the Urban Development Corporation, to most extent, may be described as politically neutral.

In discussing the implementation of the strategies spelt out in this chapter, one question which will be frequently asked is: What about the existing hotels; are they to be demolished if they are not in compliance with any of the strategies? The answer to this question is no, as this would be uneconomical as well as impractical. Existing hotels or any other tourist facility which may cause infringements of the new code of strategies may either be ignored, but better still, be somewhat ingratiated into a new pattern resulting from the employment of the strategies so as to minimize exclusiveness.

To be specific, though, the possibility of implementing the strategies developed in this thesis should not be difficult in the Montego Bay target area described in Chapter 4. The principal reason for this is that the target area is comprised of sixty-four acres of almost entirely virgin land. The social and economic burden of relocation will not exist for this area. The capital outlays

will not be at the usually high level as the entire area will be divided into much smaller lots than those proposed in the SCP Plan. Thus, many more Jamaicans may invest in the resort development. By making the subdivisions small, investment will not be limited only to expatriates and high-income Jamaicans but also to the below middle-income Jamaicans assuming that mortgages are made available by the Government through any of its financial institutions. It must be the policy of Government that Jamaican citizens be given first preferences in owning the lots.

As of now, the UDC has been charged by the Government to be the administrator of the target area during its development phase. The UDC will develop the target area and then finally dispense of its holdings. An alternative to this activity is not recommended by the writer. Consequently, there will not be any conflict with the UDC's present responsibility in this initial phase.

If there is greater Jamaican participation in terms of ownership then the nation would be heading in the right direction in minimizing exclusiveness. The enormous cash outlays required in owning a tourist facility (especially hotels) have been the principal obstacle to high rates of

Jamaican ownership. This can be eliminated if the tourist facilities are built on a "condominium" principle. Thus every facility will have its own title and may be bought or rented with an option to buy. The success in terms of Jamaican ownership, of the Turtle Beach Towers in Ocho Rios which was built on the "condominium" principle is an example which could be duplicated in Montego Bay.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. Jamaica Tourist Board and the Jamaica Information Service, "Our Tourist Industry" in Facts on Jamaica, p.3.
2. Ibid., p. 3.
3. Ibid., p. 4.
4. In Jamaica the Jamaica dollar is worth more than its American counterpart. US\$1.00 = J\$0.88
5. Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies (1972), p. 172.
6. Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics: Jamaica 1972, p. 4.
7. Owen Jefferson, op. cit., p. 4.
8. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 4.
9. Jefferson, op. cit., p. 173.
10. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 4.
11. Jefferson, op. cit., p. 173
12. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 18.
13. This year, 1972, represents the last year for which statistics are available.
14. A "long-stay" tourist is defined as one who remains in the island for three nights or more.
15. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 18.
16. Jamaica Tourist Board and the Jamaica Information Service, op. cit., p. 18.

17. Jefferson, op. cit., p. 190.
18. Refer to Table 1.6 for the sources of these figures.
19. Norman Girvan, et al., "Unemployment in Jamaica", Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean, New World (1971), p. 267.
20. The figures describing the employment picture do not tell the whole story. For instance, there is neither any indication of the extent of underemployment nor any suggestion of the number of people in the labour force who have never worked. Using the 1960 Census figures, Girvan noted that during a time of a six-day-work-week almost one out of every four men worked for four days or less. For the women the underemployment rate was just over twenty per cent.
21. National Planning Agency, Economic Survey: Jamaica 1972. Government of Jamaica, p. 63
22. The sugar industry is Jamaica's single highest employer.
23. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 4.
24. Owen Jefferson, op. cit., p. 174
25. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 4.
26. These figures are calculated from officially published figures.
27. Jefferson, op. cit., p. 174.
28. This organization was formed in 1974 after the majority of the producers realized how foreign companies were exploiting their bauxite and seeing how effective the Arabs were in their formation of a petroleum cartel (OPEC).
29. Donald E. Lundberg, The Tourist Business, Institutions/Volume Feeding Management Magazine (1972).
30. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 12

31. Town Planning Department, A National Physical Plan For Jamaica Government of Jamaica (1971), p. 36.
32. Ibid., p. 36.
33. Ibid., p. 38.
34. Ibid., p. 38.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Donald E. Lundberg, The Tourist Business, Institutions/Volume Feeding Management Magazine (1972).
2. Some of these reports have appeared in various newspapers such as the New York Times, (USA) The Daily Gleaner (Jamaica), and also in Lundberg's book, The Tourist Business, op. cit.,
3. In Jamaica, no less than eighty per cent of the tourists during the last six years have come from the United States.
4. The National Income per capita, the Personal Income per capita, and the personal Consumption expenditure per capita, were reported to be J\$514.5, J\$486.5, and J\$462.4 respectively.
5. Jamaica Tourist Board, Inns of Jamaica.
6. The Jamaica Daily News, August 18, 1974.
7. National Planning Agency, Economic Survey: Jamaica 1972, Government of Jamaica, p. 61.
8. Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson (editors), Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean, New World Group Ltd. (1971), p. 268.
9. These figures are calculated from the information published by the Government in the Economic Survey: Jamaica 1972, p. 134

10. These figures were also calculated from a Government source, Economic Survey:Jamaica 1972, p. 134.
11. Such a benefit was established by the Jamaican Government in order to promote the tourist industry. Under this legislation there is an In-Bond Merchants Association (established under the aegis of the Government) which ensures the protection of the patrons.
12. This survey was carried out by the Town Planning Department and financed by the United Nations.
13. K. Norris, Jamaica:The Search for an Identity, Institute of Race Relations, Oxford (1962).
14. Town Planning Department, The National Atlas of Jamaica, Government of Jamaica (1971), p. 77.
15. Ibid., p. 77.
16. This is calculated from figures published by various Governmental agencies.
17. Town Planning Department, The National Atlas of Jamaica, Government of Jamaica (1971), p. 77.
18. Brian Hudson, "Development on the Jamaican Coast", in The Daily Gleaner, Tuesday, January 22, 1974.

CHAPTER THREE

1. H. Peter Gray, International Travel, International Trade, Heath Lexington Books (1970), p. 157
2. Donald E. Lundberg, The Tourist Business, Institutions/Volume Feeding Management Magazine(1972), p. 127.
3. Gray, op. cit., 158.
4. Ibid., p. 158
5. Ibid., p. 158
6. Lundberg, op. cit.

7. Jamaica gained its Independence on August 6, 1962.
8. Frederick W. Ilfeld, Jnr., "Environmental Theories of Violence". In David N. Daniels, et al. (Eds.), Violence and the Struggle for Existence, Little, Brown and Company (Inc.), 1970. p. 68
9. Ibid., p. 86.
10. Ibid., p. 86.
11. Description of some of these incidents have appeared in such newspapers as the New York Times, and the Daily Gleaner, Lundberg, (The Tourist Business), and Bryden (Tourism and Development) have also made some reference to these incidents.
12. This figure is calculated from the reports made by the Tourist Board.
13. Calculated from data published by the Jamaica Tourist Board.
14. Calculated from data published by the Jamaica Tourist Board.
15. John M. Bryden, Tourism and Development: A Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Cambridge University Press (1973), p. 100.
16. Ibid., p. 100.
17. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 192.
18. See Chapter 1 of this thesis.
19. These months are characterized principally by a high influx of young tourists of modest means such as teachers, secretaries, and other clerical workers.
20. Bryden, op. cit., p. 132.
21. "Leakages" may be defined as that sum of money which evaporates from or leaves the economy as profits, savings, and various purchases of imports.

22. Owen Jefferson, the Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies (1972), p. 179.
23. Ibid., p. 178.
24. Ibid., p. 178.
25. Ibid., p. 178.
26. The Jamaican Parliament has recently passed a bill making the unofficial channelling of money out of the country illegal. Thus, there should be a recustion of the leakages via this route.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. The census figures for 1960 and 1970 are 23,600 and 42,800 people respectively.
2. The only two towns which had higher growth rates were Spanish Town (the former capital of the country) with 11.0 per cent and May Pen with 6.4 per sent.
3. Town Planning Department, Government of Jamaica, The National Atlas of Jamaica, p. 10.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Ibid., p. 12.
6. Ibid., p. 13.
7. Ibid., p. 13.
8. "Long stay" tourists are defined as those visitors who remain in Jamaica for three nights or more.
9. Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics: Jamaica 1972 p. 12.
10. The tourist population increases at a rate of more than 1.7 times that of the resident population.

11. "Short stay" tourists are defined as those visitors who stay in the island for less than three nights. "Stop-overs", on the other hand, are the total of long-stay and short-stay tourists (i.e. visitors staying overnight or longer).
12. This figure is calculated from figures published by the Jamaica Tourist Board in their report op. cit., p. 12.
13. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 29.
14. Jamaica Tourist Board and the Jamaica Information Service, Facts on Jamaica: Our Tourist Industry, p. 13.
15. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 3.
16. Calculations are made from official statistics furnished by the Tourist Board.
17. Town Planning Department, Government of Jamaica, A National Physical Plan for Jamaica 1970-1990, p. 38.
18. This is the acronym for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
19. Town Planning Department, Government of Jamaica, A National Physical Plan for Jamaica 1970-1990, p.40.
20. Shankland Cox Partnership, Montego Bay, Jamaica: Development of the Waterfront-The Action Area.
21. This plan has already been described in the previous chapter (Chapter 4).
22. The word "exclusiveness" has been defined in Chapter 2.
23. By this the writer is describing those facilities which generate participation of the local people.
24. Shankland Cox Partnership, Montego Bay, Jamaica.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. The basic needs are considered to be sleeping and eating.
2. An isolated hotel is considered to be one which is highly independent because of its distance from hotel-related facilities.
3. A distinction is made between "dining" and "snacking". "Dining" implies a formal meal with the various courses, while "snacking" is self-explanatory.
4. See the preceding note (Note 3).
5. The degree of congestion necessary for an area to be classified as "congested" should be mutually decided upon by the Parish Council, the Urban Development Corporation, and the Town Planning Department.
6. In the case of Montego Bay, noisy facilities should be kept away from the new St. James Regional Hospital which is on the waterfront and near the boundary of the target area described in Chapter 4.

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