23 TRANSNATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

Read: Katherine Verdery, 1998. Transnationalism, nationalism, citizenship, and property: Eastern Europe since 1989

Eriksen, 2002. Identity politics, culture and rights 143-161; The non-ethnic: 162-178. In Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (2nd ed.). London: Pluto Press (34)

- I. Today we'll look at two very different case studies illustrating globalization processes
 - A. Analysis of transnationalism and ethnonational identity in Tonga
 - B. Analysis of Croatia and the Canadian Croatian diaspora
 - C. Wednesday's lecture will be more theoretical, considering authors for today along with Li, Eriksen and Lewis
- II. Transgenderism is widespread in Tonga and elsewhere in the S. Pacific¹
 - A. Traditional patterns of cross-dressing—not brand new
 - 1. Beauty contests with prizes are held
 - 2. In Tonga: a yearly Miss Galaxy pageant
 - a. Seems to be a display of transgendered glamour
 - b. But equally the contest is a show of *translocality*
 - Modernity and hybridity are performed; cosmopolitanism, migration, non-local values, symbols, languages, body practices, etc
 - c. Translocality is opposed to *Locality* (here meaning Tonganness)
 - B. The stereotype of local transgendered men, called Fakaleiti, is:
 - 1. Feminine comportment
 - 2. Greater affinity with women than men
 - 3. Being responsible for domestic work in the home

¹ Information from Niko Besnier, Transgenderism, locality and the Miss Galaxy Beauty Pageant in Tonga. *American Ethnologist* 29. 3: 534-566, 2002.

- 4. Employment in professions regularly associated with women
- 5. They associate with domestic rather than public spheres
- 6. Some experience with cross-dressing
- 7. Engaging in sexual relations with "straight" men
- C. The Miss Galaxy beauty pageant
 - 1. Is the antithesis of the Miss Heilala pageant
 - a. Which involves real women performing Tonganness
 - b. With speech, body postures
 - c. Tongans will return from New Zealand, Australia, California to participate in the Miss Heilala pageant
 - 1) But they are likely to be judged as poor dancers, not proficient in spoken Tongan
 - d. In the Miss Heilala contest, locality is supposed to triumph over cosmopolitanism, transnationalism, the industrial world
 - 2. Contrasts between the two pageants:
 - a. Miss Galaxy is carnivalesque (as opposed to the serious—at times tedious—Miss Heilala)
 - b. Miss Galaxy is for fun
 - c. Miss Galaxy characterized by a "camp" sensibility
 - 1) Is an event of outstanding exoticism
 - d. Nonlocal clothing, language, names, mannerisms, performances—nonlocal gender itself
 - e. Examples of nonlocality:
 - 1) Contestants appear in "national" costumes
 - 2) Miss Rarotonga, Miss Switzerland, Miss South America

- 3) Contestants are emulating beauty pageants everyone watches on TV
- 4) Their names: Lady Amyland, Suzie from Sosefo, Priscilla Pressland, Aisa De Lorenzo, Aodushi Kiroshoto
 - a) Chosen for exotic sounds
- 5) Background music: William Tell Overture, etc.
- 6) Language: supposed to speak English as much as possible
- 7) Fakaleiti are in general expected to speak English more readily than nontransgendered men
- 8) Fakaleiti are seen as self-assured and brash, shameless (even though many are self-effacing)
- f. Clearly, the stereotypes depict the Miss Galaxy contestants as oriented toward modernity, the West, transnationalism
- 3. The interplay of gender and modernity revealed in this contest
 - a. In general in Tonga, speaking English has feminine undertones
 - 1) Competes with a code of traditionalism
 - b. Because in general a language of modernity is associated with women's aspirations for upward mobility and emancipation from the strictures of tradition
 - c. The familiar notion that girls study harder, and women more talkative by nature
 - d. So, all men who speak "too much" English do so at the risk of compromising their masculinity
 - e. Tongans born overseas are awkward in performing Tongan maleness
 - 1) They are often branded as fakaleiti-like regardless of lack of effeminacy
 - f. In general, the use of English indexes (points to) a deficient Tonganness, masculinity

- 4. **DISCUSS**: differences between these stereotypes and the situation described by Marisol de la Cadena for Peruvian Indians?
- 5. An extra ingredient: the complicated identity of the Fakaleiti with respect to gender, class, and translocality
- D. What are the Fakaleiti hoping for?
 - 1. These men are socially marginalized in many ways—economically, socially
 - 2. The link-up to international glamour provides a (temporary) escape route from local dynamics of social exclusion and poverty
 - 3. Temporarily they can try to constitute selves that foreground their superiority over, and autonomy from the rest of society
 - a. Can't actually travel
 - 4. Performing/subscribing to nonlocality provides symbolic resources
 - 5. Enables them to claim that they are exempt from local morality and forms of exchange that marginalize and degrade them (like marriage)
 - 6. Many of them idealize the West
 - a. See it as a source of desirable marriage partners, financial security, etc.
 - b. A source of partners who will take care of them, rather than their having to financially take care of their Tongan boyfriends (who are "straight" Tongan men)
 - c. Obviously a fantasy, not the reality of what the West offers
 - 7. They reject hormones to increase feminine appearance
 - 8. As elsewhere in the Pacific, they reject gay identity
 - a. "God made man and woman," they say
 - 9. They scorn what they see as the foregrounding of sexuality in Western gay identity (e.g., gay pride parades)
- E. Conclusion:

- 1. Some authors say that globalization brings challenges to the received order
 - a. Modernity, etc.
- 2. But although we see the fakaleiti temporarily enacting a glamorous translocality
 - a. We also see them rejecting Western gay and lesbian identities
- 3. "The modern," "the West" are reconfigured, and local meanings are worked into the meanings that arrive from elsewhere
- 4. Globalizing homogenization and heterogenization—here they occur simultaneously

III. The Croatian case²

- A. Croatia: following the 1989 collapse of communism and Yugoslavia
 - 1. Verdery: political parties had no recognizable political platforms
 - 2. Democratic process was very unfamiliar, to say the least
 - 3. Rejection of communism, opening for discourses relating to pre-Soviet era
- B. National symbols proved so potent that no political group could entirely avoid them
 - 1. Nationalism was turned into political capital, and it increased—which surprised everyone
 - 2. Rewriting of constitutions began
 - 3. In socialist-era constitutions, all socialist citizens had been on equal footing
 - 4. This system of civil status collapsed—ambitious politicians manipulated the very definition of citizenship
- C. Verdery's discussion of Latvia, Estonia, Croatia, Slovenia
 - 1. Nationalities were turned into majorities and minorities
 - 2. New, differential citizenship rights

² Information from Daphne Winland, The politics of desire and disdain: Croatian identity between "home" and "homeland" *American Ethnologist* 29. 3: 693-718, 2002.

- 3. Particularly restrictive citizenship procedures were developed in the Baltic states
- 4. Disenfranchising large numbers of the resident Russians
- 5. In Estonia's 1992 elections, nearly 40% forbidden to vote, most of them Russians
 - a. Estonian citizens were defined by native Estonian language and descent
- 6. We can call this "Constitutional nationalism"
 - a. Privileges members of one ethnonation over others
- D. Croatian independence in 1992 fulfilled a one-thousand-year-old dream
 - 1. Recuperation, revivals, festivals, etc., Croatian icons, monuments, folk songs
- E. An estimated half of all Croatians live outside the homeland
 - 1. Diaspora Croatians desired a free Croatia, but independence has created conditions for the emergence and exacerbation of the often fraught relationships within and between groups
 - 2. Desire for the homeland is not necessarily coterminous with the desire to return to it
 - 3. Not much scholarship has been done on the roles of homeland peoples
 - a. They change as a result of interaction with diasporic peoples
 - 4. Remember point made earlier in semester that ethnicity is a relationship?
 - 5. Clearly everywhere diasporas construct notions of homelands in ways often very different from homelanders' constructions
 - a. Leading to ambivalence and tensions
- F. History: Croatian immigrants to Canada earlier in century for economic reasons
 - 1. Endured hardships early in Canada, were the target of stereotypes of racial inferiority (applied to all E. Europeans)

- 2. The early ones had leftist leanings
- 3. They labeled the Croatians who came to Canada after World War II as "war criminals"
- 4. "Ustase"—the Croatian fascist separatist organization during WW II committed atrocities
- 5. These later ones resented the earlier left-leaning ones
 - a. Saw them as naïve about communism
- G. Tensions within Croatia played out in Canada too
- H. Canadian state's policy of official multiculturalism
 - 1. Point we've encountered often—the state wields power, influences the nature of ethnicity
 - 2. Croatian heritage language programs, music and folklore groups flourished
 - 3. They had to play the politics of recognition on the basis of terms set by the Canadian state
 - 4. Foregrounding ethnocultural traditions as part of the Croatian contribution to the (cultural) fabric of Canadian society
- I. Over the years Toronto Croatians had seen themselves as a victim diaspora
 - 1. Saw their countrymen Croatians in communist Yugoslavia as their oppressed brethren
 - 2. Independence brought changes
 - a. To already unstable and ambivalent bases of loyalty, affiliation and identity
- J. Homeland Croatians had endured enormous upheavals sociopolitical, economic, personal nature
 - 1. Needed to come to terms with the transition from communism and see themselves as citizens
 - 2. Many said yes, we should valorize Croatian culture and heritage

- 3. But a large number of critics inside and outside disapproved of the direction of post independence political, economic and social processes
- K. Initial euphoria at Croatian independence
 - 1. But soon the national policies and practices of President Tudjman's regime were criticized
 - a. Many believed it to be autocratic and corrupt
- L. Tudjman's support came from diaspora Croatians
 - 1. Many were and continue to be strongly nationalist
 - a. Diaspora Croatians (more recent emigrants) represent sentiments and qualities valorized by nationalist elites at home
 - 2. An illustration of Verdery's citation of Anderson's "politics without accountability"
 - a. Refugees who contribute funds to violent nationalist organizations in their home countries while living peacefully in a suburb or Paris or Montreal³
- M. Diaspora Croatians' participation
 - 1. Vote in federal elections...Croatia is a multi-sited nation-state maintained through transnational means
 - a. Diaspora Croatians were politically and economically involved
 - 2. They were interested in promoting the reproduction of images depicting a romantic and idealized social, cultural, and political landscape
 - 3. But these diasporic Croatians' nationalist sentiments were resented by many homelanders
 - 4. Who do not share the ethnonational vision of Croatia
 - 5. Regional differences hardened, and came to be defined in cultural terms
 - a. People held very firmly fixed notions of regional identity—impervious to change
 - b. "The snob from Zagreb," etc.

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³ Verdery, p. 293

- c. Some nationalists said that some Croatians could never be "good" Croatians
 - 1) If they're unpatriotic, if they don't valorize the Croatian past, then they're "bad"
 - 2) Are said to be "Yugonostalgic"
 - 3) Called "Yugo-zombies"
- d. Those targeted tended to be intellectuals and journalists
- 6. Some of the most ethnically based negative comments author Daphne Winland heard
 - a. Were not about Serbs or Bosnian Muslims
 - b. But about Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina and diaspora Croatians
 - c. These are the two groups most valorized by Croatian nationalist elites
- N. Croatians at home resented diasporic Croatians, characterizing them as:
 - 1. "Nationalists from the last century"
 - 2. Said they act preachy and superior
 - 3. Homelanders also resented politicians' high regard for diasporic Croatians
 - 4. Said that government authorities give preferential treatment to those who return from the diaspora
 - 5. Homelanders inferred (and resented) diasporic Croatians' ideas that
 - a. Homelanders are somehow suspect for remaining in Croatia
 - b Homeland Croatians are stupid
 - c. Homelanders are lacking in Croatian political or national consciousness
 - 1) Because they tacitly accepted Marshall Tito (who had ruled communist Yugoslavia)

- O. Many of the Croatians who fled to Canada after WW II
 - 1. Did so because they feared retribution by Tito's Communist party for suspected involvement with Ustase insurgents
 - a. Which had installed a puppet during Nazi occupation
 - b. Utase had killed lots of Serbs, Slovenes
 - 2. Comments by Tudiman before he died:
 - 3. In essence he relativized the genocidal aspects of the Ustase past as a "normal" process of war
 - 4. The post-1990 process of ethnonational homogenization produced fears among Croatians in Canada that Croatians would be seen as an inherently fascist people
- P. The intensification of transnational links has resulted in a movement to reclaim and redefine Croatian origins and affiliations
 - 1. The nationalist dream
 - 2. This did not necessarily signal a desire by all to replace the communist regime with one modeled on the Canadian liberal-democratic plural state
 - 3. The virulently anticommunist nationalists were suspicious of democracy
- Q. So, independence has served to exacerbate existing tensions and contradictions
 - 1. A concretization and essentializing of a distinctively Croatian culture
 - 2. Many diaspora Croatians feel that homelanders should look to them for inspiration and guidance in transition to democracy
 - 3. For they see themselves as exemplars of a democracy
 - 4. Say that homelanders "don't know the meaning of democracy, were under the communists for so long, they have a lot to learn"

R. Conclusions:

1. Verdery's point: diaspora and homeland relations and identities are mutually constituted

- 2. The classic modernist logic that diaspora patterns of identification function to undermine the cultural and territorial goals and political vision of the nation-state
 - a. Is wrong
- 3. One must study the impact of diaspora-homeland relations on identity formation
 - a. Examine the local in relation to transnational connections
- 4. Keeping in mind that the homeland dimension is more than just the object of diaspora imaginings
 - a. Rather, it's a crucial site of diaspora identity politics
- 5. Diaspora and homeland relations must be analyzed in their historical specificity

21A.226 Ethnic and National Identity Fall 2009

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