ATHENS 1833-1979:
THE DYNAMICS OF URBAN GROWTH

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
the degree of
Master of Architecture in Advanced Studies
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
September 1980

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ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with the urban development of the city of Athens since its foundation as the capital of the newborn Greek State (1833), until our days. The study focuses on two particular characteristics that dominate the form of the city: laissez-faire development and adhocist shaping, as they rise out of coinciding intentions and aspirations among the people involved in city making and individuals.

Under the above assumption, we traced specific interactions or counteractions among social classes and groups, planning services, land speculation, building sector, and professionals—as they have affected the legislative framework, master plans' proposals or planning guidelines, and the specific physical structure, of the city (main street layouts and lines, areas of the city, patterns of land subdivision, housing typologies), during the different historical stages of urban growth.

We further try to analyze the present status of the above social and spatial relationships as a product of the historical process, and we use the outcome of this analysis to criticize the ongoing discussion "Athens 2000", thereby connecting the thesis to the present-day problems of urban development.

We approach the historical development of Athens by focusing on specific cases, that are characteristic of four major time spans, which marked the course of city shaping. These four periods refer to: the foundation of Athens as capital of the newborn Greek state and its first Master Plan, (1833); the prevalence of land speculation and unplanned growth (1880); the refugees' settlement and the resulting urban agglomeration (1920s); and the formation of the contemporary metropolitan area.

In the light of the above historical examination we analyze the present situation, which, we believe, is
representing a new potential threshold to the development of the city. After a long time of inaction, planning comes to challenge the laissez-faire status quo of city making. Our conclusions are concerned with the dynamics of the new developing trends, calling for a control over the city environment, versus the moment of resistance or inertias of the inherited practices.

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Overview

The urban space of Athens is not a historical space. By this, I do not mean that is was not created by history... I mean that this space, these volumes continually and everywhere are being transformed, destroyed and rebuilt. What is of greater significance than the dates, are the generating powers, the alternations of mechanisms from the political to the economic, from the economic to the demographical, that assured the growth of Athens. In the same way, they shaped the specific form of the city... Inside this heaving of architecture and space, no order is brought out; only the violent game of the economic and social forces...order is defined by its lack of definition. In fact it is urban anarchy.

(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 401 & 403)

History has nevertheless always been a presence in Athens, hanging over the space of the city. Monuments from the ancient past, isolated from other structures, today stare out from Acropolis rock toward the development of the modern metropolis. This rock, unlike other ancient sites, had never been deserted by human settlement. This natural and ancient landscape has been the only string connecting the various stages of Athens.

The course of the settlement up to the present is not characterized by a smooth, continuous evolution, rather it represents a curve with violent risings and declines, corresponding to periods of vitality, destruction or lethargy. Each of these periods brought together its own philosophy, each radically different from the preceding philosophy, and each changing the Athenian environment.
Six such major phases marked the history of the city:

Prehistoric times, when the first people settled on Acropolis as well as in other places around Attica (3,000 B.C.). During this period Theseus, a legendary hero, united these small scattered municipalities of Attica into a state, with Athens as its capital (Early 13th Century B.C.). From then onwards the city is divided into two different parts --- The Acropolis, dedicated to the gods, and the lower city, consisting of the administrative and civic center (Agora), and the residential area. During this period Athens developed smoothly, spreading from the sacred rock, down towards its southern slope.

Classical Historic Era: The period of "Ancient Glory." Athens became an organized "polis." The union of municipalities was finally completed (6th Century B.C.) and an elaborate democratic system of administration was created. Following the successful outcome of the Persian wars and the victory of Salamis in 480 B.C. the power of Athens was established and its glory overshadowed the other cities or Greece. The Acropolis aquired new, elaborate temples, the city spread and new walls were built, widening the city. The Agora is remodelled: an open space is formed, surrounded by public buildings. Piraeus's ports also began developing, being fortified so as to secure the growing naval power of the city, while the "Long Walls" were constructed to guarantee safe communication between Athens and the harbors. An Athenian Confederation was created, with member cities all over Greece, in which Athens played the leading role. Commerce, arts, sciences, and philosophy developed. Opening of relations with, and dominance of the city over, the outside world, brought into it a significant wealth distributed fairly among its citizens and the municipal body. This wealth, together with the slaves' labor,
motivated the admirable activities of Athens. More and more public buildings and temples were being built. In contrast to the glorious monumental environment, the every-day one, as described by Dicaearchos at the end of 4th century B.C., was "poor and modest," a valid description according to Demosthenes, even for the houses of the most honorable men. Streets were irregular and narrow (3 meters in width), and only a few roads, leading from the heart of the city to its gates, were 4 to 5 meters wide. In contrast, Pireaus was laid out according to a Hyppidamian system. Euphoria did not last for long. After defeat by Sparta, Athens began to decline, remaining only as the cultural center of Greece.

The Roman Period began with the destruction of Athens by Syllas (86 B.C.). The fortification of the city, the "long walls," and the fortification of Piraeus were demolished. The port declined rapidly, to the point where--according to Stravon--there were a few houses around the harbour and a temple. However, Athens kept a certain autonomy, surviving as the cultural center of the Roman Empire. Thus it became enriched by new public buildings and works of infrastructure, thanks to contributions by Roman and other emperors, or wealthy men. In addition, the city was growing in all directions with emphasis to the east (122-135 A.D.).

The Byzantine Period began when the city was burned by Eruli in 267 A.D., with the ensuing dominance of Christianity. The ancient center further declined, becoming a small, provincial city with a few churches, and without commercial or transportation significance. Its population diminished.
The Frankish Period (1204-1456) marked a time when all walls were abandoned and the city was reduced to a narrow territory surrounding the Acropolis.

The Ottoman Period (1456-1821) was a time when the city, taking advantage of the privileges provided by Turks began to expand again as a commercial center. Many churches and Turkish public buildings were built. The Bazaar, being located over the Roman Agora became the heart of the city. Houses were built upon the old road traces. A new wall surrounded the city, characterized by almost the same gates as the ancient one, since the system of rural roads had not changed. The city was inhabited in its major part by Greeks as well as by Turks and Albanians. The Greek Revolution (1821) against the Ottomans came to sweep away social structure. This movement followed the French Revolution slogans and belonged to the broader category of Mediterranean liberal movements of the period. The movement was initiated by Greek bourgeois, who lived mainly in the wealthy Greek communities of Europe, but was materialized by bold, local outlaw heroes who extended it beyond the narrow borders of the small city. Athens, following the examples of the other Greek cities of the Balkan peninsula, participated in the struggle. The city was destroyed, again by the Turks. Its inhabitants abandoned it, to return after recognition was given to the independent Greek state by the London Treaty of 1830.

The modern history of Athens begins in 1833, when it was decided that the medieval village of four or five thousand people should become the capital of the newly founded state. Urban development in Athens began with a neoclassical master plan and a number of western ideas that foreigner newcomers--Bavarians, international Greek bourgeois--tried to impose on the Medieval city. Ever since, Athens has
0.1 MEDIEVAL ATHENS
developed more rapidly than ever before. Its dynamic growth seized the minds of modern planners who considered Athens a New City:

We must however resign ourselves to the fact that our capital, i.e., Athens, the Piraeus and the surrounding area, is a new city, newer than corresponding cities on the American continent or even in Australia...A hundred years ago, the population of Athens barely numbered 50,000, while at the beginning of its modern history, when the country won its freedom, it was just a village with no more than 4,000 inhabitants. Even in the new continents there were cities of much greater size at that time.

(R. Doxiadis, 1961, p. 281)

Certainly modern Athens did not carry any long urban tradition, as did other European or Asian cities, nor was it the 'Brasilia' of the 19th century. Actually its first neoclassical master plan ended in a series of compromises until new forms of urban fabric sprang up and multiplied. Starting as a purely administrative city, it soon became enriched by educational, financial, commercial, and, finally, industrial activities, and developed complex mechanisms that extended beyond the national boundaries. Since 1833, its space has experienced a great range of models, schemes, building types, priorities: from the irregular streets and the traditional houses of the medieval nucleus, to the generous open spaces and the monumental buildings of its first ambitious architects and planners; from the gridiron modesty of middle-class neighborhoods to the exotic landscape and the prestigious mansions of its upper-class suburbs; from the organized building of its first refugees' settlements, to the ad hoc, overnight appearance of illegal areas. It was seized by import business firms, and by large metallurgy and chemical industrial plants run by Greek capital; by numerous state administrative services, and by
numerous private ones. It passed into the hands of every kind of political government, from absolute monarchy and dictatorships, to socialist and even communist (for a few days) parties. Always having been a space for receiving money from abroad, it was at the same time channeling its products to the whole country or out of it. Having many faces and including many variables, modern Athens has been given by geographers and planners many contradictory labels: colonial and neocolonial third world capital, or the modern western metropolis; consumption and parasitic center, or a modern industrial capital; an international node or a Balkan peripheral city:

Athens, linked politically to the world's strategic interest, connected by its businessmen to the great economic streams, and following through its port the rhythm of overseas departures, remains for the majority of its population a city of peasants, nationalistic and closed to itself. Nowhere in the Mediterranean basin is the international infiltration (of capital, products, tourism) more intensive; at the same time, no other city of this dimension is less cosmopolitan. One cannot conceive of this contradiction if one does not take into account the young age of the city, the rural origin of its inhabitants, and its success as an artificial capital...

...Indicative and contradictory, Athens set under all these terms, the problem of development.

(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 14)

Burgel puts Athens in the category of Great Mediterranean cities (Rome, Madrid) considering its rate of population growth (3 percent for Athens, 2.8 and 3.3 percent for Rome and Madrid).* But Burgel also takes into account the fact that Athens is third in rank among the cities that develop in all directions, after Buenos Aires and Santiago, while he attributes to it a prototypical position, comparing its rapidity of growth to the limited dimensions of the country. In addition, M. de Sola-Morales,

*G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 21, 23.
noting the similar functions ("city as business venture"), common social characteristics (such as extent of and significance of middle class), and similar development of tools for expansion (master plans), places the 19th Century Athens inside the bag of the other Mediterranean cities: Madrid, Bari, Algiers, Barcelona. However, Athens abandoned very early these tools (1880), and followed the pattern of what might be called no-plan growth." Furthermore, its current ad hoc urban typology is very close to that of some middle east centers such as Beirut and Jerusalem.

Athens is finally an exotic city, congested around the Acropolis. It is also a city in full growth, that develops incidentally, according to the circumstances, without great order, but with an astonishing inventiveness. (M. Deon, op. cit., p. 400)

Athens owes this inventiveness to the broad interaction with the outside world, and also to the parallel development of its own specific tools to cope with the urban space. Unplanned growth in an historic city that began its modern phase with a well-defined master plan can only mean that land and building speculation were so successfully bound to the facilitation of this urban growth, that they became the dominant element in the city structure. On the other hand, unplanned growth also points to the inadequacy of public authorities who are unable to undertake active initiatives. Perhaps this sounds strange when one considers the volume and extent of public administration and services in Greece, as well as state practices regarding control over other sectors (cultural, educational, political). But when one reviews this newer history of the city, one discovers that no urban crisis occurred in Athens except the one concerned with the implementation of the first master plan; this contrasts sharply with the successive political crises.
Such a characteristic can only be explained by a silent consensus among the social strata living in the city, a consensus that secured for each individual certain benefits or at least covered some essential needs. Land and building speculation became both the protagonist and the means for the distribution of these benefits. The ad hocist building on the other hand connotes that the social and economic basis for this unplanned development consisted of small private units. Our historical analysis is structured on the grounds of the above assumptions.

In the following chapters we will examine these two characteristics of modern Athens—unplanned growth, and ad-hocism, since its foundation as the capital—as rising out of coinciding intentions among the social groups living in the city, public organizations and private institutions acting on the city level, as well as from coinciding aspirations among individuals. Thus, we trace specific interactions or counteractions among social classes and groups, planning services, land speculation, building sector, and professionals—such as planners, architects, civil engineers—as they have affected the legislative framework, master plans' proposals or planning guidelines, and the specific physical structure of the city (main street layouts and lines, main areas of the city, patterns of land subdivision, housing typologies). Throughout the study, we consider urban space itself as an indispensable part of the mechanisms moving the city; it is both influenced and influential, a dynamic participant, and not simply a reflection of the city's social structure.

We further try to analyze the present status of the above social and spatial relationships as a product of the historical process, and we use the outcome of this analysis to criticize the on-going discussion "Athens 2000", thereby connecting the thesis to the present-day problems of urban development.
In the examination of the development of the city we attempt four "cuts" in history, focusing on short time-spans rather than on whole periods. The four cases are representative of the periods and correspond to the thresholds of the development of the city, during which significant transformations occurred. They refer to: the foundation of Athens as Capital of the new-born Greek state and its first Master Plan (1833); the prevalence of land speculation and unplanned growth (1880); the refugees' settlement and the resulting urban agglomeration (1920s); and the formation of the contemporary urban area.

Initially, we place each case inside its larger national social context, to the extent it interfaces the principal aspects of the Athenian development. Then we are concerned with the internal social and cultural interactions or contradictions focusing on specific examples of city making. Finally, we attempt to resynthesize city form, pointing out the successive prevailing trends, as well as their continuities with former or following periods.

The specific analysis of each period conforms to the following outlines:

The Foundation of Athens as the Capital of the New Greek State is considered as the point of convergence between the nationalistic aspirations of broader Hellenism, and the Romantic expectations of the Bavarian government to restore the ancient civilization. The important aspects here are: Kleanthes' and Schaumbert's ambitious Master Plan Proposal versus Athenians' reaction to its implementation, which resulted in successive compromises and elimination of large-scale intervention inside the existing settlement; and the development of a new neoclassical urban fabric, and the transformation of the traditional everyday environment so as to approach neoclassical standards. Part One
ends with an analysis of city form character, which is marked by two components: a new, growing administrative and educational mechanism (occupying the planned expansion of the city); and an alive, traditional, merchandise pre-capitalist community (inside the old settlement nucleus).

The Unplanned City Expansion and the Prevalence of Land Speculation at the end of the 19th century are considered as expressions of two main trends: the liberalization of the constitution after the expulsion of the Bavarian king and the decision of a part of the international Greek bourgeoisie to transfer its center of activity to Athens, establishing banks and investing together with foreign capitalists on transportation works and industries--in Pireaus and the new industrial city of Lavrion. This second part focuses on the following aspects: the weakening role of city planning as a means to control the urban development, and the fast-growing opposition of land proprietors to any intervention; the laying out of railways and tramways and their impact on the laissez-faire development of the city; the land ownership system and the increasing role of real estate property for middle-class housing and investing. City form during this period is marked by the development of Athens-Pireaus as a bi-polar system (administrative-financial and industrial center, respectively), and the encirclement of the neoclassical center by railway lines and a new residential periphery.

The Period Between the Wars represents a dramatic change in the history of the nation: it is marked by the influx of refugees from Asia Minor's Greek centers and by industrialization. In this, the third part, we concentrate on three main cases: the scattered establishment of refugees'
settlements around Athens, undertaken by public and international organizations, and their catalytic impact on the industrial development of Athens; the political situation and the ad-hoc composition of the Athenian agglomeration; the failure of any planning attempt to cope with the city expansion; and the appearance of the condominium apartment building in the central lots, and its impact on the housing commercialization and on the development of the private building sector. During this period, Athens and Piraeus represent one urban whole divided into numerous municipalities. This whole is characterized by two centers with intensified density (the municipality of Athens and the municipality of Piraeus) and a loose periphery comprised of the refugees' settlements and scattered speculative and industrial developments.

The Post-War Urban Area has been defined inside a conservative political context. Social services programming is eliminated, while the development of the country is managed exclusively by Greek and international capitalists, under the protectionist policy of the national government. Athens plays a dominant role in this development, concentrating the major portion of Greece's economic activities and population inside its territory, which is growing in every direction. Three cases are essential here: the departure of planning from any concrete reality and its degeneration into "talk" among architects and planners; the proliferation of illegal settlements, and their gradual "legalization"; and the condominium apartment building boom, and the decisive role of the private building sector in the economy of the city. At the end of this fourth part we attempt to define the present problems and conflicts by analyzing the structure and the trends in the post-war urban sprawl.
In light of the historical examination outlined above, we attempt a fifth "cut" in the situation, which, we believe, represents a potential threshold to the development of the city. On the one hand, previous modes of development seem to have come to a deadlock. Inflation and staleness threaten the euphoria created by the continuous growth of the city. National government enters onto the scene for the first time, to propose a program framework intending to control the Athenian urban area ("Athens 2000"). New alliances are created among the concerned groups. A long debate has started among people involved in the private building sector, municipalities and national government. In our fifth part we concentrate on two main aspects: decentralization policy; and the new planning framework for Athens, as proposed by the government. Through the conflicts and conventions arising from the ongoing debate about the above proposal we attempt, finally, to approach the character of the current situation. Here our historical analysis is used as an underlying framework for consideration of new conditions, and projection of trends into the future. In fact, we face a situation diametrically opposite to the urban planning (or non-planning) situation of the past. Planning comes suddenly to dispute the reign of laissez-faire. The outcomes of this conflict are independent of specific tactics. No matter what particular political or economic guidelines were employed, ad hoc development always walked hand in hand with the growth of the city. Our conclusions are concerned with the adaptabilities and inertias of this inherited situation, as well as with the social dimensions of the new challenges.
The Neoclassical City

- AN IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CHOICE, ATHENS BECOMES THE CAPITAL OF THE NEWBORN GREEK STATE
- THE FIRST MASTER PLAN OF ATHENS, A NEOCLASSICAL UTOPIA AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
- ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMATION, MONUMENTAL AND EVERDAY ENVIRONMENT
  • The First Buildings of Athens
  • Neoclassicism and the Everyday Environment
When Athens was established as the capital of Greece, by the decree of June 29 (or July 11) 1833, there were few, if any, indications that the city would become the dominant and unchallenged focal point of the whole Helladic space it is today.

However, the present status of the city along with its glorious past, during the Classical and early Byzantine times, usually leads to conscious thoughts or unconscious correlations about the physical and geographical advantages of its site. Under such an approach, the location of the capital by the Bavarians is considered to be "natural" and "rational". Nevertheless one can dispute the advantages of the location as such, as well as its organic role within the national and international networks of productive and commercial activities at the time.

During the last years of the War of Independence (1826-1829), Athens became the theater of operation for important battles between the revolutionaries and the Turks. The Acropolis was constantly changing hands—the Greeks and Turks often seiged one another—and this situation resulted in a heavy battle and the defeat of the revolutionary army (1827). In fear of reprisals, the whole Greek population of the city, which represented over 90% of the total, escaped to Salamis, a nearby island, the traditional shelter for Athenians since antiquity.

It was not until the ratification of the London Treaty (1831) that the people began to re-establish themselves in the city. The physical inventory that they found was "1500 destroyed houses... 125 churches and very few public buildings." Maurer gives a vivid, terrifying account of the situation:
Wherever you looked, you could see bare rocks and drought, uncultivated land; nowhere streets, nowhere bridges. The people were living either in caves or in hovels, earthen or made with stones simply put one on top of the other. Athens, which before the War of Independence had three thousand houses, now has not even three hundred. The rest turned into shapeless piles of building materials. Most of them still remain like this. (Maurer, Pg. 410-411)

Athens, of course, was not the only settlement ravaged by the War of Independence. The 'capital' of West Central Greece, Messolongi, was also totally destroyed after a two-year long siege. (Lord Byron was buried under the ruins of the city along with thousands of its Greek defenders.) Most of the cities of Peloponese fell victim to an invasion by the Egyptians. And the few existing island cities entered into a period of decline, their wealth bled dry to support the Revolution. Actually only a handful of cities were still worth their names. Nafplion, the temporary chair of the Bavarians; Patras, the west entrance of the country; and Syra, a bustling port in the middle of the Aegean Sea. So, from this point of view, Athens had a lot of competition: a destroyed city among many others, probably the most damaged one.

Athens had other serious disadvantages. During the previous fifty years the city had lost its regional role to other cities with more advantageous positions, either in terms of their contribution to the administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire, or their proximity to the prevailing commercial routes of the time, or both. The initial result was a decline in population in the 19th century; next, all administrative and educational institutions were removed; and finally, Athens was cut off from the rest of the country as roads declined.

It is characteristic, for the role of the city at the time, that all revolutionary assemblies, all major informal
meetings and discussions, and finally all the temporary governments from 1821 to 1831 were held or established elsewhere, primarily in the Peloponnesian cities. It follows that all the institutions of the revolutionary state were also established in those cities; and ultimately in Nafplion, whose region was the only spot of the Helladic that had avoided captivity during the ten-year revolution. So it was natural that King Otto and his 'Romantic Caravan' first disembarked in Nafplion, the only place that had to offer them a "State House," a barracks, a few schools and several houses to establish themselves. But Nafplion was also decayed. It shared some of the worst memories of the long 'national discord'. Its previous governor had been assassinated. And, above, all, it was the base for all plots and political rivalry of the time. From the very beginning, it was conceived as a temporary station. Discussion about a new capital began immediately and soon became a hot issue.

Peloponnesians, who carried the main load of the war, suggested their cities: Tripolis, the center of the region, a commercial hub with acceptable communications, in the middle of a productive area, and, most important, the home of the de facto chief of the Revolution--Kolokotronis; Argos, which presented a similar case; and finally Corinth, a city with a strong fortress and an advantageous location--it was at the geographical center of the newborn state, and was located on a strip of land between two seas, which was and remains extremely important for international commerce. Megara, a nearby city in Central Greece, shared, to a certain extent, the same advantages, along with the support of a prominent politician, Kolletis, who had influence with the king. On the Aegean Sea there was Syra, a commercial center similar to Corinth, and a promising industrial area. Syra remained important in that respect for the next half century.

Athens, in this framework, did not have any particular
advantages to offer and so was not initially considered—due to the city's isolation and lack of political support.

There was one more alternative in the debate over a capital, a position which expressed the mood of a significant part of the population: a call for many mobile and temporary capitals, with the government moving from one city to another until the liberation of Constantinople. This solution, it was argued, would keep the nation alert until the fulfillment of its Renaissance. Antiquity was the Byzantine Empire and its symbol was Constantinople, not Athens. However, the nation was very weak at that time, and the idea was kept dormant for fifty more years.

The debate over a new capital was becoming more and more of an obstacle to confronting other problems. Therefore, Otto assumed the responsibility of choosing it himself, in collaboration with the Vice-royalty who were, by that time, in charge of the country. L.V. Maurer, a member of the Vice-royalty, gives us an account of the considerations the Bavarians brought to bear on their decision. First, the proposals for just about all the cities were rejected as being based on "barren localist" considerations: geographical position, potential for commerce and industry, or accessibility to the rest of the country were not discussed. Instead, the decision was based on the ancient performance of the cities and, by this criterion, only two met the requirements. First is Corinth:

... Built in one of the most magnificent sites of the world, over the ruins of the ancient city and facing the Mountains of Parnassos, Kitheron and Elicon. (Maurer, p. 478)

Not one comment is made about its commercial and geographic advantages. Nevertheless, Corinth has a very poor record when compared with the references of Athens:
But there are all these memories for the Classical Civilization, the arts, the sciences and the immortal war—cloaks that favour Athens. Built over the finest ruins of Classical Antiquity, and near Marathon, it faces Salamis, Aegina, the three ports, the remnants of the long walls, the Tomb of Kimon, the Ancient Stoa, the prison of Sokratís—where as said he had drunk the Glass of Konium—the still perfectly preserved Temple of Theseus, the Parthenon and the Propylae. In the west it faces the Academy, Kolonos, Elefsis and the Fortress of Acrocorinth. In the east finally it faces the bricked-in columns of the temples which were destroyed by the Persians, the Prytaneum, the Monument of Lycicrates, the Gate of Adrianus, the Theatre of Dionysos, the high columns of the Temple of Olympius Zeus, the Fountain of Calliroe, with its eternally bubbling water, the well preserved Stadium and the mountains of Parnassos, Hymettus and Penteli. (Maurer, p. 478).

And he concludes with:

Which king could choose another place for the headquarters of its government? At the moment, he had in his hands the intellectual spring of the world. (Maurer, pp. 478-479)

What strikes us first in this text is that Maurer is unfamiliar with the topography of Attica: Acrocorinth is not visible from Athens as it lies fifty miles away; it cannot be considered as a physical boundary since two mountains are in between. Mount Parnassos, again, is not visible as it lies more than a hundred miles to the west, and not to the east of the city. Finally, some of the monuments that Athens "faces" were, at the time, buried under alluviums supporting neighborhoods of the village.

Maurer's geographical ignorance aside, the quoted passages are interesting to the extent that they reveal the preoccupations of the Bavarians during their rule in Greece. Their "love for Greece had two sides: a plain "sympathy" for the new nation that was seen as a field for
civilizing work (and for imperialistic exploitation as well) on the one hand; and a passionate love for ancient Greece on the other. The latter notion dominated the former. Ludwig I, King of Bavaria--Otto's father, was the main source of this attitude. Later, in 1836, when he visited Athens he expressed sentiments that may have pioneered the "touristic romanticism" approach to Greek antiquities:

Today the King of Bavaria ordered fires set on the hill to illuminate the Acropolis. He desires to enjoy the spectacle by himself. (H. Russack, in Constadinides, p. 56)

Beyond all this vague Romanticism, the choice of Athens had two interesting aspects, but we do not know if they were consciously considered by the Bavarians at the time.

First, by choosing a place with no local interests, the Bavarians were not only avoiding the quarrel between the rival cities but they were also setting a field where they could exercise their political rule without interference from the regional establishments of the country. It seems that in this preoccupation they had the support of the Greek diaspora, whose aspiration was to increase its influence over the affairs of the newly born State. As Mpires notes:

It was in Athens that they could impose themselves, easily and steadily, from a political and social point of view; more than in Nafplion, where the society was already organized and strong, and in its neighboring cities Argos and Corinth, where the social life of Nafplion could easily be transported. (Mpires, 1937, p. 1247)

The second aspect and very important for our study, concerned land-ownership issues. Under the Treaty of London, which marked the end of the War of Independence, the Turks had abandoned their land properties without any
compensation. In this way, almost all the land became the property of the State, an advantageous situation for the implementation of a master plan. There were just two exceptions to the rule; Athens was one of them. The agreement for Athens gave the departing Turks the right to sell their land either at the time, or later through representatives. Soon the lands of the area came into the hands of Athenians and Greeks from abroad.

If the absence of strong local interests was creating an advantageous precondition for the Bavarians to exercise their rule, the diffusion of landownership played down that control in terms of the actual spatial regulation of the city.

Though it is difficult to determine the exact blend of political and ideological reasons that underlie the decision to install the capital of the state in Athens, the results of the installation are much more visible and clear. By choosing to develop a new city in a milieu of scarce resources the state actually initiated the stagnation of a number of other cities by depriving them of necessary services, absorbed by the new capital. But, at the same time, the state did not have the means even to transform Athens into the city the Bavarians had originally imagined.

After an initial influx of new inhabitants, attracted by public sector jobs created to support the new regime, the immigration slowed down and actually stopped by 1854 because of a cholera epidemic. In 1856 the city had 30,963 inhabitants. Its port, Pireaus, which had also been abandoned during the revolution, had another 5,000 people. Pireaus had a unique reason for existing: it supplied the capital with most of its basic supplies, due to Athens' isolation from the rest of the country.

Nothing better describes the stagnation of the capital than the notes of a traveller who visited it thirty years after its "Renaissance":
This coincidental capital has no roots. Due to the lack of streets, it does not communicate with the rest of the country. Due to the lack of industry, it does not send any products to the mainland. The plain of Athens remains uncultivated. Even the few villages that geographically surround it are not aware of its existence. To describe it with only a few words, if the government suddenly decided to move, nothing could keep the population in its place. (Edmond About, in G. Burgel, p. 243)
The first master plan of Athens envisioned the city as the capital of the Greek state, although the plan preceded the actual choice. Naturally, the Master Plan played a role in the decision to choose Athens, but it also caused Athenians to realize the potential of their city, under the existing circumstances.

Kleanthes's involvement in the Master Plan represents the attitude of Greek intellectuals towards Neoclassicism and Athens, or, in other words, the complement to the passion of the Bavarians.

Kleanthes, a native of northern Greece, and a member of Philikae Etairiae, participated in the battle of Iasion (1820) as a member of the 'Sacred Company'. The Company was a union of young intellectuals with nationalistic ideas, who were proud to compare themselves with the ancient Spartans. In the battle, a prelude to the revolution, the revolutionaries were badly defeated. Kleanthes, however, managed to escape and fled to Berlin where he studied architecture under the leading neoclassical figure of the time, Schinkel. After completing his studies he received an award that enabled him to visit Italy, and finally he returned to Greece in late 1829. He was always accompanied by his Berlin classmate and collaborator, E. Schaubert, also an architect but primarily interested in archeology. The work they did together is usually attributed to Kleanthes.

The two friends first visited Athens in 1830 to "dream the revival of the beauty of the ancient city and of the glory of Athens as a Capital of the new Greece" (Mpires, 1933), but also to carry out the first systematic measurements of the site. Soon after they visited the governor, Kapodistrias, suggesting that the capital be moved to Athens,
they volunteered to work on the master plan. Kapodistrias turned down the offer, he was assassinated shortly thereafter, and a 'temporary government' was set up. The two friends repeated their appeal and in 1832 they were assigned to work on the master plan. They began working under the arbitrary assumption that Athens was destined to become the capital—a perspective with little support at the time. In late 1832, the plan was ready and was sent to the Vice-royalty who had just previously arrived in Greece. The master plan was accompanied with an explanatory memo very characteristic of the authors' ideologies:

"We foresee that all the civilized world will enthusiastically accept this work... Following public opinion and the general wishes of the Greeks, we considered Athens as the future capital and the chair of the king, although we were not assigned to do so. (Mpires, op. cit.)"

Public opinion in Greece was little concerned with Athens, as we have seen. The statement, however, helped Athenians to realize their chances and in June, 1833, they sent an appeal to the Vice-royalty asking that the capital be moved to Athens. They also promised that, for their part, they would actually donate all the land necessary for the implementation of the plan and especially for the creation of the "Archeological Zone" all around the hill of the Acropolis. This promise, delivered by the Council of the Elders of Athens, removed any final doubts that the Bavarians may have had. A month later Athens was proclaimed the capital. The master plan was approved at the same time. In this way Kleanthes and Schaubert became decisive factors in the choice of Athens by anticipating official action.

Mpires indicates that in their work the two architects were "strongly supported by intellectuals returning to Greece at the time" (Mpires, op. cit.). This would be an
interesting matter to look into; however, there is no evidence to support such a claim in our limited documentation.

Neoclassical town-planning is much harder to define than Neoclassical architecture. The term refers to town planning practices during the era of neoclassicism and not to any specific and rigid configurations as in architecture. There are no examples of a city or large segment of a city actually built under this practice. Also, the examples we do have are quite different from each other. Yet there are certain concerns that are common to them all and that offer a guide to Neoclassical town planning. According to Rowan (A. Rowan, 1972) they are: 1. "Streets that divide the city in segments radiating from a central public space" 2. "An increasing popularity for a variety of open spaces--crescents, oval, circuses and squares--alternating through the streets and often related one to another" 3. "The final essential ingredient is Nature, found increasingly in the trees and green spaces that surround the public buildings and monuments."

If we accept the above description, Kleanthes's master-plan can be considered typical of Neoclassical town planning.

Public spaces in the corners of a triangle are the focal points of a radiant deployment of the streets. The north contains the palace which faces, in the south, the Acropolis. There are boulevards and a variety of open spaces in between. In this way the symbol of the new authority is in continuous visual and spatial conversation with the ancient ruins. The palace is also surrounded by a square of boulevards. All public buildings are free-standing and much of the space around the Acropolis was to be turned into a public promenade.

The plan intersected the old village with many new streets and some of them were basic elements in the street network. Extended clearance work was suggested. Even the streets that remained in place were 'regularized' in order
to fit the general pattern.

In addition, ancient names were given to all streets to leave little doubt about the intellectual ideas of the two architects.

Kleanthes's master plan can be considered 'absolute', because it simply stresses his concepts without any compromise with the existing architectural and environmental situation. This rigid position was later misinterpreted and Kleanthes was praised as a kind of prophet who had foreseen the later development of the city, and had provided the open space and the streets to accommodate it.

In our opinion, Kleanthes, by ignoring the needs of the inhabitants for the sake of his own 'absolute' values, actually made the first step for the establishment of a relation that later became a chronic symptom of planning shortsightedness.

Kleanthes's motive was rather obvious: to distinguish the dominance of two authorities--the intellectual authority of antiquity and the political authority of the Bavarian king. The rest of the city was seen as a support for these two focal points rather than as an independent entity worth consideration. Obviously this was not the kind of revival that the Athenians had imagined.

The inhabitants had promised, as we have seen, to either offer or provide at a low price the land necessary for the implementation of the plan. In the document the council of the elders had sent to the Vice-royalty (15 July 1833), the promise was that all lands necessary for the construction of the palace and other buildings of social character would be donated. Lands for the creation of the archaeological zone around the Acropolis would be expropriated for 70 lepta (100 lepta=1 drachma) per square ell; other lands, outside of the old city but within the plan, for 20 lepta per sq. ell. At the same time, the municipality would be given 75 acres in the new areas to provide housing for those
people who would be moved from their houses in the Archeological Zone, the palace and public buildings areas.

According to an estimate by Kolletis, even at the above low prices, the expropriations would require 1,364,000 drachmas, an amount clearly beyond the capabilities of the new state. Meanwhile, the establishment of the capital in Athens had attracted wealthy provincials, Greeks of the diaspora, and even foreigners to the city. Due to increasing demand, the price of land escalated to 2 to 3 drachmas per sq. ell, leaving behind the prices agreed for expropriations. But the Athenians said they would keep their promise if the width of the streets was reduced. The government accepted the request, the plan was reviewed and in October 19, 1833 the modified plan was officially approved. Clearances began immediately but new problems soon arose. Those directly affected by the plan realized that they would have to make sacrifices. They began disputing the interpretation of the plan and asked that the roads be shifted at someone else's expense. Big landowners had the lead and among them were some well-established foreigners such as the English colonel G. Finley and the American preacher J. King. As Mpires (1966, p. 34) notes: "He [King] was seeking the maximum compensation for his fields with the same devotion that characterized his sermons requesting the goods of heaven." Finally the rumor spread in the city that the "General" Kriezotis was coming to Athens with his troops to protect his property, threatened by the implementation of the plan. With the confusion, as well as the inability of the government to compensate even the small proprietors, the plan was soon revoked (June 23, 1834).

The 'luxury' solutions that the plan offered didn't coincide at all with the sacrifices that the Athenians had promised: to house the king and provide him with the right vista, everyone else had to be moved from his home. Also,
after the placement of the capital was secured, it was enough for the Athenians that the government provide them with jobs; large streets and spacious squares with glorious ancient names were obviously superfluous.

It was the famous Bavarian architect Leo Von Klentze who played the role of compromiser. Sent by King Ludwig, to whom he was confidant, he modified the plan to the extent that could guarantee the survival of Otto. The new plan kept the geometrical guidelines of the previous one, i.e. the triangular scheme of the city, but it pointed an absolute departure from its 'spirit'. The old city was accepted as such with only slight improvements. The width of the streets was drastically reduced, as were the number of public open spaces. The palace, finally, was moved to the west corner of the triangle and so lost its imperative role in the scheme.

The primary difference, however, was that Von Klentze's plan had an 'enclosed' or 'static' attitude when compared with the open or 'expansionist' one that had characterized the previous plan. While in Kleanthes's plan the public spaces and the radiating streets in the periphery implied an imminent expansion of the city, in the revised version the peripheral public spaces constituted an enclosed promenade, as if the city would never expand. To leave little doubt regarding the future of the capital, Klentze reduced the area covered by the plan by almost 200 acres.

With further compromises and modifications by Gartner—the major one was moving the palace to the more healthy east side of the city—the plan was finally implemented. There were still reactions, but this time the number of those adversely affected was too small to cancel the operation.

The revocation of the very first plan of Athens was to become a standard practice. Since then, dozens of plans have been elaborated, even officially approved, for the city and none of them have been implemented any more than that
of Kleanthes's. In a broader sense we have the first incident in a long story in which the city is trapped between the 'European' aspirations of its modern intellectuals and the 'vulgar' reality of a nation whose integration was badly delayed during its most critical stages. In the following chapters we will try to trace how the efforts to overcome this delay have marked the urban landscape.
Kleanthes and Shaumbert conceived of Athens as a city full of public services, educational institutions, and commercial facilities. This was also true for the modifications of the initial plan during the first years. These designations functioned as guidelines for the actual shaping of the city. A few years after feverish building, (1833-1845), Athens was transformed into the administrative and educational center of Greece; a development that stemmed from the mere fact that the Bavarian Government desired to reside in a place destroyed by the war but full of ancient monuments.

Although quickly developed, Athens had not yet been integrated into any network or productive relationship with the rest of the country. It stood out as an exotic island, a capital with "no roots" in its surrounding geographical space, as Edmond About described it (see p. ).

The wealth of the city did not result from any systematic exploitation of the surrounding agricultural lands, nor from any capitalistic development. Piraeus did not play any major role in the commerce of the Mediterranean Sea. Greek capitalists--merchants, ship-owners, financiers--kept on investing in other centers of the country (e.g. Syra, Patras), or in the communities of the diaspora (Asia Minor, Egypt).

The wealth of Athens resulted either from the diffusion of public money--mainly loans from abroad--or from the continuous contributions of the Greek diaspora. The latter had not yet begun investing in productive works and their money was offered to develop educational programs, necessary for the building up of the new "hellenic" identity. The above resources were the ones that financed the construction of the first institutional buildings of the city.
The First Buildings of Athens

While the traditional agora (bazaar) of the old settlement continued to function as the most active part of the community, in other undeveloped areas the first new buildings began to rise; public buildings and the homes of the wealthy became the starting point for the development of an area that did not as yet have any infrastructure (roads and utilities), but only a plan.

The antiquities of the Acropolis were being restored, too. The same people were in charge of both—erection of the new buildings and restoration of the antiquities. They were architects, Greeks or foreigners, who had been trained in Berlin, Rome, Vienna or Copenhagen, the last European centers of neo-classicism. Among them were Kleanthes, Shaumbert, Von Klentze, Gartner and W. Von Weiler in the beginning (1830-1840); Lys. Kaftanzoglou, Chr. and Theof. Hansen, D. Zezos, and P. Kalkos came later (1840-1860).

For Kleanthes and Shaumbert, Athens was an artificial Ithaca. For the others, the city was a field where the most elaborate rules of civilization were being tested under their archetypes. Both groups either put aside the existing settlement or tried to correct its 'irregularities'. All their efforts were devoted to the materialization of a new city, considered parallel to the old one.

Schinkel went even further than that. He conceived of the symbol of the new order, the palace, as dominating the ancient memory. He imposed it on the Acropolis itself, and he emphasized its arrangement by laying out its loosely stretching masses over the greatest part of the ancient rock. He imagined the man-made and natural surroundings in a dialogue, in which his creation was the primary orator.

But the Greeks reacted strongly and Otto was not the man who could attempt such a challenge. He preferred the restrained and simplified mass of Gartner's proposal; he even rejected Leo Von Klentze's colorful design for the
Keramikos site. The shift of the palace to the east part of the city, and the construction of other prestigious buildings around it, indicates the first movement in the east-west segregation of the city. It was not only the hygienic considerations that attracted the 'higher' activities to the east but also the existing popular bazaar that repelled them from the west. The same division was reinforced in later periods.

Kleanthes and Shaumbert did not repeat the picturesque compositions of their schoolmaster. Restrained to small parcels of land—due to the limited public funds available for land purchase—they built isolated buildings on a less grandiose scale within as yet shapeless districts. Under those limitations, they stressed the qualities of the buildings themselves. Building primarily in the neo-classical style, but with an eye to the neo-gothic style, in an elaborate scenic approach (Kleanthes) or with a civil engineering orientation (Schaumbert), the two architects provided the theme for their successors. Elementary forms, classical proportions, a balance of open and closed components, low heights, a light-tiled roof, and a yard in front were the visual characteristics of their buildings. As emphasis was placed on the facade, the interiors sometimes seemed irrelevant and inflexible—perhaps due to the functional organization of the public services which were inflexible and unformed, too. Constructed by Italian or Bavarian artisans with Greek marble and stone, these buildings are not simple copies of the ancient ones but represent, through imitation, the different ancient elements in a new formation created in the natural and cultural climate of Athens by talented artists.

Out of those first types, the successors of Kleanthes and Shaumbert preferred the neo-classical examples even though the neo-gothic style dominated over European archi-
1.2 PUBLIC BUILDINGS
tecture at that time (1840 to 1860). But for the architects of Athens, neo-classicism was not simply a matter of fashion, an opinion shared by the Greek intellectuals of the time living in Athens.

As the educational buildings were going up, a new group of religious buildings were also constructed, while the old ones—mostly Byzantine—remained in ruins or were demolished. Their lots and the building materials were used for housing purposes, despite the intentions of Kleanthes and Shaumbert, whose plan was to preserve the medieval heritage. The new churches, a combination of neo-classical proportions and elements with a Byzantine layout, expressed the new force of the relationship between the Orthodox church and the state; the former, losing its autonomy, was being incorporated into the latter.

Although in Europe neo-classicism had begun to decline (with a few exceptions in Vienna and Copenhagen) and in London and Paris the first expressions of a new industrial style had appeared, Greece resisted the new trends. Neo-classicism still remained the formal expression of the dominant ideology. While, in the country, traditional art and literature continued its slow pace, intellectuals, politicians and high officers in Athens adhered to the principles of the ancient heritage. Although there were some gifted designers in architecture, there were none in the other arts or in literature. The new, formal language, constructed according to the ancient pattern, acted as a barrier to any growth in these other arts.

... the orientation of Greek nationalism towards an excessive use of its 'resources' inevitably helped the selection of a language already cultivated and codified, that flattered feelings for national dignity. It was absolutely natural for the newborn nationalism to turn to the beautification of the tool around which the glory of the past had been centered. ... (Tsoukalas, 1976, p. 538)
The elders of the Orthodox Church had penetrated key positions in the state mechanism and constituted a dominant caste in the city. A formal language—a compromise between the archaic type used by the Church and the typical one used by the Greek bourgeois—became the official language of the state. Through the rapidly established educational network, this language spread all over the country, replacing the various spoken local dialects. This educational system—public and free, beginning with primary schools and leading to the University of Athens—established a selection process from the various social strata of those people who could fulfill the needs of both the public service and the communities of the Greek diaspora. In this socialization process, the integration in the dominant class was followed by a symbolic breaking off with the language structures of local origin.

The cultural environment in Athens contributed in this social transformation. The ancient monuments were the models for Kleanthes's architectural forms, and these in turn became the models for not only the later monuments of the city but for the everyday environment, too. The neoclassical elements, not investigated systematically, became incorporated in the previous typology under rather latent forms.

**Neo-classicism and the Everyday Environment**

Together with the reconstruction of the old houses, even before the master plan's approval, a number of new houses appeared in the larger parcels of the old settlement as well as in the proposed center and the periphery of the city. They belonged to wealthy Greeks, many of whom were living abroad on a permanent basis, and to Bavarians or foreign diplomats. Those houses had quite similar forms to the first public buildings, having been built by the same
architects in a monumental rather than domestic scale. Some of them were used, in the beginning, for sheltering the first public services or for the king's residence (e.g. those of Vouros, Konstostavlos, G. Stavros, etc.)

But providing housing for the majority of the new residents--coming to work in the public services, the most promising job opportunities--was a difficult problem in the beginning. Due to the housing shortage, speculation in land and in dwellings and large increases in rent prices began. Many houses were built too quickly and poorly. The government published a royal decree "for the execution of the City Plan of Athens" on April 9, 1836 in order to control the problem. The established building regulations called for the new buildings to have their fronts on the lines of the new streets and an open yard on the side or in the back of the house; they should also be two to three stories high. Along these legal lines and according to the aesthetic patterns of the wealthier residences, the transformation of the old Athenian houses began.

The previous style was a structure built around a courtyard, with a well or a garden in the middle. The house was built at the back, in the middle or along one side of the lot, if the lot was tiny. On the front of the street a high fence-wall would be built, sometimes together with the one side of the house to protect domestic privacy. There were small windows on the second floor. The layout consisted of a sequential placement of rooms around an arcade on the first floor (used primarily for storage, work space and livestock) and/or around a glass-enclosed porch on the second.

But the old, strict and clearly defined family life was to be transformed. The new middle class residents together with the change of their social status began to modify their lifestyle and to adapt it towards the new urban environment. Housing patterns were being transformed according to the new
1.3.

HOUSES
lifestyles.

The new middle class Athenian house did not strictly follow either the old type or the luxurious examples of the new mansions. These dwellings were characterized by a rather hybrid form, with the new aesthetics used to compose the facade, while, behind it, the old structure was more or less maintained. In front, a new stone base, an emphasized entrance, more numerous and larger openings, and balconies with decorative flanges underscored intentions for a more open life. Such features also served to demonstrate the status of the nouveau riche. However, the courtyard continued to constitute the core of the whole arrangement, and was only slightly modified. The use of the first floor for storage and livestock began to disappear and the arcade followed the new morphological demands: it featured columns and Roman arches or epistyles. On the second floor, the glass-enclosed porch continued to serve the row of rooms, but in combination with a new corridor which led towards another row of rooms looking out onto the front. In this way, the new arrangement indicated the first intentions for the more 'compact' type.

These houses, built both by anonymous artisans, who had been exposed to the Bavarian or Italian artisans working on the neo-classical buildings, and by practical architects sometimes, often show an effortless cleverness, especially when they escape from the basic typology. Most of them are considered today as representative examples of collective architectural qualities such as aesthetics, functionality, environmental control, and adaptability to newly formed needs. On the other hand, buildings produced by the professional architecture of that time, regardless of their external visual qualities, often exhibited an inorganic composition characterized by a dark corridor or room in the middle, with rooms on both sides of it.

Both the compact type and the courtyard type prevailed.
at that time in the city. But at the edges of the middle-class neighborhoods, or in the smaller lots of the city, we meet a simpler type that belongs to the lower-income populace (workers, servants, etc.). This type follows the middle-class courtyard scheme but it is differentiated from it in the size of the lot, height, and number of rooms. Aesthetic forms are also much simpler. What we do not meet in neo-classical Athens is slums or wooden barracks. Although life was rather poor and the wages were low, there was no unemployment.

The country is not rich but very few die from hunger. The majority of the population has a small house and a piece of land. . . The absence of beggars can be attributed to the proud character of the nation, but also the distribution of wealth is quite extensive; the classes that are dependent totally on their wage represent a small proportion in relation to the total population. (Charles Cheston, 1887, in Tsoukalas, 1976, p. 204)

While cities in Europe were facing complex urban problems, Athens stood out as a calm port for neo-classicists to work in so as to achieve their static utopia. They came to implement their idealistic principles in an environment that was not ideal but simply a step behind the other industrialized countries. Within this environment, utopic intentions happened to prevail. Greek nationalism kept the illusion that Greece would regain its ancient glory. This aspiration became a consensus among the different social groups that composed the new population of the city, as consensus that was spatially expressed by the adaptation of an architecture that was considered to follow the ancient heritage.

Institutional buildings and a few houses still survive from this era of neo-classicism in Athens; the former to give the city a little bit of the glory that any city should
have in order to be a capital, and the latter just to remind the Athenians of what is lost.

Judged by any standards, the neo-classical city constitutes the prehistory of modern Athens; a prehistory that predisposed in many ways the city's actual development, which began later.
The Prevalence of Land Speculation

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- CONFLICTS AND CONVENTIONS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF URBAN STRUCTURES
  - Trends before 1870--The Epilogue to Kleanthes's Master Plan
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INTRODUCTION

During the last quarter of the 19th century, Greek society was in a transformative period—like a chrysalis which has ceased to be a caterpillar but had not become a butterfly—it ceased to be Greek but it had not yet become European. (Asmodaios, in K. Vergopoulos, 1977, p. 168)

In reality, what was happening in Greece in the late 19th century was the search for a new equilibrium; the old balance had already disintegrated.

The capitalist system was developing throughout the new state, on the one hand destroying the remaining old societal relationships, while, on the other it was struggling to survive in the milieu of international competition. The first manufacturing efforts, based on Greek capital, could not compete with the products of the already industrialized European countries. As a result, Greek capital was channelled into the tertiary sector (banks and navigation), acting as an intermediate, and dependent on larger and stronger European capital.

Athens became the field where the conflicts, related to such stunted capitalistic growth, were expressed in political terms; the capital city also became the place to absorb and transform these conflicts into new directions. In a world where old agriculture and manufacturing centers were declining and whole villages were removing from the highlands to the plains, and where the few cities with promising economies were struggling to hold onto what they had already gained, Athens was stimulating a new network of connections with the rest of the country and abroad.

Although the political arena appeared to be unstable—there was a continuous interchange of governments—and the economy was weak enough to be badly affected by internation-
al crises, new ideological directions, shared by many Greeks, appeared on the scene.

Chief among these ideologies was the 'Great Idea', which called for the liberation of Greek areas still remaining under Ottoman rule, and which offered the perspective of an 'ideological contract' among Greek people.

The integration of an excessively large rural population, on the other hand, into the urban petit-bourgeoisie, through its distribution into the well-developed Greek communities abroad, worked as a key mechanism--both in ideological and economic terms--to prevent major class conflicts. Here Athens played a crucial role. It became the control center for various public and private institutions (e.g. banking, education, taxation), that spread their capitalist guidelines throughout the country. It also became the organizing center for a transportation system that served the movements of products and people: raw materials, rural products, consumer goods, those people taking part in the rural exodus, and the army.

Through foreign loans and with the help of the international Greek bourgeoisie, the capital city of Greece expanded in all directions, generously offering space to everyone.

Strangely enough Athens was developing exactly because there were no Athenians. Therefore, Athenian development and Athenian capitalism was of a different type than that of the French capital city; Athens did not express the Expansionist intention of a local power because it was rather a work of foreigners who, through it, immediately projected the set of their territorial claims and their expansionist will. (G. Burgel, 1976, p. 141)

Since imported capital had but few outlets for productive investment, land speculation and building served as the major investment channels, and the property market
became the real 'stock exchange' of the city. As a result, laissez-faire development would prevail over potential development patterns prescribed by every previous planning effort. Paradoxically, while the implementation of laissez-faire had inflated tremendous contradictions in Europe's Victorian cities, and had even posed a threat to the capitalist system itself, in Athens, a similar formula was followed in order to disperse and absorb any existing or imminent conflict. While, in Paris, planning was the new, 'neutral' and 'pure technical' tool to conduct, under the service of the new ruling class, the development of the city and to destroy the evidence of its contradictions, in Athens planning--being connected to the unpopular Bavarian autocratic regime--would be replaced by speculative private development. Thenceforward planning would act in a corrective way, and only to control the network of the main public spaces of the city.

Neoclassicism, which in its broadest sense referred to the 'absolute perfectness' of the ancient civilization, left its place to the alive 'great people' to realize their 'Great Idea' and national integration. Liberalism, strongly connected to individualism, began to offer to these indifferent 'great people' the means to express and deliberate themselves. This new ideological concept, though seemingly romantic, was strongly connected with conformism, an inherent characteristic of the bourgeoisie in a tertiary capitalistic society.

Both nationalism and individualism came to prevent any reaction that would aim at a radical resolution to the conflicts of capitalism. Old towns were declining and the few cooperative manufacturing efforts begun in the first decades of the 19th century had already disappeared; there were no suggestions for an alternative direction to the prevailing type of development. Utopia was something totally unknown, either as concept or as experiment, in Greece during that
Thus, laissez-faire occupied every position in the relationships and the minds of the 'great people', leaving room only for marginal traditional interpretations, which were going to expire later in the 20th century.

A house in Athens's speculative settlements increasingly became the dream of every petit-bourgeois, as well as of the wealthy. It was also becoming the borrowed model for the small, rural-origin, working class which mainly manned the building sector. As a result, social differences tended to be expressed in the urban space only in quantitative terms. The character of the spatial product was marked by an insignificant moderation very close to mediocrity. 'Freedom to build' in Athens of the late 19th century was interpreted into conformist terms, both in the urban structure and the urban fabric.
A closer examination of the Athenian environment, at the end of the previous neoclassical period reveals the coexistence of different trends:

As it unfolds itself, the capital is a city of great contradictions. No picture could express this truth better than that of the Athenian streets (1850). Next to a shop with a turkish appearance, where the shopkeeper is sitting cross-legged and smoking his chibouk, one can see a Perisian modiste and coffee shops recalling France. Porters from Malta are sitting on the street, waiting for work. Over there, heroes in white kilts and sailors from the Aegean Sea, in large drawers, are smoking narghile, while other Greeks, dressed in the most recent French fashion are drinking beer, smoking cigars from Havana and reading newspapers. Alongside the finest civilization one can find almost vulgar customs and manners. Alongside a democratization as instinctive in Greeks as in Americans, one can see people with a feudal attitude, based as much on violence and abduction, as in the medieval barons. (Fr. Lenorman in E. Stassinopoulos, 1973, pp. 411-12)

This picture of the city, although drawn from a Western European perspective indicates that, during this period, striking differences coexisted in the physical and social environment of Athens. Some of these differences had existed since the times of the Greek Revolution, others appeared on the scene with the new capitalistic directions. As a result, numerous conflicts unfolded. Westernization vs. traditional patterns represented one such conflict. German autocratic state vs. "free" capitalistic model was another. The different intentions of the Great Powers---Great Britain, France, Austria and Russia---regarding the Ottoman Empire were also inserted into the political context, favoring one or the other side.
Liberalism vs. Absolutism became the axial component of the contradictions. Otto was expelled in 1862. The new Constitution approved by the National Assembly in 1864 defined the system of government as a "Republican Kingdom." George I, a Danish Prince was elected to be the new king of the country. Political change brought together a more open, although not yet completely liberal, system of government. From now on existing conflicts were channeled through political parties. Parliamentary elections became the battlefield for the different trends.

Finally, Liberal intentions and laissez-faire practice prevailed over the political and economic scene. Both had to confront the already formed bureaucratic state mechanism. In the end capital and state mechanism came to a convention, where political forces, on the one hand became familiar and conformed to the previous stately attitude while capitalistic forces on the other were liberated from the old central limitations.

Under the above circumstances, laissez-faire development would enter into the Athenian scene, dramatically influencing the form of urban expansion. From the very beginning of the period, and side by side with the application of the Master Plan, new forms of development appeared in the outskirts of the narrow city. They were characterized by a less careful layout, which imitated gridiron schemes. These areas were approved by the City Plan Service, a national institution established by the government, as 'extensions' of the Master Plan or as "suburbs". They were concentrated around the main exits of the city and addressed towards different social strata. The process of peripheral development, that of land speculation, would become the vehicle for expansion of the capital in the following years.

If one were to attempt to isolate any of the decisive influences behind the peripheral development phenomenon inside only the Athenian territory, one factor would
certainly be the existing ownership patterns in the greater Attica county. Half of the surrounding land had been bought by wealthy Greeks from abroad, just before the Turks' departure. These people had left most of their estates unexploited, simply waiting to transform them into urban land as soon as the city expanded. Having the power, they succeeded in influencing state planning policy so as to achieve maximization of urban land revenues. The landowners' expectations of large profits would not allow for the neoclassical concept of grandiose vistas and broad public open spaces. As a result, narrow streets and small lots became the new pattern for land subdivision, even for the bourgeois neighborhoods.

In the meantime, the City Plan Service had already accepted quite a few modifications of the Master Plan, which further eliminated the size and number of planned public spaces. With the growth of the city, new problems arose regarding planning policy, aside from the immediate problems of swift expansion. The connection with the Saronicos ports, (Piraeus and Phaleron) as well as with the industrial town of Lavrion and the few suburbs in the basin could not be accommodated by a Master Plan that had not anticipated the coming of railways.

Introduction of the new transportation means into the city was initially handled by the City Plan Service, manned at that time by army engineers, through the remedy of "clearances".

This would be the last spectacular attempt by government planning to achieve overall control of the urban environment.

Mankind might well be divided into two groups, in regard to their surroundings: those who initially set about their environment and those who are content to accept the state of things as it exists. In spite of the pioneering spirit of the first group, there
2.1 INFRASTRUCTURES
always persists a heavy weight of inertia, which is found almost universally in extreme youth and old age. (P. Abercombie, 1959, p. 9)

Actually, any existing pioneering spirit in Athens had been consumed in the debate between neoclassicism and local pragmatism. In addition, the infant Greek capitalism, was hesitating about its priorities, being encased between international competition and traditional structures.

Planning occurs when mankind in the group makes a definite and conscious attempt to model or mold his environment; natural human growth takes place when mankind is unconscious of, or unconcerned with, its general form. (op. cit., p. 10)

Laissez-faire development would finally prevail over the initial "conscious attempts" of Bavarians to mold the neo-hellenic society. Athenian capitalism, after temporarily going along with the last guards of a conscious city plan, would gain control of the urban land. There is no doubt that the productive forces of the country found themselves in a dilemma--faced with a choice between a rural and an industrial direction--and therefore could not take decisive initiatives; but what is also true, is that the birth of "uncontrolled" growth in Athens was not at all the result of blind action by "unconscious" operators. It was rather a silent agreement among the most powerful forces of the time, which served as a means for the dispersion of the conflicts that capitalistic growth implied for the Athenian space. The preformed, politically strong state could not permit any loosening of its control without first securing social stability inside the capital city. The existence of an overall ideological framework at that period reveals, also, the grounding of an overall concensus among the main social forces and not an "unconcerned" or "confused" whole.

In the following pages we will try to trace the laissez-faire process of development in Athens at the turn of the
century, focusing on the actions and aspirations of the participants in the decision-making process, whose aim was the attainment of social stability. We will particularly focus on two areas:

1. The conflicts, compromises or inertias among the social forces of the city milieu: state ruling class, local aristocracy, Greek international capitalist class, the new social strata of merchants, manufacturers and workers, foreign international capitalists and the large middle-class. Our analysis will be concerned with those of the above interactions that had an impact on the city planning institutions and the actual city making (infrastructures, structural physical elements, and urban fabric).

2. The prevailing ideological trends, as they were expressed through spatial concepts in, for example, the layout patterns, the different zones in the center and the periphery, the landmarks of the city, and the everyday environment.
Since this period does not represent any dramatic change in the history of the country, as does its next one, but rather a series of gradual transformations of the previous situation, our examination will follow the transformations step by step, until the moment when a new institutional framework was created. This framework, along with up-and-coming social forces, would generate the industrial "take-off" of the 1920's.

Consequently, the historical analysis will be divided into three parts:

1. The conditions before 1870s, when an autocratic government coexisted with newborn capitalist trends, until this coexistence proved to be incompatible.

2. The appearance of laissez-faire in the 1870s inside a slightly transformed institutional framework.

3. The prevalence of "free-development" practice over the city and the parallel establishment of an infrastructure and institutional network across the nation, which was controlled from the capital (1880-1907).

Trends Before 1870--Epilogue to Kleanthes's and Shaumbert's Plan

During the last decades of Otto's reign the efforts of the public and municipal institutions of the capital were concentrated on three problems: the completion of the new center according to Kleanthes's and Shaumbert's Master Plan; the facilitation of a new consumption market that was introduced dynamically into the life of the city; and the establishment of an overall Master Plan, including the initial one and its modifications, as well as provisions
for city extension layouts due to ongoing growth.

Since the first years of the establishment of Athens as capital of Greece things had changed. The dreams for glorious revivals proved to be unobtainable. The Bavarians had failed to persuade the Greeks to accept them as patrons. After the peaceful coup d'etat of 1843, when Otto was forced by Greek politicians and army leaders to concede to a constitution that at least allowed Greeks to replace Bavarians in public positions. In reality, the new Constitution didn't offer any major reform except a change of guard in public seats. An oligarchy, constituted by Otto and his favorite cabinet councils, was in power anyway.

As a result, the structure of institutions, as well as the planning policy, didn't change very much. The state government was in control of Master Plan implementation, while the municipality had a secondary role. Ultimately it was Otto himself, who had the final word in every critical matter.

The new City Plan Service was comprised of army engineers. These men, who generally remained aloof from the political intrigues of the day, were expected to play a "neutral" and "objective" role, placing themselves on the service of the national interests. As military men, however, trained by their predecessors and belonging to the king, according to the law, they behaved towards citizens in an autocratic manner. Having a utilitarian educational background, they gave more emphasis to the actual implementation of the Master Plan, especially with regard to its most important streets, without caring much about its aesthetic accomplishments or any finer elaboration. Consequently, architects' roles were actually eliminated—only occasionally did they participate in the planning decisions. They were mainly concerned with the architectural scale and landscape of prestigious buildings, having as clients the state, the city and the wealthy bourgeoisie.
Municipal government's role was also sharply curtailed, although it had participated actively in the peaceful coup of 1843. From its very beginning, it consisted of members of the local aristocracy. Their numbers were later increased by the wealthy Greek bourgeois, who decided to reside in Athens. However, members of the municipal government, having been connected to the various social ranks of the Athenian population through the 'clientelle' system, were originally the only organized voice that could confront the Bavarians' proposals regarding the broad implementation of clearances. But, when powerful Greeks began to have access to the national government, local government lost most of its previous importance. Its role became that of opposing or accepting central proposals. Although it was continuously loosing its broader powers* (the municipal government's) opposition on the city planning front was more successful than ever before**, and its collaboration with the national government was more cohesive. This mutual support can be explained by the fact that representatives in both national and local government were expressing common interests, the interests of the Athenian upper class of that time.

The residents of Athens had no other representative organization, aside from the local government, to care about environmental conditions. Nevertheless, quantitative problems had not yet become a major interest. The social

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*In 1844 municipality lost the control of the city police, which fell within the purview of the national government. (See G. Chaidopoulos, 1979, p. 26.)

**In 1845 a proposal from the military service for street improvements was opposed by the city council with the excuse of its financial inability for the expropriations. At the same time national bank was also against the proposal because it affected properties involved in mortgage loans. The proposal finally was rejected. (See K. Mpires, 1966, p. 82.)
structure consisted of a large number of middle-class people, occupied mainly in state services* and commerce; a small percentage of upper-class people (local landlords, high-ranking state officers, politicians, and several capitalists); and several lower-rank strata (artisans, servants, porters, building workers and a few manufacturing workers). These groups were distributed according to the patterns of the previous period: local aristocracy and politicians, (former army leaders) in the eastern part of the old settlement (Plaka); international Greek aristocracy and bourgeoisie towards the eastern streets of the New Center; lower strata towards the western part of the Old and New settlements, and in Proastion, an "unauthorized" settlement on the eastern outskirts of the city; while the middle-class was concentrated mostly in the central areas or spread throughout the city.

Until 1853, this structure remained rather stable. Athens was growing slowly and its principal function was that of an administrative center**. Several other cities were also developing at the time, while the great majority of the population was still living in the rural areas***, and the real Greek economic centers were out of the Greek borders (in Balkan cities, Thessalonika, Istanbul, Asia Minor, Russia, and Egypt). As a matter of fact, City Plan Service concentrated its efforts on the implementation of the Master Plan by modifying it whenever a serious conflict occurred. Modifications usually favored strong individual


**The average annual rate of population increase was 0.5 percent for the years 1848-1853. (See K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 178.)

***Greece's population was 1,679,470 in 1853. The urban population comprised only 8 percent. (See N. Svoronis, 1976, p. 102.)
interests which were aiming at the expansion of their properties at the expense of public spaces. Otto reacted only when these claims were threatening his immediate environment. This was the case with Syntagma Square which, since 1838, had been under his architectural control. Since land values in this area became extremely high, owners of the surrounding properties wanted to expand over the public space. Having access to the political governments, they tried four times to modify the plan, unsuccessfully. Their interference became evident in 1847, in the "Committee for the completion of the plan of Athens". Although this committee proposed an incorporation of the unauthorized settlement of Proastion inside the city plan, the topic of discussion was not the intervention in an already structured neighborhood but Syntagma Square. The committee, influenced by Prime Minister Kolettis, proposed an elimination of its public space. Otto refused to approved the proposal. Ironically Syntagma Square would become the stage of popular protests for democracy and would keep this meaning to the present.

From 1853 on, a new sector appeared dynamically in the Athenian scene. The infusion of money, from the national government and the Greek diaspora, along with the influx of numerous white collar workers, stimulated the creation of a new consumption market, characterized by imported luxury goods (textile, leathers) as well as new recreational services (cafes, confectionaires, restaurants). This new market, totally distinguished from the old bazaar, began to spread rapidly over the new center and principally, along the new main streets of Eolou and Ermou. Both the municipal and national governments showed support for these new activities and tried to facilitate them. They both agreed on the enlargement of Eolou Street, the private appropriation of a public "people's garden" (in order to offer more space for commercial activities) and the covering of the
central streets. The municipal government displayed a significant efficiency during this period, regarding a 'decent' shaping of the new center: it undertook the coverage of 18 central streets, using French engineers;* it also cared for their illumination, beautification and leveling;** it established a new food market in the new west neighborhood of Neopolis, a new slaughterhouse out of the city this relieving Athenians from the "terrible spectacle" of the "butchery of the animals... on the sidewalks in front of the butcher shops or wherever the butchers would like" (K. Mpires, 1966, p. 88). A cleaning service and a second cemetery were also organized. Finally the local authorities undertook medium-scale infrastructure works, such as repairing and extending the water reservoir, water supply system and sewage system, funding them through new taxations.

Related to the establishment of new business in the central district was the problem of goods transportation and distribution. Urban transportation as well as connection with Piraeus became vitally important to the economy of the city. A contract between the national government and Feraldi Company—which was also entrusted with the installation of a gas system—for the construction and exploitation of a railway line connecting Athens to Piraeus, marked the birth of a new cycle of works critical for the development of the capital.

Ermou Street, whose extension was reserved for the building of the station, was expected to become a major entrance to the city. A series of street improvements, in

*These works were financed by Tossitsas' donation and by offerings from Athenians. (See K. Mpires, 1966, p. 85)

**While leaving the rest of the streets dirty and dusty (See E. Stassinopoulos, 1973, p. 377)
Ermou Street, as well as in 30 other streets, related to the above connection and to forthcoming tramways, were approved by modificatory decrees. Most of the "improvements" resulted in destruction to portions of the west side of the old city, where low-income population was living.

The management of army engineering service, enforced the evacuation of buildings, and proceeded with their demolition, showing the proper effectiveness [sic] for the execution of the works. (K. Mpires, 1966, p. 84)

But finally, when improvements were to be applied to other parts of the city, local government objected to them and stopped any further implementation.

But this internal dynamic development of commerce, and the related introduction of transportation, and of new services, brought another pressure to the limited layout of the city: population growth.*

In the rest of the period two proposals for an overall city plan were worked out, which were intended to cope with the problem of city expansion.

In 1860, the Stavrides Committee, which consisted of army engineers, architects, the French civil engineer Daniel and the mayor, proposed a format for expansion layouts and modifications in the old Master Plan. The latter included new squares in the perimeter of the central areas which were intended to accommodate institutional buildings. A city government that could not afford the suggested expropriations, opposed the plan, which was finally rejected.

*Between 1856 and 1861 the average annual increase of the Athenian population jumped to 5.9 percent from the 0.4 percent growth rate during 1853-56. (See K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 178.)
In 1864, the management of the army engineers came up with a new proposal that basically consolidated the guidelines of the former one. Three quarters of the "new" plan were finally approved. It provided the city with layouts for expansion in its northeastern part, above the Educational Center and northwest around Metaxourgeion the first textile industry. Although the expansions were following the geometrical lines of Kleanthes's and Shaumbert's Master Plan, the neoclassical concept had degenerated into a mechanical repetition of streets and blocks that followed gridiron patterns. The plan was also modified according to preexisting ownership boundaries. The resulting plan would be valid for the next seven decades. Soon, however, it would be overwhelmed by the actual growth of the city which occurred in every direction.

With all the above activities, central government tried to achieve two goals: first, to complete the initial attempts for a well-defined center according to the imperatives of neoclassicism and, by doing so, to control its character; and, second, to respond to the developing trends in the city, regarding growing economy and population. 'Clearances' proved to be a 'successful' means for the facilitation of the new market, while expansion through a well-defined overall master plan, would prove from the very beginning the inadequacy of neoclassical tools and the administration to cope with the growing population of the city.

*It divided the city into four parts according to the cross section of Eolou and Ermou Streets. The fourth part, which was not approved included archaeological space. State government didn't have the required money for compensation of the houses under expropriation. (See K. Mpries, 1966, p.161)
Trends During 1870's--The Appearance of Laissez-Faire

During the 1870s the trends related to the economic and population growth of the city, would be intensified. Financial activities and transportation works would come to be added to the already expanded commerce and enrich the character of the city as a business center. Correspondingly, city-making would, thenceforward, ignore the outdated Master Plan and concentrate on three aspects: opening of new arteries; laying out of railway and transportation lines; quick and cheap housing for the new residents.

This shift in priorities was connected with the new role that Athens assumed for itself and for the rest of the country, due to changing conditions in the political and economic scene. In 1863 Otto was expelled. He left the country, carrying in his bags the whole ideological framework that he had tried to introduce into Greece during the 40 years of his reign. Constitutional change opened up the way to the introduction of liberalism but still kept it bounded to the institution of the monarchy. Parallel to the political change, three important changes would mark the economic development: the transfer of capital by the Greek diaspora*; the increase of international loans and the involvement of international capital inside the economy of the country and the appearance of the first important industrial attempts.

As a result, this period is the beginning of the establishment of capitalism all over the country. State comes to play the role of mediator between the various forces trying both to coordinate and facilitate capitalistic development. Private initiative was defined as the vehicle

*From the Balkan and Egyptian communities, where rising of local national bourgeois classes, together with political interventions of the great powers, created unstable conditions.
for this development and the various governments were establishing the institutions that would support and protect it. Thus, Koumoundouros' government proceeded with the distribution of national lands to peasants (1871), and with protectionist measures for the protogenic industry.* But industry and agriculture were pacing their first steps, while competing against each other for first place in the protectionist policy of the central government.

As a result, large Greek capital coming from the Greek communities abroad, reserved for itself the role of financier of the various enterprises. Also, together with the international capital, it turned to investments in transportation works and mines. Their center of enterprises became Athens from where together with the state government they would establish their various networks all over the country.

Athens became the financial center of the country as well as a dynamic competitor for the other economic centers of the country. In the period between 1868 and 1873, 11 banks were established in the city and began to open branches all over the country. On the other hand, Athens was developing as a center for capital. First was Piraeus a fast growing commercial and industrial port and after was Lavrion, a city with mines and an emerging metallurgy industry. Piraeus was gaining in importance regarding the two other ports of the country, Patras and Syras, while Lavrion was becoming the first mining center of the Balkan peninsula.

As a result, the matter of connecting Athens with the developing centers of the surrounding region became the first priority regarding any planning decisions. National

*See K. Vergopoulos, 1975, p. 333.
government contributed to transportation development by opening new streets leading out of the city, while large capital undertook the construction and exploitation of railway and tramway lines. At the same time, municipal government was limited to secondary infrastructure works only inside the Athenian territory.

The army engineering service was in charge of both the city plan and new route construction until 1879. Their first attempts to connect the old rural roads, which had been overlooked by Kleanthes's Master Plan, to the center of the city failed because of the required expropriations and reaction by the residents.* The only old road that managed to be laid out so as to carry transportation networks was Patession Street leading to Patessia suburb and Kefissias Street, passing through Ampelokepi suburb and leading to the prestigious suburb of Kefissia. Two new important roads came to be added to the above network: Alexandras Street, a peripheral road connecting the two former streets, and Syggrou Street leading from the center to the small port of Phaleron. The municipal government contributed to the development of Alexandras Street by buying a large estate which became bisected. Syggrou Street construction was funded by Syggros's donation. Both were characterized as national roads, according to the Act of December 5, 1864, which facilitated their opening by the City Plan Service. But as the national government, together with the local one, had limited financial resources, it remained for private initiative to complete the rest of the transportation works.

In 1869 the completion of the railway line connecting Athens and Piraeus by a British company and an Athenian bank, marked the incorporation of the two cities in a bi-

THE CENTER

THE RAILWAY
Polar system.* Piraeus grew simultaneously during this decade, so that, by 1879, it had quadrupled its population over three decades, while Patras and Syra had stable populations. It became the most dynamic industrial center of the country producing textiles, engines, leathers, and tanning. Together with Lavrion, it concentrated almost all the industrial activities of the region while Athens remained as the administrative, educational and financial center.

After the construction of the Athens-Piraeus line, the French company of Lavrion Mines constructed the Attica Railway Line, connecting Athens to Lavrion, with a branch to Kifissia suburb, where most of its capitalists and executives were living. The terminal station was initially in the periphery of the city (Attica Square), but soon it was moved nearer to the center (Lavrion Square).

A Belgian company undertook the construction of inner-city horse-tramways as well as facilitation of the nearby suburbs and, later, connection to Phaleron and Piraeus. Previous period 'clearances' had supplied the space for the tramway's central network, while new street openings allowed for its branches.

Besides transportation lines, the same companies also undertook development of recreational centers around their suburban stations in order to attract more passengers and to gain profit from their exploitation. First, the Athens-Piraeus railways, after buying a large parcel of state land in north Phaleron, established there an entertainment center, including sea baths, restaurants, candy shops, dancing clubs, summer theater and gardens (1880). This center had a remarkable impact on its surroundings. Within a few

*See Prevelakis, p. 113.
years a new high-income summer settlement was developed. Some years later the competitor, Tramway Company, reached the area and added its own development—an operetta theater, a luna park and gardens. In addition, Attica Railways developed a recreational center in front of the Kifissia station.

Parallel to the transportation works, new housing areas were developing in the periphery of the city. Following a different process than before, land speculators divided land into lots according to gridiron patterns, and sold them to the large numbers of middle-strata*, who were coming to work in state and private services. Contrary to the transportation companies’ practice, these developers aimed at an easy acquisition of profit and not at an intensive capitalistic exploitation of land. As a result, their "neighborhoods" were lacking any facilities or communal spaces.

These parcels of residential land were continuously added to the city plan, as expansions of the city, and, for the time being, were concentrated to the north of the city along Patession Street. The same military service that had showed absolutism during the implementation of street clearances looked askance at this mode of city expansion, which they could not control. The abandonment of neoclassical planning practices, by the same people who had promoted its application, shows how decisive the socio-economic changes were. Speculative development came to respond to the dynamic growth of population, providing it with cheap land for housing. This mode of city-making was to be the vehicle for housing commercialization and the

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*The average annual increase in population was 4.3 percent for the years 1870-1879. In 1870, Athens's population of 60,000 was almost double that of 1853 (36,000). (See K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 178 and p. 167.)
dominant model for city expansion in the following years.

Trends at the Turn of the Century--Athens and Piraeus, a Powerful Bipolar System

In the following years the forms that appeared as a response to the trends of development would prevail over the city structure. Land speculation would guide the spatial development, while railway networks would be intensified, achieving the connection of the two centers, Athens and Piraeus, with the rest of the country.

Simultaneously, two changes in both the economic and institutional frameworks would mark the further development of the two cities. First, Athens-Piraeus would come to function as a dual urban whole. By the turn of the century they would be the dominant economic center of Greece. Second, the City Plan Service was transformed from a military to a civil one, abandoning, at the same time, any construction activity.

Changes in the Greek political and economic scene became critical to the extent of the development in Athens and Piraeus. Greece had already broadened its physical borders: besides the annexation of the Ionian Sea islands (1864), the fertile rural areas of Thessalia and Arta, came to be added, in 1881, to its narrow territory. The latter addition inflated, on the one hand, the national aspirations, but they also raised the issue of the large estates (Tsiflikia). Wealthy Greek bourgeois from abroad had bought the major part of the land, as in the case of Attica County, before the departure of the Turks. Sometimes, they concurred with the great landowners and capitalists of the Athenian area (Zographos, Skylitzis).* These

people, by treating the previous individual cultivators as a simple labor force and the land as simply a safe investment, and not as a field for intensive exploitation, and by continuously pressing the governments to take protectionist measures for their rural products, put the brakes on capitalistic development in agriculture and industry. Later, the country would pay with a political and economic crisis, for this superfluous protectionism.

Trikoupis' government (1882, and 1885-1895) followed a compromising policy between the great farmers' interests and those of the industrialists. As in the 1870s they favored mainly investments in infrastructure as the safest means for capital accumulation. As a result, rural reform and industrial development were delayed during this period. Recession of economic development, heavy international loans, as well as an international economic crisis, brought the country to bankruptcy in 1893.

Despite this crisis, Athens and Pireaus continued to develop. Furthermore, while the other urban centers of the country started declining--the only exception being the Thessalia cities*--the hierarchical networks, that the capital city had already established all over the country, through public and large capitalist mechanisms, started to bear fruit. The two cities were continuously receiving the surplus of production, money and people from the other centers.

Two of the three railway lines that were built during this period, (Athens-Peloponese and Athens-Thessalia) had as their starting points Athens and Piraeus. The third one (Thessalia Railways) was financed by an Athenian capitalist (A. Syggros). The Corinth Channel (1893), connecting the Ionian and Aegean Seas, was responsible for upsetting the

hierarchy of the Greek ports: Piraeus became the first port of the country.

During this period, the two cities would be the first reception centers for the large rural population, as well as the filter for the migrants moving to Asia Minor and the U.S.A. From 1879 to 1889 both cities experienced a 61 percent increase in population (by 1889, 114,000 people lived in Athens, and 34,000 in Piraeus). This growth had a significant impact on the city layout.

State government, since it had secured a well-planned center along with its connecting routes, left its previous active role and merely kept the regulatory one, leaving the housing problem to be solved by the land market quickly and inexpensively.

In 1879, the military engineering service was replaced in their city-planning role by a body of civil engineers attached to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. This service consisted, in the beginning, of graduates from the School of Surveying of the National Technical University. Later, it would include graduates from the School of Civil Engineering. Their education was confined to a strictly technical orientation, while the technocrat role was reserved, at that time, mostly for the graduates of the European schools. Infrastructural works were reserved for foreign engineers, while City Plan Service people didn't have any decisive intervention. The latter, holding a white collar attitude and working inside a bureaucratic institution, could not generate or promote any elaborated concept for the future of the city. Thus, they were concentrated exclusively on the occasionally developed pieces, checking if they conformed to their regulations. But, even in this case, they could not take any initiative, due to their non-permanent status. Their position was totally dependent on the good will of the successive governing politicians, who, operating in a patronage-oriented 'clientele' system, spent
most of their time trying to fulfill their voters' wishes. As a result, the employees of the City Plan Service, continually fearing for their own jobs, were unable to participate in any essential interference in the development of the city, and they were satisfying the land speculators' interests. In addition, they didn't have any responsibility for the various site plans involving public or municipal institutions. These site plans were elaborated by professional architects.

During this period a significant number of institutional buildings were built—mainly social welfare buildings (e.g. asylums, hospitals, prisons). These institutional buildings were considered less prestigious—their structure and location followed the prevailing market practices. Consequently they were spread throughout the periphery of the city, where land was cheap enough for the necessary expropriations. The buildings' plans were added to the city plan as 'expansions'.* Therefore, even the public institutions, followed the laissez-faire model regarding location of their buildings.

Land speculative patterns continued to prevail in residential areas. Now graduates of the school of surveying, hired by developers or by landowners themselves, were the 'planners'. Their model: land slicing. The forms of the new areas: a piece without beginning or end, with the only reference point being a major traffic artery, a station or a social welfare institution. No expansion of this period can be considered as a distinctive entity. Surrounding the city on every side along the railway and tramway lines, these new residential 'neighborhoods' were totally dependent upon the center.

In the years 1878 to 1907, city layout increased from 800 to 3995 acres,* a fourfold increase in area for a population that had only doubled.** The average population density, which was already low in 1880 (48.8 inhabitants/acre) became even less in 1907 (38.4 inhabitants/acre)*. It seems that aside from the pressure created by an expanding population, the power of land speculators was another decisive factor in shaping the Athenian urban form.

Finally, for the people who could not afford to buy a piece of land, a small 'squatter' settlement was the only viable alternative. The settlement started around the time of Otto's expulsion, and was built by artisans from the island of Anafi over the old neighborhood of the city and under Acropolis rock, in a public area (archaeological space). This traditional neighborhood would be left by the City Plan Service to survive to the present. Besides the fact that this process could provide cheap housing to the poorest migrants, located in the outskirts of the city and out of any range, in contrast to the unauthorized settlement of Proastion, which was incorporated into the city plan two decades ago.

In the rest of the residential areas soon the empty spaces between the new quarters would be filled in. The installation of an electrical plant in Phaleron, in 1892, by Nicholaedis, who represented the French company 'Thomson Houston de Mediterranee'. Electrification of tramways and railways (1904, 1906) would affect the spread of the city along their lines.

But another dynamic factor seems to enter onto the

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**In 1907 Athens and Piraeus had a combined population of 250,000, while in 1879 they had 100,000 (See K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 169, p. 177).
scene to mark the urban development during the next period: industrial growth.

The black mass of the 'fertilizers' factory that, since 1909, lay at the entrance of Piraeus and was a continuing symbol of Greece's first industrial development would underlie a new stage in the history of the two cities.
From 1860 on Athens was beginning to form the nucleus of its new urban reality;

The whole city consists of two central streets, Eolou and Ermou. Around them the four quarters are located, while a little beyond a new city has been formed, [Neapolis].

(M.A. Proust, 1858 in E. Stassinopoulos, 1973, p. 417)

The growing city showed, from the very beginning, a deviation from its first plan concept and its medieval precedent. The real center was neither the large avenues of the central triangle, that Kieanthes had conceived, nor the colorful mixture of social, commercial, residential, open and closed activities of the old bazaar, but the intersection of two new, but not so wide, streets (Ermou and Eolou).

The intersection represented the appearance of a new reality: that of a capitalistic market operated by middle-class merchants, oriented to imported consumption goods and addressing itself to the new bourgeois population of the city. Beginning from the intersection of the two streets, the new commercial activities would expand, occupying the central and western part of the central triangle.

Although, initially, the four divisions of the city occupied equal areas, their buildings were not equally distributed. Low-income residents were compressed in the west side of the old city, due to the increased land values in the east side, where the Palace and the cultural centers were located. Apart from the other residencies a new neighborhood was formed towards the northwest, where the first textile industrial unit (Metaxourgion) was installed. The upper class was building its mansions in its own area, in the east side of the new center. In addition to the above settlements, and in the extension of the central streets,
scattered houses had appeared and were built for the middle-income population.

The old neighbourhoods of Plaka, Psyrri, Thesseion Metaxourgion, and, later, Neapolis were densely inhabited. A great number of houses were also built in Vatrachonissi, Makryyanni, Vathes Square, and in the area around the gas plant, which, along with the western neighborhoods of Athens, were the poorest and most miserable quarters of the city. Today prestigious Kolonaki was scatterly inhabited till its square. ...There were, however, other spot islands inhabited too,...., as well as some scattered houses over Lyssiatreion.

(D. Skouzes, 1961, p. 9-10)

If spatial segregation in the capital itself was following a step-by-step process, segregation in the new dynamic bipole, (Athens-Piraeus) was already a fact. The space of the port was reserved for two, explicitly defined functions: that of importation of goods and that of supporting the first industrial installations along with working class housing. The railway line, was dividing the city into two distinctive parts: one of a mixed commercial and residential character, for high and middle incomes, and another mixed industrial and residential area, for low-income people.

Simultaneously, Athens was developing into an administrative and business center, as well as a reception area for the new middle class people. Its center was seized by the two ruling powers: state and financial capital, while retail was an indispensable part of both. Each one of them would follow different directions, inside the central triangle: The first two would reserve the eastern part for both their enterprises and their housing, while the latter would spread over the central and western part, along with the municipal enterprises. Through a "natural" process of development, without any intervention of zoning regulations, each one of the central streets would obtain its own character, which would remain to the present time.*
Following the labor segregation, the two cities developed different cultural characteristics. A new type of recreational center was found throughout Athens. These were offering "light" music or a kind of musical performance that became very popular among the new middle strata. One could find such centers not only around Concord Square but also in the outskirts of the city, along Illissos river, and near the seashore, in Phaleron. The so-called "hovel" music centers, on the other hand, that were popular among the lower urban strata, were displaced and sent to the basements of Pireaus's shops. In this way, middle and working strata were spatially segregating from each other.

But, at the same time, we have the fusion of the old "traditional" life-style with the new "European" one. The marriages, for instance, that took place under the protective gaze of the Palace -- first between the descendants of the heroes of the revolution and the intellectuals from Constantinople and, later, between politicians and capitalists -- resulted in the creation of the so-called "High births" of the country and represent a symbolic event through which cultural conflicts were absorbed. The prestigious western patterns prevailed also as the model for imitation by the malleable mass of the petit bourgeoisie.

The "theoretical" grounds for the new ideology were produced by the highest state educational institutions -- University, Academy and the National library -- all located on the eastern side of the central triangle. The two universities were, until the end of the nineteenth century the only universities, that served the Balkan area, as well as the Near East. As such they played an important role in

* Ermou Street for female fashion; Stadiou Street for male clothing; Athenas Street as food market; Eolou Street as financial, commercial and social center, Panepivistimiou and Academias as cultural centers.
concentrating the most dynamic cultural part of the Greek speaking people of these areas in the capital. The universities also influenced the shape of political behavior. The specific orientation of Kappodistrian University, for example, emphasized classical studies -- philosophy, theology, law -- as well as an arteriisclerotic version of Platonic philosophy, combined with the most absolutist lines of 19th century Western thought. Its graduates were the bearers of a conservative ideology, which on a theoretical level was linked to academia, while in the everyday practice was translated into the most scholastic, bureaucratic behavior. They were keeping high the banner of archaic, official language,* and strongly resisting any challenges coming from the more venturesome parts of the capitalistic class or from more progressive intellectuals. They were afraid of losing their status together with their symbols.** Similarly the envelope of the state cultural institutions kept the neoclassical morphology denoting the immutability of their content.

But besides these prestigious educational buildings, international Greek capitalists financed an extensive education program for all social levels: a large schooling mechanism was developed all over the country, including primary, high and commercial schools. Its purpose was to give the rural-origin people an opportunity to acquire those skills necessary for their employment as clerks in public and private services, both in Greece and in the Greek communities abroad.

*See E. Stassinopoulos, 1973, p. 454. The problem of language would be the cause of a series of protests undertaken by the state middle-class which, at the turn of the century was losing its power in front of a broader application of an industrial development. These protests gave to others the opportunity to express their anti-royalist feelings against a dynasty that was more inclined to support British interests than Greek ones.

**See K. Vergopoulos, 1977, p. 171.
The same people also financed the series of health, pedagogic, and disciplinary institutes that were erected on the periphery of Athens: night schools for working children, schools for women and the poor, hospitals, asylums and prisons. The last two categories were addressed to marginal and psychopathic people, whose number inevitably increased with the rapid capitalistic growth.

The increase of population, after 1870, revealed the inadequacy of the hospital care, as well as the inadequacy of social welfare. The Municipal Civic Hospital was obliged to accept patients from all over Greece. It treated only acute pathologic cases, while those suffering from chronic or incurable diseases could find asylum only in the monasteries. The mentally ill, whose relatives could not secure for them a bed in the cells of the monastery of Dafni, were carrying around their misery, in the streets of the Capital. Together with them, a great number of unsheltered people of every age, were begging for one penny or a piece of bread. The gas village, a mixture of huts and wretched sheds, between the gas plant and Sacred Street was a real hell of misery and corruption. The very old and uninhabitable buildings of Trigeta and Garbola were used as prisons. A prison term there was the worst misery, if not death. The working children, on the other hand, were condemned to remain totally uneducated and they were subjected to many dangers.

(K. Mpires, 1966, p. 202)

New social mechanisms began developing in order to handle the "marginal" phenomena and to spread over the lower social strata of the city the dominant system of values. In the wake of two epidemics that Athens suffered in 1854 (cholera)* -- and in 1881 (typhus), philanthropic associations were constituted by members of the royal family, local government, and the Athenian bourgeoisie, and were funded by Greek capitalists. Their purpose was to care for the victims of diseases, orphans, and women. These organizations under-

*During an Anglo-French military intervention -- aiming at the "neutrality" of Greece during the Russian-Turkish Crimean War.
took the establishment of social welfare institutions. Between 1870 and 1890 twelve buildings were erected in the outskirts of the existing city in order to accommodate such institutions.* In contrast with the shining educational buildings of the central district, the plain and austere new ones constituted the fortresses of the Athenian society. But both represent the twofold function of the public ideological mechanisms: to project the basic directions of the nation and 'correct' any nonconforming element.

The eastern-central area was reserved to play the first role. Two new landmarks of the city stood apart from the bulk of the monumental buildings: Zappeion, a semicircular neoclassical exhibition hall intended for the display of agricultural and industrial products of the country, and the reconstructed stadium. Both were located near the Royal Garden and were built with funds donated by Zappas, a wealthy Greek from Rumania.

Providence donated to us so much wealth, we were able to do both: beneficences and raising children. As I am older, and because I want to benefit our fatherland as much as possible with my wealth, I am asking you to create a family, so as to conserve our name.

(EV. Zappas to his nephew K. Zappas in "Signature", 1979, p. 47)

K. Zappas would follow in his uncle's footsteps:

Let the name of our family be conserved in the memory of humanity, through out good acts. It is impossible for me, not to follow your own traces, either in this world, or the future one.

(op. cit.)

As Rowe has said, when "active benevolence becomes the

*Houses for the poor, night schools for working children, hospitals, an infant asylum, workshops for poor women, an asylum for women's education, a sanatorium, Syggrou prison, a madhouse, a juvenile prison, an orphanage, an asylum for the incurable, and others. In addition, six more buildings of the same category were built between 1890 and 1909.
social goal it is probably time to look out."* Great
donators' proposals for the shaping of their 'Ithaca' had
first been addressed to the Royal family members, the most
active promoters of their aspirations.
For most of them Athens was a field to project their
Platonic utopia; neoclassicism appears in most of the monu-
ments they built in the center of the city. But, at the
turn of the century, several "foxes" appeared among them.
A. Tyggros, for example -- at the same time he was financing
theaters, and educational and social welfare institutions,
he was also involved in works of infrastructure and trans-
portations, banks, industry, mines and commerce (Korinth
Channel, Thessalia Railways, Bank of Thessalia, Mines of
Lavrion and Serifos, trade in arms).
However Athens of the late 19th and early 20th century
cannot be attributed to the power of only one social group.
It was a field where many new forces were interacting,
trying to establish a new way of life. "Clearances" were
one of the aspects of this new ideology; the expulsion of
traditional open air trade from the center of the city was
another one. For those in power, anything recalling a
"vulgar" tradition had to be eliminated.
Over there to the west, lie the Gypsies-workshops.
I have heard some time ago, that they decided to
remove this whole guild in order to locate it in
Petralona, or I don't know where else. Till to-
day, I haven't heard if they have abandoned this
plan. I never hear anything in time. It would
be sad if they expel these lovely sounds of life
and work, which harden the ears and strengthen the
nerves.
(A. Papadiamantis, 1896, p. 219)
The character of the city center, as a territory for
modern businesses and public institutional buildings, was
established during this period. Athens would keep it until

*C. Rowe, 1975, p. 72.
today, although inside a different architectural context.

If laissez-faire had finally been subordinated in a pre-planned core in the central district, its impact was decisive for the character of the periphery. This mixture of railway arteries, rural and national roads, gridiron schemes, and scattered housing, approaches more the Victorian model more than its precedent neoclassical one.

This type of development had appeared in the European and American cities some decades earlier. Certainly, the close collaboration of Greek bourgeois with the European and mainly English capitalists and the deep penetration of the latter into the Athenian economic life, was also reflected in the patterns followed in the city. But Athenian laissez-faire coincides also with a significant change inside the social structure of the city. Its middle-class became more connected to private capital than to public organizations.* Land speculation found in these new strata a new market of potential of buyers.

Nevertheless, inside the urban structure, the previous trends, regarding class distribution continued, but in an even more divergent fashion. Lower strata were settled in the western part of the periphery, upper class in the eastern one, and middle strate mostly in the north and south.

Late-19th-century Athens was still a city with a coherent structure, despite the fact that it consisted of differentiated parts. It was a city developed around one center and along a main axis radiating from it. Through building regulations and the architecture of private houses it was

*Interval composition of tertiary sector in Greece (K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 192)

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consolidating an escalation from the periphery to the center. It was a white-collar city, that was still holding its population around the work places.

Besides the common character of their jobs, these people also shared common ideological grounds. Like their habitats, gathered around a unique center, their ideological directions were all converging on one notion: the "great idea", the dream of liberating the Greek areas that were still under the rule of the Ottoman empire.

The 'Great Idea', I am proud of it. My first surprising ecstasy blew from my infancy when I heard of it in my home. They used to whisper it around like a great secret, like an expectation for a future resurrection. And I believed in it with a sacred devotion. (K. Palamas in K. Vergopoulos, 1977, p. 178)

The "Great Idea", by connecting the present reality to the romantic goals of the Greek revolution, had been the backbone of the neohellenic ideology during much of the 19th century. Every political government, no matter what its economic program was, recognized it as the priority that would lead to the national completion.* Athens, after gathering the greatest part of the Greek bourgeois from the Balkan peninsula and Egypt, became the workshop, where guidelines of national policy were laid out. But control over the official cultural mechanisms as a means to diffuse the "Great Idea" was not enough by itself, for the achievement of national unity. Since neoclassicism failed to move the Greeks, by raising the "absolute perfection" of their ancient model, Greek Nationalism had to conform to everyday reality and the new conditions emerged.

The concept of "Great People" came to unify the individual subjects and to be added to the concept of Nation. It included everyone: capitalists and workers; state officers and entrepreneurs, bankers and employees, manufac-

turers and speculators; bourgeois and peasants. All these different forces that emerged and walked together with capitalism could not be satisfied with the static schemes that neoclassicism professed. Greek intellectuals undertook to restore the image of contemporary Greeks in history. Continuity of Greek civilization through the Byzantine Empire and traditional communities was the main aspect of Paparegopoulou's *History of the Greek Nation* and N. Politis' anthropological studies. The actors of this evolution were the "Great People,* in other words, contemporary Greeks. The subject of the "Great Idea" was shifted from the static principles to the living potential of the country.

"Our popular tradition is inside us, like the traces of our soul; following it we will find our soul, the real source of Neohellenic life. Popular tradition will lead us to the source of this life."

(I. Dragoumis in A. Konstantinidis, 1950, p. 57)

In reality Athenian development followed neither the traces of ancient tradition, nor those of the popular one. The rare exceptions of Proastion and Anafiotika are nothing more than the confirmation of the rule. "Liberation" of the individual subject brought in the light the speculative soul, which subordinated private will inside his monotonous rules. And the extensive system of the new neighborhoods was dependent on one center where state and capital reigned. Athenian capitalism, after breaking down the traditional entity into a number of atoms, succeeded in keeping them along his grounds, by ensuring a personal piece of land for each one, inside its territory. Binding, also, each independent molecule to the main economic, political

*The concept of "People-Nation" was projected, at that time, in Europe, through Neo-Kantian philosophy, as a moral idea that combined the justification of History with the personal elevation and salvation. Neitzschean philosophy was very influential in the formation of its Greek interpretation. (See K. Vergopoulos, 1977, p. 173).*
and ideological choices of its center, capitalism succeeded in establishing a more or less unified continuum in the Athenian environment. Architecture comes to confirm this structural entity. From the ends of the city to the center, the different interpretations of a more or less common architectural language marked, during that period, an escalated but unified whole.
Ownership Patterns & Building Processes

Although the Athenian expansions had as common denominator the organization around a focal point, each wave of expansion was ruled by its own type of internal order. In terms of patterns of land subdivision, the city's periphery was looking closer to a set of differentiated patches than to a uniform entity. Contrary to the unique expansion unit, seen in other Mediterranean cities of the time, Athens displayed four clearly different types of urban fabric: distorted grid, regular grid, combination between grid and neoclassical schemes and, finally, traditional insular village fabric.*

The first three types were addressed to all social ranges of the Athenian population, while the latter remained only a habitat for working-class people.

The distorted grid marked the first expansions of the city and, later, became the most frequent pattern. Such grids were developing along the old roads that were connecting Athens with the rural areas of the county (Patessian Street, Kifissias Street, Pireaus Street, etc.). The irregular course of these roads, as well as the incremental process of land parceling were the main generators of the "incidental" form that this kind of grid was finally taking.

The development of these quarters was initially characterized by the concentration around specific poles

*We should point out the different form of the Kifissia suburb. Isolated from the middle class suburbs, this prestigious settlement, diverged from both the other expansions of the city and the European suburban model. The land looks as if it were divided 'incidentally', following a distorted grid pattern; but the qualitative differences lie in the larger size of its blocks, the extremely low population density and its luxuriant vegetation.
("suburbs"* such as Patessia and Ampelokipi; or railway stations, as in Attica Square and in Larissa Street) and by scattered residential structures between the center and the poles. Continuous parceling was followed by the gradual incorporation of the new areas into the city plan as "city expansions".

Due to the unbelievably high prices of the lots inside the city, ... many are building out of the boundaries of the Plan. As a result, new incomplete quarters are added in the Plan and new roads are continuously established; thus the area of the city has become almost equal to that of Smyrna, but including many vacant spaces.

(From an Athenian newspaper, in Mpires, 1966, p. 169)

The new quarters were characterized by the coexistence of straight and irregular streets intersecting each other at various angles, and by the lack of public or communal spaces. The blocks had different sizes, usually larger along the main street (Patession Street, Kefissias Street) and smaller in their perpendicular ones.

Looking at land subdivision as it was before urbanization, one can make two hypotheses: that the new quarters either had derived from rural land previously subdivided to smaller fields, or from a gradual parcelization of the original estates. The second case was the most frequent in the areas adjacent to the city. As we have seen in previous chapters, Greeks from abroad had bought more than the 50% of the Attica county land before the departure of the Turks. The rest of the land became National land. A small part of it was sold, at low prices, to the peasants; radical distribution of much of the land didn't take place until 1871, under the Koumoundouros government -- it constituted the first step of an agricultural policy, that

*In reality they were something between suburban and urban development, incorporated into the city plan as suburbs. They represent the first examples of distorted grid patterns.
had chosen the small or middle ownership of land as the quicker vehicle for the incorporation of the agricultural production into the capitalistic system.* A large part of the national lands had been appropriated by the cultivators, who had the right of usufruct, while the rights of ownership remained with the state.* In order to claim ownership titles, the prerequisite was not to pay taxes, as tax payment was proof of a leasing relationship. The distribution of national lands was nothing more than the arrangement of a situation which had been equivocal socially and economically for a long time.** The fact that the private usufruct of land according to the Ottoman agricultural system, was a common pattern in Greece in the past, may explain why this trend for small or medium ownership formation was so strong inside the rural population.***

What one can assume from the above land ownership patterns, regarding the shaping of the Athenian periphery, is that prior rural land around the city belonged to both, large and small landowners. The variable sizes of the City Plan 'expansion' -- from small to large -- corroborate this assumption. However, the larger expansions appeared first and more frequently than the smaller ones.

In both areas that followed the distorted type of grid model, urban land parceling was very similar to that of agricultural land. This switching of land from rural to

*See K. Vergopoulos, 1975, p. 89.

**According to Tsoukalas, one-third to one-half of the national lands, 3,000 square km, had been appropriated till 1879, (K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 74).

***See K. Vergopoulos, 1975, pp. 31-39. The land, during the years of the Ottoman occupation belonged to the Sultan, but the system was so loose, that the users, mainly small and medium cultivators, acted as the owners by Roman Law. The imposed German-Roman Law system in the new state ignored the traditional patterns in rural land, and created many misconceptions.
2.4 LAND DEVELOPMENT
urban, which was initiated by large powerful landowners, and from time to time included some small or medium cultivators, resulted in the increase of the number and the wealth of the Athenian capitalists.

One had better not ask for names among the local noblemen.... Names of unknown Athenians started to appear, because of their shining wealth, gained from the rural land speculation of the exploitation of Athenian quarries. These people derived from the class of Albanians who lived in Plaka and in the villages surrounding Athens...

(K. Mpires, 1966, p. 183)

It seems that something more than a small group of people gained from the intensification of speculation. It is also true that, since land prices in the new quarters were relatively low, a large number of the new population was accommodated in this way, for it was ensuring them a small piece of land and a house of their own. In addition, this process of land parceling led to a quick integration of the house construction industry into the capitalist system. Small enterprises were in charge of the construction which was still in the handicraft stage.

The state, by favoring the quick integration of land and housing markets into the capitalist system, tried to satisfy both large and small land owners.* In this way, a large portion of the newcomers soon became homeowners themselves.

The second type of expansion layout, the regular grid, derived from asystematic parcellization of large estates. It was developed after 1880, along the new streets or the tramways, (Alexandras, Kallithea), by the landowners themselves or speculative enterprises. It had a uniform

*A parallel compromising policy was applied in the rural areas, where the governments were squeezed in their effort to satisfy both large and small landowners.
rectangular grid pattern worked out by hired surveyors. The developers advertised the new areas by using seductive names totally unsuited to the dull and monotonous environments they were actually offering.

The third type, combination of neoclassical and grid-iron patterns, was an attempt to synthesize the character of the neighboring neoclassical monuments and their gardens (Zappeion, Stadium) with the successful speculative model.

Besides the typical patterns already described, there was also the formation of an "unauthorized" pattern (Proastion and Anafiotika), which tended to follow the traditional, island village model. Of the two settlements, the first one was absorbed inside the city fabric, as soon as the city started to expand towards its direction, while the second one still resists to any demolition or regulation. Both were established by artisans from the Aegean islands. Their layouts were characterized by a main bending street-agora-surrounded by "irregular" blocks and curved, secondary roads. They are the only examples of new neighborhoods with structured communal form, and totally distinguished from the speculative settlements. Proastion consisted of 60 houses and it was built on land that was legally acquired but not included in the city plan area.

Anafiotika was built on public land; officially, it was part of the archaeological space. The process that led to the development of Anafiotika presents striking similarities with later forms of land occupation:

In the beginning two craftsmen from Anafi Island taking advantage of the emergency situation during Otto's expulsion, had built without being noticed, with subtraction and addition, the curves of the rock (or Acropolis) created small houses. This nucleus not only attracted the rest of the builders, who had already been living in Athens, but it also served as a safe support for those, who, during the following years, would decide to leave their island and come to work in
the capital. This illegal settlement remained homogeneous till the two first decades of the next century. For, the solidarity and the mutual help for the always-secret-settlement of new people was given only to relatives and compatriots (Mpires, 1966, p. 172).

State government tolerated this illegal process, since it did not cost anything, on the one hand, while it provided a shelter to working class people, who were necessary for the increasing building sector of the capital.

Housing construction gradually became a matter of commercialization for the areas closer to the center of the city, while, in a large part of the periphery, guilds of craftsmen were still keeping personal contact with the house-owner. The impulse for commercialization took place in the wake of a new influx of people.

In 1879 a sudden increase in housing demand occurred. This increase was closely connected to the influx of Greeks from Egypt.* Several building enterprises appeared at that time to respond to the demand. They usually constructed two- to three-story houses. As the land belonged to many different landowners, these houses appeared in a random way: one at a time or two adjacent lots at the most, but never in long rows. "Houses for sale" were their name (metapratika). As a result, there was an intensification of urban tissue in the central areas, and the closer periphery. In the center, furthermore, there was an increase in the demand for prestigious housing and business spaces. The first bulky buildings appeared, which were characterized by an increased floor to area ratio and diminished or even light wells. Height also increased to three stories, and sometimes a basement was added. The first floor was usually reserved for commercial use, while the upper ones were multi-family dwelling units for rent, to

*Fearing possible revolt of the Arabs against foreigners, which actually occurred in 1882. (See K. Mpires, 1966, p. 198).
Greeks and foreign, high-ranking officers or young professionals. A combination of factors, such as the low efficiency and organization of the building enterprise, the handicraft character of building materials and elements production, the high cost of the imported iron beams, the inadequacy of the water supply system to serve the upper floors, as well as the desirable view of the Acropolis -- the supreme symbol of the city -- prevented the central areas from a systematic exploitation in the form of high buildings. Since it could not expand vertically, building floor-space was stretched to the limit, leaving minimal open spaces.

In the western side of the old city, intensification of urban tissue use took the form of adding rooms for rent. Small house-owners constructed impromptu, small, unhealthy rooms in the periphery of their yards, which usually sheltered poor students coming from the rural areas, or migrants and people without permanent jobs, usually singles, who preferred to live around the "job" market of the central area.

The other residential units, six to seven low rooms, all very old and dingy spaces, some without windows, almost all with rotting walls, were occupied by various people. There were two or three bachelors, one family with five or six children, one young divorced woman,... doing charring and obviously living alone. The inner room in the back of the yard was occupied by the house-owner ... and her daughter. This enclosure with the poor buildings was on a side street, between Psyrri and Tatsi neighbourhoods.

(A. Papadiamantis, 1900, p. 453)

Speculative Fabric and Individualism

Although the phenomenon of poverty and misery was limited, the differences between the rooms for rent or the small houses in Anafiotika, and their extreme opposite, the mansions of the ruling class people, was striking.
But, what did not bring the two opposites face to face and appeased the differences in a city scale was this extensive continuum of middle class neighborhoods. From the urban type of the two-to-three-story commercialized houses; to the lower, "suburban" townhouses with garden; from the more elaborate facades of the central streets; to the plain bulks in the city plan expansion; a broad channel was established, through which striking contradictions were diffused.*

The ruling class held for itself the absolute means of the architectural language, by hiring Greek and foreign architects gathered in the Greek Capital. Interpretation of the Beaux Art principles in the wealthy mansions became for the architects the only field, since any chance for architectural intervention on the city plan level had vanished. These mansions did not compose coherent complexes as in the cases of Paris or London. The Syntagma Square complex, governed by the architectural regulations of Otto's era, was the only exception to the rule. The rest of the eastern-central area was characterized by a variety of trends, according to the personal tastes of the various politicians, state officers, natives or foreign-born capitalists, landlords and intellectuals. Styles varied from the pure neoclassical to the most rich interpretation of the neorennaissance or neobaroque. The permanent setting of a large part of international Greek bourgeoisie** brought together the prevalence of Eclecticism over the Bavarian academism.

*An analogous continuum occurred in the language spoken in the city, which started from traditional idioms and continued to a whole range of mixed types in order to end to the artificial archaic language established as official by the new Greek State. (See K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 565).

**In 1880, of a total of 39 mansions, 23 belonged to wealthy Greeks who came from abroad, 14 to native Greeks and 2 to foreigners. See K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 242.
But this definition of "freedom" of style, still inside a classical repertoir, without any appearance of Avant-garde efforts, reveals the limits of the renovative spirits of Greek capitalists. The latter, preferring stability to risk, short-term to long profits, and bound to the European chariot, were repelled by any novelty that would bring change in a more or less stable society. This conservatism became more evident at the educational level, where, although they had the power, they did not dare to change an educational system oriented to the production of clerks, and as backwards as the dead, "official" language it used. For them, if it was not the most progressive process for the capitalistic development it was at least a stable one.

The educational system was actually one of the state mechanisms, that quickly transformed Greek society.

If there ever existed a country where the myth that social exclusion of the lower classes from the goods of civilization could be overcome through educational and cultural mechanisms,... that country is Greece.

(K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 571)

A large part of the rural population was absorbed by the broad schooling mechanism, and through it, transformed to a mass ready to be incorporated inside the urban middle class. This process of social rising was in conformity with the type of family programming that existed in the country.

The small ownership, managed by the family, was for centuries the basic economic unit. For such a small entity, the only way to protect itself from a further subdivision resulting from increasing numbers of its members, was to provide some of the new members with new horizons, located out of the borders of the family's own territory. Schooling system became the channel for this movement. The family was financing the studies of the sons in exchange for the exclusion from the agricultural land, and supported
2.5 1 Anafiotika 2 Popular 3 Metapratika 4 Eclectic 5 Rental CONTRASTS
them till they could make their own living. Politicians connected to the family through the "clientele" system, were protecting the graduates and providing them with clerking jobs in and out of the state mechanism. This process of "structural mobility" that produced a large part of Athens' population, was extremely influential in the system of values that prevailed in both the city and the country. For it secured strong social ties between the family unit and it functioned as a suspensive mechanism for any rising of sharp cultural conflicts between the two opposites. In reality the schooling mechanism, being stuck to a time-consuming program of teaching a complex and alien official language and an academic version of Greek history, produced masses of semieducated, antiproducive bureaucrats. For these people it was very easy to accept the ruling class ideology and imitate their patrons.

Feeling satisfied inside the "freedom" and "equality" of the regular or irregular grids in the capital, and having lost the community structure of their places of origins, the bureaucrats became the massive dough of the new urban population of Athens, without being able to structure their neighborhoods. On the other hand, the few working class settlements of the same period, show a rich weaving of social relationships in their environments.

For the individual petit-bourgeois at the end of the 19th century, personal contacts with high-ranking officers as well as individual ownership, became the means, through which he was trying to personalize his relationships with work and habitat. Although his home still denoted his personal identity, it also denoted his boundaries:

In 1860, personal contributions of the Athenians for the amelioration of the capital were stopped because some people were considering these isolated efforts as opposed to the new urban civilization. This marks the beginning of citizens' isolation, regarding their environ-
ment. Until that period Athenians were obliged to maintain themselves in the part of the streets corresponding to their own houses, and also to participate personally in a variety of other works or urban amelioration. The emerging bourgeois society, and specialization, put an end to personal and communal contribution in Athens.

(C. Haidopoulos, 1979, p. 36)

The indifferent new street patterns contributed to this isolation, by prohibiting the type of open communication that existed in the old city neighborhoods. But, while the new street patterns could not support the old form of urban life; they had nothing in common with the elaborate utility service system that other Mediterranean cities had.*

...most of the streets were unpaved. But even those covered with gravel, were overrun by a thick layer of mud because they were continually damaged by the wheels of carts and carriages, as well as by horseshoes. This created many problems for Athenians, either as dust during summer or as thick mud during winter.

(K. Mpires, 1966, p. 170)

In addition, the new quarters were lacking in water supply and disposal systems. Municipal government was incapable of dealing with the street under a "rational" perspective.

So, if local government, state government and utility services could not live up to their assumed roles -- as the bearers of a system of infrastructure ensuring the hygiene of the streets of the city -- what else could be this gridiron pattern than the best model for the exploitation of the salary earners by the speculators?

Hence, the new settlements contained nothing else than accesses and land for sale, the acquisition of this last good remained the only feasible expectation of the Athenian inhabitant.

the desire for individual settlement was widely spread in Athens. The private house, one story and simpler for the lower class, and two to three stories for the upper class, represented a common interest. Even in the houses built for rent, that contained two or three dwelling units, each one of them occupied a whole floor and it had its independent entrance and staircase. The simple internal organization included one row of several rooms in the front and another one at the back -- separated from the first by a middle wall.

(K. Mpires, 1966, p. 199)

An old custom that survived in Athens influenced a lot this broad spreading of private houses: According to it the family of the bride was obliged to provide the new couple with a house to live in. This social characteristic not only became adapted to the capitalistic relationships, but it continues until today to have a remarkable impact on the housing market.

As acquisition of a house was a family matter, even for the low incomes, state or city government could free themselves from the responsibility of housing provision for the new residents of the city. On the other hand, this "custom", still held in the capital, and strengthened the land market and the building construction sector of the city.

Certainly the 19th century speculative developments have little in common with the 20th century ad-hoc situation. But the origins of this phenomenon can be traced to the popular desire for individual housing, the absence of any state interferences in the shaping of the neighborhoods, and the inability of municipal government to respond to its role. But it was also something more. The dominance of a powerful land market, which was looking for the easiest and most profitable way to divide the land, and the absence of any strong resistance by the future residents to neighborhood models lacking social facilities. Small retail business came later to sporadically establish a few places of interaction in the new quarters. But, during those years
these places were concentrated in the central area. Among them cafe's were the most popular ones.

Since there were no structured bonds but only the ties of common fate, and social communication with the others was reduced to discussions of state matters, and political chit-chat. The great number of Athenian newspapers (56 out of a total of 131 in the whole country) with exclusively political content, reveals not only an extremely "political" society, but also the voracious appetite of the new "educated" population, professionals and employees, for public matters and their thirst for information. It shows also the important role of these "intellectuals" to the new Athenian society, which became closer to a "political society" than to a "society of citizens."

This attitude would become critical in the course of Athenian development. Inside the extensive grid of the periphery, lacking any intermediate social communal structure, the majority of the Athenian population would be acting simultaneously on two opposite levels: the individual and the public. The privately owned house would be the ideal for everyone, while familiarity with the public affairs would be the illusion, replacing real participation in the urban community.
The Decisive Turnover: 1909–1940

- INTRODUCTION
- THE FORMATION OF THE ATHENIAN AGGLOMERATION, PRODUCTIVE TRENDS AND THEIR DEMOGRAPHIC BASIS
- THE PLAN PROPOSALS: 1908–1924
- ADHOCISM AND CITY EXPANSION
  - The Establishment of the Refugees
  - 'Legal' and 'Illegal' Private Developments
  - The Congestion of the Center, the Multi-Story Urban Appartment Building
  - The Capital on the Eve of WW II
- INFRASTRUCTURES, CHANGES IN THE POWER STRUCTURE
The strong influence of socio-economic and political changes on the spatial shaping of cities is a truism. Emergency situations, on the other hand, while not given much honor in bibliographies, are also accountable for considerable alterations in city form.

In this section we are concerned with an extreme case: a city adopting a new shape in a milieu of painful transformation and continuous crisis. Under such pressure, change becomes a force out of control.

This was the case of Athens in the period from 1909 to 1940.

The task of social change was undertaken by the Army League (1909) which expressed, though in vague terms, the general desire for broad reforms in social and political life and, ultimately, for liberation from the royal court, which was considered to be liable for the country's continuous bankruptcy, for the failure of national policy, and for the 1897 defeat. Within this general climate of dissatisfaction the ruling Greek bourgeoisie initially appeared decisive in undertaking the organization of a modern state following the patterns of the liberal West. Reforms in education, the judicial system, the army and, mainly, in agriculture were the declared purposes. Unlike similar reforms in liberal states, those undertaken in Greece were carried out incompletely, after a long march on twisting paths. As Svoronos notes "the pre-history of the Greek Bourgeoisie could not guarantee any radical positions, especially at the very moment of Imperialism". (Svoronos, p. 115)

In a broader sense the Greek Bourgeoisie never existed as a unified class with clear and concrete aspirations:
the struggle between "political patronage" and the new perception of "social justice" and "public good" was, throughout the period, present and acute. Greek Liberalism shared many of the major characteristics of the brand of liberalism expressed in other European nations, but it largely remained an ideology of intention not action.

Greek events were even further removed from the European context.

The country entered the first Balkan War in 1912 as a part of the alliance with other neighboring countries to dispute the Ottoman authority in the area. The second Balkan War began in 1913 over the distribution of the former Turkish lands among the previous allies. After a waiver period of two years which was marked by a wild conflict among the pro-Central powers (Royalists) and the pro-Entente ones (Liberals), Greece entered WW I in 1916 and found herself on the winners' side at the war's end. A "last-minute ally" Greece faced severe problems in the ensuing negotiations, especially as Greek interests interfered with Italian Imperialism and the Anglo-French conflicts in the area. Greece finally achieved the annexation of East Thrace and control of a large part of Asia-Minor that would become Greek territory after a referendum five years later. Antagonism among Liberals and Royalists led the army far beyond the border of the assigned territory, deep into Turkey and destruction in August 1922. Arson destroyed the urban centers of east Hellenism, Smyrna, and more than a million Greeks returned, as refugees, to their national cradle. Their arrival marked the definite refolding of Hellenism that had already begun during the Balkan wars. The incident was perhaps even more interesting than the War of Greek Independence. As it is often noted:

Modern Greece is the child of the compulsory joining between Hellenisms and Helladism, which
took place under sorrowful situations. Hellenism was destroyed. Helladism was the only one to survive. This was the decisive turnover in Greek history.

(Markezinis, p. 9)

The same author showed that the situation in Greece after 1922, as opposed to its previous situation was analogous to the relation between modern Italy and its preceding Papal State. That is true concerning the resolution of nationalistic problems but not in what followed. After the disaster and up to World War II, Greece saw 13 governments, three coup d'etats, the deportation of the king (1924), his restoration (1936) and a dictatorship in 1936 that concluded the activity.

The existence of conflicts themselves is not the most important aspect of this period, since conflicts actually never eluded Greek politics; it is rather the nature of the conflicts that changed so rapidly. In earlier times we saw the "Grand Idea" as the common ground for political aspiration; differences would emerge from various interpretations of it and the tactics proposed to achieve it. Now the common ground disappeared and left in its place an arena of conflict with social roots.

Athens had been the place to express grandiose aspirations with prestigious institutional buildings far exceeding its needs. Quite naturally, it now became the battlefield of the different social groups that were trying to impose their particular, deeply split, aspirations and wills. The urban landscape became the victim of a bitter fire that was raging out of control.

It is important to understand how acute and wild the political struggle was. Each regime had only a short time to prove its "good" intentions and to rally peoples' support. Various governments reacted to the demands in various ways in order to achieve their own political survival. Every group or class was treated as a potential political ally,
and this treatment in turn inflated each group's hopes of solution.

Planning, a long-time effort to allocate resources as an explicit compromise between different interest groups, had no place in a situation where the long-range perspective was overwhelmed by constant changes in the government and where compromise could be neither achieved nor imposed.

Ad-hocism became the answer to satisfy quickly and separately, all needs and demands. Its consequences were perceived much later, when all the increments of action inevitably came together into a perceptible whole. It was then that many realized that the layers of government action, first to satisfy one group, then to satisfy another, had become incompatible and that, despite initial impressions, no single group's problems had ever been solved.

The most vital force of the nation, the administrative force, was concentrated in Athens; commerce, industry and infrastructures came later. It was not surprising then that Athens was the place to absorb most of the shocks and reap most of the benefits that followed national expansion and social reform.

The way in which, and the circumstances under which, the agglomeration of the Athenian basin was formulated are outlined in the first chapter. We then present the changes in power structure and the consequent failures to implement a plan as a means to illustrate the new power structure, rather than as a way to interpret city form. In the fourth chapter we will approach city form, through a detailed study of the various modes of space occupation that appeared as a response to the needs and aspirations of the different social groups.
Athens and Pireus consisted, as we have seen, of a bi-polar system of two economically interdependent though physically separated cities. They were interdependent with divided functions performed by each but also physically separated with visible peripheries existing for both. At the same time their 'suburbs' in the basin were actually small settlements, functioning as separate villages rather than as extensions of the two cities. There were five such villages in between the two cities and two more in the north of Athens, none of which had populations exceeding 2000. Much agricultural land still existed in these areas and its exploitation benefitted farmers who were close to large consumption centers.

By 1940 this image has been turned upside-down. The villages, whose total population in 1909 represented 10 percent of Athens and Pireaus combined, now had their populations increased to such an extent that the total became almost equal to that of the two major cities (Table 1).

With their enormous growth, they not only took up most of the space between the two major centers, but they also established a pattern of diffused development in almost the entire area of the basin, thus removing its non-urban functions. An agglomeration had replaced the bi-polar system. Meanwhile its total population had increased by more than a factor of five, dramatically changing the Athenian basin's share in the whole Greek population. Above all, the transition had changed the national role of the capital. Here we give an account of this shift only to the extent that it influenced city form. The purpose is not to explain how and why Athens had gained its role, but rather to explain how this new role affected the shape of the urban fabric.
The demographic and spatial development of the capital in this period was a response to a complex system of factors related to two developments. First, there was the creation and redistribution of economic activities in the helladic region. The second development was the refolding of broader hellenism which took place from the first Balkan war onwards till the late '20s, though at varying rates and for different reasons in the intermediate, short periods.

The Balkan wars resulted in the doubling of both the territory and population of Greece. The new areas included vast cultivatable regions and a network of urban centers as well. Among them was Thessalonika, a large urban center on the whole Balkan peninsula, second only to Constantinople. Thessalonika was the main focus of a railway network of regional importance and international influence, as it was the only connection between Central Europe and the Ottoman empire. With an evenly advantageous port, the city, just before its incorporation into Greece, represented 67 percent of the commerce of the Greek state. (Moskov in Haidopoulos p. 57).

The annexations enlarged the Greek market. Immediately after, Greece found itself isolated, with the declaration of WW I and the related falling off of the international commerce. The need for self-sufficiency stimulated industrial investments: under the umbrella of this imposed and absolute protectionism, the Greeks of the Diaspora for the first time seemed to trust industrial investment, instead of continuing to invest in mines and public works (Tsoukalas p. 235). Within thirteen years the capital of the industrial corporations increased eightfold, surpassing that invested in public works and approaching the capital invested in mines (Andreadis p. 210-214).

However, industrial development was not evenly distributed in the country. For a number of reasons Athens
absorbed most of it. The war front in the north and closed borders made it very risky to invest in that region. At the same time, shifts in population that followed the re-distribution of the former Ottoman territory deprived cities of their natural dynamism.

Athens, having already imposed itself as the administrative and productive center in the previous period, was now ready to vigorously absorb the victims from the Balkan conflicts. We should also remember the trust that investors from the colonies had always shown for the capital city as a reference point for their activities. Within such a framework, primarily set by the international situation and not from an inherent dynamism, it is not surprising that, during the period 1912-1922, Athens experienced a substantial increase of its population, despite immigration to the US and demographic bleeding of its natives (Haidopoulos p. 54-58).

Typical victim of this concentration process was Thessalonika. After the new national borders were formed, Thessalonika was deprived of a considerable part of its commercial hinterland. Also, its communications with Europe stopped with the establishment of the Balkan front during WW I. Finally Thessalonika lost its Jewish population, who not only counted for one third of the total but who also held most of the city's commercial wealth. As a result, the city lost a vigor that had characterized it in the previous periods. A number of other towns in Macedonia, south Epirus and on the east Aegean Sea faced similar problems: annexation to the national center under such conditions meant for them separation from the system on which they had traditionally based their well-being.

However, the rapid growth of Greece, in terms of population, still kept a relative balance between the capital and the rest of the country. The influx of refugees was the final impulse and established Athens as the dominant
element in the national urban network (Table 2).

It is a common fallacy to think of the influx of refugees into Greece in relation to the 1922 disaster in Asia Minor. Within a broader perspective, however, refugees landed in Greece from 1913 to 1928.

There were two refugee waves from Asia Minor, one in 1914 and another in 1919, 57,000 people came in from Russia immediately after the 1917 revolution and another 47,000 came from Bulgaria under the Neigy treaty of 1919 (Aggelis p. 30). This refugee population totaled up to half a million. Together with the natives of the newly annexed areas, they helped to cause the state population to double between 1907 and 1919. At the same time, half a million foreign nationals left Greece for their respective countries; therefore the first refugee waves did not greatly disturb the demographic equilibrium. Instead many of them managed to bring capital, thus participating in the industrial development we have seen before. Despite these first movements of Greek populations towards their national center, three of the five biggest Greek cities still were outside the national boundaries: Constantinople, Smyrna and Alexandria, which dominated the broader eastern Mediterranean region, and which were the mainspring of wealth for mainland Greece.

However, at the end of the disastrous Greek army expedition into Asia Minor, two of these cities were erased from the map as Greek ones. Their inhabitants along with hundreds of thousands of others from the regions rushed back to Greece during a few days in September 1922. They left behind them almost half a million dead, three hundred thousand trapped, and the largest parts of their fortunes. The shock this experience caused to Greek society was so strong that, to many, the whole refugees' influx was associated with this single violent event.

The 1928 census counted a total of 1,222,800 refugees (the number includes also those trapped in Asia Minor, who
came later under the Treaty for the Exchange of Populations (1923). Slightly more than half of that number (643,000) were established in urban centers; among these, 245,000 in the capital. Table 3 shows the spectacular impact of the influx on the total population of the city -- which increased by 30 percent -- and presents some aspects of the city's spatial development, showing a dramatic increase of the peripheral areas.

But why did Athens attract so many refugees?

Athens was the place to offer the best opportunity in either the prevailing industrial sector or in the traditionally hypertrophic Administration. For the refugees, we can also hypothesize that they felt a certain attraction for urban centers and particularly for Athens, as they had lived originally in more urbanized areas than most of the people of mainland Greece. Smyrna and Constantinople not only had a Greek population almost equal to that of the capital but, also, a cosmopolitan life that was unknown to Athens.

However, none of the hypotheses outlined above seems strong enough to explain why the 21 percent of the refugees was immediately absorbed by the capital. We feel that, in order to understand the phenomenon, we have to take into account the politics of the period.

The Asia Minor expedition took place within the milieu of a bitter fight between the royalists and Venizelos Liberals, known in history as the 'national discord'. Though it was Venizelos who obtained Greece's right to portions of Asia Minor, and who landed the army there; it was the royalists, that meanwhile overthrew him, and who continued the adventure which led to the disaster. Consequently, the refugees considered the royalists as responsible for their fates, while Venizelos was associated with the period of nationalistic aspirations and inflated hopes. Also, by their very nature, the refugees were inclined
towards progressive political positions; Liberalism became the vehicle to express their aspirations for integration into the Greek society.* As the political fight continued, it is understandable that Venizelos favored the settlement of these people in the vital control point of the country, as a means of counterbalancing the conservative forces of the royal court and the backward oligarchy. As G. Burgel put it:

The refugees became the Praetorians of Venizelos' Liberal Democracy; praetorians to whom he was not obliged to promise either (agricultural) lands or jobs and salaries, but just the possibility for settling themselves.  

(G. Burgel p. 379)

For Greece the phenomenon of the direct impact of politics on urbanization was neither new nor surprising. We have seen how the reelection of provincial politicians was connected with the fulfillment of their preelection patronage promises to their constituents. Most of these promises, giving the required signature for acceptance into higher education or providing employment in the hypertrophic public sector, were strongly related to migration to the capital, a phenomenon that was becoming more and more the symbol of social success.

Nevertheless, a new element was introduced that overshadowed the previous situation. At this point, the government, as a collective mechanism, encouraged the trend, not individuals. Consequently the capital, previously the center of provincial antagonism, became the center of the national consciousness, the symbol of a happy life and success. Given the promising industrial development of the basin, residence in the capital was equivalent to having the best opportunities.

*Sometimes the refugees went even beyond that, by taking radical positions. Generally, the foundation of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) is associated with their influx in Greece.
### Tables

#### 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH</th>
<th>ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH</th>
<th>ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1907-20</td>
<td>I920</td>
<td>I928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Athens</td>
<td>154,863</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>285,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Piraeus</td>
<td>67,982</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>113,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Piraeus'suburbs</td>
<td>6,598</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>22,518</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Piraeus &amp; suburbs</td>
<td>74,588</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>135,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>250,010</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.68</strong></td>
<td><strong>453,042</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: I920 & I928 Census, in Prevelakis, p.207-208.)

#### 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POPULATION OF GREECE</th>
<th>POPULATION OF THE CAPITAL</th>
<th>POPULATION OF THE CAPITAL AS PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL GREEK POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I907</td>
<td>2,631,952</td>
<td>250,020</td>
<td>9.50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I920</td>
<td>5,531,474</td>
<td>453,042</td>
<td>8.20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I928</td>
<td>6,204,684</td>
<td>802,622</td>
<td>12.92 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I940</td>
<td>7,318,915</td>
<td>1,346,080</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
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</table>

(Source: I920 & I928 & I940 Census, in Prevelakis, p.210.)

#### 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>REFUGEE POPULATION IN I928</th>
<th>POPULATION WITHOUT THE REFUGEES (I928)</th>
<th>RATE OF POPULATION INCREASE, I920-28 WITHOUT THE REFUGEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Athens</td>
<td>37,242</td>
<td>265,825</td>
<td>-0.88 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Piraeus</td>
<td>18,907</td>
<td>112,158</td>
<td>-0.13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Athens'suburbs</td>
<td>108,164</td>
<td>124,158</td>
<td>18.54 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Piraeus'suburbs</td>
<td>80,850</td>
<td>54,404</td>
<td>11.66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Athens &amp; suburbs</td>
<td>145,305</td>
<td>389,997</td>
<td>2.62 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Piraeus &amp; suburbs</td>
<td>99,757</td>
<td>166,562</td>
<td>2.58 %</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>245,062</strong></td>
<td><strong>556,559</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.61 %</strong></td>
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## 4

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Factories</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Workers Per FACTORY</th>
<th>HP</th>
<th>HP Per FACTORY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>2,213</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,905</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>57.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>4,515</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>277,000</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Svoronos, p. 101.)

## 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Athens &amp; Attica</th>
<th>Athens &amp; Attica A.F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No of Factories</td>
<td>No of Workers</td>
<td>HP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgy &amp;</td>
<td>3,702</td>
<td>14,317</td>
<td>6,426</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>8,103</td>
<td>7,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>3,939</td>
<td>23,735</td>
<td>10,065</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>24,096</td>
<td>96,848</td>
<td>66,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>3,101</td>
<td>20,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33,704</td>
<td>146,331</td>
<td>100,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Census of the industrial enterprises, 1920, in Prevelakis, p.225-7.)

## 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pireaus</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Pireaus as Percentage of the National Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>5,432,202</td>
<td>8,682,426</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>687,944</td>
<td>78,546</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,119,146</td>
<td>9,460,972</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Iliopoulos, p.265.)
Changing attitudes were expressed in policy shifts. The responsibility for employment was left to the prevailing private sector, and the government preferred to accommodate the newcomers on other grounds providing them with the opportunities necessary for urban settlement. The forms that this provision has taken under the specific conditions of the time are examined in Chapter 3 (Adhocism and city expansion). Here we want to point out that the state itself became a conscious promoter of urbanization, and thus it strongly influenced the ideologies of the people. This is a peculiarity when compared with policies in other European countries of the time. But it is necessary to understand it in order to explain the overwhelming urbanization of Athens and the related forms of spatial occupation that were correspondingly developed. The Liberals in Greece saw urbanization as an opportunity for modernization and for strengthening their rule, and with good reason.

The arrival of the refugees marked the end of traditional society and the beginning of unprecedented growth. The dynamism of modern European society was imposed on traditional stability. With the boldness of desperation, the refugees infused the economy with a new vigor, even apart from the fact that their demographic vitality had balanced the decline in numbers of the native population. Their presence, along with the drastic elimination due to immigration to the US, had brought the state and the people to a fundamental truth of survival, that, in various ways, had been avoided until then: Greece had to develop its own productive forces in the best possible way. Completion of agricultural reform and industrialization were the most apparent ways.

1.8 million acres of land were distributed to 270,000 families, from 1922-1929, radically solving the first problem (Aggelis p. 31-32). Agricultural reform was the only one that the Greek liberalism managed to carry out in
a satisfactory way, at least concerning the distribution of land, and shortly thereafter Greece became food self-sufficient. However, the mechanisms of the 19th century that were taking up the surplus value of agricultural production did not disappear at all. Mainly through a system of impositions, urban centers were, once more, the true beneficiaries of the reform (Prevelakis p. 218).

As for industrial development, the era is characterized by a take-off that appeared after a long waiting period of slow investment and development. Table 4 shows the increase in absolute terms and the positive development in those factors -- such as number of workers per plant -- that characterize the transition from an artisanal stage to an industrial one.

The refugees, a cheap labor force striving to survive, are generally considered to have been the main factor in the unprecedented industrial development. However, an increased market, the influx of experienced entrepreneurs and the protectionism of the state also played a major role (Vergopoulos, 1978). Finally the worsening international economy put enormous strains on the commercial balance, therefore encouraging national industry to replace imports with its own products, especially consumption goods. Whatever the exact reason, we should note that the annual rate of industrial growth in Greece between the wars was the third highest in the world, following only the USSR and Japan (Vergopoulos, 1978, p. 74).

A more detailed look reveals that the distribution of industrial growth was, once more, unbalanced -- absorbed primarily by the capital and especially by Pireaus. So the division of labor was deepened both on a national scale and within the agglomeration.

There are two reasons for this new concentration. First in a consumption-oriented industry, manufacturers and suppliers tend to move close to the existing markets.
Athens was the best, if not the only, such market at the time. Second, all the administrative functions were concentrated in Athens; an advantage in an environment of state protectionist policy, where the industrialists were forced to be in continuous contact with the backward and badly organized bureaucracy. In a sense, the fate of the city was unconsciously decided in the late 19th century, when all of those necessary preconditions were established.

Table 6 gives us a final insight into the economic nature of the agglomeration at the time. Pireaus holds the vast majority of imports (consumer goods and machinery) but very few exports (agricultural products). It has been said that the economic strength of the capital rested mainly on its ability to consume a large part of the nation's product, rather than in its productive capability (G. Burgel p. 9). Whatever the truth may be, we should note that the population growth of Athens was not a direct result of industrialization, as in other European countries. It was rather an enforced urbanization caused mainly by a turbulent international situation and a national crisis that preceded industrialization and actually helped it to occur to the extent that it did. The spatial distribution of industry that followed the patterns of the refugees' establishment is a good illustration of that process, which we will examine later in this text.

However, the fact that a productive mechanism was indeed built up as a response to the challenges of the time, demarcates the boundaries of the problem on the opposite direction and explains the differences between the development of the Greek capital city and that of third world capitals.

Within such a framework it is not surprising that Athens did not develop slums, either of a miserable working class, like those found in the advanced industrial societies of western Europe, or of the desperate migrants, as found in
the third world metropolises.

The rush towards Athens was not so much the direct result of an urban pull (industrial development) or a rural push (decomposition of rural society). Instead it happened in the milieu of a whole empire's collapse, and was reinforced by the active role of governments that saw in it opportunities to strengthen their individual positions.

This condition determined both the expectations of the inhabitants and the limited spatial control that was left to the state; given the limited resources at its disposal, it had to accept endless compromises simply to be consistent with its basic policies.
After the initial effort by the Bavarians to develop a unified and well-controlled plan for the city, the notion of a Master Plan was virtually abandoned, to be replaced by small-scale, free, private developments. In this situation, the slow rate of population growth and a relatively coherent society prevented distortion of the basic aspects of the urban fabric. However as population growth rates accelerated and changed the nature of the capital during the early 20th century, this laissez-faire approach proved to be less and less effective in solving the problems that spatial control and city plans began. A number of plan proposals appeared during the transitional period up to the refugees' influx. These plans offered very little insight into the physical shaping of the city. Nevertheless the study of their inception and fate is very useful for understanding the roles and ideologies of the various forces that were actually shaping the city fabric.

Athens at the time was a conservative place in the sense that traditional ideas and methods were preserved sometimes against the prevailing general ideological framework. This was the case with planning during the first steps of the Liberal regime. Despite declarations for reform in other fields, urban planning was felt, once more, to be strictly the affair of the king, the architects and the municipality, or more precisely of its mayor; the same old formulas were tried once more, in spite of their proven inadequacies. The governments may have altered their notions regarding social organization but, on the eve of the Balkan wars, had not yet abandoned their aspirations for a Greek empire of "two continents and five seas", in the words of the Liberal leader Venizelos. This empire obviously would have to have a suitable capital, a need strongly felt, with
the war imminent and, with the disintegration of the
Ottoman empire, promising the realization of the "Great
Idea."

In 1908 the mayor of Athens, Mercouris, and a
Venizelos protégé, invited the Berlin planner Luwig Hoffman
to lay out a "directory plan" for the city. Hoffman, in
the tradition of his predecessors of the neoclassical era,
found the assignment a "very tempting" one. In his personal
log book he explains the reasons:

I began thinking of my school years when I had
enthusiastically strolled through ancient Greece,
and admired its arts, thanks to the judicious
interpretations of the classics from our respected
teacher. It seemed to me a divine order to visit
the city and have the opportunity to help solve
the remnants of ancient art from disgusting
adjoining.

(Schmidt p. 50)

After a brief visit of nine days to this "disgusting
adjoining" he came back in Berlin and drew up a plan within
the guidelines of the Eclecticist Academic school of
planning, the "Wilhelm style", in accordance with which
the monumental arrangement of the city's open spaces was
an absolute necessity. He was mainly concerned with the
beautification of the existing streets and squares by
applying such devices as colonades, obelisks and small scale
street improvements. Characteristic of his proposal were
the large scale clearances to be made to extend Korais
Street, useless from any practical point of view, but in-
tended to symbolically connect the group of the most pres-
tigious modern educational institutions (National Library,
University and the Academy) with the area of the ancient
Acropolis. With this idealistic attitude and grandiose
proposal, Hoffman's plan was irrelevant to both the real
needs of the city, and its financial capabilities. No dis-
cussion was held about this plan and the declaration of war
gave the city administrators a good opportunity to forget
it as suddenly as it had appeared. But the Academic Romanticism aside, Hoffman's plan had some interesting aspects that were overlooked by the authorities. For example he suggested, for the first time, the creation of a peripheral street network as a basis for later development of the city and, also, the unification of the two railway stations: This measure of rationalization of the infrastructure never disappeared from the ensuing plan proposals, but also has never been realized.

Five years later the process was repeated; another foreigner was invited by the mayor to draw up a plan, but this time with the personal recommendation of the queen (Mpires p. 277). Mawson, an English architect and planner, visited Athens for a short time and then, working with maps, gave the Athenians a scheme that so much delighted them that they called it the "miracle plan".

Mawson, as Hoffman and the Bavarians eighty years before, felt compassion for the ancient city and above all with "the natural beauty and imperishable youth of the Parthenon". He also felt that the contemporary problems were ruled by the ancient glory: "Necessity must be met in a way that will conserve all that ancient Athens met". Necessity, for him, was primarily serving tourists, "for the many who regard the ancient city as the Mecca that must be visited, therefore there must be a new and well-planned system of hotels". But beyond this idealism Mawson was interested in providing the city with those facilities that would make it a viable alternative to Brindisi on the route to India. So he once more suggested the unification of the two railway stations as a means of improving the commercial transportation of the British Empire (Mawson, 1914). Apart from this colonialist attitude, the plan was based on the ideology of the "Illuminated City": good living conditions are envisioned for the working class quarters on the periphery. Boulevards and parks were everywhere, "where workman
HOFFMAN'S PLAN

MAWSON'S PLAN

3.1
and others may rest in comfort during the long midday recess", and these would be complemented by the reforestation in the outskirts of the city. Air and light standards were to be improved everywhere in the old city with even more demolition than suggested by Kleanthes. The new boulevards were, by following topography, emerging in an "organic" street pattern. Finally, a rationalization of functions was suggested and industry, commerce, transportation, education and administration were located in specific areas, related to each other with diagonal boulevards. A lot of wedding-cake architecture was forming the image of a city destined to become, as it was thought, the capital of an empire.

Once again the proposal was ignored by the authorities, a natural response in the middle of WW I and with Greece split into two separate small states, one pro-Entente (Venizelos) and one pro-German (Royalists). However, it inflamed the public imagination and became the center of a popular controversy: people fought for or against it and suggested their personal alternatives. "Marbles in the cafe tables have become planning boards and the Athenians impromptu planners, especially in the cafe of Zacharatos" (Mpires p. 278) which was a kind of Athens' Hyde Park style free forum. If nothing else, Mawson's plan gave many people a way out of the piling-up problems of the time.

Mawson's plan was the last in a series of "Grandiose designs" sailing against a vulgar everyday reality. Actually in Athens planning never managed to be imposed as one man's affair.

The fact that a king existed was not enough by itself to ensure him the force to implement his plans altogether, as it happened with Popes in Rome before Italy's unification or in Paris before the Bourgeois upheaval. It was a brought King, imposed by outsiders, not emerging from a physical-social process. His origins demarcated both the
nature of his role and the limits of his power. Greek social forces were either resisting him or allied with him only under the light of their own purposes. This hybrid situation never permitted the implementation of "Royal planning".

We believe that this prehistory of Greek planning had certain repercussions in what followed, in the sense that the new authority was subject to the same equivocal situations as its predecessors. The lack of well-formulated bourgeois class made apparent the need from the micro-bourgeois classes, a support that could not be gained with such vague generalities as "public good" or "social justice" -- promises of a liberal state -- but with visible and direct concessions. If the 1909 revolt of the bourgeois class had created any hopes for a bourgeois integration the continuous shake-up and, finally, the 1922 disaster destroyed it. The refugees with their advanced social background could not accept a marginal position in Greek society; instead, they were pushing for a share that would enable them to live a fully integrated life. The fact that they offered themselves for an initial capital accumulation had not at all the desperate perspective of the English proletariat in the early 19th century; it was seen instead as a necessary step for the integration process.

In such a framework the notion of "public good" was different than in the classical Liberal states of the West, a truth reinforced by the fact that an especially weak state had never had the means to compensate, on an acceptable level, the victims of the process of supplying these "public goods". The same deficits that had been delaying the first Master Plan were now becoming more and more prohibitive for the new state. The means that public planning could employ in Greece were also being eliminated: -- Clearances of densely populated areas in the tradition of Paris, London and Rome were not merely difficult
but unthinkable. The fate of Kleanthes's Master Plan was actually decided on that field. It was not only that money had always been in scarcity but also that the Athenian society, with its vast middle classes, had neither slums to clear nor a public authority willing and able to implement such a policy.

-- The lay-out plans for the new residential areas were, on the other hand, illogical for an authority that, from the very beginning, was concerned only with the central quarters.

Then the only applicable option was that of small-scale improvements in selected locations, mainly to guarantee a certain level of coherence in the street network. A final point that completes the picture is about the political system of clientele, which always confuses the meaning of public goods with individual ones -- achievement of the later ones being the ultimate measure for the reelection of politicians from the very beginning of modern Greece.

In this atmosphere of compromise, the new regime was obliged to follow the old paths. Nothing can describe better the depth of the problem than the denial of a member of the municipal body to support the hiring of the German L. Hoffman; he judged it vain "because good wills are lacking in the country, just as the administration loses its courage whenever facing the last of its voters (Mpires p. 276).

With the accretion of the problems it was becoming more and more apparent that the artistic approach to city planning no longer had any scope. The plan of the Calligas Committee that followed proves not the turn to an urbanistic thought, but the official adoption of ad-hocism as a consequence of an inability to control urban growth. This can be seen not only in the plan but also in the city planning legislation that was passed in the period, and actually regulates building to the present day, and above
all in the way the state itself acted in the public housing programs for the refugees. All these were conceived with a single purpose in mind: to support individual interests with no regard to the overall consequences.

The making of the new plan was entrusted to the Calligas Committee -- from the Ministry of Transportation -- that, meanwhile, had substituted the ministry of interior affairs in its city planning responsibilities. This administrative change isolated further the already deteriorated municipality and established twisting paths for the bureaucratic processes necessary to coordinate planning. In 1919 the ministry organized the "supreme technical board of state" which would be in charge of urban affairs. In the same year the French Urbanist Ebrar* was appointed president of the board, and the Greek engineer Calligas vice-president. The board first met in early 1920, and Ebrar outlined his own perception for the scope of a master plan for the city that could be successful:

Instead of providing a new plan for Athens we should, at the time, leave the city exactly as it is and work only in its periphery. From the World War [I] onwards the problem of urban modifications became extremely difficult because of a continuous housing crisis. In such a situation, an ideal and grandiose plan for the rearrangement of the existing city is unapplicable. Overlooking the danger of being considered paradoxical I have to confess my deep belief that such a plan is not even needed by the city. Instead we should study the general traffic

*Ebrar represents a different case than other foreign planners who had short assignments in Greece. He stayed in the country for seven whole years (1914-21) and was involved in the replanning of Thessalonika, which was extensively destroyed in a great citywide fire (1917); in teaching at the Athens technical university; and, finally, in Athen's planning. It is characteristic of the political climate in Greece, that he left the country, before completing his last assignment, dismissed by the Royalists that meanwhile had overthrown the Liberals (1921) who had hired him.
network and lay out the new living quarters the appearance of which is imminent and unavoidable...
We should focus on the periphery because we cannot touch any single stone of the existing city before we regain the housing balance we had had before the war.

(Ebrar in Mpires, p. 238)

Ebrar's idea was to apply a kind of zoning by dividing the city in four concentric sectors all of them intersecting in Concord Square. Different regulations would apply to each sector thus introducing a variety in urban form that Ebrar was considering to be very uniform and monotone. Each sector would consolidate its already established major function, which would be improved in the outskirts of the existing settlements. A main north-south artery was also suggested as the necessary backbone of the emerging agglomeration (Lheritier, 1921, p. 343). The ideas of Ebrar never have taken a complete form. Following a governmental change, his contract was not renewed and he was forced to leave the country. His departure meant the abandonment of his ideas. Calligas, who replaced him, provided with a mediocre plan that could neither envision the new situation nor provide an artistic attitude. The only positive aspect was the, for the first time, systematic documentation of the existing situation.

The plan, without any vision, insists on the existing city and suggests only a few, small-scale modifications. These included the extension of 3rd September Street (a street leading to the swiftly developing at the time north neighborhoods), a unified railway station but without all the boulevards that the two previous plans had proposed in order to connect it with the center, and the widening of some streets with a stage-by-stage transposition of the bordering building lines. The place of a former barrack, east to the palace, which was suffocated by the surrounding urban tissue, was suggested for the development of a
new administrational center.

While the Calligas Committee was busy in preparing plans for these modest modifications, other public authorities (Ministry of Welfare) and private speculators were also busy in independently developing the first refugee quarters in the periphery of the city. It is striking that, once more and despite Ebrar's recent warnings, the extension of the city was felt to be outside the responsibilities of the planning authorities. Their role was eliminated only in the improvement of the already existing settlements, an attitude not so much different from those underlying the previous planning efforts.

As for the committee with very little insight for the 'cosmogony' that was going on around it, it continued its work and in 1924 presented the plan in its final form. A large part of it was immediately approved by decree and building permits were processed according to the new regulations. These included the transposition of building lines of Patission Street, the main artery connecting the Patissia quarter with the center. The inhabitants were initially enthusiastic with the perspective of the creation of a boulevard that would permit the integration of their neighborhood with the more prestigious areas of the city and its consequent improvement. When, however, they realized that they had to give up parts of their lots for the widening they began a real revolt; it was conducted by land speculators with large interests in the area (Prevelakis p. 308) but the visible leader was a hero of the Balkan wars, a local priest (Mpires p. 284), perhaps to ensure the opinion that the Athenians were a very traditional society. Strong attachment to the land was one of the traditional values and it was used in the rhetoric employed to oppose the Calligas Plan; the "moralization" of land speculation begins. The plan was revoked
immediately despite the fact that, at the time, a dictatorship was in control of the state.

The case is extremely interesting, for it reveals the power balance, beyond the literal political schemes, and the inefficiencies of a period's public planning, one that failed to gain support for its plans, although the need was apparent: cancellation of the street-widening scheme has tormented the whole area and its inhabitants to the present day. As for the economic implications, we should note that the proprietors would have been fully compensated by the surplus-value that the remainder of their land would have gained by the creation of the boulevard and the consequent development of the area. Nevertheless the lack of an alternate layout for the boulevard led to development of Patission Street; surplus value was distributed anyway. From this point of view, the struggle of the inhabitants was historically justified. Thus began the incidental distribution of urban land's surplus value that, ever since has been the most strengthening dream for the petite-bourgeoisie and the best recipe for the perpetuation of the existing status. These are the first signs of a situation which will be studied in the post war period, when it becomes the main problem for urban land development.

The revocation of the Calligas plan marked the end of any effort for an overall control and physical arrangement of the city fabric. The very personal planning propositions that followed (Leloudas 1929, Belanos 1924) simply underlined the inability of the state to apply, and the unwillingness of the people to support, a coherent and coordinated spatial development of the emerging agglomeration.
In the two previous chapters, we have seen the fundamental conflict that was underlying urban development in the capital. The state was explicitly encouraging urbanization, largely for political reasons, while, on the other hand, it was unable to coordinate it in an orderly way; overwhelmed by both the results of its own activities and external factors that were out of its control. As a response to that situation, the state finally chose the solution to liberate the various interest groups, leaving them to solve their problems on their own, with respect to their specific purposes and, consequently, without regard for the public good.

The classic liberal doctrine—"what is good for the city is good for its people as a whole"—is replaced by the opposite position: "what is good for individuals may become good for the city as a whole." While liberal planning generally holds that improvements in the physical environment supposedly benefit all of its citizens, in Athens in the early '20s the situation became one where the improvement of the individual was expected to benefit the city; if not, then what could one expect by immigrating to the capital? In this sense, the Greek model still is explicitly underlined by the same positivist connotations that characterize western liberalism. This explains the references that people used to use when judging their spatial surroundings and the city.

The term adhocism is used to describe this situation, and refers to both the uncoordinated, incremental process of expanding the city and the fragmented urban landscape that occurs as a result.

Adhocism characterizes two levels of action. While migration to the capital becomes a national policy, the
accommodation of the newcomers is disassociated from any social policy measure and becomes an individual affair. But when specific conditions make it inevitable for some measures to be taken, then the actions are, again, perceived as separate from each other, and altogether detached from the social or physical environment of the existing city.

Although adhocism of the early 20th century shares with the late 19th century laissez-faire the same faith in the individual it represents a decisive turnover in the history of the city. In the previous period, the authorities were willing and able to control a large part of the city and consolidate the structural aspects of the urban fabric, despite speculative activities in the periphery. Now the system is disintegrated as a whole and leaves its place to a new system of spatial relationships. But, further than that, it is now the state itself that pronounces the password for the new mode of city expansion. The relocation of the refugees in the capital is the best illustration of this situation.

The Establishment of the Refugees

Schools, churches, railway stations, factories and warehouses, even theatres became the first shelters for the waves of refugees. Under their enormous pressure the state was compelled, for the first time, to consider urban development and especially housing as belonging to the field of its own responsibilities.

In 1923 it created the 'Refugees' Relief Fund and, at the same time, issued a national loan "for the rehabilitation of the refugees." The loan provided 7 million drachmas. This amount, along with returns from special taxations, was used to finance the Fund, which, in turn, was used for both urban and rural rehabilitation. The national government immediately began delivering tents and rough materials for the construction of "temporary" huts by the people themselves. As could be expected, most of these temporary settlements remained, until the period after WW II, scarring
the urban landscape. However, financing was weak and the Fund, with its rather philanthropic orientation, could not cope with the situation, especially in the milieu of emerging dissatisfaction on the part of the newcomers.

The government went to the Society of Nations (SN), asking it to mediate for loans from the international market. Soon after, the SN received a considerable loan from a group with main participants the "Hambros Bank LTD" of London and the "Speyers & So." of New York. However, there were, for the Greek government, two conditions to meet in order to get the loan. First, the management of the loan should be the responsibility not of the Greek state but of a "Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Refugees" (EAP)*. Second, the committee was to be headed by one representative from the U.S. and one from England, acting as president and vice-president, respectively.

Without many viable options in hand, the government was forced to accept an arrangement that gave the EAP almost absolute independence from Greek institutions. But, aside from its apparent weakness, the government has another, good reason for "succumbing" to the claims of the banks: by declining the management of the loan it was shifting the target of complaints to a party that was out of reach to the refugees, a group of people who, from the very beginning, made it clear that they were determined to get a fair share in national life.

The EAP, formed in 1923, was also determined to secure the interests of the participating banks and so, from the beginning, it notified the government that it intended to invest in productive fields with short-term returns that would enable the refugees to quickly pay off the loans.

*In the remainder of this chapter EAP will also be referred to as the "Committee."
So only rural rehabilitation, which was seen as a means of ensuring immediate returns, was initially included among the responsibilities of the EAP. The government undertook the urban rehabilitation, with major responsibilities going to the Ministry of Welfare.

Nevertheless, the potential of urban rehabilitation was disregarded: soon it proved to be more profitable, as there occurred at the time an industrial take-off that permitted permanent employment to a large number of the refugees. As Greek authorities were facing difficulties, a new arrangement was made: a part of the task of urban rehabilitation was transferred to the EAP.

In Athens, the Ministry of Welfare transferred to the Committee the four big land parcels that already had been expropriated by the Fund: Kaissariani, Ionia, and Vyron in the periphery of Athens; and Kokkinia, near Pireaus. A year and a half later the four sites were basically developed and had already become real small towns (Table I).

In contrast to its predecessors the EAP had never lost sight of the fact that its buildings were destined to have a permanent character. This attitude was reflected in both the architecture and planning of the new settlements.

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vyron</td>
<td>2,368</td>
<td>10,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaissariani</td>
<td>2,341</td>
<td>11,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ionia</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td>14,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokkinia</td>
<td>5,665</td>
<td>23,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,424</td>
<td>59,614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EAP, 16th Report, May 1925

Most of the houses were built with masonry or cement
blocks, and a very few with bricks made from dried earth, a cheap and messy technique with a long tradition in mainland Greece's architecture. All of the houses were covered with a tile roof that secured environmental control and durability.

Eighty percent of the houses are built in two-story blocks and the rest in one-story blocks. . . the houses are clustered in pairs, in a way that permits each family to have one bedroom and a living room. Besides that a small kitchen and a sanitary installation are provided. (EAP, in Prevelakis, p. 262.)

The blocks were built around a central court that consisted of small private yards and access alleys. The EAP followed this pattern, with slight modifications, in all four of its developments. The result was "a uniformity that, in a bird's-eye view gives the neighborhoods the aspect of a camp." The real problem, however, was the lack of space. The lots corresponding to the clusters of two (one-story blocks) or four (two-story blocks) apartments were very small leaving inadequate space for later additions.

Such a situation had interesting repercussions, both in the short and the long run. As the average refugee family had four members, and as these one-bedroom apartments were frequently occupied by two families (EAP, p. 182) the people soon began an additive building process that permitted them not only to acquire the necessary space, but also to elaborate a small-scale environment with virtues that overshadowed the initial image of a camp. In the long run, however, this intensive use of the land prohibited the properties from being converted into urban apartment buildings; and thus was consolidated until very recently, the basic form--and stigma--of the "refugee neighborhood." The initial overcrowding of the houses also
resulted in bad hygienic conditions, a fact that is held responsible for the rise in mortality and sickness levels of the capital at the time. (Haidopoulos p. 54-64.)

The EAP, with its concept of productive rehabilitation, no matter what its motivations were, went much further than simply providing houses. It also took care of social equipment and infrastructures. Adequate schools were built and provided with the necessary mobile equipment, and two hospitals were erected in Kokkinia and Ionia. The operation of these services was eventually transferred to the state, which was also responsible for repaying the loans used to fund them. Beyond that, the EAP also made provision for space for public squares, and for future administrative buildings.

The Committee also carried out all the works necessary for adequate water supply: reservoirs were erected, complete distribution networks were established and, finally, local drillings were done to discover water. Abundant water supplies were found, especially in Ionia.

The ultimate concern of the EAP was, however, to facilitate installation of industries that would provide refugees with permanent jobs and secure the return of money spent. To this end, it delivered free land to entrepreneurs who were willing to invest and who had "demonstrable professional credit." Along with the abundance of cheap labor, this stimulated an unprecedented, by Greek standards, industrial growth. In the territory of the four refugee quarters there existed only one small factory before their development. Five years later the Committee reports:

Within the four quarters of refugees in Athens and Pireaus there already exist 36 industrial establishments. Among them 27 rug manufacturers, 4 cloth mills, a factory of dyes and chemicals, etc. These factories employ 342 men and 4,532 women
but one must also take into account those who work in the 500 small enterprises established in private houses.

(EAP, p. 192)

The largest part of this emerging industry was concentrated in North Ionia, due to its abundance of water. "Small Manchester" was the nick name given to the area, a reference to its fast development, and the nature of its industry. As for the process of industrialization, EAP again gives us a vivid account:

A modest manufacturer was found accidentally in proximity with the houses that we began building in Ionia at the end of 1922. It provided an immediate opportunity for work to those women familiar with that kind of production. The women, for their part, were happy to have the opportunity of a fixed salary immediately after their arrival, even if it was lower than the ordinary levels of the time. This coincidence of wills changed the fate of the industry, which experienced rapid growth and now employs 1,000 workers, plus 200 more in its private power plant. Thousands of square meters of new buildings are added onto the previously primitive installations, and the small enterprise has turned into a corporation with a capital of more than 250,000.

(EAP, p. 194)

In parallel with the EAP, but more intensively after its liquidation in 1929, the Ministry of Welfare was involved in housing the refugees. The system that was followed was a combination of:

A. Construction of whole neighborhoods, or smaller settlements of one- or two-story houses or apartment buildings;

B. Delivery of lots with or without provisions of loans. In both cases the refugees were personally responsible for building their respective houses; and,
C. The formation of 350 cooperatives, which were given a total of 5,500 lots and loans averaging 30,000 drachmas per family.

(Aggelis, p. 33)

Again, the land parcels that were used were placed in the periphery of the two cities, with only a few, small-scale parcels on their fringe.

Among these planning methods, those that took a self-help approach proved to be the most successful. They provided lots adequate for decent houses, a satisfying street network and open spaces for greenery and social equipment. The self-help lots were destined for those refugees who managed to save part of their fortunes and were consequently able to build their houses with little or no state support. Most of these settlement areas were later used to build urban apartment buildings and, today, the only thing that reminds Athenians that they had once been refugee neighborhoods is the addition of the word "new" in front of their names, as in the case of the New Smyrna Quarter.

The quarters built by the state are characterized by a large variety of typologies and, usually, are smaller in scale than those built by EAP. The most interesting, in retrospect, are the small parcels developed on the fringe of the city, with the aim of accommodating refugees displaced during small-scale clearances of the illegal settlements that had appeared immediately after the disaster.

Their interest lies in the fact that they adopted the style of an emerging type of urban apartment building, with more intense land use and a higher floor/area ratio than in any other refugee project. Generally, they were conceived as a means of arresting the sprawl of the agglomeration. But they also notify the adoption of housing
commercialization by the state itself. They are interesting for an additional reason: they mark the introduction of "Modern" Architecture into Greece. They are the only refugee rehabilitation buildings designed by well-known architects of the time, most of whom followed the contemporary, European avant garde style. The morphological influence of Bachaus is apparent in their "pure" and "simple" and, indeed, simplistic facades; and the arrangements display a functional approach, with emphasis to the hygienic qualities of the space. But the landscape was overlooked, and with their minimal dimensions, the new buildings were soon overwhelmed by the suffocating needs of their inhabitants. Porches enclosed by infills demonstrate that there was a struggle for vital space in such areas--where the ownership status and rigid design prohibited the elaboration of a livable milieu--with the use of the limited means that these people had at their disposal. This situation may explain the early bad associations that followed the introduction of modern architecture into the field of housing, and its limited application in Greece thereafter.

The quarters built by the state were generally of poorer quality than those of the EAP. This includes their construction, their planning and their management.

With rare exceptions, construction contracts were assigned after Dutch Auctions with sealed bids. The major disadvantage of the system was that it obliged the administration to accept contractors with no professional standing even if their submitted bids were only slightly different from those of experienced professionals (EAP, p. 175).

On the other hand, in the neighborhoods developed by the state, the refugees were initially given free housing, so that they became more or less accustomed to the idea that they wouldn't have to pay rent for the acquisition of their houses. As the EAP comments, "This claim is justified by the refugees as being compensation from the Greek state for
their fortunes, which were destroyed or largely abandoned in their native places" (EAP, p. 176).

The Greek state obviously had many more difficulties in the process of rehabilitation than did the EAP, for it had not the luxury of being an alien. The successive governments were under enormous political pressure from a population that considered the Greek state responsible for its ill fortune. The fact that the Royalists, whose actions led to the disaster, were replaced by the Liberals perhaps meant very little to those refugees taking more radical positions. The Liberal forces, on the other hand, badly needed refugee support to secure their weak position as the ruling party. Under such delicate circumstances, the state under the Liberals, was always ready to compromise, by sacrificing long-run goals on the altar of everyday needs. The EAP comment on the Greek state, however, is at least unfair and, if nothing else, it reveals that the Committee itself was just as unconscious as the state was of the future results of its own actions.

Despite their qualitative differences, the settlements planned and built by the EAP and the state were the best examples of urban rehabilitation for the refugees. Both kinds of settlement were provided with social services and equipment adequate for their internal scale. Their qualitative differences seem negligible to us, in light of the catalytic role they both played in establishing the form of the extension of the Athenian agglomeration.

It is interesting that, although we have detailed quantitative data of the entire settlement operation and its progress, we don't have any explanation for, or even problematic about, the choice of sites and the perspectives of their urban integration. Examination of the features of the newly developed areas (spatial placement, relative size, transportation networks, etc.) leads us to the conclusion that their distribution lacked any solid guidelines.
12 μεγάλοι οικισμοί
12 major settlements

34 μικροί οικισμοί.
34 smaller settlements
First, they were not destined to become independent cities. Most of them didn't have a reasonable, self-sustaining size and were deprived of those necessary services that characterize a viable, independent center. Their boundaries were poorly defined, and, with the exception of a new settlements, lacked the planning necessary for an integrated, local employment base. The industrial response that appeared in many cases was disorganized, and it turned some of the settlements into industrial camps (Ionia and Kokkinia), attaching to them all those negative connotations that have followed them ever since, and which prohibit their integration in the social life of the city.

On the other hand it is equally clear that the new settlements were not conceived as organic expansions of the two cities that already existed in the basin. For they didn't consolidate any visible pattern of growth, and were not connected with the pre-existing concentrations, nor with those arteries that would assure a satisfying access to the existing facilities.

Instead, the new developments were simply conceived as groups of houses randomly scattered in the periphery of the two cities, perhaps with a unique criterion: land availability. The perspective of urban integration was lost not only under the time pressure but also in a confusion of institutions that were fiercely struggling for their autonomy. We have already seen the Calligas Committee working only on the center of the city, and the obstinacy of the EAP in maintaining its independence from the Greek institutions as a means of preserving the profitability of its operations. We have seen also the Ministry of Welfare (refugees' housing) acting independently from the Ministry of Transportation (streets), and both together ignoring the municipalities of the basin.

This situation, beyond the apparent confusion and waste of resources that caused*, ultimately established, or
rather, it imposed the spatial patterns of urban growth. The developments we have seen acted as focal points for that part of city extension conducted by private initiative. Their random placement resulted in a diffused growth of the agglomeration with a mixing of all those activities that, like industry, were following the supply of cheap labor.

"Legal" and "Illegal" Private Developments

The activities of the public authorities and of the EAP only partially met the refugees' needs. They were actually intended for those who, while not wealthy enough to solve the problem on their own, were at least in a situation that guaranteed their ability to pay off the debts attributed to them following the distribution of houses. People with better means were either diffused in the pre-existing settlements, thus contributing to the urban tissue intensification, or were seeking a place in the periphery, which was also the eventual destination of the poorest and neediest among the refugees—those with no access to public developments. A simultaneous internal migration was further intensifying a housing crisis that was severe even before the refugees' influx.

After the failure to devise a realistic plan and implement it, and with public authorities busy tackling a job far exceeding their capabilities, private initiative now undertook the responsibility of expanding the city. Increasing demand was leading to—and the emergency situation was consolidating—what can, at the very least, be described

*Many of the infrastructures created by the EAP soon became obsolete, as new organizations had quickly undertaken to assure the compatibility and improvement of the various networks (See
as a peculiar land development process:

These kind of entrepreneurs, either having the ownership of large parcels of land themselves or assuring the land's binding after agreements with the owners, were laying out plans for new neighborhoods, submitting them in the City Plan Office and were, usually getting approval. Sometimes their plans were in accordance with regulations, sometimes not. (Mpires, p. 287)

The growth of these new "neighborhoods" was occurring in small increments and was nothing more than a parcelization of land carried out, with few exceptions, by practical surveyors. There was no provision for open spaces and as for infrastructures, the problem was left to the state and to the future inhabitants. Transportation problems were partially solved, thanks to the neighboring, and more organized, settlements built by the state and the EAP. And then: "Seductive advertisements were promoting agricultural land or rocky places as urban lots." (Mpires p. 287)

It is clear that the problem was not one of land development so much as it was a problem of commerce taking advantage of the circumstances and the state being unable to manipulate or control growth. In most cases these new settlements were not conceived as entities but, again, as a number of houses at a certain place defined by land availability. Neighborhoods and suburbs emerged later from the coalescence of such increments, which were initially independent of each other. Typical is the case of the suburb of New Psychico.

In its growth, it has engulfed three distinct clusters: a development close to Kifissias Avenue, a "village" built for the refugees in the late '20s and another bordering on Chalandri. The first cluster, St. Sophias', was developed in a most typical manner: land was procured by a
group of shareholders, who then distributed the plots among themselves. . . the refugee "village", a roughly rectangular area of 8 acres, was an independent cluster which grew in the midst of open land. Homes were leased out to refugee families who were later allowed to buy them from the state. Both the "village" and the St. Sophia's clusters expanded independently until the 1950s, at which time the pressures of growing Athens caused a population spill-over into New Psychico. At the time, whole areas were still left open, with rolling fields and, occasionally, grazing animals. (Philipides, 1980, p. 74)

This inheritance led to the present spatial form of the suburb, and explains the incompatibility of its parts.

Even the few settlements with an integrated physical plan had serious deficiencies. A typical example is found on the other side of Kifissias Street: Old Psychico. This settlement was created and developed through the initiative of Kekrops, a real estate agency, which is a highly unusual aspect of urban growth in Athens. The plan was provided by the architect A. Nicolaides, and was influenced by the contemporary movement of Garden Cities. Old Psychico itself was advertised as a "Garden City." But the influence was superficial as it lay only in a visual similarity of the lay-out and not on the social and organizational concepts that underlay the movement. Although Old Psychico was developed for upper middle-classes it continues to suffer from the same chronic problems that plague the rest of suburban Athens: nonexisting social services and no infrastructures. The sewage system is inadequate and a large number of houses depend upon septic tanks; after the slightest rain certain streets are flooded and become impassable.

Just before WW II, Old Psychico was still a suburb with dirt roads, scattered greenery, and dispersed villas. Within a decade dozens of similar, or larger, settlements mushroomed around Athens. Only two, Old Psychico being
one of them, had physical plans made by architects. To this day, they stand as peculiar differentiations in an urban tissue that, when viewed from an airplane, lacks any organizational principle.

Usually all the "plans" were processed by the City Plan Service intact. The only care taken was the widening of some projected streets to provide room for future transportation arteries (Mpires, p. 287). This concern shows to us that the authorities were not unconscious of the future but, rather, unwilling and unable to intervene on a larger scale than providing for street widening.

In parallel with the legal lot trade another, illegal one, was taking place in the peripheries of Athens and Piraeus. Agricultural land was divided by its owners into small plots, on an individual basis, and without any attention given to the existing or potential street layout of the neighboring land parcels. The internal streets themselves were substandard, thus leaving room for more lots. Under these conditions no attempt was ever made to legalize these plans. In order to transfer these properties, the obstacles of the law were overcome with a formula characterizing the lots as "agricultural land," although they were barely large enough to accommodate a small house. Increasing demand for cheap land among poor refugees and immigrants allowed this system to flourish, especially as the public authorities were eager to see the people rehabilitated in any possible way, so as to avoid the political costs of their own inability. However this system of land occupation played only a minor role. It was only a precursor to the land sale practices of the post-war period, when it would become one of the two major forms of city expansion.

Finally, those people who could not afford to settle by any of the permitted means squatted on land wherever possible. But the possibilities were few, as in 1871
3.3  
1 'temporary'  3 EAP built  
2 squatting  4 state built  

REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS
Koumoundouros had sold all the public property surrounding the city (see p. ). This fact prevented large-scale squatting but also led the poorest refugees to the worst sites, which were the only ones available. Ilissos, a quarter built by refugees in a dry riverbed in 1929, is a typical example of this process (Philipides, 1974, p. 159-171). Ilissos with all of its problems (social isolation, floods) and all of its virtues as a coherent, small-scale environment, was swept away along with other similar settlements (Tavros, Dourgouti, etc.) during the '60s.

The Congestion of the Center

The Multi-Story Urban Apartment Building

Public and private developments in the periphery of the city mainly provided housing for the bulk of the refugees and the poorest strata of internal migration. The social environment was poor with the connotations of a "camp," rather than of an organic expansion of the city. Infrastructures were inadequate and fragmented, and poor communications and transportation networks made access to the center difficult. Institutional and administrative buildings, on the other hand, all were in the center, housed in prestigious architectural quarters mainly erected in the last quarter of the 19th century.

The center inevitably became the destination of the wealthiest among refugees and immigrants, and of the strata of public servants. The latter was undergoing a dramatic increase following the growth of the administrative sector caused by the population and territorial doubling of the country. Most of this increase was, as we have seen, absorbed by a capital that acquired an absolutely dominant role in the national urban network.

We have also seen the emergence, in late 19th and early 20th centuries, of a more intensified and commercialized
use of urban land, as a response to the prevailing changes. These hybrid forms were characterized by the building of two- or three-story houses, that were owned by a landlord, but occupied by tenants, with independent entrances for each floor. These new houses were occupying a larger percentage of the lot with elimination, first, and omission, later, of the yard, thus introducing both a new lifestyle and a more intense form of land use. The change was followed by the weakening of popular neoclassicism and its gradual replacement by an eclecticism of third-hand French origins, better known as the "Wedding-Cake Style." It was characterized by the over-use of plaster ornaments produced by impromptu workshops.

It was becoming apparent that all levels of the old fabric were less and less viable. The shock of the refugees' influx accelerated the city's evolution and caused the violent emergence of an entirely new development pattern whose dominant feature was the

The Calligas Committee, with a statement that marked its departure from both the traditional methods and the thoughts of its first president (see p. ), adopted and theoritized the emerging patterns as a solution to the housing crisis:

In contrast to the efforts taking place abroad, that intend to dilute the population of cities for hygienic considerations, in Athens we should increase densities for the very same reasons.[!] We can achieve that by arresting any further spread of the city, and with parallel land use intensification within the boundaries of the already approved plan.

(Calligas, 1924)

But it also pointed out the need to control such a development:
In Athens, despite the principles accepted in all the civilized world, proprietors can build their houses in any way they desire. (Calligas, 1924)

Actually, the building regulations of the time were basically the same as those approved eighty years before. They were the echoes of the Roman and Byzantine legislative tradition, and their purpose was to regulate neighboring relations (vistas, etc.), assuming a standard building typology accepted by everyone. The new constructions obviously were out of the building code's scope: the need for new regulations was apparent.

In 1919 came the first of a new crop of laws. It ruled building heights as a function of streets' width*. But, as Athens was a city with narrow streets, the law roused reaction among proprietors and soon (1922) was revised to permit a more favorable function and greater maximum heights.** The next year another law was passed concerning "functional projections"***. It permitted for projections of 1.4 meters outside the facade of the building, regardless of the width of the street. The measure was theoretically based upon comparable arrangements in the Mecca of Greek city planning: Berlin. However, it disregarded the differences of the two cities and permitted a wild speculation until 1937, when it was replaced by a more moderate arrangement for projections of only .4 meters. But by that time the law had done its damage: it had transferred many of the narrow streets into real wells,

*Buildings could be no more than 12/10 of the corresponding width of the street. Maximum height: 22 meters; and in streets with a width less than 8 meters, the permitted height was 10 meters.

**Maximum Height: 26 meters.

***A bay that appears from the second floor upwards.
with inadequate physical lighting and ventilation.

Another strong impetus for the commercialization of the space was provided by the resolution of the discrepancy between the ownership and use status of the building.

The 1929 formula for "horizontal ownership" (condominium formula of floor ownership) for the first time permitted the ownership of a single floor, or even part of it (Art. 1) within a building whose base (land and foundations) facade and roof were inseparable, and under communal ownership (Art. 2). The owner of a floor, or part of it had full rights to his property "to the extent he doesn't hurt the residence of the rest of the proprietors" (Art. 3).

During the period between the wars most of the multi-story buildings were developed and owned by the original proprietor of the lot. Only upper-class people had the means to develop these buildings which were destined for other upper-class or for upper-middle-class tenants. Therefore, the law was initially used only for the occasional transfer of a limited number of apartments. Its explosive potential was realized later, mainly in the post-WW II period, when it permitted the bulk of proprietors to form short-term cooperatives with contractors and, by selling apartments before they were built, to develop their property with no, or with very little, initial capital.

The final impulse was given by the "General Building Code" (1929). In its first form, the code was a moderate compromise between the old houses and the new multi-story buildings. It provided for an acceptable floor-to-area ratio and percentage coverage of the lot in an effort to preserve, at least, the physical existence of backyards (these usually comprised about 40 percent of a lot), that were becoming more and more obsolete with the appearance of minimal light wells. It also had legitimate requirements for natural lighting, ventilation, and views, along with insulation and fire safety regulations.
The appearance of the code caused a stormy reaction. Political rhetoric and "moral" approaches to the problem tended to relate these reactions only with the interests of proprietors and land speculators, and disconnect it from the "people"--who as a whole were the victims of the regulation's negative environmental impact--and the architects of the time, who had supposedly warned against these impacts. Ever since, this rhetoric, which treats as identical the appearance of the new type and its later evolution, dominates every criticism by using the positive and negative connotations related with each social group as a means to condemning or applauding acts very similar both in their intents and effects.

Ironically enough, main bearer of the reaction became the Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE)* which recommended that the government suspend the code implementation "in order to examine the problem." With this "scientific" support, government "gave in," delayed the implementation, and commissioned studies. But, as the results of the studies were delayed, it approved a new code with much worse regulations. The main change was that lightwells replaced the backyards, with all of the long-run consequences for both the scale of houses and the broader level of urban landscape. Withing a "silent consensus" the implementation of the new code began, and soon resulted in a situation where housing became the number one marketable commodity.

With all of the legal conflicts of the previous time

*The TEE has a double foundation. It is, by law, technical consultant to the state, thus defending "public good", but, it is also, the corporate union of architects and engineers, thus defending their professional interests. The assumption behind such a union of purposes is that the professional interests coincide with "public good", an assumption with its roots in the "objective technology" of the time.
resolved, and with the importation of the necessary technology (elevators, higher water pressure), the multi-story urban apartment building vigorously invaded the capital. The architects of the time either applauded the "social necessity" of apartment buildings, or involved themselves in a polemic that focuses only on aesthetics.

Kyprianos Mpires,* the architect of the first modern apartment building (1930), was excited with its potential to effectively solve the transportation problem by assembling more people in the center:

Characteristic was the demand observed during the lease of the houses: even before the completion of the construction process, leases had already begun and all forty apartments were rented within a period of three months. The occupants were among the rather exceptional people of the bourgeois class: scientists, public and bank employees that had found for their families houses very close to the center and equipped with all those comforts that contemporary civilization asks for and modern technology can offer.

(K. Mpires 1932)

Costas Kitsikis**, one of the most vigorous practioners of the new building type—he had already built a hundred apartment building by the beginning of WW II—was concerned with the benefits to the less prestigious social classes:

I think that, by equipping man with his house and with the latest technological innovations, by giving him the support of the moral world, and by breathing the warmth of pleasant family life into his home, I contributed in the raising of opulence and comfort,

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*K. Mpires was professor in the Athens Technical University (EMP) and Minister of Public Works in the right-wing government of "new democracy" (1975-78).

**Professor in EMP and member of the parliament, he was with the left wing party during the 1950s.
and in the fulfillment of the courteous needs of the contemporary urban citizen. All this happened to such an extent that the private apartment is now becoming a meaningful goal for many hard-working people.

(Kitsikis, in Damala et al, 1978, p. 130)

But the potential of the new form does not know class limits:

For the wealthy who desire city life, we have found a really satisfying combination: the two upper floors of the building is accommodated as a single family house. In this way they can live in the center, while avoiding excessive noise and dust. They can also enjoy unobstructed views.

(Kitsikis, op. cit.)

Kitsikis, who was particularly influential among the young architects of the school, had such a blind confidence in the new building type to state that, "The only remarkable achievement we have to show to our visitors, after the antiquities is the apartment building" (Kitsikis, in Philippides, 1978, p. 104).

Opposition to the apartments was focused on the aesthetic impact, the main concern being the distortion in perspective views resulting from the wide functional projections, the "barbaric" pergolas on the top of the buildings or the "heavy volumes" of some of the new buildings (K. Mpires). Among the opposition the social appropriateness of the building was considered to be indisputable: cohabitation was initially conceived to be promotion of communal life, and the reluctance of some people to accept it was interpreted as a consequence of the individualistic attitude of the Greek (K. Mpires). However, the social heterogeneity of the inhabitants overwhelmed spatial proximity; shelter under the same roof had not replaced the social interaction of the declining yard. A. Karouzos, the only "dissident"
of the time had pointed out early on:

The first impression, that these modern houses accommodate people with reduced individuality, people as similar to each other as their apartments, is false. The uniformity of facades cannot hide the truth that the need for isolation has never been so imperative... The houses, stripped of any external passion, have a particular similarity with those faces that, without any interaction, are almost indifferent to each other; they simply range in line. These portraits with their wide-open eyes and undefined expressions remind me of some other, similar creatures, of the 3rd and 4th century A.D.

(Karouzos, in Damola et al, 1978, p. 127)

"Houses without Fume," the fume always being the Greek symbol of home, was the name she gave to the new type. The introduction of the new type was followed by important changes in urban life.

With the abolition of the yard the old neighborhood entered a process of downgrading; no effort has since been made to replace it with a new form of communal living.

While the family house was a handicraft produced, most of the time, exactly for its future users, the apartment building was an "industrial" product, in the sense that it was produced to satisfy the needs of an unknown "average" or "typical" user.

The continuous and sudden population increases that occurred at the time were obviously making changes inevitable. But the specific way in which those changes have taken place marks an intense commercialization of housing that emerges as a consequence to the state inability to respond to the new demands and manipulate growth, and to the eagerness of the people to exploit their land without regard for the side-effects of their action. As, finally, architects "theoritize" the new developments, individual interests increasingly become, in a broader sense, the
definition of society. For while landowners were receiving substantially increasing land-revenues, improvements were also assumed to be received by society: it is the city as a whole that can expect ameliorations of the transportation problem, the hygienic conditions and, finally, to arrest its own threatening sprawl. In a few words, the apartment building was perceived to be an answer to the real needs of the whole city more than a profit-making machine for the individuals that were promoting it.

In such a supportive milieu the new building type continuously increased its share of the building activity in the city center.* The trend was particularly reinforced by the infusion of capital that otherwise was suffering the hardships of the international economical crisis (Sarigianis, 1978, p. 108-116).

By the end of the period between the wars, Athens already had a noteworthy number of apartment buildings, mainly concentrated in the more affluent quarters (Kolonaki, Patissia, Kypseli). These buildings, with a height of six to eight floors, were dominating the center and imposing a random intensification of the urban tissue, thus disturbing the coherence of the pre-existing fabric.

The centripetal and static space of neoclassicism is gradually replaced by a new space that vigorously spreads to all directions (Kalogeras, 1980, p. 64-70), perhaps to express the glutonous attitudes of the people and the explosive potential of the city.

Ironically enough, the message of modern architecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ONE- Story</th>
<th>TWO- STORY</th>
<th>THREE- STORY</th>
<th>MULTI- STORY</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Damalas, et. al., 1978, p. 128
MIDWAR PERIOD APARTMENT BUILDINGS
finally found a fertile ground in the requirements of the multi-story apartment building: the morphological weaponry of bauhaus was intensively applied in most of the between-the-wars multi-story buildings and created the illusion (or alibi) that Athens was developing according to the prescriptions of the European avant garde.

But even then, the small size of the lots permitted a superficial imitation rather than an integrated application of the vocabulary.

The Capital on the Eve of WW II

Settlements for the refugees, legal and illegal developments in the periphery, and the multi-story urban apartment building in the center, all were results of the same conditions; namely, the inability of the state to coordinate the urban growth, for which it had been responsible, and the disastrous events that deeply marked the first steps of Liberalism in Greece.

In the end, the extended application of the above forms of spatial occupation resulted in the formation of a macro-environment that was decisively differentiated from its predecessor, in terms of both spatial and social organization.

A quick look at the map of the basin on the eve of WW II reveals the fundamental changes that the capital had undergone. First, the bi-polar system was replaced by an agglomeration diffused in the largest part of the basin. Nevertheless the two previously independent cities still represented points of intense concentration, while the recently developed periphery continually occupied new spaces, but with very low densities.

This was not because of the existense of adequate social equipment and open public spaces; on the contrary, the predictions for these spaces was minimal, if not totally
lacking. But densities were still low because of the ad hoc, incremental growth where houses were scattered on the lotified areas randomly, just following the instant needs of the proprietors. Most of the lots in these areas were still empty (but already owned by various individuals), while the already built houses were occupying the largest parts of their lots. The spatial distribution of these new 'neighborhoods' was incidental (land availability), and their provision with social services and infrastructures was difficult to attain (as it was coming to repair an already set condition), if not impossible to attain, because of the low densities. Besides that, the 1925 law concerning 'cities' extensions' had not made clear who, and under what conditions, was in charge of these infrastructures.

In such a framework, the fact that most of the new, illegal neighborhoods were legalized, after intense political pressures, in 1936 (Mpires, p. 322-324), contributed little to their amelioration, beyond the fact that the move legitimized and implicitly encouraged participation in the worst forms of land speculation, by both the speculators and their clientele.

With its generally poor status, the periphery became the destination of the poor, the main exceptions being Old Psychico (upper bourgeoisie) and New Smyrna (relatively wealthy refugees). On the other hand, as none of the peripheral developments (the ones created by EAP and the state included) were satisfying the requirements for the spontaneous creation of viable local centers, it is not strange to find that the basic streets' network converged with the networks of the two pre-existing cities, and mainly with the Athens network. This was the consolidation and reinforcement of an old pattern; really Athens, and to a lesser extent Piraeus, had already developed all the bureaucratic and financial activities as well as the commerce that co-
existed with urban life. As the newly developed areas
were deprived from these functions the pre-existing centers
inevitably attracted the population of the whole basin. As
a result, linear extensions of the commercial center began
to be formulated, mainly along Patission and Kifissias
Streets, while the housing stock was enriched with the
erection of multi-story urban apartment buildings, a devel-
opment that, for the time being, was enough to keep most
of the bourgeois population within the boundaries of the
old city. Upper bourgeois classes lived in an advantageous
site at the foot of Lycabeyus Hill, right next to the
parliament and the palace, while middle bourgeoisie were
mainly concentrated in Patissia and Kypseli. While private
initiative was involved in developing the center there were
no public improvements to support it. Beyond the land-
scaping of the area in front of the parliament (1929) and
the creation of a park at the intersection of Alexandras
and Patission streets (1934), no other improvements appeared.
The street network remained identical to that of the late
19th century and the center became more congested.

Briefly, the basic form of the capital consisted of a
disorganized and vague periphery, and an already congested
center, that complemented each other. The evolution of
the relationship between center and periphery will matter
from now on in all changes in city form.

Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to characterize
all of the periphery as homogeneous. Although there exist-
ed some shared basic characteristics (scattered houses,
lack of infrastructures), interesting differences also
exist. Patterns established in previous periods continue
to play a role.

Industry, already developed to the north-west of
Pireaues, and along the Athens-Pireaues axis, attracted most
of the new establishments around it, while new developments
appeared in the refugees' settlements and mainly in New
Ionia, north-west of Athens. So industry increasingly occupied the west part of the basin; as a response, most of the superior activities began to concentrate on the east: most of the hospitals (along Kifisias Street), terrains for the expansion of the university as well as the prestigious quarters of Old Psychico and the neighborhood for the wealthiest among the refugees, New Smyrna, are on the east side of the basin. The east-west separation of the city that appeared from the very beginning was now reinforced. However it was not the strict separation seen in the North American ghettos. Spatial and social mobility was preserved for the very reasons that stimulated urban growth. Even beyond that, we can find working class refugees' neighborhoods (Kaissariani, Byron, and Hymmetus) on the east side of the city. They were obviously exceptions to the rule, but they also confirm the looseness of spatial segregation in Athens, that existed at the time, and still exists today.
The explosion that transformed the "sleepy provincial town" of Athens into a crowded agglomeration laid out over a vast territory, also rendered many of its organizational structures and physical infrastructures obsolete. We have seen that the municipalities of Athens and Pireaus were the two administrative entities in charge of the whole space of the basin. With limited resources, and a constant deficit, but also with some generous infusions of money from the Hellenic diaspora, they had adopted an approach of compromise between the needs of the capital and their fiscal ability; the municipalities were hardly able to satisfy the former. Most of the resources were allocated in water-supply improvements and in covering the central streets of the cities. Infrastructures were actually lagging behind the development of the city unable not only to influence and rationalize it, but even to accommodate it. The only sectors that had seen substantial ameliorations were those transferred to the hands of private enterprises, and especially those concerning transportation.

In the decade that followed the installation of the refugees, we observe more radical solutions to the problems but, also, a decisive transfer of power that offends the role of municipalities as agents for urban development.

In 1925 the government signed a contract with the Union of Greek Banks and the English group, Power and Traction, that had done business in Greece before. The contract assigned them with the production and exploitation of electricity and of electrified public transportation in an area that covered the entire Attica basin. The three existing transportation companies also participated with Power and Traction. The above groups initially formulated two companies, one for the generation of and one for the distribu-
tion of electricity. These two were later merged into the Athens and Piraeus Electric Company, which acquired all the small, local enterprises of the basin and provided the whole capital with uniform current of low price. That was achieved with the expansion of the already existing station in Phalere and the creation of a new one in Keratsini, which soon became the pole of local industrial development. The contract, however, absolutely ignored the municipality of Athens, which already owned a complete lighting network. This network had fallen out of use, because of changes in the type of current used. The municipality finally found itself a plain customer of the new company without any privilege or right on the new network (Mpires p. 301).

As for public transportation, the three companies that initially participated in the Power and Traction group were later merged into two new companies. The first took up the exploitation of the existing electrified line connecting Athens with Piraeus, with the obligation to build an underground extension of it towards Concord Square. The second company was given the exploitation of tramway lines with the possibility of adding another 15 km to the existing network, the exploitation and development of bus lines and, finally, the construction and exploitation of a railway line from Concord Square to the northern suburb of Kifissia. The following year Athenas Street and Concord Square were excavated for the creation of the subway. Sometime later the excavation continued, from the other side of the square to Attica Square, but it stopped there and the line towards the north was not completed until after WW II. The completed line became the only one, and, under the direction of the Athens Metropolitan remains so to the present. As noted, at the time of its construction the line corresponded to the only clear direction of the city expansion (north-south). The fact that it was not followed by the construc-
tion of other lines can be explained from the lack of any other clear direction of development that would ensure the profitability of the new line (Prevelakis, p. 309).

Even more characteristic of the dynamism of the private enterprises, and the parallel fade-away of the municipality, is the case of water-supply. The local authorities had always been trying to solve it with successive ameliorations of the Adrianian Aqueduct and its continuous enrichment with waters from all over the basin. It was realized, however, that these resources were limited, and that the city had to look outside its strict geographical boundaries for a permanent solution to its problem. In 1892, a French engineer had already suggested the erection of a dam and the creation of an artificial pond in the dry riverbed of Haradros in the north of the city. The work was continually postponed until 1925, when the national government, ignoring the municipality, signed an agreement with the bank of Athens and the English company ULEN, making them responsible for erection of the dam, creation of a tunnel bringing the water to the capital, and construction of additions to the existing aqueduct and distribution network. The two later were transferred to the company that, once more, "found itself a plain customer of the company obliged to pay for the water that coming from its own installations that were built with expenses and efforts of more than a whole century" (Mpires, p. 304).

Another problem, which became apparent with the installation of the refugees, was the lack of an adequate sewage system. Liquid disposals were conducted to the open riverbeds; water stagnating in these beds was the source of foul odors and epidemic diseases that led to sickness levels higher than before 1922. On the other hand, the central sewer led up into the vegetable gardens, very close to the city center, thus also contributing to the appearance of endemic diseases. Other areas of the central city that
were not served by the sewer had nonhermetic cesspools that were infiltrating their content into the aqueduct, especially after rain storms. But as the natural flow of water in the basin was disrupted by the new construction, rain storms produced yet another effect, floods, especially in the south of the city near the seashore. A final problem that was worsening the hygienic conditions was that garbage collection was still operated with horse carts that were becoming less and less efficient.

Confronting these acute problems that had such immediate and visible effects, the municipality concentrated all of its forces in an effort to improve hygienic conditions. That made some improvements possible: automobiles were introduced to replace carts, some arrangements were made in torrent beds and the central collector sewer was extended to the sea. However, a complete solution to the problem was out of reach for the municipality. The story was repeated once more: the state assigned the private sector to implement an overall, long-term solution with the establishment of the 'Sewers' Construction Corporation in 1932.

With all of this intense activity, the infrastructures of the basin were substantially ameliorated. Within a decade water-supply increased by a factor of three, electricity by ten and telephone installations by twelve. The immediate problems of sewage were solved and all the new quarters in the periphery had some kind of public transportation connecting them to the center.

The problems, however, were solved in favor of the Greek financial capital and of the foreign, industrial groups. At the same time, the municipality was deprived of the largest part of its revenues and was restricted within a narrow scope of responsibilities.

Caught between the political conflicts and the somewhat aristocratic attitude and the interests of its own mayors, the local authorities proved to be unable to
benefit from the fast development of the city. But we can also hypothesize that the governments, in a milieu of a continuous crisis, were becoming more afraid of a rivalry with strong, local authorities. In the case of Athens and Piraeus, such a contender would represent nothing less than the most vital forces of the whole nation. The transfer of the infrastructures to the private initiative was not only a response to the piling problems of the city, it was also the first in a series of political movements that had finally brought the role of the local authorities to negligible levels.

Until 1932, the territorial responsibility of Athens and Piraeus was expanding through the whole basin. At that time, it was limited to an area roughly corresponding to the boundaries of the cities before 1922. The rest of the basin was divided into 50 small municipalities and communities. But these were communities only in name, as they consisted of an heterogeneous population that had settled there only a few years before, and under externally imposed conditions. This administrative division of the space was an artificial one, without regard for any social, economic or spatial characteristics. As the urban fabric was expanding on its own in a continuous and diffused way, the division meant that these new, local authorities were actually deprived of any intervention in the general urban plan. Decentralization at the time was indispensable and positive in principle but it was carried out without the creation of a second-degree local administration that would guarantee parallel coordination. Instead, the changes reinforced the central will, which now gained absolute control in the whole basin. The new situation found its institutional form in the creation, in 1936,* of the Ministry of Administration of the Capital and of the Superior Council of Urbanism, whose chairman was the prime
minister himself. Athens had now exceeded the limits of a plain capital and was treated as a sector in national life, exactly as agriculture, industry, or finance.

With the abolition of the intermediate scales of administrative organization, a strange duet now governed the fortunes of the capital: individuals, on the one hand, looking for the opportunities and the social position that only the capital could offer them; and, on the other hand, the government, or rather sequential governments with little self-confidence, determined to assure their national power base. In such a scheme, the idea of the Liberal State is either simply ignored, or exploited by short-term governments that tend to confuse their role with that of the state, and also to confuse the public good with the specific interests of their political clientele. Actually, the belief in a common, public good is totally dismissed. For the people struggle to get their share on an individualistic basis (apartment buildings, illegal developments) and the state is restricted to those minimal actions that are necessary to keep the system going (housing for a part of the refugees, basic infrastructures). The lack of any intermediate scale transfers the power question only to the formal shape of government and confuses social justice with personal benefit.

On the eve of WW II, the whole system that underlies the present structure of the capital, both in socio-economic and spatial terms, was already set, at least in its basic guidelines.

*It is characteristic that this final coup de grace for the local authorities was imposed by the authoritarian and highly centralized administration of the Metaxas dictatorship.*
The Formation of the Metropolitan Area

- INTRODUCTION
- ATHENS, A BUILDING CONSTRUCTION FACTORY
- THE 'UNAUTHORIZED' BELT AND ITS INCORPORATION INTO THE CITY PLAN
- THE COURSE TOWARD LEGALIZATION
- FORMS TRENDS AND ASPIRATIONS
INTRODUCTION

After its liberation in 1944, the city of Athens looked wretched. Deterioration resulted not only from the abandonment during the years of the German-Italian occupation and from the Nazi-Resistance skirmishes, but also from the Battle of Athens, which occurred after the departure of the German conquerors in December 1944. During this battle British and Royalist army forces, which landed in Athens from the Middle East, fought against the leftist National Liberation Front (E.A.M.). E.A.M. was "the main prop of the entire resistance movement against the axis forces"* and received strong support from a majority of the Greek population.**

The swift occupation of the city's central triangle by the British and Royalist forces determined the course of the battle. By loosing Athens, E.A.M. lost its best opportunity to govern the country. The Varkiza Treaty (February 12, 1945) obliged E.A.M. soldiers to relinquish their arms, after which a wild persecution of its members was organized by unofficial right wing terrorist organizations and Nazi collaborators, and was supported by the Greek police.

The Greek Civil War (1946-1949) was a last desperate effort by the remaining members of the left movement to regain their power. They established their own government in the mountains, where they had left strong organizations and bonds since the years of the resistance against Hitler's occupation. E.A.M. had implemented there its

*Quoted from a German Report entitled: "Political Situation in Greece from June 4th to July 3rd 1943" (July 6, 1943).

**E.A.M. was an alliance between Communist and Socialist political powers, actually guided by the Communist Party of Greece (K.K.E.).
social and economic model, which was very close to the Yugoslavian one, based on decentralized rural production and autonomous communities. But official state forces were controlling the capital and the large urban centers, utilizing successfully the substantial, American financial and military aid, which came after the Truman Doctrine to replace the British one. A large part of Greek population, tired and confused by the civil war, moved to the urban centers to seek for safety and jobs since the country was being destroyed.

At the same time the capital was experiencing its reorganization along the economic guidelines established in the prewar period. The destruction of the city during WW II gave the opportunity to some planners to propose a state controlled expansion and improvements in the central area. The 1945 Plan for the Reconstruction of Athens proposed the establishment of a satellite administrative city in Megara, a town located southwest of Athens, street improvements and financial strategies for funding the implementation. Planning for this development was given over to the new Ministry of Reconstruction. K.A. Doxiadis was in charge of the organization.

While political power centers such as Palace, Police and Army were applying tight political control over the citizens, the economic controls, as outlined by the successive liberal puppet governments of the period, selected the laissez-faire framework, to move the economy of the cities they controlled. The planning proposals were never implemented, and Doxiadis finally resigned.

The final defeat of the "Democratic Army" (1949), -- which, having been left to its fate by the other Balkan socialist countries and the U.S.S.R., was gradually loosing its position -- marked the elimination of any other model of development and the return to the prewar trends under different labels and rhythms. The basic official ideological
slogan was anticommunism, which resulted in widespread persecution of leftists, with numerous trials, executions and political prison camps. No one could work in public services, or find a job easily in the private sector without being certified as "nationalist" and "anticommunist". Ideological terrorism, exercised by the police, became the means of ideological control since national unity had been destroyed. Right wing governments' prevalence (since 1951) was largely based on this terrorism, as well as on falsification of election results. Unofficial organizations, comprised of officers from the army, police, the palace, and foreign secret services, had much of the real power. These organizations, together with the unstable political climate of the mid-1960's finally led to the colonels' dictatorship (1967-1974).

If the political slogan was anticommunism, the economic one was rapid development. From 1951 to the present, Greece has experienced an impressive, accelerated growth.* Since the generous Greek capital from abroad had largely ceased after the Asia Minor infusions of disaster, this growth was mainly based on the intensive exploitation of the country's own resources (including labor) and the foreign capital investments. Greater emphasis was given to the industrial growth.** Athens became the central promoter of this growth, accompanied by Thessalonika after the '50s. In addition, since the previous, natural relation-

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*G.N.P. per capita increase:

<table>
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<th>Pre WW II</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1964</th>
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<td></td>
<td>$80</td>
<td>$112</td>
<td>$270</td>
<td>$500</td>
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(Source: N. Svoronos, 1976, p. 146)

**Participation in the Groww National Income (op. cit.):

<table>
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<th>Pre-WW II</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1962</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td></td>
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ships with the Balkan countries were destroyed during the Civil War and the ensuring Cold War, Athens became the main entrance to the country.

The bases of the conglomeration had been installed in the previous periods. But between 1950 and 1970, a continually increasing intensification occurred. Athens was developing and absorbing the wealth of the provincial cities and the rural population of the country. By 1971 it contained 30 percent of the country's population, (showing an average annual increase rate of 3 percent), 47 percent of the total employment in industry, 70-80 percent of the chemical and metallurgy industries, and 46 percent of the wholesale commerce.* It contained all the headquarters for the banks and the great Greek and foreign corporations. In addition, it represented 65% of the taxable income (1960-1970), it concentrated 65 percent of students, 50 percent of the hospitals, 55 percent of the graduates of the universities of the country, 90 percent of the political newspapers, all of the periodicals, 83 percent of the insurance companies, 95 percent of the advertising enterprises, and 95 percent of the computers (1970).* These statistics not only show the obvious superiority of the capital over the rest of the country, which had been established since the end of the 19th century, but they also represent aspects of an extremely complex pyramid system. In such a system the capital is not merely the imperialistic center, which expands by exploiting the rest of the nation, but also the center of redistribution of resources, the most efficient productive machine, and the real moving power of Greece in both socioeconomic and ideological terms. The developments represented by these statistics certainly have their roots in previous establishments (1880s, 1920s), but during 1950-1970 they reached

their zeniths aided by the political and economic imperatives of the time.

Such an intensification of social and economic phenomena are met also in the spatial form of the urban area. Actually we don't have the appearance of any new pattern. The Athens area is divided into two segments -- the center and the periphery -- and the periphery is again divided into the lower income northwest and the higher income northeast. The whole gives the impression of an amorphous mass which is flowing towards every direction, as happened in the '20s. Building types are the same as in the previous period: urban apartment building, working class housing built by the public sector, low-rise for middle-income people, houses, suburban villas for upper classes, and illegal settlements for the bulk of immigrants who overflowed the city after 1950. But the intensification in the use of these forms (especially the urban apartment building and unauthorized houses) together with the expansion of industry and the creation of two new national roads (Athens-Corinth, Athens-Thessalonika) transformed the quantitative crowding to a qualitative change. The Athens urban area, expanding towards the rest of the county, and even further along the national roads, became a spread-out metropolitan area.

In this sprawl urban land policy again played a decisive role. Conservative governments not only acted along the 'successful' grounds of their preceding Liberal ones, but tried to 'improve' the profitability of the land as much as possible. Public construction was minimized to 3 percent of the total housing, while the various decrees and regulations liberated the urban apartment building from the boundaries of the central areas and allowed the private sector to almost rebuild the Town Map* portion of the city.

*The "Town Map" included only the legally authorized city
4.1 Athens c1963

- legal settlements
- illegal settlements
In Athens demolitions are almost equal to the new construction. The life-span of a building owes itself less to the technical requirements than to the regulations which permit more height and to the speculative activity that is encouraged by the economic development and the needs of social rising. This has as its result the development of an economic activity that is equally intensive in the central quarters and the periphery of the city...

(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 13)

Through this encouraged growth, private speculative building becomes an indispensable, and at the same time almost autonomous, part of the activities of the city, which finally escapes any boundaries and determines its form.

As Athens does not express the internal dynamics of the country, so it does not respect the boundaries of its space or even the rules of urban growth... It demolishes its center in order to reconstruct it as higher and denser; it is eating little by little its periphery in order to settle people on the mountains around; it is expanding along the highway in order to incorporate their space; it builds the beaches in order to possess them and enjoy them.

(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 45)

The urban apartment building became the symbol of Athenian "success", a symbol and an envelope for everyone. It not only housed the higher and the middle ranks of Athenian bourgeoisie, but was also the dream of the working class. Despite the strong political depression of the period this building type became the container of the various private and public services. Behind its neutral facades the different contents are not conceivable. Thus, no one can recognize the central headquarters of the security police, which "sheltered" many students during the dictatorship, among the surrounding middle-class apartment buildings, except perhaps by seeing policemen standing at the main door.

areas, approved by the Ministry of Public Works.
...Building construction represents an integral part of the Athenian's everyday experience. The building site, which in the cities of west Europe is either an exception or is hidden behind the surrounding buildings, here finds itself first in the heart of the capital, in the center of traffic and circulation, in the center of economic life and office buildings, among the groups of tourists, inactives and buyers. It seems to mark dramatically the city with the seal of temporarity...

Seen from a deeper point of view, the building construction coincide with the development of the Athenian economy, marking the impulses and underlying its fragility.

(G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 385-86)

In the post-war period Athens was almost transformed to a permanent construction site. Building construction became the number one activity of the city, a major source of employment for its citizens, and the most efficient means for the circulation of money. In 1961, 8.7 percent of the economically active population of the city was occupied in the construction sector (4.5 percent of the total of the country); in 1971 this share increased to 10.4 percent (7.7 percent of the total of the country).* In 1970 this sector attracted 43.8 percent of private investments in the entire Attica County (industry 23.6 percent, transportation 11 percent).** Greece today leads the world in the number of new buildings constructed each year (14.7 new buildings per annum per 1000 inhabitants),*** and building construction represents 10 percent of the G.N.P.

In Athens, the most intensive construction activity

*G. Burgel, 1976, p. 386.

**M. Kamches, et. al., 1978, p. 12.

***Sweden: 13.7; Japan: 11.9 Switzerland: 10.1.
(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 396.)
appeared after 1960. It was undertaken almost totally by small building enterprises; and was oriented towards the rebuilding of the Town Map areas (central areas in the '60s; northern, northeastern and southeastern suburbs in the '70s). This intensification coincided with the expansion of industrial activity in Athens area. Before that time there was an expansion of the western residential areas, which were mostly filled out with low-rise houses for low-income population, or by "unauthorized" settlements. Meanwhile, the central areas displayed a slow growth.

The great construction boom came to absorb the savings of middle-class people after WW II, and at the same time, it provided jobs to the waves of incoming migrants. It influenced not only the building sector itself, but also a series of sectors and professions such as building materials industries, architectural and real estate offices, lawyers, and notaries. Apartment construction became the symbol of economic and social success.

State governments tried to facilitate private building enterprises as much as possible, influencing either the supply or the demand by decrees and regulations, or even by reducing construction done by the public sector. The legal framework had been laid down by the floor ownership law and the general building regulations of 1929. But the decisive incentives for the proliferation of urban apartment types came after 1955. New building regulations, passed in 1955, reduced the minimum distances for sunlight, ventilation and view while the 1968 Compulsory Decree 395/68 increased the floor-to-area ratio from 20 percent to 40 percent.

In the meantime, various decrees gradually increased the building heights. Public construction activity, undertaken mainly by the ministries of Social Welfare and Labor -- following the previously described patterns of
the 1920s, and housing remaining refugees, and low-income workers -- gradually diminished. Since 1968, the policy for low-income people has been oriented towards granting housing loans.*

Many building enterprises were born during this period, to take advantage of the favorable measure. They were characterized by their small size and the low organic structure of their capital. The origins of these entrepreneurs varied widely. Some were familiar with the building sector (contractors, civil engineers, small-scale producers and sellers of building materials, prior specialized artisans), while others were not. They all had capital or access to credit organizations. The building entrepreneur, most of the time, was the contractor or the developer. He started with low capital and continued to keep it at low levels.** The obstacle presented by the high cost of purchasing the land was overcome by the legislative formulae of "antiparochi", according to which the entrepreneur and the owner of the lot sign a contract.

In an Antiparochi contract -- which is still used today -- the landowner appears as partner, contributing only his land, transferring his ownership rights to the future buyers, and receiving at the end a percentage of floor area equal to the land's value. In the central areas this percentage has become very high (80-100 percent). In these cases, the land owner actually doesn't transfer ownership rights, but only allows the contractor to exploit a part of the building for a specified time (i.e. 10 years). Clearly the landowner gains profit without taking any risk; if his contractor fails he can continue the building with another one. However this case is rather rare.

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*In 1972, $203 million (American) in loans were granted.

**G. Yannopoulos et. al., 1974, p. 29.
Building proved to be a very beneficial undertaking. Profits in the '60s were around 100 percent.* The contractor could sell apartments before proceeding with the erection of the building, merely showing buyers the plans, and thus he could obtain the capital necessary for completion of the construction.

Finally, the central factor in this building process was the urban land. The device of 'antiparochi' matched perfectly both the needs of the Greek building enterprise and the financial conditions, since the entrepreneur rarely intended to increase his capital and the banking credit was not enough to purchase the lot. As a result of this policy, land values were increasing continually (20 percent per year), coming to a total value, in 1972, 2.5 times higher than the gross national product.**

Despite the high land values and the consequent high apartment prices, this residential type showed under "normal" conditions, a continuously increasing demand. The factors defining this demand go beyond the state's intentions: For the period 1970-74 public investments in houses were only 3.29 percent of the total, while banking finance was only 17.8 percent.*** Thus the major load of housing expenses went to the individuals. The buyers could be found in every social stratum. For the upper incomes an apartment purchase was a secure investment. For the lower ones a "respectable" residential environment, or a dowry


**From 1964 to 1972 the average land value increased 162 percent (1050 drachmas/m² to 2,750 dr./m²). See M. Kamches, et al, 1978, p. 15-16. Total land value in 1972: 699.6 billion drachmas. The center alone, which occupies only 220 hectares, had, in 1972, a value equal to the GNP (312.4 billion drachmas).

***M. Kamches, et al., 1978, p. 25.
4.2 APARTMENT BUILDINGS
of the yet unmarried women.*

The differences between Peristeri and the other areas show that the dowry system is more strongly conserved in the low-income neighborhoods... If we had to classify the situation, we would say that the case of the day-laborer -- a young modiste -- who buys, after years of exhaustive work, a two room apartment -- her dowry -- in a middle-income neighborhood, or the case of the petit bourgeois, mature woman, who obtained the same kind of apartment after a beneficial antiparochi, is much more representative of the real estate speculation in Athens and its generalization than the case of the building enterprise, which sells a luxury apartment to a doctor or lawyer, and even here it would be a dangerous simplification to characterize the real estate speculation as a profitable game of some wealthy landowners. The massive intervention of building activity as a motivating force for development, and as responsible for the transformation of the urban space, is located exactly on the level of individual personal aspirations, which are channelled to become an element of exploitation by the economic mechanisms of profit.

(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 395-6)

Just as the economic mechanisms of profit had distributed the Athenian land to small ownerships since the end of the 19th century, so in the post-war period similar, but more complex mechanisms distributed the Athenian built space to small owners. Again, modern Athenian speculation is connected with the influx of capital from other parts of the country and from Greeks living abroad (Africa) or coming from abroad (West Germany). In Athens and Kawithea, fully one fifth of the new apartment owners don't live in the urban area.**

In the most recent years housing demand was strength-

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*The percentage of unmarried women among the owners of apartments in Athens is extremely high (1/4 to 1/3). See G. Burgel, 1976, p. 394.

**See G. Burgel, 1976, p. 393.
ened, in a large part, by speculators and those wishing to avoid inflation by investing in real estate.* Thus the increase of the apartments' prices sometimes are higher than the increase in prices of other goods and services.** As a result, housing expenses have absorbed a large proportion of the family budget (15-35 percent).***

So, although the building enterprises proved successful at the beginning, to accommodate a large portion of Athenian population, the continuous, disportionate and many times speculative increase in prices, has recently made it inaccessible to the lower incomes. Furthermore, from its very beginning it was addressed more towards the high-middle income population than the lower one, which had mostly followed the "illegal" settlement alternative.

In addition, after a large part of the city was built, people discovered the low quality of their environments: the low-quality standards of their apartments -- cheap materials, small spaces -- and of their neighborhoods. Absence of social facilities (greenery, kindergardens, free spaces, health centers, educational facilities), problems of circulation and transportation, proximity to inappropriate installations (industries, workshops), absence of social interaction, congestion, etc.

However, the building enterprise is still strongly connected with the political and economic conditions in the city. G. Burgel points out the strong effect that building crisis had in compounding the political and economic crisis that threatened the colonel's dictatorship in 1973.

For the first three months of 1973, we notice a 91 percent increase of building in the Attica County in comparison with the first three months of 1972.


**M. Kamches et. al., 1978, p. 25.

months of the previous year...
This speculative gleam incited the political authorities to try to stop the housing loans, that banks generously offered. This measure was to accelerate their fall: disappointment of the great financial capital, sudden ceasing of any construction, thousands of building workers unemployed. These unemployed workers were, together with the students, the protagonist of the National Technical University turmoil in 1973.

(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 389)

Having become a source for employment and being connected to the economic UFE of the city, the building enterprise was also connected with speculation and low environmental quality. Although insufficient to meet the lower-income residents' needs, the building enterprise has become an important factor that cannot be ignored in any decision affecting the future of the city.
While the urban apartment building was spreading from the center to the closer periphery, a new residential belt started surrounding the city. This belt had two distinctive characteristics: "illegal" houses and rapid growth. In 1964 its area comprised 17.94 percent of the Town Map one (35 and 195 square meters respectively).

The new neighborhoods occupied mainly the northwestern, northern and southeastern side of the periphery of the capital and the west of Piraeus. Isolated examples appeared also in the industrial area between Athens and Piraeus, or in the eastern periphery, as well as in infills among the quarters of the two cities.

The new housing areas, together with the industrial expansion and the widespread appearance of vacation settlements, towards the sea-shores, pulled further the already vague boundaries of the Athens' area, giving at the same time a new dimension to it. The establishment of the metropolitan area was already a fact in the '60s. The urban sprawl flew out of the basin and began to cover the rest of Attica County, following the directions of the national roads (Athens-Thessalonika, Athens-Patras, Athens-Halkis, Athens-Messogeia).

The residents of the "illegal" settlements were immigrants who were coming from rural areas in order to make "a better living". These people overran the basin from the mid-sixties to the late '60s. Between 1945 and 1966 320,000 to 350,000 people were housed in "unauthorized settlements", representing 45 percent of the total population increase (1945-1966).* In 1951 the number of 'illegal'

*A Romanos, 1969, p. 141.
houses was 8 percent of the total of new houses; during the following decade the number increased at a rate of 13.7 percent per year.*

This phenomenon was neither new, nor exclusively Athenian. It has marked the development of the great cities in Latin America, Africa and Asia in the postwar period and has been given several different names, (i.e. 'barriadas', 'barrios' or 'campamentos'). However, the Athenian case includes some quantitative and qualitative characteristics that differentiate it from the third world capitals.

'Unauthorized' housing, although it was critical to the city's expansion, did not take such extreme dimensions in Athens as in Bogota, Caracas or New Delphi. It involved 11.2 percent of the total population,** which is relatively low in comparison to the other cities (25-30 percent, usually). In addition it is a phenomenon which mushrooms during the decades of the '50s and '60s but which became extremely limited by the end of seventies.

There were also qualitative differential characteristics -- in the social status of the migrants, the process of land acquisition, and the initial and final forms of the settlements. Regarding the socioeconomic status, Athens has had almost the same percentage of economically active population among the migrants as among the natives.*** Also the percentage of unemployment or underemployment has been very low in comparison with some third world cities (2 percent). Regarding housing accommodation, the majority of

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*A. Kotsi et. al., 1973, p. 244.

**The population increase between 1951 and 1961 was 500,000 inhabitants. If 45 percent of this increase represented migrants housed in unauthorized settlements (225,000 inhabitants) then their percentage in the total population (2,000,000 in 1961) is 11.25 percent.

***N. Kalogerou, 1975, p. 20.
migrants were settled in bought rural land, while the phenomenon of 'squatter settlements' remained limited. In addition, the process of shaping the 'unauthorized' settlement was more of an accumulation of many individual actions than the well-organized group action characteristic of third world cases.*

The most striking peculiarity of the unauthorized settlements was their quick incorporation into the town map. This process of legalization, besides satisfying the "illegal" inhabitants' desire for legitimacy, also received support from public authorities, who by this policy secured two goals: the absorption of "urban villagers" into city life; and the expansion of the building sector from the already rebuilt center into the peripheral areas.

Some years ago, Greek progressive architects used to think of the 'unauthorized' settlements of Athens and Thessalonika as 'spontaneous, autonomous' environments, or as reflections of Latin America's analogous examples.** However, a more careful examination of their creation and their resulting form would reveal that, in terms of mechanisms and land subdivision, they more closely resemble the speculative settlements of the late 19th century than any traditional or innovative spatial model. Interesting differences lie in the social characteristics and the relationships among the inhabitants, which still indicate rural

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D.A. Fatouros and K. Hatzemihalis, who first used the term 'self-generated' in their research study for 'Meteora' of Thessalonika, were first to dispute its appropriateness. See L. Papadopoulos, D.A. Fatouros, K. Hatzemihalis; 1979, p. 289.
4.3

FIRST STEPS
4.4 GRADUAL INTEGRATION
patterns. But these peculiarities were mostly limited to the household level and tended to disappear with time.

Four principal actors were cast in the drama of the settlement's formation: the migrants, the builders, the land speculators and the public authorities. But, in the first act of the play, landowners or land speculators were the protagonists.* Former shepherds or peasants of Attica County -- mostly Albanians -- had owned the areas. Their lands, usually empty and sloping, or along riversides, were located near the official refugees' settlements established in the previous period. Rarely did these landowners hold legal titles for their ownerships, a fact that would later cause problems for the future settlers. In most of the cases the landowners had expropriated public lands:**

In the mid-1960s a climax in land speculation was reached. Articles and reports telling of scandals and nearly mythical profits made from public-owned lands by acute speculators are

*Here we should add the minor case of squatter settlements, which had appeared sporadically since 19th century and continued in this rhythm, perhaps because of the scarcity of public lands. Such a case, in the post-war period, appeared in Perama in an industrial area out of Piraeus, around a previous refugees' settlement. There, the settlers gradually occupied the land, which belonged to the Greek church. The state came to solve the problem by buying a large part of land and asking from the squatters a small symbolic amount for their lots. The church, also, did the same for the rest. Despite the different processes, this example is much closer to the bought land settlements, in terms of form. (see I. Danou, Th. Pantopoulos, 1975, pp. 55-56).

**We referred to the process of expropriation of public lands since 19th century in Part 2, under the headline: "Ownership Patterns and Building Processes" (pp. ).

Burgel writes of a funny case in the Peristeri neighborhood where the landowner insisted in order to explain the 'unclear' limits of his land that, "His grandfather... had defined the boundaries (of his area), together with those of his neighbors, by throwing a stone from the center of the plot" (G. Burgel, 1976, p. 392).
abundant in the national press of the time. The public exposition of one such spate of reports culminated in a House debate in October 1966, in which the Minister of Agriculture and his predecessor accused one another of having allowed land speculators to make huge profits out of buying and selling state-owned land leased to shepherds for grazing.

(A. Romanos, 1969, p. 142)

Sometimes the areas had already been subdivided to small landowners, as in the case of the Brahami Settlement, but this made no difference for the buyers in terms of land prices and neighborhood quality.

The last Turkish feudal lord governing the area was Braham-Bev, after whom the area was called Brahami. In 1840, the people who had served as workers or shepherds on the farms became big landowners (tsiflikades), with fields stretching south past the present airport. Most of them were Greeks or Albanian origin (the so-called Arvanites) who were known as hardworking farmers...

...Many of the employed farm-workers started to take second jobs and by the second World War most of them had bought land with their savings. This meant that, in addition to a few big owners there were now many small landowners, often with scattered properties. In the early fifties a great influx of new settlers started to come into the area. The landowners began to find the sale of land a profitable business, so they subdivided plots for sale on a rather large scale -- thereby completely destroying all rational farming possibilities.

(B. Røe, 1979, p. 86)

After the climbing and prices, and the influx of migrants, rural landowners found that urban land revenues were incomparably higher than the rural land ones. Thus, around the early '50s, they began to sell their areas either to land speculators or immediately to the newcomers, who were unable to dispute any 'unclear' titles. In the second case the settlers usually defined the boundaries of their properties themselves, according to the number of square meters they had bought.*

*D.A. Fatouros, K. Hatzemihalis, 1979, p. 263.
The speculators subdivided the land into 'rural' plots, sometimes with the help of engineers, who were paid on a per-plot basis.* The picture of such areas was that of a distorted or regular grid, with streets from 3 to 10 meters wide, and almost rectangular lots with areas ranging from 120 to 200 square meters.** The layout was trying to conform to the 1953 lot standards waiting to be added to the city map.

This form of land subdivision had nothing to do with any 'spontaneous' or 'autonomous' process springing from the settlers themselves, but it conformed to merely speculative intentions. It was nothing more than a clear exploitation of the meager savings of the migrant, which took place under the apathetic gaze of public authorities, and gave extremely high profits to land speculators (as much as 280 percent per plot!).***

The majority of the inhabitants had come from the poorest rural areas (highlands and islands) or from small provincial towns, seeking a better life. It is difficult to isolate the reasons of its movement or attribute it only to the destruction of the productive relationships in the country or to the dynamic development and the lights of the capital.

The phenomenon cannot be explained by the assignment of people's conglomerates into Athens to general reasons (rural exodus, attractiveness of the great city) or to the coincidence of personal aspirations of millions of individuals. The real explanation should be found in the point of their interface in the

*Consequently, engineers attempted to break up the land into as many lots as possible, diminishing any public or communal space. For the working out of such a map see B. Røe, 1979, p. 86.


***See A. Romanos, 1969, p. 142.
individual wills into collective dynamisms......

The willingness of the capitalistic class to develop the economic activity of Athens, where the revenues were safer, quicker and higher than anywhere else, coincides with the aspirations of increasingly numerous masses to obtain a regular and well-paid job. This coincidence explains why, despite the swiftness of the influx of migrants into Athens, this migration never became an urbanization of misery, as in the cities of the underdeveloped countries. For the same ages, the percentages of economic activities are more significant among the migrants than the native inhabitants of the capital; and in every research study, economic initiatives are particularly projected as an explanation for the settlement in Athens. Capitalism not only succeeded in attracting the necessary masses for its expansion of producers and consumers into Athens, but also to persuade them that their settlement was due to their own will and for the securing of their happiness.

(G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 378-380)

Actually, the majority of the newcomers, although fully employed, was distributed to economic sectors different from those of the natives. In industry, the percentages are about the same; the differences are obvious in the sectors of commerce, building construction, transportation and services. Migrants turned more to the tertiary and building sectors than did the natives and less to commerce and transportation.* Apparently, in the beginning, the migrants constituted the less privileged part of the

*Occupation of Migrants and Natives in Athens (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Non Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building construction</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other occupations</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: E.S.Y.E. (National Statistical Service of Greece), 1963, Issue V.
Athenian population; and this status is seen in their distribution in space, the quality of the construction of their houses, and the attitude of the public authorities towards them. Their weak purchasing power -- which derived from a dowry, a sale of a small rural parcel, or savings from their job -- pushes them in to the margins of both the city and the law. The legal framework theoretically prohibited building in such areas but it also encouraged the 'illegal' process, since it was an inexpensive means of housing the new-comers necessary for the development of the city's labor potential. This attitude dated back to the previous period and it is expressed in the 1923 and 1926 decrees.

The City Plan Service or local police proceeded to demolish such buildings "if no permanent habitation of people occurred during day and night."* The more restrictive laws or 1952, 1955, and 1956 were never enforced, while the compulsory decree of 1968 went further to define the "habitable structure" as that which has "a completed structural frame of reinforced concrete or masonry." Owners of such units were obliged to pay a tax equal to 3 percent of the value of the built unit. Under the above legal restrictions a unique scenario developed: the new settler hired a specialist builder in unauthorized construction, who built a room with dimensions of 4 x 4 x 2.5 meters, all 'in one night', so as not to be noticed by the police. This construction cost the owner much more than a similar legal building, because of the risk, and it had all of the inadequacies of a cheap, impromptu erection. But the builders usually were experts in public relations, especially with the police, so even if the owner was himself working in the building sector, he didn't dare undertake the construction of the first stage. Of course,

for all these services the owner was exploited by the specialist builder, who provided a line of credit to his clients at extremely high rates of interest (50%).

Many of these 'first nuclei' were erected during national celebrations, or during parliamentary elections, a frequent case in the '60s. An entire illegal settlement was born during the 1964 elections, and took the name of the new prime minister (Papandreika, in Kypseli quarter) while previous ones were enriched by new houses:

A man said that one part of this house was named after "old" Papandreou and the other part after Karamanlis, relating to who had won the elections at the time it was built! Election time was selected for two reasons. The police were usually occupied elsewhere and the politicians sometimes promised to ask the authorities to "help" the unauthorized settlers, so they left them in peace at least for the time being.

(B. Røe, 1979, p. 92)

Political parties, trying to increase the number of their voters in the capital, the area most crucial to their victory or survival, supported as much as possible "illegal" housing, as a whole. Politicians on the other hand showed personal interest to those individuals who had important acquaintances.

The family tried to bribe the policeman, who was from the same village as one of the family members, but he did not accept the bribe. Then the father-in-law asked another former minister (also an acquaintance) to help them. He reacted immediately and called the Chief of Police in the municipality, who ordered his men not to patrol the area for some time. The building site was afterwards left alone.

(B. Røe, 1979, p. 95)

The political beliefs of the settler were an important factor in determining the attitude of the police toward 'illegal' housing. Communists were usually the black sheep for the conservative patrolman.*

*Such a case is described by B. Røe, 1979, p. 95.
The confusion of responsibilities among the state organizations, is made apparent when widespread demolitions by the police or the Town Map Service, had been opposed by other ministries. Such was the case of Perama in 1974. The illegal nuclei, whose safety had been guaranteed by parliamentary members belonging to the governing party, were pulled down by the police, while the Minister of Social Welfare only days before had referred to the suspension of the demolitions until the accommodation of the settlers inside its own lots.*

Inside the above institutional framework the residents of the 'unauthorized' settlements were acting under multiple pressures and influences. State authorities viewed them as a field on which to project their political aspirations, while capitalists saw them as labor potential, to accomplish their economic goals. Therefore, their attitude was to manipulate and absorb the new-comers. The housing aspect became a means to achieve this political and economic incorporation. Through an equivocal institutional framework that kept the migrants bound to the good will of each successive government, the rulers could control the political loyalty of the lower classes; at the same time they could free themselves of any costly social care while devoting any available capital to the quick economic development of Athens. Illegal settlements initially lacked public facilities and infrastructures (schools, health centers, water supply, sewage system, garbage collection).

Aside from the general framework of rules and formalities already outlined, the illegal settler had also to face the exploitive intentions of the local land speculators and builders. If for the ruling class 'illegal

*See I. Danou, Th. Pantopoulos, 1975, p. 59, 58. The politician who appeared as the patron of the new settlers spoke about "dark forces" which demolished the unauthorized houses.
"housing' was an inexpensive solution to the housing problem of working class and lower strata in general. For the local entrepreneur, it was a chance for accumulation of wealth. Thus, a large part of the settler's small budget was absorbed by others for speculative profit purposes.

So far, we have seen how 'illegal' settlements in Athens were not born spontaneously, but followed a path of restrictions and limitations that others had posed. From the moment the new settler bought a piece of land until at least the time he built his first residential nucleus, he was obliged to conform to a certain number of behavioral patterns. First he "chose" to live in the 'rural' areas surrounding the city, because no alternative place is economically accessible. Second, the size and the position of his lot was in the settlement a function of the amount of his savings; nevertheless the more or less standard small sizes and the poor qualities of the neighborhood could not offer many alternatives. Third, the building of the first portion of his house was not result of the collective communal action as we have seen in previous periods (Anafiotica, illegal refugees' settlements); it was rather an individualistic procedure, whose success depended on his acquaintances and accesses to public authorities, his local builder, his political record, or the lucky moment when public authorities seemed lax toward the control of 'unauthorized' buildings (celebrations, elections). Finally, the form of his first structure was almost a given: 4 x 4 x 2.5 meters. A habitation of this size was acceptable to the authorities although the size actually derives from the standard materials used: it is a multiple of the size of cement blocks used for quick building, or of the standard wooden planks used for slab shuttering (4 meters).* In addition, the quality of the construction

*See P.A. Fatouros, K. Hatzemixales; 1979, p. 243.
was also a given, since it took place under risky conditions and with cheap material. In the end, the first structure denotes nothing more than the establishment of the existence of the migrant inside the city, and his strong anxiety and will to secure a private base for himself and his family, in order to continue his adventurous journey towards a 'respectable' urban life.

Until the completion of the four steps described above the process of formation of the 'illegal' settlements does not differ markedly from that of the 'authorized' speculative lower-middle class settlements established in Athens at the end of 19th century. Again, land speculators define the urban form, which also lacks social facilities, communal places, and basic utilities. The first unit is built according to certain standards too. The differences between authorized and unauthorized settlements are expressed in quantitative rather than qualitative terms: smaller lots and streets; poorer transportation facilities, as the settlements precede expansion or communication networks; longer distance from the center; more frequent proximity to quarries or industrial plants; less decoration and room for the original structures. The only qualitative differences lie in the label of "illegal" and the social backgrounds of the inhabitants who are rural-origin, uneducated workers or lower rank employees.

The most interesting differences lay in the later phases, from the time the 'illegal settlement' was established to the moment it became 'legalized'. A neighborhood social relationships network was formed, while each house developed through stages, taking a form far different from the other urban or rural precedents. These last and significant characteristics emerged inside an already defined fabric, and can be explained only by the social quality of the 'illegal' neighborhoods which hardly can be found in
the rest of the Athenian urban milieu.

The social organizations that developed kept the community coherent and they provided it with the opportunity to express itself through the collective amelioration of the neighborhood. These organizations were either informal structures (based on family and friendship relationships) or formal bodies constituted for specific purposes (pressure the authorities for utilities and social services, or to build communal facilities -- playgrounds, churches, small bridges).

The informal relationships can be explained by a number of common social characteristics found among the residents.* First, there were relatives or compatriots who migrated to the same neighborhood, together or gradually; second, was the social homogeneity (rural origin, similar cultural background, similar incomes and occupations); and third, the trend to transfer the village life pattern and strengthen new friendships with new family relationships (marriages; sponsorships). These patterns were mostly developed along a single street but also could be found on the whole settlement level.

Also, acute common problems unified a part or all of the inhabitants. Formal organizations gave them the opportunity to undertake active roles.** Committees or neighborhood councils were formed to address specific environmental problems*** or to confront sudden threats such as expropriations or demolitions. By the end of the '60s most of these organizations were devoted to seeking the adoption of their respective settlements to the Town Map.

*For an analysis of the above social organizations see Axarli, P. Kosmaki, 1979, pp. 188-199.


***See B. Røe, 1979, p. 98.
Despite the residents' efforts the poor character of the whole of the area rarely changed during the "illegal phase". On the contrary, a significant change can be noticed in the houses themselves.

The main impression of Kipoupous is of visual disorder and misery. If one tries to pinpoint the disorder in space, one will come to the conclusion that disorder and ugliness are literally limited to the public areas... So the dust that covers the area comes from neighboring stone-quarries and from the wind blowing on the unsurfaced roads, the heaps of junk or rubbish are only in the unused plots, etc. on the contrary within the domain of the individual house one finds the expression of a feeling towards plants and flowers and order and cleanliness and pure decorative disposition and artistic creation -- sometimes even ingenuity... And you...begin to see that Kipoupolis, far from being a slum, far from being an ugly, poor settlement, is a collection of individual successful attempts. It is a creation by dynamic people of a viable physical environment, the virtues of which spring from their efforts and faults and disadvantages from restrictive state measures.

(A. Romanos, 1970, pp. 19, 20)

Residents were developing their houses in stages, according to their economic possibilities. Additional building was taking place during the night or during specific national events, done by builders or by residents themselves, helped sometimes by friends or relatives. Rooms were arranged around a courtyard, which became the center of communication and family life. Many times, two or even three households appeared on the same plot accommodating two or three generations. Sometimes shops or residential units for rent were also added. This typology succeeded in incorporating the villages' patterns and, also, in meeting the current needs of the settlers. Construction quality was low, but when the house came to a more or less completed stage many visual quantities prevailed. The resulting vivid, polychromic mixture of rural
and urban decorative elements cannot be compared to either the "vernacular wisdom" of the traditional villages, or to the typical, post-war "villas" popular among the petit-bourgeoisie. This mixture expressed the inner dynamism of the inhabitants who succeeded in creating, despite the multiple restrictions, a new, urbanized environment without forgetting until that moment their local habitual life.
The illegal settlements, as samples of an architectural creation and social organization different from the dominant patterns, did not last for long. The proximity to a city like Athens, which has shown in the past its tremendous ability to absorb and transform any different trend, appeared in its domain. Along with changes in the character of migration, such proximity became critical for the evolution of the "unauthorized" settlements.

At the end of the '60s conditions changed. First, the continuous stream of rural-origin migrants to Athens slowed down. The proportion of the 'unauthorized' houses fell to 2.3 percent of the new housing activity by 1966.* A series of factors, such as the premature decrepitude of the rural population,** the outlet for emigration to Europe, the development of regional centers*** as well as the quick rising of land prices in the 'illegal' areas of Athens,**** affected the quantity and the quality of people migrating to the capital. The rate of migration from the rural areas to the large urban centers (Athens and Thessalonika) diminished,***** while another category of migrants appeared on center stage -- middle-class people who were moving from provincial towns to Athens and

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***As Patras, Volos, Larissa, Erakleio, (op. cit., p. 377).

****In Kipoupolis in the period 1952-1957 the plots were sold for 6000 drs each. In 1964 the same plots were sold for 30,000 drs, which means 500% increase (see A. Romanos, 1970, p. 18).

*****D. Tsaoussis, 1971, p. 223.
Thessalonika.* Having saved a considerable amount of money, the middle-class immigrants were looking at their residence in the capital more as a safe investment than as an urgent need. As a result, the social status and the attitude of the migrant changed.

On the other hand, a change also occurred in the social and cultural characteristics of the already settled migrants. Although the nature and degree of their employment still differed from that of the rest of the city, most of them had raised their social status.

In Mesonisi, 66 percent of the population interviewed worked in tertiary occupations, the rest in secondary. A high proportion were self-employed (restaurant owner, furniture producer, truck owner/driver, building material wholesale dealer, shopkeeper). Other members of the families worked as shopkeepers, taxi owners/drivers, salesmen, etc. Several had changed occupation one or more times, but most seemed to have stabilized... The inhabitants obviously had "drive" and ability. All had a job very often by their own initiative, and if the income from the regular job was not sufficient to keep up their standard of living they took a second job.

(B. Røe, 1979, p. 88)

This change first was expressed in their houses: plastic materials, aluminum frames, decorative elements offered in quantities by the market, large rooms closed and used only for display of social status, appeared,** drawing many of the 'unauthorized' houses nearer to the models of the middle-class, authorized structures. Now, these people were looking forward either to moving towards more 'respectable' neighborhoods or to changing the status of their own neighborhood, through inclusion in the Town Map.


**N. Kalogerou, 1979, p. 55.
The private housing market, combined with state govern-
ment policy, came to fulfill both aspirations. The housing
boom of 1969, together with a number of favorable building
regulations and the increase of housing loans towards lower
incomes, had two impacts on the 'illegal' settlements. On
the one hand, the intensive rebuilding of the eastern
parts of the city attracted a number of middle-class people,
thus freeing the older areas, which the lower-income popu-
lation from illegal settlements could now reside. On the
other hand, the new opportunity for the illegal settlers
to exploit their land, by building multi-story apartment
buildings, helped to intensify efforts for adoption into
the town map. From 1968 to 1971, a great number of city
map expansions occurred, including older and more recent
illegal areas.*

Social and spatial mobility, and individual efforts
for legalization not only loosened the previous social or-
ganization but also brought together conflicts, discrepan-
cies and deadlocks in the unauthorized neighborhoods.
Political limitations posed by the dictatorship, regarding
the constitution of associations or councils, came to con-
tribute to the above process. But the basic attitude did
not change when these limitations were withdrawn after the
political reform of 1974. Most of the proposals for the
adoption into the town map were characterized by individual
desires to favor some lots over others:

Members of the group claim that the Melissa
Council is trying to influence the authorities
to save their personal properties and not to
make the best possible plan for the area as
a whole.

(B. Røe, 1979, p. 98)

The conflicts revealed that, due to the spatial arrange-
ment of the town plans and to the imposed regulations,

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*D. Emmanuel, 1975, p. 12.
which favored the few large lots (300 square meters and up), the small ones were left to slowly decline.

For the smallest unbuilt-on plots, the only solution is for two neighbors to combine their plots or no building will be permitted on either, as has been the case in several instances. The result is that (six years later) four-story houses are popping up on several of the bigger plots while a lot of smaller plots remain undeveloped. The houses that already existed on small plots have remained unchanged, sometimes deteriorating. These houses have not been "legalized" according to law 720/77 because, after paying for the legalization, their owners could not be permitted to do anything about their houses.

(B. Røe, 1979, pp. 98-99)

All inhabitants, without exception, wanted the Town Plan in their area, despite its injustices. Legalization could offer to them two immediate benefits, and the hope for a third one: the label of legal, important for their social restoration; the opportunity to sell or exploit their property; and, besides that, the increased possibility for better infrastructures.

But this solution did not automatically promise better social services or facilities. Only rarely did such "common goods" appear in a legalized settlement; public spaces remained as unorganized as before. On the contrary, all the positive elements that these settlements had displayed in the past -- the more or less creative social interaction and the skillful adaptability of their residential structures -- with legalization deteriorated. The picture of an authorized "illegal" settlement is that of confusion: a few apartment buildings here and there, and unfinished; low houses, left to decay. It could not approach the dense, continuous structure of the middle-class housing areas, nor was it allowed to develop gradually, according to the previous mode.

Taking into account the type of Athenian demographic
growth then prevailing, and the internal mobility towards more prestigious settlements, it becomes obvious that only a few people could gain from this specific mode of legalization — contractors and landowners. While for the majority of the inhabitants there remained only their nomination as regular residents of Athens and the illusion of a possible future development of their land.
A 1978 report, the Technical Chamber of Greece (T.E.E.) and the Centre of Social Studies (EKKG), defines the main elements of contemporary Athens' structure:

1. A central north-south axis, including the central business district and the areas around Patessos and Syggrou Streets, which contain the most important administrative functions (public and private) and commerce, together with high- and middle-income residential areas;

2. An eastern area, including high- and middle-class residential areas, several green spaces, most of the private high schools, hospitals and clinics, the new university campus, several public services and organizations, as well as offices of Greek and foreign corporations; and,

3. A western area, including wholesale commerce, industrial districts, the national roads and railway lines, as well as residential areas for middle- and lower-incomes.*

Beyond these general abstraction, one can also mention some additional, important characteristics: low-come housing and industries have penetrated the central and east areas as well, being concentrated mainly along the artery leading to Messageia Plain (Messogeion Street) and the artery leading to the airport (Vouliagmenis Street). In addition, each one of the three areas has been overrun by retail commerce. Furthermore, the overall visual impression that a visitor would have -- looking down on the city from a height -- is not marked by an awareness of such functional or income segregations; rather, the most vivid

AΘΗΝΑ 1978
ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΠΑΡΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΚΗΣ ΔΟΜΗΣ

4.5

center
residential areas
green spaces
industry
services

the division line
airport
port

Athens c1978
impression is of a central, built mass overflowing into a lower peripheral one, which spreads over the entire countryside. Natural boarders (hills, mountains) are almost surpassed by built volumes. Limits between areas are ambiguous. Central areas can be recognized by their higher densities and the intersection of the major arteries. Lower density peripheries include high-income suburbs, middle- and lower-income neighborhoods, and the belts of unauthorized housing. Large or small, and popping up "incidentally", the lot-based building mass is finally the sovereign element throughout the urban scene. The whole aggregation of such building volumes looks like a mass that has no end, ready to swallow up the adjacent countryside in every direction. Inside this mass, the Acropolis stands alone, a strange metaphysical element.

...All the elements that constitute urban structure, increase or improve or get more complex as one investigates the cross-section of the town from the periphery to the center at a specific point in time. Volume and height of building,...incomes, utility networks, the quality of housing, the quality of services, the quality of road network, and, of course, land values, can all be represented by curves, whose highest points occur over the centre, and lowest on the periphery of the city. Athens is like an onion.

But the onion is not static. The layers (boundaries) multiply continuously. Each wave of newcomers to the area builds another belt of unauthorized settlements pushing the periphery outward all the time. The immediately receding belt gets a higher land value and, with incomes going up, its inhabitants now press for 'recognition' from the state and the supply of basic utilities and amenities. These are, little by little provided and by then physical changes start to occur in the area in the intensity of the building density and building heights, with the result that the area is now 'authorized' and upgraded. It is then the turn of the new peripheral belt -- and so the process goes on and on.

(A. Romanos, 1969, p. 140)
But beyond the sphere of the immediate connurbation, three directions seem to attract urban development: the north, along the national roads leading to Thessalonika and Halkis, a dynamically developed industrial pole; the southwest, along the national road leading from Athens to the developing city of Corinth; and the east, towards the mixed industrial and agricultural area of Mesogeia.

The increase in density of the inner neighborhoods and the expansion of the urban network along the motorways have replaced the two terms of the Athenian urban equation, the renewal of the center and the displacement of the boundaries of the urban area... The immediate impact of the capital on the landscape and on the people's life becomes more and more clear: there never existed any Athenian economic area, because Athens's space was always spreading to the entire country; but an Athenian metropolitan area begins to be formed... Roads and cars succeeded in giving, in a few years, a new dimension to the capital, where more than a century of political and economic concentration had failed.

(G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 40-42)

This spontaneously spreading urban space contains an extraordinary, dynamic life which is expressed throughout its streets. The lights of the city, which in "a glorious red gleam light up the Aegean sky" and "are visible from Syros Island when the weather is clear"* underlie the international radiation of the city, its dominance over the rest of the country and its inner dynamism.

Athens of the post-war period became not only the showcase of Greek development, but a significant international center as well. The mutual infiltration between the great Greek** and foreign capital*** strengthened by the important...

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*G. Burgel, 1976, p. 52.

**Mainly capital coming from shipowners, banks and great construction companies.

***Foreign capital, many times in collaboration with Greek...
4.6

PERIPHERY & CENTER
position of Athens in the network of international relationships, transformed the Balkan urban center into an intermediate station crucial for the continuous movement of international capital. The city is neither an imperialistic metropolis nor a colonial city; rather, Athens is pulled by the chariot of world capitalistic streams. The securing the continuity of their course. It is the last advanced station of Europe on routes to the middle east and Africa.

Urban space became an active component in the international role: Hellenikon airport, an important intermediate station in the long international flights; Piraeus Port and the national roads completed during the '60s, which connected the capital with Europe -- to the north through Yugoslavia and to the west through the shipping line Patras-Italy -- have contributed to the quick opening of Athens to the outside world; at the same time strengthening its focal role inside the country. The triangular center of the city and the axis starting from it (Kifissias, Syggrou, Mesogelon), as well as Pireus's center became the main territories, for the headquarters of large companies with activities in the country or in the third world. The several high-rise buildings that sprang up at the beginning of the '70s, housing mainly international corporations or grand hotels, and pointing out the international significance of the city, became the new symbols of capital, has been channelled to productive investments in Greece; from 1960 to 1974 the total capital flowing into the country was $6.6 billion (American) while the amount flowing out was $2.2 billion. This contrasts to the dependent third world countries, where multinational capital is concentrated mostly in the exploitation of the raw materials of the countries and most of the profits are exported to the metropolises. For the intermediate position of Greece among the countries of the center and periphery, see G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 135-136, 351 and 356; and also G.D. Melios, 1979, p. 37-41.
post-war Athens.

But other parts of the city too, have gotten a taste of the money surplus brought by international business and tourism. Thus, wealth from abroad, to be invested or spent in the capital, has led to the appearance of numerous commercial and entertainment enterprises of small or medium size, that swarmed into the urban space. The Athenian building sector was strongly favored by this capital injection, as well as by the influx of money from sailors and from Greek emigrants in the West European countries and the United States. Numerous office and urban apartment buildings, as well as hotels were built during the '60s and the early '70s in order to meet the increased demand and utilize this money influx.

Athens's international economic role also has been accompanied by a secondary cultural one, and, recently, by new demographic movements. Athenian universities and professional schools attract a large number of foreign students coming from the Middle East and from African countries, while a number of foreign migrants lately have come to work in the shipping companies, industries or in other manual jobs.

However, all of these new demanding tasks that post-war Athens has undertaken further bind its fate to international developments, and add new parameters to its already saturated, complicated, and shallow urban space. Such cosmopolitanism also further increases the wide distance between the capital and the rest of the country. This distance was the natural result of the continuous increase in concentration of the private and public administrative services, capital and people.

The development of the Greek capital, moderate in comparison with the metropolises of the underdeveloped countries, and equal to that of the other Mediterranean capitals, becomes outrageous,
when considered inside the national demographic framework. Athens is a heavy head on a weak body; the rapidity of its expansion can be explained neither by the size of the country nor by the dynamism of its demography.

(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 23).

During the post-war years, Athens concentrated further inside its territory the administrative, industrial and commercial activities of the entire country, and increased its control over the other centers. Regarding administration, it has gathered the majority of public servants (55 percent in 1956) and banking employees (60 percent in 1958);* and it contains almost all of the higher ranking officers and executives, while provincial services remain staffed by minimal personnel, who play only a secondary executive role.

At the same time that the capital was developing as the top industrial center of the country -- half of the industrial potential in 1969 -- including number of enterprises, unit size, and industries with the greatest productivity,** the more dynamic Athenian corporations gradually absorbed the peripheral ones. Those that survived transferred their offices in the capital to be nearer to the decision-making center. The result of this Athenian growth was that a number of industrial centers that showed promise during the pre-WW II period, such as Kavala, Volos, and Kalamata, showed a continuous decline after the war.

However, by the end of '60s some new trends had appeared. Having their headquarters in the capital, heavy industries moved their plants into the periphery, to follow the cheap labor and to take advantage of the new legislative incentives *Most of the Athenian banks had come gradually under state control.

**Athens had 2,643 individual corporations, while Thessalonika, the second-largest industrial center, had only 364, and Patras, the third-largest, only 102 (G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 67-68).
passed by the government to encourage decentralization.* But, even in these cases, the new plants were not far removed from Athens's radius, concentrating mainly inside the broader Attica county (Megara, Eleusis), or the adjacent counties of Viotia, Evoia, and Corinth, along the national roads. Simultaneously, Athens area showed a remarkable increase in high-technology, medical and consumer-goods industries. These were mostly medium-scale units with few personnel, and were scattered in the basin or in its outskirts. This removal of large-scale industries, together with the expansion of the Athenian circle of influence into the adjacent centers, changed the image of the entrance to the capital. Instead of having boundaries of the building mass appearing suddenly at the ends of the basin, now a series of facilities, industrial plants, and settlements prepare the visitor, before reaching Attica County, to arrive in the megalopolis. Despite the fact that a complex network, consisting of denser urban relationships, has started to develop inside the broader space, the pyramid organization of the urban agglomeration still exists, implying inflexibility in mechanisms and systems.

Operating inside a single square kilometer of the center, a small oligarchy is in control of every decision involving the fate of national development:

The district enclosed by the 'walls' is a central zone of Athens. The reason that urged me to write about these walls is that, inside their area, all of Greece is judged and directed. When we consider that the Palace, the Parliament, the Ministries, the houses of previous and present premiers, the theater, the airway companies, the tourist offices, etc. are located inside the walls it is not odd to say that the heart of the heart, the state of the state, the life of the life, are controlled by the walls...the walls, at the first view are not closed to anybody. People are coming

* G. Burgel, 1976, p. 84.
and going from their entries all the day. Nevertheless, under the surface, the walls are entirely closed, the gates are impassable, as with the museum doors when the time comes. The 'inside' people live the life of their own, where nobody from 'outside' can penetrate...the walls are not the forwarding office of various private affairs; they are not the waiting room; the walls are a big matter; they are the surgery room.

(V. Vassilikos, 1960, p.9).

Outside of the walls, the rest of the population lives in almost uniform apartment buildings or in low-income houses. In 1971, the capital numbered 2,530,207 inhabitants.* Athens is a city of workers, employees, professionals, and tradesmen.** Occupations in the city recently have tended more towards the tertiary than the secondary sector. Rapid economic progress brought about a remarkable increase in the proportion of middle strata in the city. Full of ambition this strata contributed to the enormous increase of consumption and apartment building construction. Retail commerce and entertainment enterprises took advantage of this potential and overran the urban fabric. Although rich in production activities, Athens is, first of all, a consumption city. Although it receives 75 percent of the country's imports, it produces only 40 percent of its exports. Being encased in their three-room apartments, the major portion of the middle-class descend into the streets of the city during the evening hours, searching for recreation, or move in waves towards Saronicos or Euvolkos Beaches during summer, pulling the city towards the sea.

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*The population was 1,378,586 in 1951, and 1,872,709 in 1961. That means that, inside 20 years, the population doubled.

**From 1971 census:  
Craftsmen/Laborers 45,57%  
Professionals 10,27%  
Administrative/Executives 1,47%  
Clerks 16,25%  
Tradesmen 11,51%  
Service Workers 12,22%
Vacation housing again takes the form of an apartment building while, for the working class, the same "unauthorized" settlements, or cheap "mobile" houses, are the solution. As a result extensive urban sprawl covered the seashores in Saronicos and Evolkos Bays.

Although they are educated, the majority of Athens' middle-class come from country areas; they are still caught between provincial manners and modes and the cultural patterns provided by mass media. Connected both to public and private services, they are divided between the clientele-system course of personal social ladder climbing, and that of the hard, individual effort. Carrying no common urban tradition, facing a city that developed by eating* away at itself, dizzy and occupied in the delirium of post-war growth, they filled out the small, neutral apartment spaces the market offered. After years of residence in the capital, they could develop no alternative preference except that of "suburban" apartment building, which looked less congested, and more luxurious, and had covered the still-unpolluted northeastern peripheral zone.

Architects and civil engineers, who first designed the new building typology, following the suggestions of their clients -- building contractors -- were seized by mixed intentions. However, for just about all of them, Athens promised social success. Offering many opportunities, the city gathered 70 percent of Greece's engineers**(1970). The majority of these people worked as professionals, opening many small offices, while the rest were absorbed by public organizations or medium offices.***

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*Most of the neoclassical buildings, and even a part of the traditional Plaka, were demolished to be replaced by new multi-story structures.

**See G. Chaidopoulos, 1976, p. 3.

***See D.S.A., 1976, p. 25, Tables 1 and 2.
For those participating in the leftist movement during the '40s, private, professional practice was the only alternative, since any other channel (public works and services, large construction companies) was actually prohibited. But besides that, the design and construction of a new structure appealed to many leftist architects, who were eager to contribute their personal creations. Leftists' return from isolation through a personal, constructive work has been perfectly described by A. Frangias in his book *E. Kageloporta (The Iron Gate)*. Here the hero a civil engineer who was for years an outlaw in hiding, decides to return and participate in the city life by designing an urban apartment building, an assignment offered him by a friend:

As soon as the first sunbeam had penetrated the small room,..., Aggelos woke up immediately and started the work. Never before had he imagined himself starting so important a project, a building with seven stories...The noon passed, night had come and still he did not get up. He had remembered everything, nothing was lost and his hands, which he had considered useless, were drawing the lines straight, the design precisely. The anatomy of the structure is a magic play, an exercise that has much to teach. And maybe a piece of music. Construction of any element is the most beautiful, the most needed function...And a building lives when it provides its balance to house a life. And if the designer dies, or is imprisoned or executed, the building remains, because concrete, iron and stones are mutually bound, to be conserved for one hundred, two hundreds, one thousand years.

(A. Frangias, 1976, pp. 413-4)

The sum of the individual building efforts, deriving either from a Fragias-like humanism or simply from profit-making motives, composed finally a city that could not afford any other logic than that of profit and exploitation. Attempts such as these of Pikionis,* to elaborate an

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*D. Pikionis had been professor in the School of Architecture of E.M.P. from the 1930s to the mid 1960s.*
alternative typology springing out of traditional cultural roots (landscape design of the walk in the Acropolis and Philopapou, planning and design of the Aixoni settlement in the periphery of the city), had few followers. Many admired them, but no one was willing to implement them. Also, the blossoming aspirations of young, leftist architects who, during the dictatorship, attempted to solve the problems of the illegal settlements, were destroyed by the process of so-called legalization.

...The unauthorized settlements belong to history... they were the last example of a mixed housing production exercised by a group of people whose economic situation and their lack of skills, led them to this method of meeting their need for shelter. 
...Unfortunately, we became interested in the unauthorized settlements very late. 

(G. Arachovitis, 1975, p.17)

Athens, center and periphery, had already bound its development to the concept of rapid growth and continuous and unplanned urban speculation. But this mode was carrying with it a number of problems and conflicts: the city was expanding quickly towards more remote areas; buildings mushroomed in a capricious fashion; all of this occurred inside a legal framework, established in the 1920s under emergency situations, and with land subdivision patterns inherited from the 1870s. The cumulative multiplication of small, artificially divided, communities, which were not allowed to control their own development resulted in a mere aggregation of scattered, individual attempts, which were in sharp contrast to the austere pyramid and bureaucratic institutes in control.

Finally, there continues to be no body to connect the head with the legs. The absence of any substantial utilities (such as sewage and water supply) and services, the absence of any communal environmental quality, perhaps was affordable in the small pyramid city at the end of 19th century, or necessary amid urgency of the post-WW I
agglomeration; but how long an extensive urban sprawl, without infrastructures, be viable?

Absence of any immediate or intermediate form of citizens' participation in the affairs of their environments had been overcome in the past, through the individual privileges of the 'clientele' system; but how long can it be affordable in the anonymity of a megalopolis?

These conflicts were hardly explicit. Almost everyone seemed very happy about post-war Athens: conservative governments occupied in securing their political control and the incentives for a rapid industrial growth, favored this kind of Athenian development, since it relieved them from disposing of additional capital and energy; small- and medium-sized landowners, speculators and builders were free to develop the city in the fashion most profitable to them; engineers were overrun by the euphoria of personal creation and their significant earnings; citizens were satisfied with a piece of land or an apartment in the city -- a property with ever-increasing value and a secure investment as well -- and being with near a cosmopolitan consumption center promising them a short road to social success.

All of their goals and desires were based on the assumption that the energetic, vital 'onion' would unceasingly produce as many new layers as it did the year before.
Athens 2000

- INTRODUCTION
- ATHENS 2000
  - Decentralization
  - Reorganization, the "Athens 2000" Master Plan Proposal
  - Interventionist Planning: Act 947/79
- CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION

In this last part we trace the history, still in its initial stages of major new developments that could greatly influence the evolution of the Greek capital. The presentation of the new developments is made in terms of the various issues we have been examining throughout our study, and also in terms of the problems that arise in connection with them.

We are concerned with current events that simultaneously involve not only politicians, bureaucrats, and administrators, but also architects and engineers as well as people who are actively preoccupied with the spatial shaping of the city. Personal contradictions arise as many, who claim allegiances with various parties, find themselves in the difficult position of supporting actions or propositions that seemingly contradict their fundamental beliefs. At the same time, the most peculiar alliances occur between parties with supposedly deeply split philosophies, along with bitter confrontations between former allies or friends. As a result, political rhetoric is more obscure than ever before and one can hardly conclude what exactly different parties stand for.

The politics of the urban environment in Greece follow the chaotic patterns just outlined more closely than any other issue requiring political discussion. Since, in addition, new developments are continually evolving, any conclusions about the impact of contemporary urban planning politics on the city form would be, at the very least, dangerous. Instead, we focus on an effort to analyze provisionally the new developments in light of the historical trends that led up to them -- trends in the way people think and act (or react), and trends in the course of the city's evolution. In this sense, we try to outline the
impact that history is likely to have on the evolution of
the city and the limits and possibilities that it pre-
scribes. With such an approach the last chapter of this
part contains the conclusions of our whole work.

The 1974 political change, when the Colonels' junta
resigned in favor of a political government under Karamanu
marked a turning point for both the political and socio-
economic status of the country. A number of changes
occurred, following that point in time, that seem to be
strongly interrelated within a consistent framework of
changing policies. These changes run through the whole
spectrum, from the constitution, to the everyday economic
reality, and thus underline a new threshold in the life
of the country.

Greece's Constitution of 1952 lays down general rules
and principles of conduct; the laws regulate action and
behavior on this basis between individuals, the public and
the state. Traditionally, physical planning - other than
building controls - has not been generally accepted and
has not been supported by the constitution. Thus, property
rights have been manipulated for profit with little control.
The present Constitution of June 1975 generally reflects
more democratic aspirations, and has several implications
for planning. The relevant articles and their potential
impact on the situation are:

Article 17 -- protects property, but not its use, in a
manner detrimental to the public interest. However,
the state can regulate and coordinate the development
of the country and take part in private enterprises
in order to fulfill its goals.

Article 18 -- requires legislation to be enacted
regarding exploitation of resources such as land,
archeological sites, etc.

Article 21 -- housing for those who are homeless or
live in inadequate housing conditions is made the
subject of special care by the state.
Article 24 -- places the whole responsibility on the state to play, protect and develop "the physical and cultural environment". This article also provides measures for the exchange, expropriation and transfer of land for public purposes. Regional policy.

The democratic aspirations that underline the new constitution are more palpably expressed in the prevailing attitudes of political life. The political system is finally becoming stabilized as a parliamentary republic, with parallel rejection of all those para-political institutions (royal court, army intrigues and unofficial or right-wing terrorist parapolitical organizations) that, from the introduction of liberalism in Greece, and mainly throughout the post-war period, were always threatening -- overtly or covertly -- to undertake an active role and substitute the elected governments. The change is ultimately expressed by the legalization of the two Communist parties, which had been continuously outlawed since the civil war. In a broader sense, the change reveals tolerance of, and respect for, the opposition, which, in turn, demonstrates a desire for more explicit discussions about the country's problems. The intensity and broadness of the ensuing discussion about the capital's future could never had existed without these new developments, which may open the door to a new interventionist role for planners. For the time-being, however, one-party governments, which dominate the Parliament, conduct this intervention through the indirect paths of political rhetoric, and prevent the introduction of explicit compromises that characterize planning processes in other South European countries like Italy and Spain. Nevertheless when referring to the previous situation, the changes are apparent: the "Athens 2000" Master Plan has attracted broad public attention, the controversial Act 947/79 enjoys wide concern, and the public discussion of issues concerning the capital has reached an unprecedented peak.

Another change in political life, with important implications for planning, is that the post-junta governments
are persistently oriented to Greece's incorporation into the European communities as a means of safeguarding democracy and of surpassing the difficulties that abberant capitalist growth has piled up. The reforms that, necessarily will follow this incorporation, pose the question of the role of the capital city in the economic system of the country: the struggle for a new Master Plan, the policy of 'competitor cities', and, ultimately, the Act 947/79 must be seen in the framework of such problems as the hyperconcentration of various activities in the basin and the staggering productive efficiency of the metropolitan environment. Problems like pollution, congestion, delays in transportation, bad settlement conditions, and skyrocketing land prices not only torment the inhabitants, but also restrain productivity, endanger the entire economic system, and mark the end of a course of city evolution that has been followed throughout the post-war period.

Economic problems, however, have been exacerbated recently by the current international crisis; these repercussions have a strong effect on Greece's inherently weak economy. Recession and inflation brought increases in GNP down to zero, creating a new situation for a building industry that traditionally had been a basic stimulator, (and also the ultimate beneficiary), of the post-war economic growth. Decline in the building sector, under the historically established circumstances, would diminish the prosperity of the capital and bring bitter conflicts on the scene; but also, if controlled, could offer an opportunity for the infusion of fresh ideas and the reorganization of the city on a new basis, as in Rome during '60s (King p. 195).

The present, heated discussion about the future of the city marks a popular understanding of the changing situations and poses, once again, all the problems that had been ignored during the years of fast development.
In the following pages we trace this discussion and the motives that underline it, in order to understand the conflicts that have emerged and their possible impact on the evolution of the Greek capital.
The governmental concern about the future of the capital is marked by an effort to overcome the traditional relationship, or rather the lack of any relationship, between "official" planning and actual city expansion that has characterized the urban affairs of the city since, at least, the period between the wars.

This effort is made clear on two levels. First, in the general policy guidelines that surpass the consideration of the capital as an isolated city, and treat it as a part of the national urban network. And second, on the level of the specific implementation measures that are suggested or have already been taken, in order to support the policy guidelines.

The new effort tries to get to the roots of the problem -- hyperconcentration of population and economic activities in the capital to a degree that simultaneously causes stagnation of large areas in the rest of the country, and congestion and malfunction in Athens. Although general declarations speak about improvements in the "quality of life", a more careful examination of the original edition of the Master Plan proposal reveals its main concern to be the "improvement of the efficiency of the productive mechanism in the capital", a declaration also repeated in the introductory texts to the many new laws that intend to regulate city expansion. On the other hand, we have to note that the obstacle to a balanced development was not so much in the lack of the necessary legislation,

*"Athens 2000" is the name given to a discussion about the new Master Plan, organized by the TEE last fall. Ever since, it has become fashionable to attach the name to any related discussion, or even to the Master Plan proposal, itself.
but rather in the lack of political will for programming and organization. The proof is that those few laws assuming long-run responsibilities for the government had been rarely used, while the bulk of the laws that deal with 'city extensions' had been overused. From this point of view, the new legislation not only aims at providing the necessary tools for implementation, but also declares a will for a new course of development.

Professionals, through their organizations (TEE and SADAS*) had always been asking for the broad approach that is now promoted, but, at the same time, feverishly involved in expanding the city in the adhoc manner we have seen in the two previous parts. For the time being, they don't oppose the principles of the new policies but absolutely refuse to desist from their established "rights". The discrepancy that occurs between theory and everyday reality is then pushed back to even more fundamental issues, touching on the very nature of the system itself. This position offers the safe shelter of a reality that can't be reversed and thus postpones solution of the problems to some remote ressurection of the city and its society.

In our analysis, we follow the opposite path. We try to reduce the issues to their basic ingredients, and thus reveal the fundamental conflicts that underline the polemic about the new environmental policies. Following the broad outlines of the discussion, we examine three issues:

Decentralization, the relation of the capital to the rest of the country;
Reorganization. The intention to manipulate relationships within the capital as expressed in the 1979 Master Plan proposal; and,
Interventionist Planning. The increase of planning power as a response to the structural problems that

*SADAS is the Greek Architectural Association.
scarred the face of the capital.

**Decentralization**

Decentralization policy intends to funnel the largest part of an imminent wave of migration* to proposed 'competitor cities', instead of to the capital and Thessalonika the traditional destinations of migrants. Although the policy intends to favor the periphery, which is generally considered to be neglected by the state, it is characteristic that it includes strong considerations about the capital. Only two among the five goals of the regional policy** explicitly address the problems of the capital:

1. To check the population growth of Athens and Thessalonika.
2. To provide with acceptable living condition the population remaining in the two major cities. Institutional and administrative reforms are necessary, as well as the completion of the urban infrastructures, works of urban renewal and environmental improvement.

The remaining three goals, which directly consider the periphery, suggest:

3. The economic development of the periphery through the intense use of incentives and the suitable adoption of the program of public investments;
4. The gradual betterment of the settlement environment in the whole country, with specific initial emphasis on some regional centers (competitor cities) that because

*This is expected to occur as a result of industrial intensification and agricultural improvements, both promoted by ECM. It is said that the government has accepted an ECM goal to reduce the agricultural population from the present 28 percent to 12 percent, within the next ten years. This is not officially confirmed, but attributed to off-the-record remarks by ministers, and is persistently repeated by the press, and the opposition parties.

of their size, place and existing trends can be developed into peripheral poles of attraction for economic activities and population; and,

5. The regional distribution of those administrative services that deal with local problems.

However, all fundamental decisions are still reserved for the capital and a new ministry of Regional and Environmental Affairs has been created in order to coordinate the whole operation; it is expected to allocate resources in a more 'equal' way but without any cost for the ideologies of the basic distributive function. Thus, decentralization is attempted through further centralization of the fundamental decision-making mechanism and this is expressed by the fact that the government has initially chosen to develop 'competitor cities' and not regions. This leaves intact the basic relationship between cities and government and does not introduce any intermediary level of government with essential authority. Actually the public agencies that deal with urban affairs are expected to operate local offices which will be coordinated by headquarters in the capital. Keeping in mind the bureaucratic stiffness of the existing mechanisms, one could expect further complications in the flow of information, which is very likely to be absorbed by the capital in the form of new increases in the already hypertrophic administrative sector.

Such a policy actually supports the pattern of corporate activities that has developed in recent years (headquarters in Athens and new plants in the periphery), tends to concentrate all 'superior' activities in the capital, and thus further strengthens its appeal at least to skilled migrants.

However, it is not only that the government is too hesitant in following a consistent decentralization policy, but also that the opposition is too tepid in its criticism. That is, while the measures that deal directly with the
capital have attracted, in the last two years, hot discus-
sions. The debate about decentralization seems to be
buried within a general consensus.

In our opinion this is a good illustration of the role
that politics play in urban affairs in Greece. To clarify
this point, as well as aspects of the discussion about the
new plan proposal and the Act 947, a brief look into the
elective system could be particularly insightfull.

The central government is elected in a general vote by
the system of "reinforced proportional representation,"
according to which a party with as little as 35 percent of
the vote can achieve an absolute majority in the distribu-
tion of seats in the parliament. In this way, an electoral
minority is capable of establishing a parliamentary major-
ity and so collaboration cabinets are unknown as yet. The
other levels of administration are relatively insignifi-
cant; prefects are directly appointed by the government
and have limited control over small counties, while the
local governments are directly elected by the people, but
are deprived of any essential power, as we have seen with
the Athens municipality. With such a system, whoever gains
the support of more than 35 percent of the constituency is
theoretically capable of forming a government with full
control over the country. This system not only consolidates
the successive ruling right-wing (ND) governments, but it
also warms the hopes of the Socialist opposition (PASOK)
for an undisturbed administration after an electoral win
that now seems imminent. A complex system of directly
elected regional governments could present obstacles to
whomever is in control of the central one, and it seems
this fear is shared by both the ruling party and its prin-
ciple contender.

In this framework none is really willing to suggest
and seriously support the establishment of regional govern-
ments that might have authority to challenge the centrally
made decisions. The ruling ND relies on the present system, which has always sustained it. PASOK and other opposition parties, on the other hand, emphasize the role of municipalities they have historically controlled municipalities are good conductors of party politics and, besides that, weak enough to ever seriously challenge the central government. In a broader sense, politics overshadows policy. This will become even more clear in the presentation of the discussion about the future of the capital.

Reorganization -- the "Athens 2000" Master Plan Proposal

The "Athens 2000" Master Plan proposal, or more precisely "Proposal of a Framework for the Regulation of Space in Athens until the Year 2000," has some interesting differences in comparison with previous plans produced in the post-war period. The most essential one is that it comes as a response to explicit policy guidelines set by the state, a situation unusual in Greek politics, where planners -- either public agencies or individuals -- were usually assigned to work out plans with limited specification about the related governmental intentions. The usual request made to the planners was to devise means to arrest ad-hoc growth, replace it with an organized development, and other such vague generalities that left wide margins of interpretation and, actually, transferred responsibility for establishing policy principles to the planners themselves. Planners responded by projecting their individual values, a reality that explains both the 'utopian' character of Greek town planning and the striking discrepancies among the various plans of the recent decades: Doxiades, influenced by his own professional involvement in the United States, conceived of the capital as a megalopolis, while Kokkoliades suggested the removal of most industrial activities from the city and its gradual transformation into a cultural center similar to the one it used to be in
classical antiquity. In this way, planning became a field for professionals to exercise their personal abilities, and lost its public role. In order to reintroduce this public role, the new effort promotes the distinction between policy guidelines and physical planning to accommodate them. The latter is still reserved for the professionals, but the former is increasingly becoming the responsibility of the public interest, as expressed through the various existing institutions.

The results of this new reality are expressed in the declaration of a set of goals that represent official policy guidelines at this time. The basic aspects of the policy are:

1. To arrest the population growth in the capital: a target of 4.3 million was set for the year 2000 (present population, 3.6 million). All those activities of the public and private sectors that can attract further migration will be restricted to their present level. Industry is permitted, from now on, only to reorganize its functions on the assumption it does not create more jobs. Regional development efforts are the complement to this policy.

2. To arrest the spatial expansion of the city and, instead, focus on an effort to redistribute population within the already developed territory, in order to achieve a polycentric function that will eliminate unnecessary movements and wasted time. In other words, to develop cities within the city, with their own independent activities and centers.

3. To assure the channels of the basic transportation network. To develop public transportation and especially the long-discussed Athens subway, the Metropolitan.

4. To preserve the environment, with development of the spaces in the periphery of the city and with rehabilita-
In the beginning there was chaos

... and God said

LET THERE BE ORDER

THE 1979 PLAN PROPOSAL

- compartments
- expressways
- major roads
- centers
tion of heavily polluted industrial areas. Also to preserve the adjacent rural land through the introduction of intense cultivations that will increase its productivity.

5. The Master Plan is considered as a continuous process in which municipalities must participate with essential authority and about which the public must be continually informed.

The above guidelines were agreed upon in a meeting organized by the Ministry of Coordination, with participation of the cabinet and delegations from the TEE, the EMP, the municipal authorities of the basin and from organizations that are involved with the problems of the capital. Although the rationale behind these guidelines seems obvious and vague, the process that led to their adoption was innovative, considering the Greek reality. First, that the government has taken on some commitments; and second, the institutions largely controlled by the Socialist opposition (TEE and municipalities) have cosigned a public document that commits them as well. In a sense, none disputes the need for planning; real problems occur, however, when we move closer to the reality.

The plan, following the guidelines, suggests that the capital be separated into a compartment with an average population of 500,000 (this size is considered as adequate to decentralize the system but not diffuse it). The compartments will be assisted by centers that have already begun developing and will be reinforced by the establishment of all those administrative functions that are under the direction of a prefect and satisfy the usual everyday needs of the inhabitants. As for the road network, the plan, again, relies upon improving the efficiency of existing arteries with the single addition of an east-west highway that improves communications within the basin and connects it with the two adjacent plains that are already flooded.
with industry (Eleusis) and urban sprawl (Mesogea).

Besides these two fundamental arrangements, the plan specifies the area of wholesale commerce, the areas of study for industrial rehabilitation, the rural land to be preserved and, finally, the desirable standards for the accommodation of various activities in the basin. Further details are left to be studied by the nine compartments, for small-scale actions are suggested to be taken either by municipalities, where they are willing to do so, or by the new Ministry of Regional and Environmental Affairs. Thus the plan, along with new legislation, tries to set up a framework for a process, rather than produce yet another colorful document, which has been the case up to the present.

By the spring of 1979 the proposal had been presented to the public, and a number of discussions were held with wide participation, including both institutions and people. It was also at this point that there appeared the first strong reactions to the whole case of regulation of space in the capital. Besides a few technical disagreements the reaction was focused on three main issues.

First, is the number of the compartments, criticized by the municipal authorities on two grounds: the number of compartments is too small, they say, to carry out 'real' decentralization and in some cases they cut-off parts from the territory of the 'historically' established municipalities, that should be preserved. The implicit alternative is that compartments should be based on the existing municipalities or groups of them. Such a criticism forgets that the metropolitan area includes 'cities' as large as 1.1 million (Athens) side by side with 'villages' with a population of no more than 450 inhabitants (Kamatero). It also forgets the role that the staggering peripheral communities has played, since before WW II, in establishing
the concentric pattern we know today. Besides that, the suggested centers already 'ignore' municipal territories and develop along arteries that intersect neighboring 'cities'. Again, none suggests a new administrational structure, and all seem to prefer the existing one which is characterized by a large gap between the centralized government and the weak and numerous local ones. (By now there are 102 such municipal governments in the whole metropolitan area).

The second point is that local authorities, along with TEE and SADAS, claim that they had been ignored in the stage of plan preparation and, instead, they were invited only to ratify it after it had been completed. It is true that in a state with structures as centralized as Greece's national governments have always been mistrustful of local authorities, especially as the latter had always backed the successive opposition parties -- in a sense, it is considered natural that municipalities are almost de facto anti-government. The origins of this mutual mistrust can be traced to the manner in which the state stripped local governments from any essential power during the period between the wars. It seems to us, however, that the current problem is different, and we will be looking at it later in this text, in relation with the Act 947/79.

The third point, and perhaps the most interesting one, is that, finally, all institutions politically affiliated with the parliamentary opposition come to dispute any possibility for regulation of the space to occur within the limits of the existing socioeconomic system of the country. Despite their continued references to the well-organized western European cities, a number of mayors and a TEE delegation have cosigned a text flatly stating that "a Master Plan cannot achieve anything positive if based on free-market mechanisms." This dramatic statement totally
obscurs the discussion, especially if it is kept in mind that several among the cosigners are affiliated with parties that, though in the opposition, do not dispute at all the fundamental aspects of the Greek socioeconomic system.

Clearly, the discussion about the Master Plan proposal gives us limited insight into the actual problems of the city, the possible alternatives to overcoming them, or their associated costs. On the opposite it seems rather strange that a plan proposal could cause such a violent reaction in a city where previous plans had been considered to be simply bright colors on peculiar maps, and opportunities for philological discussion. The motives underlying this reaction will be clarified only when we focus on the specific processes that are suggested by the plan proposal for the implementation of its guidelines. The processes refer to a number of laws that have been promoted by the parliamentary majority of the right-wing government during the last few years. This new crop of laws has come to actually replace the whole corpus of legislation that had been elaborated in the '20s and early '30s. Its most interesting parts are:

- The act for building ratios (Act 880/79). This deals with two subjects. On the one hand it eliminates the floor-to-area ratio, in order to prevent excessive densities (in this way it also makes it very difficult for proprietors and engineers to develop small lots with the system of antiparochi). On the other hand the law modifies the status of eminent domain: instead of paying for state-expropriated land, the government can now replace a parcel with another parcel of estimated equivalent value in another area of the city.

- The decree for provision of parking spaces in new buildings (697/79), according to which all new buildings must be equipped with parking spaces or, alternatively, the
owners must contribute to a city wide money pool that will fund the public provision of such spaces.

- The act for "settlement areas" (947/79) that provides the framework for rehabilitation of existing settlements.
- The act for the creation of a Public Real Estate Corporation (957/79), whose purpose will be to exploit the property of the state and intervene in the land market.
- The act which establishes the Public Corporation of Urbanism and Settlement (DEPOS), whose purpose will be to actively undertake works of construction in the "competitor cities," and urban rehabilitation in the capital and Thessalonika.

The new legislation radically changes the frame of reference in which city expansion and planning is to occur from now on, and deeply affects the role of all involved in urban affairs. The first efforts to implement it (1979-1980) caused strong reactions that will help us understand the actual problems of the Greek capital. The case of the act for "settlement areas" is perhaps the most illustrative one.

*Interventionist Planning: Act 947/79*

Act 947 is a response to the structural problems which are scarring the face of the Greek capital. Its major purposes are: to establish and legislate the redistribution of urban land, and eliminate the restrictions that are imposed by extensive parcelization and land ownership by individuals; to help in the provision of those public spaces necessary for social and physical infrastructures, thus widening the meaning of "public good;" to offer the institutional framework for reorganization and betterment of degraded areas, assuming the 'rehabilitation' of these areas' inhabitants; and finally, to offer a method for the segregation of incompatible uses. The land necessary for the provision of these measures will be obtained by contri-
butions from all the proprietors of the area that will be characterized as a "Settlement Area;" the contributions can amount to as much as 40 percent of their lots. Funding of the works will be assured by special local taxation that will amount to 10 percent of the value of the remaining part of the lots. This process of reorganization of the urban fabric can be initiated by the Ministry of Regional and Environmental Affairs, by municipalities, or by the inhabitants of an area themselves; and the study and construction can be undertaken either by private groups, public institutions (such as DEPOS) or by mixed-economy corporations.

The process that, in a few words, aims to provide the settlement areas with an acceptable street network, greenery, and space for social equipment, can be applied both in areas that are included in the city map and in illegal settlements where the intensity of the problems is more acute. In the latter case the contribution in money roughly equals the fee that is now paid for the legalization of these areas, according to 1923 law for city expansion.

It is obvious that Act 947 promotes for the capital a new concept of city function, the recycling of the existing fabric on a communal basis, rather than the expansion on an individualistic basis that is the established pattern since the period between the wars. Along with other new decrees and acts, Act 947 substantially decreases the margins for the small-scale land speculation that has been the strong support for both city expansion and for economic vitality throughout the same period. The Act also tries to bridge the gap between official planning and the everyday reality. It is on the foundations of Act 947 that the Master Plan relies for the realization of its guidelines and specific proposals.

In a sense, we see in Act 947 a compromise that tries
to adopt Big Actions, that are felt as necessary to match the Big Problems of city actions that address the established scale of city fabric, and thus take advantage of its qualities, rather than attempting to implement qualities that are alien to the existing situation. To this end, the Act strives to radically change both the scope of production of urban space and the ideologies that underline the activities of all those who are the subjects of urban affairs. Exactly for this reason the case gives an excellent opportunity to approach the actual probabilities of the capital on many levels.

Actually, the idea of rehabilitation of degraded areas through an organic incorporation into the city fabric with parallel redistribution of land ownership accepting more rational patterns, is an old one. It first appears in a 1966 Conference of SADAS,* in later proposals about the fate of illegal settlements,** -- a most recent example -- in an actual effort to organically include an illegal settlement area into a city plan,*** an effort that covers very close to the terms of Act 947. The latter is especially interesting, not only because it tested the idea of rehabilitation in reality, but also because it separated the role of the state from the problems inherent in the urban communities of the capital as the initiative was taken by the local municipality, and the project was based on a close personal

*Diamantopoulos study for Kaissariani.

**Explicit similarities with proposals by Turner, assuming a city that is still under the process of expansion.

***The presentation of the case is based totally on the paper, "Coal Mines at Nea Ionia, Athens: Procedural Steps for Master Plan Inclusion -- The Role of the Architect," produced by the architects who were involved in the re-planning of the area, however, we use the information included in the above paper to reach conclusions quite different from the ones suggested by the authors themselves.
relationship between the planners and the cities of the area, rather than on the usual impersonal bureaucratic processes.

The case refers to the area of illegal settlements around the coal mines at Nea Ionia, which were developed in the '50s and early '60s, and which gave the same major chronic problems as most illegal settlements in the basin. The problems of the area cropped up recently when a major circulation axis was planned to run through the area of illegal settlements, around the coal mines at Nea Ionia. The future development of the area is therefore directly related to the construction of the project, which would transform a street running through the middle of the illegal settlement, Kymis Street, into a 60-meter wide avenue, thus splitting the settlement in two. The local authorities, after several attempts to arrive at an agreement with the Ministry of Public Works about the area's future plan, commissioned in 1977, a group of architects and planners to draw up a plan on their behalf. The group adhered to the prescribed 60-meter width of Kymis Street, and also to the position that the spatial qualities of the settlement should be preserved as much as possible. The proposed solution aimed at the smallest possible number of land expropriations, converted most secondary roads into pedestrian ways, and suggested the redistribution of large plots, to be used for green areas, a school, a shopping center and building sites allotted to the landowners suffering damages from the widening of Kymis Street. Besides that, a zoning ordinate was presented, which anticipated land coverage of 50-60 percent, two- to three-story heights, and also, standard types of house layouts; the latter to facilitate the people who built their own homes. The basic idea of the new plan meant to assure a uniform level of satisfaction in meeting the needs of the inhabitants, and also to prevent
the possibility for speculation that usually marks the transitional period of illegal settlements and deeply hurts the virtues of the initial environment.

The proposal was presented to the inhabitants and local authorities, giving rise to heated controversy stemming from conflicting interests. Following the presentation, various pressure groups first tried to win the planners to their side:

a. Some inhabitants suggested to the planners that they provide them with more advantageous zoning for specific lots, in exchange for commissioning the planners themselves to draw plans for the houses to be erected there.

b. "Big" landowners wanted to cancel the redistribution of land or the plan itself; and,

c. Pressures arose from municipal councilors, involved in building conservation, who had interests in the area (building permits with the old status under process, promises for contracts under antiparoch, etc.)

After a period of inactivity the planners were ignored altogether, and the local authorities produced and submitted to the Ministry of Public Works an alternative plan with an unimaginative orthogonal layout, with Kymis Avenue retaining its present width of 27 meters. No comment on or replay to the plan was ever received from the Ministry. Instead, in January 1979, the Ministry of Public Works announced that the construction of the 60-meter-wide Kymis Avenue was a top priority project, to be started immediately.

The experience of replanning the coal mine settlements of Nea Ionia reveals the fundamental difficulties that will follow any intention to overcome the present concept of city growth. The case is especially vivid as it is absolved from the odious aspects that the Act 947 suggests in order to rehabilitate urban areas: no monetary contri-
bution from inhabitants is required, and only insignificant contributions in land, as the planners assume that the neighboring public land will be delivered in compensation for the expropriated land used to widen Kymis Avenue. Essentially, the obstacle lies in the fact that the plan intends to arrest the use of the land as a speculative means, and thus disrupt the spiral of inflated expectations on the part of the inhabitants, which in the specific case, is inflamed by the fact that the area is adjacent to such highly developed neighborhoods as Phlothei and Galatsi. The case gives insights into the limits to the role of the municipalities, which, despite any declarations, have to recycle the existing concept of city growth as a means to consolidate its electorate base. Whoever makes the highest bid in this auction of expectations will gain the political support of the people, and local authorities are in an advantageous position, as they can disassociate local problems from the fate of the basin as a whole. In addition, the fact that elected councilors of municipalities are often professionally involved with building construction further tightens their bonds and their interests with the many individual citizens who want to develop their properties, and puts in doubt their ability and will to positively intervene in urban affairs.

After the reaction we have seen in the Nea Ionia case, it can hardly seem strange that a storm was caused by the Public Works Ministry's efforts to implement Act 947. And it no longer seems paradoxical that municipalities were reluctant to take their own initiative in planning, even though they finally had the chance to fulfill their old and persistent requests for an active role in urban affairs.

Recent plans drawn for the rehabilitation of two urban neighborhoods and of an extended area of summer houses, along with the implementation of Act 947, have caused, up
to the pay we write these lines, 20,000 grievances from the inhabitants, refusal by the municipality of Nea Heraklion (initially a participant in Act 947) to be actively involved in the process, and finally, the replacement of the minister who conceived and tried to implement the act by a new one, who promised to "study" the case and modify the law to a more lucid one. Thus, the government temporarily removes its policy in order to avoid the political consequences. The opposition, on the other hand, attempts to take advantage of the situation by violently deploiring the law, and by making vague criticisms similar to the ones we have seen earlier in the chapter.

We have seen thus far conflicts and divisions on three levels: People split between their identity as inhabitants and proprietors; local politics; and split between desires and present reality; and national politicians split between their understanding of the need for planning policy and their very political survival. In this game, the roles of government and opposition can be seen as temporary and interchangeable, as the problems do not make ethical distinctions between who is in control, and interested in consolidating their status, and who is the opposition, and thus interested in overturning the situation. Sooner or later the opposition will have to face the same puzzling questions; and rhetoric against planning will only bind them, should they come to power, hampering their ability to implement a policy.

In this milieu, the position of the professionals brings onto the scene other aspects of the problem, which completes the picture of present dead ends. While the professionals do not dispute directly the necessity of the improvements that the Act 947 intends to bring to the city, they react strongly to its supporting legislation and to the process that are suggested for its implementation. Actually, the act for building ratios and the decree for
provision of parking spaces have substantially decreased the margins for small-scale speculation that has been the motivating force for expanding the city in the post-war period. Along with the economic recession, an inflation rate that, in the case of building industry, moves 2-3 percent higher than the general index, and a new burden of taxes that discourages potential buyers, the above laws reduced building activity in the last 9 months to levels 25-57 percent lower than in the previous year. The threat to the 200,000 people involved in the building industry seems to be very serious and Act 947, with its regulations that intend to drastically cut the margin for small speculation, is considered to be the potential coup de grace for the building industry. In a broader sense, however, Act 947 threatens the whole institution of small- to medium-scale private building enterprise, which has been the cornerstone of the building industry in Greece since the state had quit its role in housing provision during the '50s. Besides limiting margins for speculation, Act 947, indeed the entire spectrum of new government policy, introduced bigger scales in city growth that, if applied, will inevitably leave the existing small enterprises behind, rendering them obsolete. Under the hard truths, professionals persistently complain that Act 947 opens the door to "big capital" which will transform independent, small entrepreneurs into employees in the big enterprises. Paralyzed by a similar fear, the professionals have ignored altogether the possibility of creating cooperatives from public corporations and the municipalities, as it implies the same strains of large-scale planning. It is inevitable that socialization of production will lead to more efficient forces of city expansion and, under this reality, it is also inevitable that the professionals will lose their advantageous position, a face that will be especially true if they don't
adopt to the new situation with mergers that will make possible their survival. Persistent recourse to vague, anti-monopolistic rhetoric will fail as soon as more efficient forms of production appear, and thus persuade the people that they can provide less costly solutions to their problems.

In such a confusion between public and local or private interests, no one is surprised by the fact that professional bodies such as TEE and SADAS are split by their double nature, as scientific organizations on the one hand, and corporate bodies of the engineers on the other: The TEE is organizing discussion and criticism of the plan but, at the same time, it promotes strikes to protest decline of the building sector. In this context, it is not difficult to understand the professionals' vague criticism of the scale of the plan nor to understand the coincidence of opinion between suppliers and buyers of the market.

The struggle to promote an acceptable Master Plan and new legislation represents, in spatial terms, a conflict between two concepts of city growth: a continuation of urban sprawl, or a change to a pattern of localized growth that would lead to a decentralization of the city itself. In a broader sense, however the new policies intend to drastically intervene in the mechanisms that produce the urban fabric, and introduce governmental intervention and land use regulation instead of the ad hoc activity that dominated the scene for the last half-century. In this sense, more decisions that, up to the present, were in the hands of the private sector, will be transferred to the hands of the state, these decisions will also be made in light of the state's intentions.

Regulation -- although all agree that it's necessary -- is not supported, through action, by anyone for whom it would mean restriction of potential income from land. Since
the regulations in effect in the early '50s were minimal, if followed at all, any increase in regulation or the enforcement of regulation would mean effective downtoning of many areas and, thus, loss of income for both the entrepreneurs and their clients. As the motivations for regulation express, in our opinion, a response to such fundamental issues as recession and inflation and improvement in the productivity of the city's mechanism, one could expect that planning will increasingly become the vehicle of political struggle, and thus acquire a central role in city expansion. The role of planning becomes more and more crucial as adhoc city expansion threatens the very foundations of the system on which such expansion was based.
CONCLUSION: CHANGE OR INERTIA?

So far the "Athens 2000" framework and Act 947 by themselves cannot give us specific insights into the course of city making in Athens. They only express the present government's intention to establish control tools over the urban environment and interfere in the status quo of urban shaping. Their general pronouncements, which aim at the city's betterment, and at stimulation of the local municipalities' participation in the solution of present environmental problems, are not enough to answer questions about how they will be implemented, or whom they will benefit.

However, the debate, that the new proposals have stimulated, can bring new insights into the trends developing among the groups of people involved. But, again, as the trends have come out only through the present response to the governmental policy, they cannot reveal their actual dynamics. Here history intervenes to shed light on the character of the contemporary situation, revealing the time dimensions of its phenomena.

As shown from our analysis, present attitudes towards the future of the city revolve around two main contradictory components: one promoting planning as a means for structural changes in the stale city fabric, and one defending or accepting the continuation of the unplanned course of urban shaping. The significance of this counteraction is that, for the first time, events are unfolding in the reverse order: it is planning that comes to dispute the feasibility of laissez-faire to cope with the present-day environmental problems. In contrast, throughout the four examined historical cases of city formation, planning was successfully overwhelmed by the ad hoc city expansion, to be overtly reduced, in the post-war period, to a mere means
of stimulating architectural fantasy. Small lot exploitation was increasingly becoming the essential unit of urban development. This mode of city making was always the result of three components: the politicians' will to promote urbanization as a means to accommodate their constituency; the stimulative role of Athens regarding money investments from abroad, or from other peripheral cities; and the high rate of social mobility and the specific ideologies developed inside the social unit of Greek society. These elements have deeply infiltrated the Athenian urban structure, and motivated, overtly or covertly, its development. Despite the conflicts and sometimes violent contradictions that appeared—in both the relationships of labor (working class struggles in the period between the wars, and in the Sixties), or on the national level (the split between Royalists and Liberals occurring in World War I; the civil war of 1947-49)—these three components of Athenian life worked quietly to converge on one single aspect: individual housing. Politicians used it as a means of providing individual privileges for their voters, and created the corresponding legislative framework; influx of money into the city found it to be a secure channel for investment; and an expanding middle class chose it as a symbol of social success and as a channel for their surplus earnings. An emphasis on individual habitation, and the institution of the dowry system, was expressed throughout the social ranks of people migrating or living in the capital.

These forces behind individual housing fed an economic circuit that followed its own course, independent of the specific political changes. Land and building speculation became the vehicle for converging aspirations for private housing, absorbing a substantial portion of Greece's engineers and architects. Being disconnected from national discords, but always linked to the petty or broader politics,
housing in Athens expressed a silent consensus among the succeeding generations of politicians, people involved in the real estate markets, and citizens. This consensus created the conditions for a quick, quantitative solution to the housing problem, at the same time depriving such a solution of any broader social meaning. Ad hoc, lot-based building aggregation in Athens best illustrates the individualist basis of this consensus. In the remainder of our conclusion we will outline the large role this consensus played throughout the four historical cases, according to these three components: the political will, the speculative circuit, and the individualistic aspirations.

Political will founded the capital of the New Greek state in 1833, and determined its specific location and form. However, it alone was not enough to secure the regeneration of its initial concept. Another political mechanism came to facilitate the continuity of urbanization. Through the channel of the clientele system, politicians promoted the continuous concentration of rural population in the capital. Transformation from the rural to the urban status represented a special privilege given by the political aristocracy to these people connected to it through a network of family relationships or acquaintances. This system ensured politicians two things: a broad constituency in the counties, and the creation of a new network of relationships in the seat of government. Thus, a smooth transition to urbanization was achieved through the above political channel linking the country and the city. But the specific form of this urbanization had three impacts on the city institutions and form: the reduction of the housing problem to a matter of individual privileges; the resultant abandonment of urban planning, which is inherently too broadly socially based to accommodate individuals; and the subordination of bureaucratic urban affairs directly to public organizations, whose
role was the better distribution of privileges among individuals. Expansion came to maximize the private territorial space. Subdivision of the land into small-sized lots and elimination of public spaces facilitated urban land distribution among the citizens. Landowners and speculators benefitted most from this practice of urban space production. Thus, the concept of "citizen" was split into two personalities: one half was concerned with politics, and the other half was an individual aiming at the promotion of his private benefits. Thus, urbanization in Athens represented an aggregation of personal privileges. Distribution of these privileges was not considered a social issue, but as connected to the political will.

This characteristic, resulting from the preindustrial and rural structure of the country, was going to mark the next periods of the Athenian development. The establishment of Asia Minor refugees in Athens ensured for the liberals a strong electoral base. However, for the first time the housing problem was placed on a social-political—and not individualistic—political basis. But also, for the first time the pre-established institutions displayed their fascinating capability to adapt to the new conditions and absorb the foreign bodies. The Calligas Committee proposal failed to give any social dimension to the entire form of the city, the scattered establishment of refugees' settlements around Athens—separated from the previous city context but being also very close to it—was rather a sum of independent site planning attempts. Both represent the inability or carelessness of the government to place Athens' development on a holistic social basis. Soon the unplanned expansions of the city approached the camps of the "Praetorians," surrounding them with their own fabric. The 1923 and 1928 laws covering "unauthorized" housing expanded, again on an individual basis, the privilege of private ownership to the lower income
migrants of the city, thus continuing the institutional framework established in the second half of the nineteenth century, in an urban agglomeration that was now facing rapid industrialization. The laws framing the appearance of the condominium apartment building developed further benefits for the small landowners, providing them with the right to exploit their property while giving the opportunity to a larger number of architects and engineers to follow a successful professional career.

In the post-war period, the rightist government intensified, expanded, and diffused further the system of privileges, facilitating the growth of the city and trying to avoid any urban crisis connected to social questions in a time when the memories of a divisive and hard-fought Civil War were still fresh. The continuous expansion of urban apartment buildings, the continuous increase in heights, the growing number of "unauthorized" settlements, the housing loan policy, all facilitated the numerous small landowners, building enterprises, and professionals; while they provided a private shelter to the increasing numbers of new residents of the city.

In addition to the above official attitudes, opposition parties were trapped in a competition of promising the most to everyone, if they would win in the elections. It is characteristic here that election periods were the times when "unauthorized" building flourished, since both government and opposition were trying to gain as many votes as possible in the most decisive electoral precinct of the country. As a result of this situation, it was always politics that replaced policy in the Athenian urban space. The fact that both are expressed by the same word -- "politiki" -- is the best evidence of this attitude.

The Speculative Circuit: At the same time Kleanthes and Schaumbert were elaborating the first master plan of
Athens, wealthy Greeks from abroad and some foreigners were buying more than the half of Attica county land, expecting the increase of their property value, after the city was chosen to be Greece's capital. Their predictions were not unwarranted. Land value in Athens, from the very beginning of its modern history, showed an incredible rate of increase, and proved to be the most profitable investment in a city that had not yet developed advanced modes of capitalistic production and exploitation. But this way of profit making was not only stimulated by the mere fact that Athens, as the capital of Greece, was expected to grow, but also by the intention of Greek bourgeoisie of diaspora to invest a part of their money surplus on their country.

As the future of the Greek communities abroad seemed rather uncertain, due to the nationalist movements in the countries in which they were established, Greek bourgeois were seeking a safer place to transfer their capital. Athenian space was promising both security and profitability. Channelling capital into a city that, in the beginning, looked cut off from any regional area, stimulated the development of large numbers of tertiary activities, promoting consumption and services. On the other hand, being the first to consider land as an investment, the bourgeois became the catalysts for the specific course of Athenian expansion. Soon a circuit of land speculators was generated, which also included people who, in one way or another, had obtained rights on the rest of Attica's lands. It was this circuit that produced the speculative expansion of the city at the end of the nineteenth century. Scarcity of land for sale never existed in the Athens area. Even though the supply always outweighed demand, profits were always high. As soon as an area began to be inhabited, land values were increased before the area was filled up. A new area next to that started to be developed, pulling the expansion of
the city further, and so on. This process facilitated two things: adequate Athenian space, to provide a piece of land to its increasing population, and the investment of the substantial money surplus stimulated overtly or covertly by the influx of money from Greek communities from abroad. Soon this circuit developed its own independent logic and went beyond the conditions that created it. Illegal settlements, first appearing in the period between the wars, were the alternative that land speculation provided for low-income people. Again, we have very similar processes. Rural land is parcelled and sold as soon as the first houses are built in the settlement, and another one begins its parcelization. After dividing the land of the basin into small lots, the circuit is transferred to the rest of Attic basin, providing vacation settlements for the Athenian population, aiming at the easiest and most profitable method of exploitation, and increasing the size of private land while diminishing that of public or communal spaces. Their remedy was the subdivision into small blocks and lots as well as narrow streets. Thus, by definition, the speculators were against the standards of planning. As influx of money from abroad stimulated land speculation, it also stimulated the commercialized building circuit. The first commercialized housing for sale appeared after the transfer of capital from the Greeks living in Egypt who feared expulsion because of the appearance of a strong nationalist movement in this country. In post-war Athens, the urban apartment building also was revived by the investments of Greeks living in African countries as well as those of the Greek immigrants working in the Western European countries or in the USA. By filling the central areas with condominium apartment structures, as well as most of the suburbs and the close-lying, lower-income periphery and expanding along the seashore, the building sector proved its efficiency and independence of the causes that generated
it. This efficiency is also strengthened by the number of professions developed around it. Not only architects and engineers but also lawyers and notaries have based their success on the numerous sales and contracts that came with urban apartment building expansion. Depending for its efficiency on small lots and continuously larger floor-to-area ratios, building circuit and the relevant professions that follow it were always against any planning framework proposing down-zoning regulations.

The Individual Aspirations: So far we have seen how political and speculative mechanisms facilitated and promoted private housing in Athens on an individual base. Here we are coming to outline these social and cultural characteristics of the Athenian population that supported this base. Middle-income people, employed by public and private services, were the first "clients" of both circuits. They had come from rural areas or provincial towns with their only means being an education provided by the public schooling mechanism. Athens represented for them the promise of climbing the social ladder. Their earnings were not great enough to assure their habitation, in a space of their own. A traditional custom incorporated inside the family law framework intervened here to facilitate the new middle class aspirations: dowry. Although the social characteristics of the Athenian population changed dramatically in the period between the wars, the dowry institution continued to survive inside the working class families of privately organized settlements. In the post-war period the institution of the dowry stimulated another trend. Families with a daughter, or single women living in other cities of Greece, bought an apartment in Athens with the hopes of marrying and either living in it or at least having a standard income from it. But a change seems to have appeared in recent years. Apartment dowries are a declining trend. Broader
participation of women in the production system will reduce further the application of this institution.

Apartment buildings followed the same course that speculative settlements established. They were first built for the increasing numbers of middle-class people, they expanded later to lower-income neighborhoods and, more recently, to facilitate the internal movements of the middle class from the center to the suburbs. Increased social mobility, and the resulting ability of working class people to rise above their status into the middle class, combined with the trend among members of this class for owned housing, implies that apartment-house construction in Athens would have at least a more or less standard clientele. But this is not enough for the building entrepreneurs who have based their economic success on the continuous growth of the Athenian population. In general, the people living in the city were motivated by the strong tendency for individual housing, which was representative of the power of family programming in Greece and the success of real estate investments. This tendency also symbolized the stabilization of a better social status.

The increasing rate of growth and building contributed to the isolation of private dwelling from the surroundings. But the previously happy apartment owners, after the filling out of their neighborhood with multi-story building masses, are realizing the problems of this kind of urban habitat. They are becoming very much worried about the lack of services and qualities that resulted from this building congestion. They discover that there are not any spaces for their children to play, no space for parking their cars, no other view than the facade of the opposite multi-story building.

Environmental pollution (bad air, loud noises), congestion of children in schools, inefficiency of the transportation system, slowness of social services, all have
become the major issues today. Decline of environmental quality in the already built neighborhood has resulted, in many cases, in a decline in the property value in these areas. Suddenly the apartment owners have discovered that their real estate investments were not as secure as they thought. When buying an apartment, residents of Athens had satisfied their urgent desire for private housing through the speculative circuit. But this has become the weakest link of the system. The environmental problems by their nature cannot be solved through any "clientele," speculative or family-based institution. Since the problems affect a broad range of social strata, they can be approached, rather, through citizens' actions than the usual political channels.

The reaction to the challenges put by the government has shown, up to the present day, that the speculative circuits, as well as traditional politics in general, continue to hold the power and the influence over urban affairs. The public response to the government planning proposals ("Athens 2000," Act 947) was totally negative. By this response, landowners, architects, engineers, and builders showed their strong will to conserve the framework that shaped Athens. But this framework was based on the assumption of continuous growth. Some conditions that generated this growth now seem to be changing. Change in the trends in industry, development of other centers on the regional and national levels, bad environmental conditions, high cost of living, staleness in productive investments, all imply that Athens may not be as attractive to people from the rest of the country as it once was.

And certainly this new reality would have an impact on people's attitudes and mechanisms. So far, political will,
which had created modern Athens, showed a certain commitment to proceed with fundamental changes in the city-making process, but a viable change needs another base of consensus than the present one.
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