THE HAND THAT ROCKS THE CRADLE:
A STUDY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE CHILD DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1971

by

FREDERIKA RANDALL
B.A., Radcliffe College
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ABSTRACT

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Frederika Randall

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In 1971 Congress passed legislation, later vetoed by President Nixon, that authorized an important new public investment in child care. The Comprehensive Child Development Act was a major departure for Congress, in view of the limited experience of the United States with public day care. This thesis looks at the process by which Congress approved the child development bill and explores the interests that proposal reflects.

The important legislative precedents for day care are considered. Particular attention is paid to the features of the proposal that distinguish it from past and contemporary child care schemes, and to the legislative and media debate about issues raised by these provisions. The political motives of supporters and opponents are explored and conflicts of values about child rearing and socialization are outlined. Practical consequences of various proposals and provisions are suggested.

The prospects for future child care legislation are discussed and issues that are likely to be important in the future are laid out.

Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Fogelson
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION

Late in 1971 Congress, at the request of President Nixon, passed a bill to extend OEO for two years. It was not the routine authorization Nixon had wanted, for the bill, written by the Democratic opposition, restricted the President's authority to run the poverty program as he saw fit. Nixon wanted discretion to cut back certain projects; Congress directed him to maintain specific funding levels for fifteen different categories of programs. Nixon wanted authority to transfer projects out of OEO into other departments; Congress sought to protect the very existence of the poverty program by maintaining its responsibility to administer projects.

Nixon had plenty to object to in the OEO extension act, but when on December 9, 1971 he vetoed it, he devoted most of his attack to Title V, Comprehensive Child Development Programs, a separate bill somewhat hastily attached as a rider:

This legislation would truly be a long leap into the dark for the United States Government and the American people. I must share the view of those of its supporters who proclaim this to be the most radical piece of legislation to emerge from the Ninety-Second Congress...for the Federal Government to plunge headlong financially into supporting child development would commit the vast moral authority of the National Government to the side of communal approaches to child rearing over against the family-centered approach...This President, this Government, is unwilling to take that step.
Even granted the inflated rhetoric, Nixon's statement suggests that child development was significant legislation. Yet most people had never heard of the proposal before Nixon's veto message appeared in the newspapers and even many Congressmen seemed to have little idea what it was all about.

So Nixon was quite right to point out, as he did elsewhere in the statement, that the public had not demanded child development programs or even considered their merits. Congress passes much legislation that does not attract public attention, but in this case the public ignorance was significant. Child development was a big new social investment, a program not only for the poor but for some working and middle class families as well. And, it dealt with child rearing and socialization, sensitive matters for Congress in terms of public opinion.

Child development was one of several major day care schemes that had been stirring in Congress since 1969. Much of the impetus for federal support of day care came from welfare reform; the Family Assistance Plan included money for day care but many Congressmen were not satisfied with its provisions and wanted to enact separate day care legislation. Welfare reform day care was parsimonious; rather than provide services, it reimbursed eligible women for their child care expenses. Child development subsidized services; it covered not only day care but medical, educa-
tional, psychiatric, social work expenditures, even maternity care and family planning. It was expensive, for it proposed to spend government money rather than save it through welfare reform. And it attempted to make day care a public service for the use of everyone, rather than a social service only for the welfare population. While this intent was considerably compromised in the final version of the proposal approved by the House/Senate conference, the supporters of child development continued to regard the bill as the first step toward universal day care.

Nixon called Title V radical; he was right in the sense that its passage was a major departure for Congress. It took years to get Medicare through Congress, and people had been proposing national health insurance for decades before that. Child development day care was a new idea, yet the bill passed rather quickly and without arousing much controversy. Further, the initiative for the legislation came from Congress. So far as I know, no other major social welfare proposal has been written and passed by Congress without Executive initiative. The Nixon Administration had remarkably little to do with shaping child development while the bill was passing through Congress.

As advocates of children's programs often point out, federal expenditures for children are extremely stingy compared with expenditures for adults, especially for the elderly; in this sense too child development was something
of a break with recent tradition. Both the friends and enemies of the bill argued that it was a radical new venture, for it proposed that government should be responsible for young children much more directly and extensively than ever before. The United States has had comparatively little experience with day care and there were other ways that government might have taken responsibility for children, through children's allowances or mother's wages for instance. In a time of budgetary austerity, what prompted Congress to authorize an expansion of government obligation for children? And what was the appeal of day care among other alternatives? What other circumstances besides public demand could have stimulated such a proposal?

Why did Nixon veto the proposal? Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress were willing to spend billions on it and yet the President felt confident in opposing it. (In retrospect, considering the Administration's determination to close down OEO, there is some reason to think that Nixon seized upon child development as the politically safest element to attack in the OEO extension act, in order to avoid submitting to restrictions on his authority over the poverty program.) Nixon apparently felt sure that a vigorous rejection of the child care proposal would not hurt him politically, and since the veto he has become even more certain. Since the Administration was committed to day care as part of welfare reform, why didn't Nixon accept child development
with the intention of using the day care it authorized to implement the Family Assistance Plan? Though all the provisions of the legislation may not have been to his liking, might not the Administration have been selective in carrying out child development programs? We know that Nixon has not hesitated to use this strategy in the case of other Congressional authorizations.

Why did Congress fail to override Nixon's veto? At least in the Senate child development had succeeded by better than a two-third's vote; after the veto it could muster only something over half. Why did many of the bill's backers change their minds?

This paper looks at the process by which Congress decided to make a big social investment in child care. The two features of the Comprehensive Child Development Act that aroused most controversy were the degree of coverage and the mechanism of administration. Who should be eligible for day care? Should it be only for the poor, or for everyone? And where should control of programs lie? What agencies or levels of government should have authority to plan, fund and supervise child care projects? In debate about these two issues, the Nixon Administration and the supporters of child development reveal political motives that go beyond questions involved in day care.

My aim is first of all to tell the story of the passage of the child development bill, and to assess the significance
of its provisions, in view of past day care experience and in view of current Congressional politics. Other than short and usually superficial accounts which have appeared in the popular media, no such discussion exists, so far as I know.

Although I have not made recommendations for child care policy, I have tried to reveal what issues are likely to be important in any future legislation. I have suggested practical consequences of the provisions of the child development bill, and compared them with the consequences of other day care proposals. A study of the politics of child development also has something to say about Congressional and party politics as they bear on the provision of social services. And the legislative process brings to light conflicts of values about the family and child rearing that are likely to persist and continue to affect Congressional decisions about child care.

A study of legislation also has limitations, for certain issues and interests may be concealed or may simply be part of the background, evident only in the limits of debate. For instance, a number of people who write about child care point to the importance of the economic system and economic interests in shaping what services government will provide, and for whom, and also in shaping what people think about the family and about government's responsibility in child care. Although I have not dealt with those questions here, I have
tried to bear in mind that the whole story does not lie on the surface of Congressional debate.
CHAPTER ONE
PUBLIC DAY CARE BEFORE 1971

Most of the literature on child care is written by administrators and professionals, who tend to see public day care in context of a progressive accumulation of knowledge of, and interest in, child rearing and child care. In this view, as knowledge about the development of children has become more specialized, government has progressively taken on more and more responsibility for children. Child development programs are a logical extension of that responsibility.¹ This view emphasizes the development of policy ideas and tends to make light of discontinuities.

Looking back over the past century however, the striking thing is how little direct responsibility for young children government has taken on. Day care of children has decidedly been the exception. Government has not taken on special obligations for the health, education or socialization of most pre-school age children. And many people defend this situation, arguing that child care has been and should be the responsibility of parents and the family, and that government ought not to interfere in this private sphere.

While child care has mostly been left to the family, indirectly, government influences child rearing, by enforcing the responsibility of the family to care for and bring up children. The obligations of parents are governed by law.²
And, as it is evident that economic forces shape families, government, in maintaining and enforcing certain economic policies, affects how children are brought up in their families. It is sometimes argued that there is a danger, especially for the poor, in public child care, that parents will have to give control of their children over to professionals or to government. While this is a real concern, it is important to recognize that a laissez faire government child rearing policy does not leave parents entirely free to bring up their children any way they wish. If parents do not have money to pay for medical care, nursery school, or even just for a babysitter, then they have very little to say about how their children are brought up.

While as a rule government has stayed out of the business of providing child care, there was one major exception to this policy: during World War II the federal government subsidized day nurseries for the children of women working in war industries. Other than that, past day care movements have been unsuccessful. From time to time middle class and professional groups have tried to set up public child care centers for the poor; they have usually justified their aims by arguing that the poor do such a bad job of child rearing that the public must intervene. But while this point of view is persistent, on the whole, these groups have not been very successful in bringing about public child care. I
think it can be said that they have only been successful when there were compelling other reasons for government to set up day nurseries, such as the demand for female labor during World War II.

What I want to emphasize is that the child development bill is an anomaly in light of the prevailing government policy over the last century. In turning to the past experience with child care it is more important to look for the reasons why day care has not become a public responsibility, than to emphasize the progressive development of public obligation for children. Why has the United States not developed public day care, unlike many other countries? For what purposes has day care been provided here?

In the late 19th century, wealthy ladies in a number of cities opened day nurseries for poor unwed and deserted mothers. These charitable enterprises doubled as lying-in centers; the mother would come to have her child there and afterwards leave her baby in the center and go to work as a wetnurse or domestic servant for upper class families. The wealthy had a ready supply of servants and the opportunity to mold the upbringing of the children of the poor.

By the turn of the century, Progressive settlement house workers had transformed the early nurseries into professionalized child rearing centers for the urban immigrant poor. Settlement house nurseries offered educational in-
struction and medical care for the children; they trained
the mothers in housekeeping and sought to direct them into
domestic work. The settlement house nursery movement flou-
rished around the turn of the century, but after the Pro-
gressives achieved another of their desired reforms, the
mother's pension, the nurseries began to decline. In 1909,
the first White House Conference on Children argued, "Home
life is the highest and finest product of civilization. It
is the great molding force of mind and body. Children should
not be deprived of it except for urgent and compelling rea-
sons." Accordingly, the Conference recommended mothers'
pensions, so that widows with children would not be forced
into the factories and sweatshops and compelled to neglect
their children.

As Sheila Rothman has pointed out, the coming of the
mother's pension set back the nursery movement. Mothers on
relief were supposed to stay at home with their children. As
most states established the pensions, social workers turned
their attention away from "deserving poor" mothers who could
receive relief, toward casework with "problem" families. Ac-
cording to studies of welfare caseloads around 1920, more
than half the recipients of pensions also worked; relief did
not necessarily keep mothers out of the labor force. Never-
theless, social workers lost enthusiasm for the nurseries
with the coming of public relief. So far as I know the only
time that government has sponsored both a major relief pro-
gram and a major day nursery program was during the Depres-
sion, when the WPA supported temporary nursery projects in
order to create jobs for unemployed school teachers. Mothers
of children in WPA nurseries were rarely employed; they were
on relief.8

It would be nice to know more about these fits and
starts of day nursery movements; unfortunately no one has
written that history. Sheila Rothman sees the record of day
care in America as the continuing attempt of elite reformers
to interfere in the lives of the poor, dictating what work
mothers should do and how they should raise their children.
She argues:

> It is not clear that day care centers historically
> have been an essential mechanism for getting women
> into the work force, or that they will become so.
> Nor is it true that enlightened change is the theme
> of day care developments or that these institutions
> will bridge the gap between social classes. Rather,
> the history of day care in this country, from its
> origins in the 1850's through the events of World
> War II, is filled with cautionary tales that scarce-
> ly legitimate the kind of inflated rhetoric that we
> are now hearing.9

The lesson of history, it seems, is that day nursery move-
ments start out with passionate reform expectations and high
moral hopes, but they quickly degenerate. Rothman goes on:

> Like so many other social welfare institutions, they
> enjoyed a brief spurt of seeming excellence and then
> suffered a prolonged lapse into mediocrity or worse.10

This interpretation is fine so far as it goes, but it doesn't
really tell us much about why day care has never caught on in
America. Why has day care never become institutionalized, as it has in other countries? Rothman suggests that nursery movements have failed because they did not live up to the expectations raised by reform rhetoric. But public schools, similarly endowed with reform promises, have not lived up to the promises either and yet are quite a live institution. This question needs further research; no doubt it could be answered by looking at the development of relief and the functions that it serves, at patterns of women's employment and the demand for female labor, and at the development of the social work profession.

At least this can be said: day care has mostly been a fringe of social welfare. If anything, government has invested in keeping mothers at home with their children, through public assistance. Unlike many other countries the United States government has not taken much of a role either in promoting women's employment by providing nurseries, or in providing directly for the education, health care, or socialization of young children.

With World War II came full employment. Women entered the labor force in record numbers. In early 1941, about 10 million women were at work outside the home; by early 1944 nearly 17 million were employed and two million more would go to work before the peak of employment in the fall of that year. Many of these were married women who took jobs to
support their families at a time when the cost of living was high. Not only did mothers go to work of their own accord; the industries and the War Manpower Commission promoted female employment as a patriotic duty. ¹²

Some big industries, like Kaiser on the West Coast, and big cities, like New York, began to set up day care centers, and they began to pressure Congress to subsidize them. In 1943 Congress approved the use of Lanham Act funds for day care centers in war industry areas. The industries wanted government to subsidize day care to help attract women into the factories, and because they hoped that women with child care would come to work on time, every day. ¹³ They wanted, in other words, an assist from government in increasing production and profits; and they got it.

Child welfare professionals and committees of citizens for children raised another concern: they argued that in a time of crisis government ought to take responsibility for children, who might otherwise be neglected while their mothers worked. ¹⁴ In terms of what the Lanham Act provided, it looks as if this group was not very successful in pressing its claims on a national level. Federal day care was run by the Federal Works Agency, not by the Children's Bureau as those who spoke for the children wished. Furthermore, federal subsidy was available only in designated war production; it was not designed to take care of the children of the many women who did not work in defense industries or defense re-
lated jobs. In other words, federal day care was an emergency measure, designed to regulate the labor force participation of women in a very specific way.

States and cities also provided day care during the war. Consider the case of New York City, not a war production area and thus not eligible for federal funds, unlike some upstate cities. As more and more women there went to work, there grew up an assortment of commercial and informal child care arrangements. Groups like the Child Welfare League and the Committee on the Wartime Care of Children, a task force appointed by Mayor Laguardia, began to publicize concern for the children of working mothers and press for aid, arguing that if government did not intervene in child care, it would have to suffer the consequences of neglect later, in juvenile delinquency. They persuaded the city and the state to support child care, so that the health and welfare departments could begin to inspect and license existing day care arrangements. Settlement houses that ran day care centers got a subsidy so that they could offer child care at low fees. The object was to bring existing child care under professional scrutiny and to provide free or cheap day care that would compete with the commercial market. Because New York State got federal money for child care upstate, much of the state money went to New York City.

After the war most states declined to assume the federal share of the cost of day care. New York State continued
its support until early 1947; by that time most of the upstate centers had closed down, but in New York City, day care was actually expanding.15 Women were leaving their war jobs, yet there seemed to be more public demand for day care in the late 1940's than there had been during the war. The city and voluntary agencies responsible for child care had only just begun their work by the war's end, and it was the settlement houses and the welfare department that argued hardest for continued public support. Angry parents went to see Governor Dewey at his home and were turned away by police.16 Women marched with signs saying "day care, not welfare". Several City Representatives took up the cause in the Legislature. Upstate, the legislators were concerned about teenagers and juvenile delinquency.17 For a while, child care was something of a political issue in the city, but eventually the politicians abandoned the cause. Child care remained the province of the welfare department and the settlement houses, but without more funds they were unable to continue to expand their territory.18

At first glance, it might not seem surprising that public child care did not survive the war. The commonsense view was that wartime employment of mothers was a temporary necessity, and that after the crisis, women would go back home. There would no longer be any need for day care centers. But although women were turned out of the factories after the war, married women did not leave the labor force;
on the contrary, the numbers of working mothers have steadily increased. Today, eight times as many mothers work outside the home as did in 1940.19

Federal child care came about during World War II because the industries and others dramatized "need"; they created a perceived need for the public to look after the children. After the war they might well have continued to do so. Most people, however, expected economic recession; industry, for the most part, had no plans to keep on women workers after the war.20 Many in the children's lobby had viewed day care as an expedient all along; the Child Welfare League, for instance, was consistently critical of conditions in day care centers. Throughout the war, the League issued cautious appeals for day care, always with a reminder that day care was a poor second best to mother's care.21 Whatever the reasons, those who had been influential in bringing about government investment in child care did not push very hard to maintain it after the war. Perhaps the nurseries were too much a symbol of the disruption of war; to be done with day care was to be done with some disturbing changes in the way people led their lives. Certainly, there was ideological sentiment in favor of getting the children back in family, out of the hands of government. Many feared the prophecy of one woman, writing in 1943:

If we free women now from the care of children, it is like letting the stopper out of a bottle of carbonated water. Women will come pouring out of the
house -- permanently -- and will never be satisfied to go back home once they get accustomed to a pay-check, to the satisfaction that comes from productive work, and above all, if they know their children can be better cared for by professionals than by amateurs. 22

In fact, "professionals" -- the city and private agencies who were in charge of wartime day care -- never took over child rearing; as is evident in the case of New York, these agencies were not powerful enough in themselves to command continued government support.

With the temporary exception of wartime, government has had little part in day care. Relief has by and large been the strategy for the poor. As for working families, child care has been whatever people could buy or borrow. In the 1960's however, the federal government began to sponsor several child care programs for the welfare population. Of these, Work Incentive Program day care and Head Start were ultimately the most significant, for they represented the two opposite ways of thinking about child care that would emerge in the debate about child development in 1971.

In the 1960's, welfare caseloads increased dramatically. The welfare explosion has been well documented and variously interpreted; 23 the important thing about it in relation to child care is that most AFDC recipients are women and children. Thus, when administrators began to talk about ways to reduce or appear to reduce the number of people on relief, day care emerged as a strategy. 24 One way to prevent
people from getting on the rolls, or to get them off, was to insist that mothers who had access to any kind of child care should have to work.

The Work Incentive Program, part of 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, marked the beginning of federal legislative efforts to use child care as a work-enforcer. WIN created a mechanism to screen out "employable" persons on the welfare rolls; it was designed to rationalize the process by which welfare departments took on, and kept on, AFDC cases. As part of the process, welfare departments were required to make available a number of "employment-related" services, one of which was child care.

As originally conceived, WIN put first emphasis on getting unemployed fathers and teenagers into training for work. Mothers of young children were least employable in the WIN scheme; persons responsible for the care of children for whom an "adequate child care plan" was not available, were among those specifically excluded from referral to the manpower program.25

For a number of reasons WIN was not successful. Most of the men on welfare turned out to be unemployable. Many who went into manpower training didn't come out with a job.26 After a year or two of operation, it became obvious that since most welfare recipients were women, WIN would have to concentrate on employing women in order to reduce the welfare rolls. Studies by HEW revealed that lack of child
care was the most commonly cited obstacle to participation in training or work. As pressure for welfare reform grew, Congressional critics of welfare expansion seized upon the lack of child care as the explanation for the failure of WIN.

Child care had not flourished under the program, largely because the employment of mothers was not at first a high priority. The legislation required that welfare departments make child care available to women on relief, but it did not provide for construction of day care centers or pay the cost of setting up programs. States and cities not only had to subsidize the full cost of setting up programs; they had to cover 25 per cent of payments for services, and many welfare departments claimed they could not raise the local share. And WIN left some discretion to departments and social workers to determine what "adequate" child care was. Potentially, all mothers of children under 14, most adults on welfare, could be excluded from the work program. Often it was easier to exclude women than to find both day care and jobs for them.

Cost was at the heart of the problem of work-incentive child care. If child care were actually to reduce welfare expenditures, the cost had to be less than the amount paid out for welfare. Welfare departments had no incentive at all to build day care centers under WIN; no money was
provided for construction, and anyway the cost of center day
care can run as high as $3500 per child per year. Existing
day care centers were few and far between in 1967. If
states were really to use child care to reduce welfare costs,
it made sense for them to pay for babysitting by a relative
or neighbor. But these arrangements were often unreliable.
And unless welfare mothers actually got jobs, even the cheapest
child care was an added expense for states and cities.
And, there was a good deal of protest, from professionals
and others, both against the use of child care as a work-
enforcer, and especially against the use of what was called
cheap "custodial" care.

In the end what happened in New York City was probably
typical. There the Department of Welfare was well aware
that day care centers would not reduce either public expendi-
tures or the number of people on welfare. But as the wel-
fare budget continued to increase, officials made more and
more of the opening of a few day care centers. Day care
centers were a symbolic demonstration of concern on the part
of administrators and politicians, about the expanding re-
lief budget and also about the care of little children.

In Congress, not everyone was happy to let child care
be a symbolic effort. Conservatives began to dig into the
reasons why the work incentive did not, as they hoped, put
people to work. Liberals began to respond to charges of
coercion against WIN and to calls of concern for the children. When finally the Nixon administration decided to take up the cause of reforming the welfare system, child care was bound to be part of what was at issue.

WIN was the precursor of Family Assistance Plan child care. Child development followed the strategy of Head Start. Head Start's foundations lie in the poverty program. Among OEO projects Head Start has had something of a life of its own, and it has probably been the most popular of anti-poverty programs, even among those who look with horror upon the OEO as a whole. Even Nixon, who would like to get rid of this preschool program, moves with care because of its popularity.35

Head Start probably owes its popularity to the fact that unlike other poverty programs it provides a new service, compensatory preschool education; it does not compete with established municipal service preserves -- schools, hospitals.36 As originally conceived however, Head Start was to do more than provide preschool education.

Head Start was part of a general federal strategy toward the poor, the instrument of which was the Community Action Program, a local community agency funded directly by the federal government which would "mobilize resources" for a community attack on poverty. What exactly community action did, and how successful it was, has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.37 Unquestionably this strategy did organize the
poor, publicize poverty and put demands on government, especially state and local government. As Francis Piven and Richard Cloward describe it, the purpose of the strategy, initiated by President Kennedy and followed up by Johnson in the "war on poverty", was to force urban government to give blacks their share of municipal services. The strategy was to set up federally funded local agencies that would compete with municipal service agencies controlled by the Democratic party machine. Piven and Cloward argue that the result of this strategy was to stimulate welfare expansion, for it was easier for city government to give relief to blacks than to redistribute services that other groups in the city had an interest in. As they see the function in practice of service programs, including Head Start, it was primarily to organize welfare rights activity and stimulate expansion of relief.38

Overall, Head Start probably did less welfare rights organizing than did other poverty programs. (That a child development day care program modeled on Head Start might have the function of putting people on relief, rather than getting them off as in the work-incentive strategy, is however, worth keeping in mind.) Some Head Start programs did organizing; the Mississippi Child Development Group was one that did a lot of "mobilizing resources", and didn't confine itself to preschool education. Head Start certainly functioned as an ad-
vocate for children and for the poor, and its independence from local government and strong parent participation gave it the means to do so. 39

Whatever the organizing functions that Head Start may have served, a lot of people believed that the aim of the program was to provide services to children, and also that the purpose of providing services was to change the environment in which poor children grew up, so that they would no longer be "disadvantaged" in relation to their middle class peers. Organizing might get poor children a little more health care, a little more from the schools, a little more welfare, but it wasn't going to make their life circumstances like those of the middle class.

And so many professionals -- who took seriously the idea that Head Start should turn around the environment of poverty and who saw environment not in terms of schools or hospitals, but in terms of how a mother spoke to her child and whether the child had a father -- developed compensatory programs that would prepare children for school. Head Start became a program in which children went to classrooms, at first for half days, then for the whole day, where increasingly the emphasis was on "cognitive development". This definition made the program vulnerable to attack; what professionals had created other professionals could evaluate. 40

Indeed, along with Head Start came a whole new field of government sponsored research and demonstration projects, and
a lot of child development specialists went on the payroll.

But though Head Start came under professional attack, politically it was popular even at the local level, for so long as professionals concentrated on preschool education they did not threaten to redistribute existing services and thus did not cause trouble for local government.

Outside government auspices, preschool flourished too. Increasingly, Head Start became the model for what day care should be. Labor unions, corporations, factories, private research groups all ran preschool day care centers. In other words, by 1969 and 1970, preschool had taken on the character of a service that government might distribute. Not only who would get the service, but who would provide it was at stake.

Head Start and WIN were the major legislative precedents for child care. They represented two opposite kinds of poverty strategies that involved, among other things, child care. They were not by any means the only federal day care programs, but they represented the two important ways of thinking about public child care that would emerge in Congress in 1971 when child development came up.

In addition to Head Start and WIN, cities and states embarked on a vast expansion of day care, beginning in 1969 and 1970.

States began to discover that they could use to their advantage federal money for social services, provided under 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, Title IV-A.
The appropriation was open-ended and the language was loose: a 75% federal share was available for social services to "past and potential" welfare recipients. Under this authorization, public or private non-profit agencies could set up day care centers, among other things, and the day care did not have to be part of a work-incentive scheme.

Between 1968 and 1971 the number of community day care centers in New York City increased from 99 to 212. As a welfare official there put it, "We were slow to catch on, but when we did we saw that literally thousands of jobs could be covered." Jobs were not the only thing that Title IV-A day care offered. Under this appropriation community groups, parent cooperatives, and women's groups found a way to run day care centers. For some of these groups, community-controlled day care meant more than just control over what the day care program would be; they saw day care centers as a base for community organization.

The idea that some of these radicals wanted to go beyond running day care centers did not escape the attention of conservatives in Congress; in New York community-controlled day care caused a certain amount of trouble for officials. But on the whole Lindsay and the Department of Human Resources suffered the inconvenience, for there were advantages to them in being able to provide day care centers.

The expansion of day care meant that more and more states, cities, agencies, professionals, parents, and com-
Community activists had a stake in federal day care. Simply, the more day care there was, the more people there were who had an interest in it.

Finally, professionals and child development specialists, whose interest in the early years of childhood was helped along by Head Start, got a public hearing in Washington in 1970, when the White House Conference on Children was held. Their first recommendation was that the federal government establish a national program of "comprehensive developmental child care services". Perhaps we should accept their statement as a sign that Congress was ready to do something about child care. They put the case for child development this way:

Economics, divorce, education, cultural values and other factors have led to a variety of family situations. The working mother is no longer a "misfit", and the family is not the simple mother-father-child picture usually assumed. By the end of this decade it is possible that most American children will have working mothers, and there is no reason to think that these mothers will be less concerned than other mothers about the care their children receive, or that their employment will, of itself, lead to destructive deviations from normal parent-child relationships.50

Should mothers work? Is it better for children to be brought up at home, as the first White House Conference recommended, or in day care centers? While professionals debate these questions, we ought to remember that Congress makes the decisions. Some observers point to the White House Conference as a key event influencing Congress to approve the
Comprehensive Child Development Act, but I doubt that professional opinion carried much weight with Congressmen despite the fact that child development backers often used the testimony of child specialists to support their case. Similarly, I disagree with those observers who argue that the women's liberation movement was responsible for persuading the public and Congress that day care was an acceptable alternative to mother's care. According to this view, beginning in the early 1960's middle class women's groups justified day care as a right for women who wanted to pursue careers. Officials then turned around and used their arguments to force welfare mothers to take jobs and put their children in day care centers. While it is true that Congressmen and local officials who wanted to justify reducing the relief rolls often used the rhetoric of the women's movement, they would very likely have found other ways to get mothers off welfare had not women's movement arguments come along. And child care was used as a work enforcer (in WIN) for several years before women's groups began demanding universal public child care; indeed, groups like National Organization of Women did not take up the cause of day care in Congress until early 1971, when the child development bill was introduced.

Where did the impetus for child development come from, if not from professionals or middle class women? I have suggested that welfare reform was one stimulus. And Title
IV-A day care and Head Start created a modest constituency for child care services. In order to explain why child care was top priority social legislation for Congressional liberals in 1971, I turn now to an account of the action in Congress.
CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICS OF PASSAGE

In June 1971, Senator Walter Mondale pointed out something about the child development bill that has come to seem significant in the two years since:

This is social legislation in a class with Medicare, yet it is happening without any initiatives from the executive branch and without much public notice. It's like spontaneous combustion.¹

He was right to speak of the bill as significant social legislation, for its premise was that all children are entitled to not only what AFDC is supposed to cover -- food, shelter, clothing -- but also "a full range of health, education and social services" necessary for children to attain their "full potential".²

To say, as the bill did, that all children are entitled to such services as a right is certainly to greatly expand the definition of government obligation to children. This was not, in other words, just a bill to provide day care for the children of working mothers, nor was it, like Head Start, expressly part of a poverty strategy, limited to a particular population. It is hard to know just what would have become of child development, had it actually been implemented, but certainly in intent it was something quite adventurous for Congress.

As Mondale suggests, in the past such legislation has not come at the original initiative of Congress. In this
case the Nixon Administration had little to do with the proposal, not even so much as to clearly oppose it. And it was not as if Congress took years to deliberate about child development; a more modest version of the bill had been considered in House committee in 1970, but no such proposal ever reached the floor of the House or Senate before 1971.

In all, the Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971 passed Congress so quickly and so quietly that most people probably had no idea what "child development services" were, let alone what social circumstances these services were supposed to correct. When New Deal programs were created, it was obvious that people were out of work, hungry, poor. But in 1971, was it obvious, as the child development bill stated, that "millions of children are suffering unnecessary harm from the lack of adequate child development services"?3 Certainly there was no evidence of public concern about such a situation, except perhaps for that voiced by the White House Conference. What prompted Congress to declare such an emergency?

In the 1960's the passage of anti-poverty legislation presented a similar puzzle. Then, as in 1971 with child development, there was no apparent pressure from interest groups; nor was there evidence of great public concern about poverty. Moynihan, recognizing that an interest-group politics explanation seemed inappropriate, argued that it was intellectuals, professional social scientists, who pushed
through "great society" programs. He describes a process of "professionalization of reform", in which social scientists took on an increasing role in national decision-making during the 1950's and 60's, and he ascribes the "failure" of poverty programs to the mistaken ideas of these policymakers.\(^4\) A number of people who write about day care implicitly follow this kind of a view, emphasizing the importance of child development specialists and professionals in bringing the problems of children to national attention, and sometimes issuing dark warnings about the dangers of the "professionalization of child-rearing".\(^5\) So far as I know, no one has actually tried to explain the passage of the child development bill this way, but it is commonly asserted that specialists and professionals have a powerful role in defining the direction of reform. Thus, it might be argued that a few influential professionals managed to persuade Congress that a crisis was at hand, and that child development legislation was the solution. Indeed, a look at some of the hearings before Mondale's Subcommittee on Children and Youth would strengthen this impression, for many of the witnesses were experts on child psychology and child development.\(^6\)

But if it was hard to believe that a few influential social scientists could be responsible for such a large and enduring effort as the poverty program,\(^7\) it is even harder to believe that child development legislation could come
about by a similar process. Such an explanation might seem reasonable if child development had come at the initiative of the Nixon Administration. But when has Congress been known to initiate major legislation, for which there is no apparent demand and no obvious constituency?

Despite what Mondale says, bills do not come up in Congress by "spontaneous combustion". The child development bill was very adroitly managed. It appeared at a time when everyone in Congress was ready to enact day care legislation. And, as I shall argue later on, it was not by accident that the Democratic opposition took up child development. In many ways the bill amounted to a counter-strategy to the Nixon Administration's domestic social policy.

For the beginnings of the conflict over child development, we have to go back to several proposals first introduced in 1969. In the 91st Congress John Brademas introduced in the House a bill called "The Comprehensive Preschool and Child Day Care Act of 1969". The bill was referred to his Subcommittee on Education, which held hearings. Near the end of 1970, the subcommittee reported the bill to the full Education and Labor Committee, where it was blocked from further action by representatives of labor unions and other groups, notably the Washington Research Project Action Council, a "public interest" lobby. The lobbyists appealed to Democrats in the full committee, arguing that the Brademas bill gave too much control to the
states and that local communities should have control of day care programs. Brademas favored the "state-plan" bill in part because it was acceptable to several Republicans on the Education and Labor Committee, notably Albert Quie, John Dellenback and Orval Hansen. From the beginning, Brademas believed that it would be impossible to get child care legislation through the House unless it had the support of Republicans. This issue of control -- what agencies or levels of government should be designated "prime sponsors" of child care programs -- would continue to be a troublesome one for Brademas.

Brademas introduced his 1969 child care bill only five days after President Nixon made public the details of the Family Assistance Plan, which included some money for day care for the children of welfare mothers required to go to work. The Brademas bill was really the first effort in Congress to combine compensatory pre-school programs and day care; it would have created day care programs modeled on Head Start for essentially the same population as was included under the Family Assistance Plan. It could have provided child care for Nixon's welfare reform plan, but it would have cost a good deal more than Nixon was prepared to spend.\(^9\)

The original Family Assistance Plan passed the House in April 1970 and went to the Senate. There the Finance Committee put welfare reform into a social security bill\(^{10}\)
and Russell Long tacked on as an amendment a bill to create a federal child care corporation. Concerned that lack of child care might be an impediment to putting mothers to work, Long devised a self-sufficient corporation, supported by fees, that would provide day care so as to assure that welfare mothers everywhere would have access to it. On the floor, the Child Care Corporation was struck from the bill by a narrow vote.11 (Subsequently, the bill was filibustered by opponents of the welfare reform provisions and did not come to a vote.)

The Brademas bill and the Long bill were the two major day care proposals of the 91st Congress. Each was in some way a response to the likelihood that welfare reform would require an expansion of day care. In addition, Mondale introduced a bill, "The Head Start Child Development Act of 1969"12 which would have expanded the Head Start program. (The bill was never reported from committee.) The liberals wanted to protect Head Start; they feared that Nixon wanted to kill it.

As the 92nd Congress opened, suddenly everyone had a day care bill; more than thirty separate bills were introduced in the House and Senate in the first few months of 1971. As a labor union lobbyist put it recently:

Day care in the abstract is a little like motherhood; everyone's for it. But when you get down to specifics...like delivery systems, then it's a different story.13
Ironically enough, day care was an issue a little like motherhood, for a time in 1971, and an important group outside of Congress took advantage of its appeal.

Half of all bills introduced into the House and Senate are written by lobbyists. Lobbyists do other things besides write legislation; sometimes they pay for what they want, in political contributions, sometimes they promise to deliver votes. Lobbyists also publicize issues and legislation; they get people to write letters and telegrams; they stir up "grass roots" support and opposition.

Late in 1970, the lobbyists who had blocked the Brademas day care bill got together to write a day care and child development bill. Brademas, angry about their action in committee, had said that if they didn't like his bill they should write their own. They realized that children's programs were something that many of the groups and organizations that lobby in Washington could stand behind; and, by early 1971 an enormous group of lobbies and special interest groups had assembled to work on child development. The lobbyist's coalition was not only large, representing nearly 100 different organizations, but diverse; it included not only the regulars, like labor unions and civil rights organizations, who would ordinarily support such social legislation, but also women's groups, church groups, professional organizations, and such strange bedfellows as National Welfare Rights and the U.S. Conference of
Mayors. Even the governors joined; it looked as if there might be something in child development for everyone. Not without a good deal of internal disagreement, the coalition produced a child development bill. Some of the women's groups, especially National Organization of Women, wanted universal free day care as a right for women. Others, particularly NWRO and minority group organizations, felt that the best strategy was to concentrate on services for the poor and welfare populations, and they wanted strong local control and parent control provisions. The mayors were alarmed about community control and the governors hoped to persuade the others that money should go to the states and not to localities. Not all of these groups actually participated in drawing up the legislation, but all of them lobbied for it in some measure.

The coalition took its proposal to Mondale in the Senate and Brademas in the House, where the bills were introduced and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the Committee on Education and Labor, respectively. Mondale had just persuaded Harrison Williams, chairman of Senate committee, to create a new subcommittee on Children and Youth, a sign that Mondale, and the Senate, were prepared to take children's legislation seriously. Joint hearings on child development, before Mondale's subcommittee and Gaylord Nelson's Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty, began in May 1971.
Brademas began hearings the same week before his Subcommittee on Education. Despite the evident enthusiasm for child development in Washington, the legislation attracted little attention in Congress and little comment in the media.

Mondale took on the hearings with zeal. He heard testimony from the major lobbyists who had written the bill, from child development specialists, from sympathetic other Congressmen, from parents and administrators of Head Start projects and community day care centers. Almost no one who testified was opposed to the provisions of the coalition's bill. Mondale used the hearings to document a case for the desperate need for children's services, and he called upon his friends to present witness. Nobody in the Labor and Public Welfare was especially hostile to the bill. Even Robert Taft, who would later during the Senate debate offer amendments for the Nixon Administration, came only to one session of the hearings and asked only a few mild questions of those testifying.

There was more dissension in the House; there the committee on Education and Labor had several powerful Republicans, most prominent of whom was Quie, ranking minority member, who demanded compromises from Brademas in return for support of the bill. The proposal written by the lobbyists favored localities; it gave the states little authority over child development programs. Brademas, anxious to keep the support of both parties, wanted a compromise
bill that would favor the states and large cities, and which would not give authority over programs to small cities or rural counties.

Testimony in the House committee was more lively than in the Senate. Bella Abzug and Shirley Chisholm, who had jointly introduced the biggest child care bill of all—a proposal costing $23 billion for three years, with stronger local and parent control and more money for working class and middle class families than the Brademas/Mondale version—sharply criticized the powers that states would have under the compromise version that Brademas wanted. Brademas also called on several governors, who not surprisingly, wanted even stronger authority for the states.

The same issue that had caused lobbyists to block the 1969 Brademas bill was again causing trouble in the full Education and Labor Committee. Republicans wanted states and cities over 500,000 in population to be eligible for "prime sponsorship"; Brademas got them to agree to include cities over 100,000 in population. So far as most of the lobbyists were concerned, this was no compromise at all, it was simply another version of a "state-plan" bill. They wanted what the Mondale version provided: no stipulations on the size of localities eligible to be "prime sponsors".

Carl Perkins, committee chairman, decided that he, too, did not like the compromise on sponsorship; he wanted to
make sure that rural counties, like those in his home state of Kentucky, would be directly eligible for federal funds. Perkins' decision to go against Brademas was important not only because of his power in committee, but also because his stand carried weight with other Southern Democrats in the House.

The position of the Nixon Administration seemed unclear. Elliot Richardson and others at HEW, notably Edward Zigler, head of the Office of Child Development, were known to favor services for children in principle. Richardson twice cancelled scheduled appearances before Brademas' committee because he could not reach agreement with Nixon and the Office of Management and Budget. (OMB felt that the $410 million in new appropriations for day care under the Family Assistance Plan was already extravagant.)

For a while it seemed as if Richardson might be successful in negotiating Administration support for some kind of a child care bill, but in the meantime the official line from HEW was tough. A letter from Richardson to House committee and the testimony of Stephen Kurzman, Assistant Secretary for Legislation of HEW, before Senate committee make it clear that Nixon did not want a bill with local control, or strong parent control, or one that would in any way conflict with the Family Assistance Plan.

Both the Brademas and Mondale bills offered free services to all families with incomes below $6,960. The Fami-
ly Assistance Plan had elaborate restrictions on child care; only working mothers who were heads of households, and then only those making very low incomes, were to have free day care. And day care could be home care with minimum standards, and need not include special services.

While the child development hearings were going on, the Finance Committee was conducting hearings on H.R.1, the Ways and Means Committee bill which included the Family Assistance Plan. Among other things, Russell Long was still dissatisfied with the bill's day care provisions. So in June 1971, Long introduced a new Day Care Corporation bill. The corporation was the antithesis of child development. It was run by a three man board appointed by the President; it offered day care for a fee to all but the very poorest. Parents had an "observer's" role. The corporation could contract with any provider of services, and the suggested standards for child care were lenient. The corporation would make day care available; it would assure that welfare mothers would go to work.

Because the Finance Committee was holding hearings on H.R.1, liberals in the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee began to fear that Long's corporation or Family Assistance Plan day care might come up for a vote before child development legislation reached the floor. Mondale and Gaylord Nelson decided to attach the child care bill to legislation to extend OEO, a bill that was about
to be reported from committee. Nixon had requested authorization to extend the poverty program for two years; Democrats sought to use this authorization bill to protect various programs by specifying funding levels. By restricting Nixon's ability to transfer out programs into other departments, they hoped to prevent him from closing down the Office entirely. Along with the child development title, the OEO bill also had a separate section establishing a national legal services corporation.

In the House the Education and Labor Committee was marking up its OEO bill, also written by the Democrats.29 There, Perkins decided not to report the Brademas child care bill, but instead to hold it in committee. When the OEO bill reached a vote on the House floor, he intended to offer the Mondale child care bill as an amendment. Perkins wanted to make sure that the House did not vote on the "state-plan" bill that Brademas wanted. But Quie, who guessed Perkins' tactic, got a promise from majority leader Hale Boggs that the OEO bill would not go to conference before the House voted on the House version of the child development bill.30 So Perkins had to report the bill from committee. As reported, the House bill had the following major provisions:

- families with incomes up to $6960 (for a family of four) were eligible for free services; about one third of funds under the bill could go toward providing services for higher income families, who would pay fees
states and cities over 100,000 in population were eligible to be "prime sponsors" of child development programs; that is, to plan, fund, and supervise local projects.

- on the local level councils of parents would have control over their own projects.

- a variety of different kinds of child care arrangements, as well as medical, social and educational services were authorized.

The major provisions of the Senate bill were much the same, with the important exception that there were no population limitations on prime sponsorship -- cities and counties of any size, and in some cases, non-profit agencies (such as CAP's and Head Start projects) were eligible for direct funding from the federal government.

It is important to remember also the ways in which child development differed from the other day care proposals then up in Congress. First of all, child development had a "services delivery" mechanism that even in the House version bypassed to some extent state and local government and the bureaucracies that traditionally ran day care.

Federal money went to (partially elected, partially appointed) councils at the prime sponsorship level; these councils in turn approved money for local projects. Secondly, not only those on welfare, but all families with incomes below $7000 got free services and higher income families paid partial fees. Third, the program did not just create day care centers with community participation. Child Development Councils were authorized to provide an
enormous range of services for children as well as for their families. The day care center might be a focus for local efforts on behalf of children, but day care, in itself, was a small feature of the bill. The idea behind child development was like that of Head Start and CAP: an extra-governmental agency was empowered to push for services on the local level.

Under H.R.1, the idea was just the opposite: rather than pay out money to the providers of day care, the government provided a subsidy to welfare mothers. Those women who worked and who needed child care would make their own arrangements and pay for it themselves; they would then be reimbursed through a partial earnings disregard. This plan minimized the government's role in the provision of services. Coverage was limited, not only to low income families, but to those children of women who actually worked. Once family income rose above a certain point, subsidy was cut off.

From the point of view of Russell Long there was only one thing wrong with this plan; since day care was already a scarce commodity, women might be prevented from going to work if they could not find some way of taking care of the children. Long devised the corporation as a means of assuring that there would be just enough child care to go around. Preferably, day care under welfare reform should not be expensive; as with WIN, it made no economic sense
to pay out more for child care than would be saved in welfare costs. A self-sufficient corporation was one approach to keeping costs down. Most likely, the corporation would have stimulated private enterprise day care, for the private sector can run day care more cheaply than the public, so long as standards are not very strict.\textsuperscript{31}

HEW was budgeting about $700 per child per year to provide day care under the Family Assistance Plan; as officials admitted, this amount would pay for services comparable to child development for only a few children.\textsuperscript{32} The Nixon Administration did not want to stimulate expensive day care, but steps had to be taken to assure that some kind of child care would be available. The Administration was looking for ways to cut the cost of day care in 1971; at HEW officials were looking into private enterprise child care, and they were working on developing a new job category -- a low-paid paraprofessional child care worker -- that could hopefully employ welfare mothers.\textsuperscript{33} In 1971 HEW also revised the Federal Day Care Requirements, which had formerly been quite stringent, and had made day care expensive.\textsuperscript{34}

When child development came to the floor of the House and Senate, most Congressmen thought of it as a day care bill, perhaps something a little fancier than the other proposals. It was not by accident that child development was thought of just as a big day care bill; it was a de-
liberate strategy on the part of the lobbyists and managers of the bill. They knew that Congress was in a mood to pass day care legislation, so they publicized child development as a day care bill. Most legislators were too busy to read the fine print, and children's programs, like motherhood, were at heart a dull topic for politicians. The lobbyists kept publicity on the bill to a minimum; they avoided the press, so that most people knew nothing about the bill, and most Congressmen knew only its outlines. The decision to put child development in the OEO bill was in part an attempt to keep it quiet. The sponsors hoped that child development might slip by, much as Medicaid went through, attracting little attention, when the Medicare bill was passed.

Up to a point this strategy was successful. It was particularly successful in the Senate. The first time anyone there made a speech against child development was on September 9, 1971, the day the bill was passed. James Buckley tried to call attention to the language of the bill assuring comprehensive services "as a right" to all children:

This is not mere legislative boilerplate...These are words and phrases committing Congress and the American people to a social policy that threatens to destroy parental authority and the institution of the family.

Buckley went on, arguing that "innocent-sounding" child development programs were "radical" and "revolutionary". Per-
haps he had cried wolf once too often; in any case no one seemed to pay too much attention to him.

Robert Taft was the major opponent of the bill's provisions during the Senate floor debate; he offered a series of amendments that would have limited its coverage and focused control of programs with the states. Taft first tried to have the child development title stricken from the OEO bill; when he lost this vote, he offered an amendment to limit free services (to leave the judgement on coverage to the Secretary of HEW). He also offered amendments to limit prime sponsorship to cities over 100,000, to limit the policy-making authority of the child development councils, (that is, to make the role of the councils "advisory" rather than give them decision-making powers) to delete one section of the bill establishing "child advocacy" projects. All of Taft's amendments were handily voted down. His final effort, to send back to committee the entire OEO bill in order to strike off the child development title, was defeated by a vote of 46 to 17.

Taft was not successful in demonstrating that these details of the bill were very significant. Two other Republicans on committee, Jacob Javits and Richard Schweiker, supported the bill. Taft himself was evidently in favor of some kind of child development legislation, but the Administration called upon him to try to limit or kill Title V. During the debate Taft presented a letter from
Richardson detailing the amendments that Nixon would require if child development were to be acceptable. But the tone of the letter was curiously vague, perhaps reflecting Richardson's ambivalence. At any rate the Senate made no concessions to the Nixon Administration. Buckley, with the agreement of Nelson and Mondale, offered the only amendments accepted; his provisions changed the wording of the bill so as to protect the "moral and legal responsibilities" of parents.

Buckley was the first person in the extreme right to catch on to the fact that child development was really more than a big day care bill. Conservatives finally began to publicize child development, beginning in September after the Senate had already passed the OEO bill. At a meeting of newspaper editors Buckley castigated the press for ignoring such an important piece of legislation. His cause was taken up by conservatives in the House, who began to make speeches against the bill and collect letters from their constituents opposing the legislation. The magazine Human Events also began to attack the bill and organized the Emergency Committee for Children, a group of doctors, ministers and other professionals who began to lobby against the bill. The emergence of this lobby meant that conservative Congressmen, who had been more or less left alone by the child development lobby, began to hear about the bill for the first time.
The House did not take up the OEO bill until several weeks after the Senate. Whatever the influence of the conservatives, opinion in the House had been more divided all along. Brademas was criticized from both sides about his handling of the bill, by Abzug and Chisholm, and by Quie. Members of his own committee hinted that the bill was being railroaded through Congress; they complained that the hearings had been too brief and that all sides had not been heard. During the debate, committee Republicans called attention to the haste with which the bill had been reported and sought to have the bill returned to committee for further consideration, arguing that such an important measure deserved the full attention of the Congress. Since Perkins had only reported the bill a few days before, no copies of the committee report were available on the floor and Brademas sought to cover up the dissension in committee.

In lieu of a report, Brademas offered a set of prepared questions and answers. Any Congressman who bothered to read through this document did not learn anything about prime sponsorship, the main issue of contention in committee, for that topic was studiously avoided.

On September 30, Brademas introduced the child development bill as an amendment to the OEO extension act. He sought to downplay the significance of the bill; in response to a question about how much programs would cost,
he estimated about $350 million per year. (While the House bill did not specify appropriations, the Senate bill, substantially the same, authorized much more than that sum for programs in the first year of operation.)

The fight on the floor was much fiercer than in the Senate. Over Brademas' objection, Perkins offered an amendment that would permit small cities and counties, above 10,000 in population, to be prime sponsors of programs. Because of Perkins' influence this amendment succeeded. When Brademas lost this vote the difficulties in his bipartisan coalition became evident as Republicans began to take the child development bill apart, offering a series of weakening amendments. Quie and Gerald Ford argued that the effect of a bill that gave free services to so many people and that had strong local control, would be to negate the Family Assistance Plan, which the House had already passed; they predicted that Nixon would certainly veto any child care legislation which could not be coordinated with the Family Assistance Plan. The only Republican on committee who spoke up for the bill was Ogden Reid (who has since become a Democrat); much more than in the Senate the vote split on party lines. After Perkins got his amendment through, Republicans like Quie, John Dellenback, and John Erlenborn sought not merely to amend the bill, but to kill it.

Erlenborn put up an amendment to limit free services,
so as to bring the bill in line with the Family Assistance Plan. Quie read a letter from Richardson, who took by now a firmer stand. "An attempt is being made essentially to reverse the effect of H.R.1", Richardson said; he warned the House that Nixon would not tolerate an attempt to undermine the careful balance of his welfare reform proposal. For the first time, Republicans began to suggest that child development was part of an attempt by liberals to subvert the Family Assistance Plan.

Erlenborn's amendment lost by only two votes. He then tried to amend the bill so that child development councils would not have authority over existing day care or day care under H.R.1. Brademas opposed this amendment as well, and the House defeated it. But Brademas knew that the Republicans had almost enough votes to defeat child development and that they were prepared to do so. He therefore accepted two weakening amendments offered by Quie that lessened the powers of local project councils and enhanced the authority of the states and cities, by striking out a provision that would have permitted local groups to apply directly to HEW where local government discriminated against them.

After a heated debate the House by a vote of 203 to 181 accepted the Brademas bill as an amendment to the OEO bill. The margin of support came mostly from conservative
Democrats, who responded to appeals from Perkins and Edith Green. Quie, Dellenback, Erlenborn and Hansen all voted against the measure. But Brademas had somewhat undercut their argument that child development would conflict with welfare reforms. In his final speech he presented a colloquy between Wilbur Mills and himself; in this interchange Brademas assured Mills that the child development proposal was in no way intended to conflict with H.R.1.46 Mills, thus satisfied, was then prepared to vote for the bill.

The House then took up the OEO bill. There was no doubt that the bill would pass, but much of the debate was devoted to further attacks on the child development title. This time Republicans saw their issue: Quie and Erlenborn began to emphasize that a bill which offered free services to so many people would cost $20 billion a year. When the OEO bill came up for a vote, Erlenborn made a motion to send the whole bill back to committee, with instructions to amend the child care title so that only the Family Assistance Plan population could receive free services. Although this same amendment had been defeated earlier in the day, this time Erlenborn's motion passed, by nine votes. So Perkins, in order to get the OEO bill approved, had to agree to Erlenborn's amendment. Thus amended, the OEO extension bill passed the House by a vote of 251 to 115; it had, in other words, slightly more than two-thirds of the vote, enough to override a veto by Nixon. But it
was clear that the child development section could not by itself command the vote of two-thirds of the House.

At the beginning of October, the OEO extension act went to conference. While there were a number of differences between the House and Senate versions of the child care title, the disagreement that would occupy the conference for almost two months, was on the issue of income eligibility: who should be eligible for free services? Perkins used his influence to settle the issue of prime sponsorship once and for all; he did not appoint Brademas to the conference committee. Without Brademas' support, Erlenborn, Dellenback and Quie, who were appointed, would be unable to get the "state-plan" bill they wanted.

When the bill went to conference, there was a good chance that the more liberal Senate version would be upheld and that the liberals and lobbyists would succeed in getting almost everything they wanted. They owed their success in part to their silent strategy; the bill was complicated and most Congressmen did not see at first glance that it represented a substantial expansion of public responsibility for children. Elements of the bill, such as the extension of coverage to the working class, appealed to many middle of the road Congressmen. Edith Green made a compelling argument for equity in services during the House debate:

So if this (i.e. working class) mother is out work-
ing and she has two or three children entirely dependent on her for support, we are going to charge her to have her children go to a child development center. But if there is another family and they do not work, we are going to make it free for them. I would like to know what kind of justice there is in this country. May I say that I think it is high time that this Congress...give a little more attention to the middle-income people in this country instead of directing all the programs to the lowest-income groups.49

Similarly, others, such as Perkins, liked the idea that federal money would go directly to small towns and rural counties. The only outright hostility to the bill came from the extreme right, but conservative opponents did not have a great deal of influence in Congress. As the conference opened negotiations, the passage of the Brademas and Mondale bills looked like a triumph for the liberals.
CHAPTER THREE

CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS: THE ISSUE OF COVERAGE

On November 29, the House/Senate conference committee sent the OEO bill back to Congress for final confirmation. The conference negotiations had been lengthy and child development had been particularly troublesome. First the conference agreed upon an income ceiling for coverage that was about halfway between the Senate figure of $6960 and the House figure of $4320. (The language of the House bill actually left up to the Secretary of HEW the decision about what families would get free day care; it was assumed that because of Richardson's insistence on coordinating child development with the Family Assistance Plan, only that population would get free services.)

Had not the Nixon Administration taken a firm position during the conference, the committee might very likely have chosen to support the Senate version. They compromised because Richardson made it clear that Nixon did not want such a broad extension of free services. But then Richardson informed the committee that the compromise plan still did not suit Nixon and that he would certainly veto such a bill. So the committee finally hit upon a plan that would guarantee free services only for the Family Assistance Plan population, but which set fees at a modest level for families with incomes up to $6960. The liberals
regarded this as a generous compromise with the Administration and many supporters of the bill were dismayed, feeling that the committee had gone too far.\textsuperscript{1}

In many ways the most novel feature of the child development proposal was the degree of coverage. In the past, day care has always been provided selectively, for special children and in special circumstances. Family Assistance Plan day care was selective, provided for the special purpose of putting welfare mothers to work. Quite the opposite, the Comprehensive Child Development Act was called, in its preamble, the legislative framework for universal services. The extension of coverage to others besides the welfare population was an important article for the supporters of the child development bill; it was also one of the features of the bill that the Nixon Administration most opposed. What was at stake? Why, in conference negotiations, was Richardson so adamant on this point? What difference did the issue of coverage make to the supporters of child development?

In order to see how profound was the disagreement on this point, it is worthwhile to go back to the beginnings of the bill, to the lobbyists who first drew it up. Critics of child development have argued that the reason the proposal went beyond providing day care just for welfare mothers was that women's groups leaned on Congress to get government sponsored day care as a right for middle class
The day care proposal was propelled through Congress chiefly as a response to women's liberation, and its desire to free women from some of the day long burdens of child care. With its support from the affluent it is not surprising that under the bill, day care would be available to everyone. Opponents saw this as a frivolous aim. They argued that National Organization of Women and National Women's Political Caucus represented an elite minority, and that in seeking to get day care for themselves, they would force the poor into day care centers against their will and against their best interests. But the child development bill did not provide universal day care; from the point of view of women's groups it was a very small step toward that goal. It would be wrong to over-emphasize the influence of middle class women's groups, for I think they had relatively little success in pressing their demands in Congress. Not only women's groups but most all of the other interest groups behind child development supported the extension of coverage to working and middle class families. To see why, we have to look to the general legislative aims of the poverty, civil rights and labor lobbyists who pushed the child care proposal through Congress.

First of all, they developed their proposal in response to welfare reform day care. Supporters of child development felt that child care should not be thought of simply as a work incentive for mothers on welfare, and
they believed that the Family Assistance Plan did not put sufficient emphasis on the welfare of children. They pointed to the minimum funding under H.R.1 and to the Ways and Means Committee Report on that bill, which disposed of the problem of child care in one paragraph: it stated that women could not evade registration for work just because they were dissatisfied with the arrangement available for the care of their children. Some of the lobbyists who supported child development were opposed outright to the Family Assistance Plan, but many were not, and most liberals in Congress were not wholly opposed either. They simply wanted to enforce an emphasis on the welfare of children in any day care legislation.

Kenneth Young, legislative representative for the AFL-CIO, was one of many who argued that it was necessary to defend children from the excesses of welfare reform:

Far too many people...are demanding that the mother get off the welfare roll -- even when it means the minimum of custodial care, or no care at all for her children. The AFL-CIO is convinced, Mr. Chairman, that such a policy is disastrous. These children of the poor are already disadvantaged. To further deprive them of opportunity in their most formative years is to make them doubly disadvantaged. If these children spend their early years neglected in a back room or left to roam the streets unattended, the next generation will face problems much more severe than the costs of welfare.

Others were prepared to carry this sentiment further. "Taking care of a murderer in our society takes care of $18,000 per year per murderer," one expert put it, in an attempt
to illustrate the costs and benefits of a generous child care program.\textsuperscript{8} It was easy to argue that government should not scrimp and save on child care for the poor. It would seem that the obvious strategy to protect children would have been to try to amend H.R.1. But liberals were not really in a position to force compromises on that bill.\textsuperscript{9} And so they sought to pass separate legislation.

The model for child development was Head Start, and in part the aim of the legislation was to protect the Head Start program.\textsuperscript{10} The Nixon Administration was not enthusiastic about that program; each year since Nixon had taken office he had requested a little less money for it.\textsuperscript{11} For several reasons those who favored child development programs decided that it would be a good idea to expand on Head Start and create a program that would include not only the poor, but working and middle class families. First, this strategy helped to satisfy the women's groups who were demanding universal day care. NOW, for instance, took the position that socioeconomic integration in child care programs would improve the quality of services:

[I]t is a mistake on the part of an awful lot of other kinds of civil rights groups and poverty groups to try to perpetuate the Head Start, the poverty kind of program...unless we are extremely cautious...we are going to end up with another poverty program which is not going to work.\textsuperscript{12}

Arguments for socioeconomic integration on the basis of educational benefits to children had a certain amount of appeal.
Mondale was very enthusiastic about this approach, and he often cited the testimony of professionals, including Zigler of HEW, who followed this line.13

As the NOW statement suggests, there was some friction between women's groups and poverty groups, but at the same time, lobbyists who sought to protect programs for the poor recognized that extending programs to groups above the poor might have political advantages. For this reason, more than any other, the influential lobbyists, especially labor union representatives, fought hard to extend coverage.

While the lobbyists and liberals often extolled the educational benefits of socioeconomic integration, what they usually meant was that programs not for the poor alone would be easier to get funded and easier to keep funded. An aide to Mondale put it: "It's pretty easy to keep a financial lid on programs that deal just with the poor."14

In part the strategy was to enlist the support of working class families in getting services for the poor. As Shirley Chisholm put it:

All of us are vividly aware of the splits and tensions in this country between the poor and the working class...Let's not aggravate these tensions. The poor and the working class have the same needs and the same problems...Do not pit these people against each other like starving dogs fighting over the same meager scraps.15

And as she went on to say, programs for the poor alone are not very popular. She and others felt that many Congressmen would be happier spending money on day care if they
could offer something to working class constituents — that was the strategy for getting the bill through Congress. Once enacted, they hoped that child development programs would create a constituency for children's services, of families who came to depend on services, and people and organizations who provided services, thus keeping pressure on Congress to continue to expand child care. Presumably, this coalition of poor and working constituencies would be even more significant at the local level, in pressuring local government to distribute more jobs and services to the poor and near poor.

What the child development proposal provided was a very small step toward universal coverage. But even so, as opponents pointed out, to extend free coverage to families with incomes up to $7000, with partial fees above that, meant a program that could end up costing billions more than day care for welfare mothers alone. I don't think that there was ever any question that the Nixon Administration would tolerate the extension of coverage, on the grounds of the initial cost alone. Let us see why Republicans in conference insisted upon limiting coverage to the Family Assistance Plan population.

According to Taft and Quie, who spoke for the Administration, Nixon was concerned above all that child development would conflict with welfare reform. This was something that Richardson too repeatedly stressed: child care legis-
lation should work with welfare reform and not against it. At times they went so far as to suggest that the bill was a deliberate attempt to foil H.R.1. Yet many of the lobbyists and Congressmen behind child care also supported welfare reform. This was by no means the only thing about the child development bill which troubled the Administration, but it was an important issue. Why did Republicans see the bill as a threat to welfare reform?

Spokesmen for the Administration emphasized that Nixon's opposition to the Bradaemas/Mondale bill was largely tactical: that is, he feared that if Congress passed separate day care legislation it would be more difficult to get H.R.1 through. Thus Clark McGregor, Administration lobbyist, explained why he sought to defeat child care legislation:

I don't think the President would like a new vehicle to come along which would stop H.R.1 in its tracks... H.R.1 was carefully constructed with each piece meshing into another and it is the cornerstone of our domestic legislative program.16

What he meant was that the day care in the welfare reform plan was included as part of a strategy to get the Family Assistance Plan through Congress. Nixon probably would have preferred to find a way to make welfare reform work without including day care. His aides spoke of day care as the "sweetener" for liberals in the welfare reform plan, just as the work requirement was designed to appeal to conservatives.17
But Congressional liberals were not very impressed with welfare reform day care, and took the opposite tactic: they warned that an uncompromising attitude on Nixon's part toward their child care legislation would simply make it more difficult to get welfare reform through Congress. The fact that Nixon signed the 1971 Talmadge work requirement provision\textsuperscript{18} in deference to conservatives, even though its separate passage presumably took away some of the appeal of H.R.1, suggests that there were other reasons beyond Congressional tactics that Nixon opposed child development. It is not at all clear that the President was ever so enthusiastic about the Family Assistance Plan, and according to several accounts, the Administration had all but abandoned welfare reform by late 1971.\textsuperscript{19}

Nixon's opposition was more than tactical. Child development was at odds with H.R.1 because it could not be used to implement the Family Assistance Plan unless substantially amended. Beyond that, the extension of day care services did not fit in comfortably with Administration domestic policy. And in many ways the liberals' child care plan was directly antagonistic to that policy.

When Republicans argued that coverage for child care should be left to the discretion of the Secretary of HEW, so that services could be coordinated with the Family Assistance Plan, what exactly did they mean? First, if free services were extended to families above the income sup-
plement cutoff point, the carefully worked out graduated supplementation scheme would be jeopardized. If day care were free to families with incomes up to $7000 per year, it meant that the poor could not be made to assume the cost of their own child care once their incomes rose above the cutoff point. Day care could not function as a work-incentive benefit for the very poor if it were also made free to the near poor. Just this sort of problem with the welfare reform scheme had already caught the attention of conservatives in the Finance Committee, and the Administration was by now alert to all the snags and pitfalls in the work incentive.

Republicans also argued that a limited program would better serve the poor. First, they said, the extension of services would make the program cost too much, more than Nixon would be willing to spend. Secondly, since it was unlikely that the program would get full funding, it was best to try to serve the very poor, who needed services most. Richardson argued for the limitation of coverage in a letter to Gerald Ford:

> If left unamended and enacted into law, this will be another tragically unfulfillable commitment to the American people of a type which has already so undermined public confidence in our governmental system.

He meant that government should not promise what it could not deliver. Implicit in this argument was the recognition
that the Brademas/Mondale bill might create an enormous demand for child care and children's services, just as I have argued its supporters hoped it would. Republicans were arguing that Nixon did not want to stimulate such demand, nor was he willing to spend so much money.

The Administration position on free services should not have been surprising, for it followed from Nixon's general aim to cut back on federal spending, especially for welfare and social services. According to Moynihan, who was present at the creation of the Family Assistance Plan, the President had come to believe that the poverty program and other service programs were ineffective in reducing welfare dependency. Moynihan urged Nixon to adopt an "income strategy" -- that is to redistribute money directly, rather than seek to reduce welfare circuitously, through the provision of social services. Thus, Moynihan says, Nixon began to see how a guaranteed annual income could be superior to a program like Head Start as social policy for children:

This (i.e. 1969) was a curious time in government. A sense of the limits of social policy, as of foreign policy, was making itself felt in the aftermath of substantial failures. At this time, for example, the relative lack of success of the compensatory education programs of the nineteen-sixties was being reported from the field with ever greater insistence. The issue of compensatory education, in fact, arose early in the new Administration, and influenced the adoption of FAP. It was an issue as closely connected as any could be to the achievement of racial equality, the minimization of social class differences, and a general relaxation of the wrenching
social tensions of the time.\textsuperscript{22}

Whether or not the Nixon Administration saw things quite in the way that Moynihan did,\textsuperscript{23} at least one part of this argument was appealing: service programs that didn't work should be cut out. There were plenty of evaluations that showed that various OEO and HEW social services programs for the poor did not achieve their goals. The experts merely provided the rationale; the course of action was already one that Nixon was sympathetic to, for the programs in question were mostly creations of the Democratic party and had a Democratic constituency. By 1971, Nixon had begun the process of cutting back on federal programs for the urban poor.

I do not want to suggest that the above is a full interpretation of Nixon's domestic policy, for that would require an analysis of revenue sharing and income maintenance and lead far afield from the problem of day care. Here I am simply concerned with one facet of Administration policy: the decision to cut back on federal spending for social services and to eliminate the poverty program. Recent efforts by the Administration to close down OEO and to curtail HEW social services\textsuperscript{24} make it clear that Nixon wants to get rid of these programs, with or without special revenue sharing and income maintenance as alternatives.

In other words, one thing that the President did not want was a huge new federal outlay for social services, and
especially not a program that was styled on Head Start and community action. (I discuss the issues of administration and control in the next chapter.) The provisions for day care in H.R.1 demonstrate this quite clearly; there government does not provide day care services, but rather those women who use child care are partially reimbursed for the cost to them. It is a provision designed to minimize federal subsidy of services; H.R.1 would not have stimulated new public child care.

Thus the position of the Nixon Administration on the issue of who should get free child development services was predictable. Not only would the extension of services have interfered with the way that the Family Assistance Plan was supposed to work; it would have reversed the frugal federal policy on social service expenditures that Nixon wanted. And the Administration was well aware that to take on an obligation to provide services such as the child development bill authorized might very well have stimulated public demand for more and more services.

Did Democrats devise the child care proposal intentionally to thwart Nixon's domestic aims? In many ways the proposal embodied all that the Administration opposed in social welfare policy. It is important to remember that child development provided not only day care, but preschool programs, medical care, psychiatric services, remedial and
special programs for handicapped children, family planning and maternity care; in effect it protected a large range of services for the poor.

I don't think that child development supporters set out deliberately to create a program so antithetical to Nixon's policy or to defeat the intent of the Family Assistance Plan. But it is well to remember that much of the impetus for the bill was a response to Administration policy. Nixon wanted to minimize spending for Head Start; liberals in Congress responded when Head Start administrators complained about cuts in funds. Similarly, the mayors and governors, who had come to rely on federal money for local programs, saw in child development an opportunity for more fiscal relief. When Nixon introduced the Family Assistance Plan, he introduced a proposal that ultimately threatened jobs in poverty programs and social services. In Congress in 1971, there was considerable pressure from professionals and administrators of federal programs who sought to prevent cutbacks which threatened their jobs and their programs. Social workers and poverty program directors condemned the Family Assistance Plan as coercive, as a scheme to provide cheap labor by forcing welfare mothers into low-paid jobs.

It is not surprising that liberals in Congress responded by embracing child care legislation, for there was something for most every one of these aggrieved groups in the
child development bill. Nor is it surprising that the liberal lobbies who pushed the bill through Congress were concerned about the possibility that the Nixon Administration would not do justice to a child development program that was only for the poor. Thus, the extension of services to working class families was by no means a frill in the Brademas/Mondale bill; liberals thought of it as a very important element in a political strategy, designed to protect child development programs from Nixon's policy of fiscal starvation.28

If there was any one feature of the child development bill that provoked right wing opposition it was coverage. Typically, conservatives exempted the welfare poor in their defenses of the American family and the rights of parenthood; it was the working class and lower middle class they sought to protect. Because the child development bill was designed to serve their appointed constituency, it came in for special abuse.

What made right-wing Congressmen particularly suspicious were references to socioeconomic integration. They detected a suggestion in the liberals' arguments that the purpose of the bill was to enhance opportunity for poor children at the expense of middle America's children. Perhaps the most persistent critic of the child care proposal was John Rarick of Louisiana, who defended parenthood and the family in a speech before the House:
Mr. Speaker, "the hand that rocks the cradle rules the nation". Historically, in America as in all free countries, parental hands have rocked the cradles and people ruled the nation. Conversely, in totalitarian countries, the government rocked the cradle and ruled the people dictatorially and mercilessly...We find ourselves confronted with several legislative proposals seeking to turn control over the lives of our children in some measure to the Federal government. If enacted into law, these measures would further undermine and lead to further deterioration of the family, locally controlled public school systems, and religious morals. 29

Conservatives argued that the proposal was the subversive plan of a professional and administrative elite -- "white-coated bureaucrats" -- who, encouraged by radicals, sought to create a "new society" using "child control centers" to socialize the children of middle America. 30 The conservatives paid attention to the language assuring services as a right, and they did not fail to notice the argument for the extension of services to the working class: that children "learn better" in programs with a socioeconomic mix of families. This was one of the arguments used to justify integrated schools, and in fact, much of the right wing attack was really a veiled reference to busing and forced integration. Conservatives threatened that the federal government would soon begin forcing children into day care centers, 31 just as the government forced desegregation of schools and instituted busing. "The opportunity to develop attitudes is what these people are really after," argued John Ashbrook of the professionals and bureaucrats he said were behind the bill. The threat was
that parents would no longer have authority to raise their children in their own way and teach their own values. Rather, upper middle class professionals, who were sympathetic to radicals, blacks, and the poor, would take over child-rearing.  

The outrage of conservatives seems to be off-target, for the Brademas/Mondale bill did not really create socio-economically integrated day care centers, although the liberals' defense made it seem so. But these arguments paved the way for a more sophisticated right wing attack on the child development bill, which emphasized the cost of the program, and the likelihood that the working class would pay dearly for it through taxes.  

The right wing, by force of rhetoric, first brought the bill to attention, at least in Washington. Not only did they publicize the importance of the bill, they also dramatized its obscurity. They raised the question of whether child development was really a popular proposal and whether people in general really wanted government to make such a commitment. Columnist James Kilpatrick helped air the conservatives' opposition in an article written during the conference. He warned:

This bill contains the seeds for destruction of Middle America; and if Richard Nixon signs it he will have forfeited his last frail claim on Middle America's support.  

This campaign did not get under way until the OEO bill was already in conference; right wing opponents were too late.
to prevent Congress from passing child development so they appealed to the President, with whom they had substantial influence. The conference accommodation on coverage did not mollify the right wing. Rather the actions of the conference intensified their attack, for they feared that if Nixon was willing to compromise he might be willing to sign the bill.

The decision about coverage for child care services was not the only difference resolved in the House/Senate conference on the OEO bill, but it was the most important compromise. Although the decision to limit free services to the Family Assistance Plan population was a major concession to the Nixon Administration, it was still not quite what Republicans had tried to get, which was authority for the Secretary of HEW to set fees for child care at his own discretion.36 Most of the other conference decisions went to the favor of the liberals. The conference report adopted the stronger provisions for parent control at the project level.37

Finally, the conference decided to set the lower limit for the size of a locality eligible to be a prime sponsor at 5,000 in population. (The Senate version had no limitation; the House excluded areas under 10,000 in population.) This limit, and other provisions that weakened the role of states, meant that the child development program effectively bypassed the states.
The OEO bill was passed by both the House and the Senate in early December. The Administration had lobbied hard against child development, seeking to have Title V struck from the bill. The Senate approved the OEO measure by a vote of 63 to 17; in the House there was another fierce debate about the child development title, but the bill finally passed by a margin of about 20 votes.

Coverage was an important issue for Nixon. That the Administration sought compromise made it appear that Nixon might sign the child development bill; from most reports he made up his mind only at the last minute. But I think it was inevitable that the President would veto child development despite the accommodation reached in conference, for he had other reasons to oppose the bill.
CHAPTER FOUR

NIXON VETOES THE BILL: ISSUES OF ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL

The conservative campaign did not go unrewarded, for not only did Nixon reject the child care proposal, he condemned it in words that echoed the right wing attack. One lobbyist called the veto "purely political", meaning that the President would have vetoed any liberal legislation that came along just then out of deference to conservatives. The "political veto" explanation is that Nixon had to placate conservatives after his trip to China earlier that year. Others argue that morally, the President found day care repugnant, that in his heart he agreed with right wing opponents of child development. Thus, after all was said and done in conference, Nixon brought his personal feelings to bear and decided not to sign.

During Nixon's second term as President, it has become obvious that he is prepared to veto any number of bills, and especially that he will refuse to sign social legislation when it does not suit his domestic aims. But in 1971, the pattern of conflict between the President and the Congress over domestic legislation was just beginning to unfold. Apparently supporters of the child care bill did not realize right up to the end that Nixon would veto. Because his rejection came as something of a surprise, observers tended to look for idiosyncratic explanations. But
Nixon's action was perfectly in keeping with the policy of his administration.

Liberals were stung by the right wing tone of the veto message, and felt it was a lot of symbolic rigamarole, evading the "real issues". But Nixon made it quite clear just why he opposed the bill:

"[M]y conviction [is] that the Federal Government's role wherever possible should be one of assisting parents to purchase needed day care services in the private, open market with Federal involvement in direct provision of such services kept to an absolute minimum." He explained that he was opposed to the direct federal-local prime sponsorship mechanism "which has made Head Start so difficult a management problem" and concluded that this scheme would create administrative confusion, duplication, and waste. In all, the proposal was "fiscally irresponsible" and "administratively unworkable". The rhetorical references to the sanctity of the family aside, what Nixon was concerned about was the prime sponsorship mechanism, and the features of local and parent control. The conference accommodation on coverage had been a victory for Republicans, but in many ways the prime sponsorship scheme was more of a problem for the Administration than was the issue of free services.

What was involved was the administration and control of programs. As approved by the conference, the child development bill had the following administrative provis-
ions:

- Any unit of general local government having a population of 5,000 or more and any Indian tribal organization, was eligible to be a prime sponsor, a direct grantee, for a child development program.

- Localities other than states had preference.

- Combinations of localities (not necessarily governmental units) totalling 5,000 in population, and public and private non-profit agencies (including community action agencies, Head Start agencies, community development corporations, labor unions, educational institutions) could also become prime sponsors, if no other governmental unit applied to HEW within a certain period of time, or if the prime sponsor responsible for their jurisdiction was "not satisfactorily implementing" programs.

- At the prime sponsorship level, the Child Development Council would receive grants from HEW to plan, fund and implement child development programs. The Council was composed half of parents of children served under the program, who were elected, and half of appointees. One-third of the total membership had to be "economically disadvantaged" parents.

- The council would contract with local groups to carry out programs, and preference in applications from local groups went to ongoing projects. Each project was supervised by a project policy committee, to be made up one half of parents, one half of other persons approved by the parent members.\[8\]

Several things about the child development "delivery system" are worth noting. First, as the Administration pointed out, there were as many as 7,000 communities, not counting non-governmental sponsors, eligible to be direct grantees under the bill.\[9\] Second, there was little for the states to get out of the bill, for it would have been very difficult for a state to qualify as a prime sponsor for all or even most of the projects within its jurisdic-
tion. Third, the Child Development Council, not local government or traditional service bureaucracies, had control of funds and decision-making authority. Further, government could be bypassed entirely and a non-governmental sponsor approved. Finally, the bill protected existing Head Start and OEO projects. These were the provisions that the Administration opposed most strenuously, and I shall explain why below. From the Administration point of view, the most important, and most objectionable elements of the "delivery system" were the direct federal-local funding, and the degree of control over policy that the Child Development Councils had. Not surprisingly, these were the features that liberals defended most vigorously, for they believed that the very nature of child care was at stake. What was the significance of these provisions for liberals in Congress and for lobbyists for the child development bill?

The liberals felt that child development programs should be administered close to the community with full involvement of parents. They argued that it was necessary to have local control to assure that all local groups would have access to funds for child care programs. They wanted parent participation because child care was an intimate matter that should be dealt with close to the family. But there was more to it than this.

During the House debate, Shirley Chisholm argued that
communities of any size should be eligible to be prime sponsors:

One of the many things that people have been consistently concerned about is the fact that they have absolutely no determination or absolutely no voice over the kinds of programs that will help to make their lives more wholesome...We know that in certain states of the United States of America some groups have not been able to get a fair share of the action from the States.11

The arguments about community self-determination and the reference to groups excluded by local government recall community action. And not coincidentally, for many child development supporters had something very much like that in mind.

In early 1971 Birch Bayh made a speech in which he admitted that child development proposals harked back to community action. He defended the idea behind the poverty program, arguing that it had never been given a proper chance to work. It was the kind of speech that puts fellow Congressmen to sleep. Bayh talked about "alleviating powerlessness" among the poor; he quoted Victor Hugo; and with rhetorical flourish he finished up:

This is my dream -- that our communities shall one day be healthy, be together, be united -- and it is my belief that universal concern for children and families is the best way to begin making that dream a reality.12

At the time, Javits and Mondale also made speeches comparing the strategy of their child care proposals to community action, but later on such references disappeared from
their defenses of child development. In retrospect, it is worthwhile to look again at Bayh's remarks and others like them. A number of people took quite seriously the notion that children's programs could be a focus for organizing communities.

For instance in testimony before Mondale's committee, Maurien McKinley, of the Black Child Development Institute, held that child care could be a strategy to push for community control for blacks and the poor and she appealed for even greater parent representation on the Councils. "Community institutions which control the flow of resources and the provision of services buttress community power," she argued. Such an idea was cause for concern for local and state officials. In New York City, for instance, there were several day care centers with parent-controlled boards, and they fought a constant battle to get money from the city. One observer there pointed out back in 1970 that these groups wanted more than day care:

These community control leaders are interested in a whole community organization effort, and they are really trying to build a power base. They have to have salaries and many of them are looking for them in the Department of Social Services, or any government agency that will provide money...Their salaries will come out of the day care budgets.

It is not clear what liberals in Congress thought about this, for they took care not to talk about it when child development was being debated in Congress. The mayors and governors were ambivalent. Although they were opposed to
strong community control provisions, they wanted some sort of child development bill rather badly. Certainly representatives of the mayors and governors might have made an issue of the dangers of community control in their lobbying effort, but they followed the strategy of other lobbyists, which was to keep quiet and play down controversial features of the legislation.

For the mayors and governors the bill meant money—fiscal relief. The mayors wanted a plan that would fund cities directly, but they did not like the fact that the Child Development Council would not be under city control, nor did they relish having to deal with project committees run by parents. But in the end they reluctantly supported the bill, for they saw that it would at least cover existing projects whose funds were threatened.

The governors got least of all from child development; while they had some success in modifying local control provisions in the House, their efforts were turned about in the conference committee. Arch Moore of West Virginia, who testified before Brademas' committee, was one of several governors who explained the position of the states. Moore wanted federal money for children's services very badly; he argued that state government should be the channel for money because only the states could properly coordinate funds to assure their most efficient use. He compared local control under child development with Head Start, and
argued that the effort that should be directed to providing services, not diverted into "power struggles":

[T]o raise expectations so high -- and then be unable to deliver (i.e. under Head Start) was a cruel act, I think, and the rightful roars of anger which followed this frustration, were I think justified -- even though it was turned to the nearest people who looked like government -- the local officials. 17

Civil rights groups, poverty groups, community activists were adamant about local sponsorship and parent control, for they saw child care legislation as a means to get funds, to provide jobs and to gain a measure of power for poor urban and rural communities. 18 They hoped that community authority could be used not merely to run parent-controlled day care centers, but as a lever to get all kinds of services for communities.

Community activists, mayors, governors, all supported the bill because it meant, first of all, a new source of federal funds in a time of fiscal drought. It meant jobs and services, and not only did officials want control of jobs and services, they wanted to prevent community groups from getting their hands on federal money that might be used to badger local and state government, as had happened under community action and Head Start.

The leading liberal supporters, and Republican opponents, of the local and parent control provisions, were surely well aware of the ways in which the Brademas/Mondale bill resembled the poverty program in administration.
But I doubt that most in Congress thought much about the administrative provisions of the bill, again because it passed as a day care proposal, which seemed harmless enough. When the issue of state versus local control came up in House debate, Carl Perkins and Edith Green took a straightforward pork-barrel position, pointing out how few states had more than one city over 100,000 in population, and suggesting that it would be unfair to deprive slightly lesser cities of the benefits of child care programs. Very likely, many in Congress didn't think much beyond this argument.

The Nixon Administration, however, did not fail to see the significance of the administrative provisions of the child care bill. First of all, as I suggested in the discussion of coverage, Nixon wanted to reduce federal spending for services such as were authorized under the Brade-mas/Mondale bill. Certainly he did not want to create a new categorical program of social services. While the President was willing to spend a certain amount of federal money for day care under H.R.1, he wanted to minimize the public machinery needed to make those services available. The child development bill had as extensive and complicated an administrative structure as could be imagined, and rather than go through existing governmental channels, it went around them at every turn. The bill could not be used to provide day care under H.R.1, and anyway Nixon
wanted no part of legislation modeled on community action.

From the start Richardson sought to change the local and parent control features of the Brademas/Mondale bill. In communications to Brademas and Mondale in June, he proposed that states should be the sole prime sponsors for programs, with the exception that cities over 500,000 could be sponsors if they chose. Further, he recommended that Child Development Councils "work with" officials in developing plans, and that Councils have authority to review plans and applications from local projects, but no veto power over actions of prime sponsor officials. He recommended that the Council be a wholly appointed body with one-fourth of the total made up of parents representative of the population served. 20

This plan would have given governors effective control of child development. The Child Development Council would have been a committee chosen by the governor, and it would have had no separate authority. Richardson said, "It would, of course, have the opportunity to make its comments public." 21 This was a far cry from the direct authority granted under the Brademas/Mondale version. Richardson also proposed that HEW should have a limited role in setting standards for programs and suggested that the revised Federal Day Care Requirements, designed for H.R.1 day care should apply. 22 The Administration wanted to give the states more leeway in contracting with pro-
Richardson tried to find a way to bring child development programs in line with H.R.1. Republicans in the House and Senate sought to amend the child care bill according to his specifications. In the end, it appears that Nixon never wanted child development at all, not even in the version that Richardson proposed. In the spring of 1971, Richardson repeatedly tried to get direction from Nixon on the legislation; Nixon consulted with the Office of Management and Budget, thought about it, hesitated, but never, according to Richardson, said no. And so the Secretary proceeded as if that meant yes. And Congress proceeded as if Richardson's suggestions were a bargaining position.

Most likely, Nixon did not begin to take the child development bill seriously until it had already passed the Senate, when it was too late to begin a lobbying effort to amend the bill along the lines Richardson proposed. But I suspect that the President didn't want any part of child development anyway, and perhaps he was just as happy to have an excuse to veto the whole OEO extension bill.

The Administration argument against the Brademas/Mondale proposal was based on the principles of managerial efficiency. In the veto message, Nixon argued that "a new army of bureaucrats" would be required to monitor the thousands of projects likely to apply under the bill. He stressed the duplication and waste of money and effort in
a federal-local funding plan, and he argued that the way to improve services was to consolidate administration, to minimize the role of the public sector as a provider, and to concentrate assistance by limiting services to the welfare population.

Managerial efficiency and fiscal thrift were the rationale for his opposition, but the President was more concerned about the distribution of resources and the political consequences of distribution. He spoke of the necessity not to bypass the states, and obliquely, he suggested that the difficulty with programs modeled on Head Start was that local groups might use federal funds for purposes that the Administration, and state government, did not approve. During the final debate in the House on the conference report, Quie, who along with Dellenback and Erlenborn, did not sign the report, threatened Congress with the consequences of child development:

To me this conference report is an administrative monstrosity. It is impossible for it to work out properly. All the problems we saw with the inception of the Economic Opportunity Act through OEO are going to be visited on this program and the way it works.

This was considerably stronger language than Quie had used during the House debate in September, and the references to the poverty program had become explicit threats.

Nixon wanted to avoid, at all costs, another poverty program. Unlike the administrations before him, he did
not want to extend federal aid to cities controlled by the Democratic party. As we have seen, his policy of cutting off aid to OEO projects and social services was causing special trouble for mayors, who were so desperate not to lose federal aid that they were willing to forego city government control over child development programs. The mayors had come to depend on these programs; they had no city jobs and services to give to urban blacks, nor could they afford to continue to expand the welfare rolls.

Instead, Nixon sought to channel federal money through revenue sharing and welfare reform to state governments, many of which were controlled by the Republican party and by conservative Democrats in the South. As several writers have pointed out, the Family Assistance Plan's fiscal benefits would have gone to the South, not to Northern cities where welfare benefits were already more generous than H.R.1 benefits.

And very likely, Nixon sought to stimulate private sector preschool and day care. In 1971, business was looking into children's services as a vast new market, and corporations hoped that the Family Assistance Plan could be used to subsidize their efforts. One conference that hopeful businessmen attended in 1970 had a workshop called "Fleecing the Preschool Sheep", a title which aroused a demonstration of angry parents. The liberals were heartily opposed to franchise and corporate day care, on
grounds of moral concern for children. "Kentucky Fried Children" was a disturbing idea even to those who did not as a rule oppose private sector social services.

Ultimately, what is surprising about the child care bill is not that the Administration rejected it, but that it got as far as it did. It was not that child development was "radical", in the sense of promoting a revolution in social and family patterns, as was often claimed. That interpretation came from the idea that child development was a day care proposal, whereas, as I have suggested, it was much more a political strategy to provoke services for children and families. The significance of administrative features of the bill and the extension of coverage to working class families, lay in their potential to provoke political demand for children's services.

On December 9, Nixon sent the OEO extension bill back to Congress. The next day the Senate took a vote to override the veto, and the liberals failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority. Nineteen Republicans who had voted for passage of the conference report, switched over and voted to sustain the veto. Because the bill failed in the Senate, it did not come to a vote in the House, but probably it could not have mustered even a majority there.

There was never much chance that Congress could override the veto once the Nixon Administration made its opposition clear. During the conference, the Administration
began to lobby hard against the bill for the first time. The combination of Administration and right wing lobbying efforts against child care had the effect of dramatizing the significance of the bill, and on the whole the more Congressmen thought about it, the more uncertain they were. Apparently some Republicans in the Senate who voted for final passage did so because they already knew that Nixon would veto. In the end, child development was a Democrat's bill, for the President finally made it clear to his party that he disapproved.

Politically, it was easy for Nixon to reject the child care bill. One of the things that he emphasized in his veto message was that the people had not been consulted, nor was there any apparent popular demand for child care legislation:

[S]uch far-reaching national legislation should not, must not, be enacted in the absence of a great national debate upon its merit, and broad public acceptance of its principles...No one, I believe, would contend that the American people, as a whole, have determined that this is the direction in which they desire their government and nation to go. He meant that there was no evidence of public support, or public opposition, for that matter. The lobbyists had not sought to stir up public support by publicizing the child care bill; their tactic was just the opposite. Despite the coming elections and despite legislators' reluctance to vote against little children, Nixon and the Republicans recognized that they would lose little popular sup-
port in voting against the measure. Not enough voters knew about the bill for it to make a difference. Further, when the time came, lobbyists weren't in a position to generate the flood of letters from constituents that might have made the difference. And it is one thing to be able to arouse support for an established program, in which people have an interest; it is another to demonstrate public demand for a new program. Perhaps it is just for that reason that such legislation as the child care bill does not usually come at the initiative of Congress.

In view of the history, child development was an unusual proposal. Government has supported extra-familial child care only in the exceptional circumstance, as during World War II. Rather, relief has been the policy for the care of dependent children. And the Brademas/Mondale bill was peculiar, too, in view of the usual way that social welfare policies are determined by national government. Ordinarily, we expect that reform legislation will be initiated by the Executive.

In order to explain the passage of the child development bill, I have argued that much of its appeal lay in its capacity to distribute jobs and services. Indirectly, the impetus to create a program of children's services came from the Nixon Administration. Part of Nixon's aim was to cut off public support for service programs that had grown up under the previous Democratic administrations.
Not surprisingly, those who had an interest in these programs resisted Nixon's strategy. Among child care supporters were many who opposed Administration cutbacks, and they found sympathy among liberals in Congress, especially among Democrats. In effect, child development was a way to get back what Nixon sought to take away. I do not mean to suggest that most of the supporters of the child care bill set out with the intention to design a program that would reverse Nixon's strategy, but only that they came up with one which would have served that function.
EPILOGUE

In 1971 Mrs. Richard Nixon was honorary president of the Day Care and Child Development Council of America, one of the organizations which lobbied for the Brademas/Mondale bill. In 1972, she resigned. After Congress sustained the veto of the bill, Nixon made it clear that he did not intend to sign any new child development legislation that Congress might pass, and since then the conflict between child development supporters and the Nixon Administration has sharpened. Since his re-election the President has followed up on his plans to close down the poverty program and limit HEW spending for social services. Richardson and Zigler, who were thought to be soft on children, are no longer at HEW and there are no prominent advocates of children's programs in that department.

In 1972 the Senate passed by a substantial majority a more modest version of the child development bill. Free services were limited to the Family Assistance Plan population and the role of the states was considerably enhanced. The House Education and Labor Committee also reported a bill, but no action was taken in the House on either bill before the adjournment of the 92nd Congress. The Senate bill, which had the support of Republicans, reflected the kinds of compromises necessary to get child care legislation through Congress during the present Ad-
ministration. And though the bill had Republican support, the Nixon Administration lobbied vigorously against it.\(^3\)

Now that Congress has defeated the Family Assistance Plan, I doubt whether Nixon will support any day care legislation.

The experience of the child development bill suggests some issues that are likely to come up again with future day care proposals. Any program of the magnitude of child development will offer substantial federal spoils to be distributed. Those groups who gain control over program funds and administration will also gain power to distribute jobs and services. Thus decisions about child care "delivery systems" will be very important.

I have shown how Congressional liberals sought to bypass the states in order to get money to groups -- urban blacks, the rural poor -- who are neglected by state government. In turn the Nixon Administration and Republican Congressmen wanted to give control over funds to the states, thus effectively bypassing poor communities. Because child development had the potential to become an expensive and permanent government investment, decisions about administration and control were particularly important.

Other accounts of the bill's passage look to pressure from interest groups, such as middle class women or child specialists, to explain why child development day care was appealing to Congress. These explanations have little to say about the political dimensions of the bill's provis-
ions, and for that reason I think they fail to account for why liberal Democrats were the main supporters and the Nixon Administration the main opponent of the child care proposal. This paper puts particular emphasis on the aims of political parties because other writers have ignored that factor. In other words we should expect to find that future child care legislation will serve the purposes not only of interest groups, but of political parties.

The prospects that Congress will soon again approve a child care proposal comparable to the child development bill look dim. So long as Nixon can count on the support of Republican Congressmen, it will probably be impossible to override a Presidential veto, and I think Nixon will veto any new legislation. Further, the debate over child development raised some other questions that will make child care legislation more controversial in the future, whatever party is in office.

After the defeat of the bill a number of observers began to raise doubts about public child care as a policy for children. Wouldn't it be better to pay mothers to stay at home to raise children? Wouldn't children's allowances or some form of guaranteed income to families be preferable? One consequence of the attention focussed on child care in Congress was to remind people that public day care might serve other purposes besides providing services for children. Fears that child development pro-
grams might become vehicles for the political purposes of adults, rather than serve the best interests of children, led some to argue that a guaranteed income policy would be better for children.

Without question, a substantial redistribution of income and wealth would serve the welfare of low income children. But the fate of the Family Assistance Plan suggests that there is powerful resistance to a guaranteed income generous enough for people to live on. If the prospects for child development look poor, the prospects for even a modest guaranteed income look worse. H.R.1 demonstrates the ironies of a compromise income scheme, which includes a work requirement along with an income supplement. Contrary to the intentions of those who advocate a guaranteed income so that women can stay at home to raise children, under H.R.1 welfare mothers would have had to put their children in day care and go out to work.

Implicit in these doubts raised about child development is a notion that authority over child rearing and socialization is a political matter. Thus Sheila Rothman opposes public day care on the grounds that it limits the freedom of the poor to control their own lives and the lives of their children. One of the most important controversies that came out of the debate on child development and one that is likely to cause conflict in the future centered on this issue of authority over child rearing.
Conservatives argued that child development was a plot by government to take away the authority of parents and communities to bring up children as they chose. Representative John Rarick said, "the hand that rocks the cradle rules the nation" and he meant it not as a sentimental tribute to motherhood, but as a statement about power that accrues from control over child rearing. Those on the left also saw the issue as one of control; they argued that child development was a means by which the poor and working class could gain control over the institutions and circumstances in which their children grew up.

The liberals responded to conservative attacks by emphasizing the strong local and parental control provisions of their plan, but these arguments did not appease right wing Congressmen. What concerned conservatives is most accurately described as an issue of status rather than control.

In part, their opposition was designed to maintain a distinction between working and middle class families and the poor. Thus they suggested that one of the rewards of working and middle class status was that government did not interfere in the family or tell parents how to raise their children, and they portrayed child development as a threat to parental authority and to the status implied by that authority. Conservatives objected to the definition of public child care as a benefit that government might
distribute; they sought to depict it as a punishment that should be reserved for the poor. In defending the responsibilities of parenthood and the privacy of the family, they were defending what they regarded as important privileges of working and middle class status.

President Nixon responded directly to this appeal when he refused "to commit the vast moral authority of the National Government to the side of communal approaches to child rearing over against the family-centered approach." In a practical sense communal as opposed to family child rearing had little to do with child development, and I doubt that Nixon thought that it did. The function of his statement was to confirm the values that conservatives were defending.

These issues of values will be persistent, particularly because most people seem to have strong feelings and firm beliefs about the family and about children. While values are ordinarily important in politics, they are especially important where children are concerned, for in some sense people feel their very survival -- the continuity of a family, a community or a race -- is at stake. When Shirley Chisholm said, "The poor and the working class have the same needs and the same problems...Do not pit these people against each other like starving dogs fighting over the same meager scraps", her words were a call to battle for conservatives. They will spare no effort
to prevent a child care program that could unite the inter-
ests of the poor and the working class. In the end, the
issue of who should get free child care will be decided
according to beliefs about family versus government respon-
sibility for children.
INTRODUCTION

1. S.2007, "A bill to provide for the continuation of programs authorized under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and for other purposes" was introduced by Senator Gaylord Nelson.


4. The federal government spends $9 on the elderly for every $1 spent on children. Testimony of Therese Lansburgh, April 27, 1971, United States Senate, White House Conference on Children: Child Development Recommendations, hearings before the Subcommittee on Children and Youth, p. 78.

5. Nixon said in his veto message that the restrictions Congress had placed on his authority over OEO were sufficient by themselves to cause him to reject the bill. *Congressional Record*, December 10, 1971, p. S21129.


7. For example, see Kate Ellis and Rosalind Petchesky, "The Politics of Day Care", mimeo, n.d. and Vicki Breitbart, "Day Care--Who Cares?", mimeo, 1971.

CHAPTER ONE

1. For examples of this view see Huron Institute, Federal Programs for Young Children (Cambridge, Mass., 1972) chapter 2; Massachusetts Early Education Project, Child Care in Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass., 1972) chapter 4.

2. For instance, laws prohibit parents from neglecting or abusing children.

4. For the history of day care before World War II, I have relied on Sheila Rothman, op. cit.


8. For an account of WPA nurseries in New York City, see Frederic Cantlo et al., "Day Care as a Social Utility", paper prepared by students at New York University Graduate School of Social Work, April 1971; included in testimony of Shirley Chisholm, May 17, 1971, United States House of Representatives, Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, hearings before the select Subcommittee on Education, pp. 75-89.


10. Ibid., p. 16.


13. See United States House of Representatives, Absenteeism, hearings before the Committee on Labor, March, 1943, for connection between industry's problems with lateness and absenteeism among women workers and its support of federal day care.

14. This and subsequent material on wartime day care in New York City drawn from New York Times, January 1943 to January 1953.


17. Along with married women about three million teenagers went to work during the war. Officials were concerned about post-war problems with youths laid off jobs. It
appears that in New York State the choice between day care centers for mothers and programs for teenagers to discourage juvenile delinquency, was quite explicit.

18. However the Day Care Council of New York City, a committee representing the agencies that ran day care centers, survived the 1950's and 60's. These voluntary agencies, with a small amount of financial help from the city, ran day care on a modest scale right up until the late 1960's when federal money again became available.


20. Trey, op. cit.


23. For two very different interpretations see Piven and Cloward, op. cit. and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York, 1969).


26. For criticisms of the WIN program, see United States Senate, Work Incentive Program, hearing before the Committee on Finance, June 27, 1972.


28. Piven and Cloward, op. cit., pp. 170-171, suggest that relief administrators were cynical about the value of day care in reducing the welfare rolls. Whether or not conservative Congressmen really believed that day care for welfare mothers would reduce relief costs, they acted as if they believed it.

30. Gilbert Steiner ("Day Care Centers: Hype or Hope?", Transaction, July-August, 1971) points to the reorganization of HEW, in which the Vocational Rehabilitation Service was combined with the Welfare Administration in the new Social and Rehabilitation Service, as a sign that HEW was ready to start employing mothers in 1967. As he also points out, that year HEW was developing the idea of neighborhood family day care, something like a babysitting pool for welfare mothers and the cheapest kind of day care--cheap enough to make welfare reform economically feasible.


32. HEW's stringent standards contributed to high cost; even babysitting was subject to standards. See Regulations of U.S. DHEW concerning child care services, op. cit. In practice, most welfare departments did not worry about licensing except for day care centers.

33. For instance, the Day Care and Child Development Council of America (National Voice for Children, June, 1969) criticized WIN child care.

34. Piven and Cloward, op. cit., p. 170.


36. Robert Fogelson helped clarify my thinking on the reasons why Head Start is popular.


40. The Westinghouse Learning Corporation study (The impact of Head Start, an evaluation of the effect of Head Start on children's cognitive and affective development, prepared for OEO, 1969) was the most influential of these studies. It was cited by Moynihan and others who wanted to cut off funds for the program. See New York Times, March 8, 1970.
41. Particularly proprietary efforts. Further, in 1969 the Taft-Hartley Act was amended so as to make day care a negotiable issue in collective bargaining; since then a number of labor unions have set up day care centers, funded by joint union-management trust funds. See testimony of Jane O'Grady, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, May 21, 1971, in United States House of Representatives, Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, hearings before the select Subcommittee on Education, pp. 193-216; also see testimony of Kenneth Young, AFL-CIO, Evelyn Dubrow, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, and Jane O'Grady, May 25, 1971, in United States Senate, Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty and the Subcommittee on Children and Youth, pp. 433-519.

42. The largest program was Title IV-A day care provided under an authorization for social services to "past and potential" welfare recipients.


44. Ibid.


46. "The Bad News About the Budget", Fortune, op. cit.


53. A case in point was Russell Long, who introduced a proposal to provide income tax deductions for child care for middle class women. His objective was to encourage women to hire welfare mothers as domestic servants, thus the bill provided a larger deduction for in-home child care than for day care center care. When at one point his proposal was temporarily stalled in committee, Long said he thought that "women's lib just hasn't caught on enough on the Hill to expect a majority of the committee to accept the idea that a woman should have the choice to work and to hire someone to do the household duties and claim a deduction for it while she is working." (New York Times, November 6, 1971).

54. Women's groups were not among the original group of lobbyists who drew up the child development bill, although they joined the coalition early in 1971. (Personal communication, Peter Edelman.)

CHAPTER TWO


3. Ibid., p. 4.


7. As Piven and Cloward, _op. cit._, chapter 9, point out.

8. H.R. 13520, United States House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd session.


10. H.R. 17750, United States House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd session.


12. S. 2060, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd session.


15. Warden, _op. cit._

16. Ibid. Paper strength of the coalition was 25 organizations.

17. For list of prominent member organizations see United States Senate, Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, _op. cit._, p. 551.

18. Information on differences within coalition provided by Peter Edelman.


20. H.R.8402, United States House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st session.


25. For instance, a mother with two children could earn up to $3120 before her family's supplement was cut off. She also was eligible for a partial earnings disregard for child care expenses, which meant that she could receive some supplementation (paying part of the cost of child care) until family income reached about $4250. Thus only those families with incomes below the supplementation break-even point were eligible for free day care.

26. S. 2003, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, 1st session.


28. S. 2007, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, 1st session.

29. H.R.10351, United States House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st session.


34. Bella Abzug attacked the revision of the Federal Day Care Requirements in a speech in the House (Congressional Record, July 1, 1971, pp. E6947-57) pointing out that liberalizing standards was one way of making day care cheaper. She there suggested that "one of the real aims of welfare and child care reforms is to enrich the same sort of entrepreneurs that fed off Medi-
care and Medicaid." Relaxed standards made it possible for the private sector to make a profit in day care.

35. Warden, op. cit.

36. Personal communication, Peter Edelman.


38. Ibid., p. S14022.


40. For list of the members of the Emergency Committee for Children see Congressional Record, November 17, 1971, p. E12323.


44. $2 billion for the first year; originally the Senate version authorized $4 billion for the second full year of operation and $7 billion for the third year. The Labor and Public Welfare Committee decided to strike out the provisions for specific funding levels for the second and third year, apparently to make the bill seem less controversial.


48. The only members of the conference committee who were strongly in favor of limiting coverage to the Family Assistance Plan population were the Republicans from the House.

CHAPTER THREE


4. Wilma Heide letter to Richardson, op. cit.


8. Testimony of Mary Rowe, September 23, 1971, United States Senate, Child Care, hearings before the Committee on Finance, p. 250.

9. As Tom Wicker, (New York Review of Books, March 22, 1973) points out, the Nixon Administration was making no concessions to liberals in negotiations over welfare reform; most all the compromises Nixon made on the Family Assistance Plan were concessions to conservatives.

10. Thus the child development bill gave preference for funding to Head Start projects.


17. Ibid., p. 214.


23. "The Real Richard Nixon Stands Up", Fortune, April, 1973 suggests that Nixon was at heart much more sympathetic with conservatives than Moynihan portrays him, and that he was less interested in the "income strategy" than he was in finding a way to reduce welfare costs and costs of services to the welfare population.


25. Personal communication, Peter Edelman.

27. See Moynihan (New Yorker, op. cit., January 20, 1973) who is cynical about the motives of these groups and believes that they were pursuing their own interests at the expense of the poor.

28. Personal communication, Peter Edelman.


30. See especially remarks of Representative Schmitz (Congressional Record, October 18, 1971, p. E10985) and Representative Pelly, (October 28, 1971, p. E11455) who made strong appeals to Nixon to stand by his middle America constituents by vetoing child development. See also material presented by Rarick (October 19, 1971, p. E11049).


32. See statements of Barbara Morris and Evelyn Barnes, submitted to United States Senate, Child Care, hearings before the Committee on Finance, pp. 492-4 and 502-5.

33. The bill contained no stipulations about socioeconomic integration at the project level; it merely created a constituency for day care that crossed the line between the welfare poor and the working class.


36. Thus Richardson would not have had authority to raise fees if welfare reform day care became too costly.


CHAPTER FOUR

1. Richard Warden, April 5, 1973, in a talk at MIT, offered this explanation.

2. See New York Times, December 12, 1971, quoting "a White House source".
3. According to Warden,(see note 1.) Nixon is prepared to veto all social legislation offered him by Congress in order to force Congressional action on special revenue-sharing.


5. According to Warden (see note 1.).


8. Ibid.

9. States would have had the opportunity to fill in the gaps, but probably little more than that.

10. For final text, see Congressional Record, November 29, 1971, pp. H11386-95. I have presented a simplified version.


12. Ibid., February 2, 1971, pp. S676-7. Bayh is speaking here not of the child development bill introduced by Mondale in April (S.1512) but of a similar bill earlier introduced by himself and Mondale.


15. For an example of such a dispute between New York City officials and a group of Puerto Ricans who occupied a settlement house demanding community control of day care and other services, see New York Times, March 8, 1973.

16. Personal communication, Peter Edelman.


21. Ibid., p. 467.

22. Abzug and others criticized these standards as too lenient. See chapter 2, note 34.

23. Private enterprise had a difficult time meeting earlier standards; the relaxed standards would very likely have had the effect of encouraging private sector day care. See chapter 2, note 34.


28. Ibid.


33. The bill went first to the Senate for the vote to override the veto because it originated in the Senate.

34. The vote to override the veto was 51-36. The only Senators who switched their votes were Republicans, but several conservative Democrats who were absent during final passage of the bill, were present and voted to sustain the veto on December 10. See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, January 29, 1972, pp. 214-7.

35. Ibid.


EPILOGUE


2. The vote was 73-12. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972, pp. 914-918.

3. Ibid.


6. Rothman, op. cit., p. 27.


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