

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN COLOMBIA:

CAMILO TORRES

by

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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an inquiry into the processes of social change in Colombia. The paper is divided into four parts.

The first part is devoted to analyzing current ideas held by eminent analysts of the underdeveloped world, in this case Albert Hirschman particularly, that in the case of Colombia, in spite of the obsolescence of the elites in power, and that even in spite of my country's lacking of "certain institutions and capacities such as an adequate bureaucracy, public participation in the governmental process, legitimacy, ability of a political elite to mediate conflicts, and so on," peaceful social change and economic reforms are occurring every day. This hypothesis is viewed in the light of the land problem, one of the most important and pervasive Colombia has, closely following Hirschman's observations about the same problem, and arriving at totally different conclusions from Hirschman, and demonstrating the total lack of occurrence of change.

The second part is devoted to demonstrating how the rest of the components of the Colombian economy reflect the same treatment as the one given to the land problem by the elites. In this chapter I demonstrate that Colombia has become a social, political and economic colony of the U.S.A. This has happened because of the United States interest in protecting its economic and political interests in Colombia, threatened by the menace of popular uprisings because of the failure of the elites, the allies of the U.S.A., to administer the country. The reflections of the U.S. dominance are seen when analyzing the different components of the economic sector of the country.

The third part of the study is a look into the alternative when social, political and economic change becomes a permanent frustration in a country like Colombia: violence. The case of a priest, Camilo Torres, who was killed as a guerrilla in 1966, is taken as a pretext for analyzing the different steps a program of change through violence would have to follow in a country like Colombia.

The fourth part consists of my own ideas in order to implement social change in Colombia by way of using pacific and violent means, based on the experiences of Camilo Torres.

to my parents

If only it had happened somewhere else, in some other country, and we'd just read about it in the papers, one could discuss it quietly, examine the question from all points of view and come to an objective conclusion. We could organize debates with professors and writers and lawyers, and blue-stockings and artists and people. And the ordinary man in the street, as well - it would be very interesting and instructive. But when you are involved yourself, when you suddenly find yourself up against the brutal facts you can't help feeling directly concerned - the shock is too violent for you to stay cool and detached. I'm frankly surprised, I'm very very surprised. I can't get over it.

Berger
Act Three
Rhinoceros
Ionesco

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Introduction.

This work is about Colombia. About the problems for change in Colombia. I can say that I have developed this work, thanks to what I have learned in M.I.T. Some of the crucial problems of change and development in an underdeveloped country will be examined here.

Before starting this work I would like to thank all those wonderful friends, my professors and my classmates, that have encouraged me in my work. I have developed the main ideas of this work through all the time I have spent in M.I.T.

The best thing I found in M.I.T. was the freedom for learning, a wide camp for battles of ideas and the freedom for making mistakes, if they were made while seriously looking for the truth. I am looking for the truth about my country, and I have put a great passion in it, and I still expect this work to have a lot of mistakes.

I examined and re-examined my main concepts about my country, and I have tested them against very valuable data I have found. I have also examined the contemporary studies and theories about development in Colombia; I have made my own hypotheses and I want to open them to debate.

The data I have found in this country has been very valuable; not only have I been able to know through very long study data about the socio-economic and political conditions of my country, but I have also learned a great deal about the socio-economic and political con-

ditions an organized society is able to sustain. I have been able to experience life in this country; I can appreciate the gaps between a country like mine and the U.S.A., and as a planner I have questioned in this study the reasons about - the convenience of the continuance of the explicit policies of imitation of the U.S.A. my country has, as a model of economic development, of social equality and justice; I have made some hypotheses about the future of my country, based on its realities.

I want to state here my position as a planner; the only way I can understand the city planner's role is when he identifies himself, according to his values, with a determined social order he is working for; I cannot accept the picture of a city planner that is treated as an intellectual commodity, super-computer who can be put to work in any socio-political or economic latitude. In developing areas, where he finds himself as one of the very few in the country who has some education for foreseeing the possible future ways the country should take, the planner has a very wide range of functions which in most cases get him into decision-making positions and situations; if the planner then, the non-attached; "technical advisor," is not in the capacity (strongly motivated by his values) of differentiating and choosing among different systems of pushing economic and social and political development, then what to plan for? Let us remember that the question of who, when and how gets the products of society is one of the most important and unavoidable considerations when planning for development.

After saying this, it is now easier for me to explain the different approach I have followed through this study in which I arrive at the conclusion that the objective basis for a redefinition of the problems of Colombia, is a revolution in the social, economic, and political systems and institutions of the country; this because:

1. of the tremendous injustices I find in the actual system;
2. poor people in Colombia have waited literally for more than four hundred years for any change;
3. given the actual conditions of the country, nothing seems to indicate that the will of its actual lords will change towards the needs of the majority of dispossessed people.

And besides these tremendously important factors that weigh so heavily in my study, and to which I am able to arrive under the present development of my study, there exist new developments not considered in this study, that show to us as an example to follow that in countries like Cuba, which in a decade have done more justice for the people than centuries of colonial system, these changes occur after drastic revolutions have evolved.

I hope to keep this study within the ambit of objectivity, but nonetheless, in matters of political economy, and social organization, my choice is socialism, marxism-leninism, and one of my main purposes

will be to work towards building socialism in my country. But my rule as I said, will be to approach the objective reality by all means.

I do not expect to have, after I finish this work, a universal formula for change in underdeveloped countries, neither do I expect this formula to fit for the whole of Latin America. My country has very special and particular problems, and this fact will make us consider special and particular answers for them. There is something, nevertheless, that I think could be used as a general model for other countries, and it is the general framework of thought I used, the general approach for analyzing the problems of my country, through an analysis of the interior components of the social, political, and economic structures and the relations of the components throughout the different structures.

This work is going to be divided into four parts:

- a. I expect to analyze in the first part the approach followed by many scholars and technicians that have analyzed my country, and see in the country a good example of politics at work for the people, and of social change being organized from above, even if the system and the regime show chronic deficiencies and rottenness.

In this first part I will make some analysis about the kinds of change that may occur in my country, pacific or violent, based on the actual

performance of change measures approved by the actual elites of the country. I will advance an hypothesis about my country's status in its international relations and the repercussion of these relations in the structures of my country; this I consider one of the main starting points of my study.

I will also examine in this part, taking it just as an example of one of the elements of the social structure where change is expected to be occurring faster, one of the most pressing internal problems my country has, the land problem. I will examine the different changes in the land problem within the context of pacific evolution, as an example of the so-called change in Colombia.

b. In the second part I will examine the rest of the main components of the Colombian economy in the light of the status hypothesis I state in the first chapter, and I will open the discussion about an approach to social change using elements of violence.

c. The third part will consist of an examination of the work of a brave priest, Camilo Torres, who was killed as a guerrilla in Colombia, in 1966. This may be considered as an analysis of a violent approach to change. This is the opposite approach to change to the one analyzed in Chapter One.

d. In a last part I will give my own approach to change in Colombia, based on my conclusions about the possibilities of pacific social change and on the experiences of those who have tried to implement social change through violent means in Colombia.

Chapter One. Pacific Evolution in Colombia.

My country is one of the underdeveloped countries in Latin America. My country is a violent, hungry and dispossessed one. By this I mean the absolute majority of the people; there is a very small minority that is tremendously overfed, wealthy and by word terribly loving of peace.

We have national plans for economic development and the Alliance for Progress, but in spite of these, the majority of the people have each day less food, less schools, less opportunities for working, less health facilities, less land, less clothing. Each day they become more impatient; their environment is each day more oppressive for them, the years pass by, their children become old, the same is the same, and it is as if a tremendous and terrible electric storm were taking shape, and as if the killings of people we have had especially during the last twenty years, were the first and each day more intensive sparks of this storm.

Until this moment the Gods of this storm have been the stubborn, arrogant, educated, refined, and wealthy upper classes with their huge provision of violence and dogma for pinning down the miserable, ugly, and hungry people. But as we will see throughout this study, there are some indications that their concerted storm of violence and dogma may become too big for their hands, and that their heads that so admirably were used to dominate the populace may in one not-distant day be lost to the same ignorant and stupid populace.

It has been said by many scholars, eminent scholars that have even lived and worked in my country, like Albert Hirschman, that even in underdeveloped countries, with rotten institutions, pacific social change is occurring day by day. Hirschman in his book, Journeys Toward Progress, Studies of Economic Policy Making in Latin America, states, that if we, as political scientists, analyze the problems of a country like Colombia, we would see the effects of good government "as resulting from certain institutions and capacity such as an adequate bureaucracy, public participation in the governmental process, legitimacy, ability of a political elite to mediate conflicts and so on. Hence the political scientist's advice to countries with a defective political process is to acquire these institutions and capacities much as economists advise them to step up capital formation or to generate a group of entrepreneurs."¹

But I assume that Hirschman as a very realistic and pragmatic American scholar understands those words we have in Spanish: "It is impossible to ask for pears from an apple tree." It would be impossible to ask our elites in Latin America, where the differences between wealth and poverty are so accentuated, to become efficient and just lovers of the hunger, etc., etc.; they would have to give

1. Albert Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Studies of Economic Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1965. P. 21.

up with it, too much of comfort, and wealth, and privilege and status; attempts to do so have proven futile. So Hirschman as a pragmatic man who likes things to get done, goes on: "Our inquiry on the other hand, takes the existing political framework with its defects for granted and explores whether and how the weight and urgency of certain economic policy problems can nevertheless lead to constructive action. Our basic working hypothesis must be that, within rather broad limits, the existence of defects in political structure does not constitute an absolute impediment to progress in dealing with economic policy problems; by the same token, it is likely that problem solving will under these conditions follow quite unfamiliar paths whose possible efficiency and hidden rationality we must try to appreciate."²

I do not understand what Hirschman means when he states that "the existence of defects in political structure does not constitute an absolute impediment to progress in dealing with economic policy problems." What is an absolute impediment to progress? Of course, you will always be able to say that the country progresses, you will always be shown new schools, new hospitals, and agrarian reform, and hotels, and beaches, and American cars. Yes, but who gets them? How many children do go to school? How many people have food and jobs every day? Who rides those cars and jets, and who lives in those beautiful houses? Who is able to pay for being served in those

2. Ibid., p. 22.

hospitals? I do not understand when Hirschman goes into assuming that economic policy problems have only relation to economic policy problems. As Professor Howard in his classes at M.I.T. used to say, in society, who gets what, when and how -- that is the real problem; not economic policy making as we are used to hearing, words that are just a custom that covers in societies like mine the real group of oligarchs that are sucking every day the blood of the people.

Economic policy making is a problem of politics. Otherwise, what is politics? What is "the art of good government" in capitalistic societies? In countries as rich as the U.S.A., we still have to think of social class. Why? Because social classes are necessary for the existence of "good government." Because it is necessary that some people have less in order for others to have more. On the other hand, is economic growth social development? If we were agreeing with W. W. Rostow's theories³ that once modern technology is spread in the society, the game is won because the aim of development is the adoption of modern technology, we would not be seeing the riots we are seeing in the U.S.A. Or is it that we do not consider the black people in the U.S.A. as being part of this society? Am I going to be argued that they have not been integrated into society? Isn't it better to state that they have always been integrated into the American society, but only on the side of the ones who have less in order that others may

3. Henry Bienen, Violence and Social Change, A Review of Current Literature, University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 64.

have more? They are the ones that are left with nothing, in order that this country may have rich millionaires.

But let us not interrupt any more. Let us see what Mr. Hirschman did. Professor Hirschman in a way I really admire very much. He built a whole system of ideas for showing how countries with rotten systems actually progressed. He took three specific case studies for fundamenting his studies: the case of inflation in Chile; the case of the northeast of Brazil; and the case of land use and land reform in Colombia -- all three very deep problems in each country.

In the case of Colombia, ours this time, he made a very elaborate analysis of the ways land use and land reform measures have been taking place in Colombia.

I really like very much his study and I will try to follow it throughout the first part of this paper. What I cannot agree with are the conclusions Mr. Hirschman tried to draw:

- a. that the bourgeois class in power in Colombia is a responsive one to the needs of the people, though in a rather lazy manner;
- b. in the specific case he used in his book, the land problem, that real change has occurred in land use patterns in Colombia;
- c. that changes in Colombia, if some, have been of the evolutionary type.

I really cannot agree with any of those things Professor Hirschman has tried to show in his book, nor with the many that defend these points of view, as I consider that land use and land reform problems are of the utmost importance for my country. Half of the population lives in the countryside, and my country depends heavily for its exports and foreign currency earnings on an agricultural product, coffee.

I would like to elaborate on this problem, using Mr. Hirschman's arguments and some other little data I have gathered these years, to show:

- a. how the land use problem is a chronic, dangerous, and lethal one, caused by the greed of the lords;
- b. that in spite of the "Social Agrarian Reform," and the Alliance for Progress, nothing in land use patterns has happened in the countryside;
- c. that the few reforms, in literature, have been hurried responses to the irate hunger of the peasants in revolt;
- d. that the rich people have been teasing the population with promises of reforms for years and years, but that the only things these poor peasants keep are these mountains of promises of reforms over reforms and their hunger, which grows and grows;

- e. that after having lied and lied with more and more promises to the poor people by announcing each time more stridently radical reforms that never happened, there is nothing else to promise; and
- f. that in view of their blindness, and of their negativity to change, and that in view of the growing impatience, and hunger and despair of the poor people, the only alternative is a violent, drastic and fast change of those institutions and people dragging on the lives of the majority of the population.

The analysis of the land problem which we will follow, is the same type of analysis Mr. Hirschman followed, arriving at conclusions I do not agree with. The problem of lands, so important in Colombia, will be for us a specie of mirror, where we will be able to look afterwards, to the rest of pressing problems Colombia has. The ways in which the government reacts to this problem, will be found typical in many other important sectors of the Colombian economy. This will be a most detailed example of the frustrations in the processes of social change in Colombia, understanding by social change, "the process through which alterations occur in the structure and function of a social system."⁴

4. Everett M. Rogers, Elementos de cambio social, Tercer Mundo, ed., Bogota, 1966.

Background to our problem.

Since the beginning of the Spanish colonization in America, land constituted an element that brought with its ownership wealth, political power, and social status. I agree with Hirschman when he says that in Colombia most of the land ownership patterns did not fit into the common idea of feudal patterns; mainly because of:

- a. the formation of many small plot holdings with the liquidation of many indian communities and the formation of many small coffee growing farms;
- b. virgin lands that were held nominally by grants given by the Spanish Crown were invaded many times by settlers and squatters; the important Colombian region of Antioquia was developed in this way;
- c. the existence of Spanish laws, making the rights of ownership on previously public lands, dependent upon their effective economic exploitation.⁵

"...private ownership was made conditional on morada y labor (habitation and work), as early as 1513 by Ferdinand the Catholic, it being of course understood that the work was to be carried out by the

5. Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress, Studies of Economic Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, New York, 1965.
p. 140.

indians under the supervision of the owner or his employees...This requirement was later confirmed in considerable detail at the end of the sixteenth century under Philip II."⁶

"In 1780 the viceroy of Santa Fe (Bogota), gave laws in the same direction."⁷

It is evident the eagerness the "colonos," settlers from Spain, had for the lands of Colombia. Hirschman says that by the end of the sixteenth century the best lands in the valleys and the highlands had been taken up already. In the nineteenth century, parallel to the extinction of the indian communes -- lands that were generally afterwards taken by big landlords, the same as lands confiscated by the state to the Church -- many settlers squatted on lands belonging to grantees of the Spanish Crown, mainly in the important regions which today constitute the states of Antioquia, Caldas, Quindio, and Sucre. Hirschman says: "most frequently however some compromise was reached after prolonged litigation, occasionally punctuated by violence."⁸

6. Hirschman, *Ibid.*, p. 134.

7. Hirschman, *Ibid.*, p. 135.

8. Hirschman, *Ibid.*, p. 137.

We should not believe that the times of the first settlements in my country were peaceful ones. Politics has been used since those times to protect rights of ownership. Virginia M. O'Grady, in the book, Camilo Torres, His Life and His Message, puts it in a very few words: "Independence was won in 1810. From that year until 1903 Colombia suffered ten revolutions and seventy uprisings." The power factor, economic power, was always one of the most important elements in those wars. And we should not forget that the people that lubricated those revolutions and uprisings were the ancestors of the same ones we have as elites of the country now.

From now on we will see how power has been used by the elites in government, under different disguises, in order to keep their entrenchment in politics, in social life, and in the economic sectors of my country. In this case, the land ownership problem, we will see how different gadgets, civil wars, laws, counterlaws, time, promises, fictitious agrarian reform, follow one after the other in an interminable succession during the present century, in order to perpetuate the power of the elites.

The Twentieth Century.

Let us go on then, with the account of how the elites in government have completely disregarded the misery of the peasants and workers during this century, and how they have reacted to the needs of the people.

In 1928, there was a strike at the United Fruit Company, because of the miserable working conditions and economic extortions of the company to the workers. The government, faithful to the United Fruit Company, sent the soldiers to force the peasants to work, and as they refused, to assassinate the miserable workers. Hirschman doubts the number of people killed on that occasion; he agrees with the number of one hundred killed given by Robert J. Alexander in his book, Communism in Latin America,⁹ because he says that that number is like the one which appeared in the newspapers. But we cannot forget that the government was trying to hide the real numbers of the massacre and that the newspapers in Colombia belong to the minorities in government. V. L. Fluharty, in Dance of the Millions,¹⁰ gives as the number fourteen hundred people killed and seven thousand wounded in that assassination made by the government of Colombia. We cannot forget either that the Army of my country was ordered at that time to do agricultural work for the United Fruit Company to replace the workers.

And what was happening in the countryside in the thirties? The big depression was going on, and we do know very well how depressions hit on underdeveloped countries and we do know very well who is hit the hardest in those countries: the workers and the peasants. The landless peasants were being beaten and chased like rats, by the police,

9. Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New York, 1957, p. 245.

10. V. L. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957, p. 37.

the army, and the economic phenomenon they could not understand.

They started getting inside lands with absentee landlords and started seizing them. For these miserable men, it was a question of deciding between the "rights" of the fat landlords in the capital, or their lives. And as those peasants working in the lands with permission of the landlords were not permitted to have their own crops, but had to give their work for miserable salaries to the lords, they fought back the lords. And the government saw the danger inside these class conflicts and became aware, because this was dangerous for the interests of the lords in government.

We have then, the Minister of Industry, Francisco Jose Chaux, saying to the lords: "This torment of Tantalus which consists in always harvesting the coffee of someone else without ever being able to look forward to having one's own trees is bound gradually to affect the psychology of the peasants. Generation after generation, the possibility of improving their own and their children's economic and social position through profitable seedling plantings has been before their eyes but has been foreclosed by a prohibition which their conscience is unable to understand and which makes their life and that of their families insecure."¹¹ But the landlords, with private armies, killed the peasants, and appropriated their crops, and burnt their houses; the peasants always fought their way back to the land.

And then, what did the government do?

11. Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress, Studies of Economic Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, New York, 1965, p. 143.

This is the first step of those which Hirschman calls pacific and evolutionary ones that the government of Colombia has taken to duck the storms: it passed through Congress a radical law apparently favoring the peasants in land disputes: the Law 200 of 1936.

As we saw in the introduction of the problem by Hirschman, great quantities of this land held by the absentee lords could not be defended as their property as it was taken by them from public property lands and appropriated to themselves. The government, remembering the old Spanish law, in this new law said that farms had to be given an economic use in order to be held a private property. And that the government could expropriate lands for public benefit. The government then tried to make it difficult for landlords to evict squatters, and in some instances bought land from the lords and gave it to the peasants, and it said that private lands held uncultivated for ten years would be expropriated. (Afterwards they extended this period to fifteen years and finally they forgot about the whole thing.)

This is how the government ducked the storm in 1936. But, we ask ourselves, how did the Congress, part of that traditionalist Colombian government, pass this radical law? Evolutionary pacific change? Hirschman himself says: "As the landowning interests were always generously represented in Congress, it may be surprising that the law... Two elements conspired to force action. One was the anarchic situation in the countryside and the fear of the owners that they

would entirely lose control over their properties."¹² He cites as the other factor the abilities of the president. No doubt of that.

And how did the "landowning interests" always generously represented in Congress duck the storm in 1936? Hirschman answers: "It is this unforeseen effect of the law which has been described everywhere in the subsequent literature on the subject: how the landowners expelled tenants, burned their houses, replaced labor intensive crops by cattle-grazing, hired only unmarried laborers for short periods and housed them communally instead of giving them individual plots, and so on...Thus the law had resourcefully attacked the problem of unutilized land at the cost of making that of the underutilized hacienda more untractable: the best lands of the country remained firmly devoted to extensive cattle-grazing...in the Valle del Cauca, one of Colombia's most fertile provinces, it used to be said that only three lines of business promise success: (1) well-administered cattle ranching, (2) poorly-administered cattle ranching, and (3) cattle ranching without administration."¹³

Moreover, as soon as the worst of the storm seemed to be passing away, the landlords in 1944 passed a law, Law 100, which reinvindicaded their rights, because certainly Law 200 of 1936 was an escape-law, a duck-law, and now the time had come to turn around. Let us have

12. Ibid., p. 148.

13. Ibid., pp. 155 and 157.

Hirschman: "An important concession was made to a long-disputed claim of the landowners: the tenant was told that, in the absence of explicit permission, he had no right to grow tree crops or other perennials on his plot but only annual plants; if he grew such forbidden fruit he made himself subject to immediate eviction."¹⁴

Here in this law was also included the article giving the landlords five years more of time, lengthening their ten-year term established in 1936 for cultivating their land once. As Hirschman very politely puts it: "These were signals that times and power relationships had changed."¹⁵

Then it came 1948: the year in which Bogota was burned down on April 9, two thousand dead and riots, when a populist leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, was assassinated. Once more the lords were in action; this was the year in which what is called "The Violence" started. Frantz Fanon, in 'The Wretched of the Earth,' has written of a parallel kind of conflict in colonial countries, where the people from the colonist countries are the formal rulers; before the natives have a clear conscience of what is happening to them, and before they can recognize clearly the oppressor, as hunger and misery become so acute, and as their despair grows and each day is more terrible, they start killing among themselves. In Colombia, as the peasants had not

14. Ibid., p. 158.

15. Ibid., p. 158.

recognized their oppressors, and as they followed their oppressors' commands, commands that were always given legitimacy by order of the law, or the church, or the army, or the president, or the landlords, and as the landlords of the country started fighting (orally) among themselves for the spoils of the country, the peasants following the landlords' commands started killing among themselves. Two hundred thousand people were killed reckoning from 1948 till the beginning of the sixties.¹⁶

They are still in power and have not paid for this crime. For the people who read this paper, as for myself, the idea of having to go on living in a "country" with these conditions must be repugnant; to go on keeping our cold blood, and our objectivity, and our scholarism, as a means to not engage ourselves in a fight for these miserable peasants.

Let us go now to the subsequent period of the land history of Colombia, from 1948 to 1960. As we saw before, with the peasants being engaged in this civil war, and the landlords expelling them from their farms, the country's huge bureaucracy wouldn't be able to survive for a long time. As the country's process of inflation was an accelerated one, and huge amounts of the food for the country had to be imported because the lands were kept idle, the regime looked for foreign advisors this time, in order to find the ways of ducking the storm once more.

16. See: Guzman, et al., La Violencia en Colombia, Tercer Mundo, ed., Bogota, 1964, two volumes.

And now that I am talking about inflation, one of the biggest ferments of the Colombian economy, I want to transcribe here Mr. Hirschman's findings, about the ways economists of Latin America look at this problem with a very different approach than the one the International Monetary Fund has imposed in Latin America for many years, attempting to end inflationary processes in our countries through fiscal discipline, bank credit restrictions, and salary freezings. The Latin American economists, independent ones, see this problem as resulting from the very basic economic relations of our societies: the land problem being the main one. Their theory, called structuralist, is revised by Mr. Hirschman in his findings about Chile:

The structural factors are essentially conceived to be the following:

- a. the low productivity of agriculture and its lack of response to economic incentives due to the latifundio pattern of ownership; as a result, industrialization and urbanization tend to lead to rising food prices;
- b. the tendency to a deterioration in the terms of trade which derives from the fact that demand for imports (of equipment, semi-manufactures and food) increases faster in a country like Chile (N.B., or Colombia) as development proceeds than does foreign demand for its exports; this results in a tendency for the price for imported goods to rise, usually as a result of devaluation;
- c. sometimes, the uneven distribution of income is designated as a further structural factor. It is argued that, instead of higher savings and investment, this distribution leads to continuous pressures against the two critical shortage areas: food consumption on the part of the bulk of the population and foreign exchange demands on the part of Latin America's rich with their weak stay-or-reinvest-at-home propensities.

These structural factors exert upward pressures on the prices of specific but important groups of commodities. The pressures are then validated by the extension of bank credit and permitted to affect the general price level, and they are further amplified and perpetuated by wage and salary adjustments and consequent fiscal deficits. The later elements of the process make up the "propagating" factors, one might say the superficial as opposed to the fundamental underlying structural ones.

Attempts to hold down the expansion of the money supply through bank credit restrictions, fiscal discipline, or wage and salary stops, are in this view directed "merely" at the symptoms of the disease, not at its real cause. They may do more harm than good because, with the structural factors continuing to exert their influence on the price level, a decision not to validate these pressures can lead to a decline in growth, output, employment -- and to serious trouble in the streets.

...It should be noted that the structuralist critique of the traditional "monetary discipline" is quite different from the one that views inflation as the consequence of the struggle of different social groups for ever longer slices of the social product. Those who hold this "sociological" view concede that inflation would stop if the increase in monetary supply and income could be restrained; but they point out to the innocent foreign adviser that this is a taller order than he realizes, that inflation results not merely from irresponsible profligacy, from some isolated failure of will power, but represents the difficult-to-change outcome of group attitudes and conflicts. The structuralist on the other hand affirms that, to eliminate inflation, not only attitudes, but basic economic relationships must be altered.

And at that time in Colombia the regime, in economic trouble, sought the help of foreign advisors. In 1949 the "World Bank Mission" headed by Lauchlin Currie concluded that "the way in which agricultural activities were carried on in Colombia were both absurd and

17. Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress, Studies of Economic Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, New York, 1965, p. 283, etc.

unjust: ...land use follows an unusual pattern. As a rule the fertile level valleys are used mostly for grazing, while the steep mountainside slopes are cultivated...the cattle fatten on the plains while the people often have to struggle for a bare existence in the hills."¹⁸

And then, these foreign advisors proposed a series of tax reforms that would oblige the big landowners to cultivate their land or to sell it. But once more, it was proved to be a utopia, to try to have the government implementing hard measures against the landlords; the reason now was the absence of sound cadastral surveys of the country which could be used as a base for tax accounts.

In 1951, two U.N. experts tried to help and found the same problem: the difficulties with the cadastral surveys. Hirschman says:

...the task of making such a survey and of estimating the fair market value of every farm is a most difficult one for an underdeveloped country where land is privately owned. It presupposes a large corps of well-trained surveyors who are incorruptible and courageous and a legislature that is willing to make adequate appropriations for this work. Moreover, it requires either an absence of inflation or frequent revisions through re-surveys or escalator devices. Rapid economic development and urbanization also affect land values profoundly and differentially. Thus, in Colombia, a country with powerful landowners (including not only the hacendados but the numerous and politically influential owners of middle-sized and small coffee farms), weak local administration, considerable inflation and rapid economic development, the establishment of realistic land values for the whole country through cadastral surveys has long been unattainable.

18. Ibid., p. 161.

This is a most serious conclusion for it appears to rule out the use of taxation as a means of coaxing landowners into making full use of their land and therewith the gradual, peaceful solution of the problem of under-utilized latifundios.¹⁹

Here we see now Mr. Hirschman's chips going a little down in front of the problems he was observing, and in spite of his general frame of thought.

1953: Colombia under a military dictatorship. The Minister of Finance, Carlos Villaveces, gave two decrees; one of them was Article 20 of Decree 2317 of 1953, ordering the automatic upward valuation of all assessments in accordance with the rise in the cost of living from the date of the last assessment. The other one, in 1954, provided "that the values of landed properties were to be set from now on by declarations of the owners themselves to municipal cadastral committees. The decree contained the threat that the value declared by the owner would be the basis for payment by the state should the property at any time come to be expropriated."²⁰

And, customarily, nothing happened.

Let us see Hirschman:

The idea of enforcing honesty through the threat of expropriation at the self-assessed value is ancient. But like the threat of future expropriation of Law 200, it did not work, in both cases because of what our atomic strategists call the lack of credibility of the threat. When, as had long been the rule in Colombia, the state

19. Ibid., p. 167.

20. Ibid., p. 169.

has to pay cash for expropriated property, its ability to acquire large tracts of land, even at bargain prices is strictly limited and it is naive to suppose that the landowners do not know this. Moreover, the individual landowner is likely to rate as low the probability that the government will single him out -- and, anyway, he has a good, well-connected lawyer friend in Bogota -- so why worry? 21

Then another foreign mission, in 1956, by the International Bank, and the overthrowing of the military dictatorship in 1957, being replaced by a military junta for a year. Now we have Decree 290 of 1957. A complicated one, using land taxation as an instrument for agrarian reform.

Now Hirschman says:

The heart of the decree was the requirement that certain minimum percentages of these lands were to be cultivated... Application of Decree 290 thus required first a classification of farmlands and farms into the four land categories and, secondly, a yearly inspection to ascertain whether the various percentage requirements were satisfied. The measure was obviously and utterly unworkable, far more so than the Currie proposal which had been extensively criticized for its lack of attention to the "ambiente." Clearly the occasional passing of unworkable laws is very much part and parcel of the ambiente and perhaps the foreign expert only shows he is becoming assimilated when he takes part in the game. 22

A more important reason for the lack of decisive and consistent action was that everything depended in the end on the quality of the cadastral survey or of some other method of classifying and surveying land and land values. It is perhaps the feeling that a realistic survey is beyond hope that accounts for the byzantine discussions

21. Ibid., p. 169.

22. Ibid., p. 174.

about various schemes, all of which are worthless without good survey work. A typical vicious circle is faced here: land taxation is ineffective without realistic land values, yet the administrative effort needed to make a reliable survey will hardly be forthcoming unless the prospective yield of land taxation makes such an effort worthwhile for the national authorities...23

...inadequate production and unnecessary agricultural imports came to be gradually superceded as a principal cause for concern by the continued low income, depressed social status and unrest of the large mass of Colombia's campesino population...24

...The Colombian experience is by no means unique. Whatever redistributive effects progressive income taxation has had in the advanced industrial countries has been a by-product rather than the primary motive. The latter was supplied by some compelling need to increase revenue, usually during wartime. External war, or the threat of war, is thus frequently the condition for achieving a peaceful redistribution of income within the country. Without such an external threat and the consequent imperious need to increase total expenditures, redistribution is far more likely to take place directly, i.e., through the have-nots seizing the belongings of the haves, than indirectly through taxation of the rich. 25

Besides this expensive wasting of precious time for the country spent in passing all those laws for laughing and ducking at the unrest of the poor people, the elites in government intended three times during these years, to try to calm the hunger of the people with token colonization projects that as usual imposed serious sacrifices on the miserable, but none on the rich. Let us see what Hirschman says:

A few colonies were established in the late twenties and in the thirties with financing provided on an ad hoc basis by the national budget and official credit institutions.

23. Ibid., p. 183.

24. Ibid., p. 178.

25. Ibid., p. 187.

But the first ambitious effort in this field was undertaken in May 1948 only four weeks after the Bogota riots, with the establishment of an Institute of Colonization, Parcelization and Forest Defense. This action was one among several almost reflex-like reactions to that sudden and awesome explosion of mass violence. However, the outbreak was so extraordinary that it was soon dismissed as an inexplicable accident; this is perhaps the reason why it failed to lead to a continuing active search for ways of relieving social tensions in the country...

... The Institute of Colonization, once established with the usual fanfare, was left to lead a rather wretched existence, lacking both adequate financing and personnel. Its principal activity was not in colonization, but rather in "parcelization," i.e., in the subdividing of privately held lands that were already under some sort of cultivation or use...26

In 1953, under the military dictatorship, in order to appease the hunger, a new "Institute of Colonization and Immigration" was created.

Under inexperienced management, with hardly any prior study, the Institute plunged into several colonization ventures, built airstrips, bought machinery to set up sawmills, brought volunteer settlers to work poor soils in inhospitable climates and...met with total disaster. 27

In 1959, under the first government of the actual National Front, another colonization program under the management of the Caja Agraria, was created.

The law was entitled "Parcelization Law," probably because of the bad name the Rojas Pinilla regime had managed to give to programs of colonization; the latter were clearly included among the activities to be engaged in. As under Rojas Pinilla, one of the principal purposes of the Caja's

26. Ibid., p. 188.

27. Ibid., p. 189.

colonization efforts was to resettle peasant families that had been displaced by countryside violence and guerrilla warfare and were living wretchedly as refugees in provincial towns. Several colonization centers were established in widely separated and outlying locations; and the limitations and unanticipated difficulties of this kind of effort soon became apparent once again. The Caja avoided the reckless expenditures which had characterized the Rojas Pinilla ventures, but as a banking institution it committed the opposite mistake; it aspired to set up the colonies as a fully reimbursable basis, by apportioning its basic investments in roads and services among the individual settlers. This policy led to difficulties with existing and potential settlers and the new colonization effort soon bogged down; the total number of families that was settled from 1959 on did not exceed 1,000 when in 1962 the Caja decided to abandon its colonization activities... 28

And that is all for this period. The landlords and the oligarchs had succeeded once more in temporarily ducking the storms.

And then 1958, the year when the National Front was organized -- a division of the country between the two traditional parties' leaders, that, since 1948, had been directing the killings among peasants. And then in 1959, the takeover of Castro in Cuba and the fast agrarian and urban reforms there. That factor, plus the hunger of the peasants of Colombia, the fact that the elites in Colombia had proposed almost every reform on earth without accomplishing it, and the hurried Alliance for Progress in 1961 in front of the coming danger of more revolutions, all led the elites in power to decree in 1961, in December, the law of "Social Agrarian Reform" in Colombia.

28. Ibid., p. 190.

This was recognized by Mr. Hirschman, with good faith, but with very few precautions in front of the precedent periods of irresponsible ducking of the reforms by the oligarchs, as a very advanced step of change, pacific change by evolution. But wouldn't I be justified in calling it better, "hurried proposals for change in front of a real revolution"?


We cannot believe that the leaders had changed their minds, from one day to the other, and that now change was being implemented in Colombia, from above, from the enlightened leaders.

My point goes further. I want to demonstrate that the "Social Agrarian Reform" is another farce, and that it is being used as a facade for the minorities in power to escape the rage of the people once more. I will demonstrate that the problem of land tenure is many times worse now than when the Alliance for Progress and the Social Agrarian Reform started.

Hirschman says:

...it had become increasingly clear that the conversion of some grazing lands to mechanized crop production, which was one of the principal objectives and likely results of the various tax schemes, would do little to improve the lot of the mass of Colombia's rural population. As we have noted, this conversion had been proceeding apace in some areas during the late fifties; yet the levels of living in the traditional mountainous areas of settlement had rather deteriorated because of the natural increase in population and the consequent further splitting up of already uneconomically small holdings, because of the drop in

MAPA GENERAL



Populated Regions

- A. Caribbean
- B. Andean

No Populated Regions

- E. Orinoquia
- C. Pacific
- D. Amazonian




Figure 3. Physical features of Colombia.

world coffee prices, and because of the long-continued and widespread insecurity and violence. 29

Although I do not care too much anymore about the causes for the passing of the Social Agrarian Reform, I would like to bring Hirschman's reasonings in here:

1. Social unrest in the countryside resulting from living conditions acutely felt as intolerable is continuously signalled by spontaneous internal migrations of landless peasants, by frequent seizures of land by squatters, and by the ease with which guerrilla bands find recruits.
2. Economic policy-makers facing inflationary pressures and balance-of-payments deficits cannot help noticing that low agricultural production and productivity share in the blame for both these recurrent difficulties. 30

Let us see how the problem has developed since 1961. At this point we will get for a moment into some statistics that will substantiate more our discussion.

Colombian Natural Resources. Land.

Colombian geography is very important for understanding the actual population distribution and land cultivated areas.

In the included maps we can observe where the people live and which are the unexploited regions of the country. The size of the country is 440,000 square miles.

29. Ibid., p. 192.

30. Ibid., p. 209.

The mountain chains, the rivers' directions, and the altitude above the sea level have determined certain regions of Colombia to hold the actual population, and others which are by now just jungle.

Colombia may be divided into five natural regions:

- (1.) The Caribbean region of flat land, and cattle raising, and
- (2.) the Andean region of high mountains and valleys of cereal production are the most populated regions.

The Caribbean region has 17 percent of the national population and the Andean 80 percent. All the rivers of these regions go to the Atlantic Ocean.

The other three regions are:

- (1.) The Pacific region: practically jungle with certain scattered mine exploitations and one of the highest rain precipitation levels in the world; the rivers of this region go to the Pacific. It has two percent of the population.
- (2.) The Amazonian region with all the rivers going to the Amazonas, and the lands are jungles where only 75,000 "civilized" men inhabit. I do not have data about the indigenous population in any of the regions of the country.

(3.) The Orinoquia region of flat lands, which rivers go to the Orinoco and have floods every year, it has one percent of the population (200,000 people).

Population and Climate.

Colombian climate varies according with the sea level, which makes the kinds of cultivates vary according with these changes in temperature and altitude. We can divide the Colombian climate variations into four categories which can be appreciated in the geographic map included before:

(1.) Hot climate: from ± 0 to 3,000 feet of altitude and with an average temperature of 75 F. In this climate lives 40 percent of the population and represents 80 percent of the land.

(2.) Warm climate: from 3,000 to 6,000 feet with an average temperature of 62.6 F. It has 9 percent of the land and 37 percent of the population.

(3.) Cold climate: from 6,000 to 9,000 feet and a temperature average of 53.6 F. It has 9 percent of the area and 22.5 percent of the population.

(4.) Freezing climate: from 9,000 to near 19,000 feet and with temperatures under 53 F. In its lowest level lives 0.5 of the population and it includes 2 percent of the land.

Land Use.

In Colombia, under the present circumstances of technological development, land use is determined by the actual state of the soils. In the populated regions, Andean and Caribbean, studies indicate that more than 50 percent of the land is good for agriculture now. (CIDA, p. 18) But in a recent land use census in 1960, only 16 percent of the potential land was under cultivates, the rest was with cattle (CIDA, p. 17); 84% of the potential productive land was for grazing. This data is without considering the non-populated regions, Orinoquia, Amazonas, and Pacific, that the country for geography, climate, and deficiencies in capital investment is not able to exploit under the present circumstances. In total, the country is exploiting now in cultivates, 4.5 of the national territory.

People in Agriculture.

The high proportion of people who live from agriculture are indicated in the next table from 1960:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Pop.</u> <u>000's</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Agricultural Population</u>			
			<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Active</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Caribbean	11,949	83.5	6,400	82	2150	81.1
Andean	<u>2,365</u>	<u>16.5</u>	<u>1,400</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>18.9</u>
	14,314	100.	7,900	100.	2,650	100.

Source: CIDA, p. 28.

We can see in this table that half of the population of Colombia works in agriculture. With respect to the population in the countryside, we have to notice that the active population with respect to the total of the campesino population is rather high by Colombian standards, because Ramiro Cardona in Marginados Urbanos³¹ states that a Colombian worker must sustain himself and three people more, while in an industrialized country, a worker must sustain himself and less than another person more. But with the low productivity of the Colombian agriculture, these higher standards of occupation of agriculture, let us say when compared with industry, only represent the high underemployment rates in this activity.

The 7,900,000 people in the countryside form 1,370,000 families.

Land Ownership.

Land ownership embodies one of the most tremendous sicknesses of my country. I have done for the present work a rather complete study of land ownership in my country, with the help of Professor Rodwin of MIT. The main resource of data has been a study of the CIDA,³² from 1966, and now I will try to resume here the main problems I found.

31. Ramiro Cardona, Marginados Urbanos, Tercer Mundo, Suplemento 50, Diciembre 68, Bogota, p. 3.

32. CIDA: Interamerican Committee for Agricultural Development, Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 1966.

Land Use Classifications.

First of all, CIDA people making the work realized that the Caribbean region has lower productivity than the Andean per unit of land; they have classified the lands giving different extensions for both regions in order to equiparate the differences in production, because the landlords in the Caribbean do not care about irrigation and have lower production. It does not imply that the Andean landlords care more, but that they probably have more rains; in fact, pluviometric studies indicate that 68 percent of the Caribbean and 90 percent of the Andean regions receive enough rain.³³ I do not agree with this arbitrary classification, but I will use it for the present study, in absence of better data; the next is the land classification we will use in the study:

<u>Farm Classes</u>	<u>Andean Region</u>	<u>Caribbean Region</u>
1. Subfamiliar	less than 5 hectares	less than 10 hectares
2. Familiar	from 5 to 50 hectares	from 10 to 100 hectares
3. Multifamiliar-medium	from 50 to 200	from 100 to 500
4. Multifamiliar-big	over 200	over 500

Source: CIDA, p. 5.

The land ownership problem is very difficult to understand, because if we look at the censuses of land in Colombia, over 1,370,000 agricultural families in the Andean and Caribbean regions, (97 percent of

33. CIDA, p. 15.

the total agricultural population of the country) "only" 175,000 agricultural families did not have land. But other things happen; let us see this table of agricultural families according to land extension that follows.

In this first table, we can identify how many agricultural families hold the land, by size of the plots, in the two main regions; but in order to analyze the problem a little, if we look at the next table, Table B, we will find something which in the first table was not indicated -- the effective land ownership of land occupied -- and we need

Table A

COLOMBIA: DISTRIBUCION DE LAS FAMILIAS AGRICOLAS EN LA ESCALA
DE TENENCIA POR REGIONES, 1960

Escala de Tenencia	<u>Región Andina</u>		<u>Región Caribe</u>		<u>Total Colombia</u>	
	Miles	Por- ciento	Miles	Por- ciento	Miles	Por- ciento
<u>Productores:</u>						
Multi-familiares grandes	12	1,1	2	0,8	15	1,1
Multi-familiares medianos	41	3,8	12	4,5	54	4,0
Familiares	317	28,9	44	16,0	361	26,3
Sub-familiares	644	58,9	121	44,1	765	55,8
<u>Administradores y trabajadores sin tierra</u>	80	7,3	95	34,6	175	12,8
<u>T O T A L</u>	<u>1.095</u>	<u>100,0</u>	<u>274</u>	<u>100,0</u>	<u>1.370</u>	<u>100,0</u>

Fuente: CIDA basado parcialmente en DANE (1962; 1964).

Nota: Los parciales no suman a los totales por razones de redondeo.

Table B

COLOMBIA: DISTRIBUCION DE LA POBLACION AGRICOLA EN LA ESCALA DE TENENCIA

Escala de Tenencia	Familias Nucleares		Población Agrícola			
	Miles	Por- ciento	A c t i v a		T o t a l	
			Miles	Por- ciento	Miles	Por- ciento
Multifamiliar Grande						
Propietarios	11,1	0,8	22,2	0,8	65,9	0,8
Arrendatarios <u>a/</u>	0,9	0,1	1,7	0,1	5,0	0,1
Ocupantes	1,7	0,1	3,4	0,1	10,2	0,1
Otros	1,0	0,1	2,1	0,1	6,3	0,1
<u>Sub-Total</u>	14,7	1,1	29,4	1,1	87,4	1,1
Multifamiliar Mediana						
Propietarios	39,1	2,9	78,2	3,0	231,5	3,0
Arrendatarios <u>a/</u>	4,1	0,3	8,2	0,3	24,5	0,3
Ocupantes	6,5	0,5	13,0	0,5	38,6	0,5
Otros	3,9	0,3	7,8	0,3	23,3	0,3
<u>Sub-Total</u>	53,6	4,0	107,2	4,1	317,9	4,1
Familiares						
Propietarios	244,7	17,9	489,4	18,5	1.456,2	18,7
Arrendatarios <u>a/</u>	56,6	4,1	113,2	4,3	338,3	4,3
Ocupantes	17,5	1,3	35,0	1,3	103,3	1,3
Otros	41,7	3,0	83,4	3,1	248,8	3,2
<u>Sub-Total</u>	360,5	26,3	721,0	27,2	2.146,6	27,5
Sub-Familiares						
Propietarios	454,1	33,2	908,2	34,3	2.703,4	34,7
Arrendatarios <u>a/</u>	214,0	15,6	428,0	16,1	1.271,0	16,3
Ocupantes	17,9	1,3	35,8	1,3	104,3	1,3
Otros	79,0	5,8	158,0	6,0	469,8	6,0
<u>Sub-Total</u>	765,0	55,9	1.530,0	57,7	4.548,5	58,3
"Administradores" de Fincas						
<u>Multifamiliares</u>	20,8	1,5	31,2	1,2	83,2	1,1
<u>Familiares y Sub-Familiares</u>		2,6	53,7	2,0	143,2	1,8
<u>Trabajadores sin Tierra</u>	118,4	8,6	177,5	6,7	473,6	6,1
<u>T O T A L</u>	<u>1.368,8</u>	<u>100,0</u>	<u>2.650,0</u>	<u>100,0</u>	<u>7.800,4</u>	<u>100,0</u>

Fuente: CIDA, basado en los resultados del Censo Agropecuario de 1960. Véase metodología en el Apéndice Metodológico L-1.1.

a/ Incluye a los arrendatarios (pago fijo en efectivo o especie), a los aparceros, y a otros arreglos de arriendo. Estas categorías son detalladas en el Cuadro II-22.

it, to know how the real conditions of ownership are. This table is interesting although it is expressed in terms of a differential farm extension appreciation. Now, with this table of agricultural population distribution, accordingly with land extension of the farms and ownership rates, we can analyze case by case:

Case A: Multifamiliar Big Farms.

Accordingly with Table B numbers and Table A percentages of farm by region, ±12,500 of these 14,700 farms are of more than 200 hectares and they are in the Andean region; and ±2,700 farms are bigger than 500 hectares and they are in the Caribbean region.

These 14,700 farms, represent 1.1 percent of the number of farms and they are worked by 11,000 landlords and 3,600 with rented land. The extension of land these farms represent will be given afterwards.

Case B: Multifamiliar Medium.

Of the 53,600 farms in this category, 41,000 have between 50 and 200 hectares, and are in the Andean Region; and there are 12,600 farms, between 100 and 500 hectares and they are located in the Caribbean region.

The 53,600 farms represent 4 percent of the number of farms and they are worked by 39,100 landlords and 14,500 families without the land.

Case C: Familiar Farms.

Of the 360,500 farms, 317,000 are between 5 and 50 hectares, they are in the Andean region; and 43,500 between 10 and 100 hectares, and they are in the Caribbean region.

The 360,500 farms represent 26.3 percent of the number of farms and they are worked by 244,000 peasant owners and 158,800 families without any land.

Case D: Subfamiliar Farms.

Of the 765,000 farms, 644,000 were less than 5 hectares in the Andean region, and 121,000 farms less than 10 hectares in the Caribbean region.

These 765,000 farms represent 55.9 percent of the number of farms and they are worked by 454,000 peasant owners and 310,000 families without any land.

Land Dispossessed People.

It is now not very difficult for us, to know how many families out of the 1,368,000 agricultural ones, do not possess the land they work or, if they possess it, it is so little that they have a starving life: I will take them from this CIDA study; the estimative data they hold, do not include rich entrepreneurs with rented land, as dispossessed people:

765,000	Subfamiliar, families operating with too little land
118,000	Working families without land
133,000	Arrendatarios, ocupantes and others, in multifamiliar big and medium, and familiar farms
35,000	Administrators of familiar and subfamiliar farms
<hr/>	
1,051,000	Families without land, of 1.368.000 agricultural families

Source: CIDA, Table B.

This data represents more than 40 percent of the national population and more than 76 percent of those families who earn their living from agriculture. This data will increase with the natural growth of the population, and in 1970, I have calculated we will have more than 7 million people without land, or 1,300,000 families.

Farm Size.

If we want to know what is the size of the farms, we have to see the cadastral data for Colombia, which is in Table C., and some new data received for landlords with farms of more than 2000 hectares that the Agrarian Reform Institute asked of them with some threats in 1963. These demonstrated that landowners with more than 2000 hectares were smuggling more than 5,000,000 hectares from taxation. So, if we look at Table C, we will find the apparent number and size of all farms in Colombia. But after the Institute asked all those owners of farms bigger than 2000 hectares to declare their properties, we found the

Table C

COLOMBIA: NUMERO, SUPERFICIE Y AVALUO DE LOS PREDIOS CATASTRALES POR GRUPOS DE TAMAÑO^{a/}

Grupos de Tamaño (Hectáreas)	Predios Catastrales		Superficie Catastral		Avalúo Catastral					
	Número	Por- ciento	Hectáreas	Por- ciento	T o t a l		Promedios		Por Predio (en pesos)	Por Hectárea (en pesos)
					(en miles de pesos)	Por- ciento				
Menores de 0,5	292.679	20,40	51.894	0,24	435.855	3,35	1.500	8.400		
De 0,5 a 1	186.513	13,00	120.405	0,55	317.083	2,44	1.700	2.600		
De 1 a 2	254.935	17,73	324.338	1,48	610.938	4,70	2.400	1.900		
De 2 a 3	135.327	9,40	297.811	1,34	460.791	3,55	3.400	1.500		
De 3 a 4	93.291	6,50	299.555	1,36	428.186	3,30	4.600	1.400		
De 4 a 5	57.828	4,00	239.030	1,10	294.782	2,27	5.100	1.200		
De 5 a 10	148.312	10,30	976.876	4,46	1.140.877	8,78	7.700	1.200		
De 10 a 20	101.831	7,08	1.350.382	6,16	1.277.025	9,83	12.500	950		
De 20 a 30	43.545	3,03	1.001.089	4,57	769.804	5,92	17.700	800		
De 30 a 40	26.439	1,84	867.662	3,96	579.427	4,46	21.900	700		
De 40 a 50	17.245	1,20	734.425	3,35	470.509	3,62	27.300	650		
De 50 a 100	39.598	2,75	2.623.309	12,00	1.426.106	10,98	36.000	550		
De 100 a 200	21.670	1,50	2.860.004	13,05	1.382.581	10,64	63.800	500		
De 200 a 300	7.665	0,53	1.777.606	8,11	777.461	6,00	101.400	450		
De 300 a 400	3.582	0,25	1.173.325	5,36	530.536	4,10	148.100	450		
De 400 a 500	2.009	0,14	854.896	3,90	348.652	2,67	173.500	400		
De 500 a 1.000	3.217	0,22	2.155.092	9,84	899.932	6,92	279.700	400		
De 1.000 a 2.500	1.322	0,10	1.859.999	8,50	552.184	4,25	417.700	300		
De 2.500 a 5.000	334	0,02	1.677.715	7,65	273.197	2,10	817.900	160		
Mayores de 5.000	68	0,005	662.562	3,02	15.891	0,12	233.700	20		
T O T A L	1.437.410	100,00	21.907.975	100,00	12.991.817	100,00	9.040	600		

Fuente: INCORA, basado en datos del Instituto Geográfico "Agustín Codazzi" (febrero de 1963).

^{a/} Datos para 723 municipios sobre un total de 837 en los departamentos.

next additional data, Table D, which gives us the data about the farms they were smuggling from taxation.

Then, for a final account of farm size and its relation to farm number, we replace the data from Table C with the data from Table D in the space for farms from 2,500 to 5,000 hectares and bigger than 5,000. There is an overlap because Table D starts counting from 2,000 hectares of extension, while Table C does it from 2,000 on; but I do not think it makes a big difference, because the average extension in Table D

Table D

COLOMBIA: PROPIETARIOS Y SUPERFICIE DE PREDIOS MAYORES DE
2.000 HECTAREAS, SEGUN DECLARACIONES RECIBIDAS EN INCORA, 1962

Categorías de Tamaño (Hectáreas)	Propietarios (Número)	Superficie Total (Hectáreas)	Promedio (Hectáreas)
De 2.000 a 5.000	433	1.297.416	2.996
De 5.000 a 10.000	100	756.566	7.566
De 10.000 a 20.000	50	720.193	14.403
De 20.000 a 50.000	30	931.774	31.059
De 50.000 y más	23	3.368.121	146.440
<u>T O T A L E S</u>	<u>636</u>	<u>7.074.070</u>	<u>11.123</u>

Fuente: CIDA basado en las listas suministradas por INCORA. (División de Control y Uso de la Tierra, véase Cuadro Apéndice P-9).

Nota: Se ha excluido al Chocó de la lista de las declaraciones.

for farms from 2000 to 5000 hectares is 2996, which is appreciably higher than the limit of 2,500 in Table C.

Summarizing from this cadastral table we can continue defining the farm size property in Colombia:

<u>Farm Size</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Extension (hectares)</u>	<u>% of the agricultural land</u>
From 0 to 5 hectares	1,020,500	71.03	1,333,043	5.0
5 to 50	337,372	23.45	4,930,434	18.5
50 to 200	61,268	4.25	5,483,313	20.9
200 & over	18,431	1.1	14,894,988	55.6
	<hr/>		<hr/>	
	1,437,644		26,641,768	

Now we can see the land problem in Colombia in a very simple way:

.71.3 percent of the agricultural people occupy 5 percent of the land, and 1.1 percent, the landowners, own 55.6 percent of the land, and there are 1,051,000 out of 1,368,000 agricultural families without land.

While the masses live like rats, the lords divide the country among themselves. Now we have seen in cold statistics, in what terms the land problem stands in Colombia. The problem has arrived to this point after the many reforms we saw before. But behind this cold statistical data stands hunger and despair, and many powerless and

resented human beings. Let us see now, what this new and radical promise, the Social Agrarian Reform, has meant to the peasants of my country.

The Social Agrarian Reform.

I have made a rather complete study of this institution we have in Colombia.

It is the impression of very authorized observers and mine also, that Colombia has, after Cuba, the most radical law of agrarian reform these years; the big difference is that the Cuban law of agrarian reform is of an imperative type, meanwhile the Colombian one is of a permissive type; one is an instrument of the capitalists and oligarchs in power to send a smoke curtain over the problems of the country, while the other one has had a real effect for the whole country of Cuba.

There have been studies about the different possibilities of modification of land tenure patterns in Colombia. Many people argued in favor of colonization of new lands, but recent appraisals indicate:

1. the high degree of difficulties of massive movements of people to new areas in the country;
2. that the land in actual use, if done in a technical way, could produce to give perfect nutrition to more

than twice the actual population of the country;

3. the very high costs in building infrastructures in new lands, far from the populated areas;
4. the knowledge that most of the actual lands without colonization are thus faraway from the actual technical knowledge and economic possibilities of the country to dominate the environment;
5. the greed of the lords would obstruct any "national policy" of colonization that were not for their direct benefit and we know that this is not possible. Another answer is agrarian reform.

Agrarian Reform Orientation.

The crucial orientation the agrarian reform is being given in Colombia, starts from the convincement of the Agrarian Reform Institute, that Colombia does not have "latifundios," big extensions of land in the hands of a few landlords. But we very easily demonstrated what the truth about that is. They say that the agrarian law will not take "well cultivated lands" away, (this is a very relative term, because there is no comparison with productivity of other countries, but only in a regional extension), unless the landlords want to sell it to the state; we know that the big landlords, always for inertia, will own the little agricultural machinery in the country and will hire more workers at prices of desperation, and will present their

lands as the "well cultivated ones," and the ones with the highest productivity. They cannot be expropriated.

And then, as the Agrarian Institute knows how difficult new colonizations are, and as they will not do anything against their friend-landlords, the Agrarian Institute has decided to shift its goal from the problem of social concern they were trying to face at the beginning, the structure of land tenure which goes with social, politic and economic power, to a matter of economic productivity without breaking the actual system, and devoting the resources of the institute to very highly expensive irrigation projects in the short amount of land dispoible without conflicting with the landlords, in order to give very high productive lands to a very few peasants and most of the time to the remaining landlords, forgetting that agrarian reform is not only a problem of land tenure, that it starts there, but this latifundio breaking is followed by housing, education, health, credits, roads, electrification, irrigation, resource studies, and forgetting that agrarian reform is not possible to be measured in cost-benefit terms.

But, of course, the problem is not in the Institute of Agrarian Reform. The problem is in the whole country. The problem is a political, social and economic one, and we can not simply ask the landowners to give away their economic power, which they use to bleed

the country without getting away their political power; and this has not been accomplished yet.

How is the land being acquired and given?

1. If the Institute of Agrarian Reform wants to acquire certain land bigger than 100 hectares, or if the landowner wants to sell it, it is the landowner who sets the price; the land is not acquired according to the cadastral price plus 30 percent, as they thought it at the beginning, but as the commercial land the landlord imposes.
2. Then the Institute of Agrarian Reform will subdivide the land, make some improvements and give it to a peasant who will have to pay the whole price for it (the price the landowner through the intermediary, the Institute, imposed).
3. Now this money is taken by the former landlord, and two things may happen to it:
 - a. they take it away from the country, impoverishing it more;
 - b. they put in some industry and once more dominate from the new position the defenseless peasant, who is left without a price mechanism, or credit systems, or resources of any kind; and they reduce once more

the peasants at their will, creating thus the basis for an industrial reform.

It is thus very easy to approach a "radical" agrarian reform in Colombia.

Accomplishments.

We know how big the problem is. What has the Agrarian Institute accomplished? For the Committee of Nine of the Alliance for Progress, the Institute stated as targets to allocate land to 35,000 families in the first four years, and 100,000 families in the next five years.

After two years of Agrarian Reform, less than 2,000 families had received land and they expected to give land to 25,000 families in five years, with irrigation projects.

We are now in 1969. After eight years of "Social Agrarian Reform," what has happened? This false reform claims to have given land to 60,000 families.³⁴ Although some time ago I got information from my country that 20,000 of those families just received titles for the land they were squatting already. Nevertheless, let us make some calculations about this "Social Agrarian Reform": let us suppose that

34. Source: Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February, 1969, Colombia,- A Case History of U. S. Aid.

the "Social Agrarian Reform" continues advancing very fast and being generous; let us suppose that if they gave land to 60,000 families in eight years, let us suppose that at the end of the first decade they will have given land to 100,000 families. Very well.

Supposing that the peasant population is static in Colombia, the "Social Agrarian Reform" will have given land to one tenth of the one million families without land in the country. With this number, at this speed, the problem would take exactly 100 years to be solved, in terms of land ownership, not speaking of credit problems, marketing problems, price problems, agricultural problems, educational problems, etc., etc.

But as the peasant population is not static in Colombia, but grows at a pace of 250,000 people a year, and each family is composed of five members, we would have 50,000 families each year. This 50,000 families each year will absorb the work of the "Social Agrarian Reform" in almost more than five years.

So we know when this problem of land is going to be solved with Social Agrarian Reform: never.

I have to accept that a fast program of this type is very expensive, and besides my country may not be able to gather the necessary skills, and overpass the bureaucratic problems under the present institutional

forms. I think that this problem is impossible to be solved under the present form of government the country has.

Here we arrive at the end of our analysis of a typical and very grave problem in Colombia. We could see how the lords and landlords of the country, telling and promising and ducking the storms, spend the years and the hopes of the miserable people. From reform to reform their promises went always farther and farther, changing in form, from mild ones to radical ones, promising and deceiving, raising hopes and then escaping, till the present time.

Is there something else they could promise now?

I guess their opportunities are arriving at the end...

Could we say the peasants have improved their conditions up to now?

No, they have not. And if we go some pages back and read carefully, we will notice that whenever any change happened to the peasants' conditions, it was after they had exercised, in their desperation, violence against the lords. In no instance do we find the signs of peaceful evolutionary change.

Do we naively think the regime would have passed such radical laws as the "Social Agrarian Reform" without having its stability seriously menaced, even if they knew they would deceive the peasants?

We do know that the lords count in their power with very well-trained lackeys, their counter-insurgency troops, and troops are easier to deploy than laws, even fake laws.

Of another factor we can be completely sure, and that is of the rising amounts of expectations the poor peasants have had with the passing of each law, every time more radical; and also we can be sure of their mounting frustration and disbelief in a regime they cannot understand.

What do I actually know when I make these last affirmations about the rising amounts of expectations, and frustration among the peasants of Colombia? There have not been made to the present, quantitative studies that show that that is happening in Colombia.

I base my affirmations on three very important factors:

- a. the latest developments in information media systems that are practically flooding the peasants every day with large amounts of advertisements about products of the consumer society of the cities. Their inability to acquire many of these elemental goods must, I expect, raise as more goods are circulated within the other strata of the population and as information channels reach farther into the countryside.
- b. The second point on which I base my assertion is the growing polarization of wealth in Colombia, with the more acute impoverishment of the peasant population, because of the fast subdivisions of the tiny spots most of the peasants have, with the high birth

rates among the peasants. Their inability to buy those ever more expensive products that could help them with higher productivity, tractors, fungicides, fertilizers, better seeds, grows then everyday; the gap between the poor and the rich then, widens more and more.

c. The third and maybe the most important factor for the growing expectations and frustration of the peasants I call the external revolutionary agents. Poverty has existed since the Spaniards came to America; the indians have always been poor. Lands have been scarce since more than two centuries ago, as we saw when we were going over the background of the problem. But the most important change has taken place during the last ten years, when external agents, revolutionaries, have gone to the countryside, and have started talking to the peasants about their poverty, and about their ways to avoid it by elimination of their lords. This is the new element in the countryside in Colombia. And more recently indeed, other agents that are only starting to act, will make these gaps between the rich and the poor more evident. These elements are the growing dissident members of the Church, especially activated during the last three years.

If the elements of the Colombian poor people's environment have been the same during these four hundred years, although these problems were growing in proportion, without any large-scale revolts by the peasants having occurred, the real new element able to stir up conflict in the countryside is constituted by these new people with political and economic and social new abilities that may appeal to the peasants.

These observations will become of extreme importance in a later stage of our study, when we will discuss strategies to follow for implementing social change in Colombia, under the present circumstances.

I guess we stop here with the talk about Mr. Hirschman's pacific evolutionary changes in Colombia. May I now introduce my second theme and hypothesis for this paper: I will show now the rest of the key elements of the Colombian economy and how they operate in the same fashion as the land problem.

But my hypothesis to demonstrate is a very critical one: that in the absence of a truly peaceful evolutionary change in a country like Colombia, this underdeveloped country -- in order not to precipitate a chain reaction in other underdeveloped countries by being destroyed in all its present structures by the resented population -- is taken over by its major capitalist partner, the United States government and private enterprise, and is converted in a plain colony, a mere appendage to serve American interests.

I know this hypothesis I will demonstrate here may hurt the susceptibility of my American professors. I can do no more than to honor the truth and try to present it, with honesty, humbleness, and in precise terms.

My main material for this part of the exposition has been gathered by myself here at M.I.T., under Professor Rodwin's direction, and also I will draw heavily on this document: Survey of the Alliance for Progress. Colombia, A Case History of U.S. Aid, a study prepared at the request of the sub-committee on American Republics Affairs, by the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, together with a report of the Comptroller General, February 1, 1969, U. S. Government Printing Office.

This hypothesis I will demonstrate is what I called at the beginning of the work, the "status" hypothesis.

It is of great importance that I clarify here, what are the relations

- a. between the land problem and the rest of the elements of the Colombian economy and,
- b. the relation between all these elements and the Colombian-U.S. relations that are going to be studied next, because apparently there is no relation, or at least, no harmful one.

The connections between the land problem and the rest of the elements of the economy exist because:

1. the main basis for the actual economy of the country is an agricultural product: coffee. This fact repercutes in the economies of the cities;
2. the patterns of ownership in the countryside are the same ones as in the cities. The wealthy class of the countryside is very often found the same as in the cities. The same applies for matters of social or political consequence.

The relation between the U.S. and the land problem and the rest of the elements of the Colombian economy is less evident and more complicated. Although the U.S. private enterprises, as we will see later, hold a considerable part of key Colombian assets, in industry, mine exploitation, and agriculture, we cannot be simplistic and argue an interest of the U.S. in Colombia as starting only from economic reasons.

So, how can we start seeing the interest of the U.S. in Colombia?

We cannot say that the U.S. government is interested in my country because private American enterprises hold long shares of the Colombian economy, so the U.S. is interested in their protection, so they can give more revenues to the American economy; that is a simplistic appreciation.

We cannot say that because of the tremendous administrative failures of the Colombian Government, the U.S. Government has to step in, in order to maintain the regime in its place, thus avoiding the possibilities of violent and Communist revolutions; that would be a very simplistic way of seeing the problem.

But our point is strongly explained if we look at all of these interacting factors as an organic totum; political reasons, plus economic interests, mutually reinforcing and inclusive, in a self-perpetuating vicious circle, I give as the explanation for the interests of the Government and the American private enterprises in my country.

This is what we will see more in depth throughout the explanation of the "status" hypothesis. We will also be able to see the degree of intensity of interest the U.S. shows in my country, mainly during the last decade, that led me to conclude that Colombia has passed to be a social, political, and economic colony of the United States.

Chapter Two. Demonstration of the "Status" Hypothesis.
The Key Elements of the Colombian Economy.

Let us go inside the demonstration of our hypothesis that Colombia has become, mainly during the present decade, a social, political and economic colony of the United States. First of all, a very important starting point: What kind of country is Colombia? Is Colombia a feudal society? Had Colombia developed somewhat along the paths of modern capitalism before the actual high input of American capitalism? Are the American advisors and entrepreneurs arriving with a new set of economic patterns of relations unknown to the Colombians before?

Many people try to explain the social and economic organization of the Latin American countries like a remnant from feudalism. Long theses have been done to demonstrate that this is not true, and I agree with them. These theses show that, since our countries were Spanish colonies, the economies of these colonies were subject to a very fast exploitation, with economies based on markets, with cash exchanges, social relations based on vassalage, and with even the Indians paying tribute in kind since 1549 and in cash since 1569; our economies were devoted to export raw materials to Spain. I refer the reader to an article written by Luis Vitale in Latin America, Reform or Revolution?³⁵ in which, among other things, he

35. Luis Vitale, "Latin America: Feudal or Capitalist," Latin America, Reform or Revolution?, Fawcett Publications, Inc., New York, 1968, pp. 32-43.

says how

...In three centuries Spain extracted twenth thousand million francs in precious metals from American sources, and the principal colonial cities were created for the purpose of exporting raw materials to Europe. The exploitation of labor during the colonization was not feudal in character; black slavery was not a feudal institution but a capitalistic enterprise, organized with large amounts of capital...And the native laborers on the encomienda, while in no way the typical workers of modern industry, did receive a 'bastardized salary.'

I guess it is important to explain at this point about the past of the Latin American countries, in order to know what is happening at the present. Many writers and economists say that Latin America has been until now under feudalism and that capitalism is now arriving, and that that will be the thing of the future. While many others, I among them, believe that on the contrary we, the Latin American countries, are the natural product of the "liberal" and "enlightened" capitalism.

After the three centuries of intense economic exploitation by Spain, since our countries obtained their political independence from Spain, the elites of our new countries assumed the economic role the Spaniards had before. Under the disguise of liberal economic theories, the "laissez-faire," modern capitalist enterprises devoted to exporting raw materials sprang up, side by side with the old feudal structures existing in many of the points of our society. Carlos Fuentes puts it this way:

Thus capitalists turned us into single product countries, exporters of raw materials to the occidental marketplace. The utopia of those entrepreneurs was the following:

because of the international division of labor, it was appropriate for some regions to produce raw materials and for others to refine them; such an exchange would produce welfare for everyone. Now we know this is not true; now we know that in a depression of the central economy, those who suffer more are the satellite economies, the producers of raw materials...

...If economies were complementary, as the classical theory states, our standard of living should be equal to yours. 36

Capitalism is then not so new in Latin America. After 1930, most of the Latin American countries tried to industrialize their internal economies through protectionist capitalism, but the leaders were only interested in industry, and had forgotten forever the people not belonging to the bourgeoisie classes; old feudal structures, mainly in the countryside, were left untouched.

Fuentes says:

The minority society became richer at every turn, face to face with a majority society becoming more miserable at every turn. In the last two years, the abyss between the two has done nothing but grow. 37

Power is not in the countryside of Colombia any more. Power is in the banks, and industries and corporations. Elimination of the few feudal remnants in the countryside would leave the balance of power intact as it is now.

36. Carlos Fuentes, "The Argument of Latin America: Words for the North Americans," Whither Latin America?, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1963, p. 11.

37. Ibid., p. 12.

Andrew Gunder Frank, an economist, says:

The measures which the Alliance for Progress wishes to introduce and which it hopes will substitute capitalism for feudalism, already have a century and a half of failure behind them in Latin America.

...Latin America is a capitalistic castle with a feudal facade. Breaking the facade would not accomplish much, not even a land reform. 38

Luis Vitale also points out:

Feudalism was an agrarian economic system based on barter, with no salaries, since services were paid for in land, lodging and food. Its social structure was based on relations of servitude, of vassalage, with punishment for those who left the fief... 39

and talking about the purposes of the lords during our colonization:

The conquest had a capitalist purpose: the exploitation and commercialization of precious metals. Despite the presence of feudal manors, the colonial economy was not based on a natural economy or the small scale production of the feudal state, but on the exploitation of raw materials for the international market on a relatively large scale and through the employment of large numbers of native workers. 40

The existence of what Luis Vitale calls "feudal manors" has not interfered with the general purpose of converting my country into an exporter of raw materials since the Spanish colonial times. On the

38. Andrew Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment.

39. Luis Vitale, "Latin America: Feudal or Capitalist," Latin America, Reform or Revolution?, Fawcett Publications, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 33.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

contrary, this is one of the most advantageous points for the help of capitalist strongholds. This interrelation between the feudal manors with the capitalist lords has been very well studied already by the economist, W. Arthur Lewis.⁴¹

This is a very important and strong point. Because nothing new in terms of economic relations are the U. S. Government and U. S. private enterprises fostering in my country; enlightened capitalism is quite old in Colombia. Great shares of the maldistribution, injustice, waste, hording, and contradictions of our economy and of our society are the natural products of capitalism. Something more advanced than capitalism must be implemented in order for us to be able to solve our problems. The theory of the American Government that what is needed is more intensive capitalism is not valid, since then we would not be seeing the inequalities and contradictions that beset the American and the rest of capitalistic developed western societies, like France and England. Theories like the Alliance for Progress, fostering capitalist development of the countries of Latin America, will tie us more to the United States, augmenting our burdens, instead of giving us the freedom so badly required.

41. W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour," The Economics of Underdevelopment, ed. A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963.

But let us get into our demonstration of my hypothesis of the U. S. present domination of my country as a colony; when I call on data from the Congress Report, I will identify it with the initials "CR." I will use extensive quotations from this document from the U. S. Congress in this chapter, because I feel it is the most accurate expression of the feelings of the U. S. Government towards my country. This factor helps me to eliminate a great part of subjectivity in my writing, given the deep involvement I have with the issue. The Alliance for Progress time is for me the culminant point of the U. S. process of domination of Colombia. Now we will see the problems of Colombia being treated by the new manager of the country, the A.I.D., accordingly with A.I.D. values, programs, and goals.

Let us start with the U. S. aims when "helping" us with the Alliance for Progress:

The U. S. foreign assistance program in Colombia has achieved a basic political objective, but it has fallen far short of the economic and social goals of the Charter of Punta del Este.

From the first loan in April 1962, a primary objective has been political stability and maintenance of Colombia's democratic political institutions through support of the succession of National Front governments. This has been accomplished. 42

In these simple words of the CR, we can discover the whole complexity of the relations between the U. S. and my country. What is called

42. CR, p. 3.

the Charter of Punta del Este is just a set of game rules which stressed the necessity of all the countries of South America to have "better" economic relations with the U. S. by being able to provide better facilities for private American enterprises, and to avoid revolutions by giving something of the wealth of our countries to the poor. Unfortunately for us, more American enterprises under the present circumstances are in contradiction with the urgent necessity we have of giving to the poor.

And now let us see the accomplishments:

On the other hand, between 1961 and 1967, per capita gross national product increased only from \$276 to \$295 a year, an annual average rate of 1.2 percent, compared to the Punta del Este goal of 2.5 percent. The peso had depreciated from 8.50 to the dollar in 1961 to 16.45 to the dollar in August 1968. The deficit in Colombia's balance of trade decreased from \$142.6 million in 1961 to \$64.5 million in 1967, but this improvement was more apparent than real, resulting from severe import controls imposed in early 1967 after a deficit of \$290.2 million in 1966.

An agrarian reform program, one of the earliest under the Alliance for Progress, was enacted in 1961, but through 1967 it had provided land titles to only 54,000 out of the approximately 400,000 to 500,000 landless families (N.B., I have demonstrated earlier that this number is really twice the CR data), whose numbers, furthermore, are increasing by 10 percent a year (N.B., five percent in our case). Although the agrarian reform has received some U.S. assistance, the major emphasis of U. S. aid policy to agriculture has been directed to increasing production for export. These efforts have achieved some success, but until recently they concentrated on providing credits and other assistance for large commercial farmers at the expense of rural social

progress. The education policies of both the Colombian Government and the United States have vacillated from an emphasis in primary education to an emphasis on universities, with the result that little progress has been made in either. The literacy rate has remained relatively constant, but the absolute number of functional illiterates has increased from approximately 5 million to more than 6 million. Taxes have been increased, but not until 1967 were serious efforts made to improve collection. Colombia has barely begun to tackle the problems of more equitable income distribution, and the country's social structure remains essentially unchanged, with close to two-thirds of the population not participating in the economic and political decision making process. 43

As we have just read, the "achievements" of the present decade do not appear very brilliant. What the U. S. has achieved is to maintain the regime in power; which must have been an extremely hard task.

The CR asserts that,

The aid program in Colombia has bought time for Colombian political institutions to work out the changes which almost everybody in a position of responsibility in either country agrees must come. But Colombians have used this time at their leisure. 44

It is very daring to affirm this of the Colombians. This cannot be said of all the Colombians. The ones without any power? The illiterates? Didn't it say before that there were (in conservative terms from my point of view) "close to two-thirds of the population not participating in the economic and political decision making process"? Why not to say better, that it bought time for the elites?

43. CR, p. 3.

44. CR, p. 5.

And at what price has Colombia, this time the whole Colombia, bought this time for the political institutions to spend it at their leisure? At a very dear one, indeed. At the price of subduing the country to the United States domination. How has the U.S.A. bought the country? With dollars, which are called aid and with the onerous conditions they bring with them.

Let us first clarify what the U. S. "aid" means for a country like Colombia. There is a very widespread notion in this country (the U.S.), that the United States is every year giving millions of dollars as gifts to underdeveloped countries, and that we, the countries of Latin America, are milking the U.S.A. Without reckoning by now what the U.S.A. is really taking away from our countries in terms of profits, let us see the data about the economic "aid."

We will find out that a very high percentage of this "aid" consists of commercial loans, which have to be paid back. There are grants, too. All this of course only serves to keep running the elites in government, and that in turn serves the U.S. economic interests.

If we go through the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), files of the economic relations with Colombia during the Alliance for Progress, we find the following table:

Table 1. A.I.D. Loan and Grant Assistance to Colombia.

(in millions)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Nonproject Assistance</u>	<u>Project Assistance</u>	
			<u>Capital</u>	<u>Technical</u> ¹
Fiscal year 1961 and prior:				
Loans	\$ 25.0		\$25.0	
Grants	15.4			\$15.4
Total	40.4		25.0	15.4
Fiscal year 1962 to December 1967:				
Loans	358.7	\$305.0	53.7	
Grants	31.1			31.1
Total	389.8	305.0	53.7	31.1
Total	430.2	305.0	78.7	46.5

¹ Includes cost of training Colombian officials and specialists.

Source: CR, p. 105.

We find out that from a total of 430.2 millions involved in the economic relations, 10.8 percent of it, 46.5 millions, were grants given to Colombia. The rest were commercial loans. If we then compare this with the profits U. S. companies are getting out of Colombia, the story may be totally different.

And what have most of these millions of dollars in "aid" been used for? They have served three purposes:

- a. short range budgeting and balance of payments financing of an obsolete administration and a huge bureaucracy;
- b. the U.S. being able to sell us merchandise at very high prices, out of competence;
- c. imposing on the country political schemes favorable to the external policies of the U.S.A.

I will explain this.

First, with respect to the regime financing; this whole Congress Report is devoted to lamenting how the regime, instead of asking for loans for investing in the development of the country's infrastructures, and developmental organizations, has spent the loans in financing just the running of the governmental machine.

Further it appears that although the aid program achieved some short-term successes with respect to economic stabilization and in influencing the Colombian government's fiscal and monetary policies, the support which U.S. assistance provided at least contributed to making it possible for successive Colombian governments, especially that of President Valencia, to postpone making more basic reforms in such fields as public administration, taxation, local government, education, and agriculture. 45

45. CR, p. 4.

Starting in 1960, however, rising operating expenses of the central government and failure of revenues to meet expectations reduced public funds available for a development program. The 1960 tax reform turned out to produce less revenue in real terms from direct taxes than the previous tax structure. Thus began one of the major economic problems for the Alliance for Progress period -- a large budget deficit with inflationary financing. 46

...except for a period in 1965, the United States has repeatedly succumbed to the short-term political pressures against which Bowles warned. It has not been willing to risk the political consequences of refusing aid in the face of a strong plea that a government would fall without such aid. Further, the United States has generally been reluctant to attach strong conditions to aid for the same reasons which made aid necessary; that is, the tenuous position of the current government which undermined its ability to take strong reform measures.

This type of aid conflicts with long-term development goals by facilitating postponement of necessary host country reforms, a fact which has been demonstrated in the case of Colombia by the chronic persistence of the same basic problems throughout the Alliance problems. 47

Heretofore, program loans had either been frankly political with the purpose of tiding the country over an electoral period (as in April 1962 and March 1964) or had been primarily aimed at backing up a stabilization program (December 1962). 48

I think we have had enough to prove this first point of my observations of the U. S. aims when "aiding" my country.

46. CR, p. 9.

47. CR, p. 11.

48. CR, p. 24.

Let us go to my second assertion, that these loans are used as a means for the U.S. to sell us merchandise at very high prices, out of competence; Americans call it "additionality." On pages 6 and 7 of the CR we read:

Two of the most troublesome issues with respect to Colombia have been exchange rate policy and what AID calls "additionality," that is, the use of program loans to increase U.S. exports.

...The problem arises because of the United States' own balance-of-payment deficit. In an effort to reduce the impact of the foreign aid program on this deficit, the United States first adopted a policy of domestic procurement -- that is, of limiting the use of AID dollars, with increasingly rare exceptions, to the procurement of goods in the United States. Then, the United States became concerned that countries receiving program loans should not use them to buy goods in the United States which they would have bought in the United States anyway, while shifting their own resources to procurement in Europe, Japan or elsewhere. To meet this problem, AID has steadily refined the list of U.S. goods eligible for AID financial procurement, the object being to limit these goods to items which would provide the United States with additional exports over and above what it could normally export on the basis of its historic share of a foreign market.

To the degree that the United States insists upon additionality, it reduces the flexibility of program loans both with respect to promoting economic growth abroad and with respect to influencing the borrowing country's economic policies. Lists of goods eligible for AID financing are drawn up with a view to increasing U. S. exports. These goods, of course, represent a net input into the foreign economy and are therefore useful, but they are not necessarily the goods which would be most useful from the point

of view of economic development. Frequently, too, they are more expensive than similar goods purchased elsewhere. There is an almost complete lack of data on whether this is due entirely to generally higher costs in the United States or whether it is due at least in part to the administered prices (America's own imperfect competition), encouraged by knowledge on the part of American exporters that the goods cannot be bought anywhere else.

...Thus as it has evolved over the years, the program loan has become a device for subsidizing specified U.S. exports. But the United States still tries to use this device to influence foreign economic policies. To the degree that a program loan is used to achieve one purpose, its value as an instrument for achieving the other is decreased. 49

I call this U.S. "aid" to my country economic imperialism. Then we have the case of Mr. Chester Bowles, the President's Special Representative and Advisor on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs in 1962, when speaking before the Colombo-American Chamber of Commerce and the American Society of Bogota, giving "Seven Critical Development Criteria" for my country, which included a national plan, a wide sharing of economic growth, taxation on the basis of ability to pay, agricultural reform, incentives for private investment, efficient and honest public administration and "a sense of national morale and purpose."⁵⁰

He spoke to the Colombians about "a sense of national morale and purpose," when just the setting up of relations between Colombia and

49. CR, pp. 6-7.

50. CR, p. 11.

the United States was on the basis of a sell-out of their country by the same Colombians.

...By the end of 1963 only about 50 million had been disbursed of the \$65 million estimated inflow from project and program loans. The main problem was compliance with the requirement that at least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of the goods financed by the loans and transported on ocean vessels should be carried on privately-owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels. Determination that U.S.-flag commercial vessels were not so available had to be approved by AID. The documentation which had to be presented to AID in keeping with this agreement were the bills of lading and statements indicating the U. S. origin of the goods being shipped. 51

With respect to the ground rules under which the loan was to be disbursed, there were three issues -- additionality for U.S. exports, marine insurance and forward procurement. 52

Forward procurement would allow AID to select the categories of goods which it would finance and thereby hopefully insure that AID financing would result in U.S. exports. 53

I have calculated from the CR, p. 168, that Colombia, during the period 1962-1966 imported an average of 45.7 of its necessities from the United States. As we see, these conditions in its markets have tied Colombia irremediably to be a United States servant in its economic policies.

51. CR, p. 20.

52. CR, p. 25.

53. CR, p. 26.

And now let us go to my third point, about the loans the U. S. gives to Colombia as acting as a curtain for the U. S. imposing its will in political matters, after it had opened the doors of the country for the U. S. private enterprise. Besides controlling the economic matters of the nation (see quotations of the CR below), from now on the U. S. could determine policy in matters like education, land policies, foreign investment, wage rates, etc., etc., in order to condition the sense of "national morale and purpose" to the U. S. convenience.

Here we have a show of the U. S. manipulation of the country with the carrot of the U. S. "aid":

The first quarterly review sessions under the May 1967 loan for \$100 million were held from July 17 through September 1. The review concentrated on examination of fiscal, exchange, export, import, monetary, wage and price policies, as well as on the preliminary agriculture plan and agricultural price policies, coffee diversification, and additionality for U.S. exports. Such questions as import liberalization, industrial policy, and education were left for subsequent reviews... 52

Let us see how decision making in Colombia operates:

The programming and management of U.S.-controlled local currency was primarily a Mission responsibility, and little information other than the final decisions on peso allocations was transmitted to Washington. These allocations were originally proposed to the AID Mission by the Colombian Planning Office on the basis of an initial review

52. CR, P. 50.

of requests from counterpart from the various ministries and independent agencies of the Colombian Government. An agreed AID-Planning Office proposal was then submitted to the Ministry of Finance for approval. Before forwarding the proposal to the Ministry of Finance, USAID/Bogota requested the concurrence of USAID/Washington which usually gave its routine approval. 54

In addition, the new system required the Colombian Government to prepare a total resource investment budget, lumping together central government revenue and counterpart (N.B., counterpart is Colombian money controlled by the U.S. as parts of agreements for loans) as a single founding resource. This plan and the Colombian Government's proposed distribution of counterpart would then be reviewed by USAID, a procedure which involved USAID more intimately in the total Colombian budgetary process. 55

So I guess we have seen enough proof of the real political, economic, and social powers which dominate Colombia now, and that have made of my country a mere appendage of the U.S. wealth and of the U.S. politicians.

Let us look at the other main components of the social and economic structure in Colombia. Of course it should not surprise us if we find that these sectors of the nation sadly correspond to the classist view of the people handling the regime, that blinded by their wealth and fatness, not caring but for their bellies and their farms and their

54. CR, p. 65.

55. CR, p. 66.

factories, have the patient people of the country starving, ignorant, and apparently without hope, or that they reinforce our points of view about the U.S.-Colombian relations.

When studying the characteristics of the land problem in Colombia, we saw in it one of the main elements of the economic institutions of the country. Going through different frustrations when observing the different characteristics of the land problem, the high concentration of land in hands of a few owners, the crowding of most of the people in tiny plots, the low productivity of these lands, the low levels of technology in cultivates, we had just started seeing the real problems for most of the Colombians. Because coupled with these specific problems of the lands, we will find that these people who work them, the same as the people who do not have lands and that have migrated to the cities to live in slums, have to stand a miserable life, with miserable housing, no medical services, starvation levels of food, without schools to send their children to, with no credit services from the banks to improve their lots, forgotten and condemned to a wretched existence.

And these elements of these people's environment, reinforce each other in order to produce a total mass of hopelessness for these people. Because the little advancements in solving one side of the problem are always absorbed by the other sides of the same problem.

In some cases, advances in one of the sides of the problem do but worsen the situation of the peasants, i.e., advances in preventive medicine make for peasants with their huts full of little children without food, when they cannot control their environment, confronted with an authoritarian Church that forbids birth control measures, and discourages sex education, and confronted with the elite class of landlords who exploit and force them into poverty. But this circle, this vicious circle, of problems in the economic level -- if we make a tremendous abstraction, and call the before enumeration of problems the economic level -- constitute only one of the wheels of underdevelopment. Because the other two, also internally self-reinforcing, and externally linked to constitute the machine of underdevelopment, are constituted by the social institutions and the political institutions. (But underdevelopment is not for everybody; if some individual is born with wealth, the economic wheel, or if he belongs to the upper social class, or if his family is in government, he will make it in Colombia. He will have house, school, recreation, servants, doctors, job, position, power. If the same person is born outside of the elites, surely he will not have any of the things said before.)

The economic wheel, to a certain point, only gyrates, because of the force transmitted to it from the social and political wheels, but at the same time reinforcing the power of the other two. This image of

the wheels is just an abstraction I have created to explain the phenomenon. In reality there exists a continuum between the three of them. There exists also, a continuum between the muscles that generate the power to move three wheels: men.

The elements that constitute the elite in one of the wheels of this classist system, will automatically constitute part of the elite in the other two. The ones who constitute the impoverished mass of the people in one of the wheels, will do so in the other ones too.

The term, underdevelopment, in the case of Colombia, will be easily understood in the rest of this chapter when we will observe the discrepancies between social-want formation and social-want satisfaction, in the three orders, social, political and economic, when viewed in the light of the potential technological advancements of this century, applicable to the case of Colombia. The negation of the leaders of the wheels to accept the introduction of these changes, that would disturb their peace, constitute the most severe problem to the superation of underdevelopment.

If we try to summarize our study since the beginning until now, we will find that the four most important points made are:

1. Taking the land problem as an example of the way the important problems of the other sectors of the economy, with its social and political implications, are handled, we concluded that:

- a. land reform has been illusory;
 - b. the situation is getting worse in spite of claims to the contrary.
2. Colombia has been and is capitalistic and not feudal. American programs mean more of the same.
 3. Colombia has become during the last decade a social, political and economic colony of the United States.
 4. Colombia is caught in a self-reinforcing circle of social, political and economic contradictions which are more than a burden, a growing disgrace.

Let us observe those elements of what we abstracted before, and called the economic wheel of Colombia. The social and political wheels will be examined in the chapter about Camilo Torres. The relations between the most important of these sectors and the U. S. enterprises will become evident now.

Colombia. The People.

1. Cities with more than 100,000 people.

The next is the list of the cities with more than 100,000 people, according to the 1964 census.

<u>City</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>% increase</u>	<u>Annual Growth Rate</u>
Medellin	362,054	772,887	53.0	6.0
Barranquilla	281,891	498,301	44.8	4.9
Cartagena	130,016	242,085	48.98	5.4
Manizales	127,199	221,916	43.74	4.4
Monteria	77,591	126,329	38.21	3.8
Bogota	723,929	1697,311	67.74	6.8
Sta. Marta	47,880	98,386	52.0	6.2
Pasto	81,478	112,478	28.0	2.5
Cucuta	88,334	175,336	50.0	5.4
Bucaramanga	113,380	229,748	51.0	5.6
Ibague	99,394	163,661	39.11	3.9
Cali	287,411	637,929	55.0	7.6
Pereira	115,342	188,365	39.0	3.8
Palmira	80,957	140,889	42.5	4.3
Armenia	78,380	137,222	42.9	5.4
Cienaga	56,854	113,143	49.8	5.4
Buenaventura		100,000		


One of the main differences of Colombia with the rest of Latin America, is its organic urban growth distribution which we can observe as a statistic result of the census and in the maps indicating the geographical situation of these cities. Colombia now has more than 17

CENSO DE POBLACION DE COLOMBIA LEVANTADÓ EL 15 DE JULIO DE 1964,
SEGUN SECCIONES DEL PAIS Y CIUDADES CAPITALES

SECCIONES DEL PAIS	Total de la Población	%	CIUDADES CAPITALES	Habitantes de las Capitales		Resto del Departamento	
				Número	%	Número	%
TOTAL GENERAL	17,482,420			5,430,006		12,052,414	
DEPARTAMENTOS							
Antioquia	2,477,299	100,0	Medellín	772,887	31,20	1,704,412	68,80
Atlántico	717,406	100,0	Barranquilla	498,301	69,46	219,105	30,54
Bolívar	1,006,347	100,0	Cartagena	242,085	24,06	764,262	75,94
Boyacá	1,058,152	100,0	Tunja	68,905	6,51	989,247	93,49
Caldas	1,455,872	100,0	Manizales	221,916	15,24	1,233,956	84,76
Cauca	607,197	100,0	Popayán	76,568	12,61	530,629	87,39
Córdoba	585,714	100,0	Montefrío	126,329	21,57	459,385	78,43
Cundinamarca	2,817,436	100,0	Bogotá D.E.	1,697,311	60,24	1,120,125	39,76
Chocó	181,863	100,0	Quibdó	42,926	23,60	138,937	76,40
Huila	416,289	100,0	Neiva	89,790	21,57	326,499	78,43
Magdalena	789,410	100,0	Santa Marta	104,471	13,23	684,939	86,77
Meta	165,530	100,0	Villavicencio	58,430	35,30	107,100	64,70
Nariño	705,611	100,0	Pasto	112,876	16,00	592,735	84,00
Norte de Santander	534,486	100,0	Cúcuta	175,336	32,80	359,150	67,20
Santander	1,001,213	100,0	Bucaramanga	229,748	22,95	771,465	77,05
Tolima	841,424	100,0	Ibagué	163,661	19,45	677,763	80,55
Valle del Cauca	1,733,053	100,0	Calí	637,929	36,81	1,095,124	63,19
Sub-Total	17,094,302			5,319,469		11,774,833	
INTENDENCIAS							
Arauca	24,148	100,0	Arauca	7,965	32,98	16,183	67,02
Caquetá	103,718	100,0	Florencia	30,445	29,35	73,273	70,65
Guajira /	147,140	100,0	Riohacha	31,897	21,68	115,243	78,32
San Andrés y Providencia	16,731	100,0	San Andrés	14,413	86,15	2,318	13,85
Sub-Total	291,737			84,720		207,017	
COMISARIAS							
Amazonas	12,962	100,0	Leticia	4,013	30,96	8,949	69,04
Guainía	3,602	100,0	San Felipe	1,090	30,26	2,512	69,74
Putumayo	56,284	100,0	Mocoa	13,059	23,20	43,225	76,80
Vaupés	13,403	100,0	Mitú	6,206	46,30	7,197	53,70
Vichada	10,130	100,0	Puerto Carreño	1,449	14,30	8,681	85,70
Sub-Total	96,381			25,817		70,564	

MAPA GENERAL

MAPA GENERAL



-2-

-3-

● Cities with more than 100,000 people

cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. At the beginning of the century Colombia had 4.5 million people and at the end it will have 45 million.

The urban population increased from 1951 to 1964 from 39.10 percent of the total population to 53.37.

The rural population decreased from 60.90 to 46.63 percent.

2. Racial Composition.

The racial composition was in 1960 as follows:⁵⁶

<u>Race</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>
Indians (natives)	1	150,000
Mestizos (native/white)	58	8,700,000
Negroes	4	600,000
Mulattoes (negro/white)	14	2,100,000
Zambos (native/negro)	3	450,000
Whites	20	3,000,000

3. Population Growth.

Colombia has a natality rate of 38.6 per thousand, a mortality rate of 10, and an increase of population of 28.6, which is one of the

56. Source: W. O. Galbraith, Colombia: A General Survey, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 17.

highest in the world. Colombia adds 500,000 people each year to its population.

With this growth rate I have calculated that, in 1973, Colombia will have doubled its population. In 1951 that was 11,138,470. This will be done in a very short term of twenty-three years and the trends are to reduce this time. In 1980 the country will have 27,000,000 people.

4. Age Composition.

Colombia is a country of young people. This fact, very good if profitted by strengthening the economic growth on it, may be a very painful one, as it is happening, as the country's elites have not been preoccupied with the educational and service programs for those people. Also we have to notice the very low level of people with ages over 65.⁵⁷

Age composition:

	<u>% Under 15</u>	<u>% 16-64</u>	<u>% 65 and over</u>
1960	44.3	53.0	2.7
1975	42.6	54.3	3.1

5. Education.

Education in Colombia is a bad story. Education is one of the things

57. Source: U.N. Preliminary Study of the Demographic Situation in Latin America.

we most lack in Colombia. Education for us is private business almost entirely in the hands of the Catholic Church, which in Colombia is held as the official national religion. Education is given to those who can pay the prices they want to impose for it, and which the poor people cannot afford. Let us see who receives education in my country at the present, and what the future projections are:⁵⁸

Projections of Age Groups 7-14, 15-19 and Total Population (000's):

	<u>1960</u>		<u>1965</u>		<u>1970</u>		<u>1975</u>	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
7-14	3,095	20	3,550	20	4000	19.5	4,560	19.2
15-19	1,490	9.6	1,790	10	2100	10.2	2,380	10.0
T.P.	15,468		17,787		20514		23,774	

Growth Rate:

	<u>1980</u>		<u>1960-80 %</u>
7-14	5,170	18.7	25.1
15-19	2,660	9.6	28.2
T.P.	27,691		28.3

In the percentages we find that probably the critical year with the highest peak of potential students as a percent of the total popula-

58. J. Mayone Stycos and Jorge Arias, eds., Population Dilemma in Latin America, Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, D.C., 1966.

tion, has been 1965. From that year on, the percentage started to go down, but we can note that the natural growth of population, the real number of potential students, is always increasing, as the table shows.

In 1960, only 54.1 percent of the potential students could attend elementary school; this percentage represents 1,674,395 boys, but it also represents that neither the Government or the Church gave schooling to 1,420,605 boys between seven and fourteen years old.

My old sources indicated that in 1960, there were only 54.1 percent of the children between seven and fourteen years old attending primary school. Now I want to use some of the material of the CR, although we have to notice that the age level for primary school in the CR table for 1961 we find 59.9 percent of the children going to school, 5 percent more than the year before. Nevertheless, I think we can follow the CR data, which I suppose is very accurate.

Primary School Education.

	(in thousands)					
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
Primary school-age children (ages 7-11)	2,278	2,376	2,477	2,582	2,689	2,804
Primary school-age children enrolled in school	<u>1,364</u>	<u>1,476</u>	<u>1,574</u>	<u>1,667</u>	<u>1,714</u>	<u>1,951</u>
Percent enrolled	59.9	62.1	63.5	64.6	63.7	69.6

Source: CR, p. 123.

If in six years, from 1961 to 1966 the difference between the boys who cannot attend school against the ones who can was reduced by 61,000 boys and as in 1966, the difference was of 853,000 boys, it means that the primary school problem will take almost fourteen years more to be solved nominally. I said nominally, if then we look at the quality of schools we have, at the number of years the boys are taught, and if we look at the rate of dropouts in primary school.

I have to note that education has been one of the sectors where the regime says it has been working harder.

Seymour W. Wurfel, in Foreign Enterprise in Colombia,⁵⁸ says:

In 1960 of eight million Colombians fifteen years of age or more, three million or 37 percent were illiterate. This situation is aggravated by the fact that many of the statistical literate are just barely so, that 40 percent of those in the seven-to-fourteen year age group do not attend school, (N.B., 46% more accurately) and that little has been done to prepare to meet population explosion educational requirements.

The U. S. Army Area Handbook for Colombia⁵⁹ has a pathetic relate about this theme:

Types of elementary education are a five-year urban program, a four-year rural program with separate schools for boys and girls, and a two-year "alternate" rural

58. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia, University of North Carolina Press, 1965.

59. U.S. Army Area Handbook for Colombia, Department of the Army, Washington, 1964.

program in which boys and girls attend on alternate days. A few rural schools in some of the departments have a five-year program. The two-year alternate rural schools have 188 days of school attendance in the academic year. Because of the alternate attendance, however, boys and girls attend only 94 days, respectively. Since each group of boys and girls is further divided into first- and second-year courses, each course receives instruction for only 47 days, the equivalent of 282 class hours. It is the system operating in 8,760 of 11, 861 rural public schools.

In 1966 AID determined that of the 23,000 primary schools in Colombia, only 20 percent offered a full circle of five grades even though primary education of five grades is obligatory under the Colombian Constitution; 12,500 of the schools or about 54 percent offered two grades or less. The shortage of classrooms is more acute in rural areas where only about 1 percent of the school age population completes five grades. 60

A key problem identified early in the Alliance was the relatively high dropout rate in primary schools. In 1963 AID determined that 90 percent of Colombian primary school enrollees dropped out of school before completing the fifth grade. An AID goal was to reduce the dropout rate to 70 percent by 1968. In 1966 an AID study showed the following dropout rates:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Dropout Rate (%)</u>
2	43
3	79
4	89
5	93

Of the 22,000 primary classrooms which were to be constructed by July 1965, under Colombia's development program, 5,150, or about 25 percent of the total, reportedly were complete as of October 1967. 61

60. CR, P. 124.

61. CR, P. 17.

...AID estimated that there was a shortage of 25,000 primary classrooms in Colombia in 1966, and has estimated a shortage of 48,500 primary classrooms in Colombia by 1973. 62

Making some accounts, according to Wurfel, in 1960, the 37 percent illiterate older than 15 years, represent 2,960,000 people, without counting "that many of the statistical literate are just barely so;" in 1960 we had:

Boys Not Going to School:

From 7 to 14 years old	1,420,605
Illiterate older than 15 years	<u>2,960,000</u>
Colombian illiterates	4,380,605

This represents 39 percent of the people who should know how to read; but AID estimated in May 1967 that 44 percent of the population was illiterate.⁶³ This percentage represents almost 8 million people illiterate over a population of 18 million by that time.

Secondary Education.

The secondary educational opportunities are even less than the primary ones. In 1960, out of 1,490,000 potential students between 15 and 19

62. CR, p. 124.

63. CR, p. 125.

years old, only 19.2 percent could assist to school; this percentage means 286,000 boys and also means that 1,204,000 people could not find any kind of high school education in that year.

AID in 1963 established a goal of increasing the enrollment in Colombia's secondary schools by 300 percent by late 1967. From 1963 through 1966, enrollment in Colombia's secondary and vocational schools increased by about 42 percent. The level of such enrollment during the Alliance is shown by the following schedule: 64

(in thousands)

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
Secondary school-age children (12-18)	2,415	2,526	2,624	2,710	2,798	2,872
Enrollment in secondary and vocational schools	<u>261</u>	<u>291</u>	<u>331</u>	<u>361</u>	<u>405</u>	<u>472</u>
Percent enrolled	10.8	11.5	12.6	13.3	14.5	16.4

A large number of Colombia's secondary school students drop out before completion of a secondary education. In 1966 AID estimated that the dropout rate was about 75 percent -- a decrease from the 80-percent rate experienced in 1963. The few who go to school, in most cases, do it because their parents make big sacrifices to feed that monopoly which is almost entirely in the hands of the Church.

Let us see what Wurfel says:

Eighty-five percent of the students go to private schools, either church operated or proprietary profit institutions...The vested interests of the church and of the owners of profit-making schools are such that they oppose extension of public secondary

64. CR, P. 124.

education...Only 4.32 percent of those who enter grammar school, reach secondary school, in which there are six years of instruction. Nearly half of the teachers have only a secondary education, and less than one-third of the students who start are able to graduate. By that time the survival rate of the original 100 is 1.34 percent. The secondary student enrollment in 1960 was 38,400. Those who enter a university comprise less than one percent of primary school entrants. 65

The next is the distribution of students by type of learning in secondary school:⁶⁶

(See following table.)

65. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia, University of North Carolina Press, 1965., p. 19.

66. CIDA, p. 332.

COLOMBIA: ALUMNOS MATRICULADOS EN ESCUELAS DE ENSEÑANZA
SECUNDARIA, 1958 y 1962

Tipo de Enseñanza	Alumnos 1958		Alumnos 1962	
	Número	Por ciento	Número	Por ciento
Bachillerato (general)	115.041	53,6	174.966 ^{a/}	56,0
Comercio	30.479	14,2	47.461	15,2
Normalista Superior	13.806	6,4	28.304 ^{b/}	9,1
Industrial y Complementaria	13.185	6,1	20.195	6,5
Normalista Rural	5.302	2,5	13.624 ^{c/}	4,4
Teología (Seminario)	4.671	2,2	6.987	2,2
Artística	4.823	2,3	5.386	1,7
Agropecuaria	2.822	1,3	3.487 ^{d/}	1,1
Hogar para Campesinos	1.791	0,8	2.515 ^{e/}	0,8
Sin especificar y otros	22.670	10,6	9.466	3,0
<u>T O T A L</u>	<u>214.590</u>	<u>100,0</u>	<u>312.391</u>	<u>100,0</u>

Fuente: Para 1958: DANE, 1960; para 1962: DANE, 1964.

- a/ 117.956 hombres y 57.010 mujeres.
- b/ 22.454 mujeres y 5.850 hombres.
- c/ 10.767 mujeres y 2.857 hombres.
- d/ 3.451 hombres y 36 mujeres.
- e/ Todas mujeres.

We can see the high degree of people studying commerce, and the low level in agriculture when half of the population lives in the countryside.

University Education.

In the area of higher education in Colombia, enrollment is somewhat limited as shown by the following: ⁶⁷

(in thousands)

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
Higher school age youth (ages 19 to 24)	1,543	1,592	1,643	1,696	1,751	1,807
Enrollment in schools of higher education	27	30	34	37	38	49

Key problems in the area of higher education include:

1. a dropout rate of 50 percent;
2. the small number of full-time professors;
3. limited facilities; and
4. an unbalanced mixture of disciplines relative to Colombia's manpower needs, there being a heavy emphasis on doctors, lawyers and engineers, and not enough emphasis on the social and physical sciences and other less traditional professions.

According to my data from CIDA⁶⁸ barely a 0.2 of the population is receiving higher education. Fifty-six percent of the students go to

67. CR, p. 125.

68. CIDA, p. 334.

public universities, although the state education is decreasing in favor of the business of the church. It has decreased from 73.9 percent in 1946, to 56.1 percent in 1964. Only one-sixth of the students are women.

The next is the table of enrollment by academic areas in 1964:⁶⁹

69. CIDA, p. 334.

COLOMBIA: ALUMNOS MATRICULADOS EN LA ENSEÑANZA UNIVERSITARIA,
1964, 1956 y 1954

Especialidad	1 9 6 4		1 9 5 6		1 9 5 4	
	Número	Por- ciento	Número	Por- ciento	Número	Por- ciento
Ingeniería	9.021	24,1	2.514	19,4	1.980	16,5
a) Civil	(3.968)	(10,6)	(1.333)	(10,3)	n.d.	-
b) Química	(1.648)	(4,4)	(410)	(3,1)	(213)	(1,8)
c) Otras	(3.405)	(9,1)	(771)	(5,9)	(1.767) ^{a/}	(14,7) ^{a/}
Derecho	4.735	12,6	2.279	17,6	2.306	19,2
Educación	2.718	7,2	607	4,7	n.d.	-
Medicina	2.609	7,0	3.044	23,5	3.186	26,6
Economía	2.215	5,9	517	4,0	n.d.	-
Arquitectura	2.086	5,6	1.137	8,8	943	7,9
Agronomía	1.988	5,3	327	2,5	256	2,1
Teología	1.357	3,6	n.d.	-	127	1,1
Odontología	936	2,5	n.d.	-	738	6,1
Veterinaria y Zootecnia	743	2,0	199	1,5	116	1,0
Administración Industrial y Economía Industrial	902	2,4	7	-	-	-
Sociología, Psicología y "Ciencias Sociales"	700	1,9	169	1,3	-	-
Contabilidad Pública	529	1,4	121	0,9	-	-
Otras	6.923	18,5	2.057	15,8	2.344	19,5
T O T A L	<u>37.462</u>	<u>100,0</u>	<u>12.978</u>	<u>100,0</u>	<u>11.996</u>	<u>100,0</u>

Fuentes: Para 1954 y 1956, Le Bret *et al.*, 1958: 321; para 1964, DANE, Boletín Mensual de Estadística N° 170 (mayo de 1965), p. 70.

^{a/} Incluye Ingeniería Civil.

Teachers.

Primary Education. In 1960, Colombia had a teacher-student ratio of 40.0, which represents 41,800 teachers. If we want to give education to 98 percent of our children, let us say in 1980 we would have to have by that year, with a student-teacher ratio of 25., 202,700 teachers.

Secondary Education. The Unesco made some calculations that countries with a proportion of 10-24 percent of school attendance in 1960, in 1980 should have as a goal 45% of the school-age boys in high school. Colombia with 286,000 students, an attendance of 19.2% in 1960, would have in 1980 as a goal 1,197,000 students.

According to data from Ocampo-Londono,⁷⁰ Colombia had in 1965, a student-teacher rate of 19, which is a surprisingly good one. I believe, if we put that ratio at 20, we will need in 1980, 59,950 teachers. This, if we only decide to give education to 45% of the potential students.

University Teachers. In 1965, according to Ocampo-Londono,⁷¹ we had 37,900 students and 5,800 teachers and a ratio of 16.5 and a percentage

70. The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role, A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., University of Florida Press, 1967, p. 133.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

of potential high school graduates passing to college of 10. If we only try to keep up with this percentage in 1980, with a student-teacher ratio of 16., we will need 10,200 teachers.

So we see that even in the most basic of the elements of the social requirements for the economic infrastructure, even with the Alliance for Progress, we are well back in time.

6. Housing.

We are now before another of the huge Colombian problems: housing. Here is where the culture of underdevelopment demonstrates itself. These mute statistics show the conditions the people of my country are living in. Colombia spent in 1962, 4.2 percent of the budget in public housing.⁷²

The minimum annual needs in 1960 and projections for 1975 are:⁷³

<u>Year</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Total</u>
1960	67,000	24,000	91,000
1975	212,000	13,000	225,000

This data represents a deficit of 1,365,000 units between 1960-1975 only in order to keep the 1950 percentage of families living in houses or apartments. The projections for 1975 are by assuming housing

72. Population Dilemma in Latin America, J. Mayone Stycos and Jorge Arias, eds., Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 102.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

ownership to 95% of the families and also assuming that the average urban family will be 4 and 5 in the rural areas. The before was given by Octavio Cabello in Population Dilemma in Latin America.⁷⁴

The U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America gives this other interpretation according to Abraham Horwitz and Mary Burke in the same work:⁷⁵

	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Total</u>
Estimated Deficit	300,000	500,000	800,000
Housing Units Required (annually to meet population growth and replacements)	72,000	28,800	100,800
Actual annual construction			40,000

Colombia constructed about 224,000 new housing units from 1962 through 1966, or about 62 percent of the AID goal of 360,000 units. This rate of housing construction was about 5 percent greater than the average annual rate of housing construction achieved during 1960 and 1961 prior to the Alliance.

AID says that a key factor in Colombia's failure to meet its housing needs has been a lack of available credit due, in turn, to:

- (1.) Colombia's inflation problem which tends to limit savings; and
- (2.) the lack of an effective mechanism for channeling savings into housing for the mass market.

74. Ibid., p. 119.

75. Ibid., p. 175.

Colombia's high rate of population growth -- about 3 percent a year -- and migration from rural to urban areas increases the problem. At the beginning of the Alliance, there was a shortage of about 277,000 housing units. This shortage had increased to about 375,000 housing units as of 1966. Moreover, it was estimated in 1966 by Colombia's Land Credit Institute that of the 778,000 available urban housing units in Colombia, about 200,000 or about 25 percent were sub-standard. In rural areas there was a shortage of an estimated 500,000 units as of 1966. Colombia's Agriculture Bank estimated that, in addition, about 400,000 rural housing units in Colombia were sub-standard.

Colombia's housing construction:

<u>Year</u>	<u>AID Goal</u>	<u>Total housing units constructed</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
1962	20,000	64,278	44,278
1963	60,000	44,876	15,124
1964	80,000	40,859	39,141
1965	100,000	32,501	67,499
1966	100,000	41,543	58,457
Total	360,000	224,057	135,943

Standards. If we want to see the standards of housing in Colombia, let us look at the next item, health and sanitation, that shows how rural housing, where half of the country's population lives, is.

7. Health and Sanitation.

In rural housing, for 46% of the population, 8,060,173 people, health and sanitation conditions at home are these:⁷⁵

- 68% of housing without floor
- 92.6% without running water
- 88.7% housing without w.c.
- 97.4% housing without showers
- 95.8% housing without electric power !!!!!!!

Galbraith says:⁷⁶

Work was begun in 1962 on the national water supply and sewerage plan to expand existing supplies and sewerage schemes and to provide new services. It does not include Bogota, Medellin, Barranquilla, Cali, Cartagena, Manizales, Bucaramanga and Cucuta, which have their own plans. It is reported that 348 projects were progressing in 380 localities at the end of 1964. The Ministry of Public Health was playing its part by its campaign for basic rural sanitation and was constructing a number of small water-supply projects.

This is our AID data about the percentage of urban population for which potable water is available:⁷⁷

<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>Percent change Prealliance period 1958-61</u>	<u>Alliance period 1962-66</u>
66.9	72.6	77.6	8.5	6.9

Percent of urban population with sewerage systems:

52.3	56.6	59.5	8.2	5.1
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75. German Guzman, Camilo, El Cura Guerrillero, Tercer Mundo, 1967, p.48.

76. W. O. Galbraith, Colombia: A General Survey, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 27.

77. CR, p. 127.

This is the ten-year plan for water supply in rural and urban areas in Colombia, 1961-1971:⁷⁸

<u>Estimated Urban Population</u>	<u>Without Water</u>	<u>Average number to be supplied Yearly</u>	<u>Annual cost of construction at 50 per capita</u>	
1961 6,289,000	1,334,000	248,000	12,405,000	
1971 9,437,000	4,482,000			

<u>Estimated Rural Population</u>	<u>Without Water</u>	<u>Average number to be supplied</u>	<u>10 p.c.</u>	<u>15 p.c.</u>
1961 8,663,000	5,171,000	180,200	1,820,000	2,703,000
1971 10,587,000	7,095,000			

What a pity that this plan was made in order to have in 1971 9,237,000 over the expected population of 20,000,000 without water.

Also, according to the 1964 census, the shift in population was from 60 to 46 percent in rural areas, which is not according to this plan; it will make water to be provided to the cities more expensive.

This is an idea of what the authorities of Colombia care for the most elementary thing for people: water.

8. Medical Care.

Wurfel says⁷⁹:

In 1960, over 50 percent of the population was under twenty years of age, and less than five percent was

78. Population Dilemma in Latin America, J. Mayone Stycos and Jorge Arias, eds., Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 172.

79. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia, p. 26.

60 or over. Comparable percentages in the U.S. are 32 percent over 20 and eight percent over sixty. The infant mortality rate in Colombia in 1959 was 96.9 per thousand as compared with 26.4 in the U.S. and 58.7 in Venezuela.

The data about medical services is very alarming, mainly because there are very few opportunities for people without money, the most, to see a doctor:⁸⁰

<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>Percent change Prealliance period 1958-61</u>	<u>Alliance period 1962-66</u>
Number of physicians per 10,000 people:				
3.5	3.9	4.3	11.4	10.3
Nurses trained annually:				
57	79	107	38.6	35.4
Hospital beds per 100,000:				
1.6	1.6	2.4		50
Life expectancy at birth (in years):				
47	51	59.3	8.5	16.3
Death rate per 1,000 population:				
12.4	11.0	9.4	-11.3	-14.6
Infant mortality per thousand live births:				
100	89.6	79.0	-10.4	-11.4

80. CR, p. 127.

The physicians distribution throughout the country is very uneven.

Let us see it in 1962:

<u>Colombian Physicians</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
Capital and cities from 500,000	3,784	7.4
Remainder of the country	3,669	3.8

This fact means that in four cities, Bogota, Barranquilla, Medellin and Cali there were 3,784 physicians for 3,500,000 people, and in the other cities and the countryside the unbelievable record of one physician for 40,000 people; this is how the "civilized" live in a different world from the miserable poor.

9. Labor Force.

According to the 1964 census, 54.3 of the population was between 15 and 64 years old. The population in that year was 17,482,420, which means in the actual conditions a potentially active population of 8,416,500.

The Colombian Institute of Public Opinion calculated in 1962 an active working force of 5, 010,000, with this distribution:⁸¹

(my calculation by sectors)

81. W. O. Galbraith, Colombia: A General Survey, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 152.

<u>Primary</u>		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Agriculture and related	2,760,500	55.1
Extractive industries	<u>65,100</u>	<u>1.3</u>
	2,825,600	56.4
<u>Secondary</u>		
Processing industries	501,000	10.0
Building and construction	175,300	3.5
Electricity, gas, water	<u>15,000</u>	<u>0.3</u>
	691,300	13.8
<u>Tertiary</u>		
Services	481,000	9.6
Commerce	265,500	5.3
Transport, communications	170,300	3.4
Other activities (N.B.-Government?)	<u>576,000</u>	<u>11.5</u>
	1,492,800	29.8

These five million workers represent less than one-third of the total population. Other facts we can notice in this table is how, while more than half of the population is engaged in agriculture, only ten percent of the labor force is in the processing industries, and thirty percent of the labor force is in services.

The distribution of workers by economic categories is:⁸²

	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Number</u>
Employers	10.3	516,030
Independent workers	23.7	1,187,370
Domestic servants	8.3	415,830
Employees	19.5	976,956
Laborers and handicrafts	33.0	1,653,300
Others	5.2	<u>260,520</u>
		5,010,000

82. Ibid., p. 153.

We can observe the high proportion of people working in unproductive work, like servants; the proportion of skilled workers is not in my hands, but we saw how the processing industries, where the skilled labor is, only occupies 10 percent of the labor force.

Antonio Montana, in Colombia, pais formal y pais real,⁸³ states that:

According to studies by the National Planning Council, there was in 1951 in the activities of mining, construction and transports, from 42 to 52 workers by employer; in commerce 121 workers by employer, and in manufacturing, 14 workers by employer.

10. Unemployment.

If we find that the rates of employment are so low and distributed in the way that fits more the elites of the country in order to give them more profits and comfort, when we look at the data about unemployment, we can imagine the painful situation the people of my country are going through.

According to studies of ANDI (National Association of Industrialists), in Camilo, El Cura Guerrillero, by Guzman⁸⁴, in 1966, 225,000 new workers needed jobs, but only 81,000 could find a place, and of this number,

83. Antonio Montana, Colombia, pais formal y pais real, Editorial Platina, Buenos Aires, 1963, p. 258.

84. German Guzman, Camilo, El Cura Guerrillero, Tercer Mundo, 1967, p. 49. (Bogota)

industry only absorbed 8,467, and 144,000 young men could not find jobs, and we know that the countryside, under the present circumstances is giving away more people. Is this supposed to be a country in ways of industrialization?

The CR says that the actual rate of unemployment in Colombia is 20 percent of the labor force, and that in 1971 it will be 36 percent.

New jobs are created at about 50,000 a year, while the work force is growing at a rate of 200,000 to 300,000 a year. 85

Many causes can be adduced for explaining the disastrous state in which the elites have thrown the people of my country, but nothing will be able to hide them any more, because it is very possible now to point to them one by one; this state of hunger they are incubing in my country, in a few years more, with 36 percent of unemployment, will produce the elimination of the same lords that concocted it with their greed. AID has seen the problem already:

AID has determined that the undertaxing of land in Colombia and that periods of overvalued exchange rates, due to the pace of inflation and Colombia's pegged exchange system, which encouraged manufacturers to import capital equipment, were factors that may have contributed to unemployment in Colombia. With respect to undertaxed land, AID reasoned that higher taxes on land could lead to more intensive use of the land and thereby reduce rural unemployment provided that capital-intensive methods were not employed. 86

85. CR, p. 147.

86. CR, p. 148.

11. Income Distribution.

It is very difficult to ascertain the truth about income distribution in Colombia. Of course we may assume that it is very uneven, or better put, that a few ones own the most, and that the whole of the people own nothing. But even so, how much do the rich people own?

I guess through the income tables the regime elaborates for taxation purposes, there is very little that we can know. We saw for example, when analyzing the land problems, that just in 1963, it was discovered that the landowners were smuggling from taxation more than 5,000,000 hectares in farms larger than 2,000 hectares each one. So, what kind of precision can we suppose from the rest of the government data about taxation?

In a fiscal study of Colombia made by the OAS and the IDB, that must have been done in 1962,⁸⁷ we find what we are talking about. The official Colombian data indicates that the income distribution in 1961 is in these terms:

9.69 of the people, the rich, received 41.31 of the total income;
2.15 of the people, the rich, received 18.95 of the total income;
.91 of the people, the rich, received 12.44 of the total income;
64.54 of the people, the poor, received 26.16 of the total income;
11.06 of the people, the poor, received 1.92 of the total income.

There we can see the tremendous inequality.

87. Source: Study published by the Pan American Union, General Secretariat of the OAS, Washington, D.C., Spanish Edition 1967, p. 235.

These income distributions are understood to be among the people who work. So we know that among the poor people, mainly, these shares will have to be distributed among the family, and we know that families have a tendency to be more numerous among the poor. Besides that, we know that unemployment hits just in the middle of the poor, too. Here we are just counting those poor who manage to get a job.

Ramiro Cardona, a Colombian, in a newspaper supplement,⁸⁸ writes that in Colombia a worker must feed himself and three people more, while in a developed country, each worker must feed himself and less than a person more.

Nevertheless, let us go on. In terms of dollars, we know from the OAS study we are analyzing, that while

64.54 of the workers earn less than 187 dollars a year,

2.15, the rich, receive 1,187 dollars a year, and

.91, the rich, receive 1,750 dollars a year.

No wonder that foreign companies like the same thing to continue, when they can have a worker working for 187 dollars a year. But this is not all. Some clues about the way the fine, educated, professional elites in the cities are cheating in their income tax accounts: according to a test administered among some professionals in Bogota, by the

88. Tercer Mundo, Number 50, December 1968, Bogota.

OAS people, they found out that "this data indicates that doctors and lawyers are hiding their income at least 50 percent."⁸⁹

I guess this is enough by now.

We will see more about the wealth concentration when we write something about corporate ownership in Colombia.

12. Foreign Investment.

The CR says that:

AID established goals to encourage Colombia to establish the incentives necessary to attract such investment and to press Colombia to enter into a comprehensive investment guarantee agreement with the United States. 90

We will see why later.

According to the CR, p. 152, American investment in Colombia during the Alliance has risen from 435 million in 1961 to 576 million in 1966; American investment represented half of the foreign investment in 1963. The 200 American industries are the keys for the existence of the country by now; two-thirds of them are 95 percent or more American-owned.

The next table explains the recent allocations of American investment in Colombia:⁹¹

89. OAS Study, p. 100.

90. CR, p. 152.

91. Source: Wurfel (First National City Bank of New York: Colombia, 1964, p. 9.)

Primary Economic Factors

	1950	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Total investment	193	401	424	425	455	465
Petroleum investment	112	225	233	229	257	246
Manufacturing investment	25	77	92	94	102	120
Trade investment	---	---	---	---	51	52
Public utility investment	---	---	---	---	27	27
Other	56	99	99	102	18	19
Earnings (total)	16	17	26	33	21	33
Transferred to U.S.	10	11	19	27	12	25
Reinvested in Colombia	6	6	8	7	10	8
% of total investment	8.3%	4.2%	6.1%	7.8%	4.6%	7.1%
New capital from U.S.	-7	11	15	-7	21	-1

But here I find that the American capital seems not to be earning too much: 4%, 6% and 7%. But American investment must earn much more; we saw before how onerous American credit is for Colombia.

In the CR we read:

Publicly and privately, other Colombian officials elaborated on this point. They felt that foreign credits were cheaper than foreign investment because they resulted in a fixed charge on the balance of payments over a fixed period of time, while remittances from foreign investment represented an open-ended charge over an indefinite period of time. It was noted, in this respect, that foreign firms tended to try to recoup their capital investment in periods of only three to four years, even if they did not try to repatriate all of it in that period. In addition, foreign investment was frequently made in ways which minimized the inflow of dollars, and created additional demands for domestic peso credit while increasing the future potential demands on Colombia's foreign exchange resources. An example would be a foreign firm which brought in as few dollars as possible and borrowed the balance of its capital needs on the local peso market, sometimes to buy a going Colombian concern rather than to establish a new industry. In such a case, the local

concern would shift to foreign ownership with only a very small, if any, net addition to the country's industrial capacity. 92

German Guzman, a Colombian priest and sociologist writes:⁹³

a. for each dollar of American private direct investment in Colombia, there are extracted 2.27 dollars between profits and dividends. (Source: Financial Statistics, October, 1966, p. 86.)

b. between 1951-61 for each dollar that North Americans brought to the country, they got almost four dollars by effect of non-equivalent exchange. (Source: U.N. External Finance of Latin America; New York, 1963, p. 53.)

c. only in 1965 for each dollar that the U.S. lent to us, Colombia had to pay U.S. \$1.50 for mortgages and interests. (Source: Contraloria General de la Republica. Revista Economía Colombiana. n. 82, p. 35.)

From Antonio Montana's Colombia, pais formal y pais real, I translate:⁹⁴

The major investment and also the major drain of economic "plusvalue" are represented in the oil industry. Within the total of foreign investment that between 1955 and 1960 reached an average of 6 million dollars, more than 60 percent corresponds to inversions in the oil refineries. During this same lapse of time, the yearly average of exports was of 75 millions, which value was not reintegrated to the country in the form of dollars (divisas). In the period between 1921-1957, according to ECLA, the oil industry has brought 127 million dollars to Colombia, and has taken away as profits 1,137 million.

92. CR, p. 53.

93. German Guzman, Camilo, El Cura Guerrillero, Tercer Mundo, ed., 1967, p. 50.

94. Antonio Montana, Colombia, pais formal y pais real, Editorial Platina, Buenos Aires, 1963, p. 50.

The major contradiction that exists between the needs for development and the dependence on imperialism, is in that the oil imperialist monopolies have accumulated one-third of the country as future reserve, 27 million hectares, of which they only exploit 1,393,647. The Colombian enterprise that starts to experiment the excludent pression of the international monopolies, is being left behind: 88 percent of the oil is in the hands of the imperialist trusts and only 18 percent of the oil belongs to the State enterprise. The internal market of gasoline and derivates also is excludent of (the State enterprise)...and we know that only 48.12 of the oil is refined in the country...

Let us see what happens to the oil revenues in one year, 1961:⁹⁵

Total Production	53,246,516 barrels
Value in Dollars	
(U.S. \$2.62 a barrel)	139,505,571.92
Value in pesos	933,007,331,86
Value paid to employees and workers	198.570.434,59
Paid to the Country in Taxes	
and Profits	57.258.084,63
Taken away from the Country	677.176.812,64

Colombia has the richest platinum in the world. It is 86 percent pure.

...President Alfonso Lopez in his Message to Congress in 1935: "The big mines of gold, platinum, etc...are controlled by foreign capital. Oil, given or not, goes to his hands almost always. But even so, we make reckoning in our balance of payments, as if it were a Colombian export, of the gold, the banana, the oil, the platinum, that do not give us any economic or fiscal profit, more than paying for salaries and the income tax. The economic game of those industries develops almost all out of the country, their products are transported in foreign ships, and the gold of those sales do not come back to Colombia. Those are the characteristics of the colonial industry, that do not impede that we be considered as a Republic producer of raw materials. 96

95. Ibid., p. 235.

96. Ibid., p. 272.

13. National Industrial Development.

In Colombia there are 63 private corporations and seven banks, three insurance companies and an investment company.

The corporations in the exchange list of Bogota are:

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Net Worth In millions of pesos</u>
7 sugar and flour mills and food processors	265
4 breweries and 1 soft drink producer	788
2 shoe manufacturers	49
2 theater chain operators	50
11 cement, brick and pipe manufacturers	440
4 tire and other rubber goods manufacturers	127
4 pharmaceutical, match, fertilizer and soap manufacturers	30
5 steel and steel products manufacturers	707
1 tobacco manufacturer	33
15 textile manufacturers	877
5 construction companies	79
1 furniture manufacturer	10
1 retail store chain	48
63 Corporations	3,503

This is wholly exclusive of all individual Colombian enterprises and of the thousands of corporations and unincorporated associations not listed on the exchange.⁹⁷

But I nevertheless think that this list is fair because it includes the most powerful industrial sector of Colombia.

97. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia, University of North Carolina Press, 1965, p. 78.

Aggregate Manufacturing Production. In this table we will find the general aggregate by type of industry:⁹⁸

Industry Group	Number of Enterprises	Number of Employees In Thousands	Gross Production in Millions of Dollars
Food	2,727	39	344
Beverages	209	16	126
Tobacco	197	4	38
Textiles	453	44	203
Wearing apparel	1,983	31	69
Wood, except furniture	401	6	12
Wood furniture	402	5	9
Paper	95	5	29
Printing	442	11	31
Leather, except shoes	256	5	20
Rubber products	57	7	30
Chemicals	487	17	103
Oil and coal products	17	2	71
Non-metallic minerals	982	24	59
Basic metal industries	24	3	68
Metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment	575	17	47
Non-electric machinery	231	4	10
Electrical appliances	196	8	34
Transportation items	561	13	25
Miscellaneous industries	260	6	23
Totals	10,555	267	1351

We can see how the most important industries are concentrated in: textiles, 203 million dollars, food, 344 millions, chemicals, 103 million dollars and beverages 126 millions.

Now, let us see in how many hands is this wealth concentrated. In fact, 149 people, enterprise managers, control 52 percent of the total economic

98. Ibid., p. 83.

power and are tied very closely to the political power, as was denounced in the same Senate of the Republic, in August, 1962. 0.16 percent of the shareholders, are owners of 53.93 percent of the shares, while 63.83 percent of the shareholders only own 1.21 percent of the shares, according to ECLA.^{98a.}

14. Agriculture.

Agriculture as we know occupies half of the population of the country, and coffee constitutes 65 percent of the external commerce of the country (1965). Colombia is a one-crop country, where agriculture produces 31 percent of the GDP, and we know the international market's weaknesses that crops have, and all the problems for the producer countries like Colombia.

Crop production capital is Colombian for coffee, cotton, sugar and tobacco; but it is American for bananas.

Colombia is not self-sufficient in agricultural production; here we have two tables of the Colombian agricultural markets:

98a. Montana Cuellar, op. cit., p. 236.

COLOMBIA: VOLUMEN DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE PRODUCTOS AGRICOLAS, 1951-63
(Toneladas métricas)

A r t í c u l o s	I m p o r t a c i o n e s				E x p o r t a c i o n e s			
	1951	1955	1960	1963	1951	1955	1960	1963
1. Animales vivos (menos mariscos)	146	7.350	876	150	4.432	33	284	913
2. Leche y productos de la lechería; huevos y miel	1.541	5.732	436	90	5	*	-	-
3. Legumbres, plantas, raíces y tubérculos alimenticios	10.841	2.323	47	80	*	1.214	40	3.559
4. Banano y otras frutas comestibles	858	2.027	107	348	154.572	209.622	190.813	202.595
5. Café, té y especias	313	310	157	247	290.519	355.015	359.325	371.092
6. Cereales	60.732	59.537	92.875	98.690	-	80	-	3.464
7. Semillas y frutos oleaginosos; plantas industriales y medicinales, paja y forraje	35.021	72.453	39.291	16.460	76	951	59	36
8. Azúcares y dulces	1.319	2.197	6.807	712	51.649	27.801	150	43.100
9. Cacao	7.361	10.680	3.773	5.906	-	-	*	20
10. Tabaco	564	265	413	224	4.223	4.563	6.401	11.432
11. Maderas y productos	2.210	5.021	2.361	571	5.614	45.398	64.478	113.380
12. Corcho y productos	476	1.545	1.906	1.823	2	-	-	19
13. Lana, crines y pelos	2.962	4.705	3.730	6.896	4	7	16	34
14. Algodón	16.688	3.652	749	1.815	97	121	26.093	22.230
15. Textiles vegetales	290	443	364	146	3	*	56	181

Fuente: DANE, Anuario de Comercio Exterior, Volúmenes Respectivos a los Años Indicados.

* Cantidad inferior a la mitad de la unidad.

COLOMBIA: VALOR DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE ALGUNOS PRODUCTOS AGRICOLAS 1951-63
(En miles de dólares)

Artículos	Importaciones				Exportaciones			
	1951	1955	1960	1963	1951	1955	1960	1963
1. Animales vivos (menos mariscos)	438	8.478	1.982	424	1.129	40	107	269
2. Leche y productos de lechería; huevos y miel	1.219	4.197	157	32	4	*	-	-
3. Legumbres, plantas, raíces y tubérculos alimenticios	1.130	496	13	20	*	122	6	119
4. Banano y otras frutas comestibles	343	785	68	201	8.784	16.850	13.692	13.257
5. Café te y especias	463	423	200	308	359.780	487.387	332.249	303.005
6. Cereales	7.800	6.027	8.351	9.160	-	7	-	406
7. Semillas y frutos oleaginosos; plantas industriales y medicinales, paja y forraje	10.702	16.211	10.799	4.757	777	851	315	324
8. Azúcares y dulces	346	472	229	262	7.935	2.385	20	5.606
9. Cacao	5.588	8.556	2.461	3.576	-	-	*	16
10. Tabaco	1.402	880	1.379	720	2.052	2.156	2.398	7.210
11. Maderas y productos	853	1.435	459	262	239	800	2.198	3.473
12. Corcho y productos	483	1.260	1.289	644	0,9	-	-	8
13. Lana, crines y pelos	15.232	16.797	10.559	10.521	10	59	26	87
14. Algodón	24.595	6.332	802	1.292	158	673	12.876	12.532
15. Textiles vegetales	433	333	201	163	2	*	9	70

Fuente: DANE - Anuario de Comercio Exterior, Colombia.

* Cantidad inferior a la mitad de la unidad.

The special problem of coffee exports is its price fluctuation in the international market.

Up to 1955, the high price of coffee had an expansionary effect but the fall in the price in the 1956-1958 period caused inflation when the resultant drop in foreign exchange earnings coincided with a high demand for imports. It is estimated...that a fall of ten percent in the price of coffee in New York is sufficient to cause an immediate reduction of 1.5 percent in the national income without taking into account the secondary effects. 99

Very slow diversification of production is nevertheless taking place and there seems not to be any possibility of a serious regulating price mechanism with the intervention of the buying countries.

Livestock. The livestock number in Colombia is "over sixteen million head of cattle and seven million of sheep, pigs, goats, horses, mules and donkeys."¹⁰⁰ But there is neither an internal high or external productive market organized and the ownership problem is similar and parallel to land ownership.

Fishing. Fishing is not a developed industry in Colombia. Only 1.5 million dollars of shrimp are exported a year.

99. W. O. Galbraith, Colombia: A General Survey, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 96.

100. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia, University of North Carolina Press, 1965, p. 43.

Forestry. Colombia exports to the United States and Britain 2 million dollars of logs and lumber and paper is made from sugar cane waste.

Colombia, where the "Social Agrarian Reform" is being used with so much fanfare about change, demonstrates that:

- a. Colombia's per capita agricultural production has declined during the Alliance;
- b. the average daily per capita intake in Colombia has decreased during the Alliance, below the 2,500 calories required for an adequate diet;
- c. the augment in production of food and crops during the Alliance, resulted mainly from expansion of areas under cultivation. Production of five of the six most valuable crops were less in 1966 than production before the Alliance.

According to AID, the factors adversely affecting the agricultural production of Colombia are:

- a. problems in planning;
- b. maldistribution and inadequate utilization of land'
- c. lack of agricultural credit;
- d. insufficient availability of fertilizers and pesticides;
- e. lack of marketing and distribution;
- f. insufficient storage facilities.

Colombia has about 275 million acres of land, of which about 65 million acres were in agricultural use in 1966. Of the 65 million acres, about 9.4 million acres were under cultivation and the balance in pasture and fallow. In 1967, between 40 and 45 percent of Colombia's labor force was employed in agriculture. Colombia's agriculture sector accounts for about 30 percent of the country's GDP, which makes it one of the most significant sectors in the Colombian economy. 101

This table shows that per capita agricultural production is decreasing, with the exception of crop production:

Index of Per Capita Agriculture Production

(1957-59 = 100)

	<u>1960-64</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966¹</u>
Overall	101	99	97	97
Food production	101	99	102	100
Crop production	102	100	98	98
Crop production, excluding coffee	107	111	106	112
Livestock production	97	95	93	94

¹Based on preliminary data.

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture and AID.

Average daily per capita caloric intake has declined during the Alliance into proportions below the 2,500 caloric limit for a normal person:

Year	<u>1967</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1966</u>
Caloric Average	2,525	2,466	2,428

Source: CR, p. 122.

101. CR, p. 122.

The AID mission director informed us in November 1967 that the shortfall in caloric intake, although increasing, was not considered critical. This view differed from the mission's food-for-peace officer, who pointed out that the above averages did not reflect the wide variance in the caloric intake between Colombia's high and low income groups or the protein deficiencies in the diet of Colombia's low income groups...In this regard a mission study estimated, in December 1966, that one-third of Colombia's population, principally that located in the less prosperous urban areas, had a caloric intake of only 1800 calories a day. 102

This table shows the diminution in yields per hectare in four of the six most important agricultural crops:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Coffee</u>	<u>Rice</u>	<u>Sugar</u>	<u>Brown Sugar</u>	<u>Corn</u>	<u>Potatoes</u>
Total production (thousands of tons):						
1957	365	350	234	480	698	682
1961	450	474	363	610	758	551
1966	456	700	386	650	895	832
Yield (tons per hectare):						
1957	0.46	1.84	4.4	2.6	1.2	11.4
1961	.54	2.00	5.8	2.8	1.1	11.5
1966	.56	1.86	4.2	2.4	1.0	10.2

Source: Department of State and AID.

Credits. According to AID, 600,000 agricultural families do not qualify for bank credit, but I find this data very low.

102. CR, p. 111.

...About 15 percent of bank loans in Colombia are agricultural credits. It has been reported by a leading United States commercial banking institution that these funds are channeled to large farmers who have the resources and ability to use the funds effectively. AID informed us in November, 1967 that, at the close of 1966, the loans outstanding in agriculture amounted to 36 percent of the total loan portfolio in Colombia. 103

I have included this long portion of the CR because of the evident interest it has in our study, for showing how the most elementary requirement of a person, food, is fulfilled in Colombia, and how the problem is seen by the AID.

15. Colombian International Trade.

Colombia for foreign trade is dependent on primary products: coffee, crude petroleum and bananas, coffee being the most important one. This dependence has led Colombia to balance of payment problems, caused by the augment in prices in imports of capital goods as sophistication augments in those products, and deterioration of prices of primary products augments, principally by the lack of effective stabilization price mechanisms.

According to Wurfel,¹⁰⁴ the process my country follows, very clearly, is:

103. CR., p. 116.

104. Wurfel, op. cit., p. 84.

1. Colombia has a chronic balance of payments shortage.
2. International lending agencies will not indefinitely underwrite this shortage and they insist that corrective measures be taken.
3. The rest of the world does not pay a price for coffee which will cover Colombian expanding import requirements.
4. This compels us to restrict needed and desired imports.
5. In spite of the drastic curtailment of imports by licensing, their value continues to exceed that of traditional exports.
6. The ultimate solution is to diversify and expand exports.
7. These circumstances impel us to use our abundant resources to manufacture for export so that our terms of trade will be more favorable.
8. We must sell in the world market. Thus, foreign trade is a burdensome necessity rather than a spontaneous undertaking.

Of course, these points of view do not say anything about who owns the means of production. It assumes that the same people should continue forever accumulating wealth in their hands, and these points of view do not say anything about the measures to be taken for the people who are starving now, and for the measures to be taken in order that the profits of the foreign companies do not impoverish the country more.

Colombian Balance of Payment Status.¹⁰⁵

The International Trade of Colombia

	Millions of Dollars				
	1962	1963	1964*	1965*	1970*
Exports	492	521	555	600	660
Imports	<u>-517</u>	<u>-529</u>	<u>-572</u>	<u>-600</u>	<u>-670</u>
Trade balance	- 25	- 8	- 17	0	- 10
Net service transactions and transfers	<u>- 95</u>	<u>-140</u>	<u>-140</u>	<u>-125</u>	<u>-220</u>
Balance on goods, services and transfers	-120	-148	-157	-125	-230
Private long-term capital, net	10	15	2	20	35
Private short-term capital, net	- 15	5	- 2	10	10
Official long-term capital, net	80	97	152	160	185
Net errors and omissions	<u>- 2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>
Deficit or Surplus	- 47	- 30	- 5	65	0

*Projections

Source: Wurfel, p. 85.

As we can see, Colombia is kept running now by the official long-term capital loans from the U.S.

Wurfel gives as an immediate and long-term policy for reducing the balance of payments deficit, some measures that apparently seem very sound:

1. exports expansion and diversification;
2. developing tourism;
3. continued import restrictions;

105. Wurfel, op. cit., p. 85.

4. domestic production of import substitutions;
5. avoidance of short-term debts and austerity and consolidation of outstanding obligations by long-term lower interest rate refinancing.

These, as I said before, may be just some of the measures for stabilizing problems of that part of the Colombian society that is living in the twentieth century, and which needs industrial products. But this is not, it cannot be, the answer for that part of the population -- the most -- who live not only in another century, but in another world. Solving the balance of payments problem would leave them starving as always.

In the next table, of Colombian foreign trade, we can see the very high dependence we have on the U.S. trade for imports and exports. This is given to the fact that the economic ties of my country with the U.S. at the present time are imposed on us in such a way, under terms like additionality, that give the impression that my country would not be able to survive without the U.S. "aid"!

COLOMBIAN FOREIGN TRADE¹

EXPORTS:	(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)					
	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Coffee	355	363	334	308	332	303
Crude petroleum	65	73	80	68	61	78
Raw cotton			13	11	16	9
Bananas	16	14	14	14	11	13
Sugar				5	7	6
All others	25	24	25	29	36	37
<i>Total</i>	461	474	466	435	463	446
To the United States	319	321	298	260	267	232
To EEC	66	71	89	86	95	98
To EFTA	23	40	35	41	39	29
To LAFTA	3	3	5	6	7	6
IMPORTS:						
Machinery & equipment	101	103	161	174	165	
Chemicals & products	67	68	79	88	72	
Iron & steel products	45	41	55	50	39	
Vehicles & parts	22	46	62	74	42	
Paper & manufactures	20	22	26	28	23	
Fuel & derivatives	13	12	14	16	16	
All others	132	124	122	127	183	
<i>Total</i>	400	416	519	557	540	467 ²
From the United States	238	245	294	279	278	242
From EEC	79	66	98	112	105	85
From EFTA	41	44	57	66	66	49
From LAFTA	7	9	7	10	13	19

1. Data derived from First National City Bank, New York, Foreign Information Service, Colombia, June, 1964, p. 9.

2. 1963 import figures are estimates.

During the last years, however, the share of imports from the U.S. has decreased somewhat:

(In Percent)

	1957-61	1962-66	Decrease	Increase
United States	53.9	42.4	11.5	----
Western Europe and Japan	35.5	41.5	----	6.0
South America	2.2	5.9	----	3.7
Communist bloc countries	.7	1.8	----	1.1
Central America	3.7	4.5	----	.8
All others	4.0	3.9	.1	----
Total	100.0	100.0	-----	

Source: CR, p. 169.

But I do not know how much Colombia is buying from American industries in the other countries.

In the table of exports by principal products we can see the actual percentages of the products we export and the importance that coffee, oil, cotton and bananas have in our economy; but we know that in reality the oil, bananas and platinum are not ours. Finally, in the table of imports we can see which items should have a vigorous substitution import policy, in order to accelerate the industrial development of the country: machinery and apparatus, chemicals and products, metal and manufactures, vehicles.

COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS
(Percentages of total)

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Coffee	76.6	76.7	78.2	81.6	83.3	81.3	70.9	67.3	67.3	66.9	64.5	70.8	71.6	67.8
Bananas	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.1	3.9	4.2	3.7	3.0	2.6	2.7	3.2	2.3	3.0
Tobacco	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.9	1.2	1.6
Cotton	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.5	2.6	4.0	2.8
Wood	—	—	—	—	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.6
Platinum	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.4
Cement	0.2	—	0.1	0.1	—	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.4
Crude oil	16.2	15.4	15.5	12.4	10.7	10.3	10.4	12.5	12.6	13.5	15.5	15.7	13.1	17.3
Sugar	0.5	1.7	0.1	—	—	0.4	0.6	0.1	—	—	—	1.2	1.6	1.2

SOURCE: (1950-60) *Plan general*, pt. 1, p. 309; (1961-3); Bank of London & S. America, *Fortnightly R.*, xix/728 (1964).

COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS

	1961		1962		1963	
	US\$ m.	%	US\$ m.	%	US\$ m.	%
TOTAL	557.1	100.0	540.4	100.0	506.0	100.0
Machinery & apparatus	174.4	31.3	184.4	34.1	150.3	29.7
Electric machinery	45.3	8.1	45.7	8.5	40.0	7.9
Chemicals & products	87.8	15.8	87.4	16.2	79.6	15.7
Metals & manufac- factures	64.6	11.6	62.6	11.6	51.6	10.2
Iron & steel, & mfs.	49.6	8.9	47.0	8.7	41.1	8.1
Vehicles & equip- ment	74.2	13.3	46.1	8.5	46.8	9.2
Road vehicles & parts	53.2	9.5	37.9	7.0	36.1	7.1
Paper & manu- factures	27.6	5.0	26.3	4.9	20.4	4.0
Textiles and manu- factures	21.6	3.9	20.2	3.7	17.7	3.5
Wool & animal hair	13.2	2.4	10.2	1.9	9.9	2.0
Rubber & manufac- tures	9.9	1.8	12.3	2.2	12.4	2.5
Fuels & derivatives	16.4	2.9	16.7	3.1	12.0	2.4
Cereals & prepara- tions	25.2	4.5	14.6	2.7	9.2	1.8
Others	55.4	9.9	69.8	12.9	106.0	20.9

SOURCE: Bank of London & S. America, *Fortnightly R.*, xxix/728 (1964).

Ten-Year Development Plan for Colombia.

Colombia does not have a comprehensive development plan to guide its economic and social development.

In December 1960, Colombia published a four-year public investment plan...that consisted of investment plans submitted by various ministries and other government agencies without regard of overall national priorities... that plan was only a statement of statistical goals; it included no strategy or procedures for achieving the stated goals and it did not constitute a workable development program. 106

Key factors relating to Colombia's problems in planning efforts during the Alliance, according to the CR, are:

- a. lack of political and financial support;
- b. attention addressed to immediate rather than long-range problems;
- c. lack of coordination between the department of planning and the planning of sections of the various ministries and public agencies;
- d. lack of sufficient basic data for sound policy formulation and long-range planning;
- e. lack of qualified personnel.

In early 1965, it was recognized that there was, in fact, no Colombian development plan to support. 107

106. CR, p. 136.

107. CR, p. 137.

The only comment I have for this problem of the national planning is that, under the present circumstances, it will be very hard to have "national goals" as the CR hopes for. The elites of the country seem so blinded in their egotism, that they would never agree with any "national goal" that has to do with giving part of the wealth of the country to the poor people. This represents giving away part of their self-taken shares. That helps to explain the failures of planning under the present regime...

This problem of national planning constitutes one of the elements that go into the economic circle of underdevelopment. Breaking it may prove to be as hard as having the leaders of the country departing from their views about what society is, and from their views about what the ends of wealth are. As we can see, the levels of complexity of the problem approximately correspond to the other sectors of the Colombian economy.

More Planning in Colombia?

1. Colombian development corporations. Colombia is a fanatic country for planning; there is a national planning body -- the National Council of Economic Policy and Planning; there is the Administrative Department of Planning and Technical Services, with its famous Ten-Year Plan for the Alliance for Progress; there is also a National Civil Service Commission, an Administrative

Department of Civil Service, and a Civil Service Chamber of the Council of State; each ministry has its own planning body and besides has lost all the effective power, giving it to autonomous bodies, each one with its own planning body. And besides that, we have three regional planning bodies like the TVA.

2. We have all the international planning agencies: UNICEF, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, IAEA, ITO, ITU, WHO, WMO; OAS organizations, CEPAL missions, BIR missions, IFC missions, IDB missions, SPTF of the US, IMF missions.

3. The Alliance for Progress.

4. Private programs: CARE, CARITAS.

5. Regional Development Corporations.

6. And the list of decentralized institutes doing planning which I have included in Appendix A.

But Colombia does not have planning.

With this impressive quantity of planning bodies working accordingly, Colombia should not be going through the times it is going through now.

Colombia's Savings.

Here we will find out what has happened to the general projections for investment Colombia had in the Ten-Year Development Plan.

Colombia's levels of savings, during three of the first four years of the Alliance, failed to meet what AID calls "minimum marginal savings requirements." Colombia's marginal savings were more than 1.1 billion constant 1958 pesos below the minimum levels required by AID criteria. In addition, Colombia's gross national savings, as a percent of GDP, declined substantially during the first four years of the Alliance, compared with the pre-Alliance period of 1957-1961.

Accordingly with AID, the best measure of a country's success in improving its domestic capital supply available for investment is the proportion of additions to GNP which it saves; that is, its marginal savings rate; a minimum of 20 percent of annual increments to GNP should be saved, and in serious development efforts this ratio often goes over 30 percent.

Table showing that Colombia's average annual marginal savings rate during the first four years of the Alliance was a negative 4.7 percent:

(In millions of constant 1958 pesos)

	Total, 1957-1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	Total, 1962-65
Gross national product	108,420	24,909	25,785	27,342	28,141	106,177
Increase in GNP	4,289	1,120	876	1,557	799	4,352
Gross national savings (GNS) ¹	21,166	4,453	4,422	3,809	4,486	17,170
Increase in gross national savings	+1,063	-239	-31	-613	+677	-206
Ratio of increase in GNS to increase in GNP (marginal savings rate)...percent..	+24.8	-21.3	-3.5	-39.4	+84.7	-4.7

¹GNS is the total savings minus net foreign trade balance (imports over exports) and factor income from abroad. Net factor income consists of the net receipts from the rest of the world of investment income, such as interest, dividends, and branch profits; of earnings of residents working abroad; and of other factor income of normal residents.

We notice that the rate for the four years previous to the Alliance was 24.8 percent.

Colombia's development program established that the level of investments, financed to a large extent by savings, would be increased from 20 percent of GDP in 1960 to 26 percent by 1964.

Table showing that investments were 18.2 percent of GDP in 1964, rather than the 26 percent planned and the total investment as a percent of GDP has declined during the Alliance:

(In millions of constant 1958 pesos)

	Average, 1957-61	1962	1963	1964	1965	Average, 1962-65
Gross domestic product	22,043	25,400	26,200	27,800	28,700	27,025
Total investment	4,479	4,805	4,780	5,058	4,899	4,886
Total investment as a percent of GDP	20.3	18.9	18.2	18.2	17.1	18.1

The increase in investments, according to the Colombian Development Plan should rise from 18 percent of GDP in 1960 to 23 percent by 1964.

Table showing the low levels of saving during the Alliance; an average of 15.9 percent. Less than before the Alliance:

	<u>Gross national savings as a percent of GDP</u>
Average 1957-1961	19.2
1962	17.5
1963	16.9
1964	13.7
1965	15.6
Average 1962-1965	15.9

The CR says that the factors contributing to the shortfall in Colombia's gross national savings and the low marginal savings rate were:

- a. low interest rate: 4 percent paid by savings institutions, compared to 14 to 24 percent charged by lenders;
- b. limited success of tax reforms;
- c. inflation, that encourages spending in durable goods, that tend to increase in value: the value of passenger automobiles imported by Colombia during the Alliance was more than double the value of passenger automobiles imported during the 5-year prealliance period;
- d. increase in private consumption expenditures.

Table showing the high levels of private consumption expenditures in Colombia:

	(In millions of 1958 pesos)					
	Average, 1957-61	1962	1963	1964	1965	Average, 1962-65
Private consumption expenditures	16,190	18,924	19,744	21,706	21,714	20,522
Gross domestic product	22,043	25,400	26,200	27,800	28,700	27,025
Private consumption expenditures as a percent of GDP	73.4	74.5	75.4	78.1	75.7	75.9

Savings are one of the most pervasive problems Colombia has; as there cannot be a general purpose agreement on the needs of the country, in

order to share between the ones who have, and the ones who do not,
then what to save for?

Inflation in Colombia.

After we saw the low savings and investment rates in Colombia, one of the keys for the low pace of development of the country, now we will see another of the points of the vicious economic circle around which my underdeveloped country gyrates; as we saw, AID thinks that one of the main causes for the low savings rate is the high inflationary process operating in Colombia.

Inflation as experienced by Colombia in recent years, tends to suppress the mobilization of resources needed for development by discouraging domestic savings and foreign investments, which are ingredients of paramount importance in any development effort, while encouraging capital flight and spending of durable goods which tend to increase in value. 108

Table showing inflation rates in Colombia; preAlliance period 9.8 percent, and Alliance period, 15.1 percent of average annual rate. The goal for the Alliance period was of 10 percent.

Year	Rate of Increase (%)	Year	Rate of Increase (%)
1957	14.5	1962	2.5
1958	14.9	1963	32.3
1959	7.0	1964	17.1
1960	3.7	1965	3.7
1961	9.0	1966	20.1
		1967 (8 months)	7.5
Annual Average: 1957-61	9.8	Annual Average: 1962-66	15.1

108. CR, p. 149.

The CR attributes the 1963 high rate of inflation to the Government decreeing a wage increase of about 40 percent to both private and public sectors, coupled with the monetary effects of a large government deficit in 1962.

The CR attributes also the high rate of inflation in 1966 in part, to:

1. the devaluation of the exchange rate covering imports;
2. a substantial wage increase for the public sector;
3. heavy borrowing by the National Coffee Federation;
4. higher tariffs on prices of imported goods;
5. increase in public utility tariffs.

We understand that other factors contributing to Colombia's inflation have been the extent of central Government deficit financing due, in large part, to the failure to increase government revenues adequately, by a combination of new taxes and improved tax administration, and to the increase of domestic credit.

The CR says that:

1. the Colombian Government's deficit financing amounted to an average of 1,077 million pesos per year during the Alliance period 1957-61, and
2. domestic credit has increased an average of 19.2 percent per year during the first five years of the Alliance compared with an average increase of 15 percent per year during the five years preceding the Alliance.

See table:

<u>Year</u>	(In millions of pesos)		<u>Annual percent of increase domestic credit</u>
	<u>Government Surplus (+) or deficit (-)</u>	<u>Domestic Credit</u>	
1957	-95	4,139	21.9
1958	-37	4,641	12.1
1959	+83	4,911	5.8
1960	-162	5,461	11.2
1961	-1,296	6,762	23.8
1962	-1,243	8,340	23.3
1963	-940	9,577	14.8
1964	-543	11,181	16.7
1965	-1,397	13,078	17.0
1966	-1,263	16,247	24.2
Annual average, 1957-61	-301	5,183	15.0
Annual average, 1962-66	-1,077	11,685	19.2

As we saw throughout the study, no mention was in the AID analysis of the causes of inflation in Colombia viewed from the point of view of the "structuralist" position we revised in Chapter One, and that relates the problem of inflation in underdeveloped countries with the low productivity in agriculture, with the patterns of land ownership, with the terms of trade with industrialized countries, with the exorbitant differences in income between the rich and the poor, and the rest of the inequalities inherent in our present regimes and that "attempts to hold down the expansion of the money supply through bank, credit restrictions, fiscal discipline, or wage and salary stops" are in this view directed "merely" at the symptoms of the disease, not at its real cause. They may do more harm than good because, with the structural factors continuing to exert their influence on the price

level, a decision not to validate these pressures can lead to a decline in growth, output, employment -- and to serious trouble in the streets."¹⁰⁹ And this is what the regime is doing; trying to solve the problems, the effects of inflation cause, but without looking at the causes of inflation. The CR says about the measures the government takes:

...the Colombian Government...adopted new monetary measures which raised the legal reserve requirements of commercial banks.

AID gives also as conditions for the loans to Colombia conditions "as wage freezings" which put the load of the inflation on the workers.¹¹⁰

...a new monetary commission was created as the policy body on monetary, credit, and exchange policy.

Capital and Human Flight.

As a result of the inflationary process in Colombia, another point in this vicious circle of underdevelopment is found: the rich people get their money out of the country, and the technicians go to work in other countries. This, at the same time contributes to aggravate the problems more. To this, we have to add the capital the foreign companies each year are taking out of the country.

AID evaluated the problem and estimated the amount of capital flight in two of the first five years of the Alliance. The AID-estimated capital flight from Colombia in 1962 amounted to about \$35 million and

109. Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress - Studies of Economic Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, New York, 1965, p. 284.

110. CR, p. 149.

in 1963 amounted to about 82 million. AID made no estimate of the amount of capital flight in 1964... A member of the consultative group reviewed the problem in 1965 and estimated that the bulk of an estimated 47 million decline during the first half of 1965 of Colombia's international reserves was accounted for by capital flight. 111

AID warns Colombia of not touching the flight of the capital exploited by American "enlightened capitalism" because "establishing definite and stable norms that govern remittance of profits and principal of foreign capital investment may curb capital flight to a major extent but that these controls will also restrict foreign investment which is needed for accelerated economic development. 112

About the human flight we saw that just in 1965, 800 professionals from Colombia came to the U.S. as immigrants: "physicians, engineers, nurses," etc. 113 But I think that if we are an economic, social, and political colony of the U.S.A., the most natural thing for a professional is to try to live where the elites are, and not to bother himself, having to work with the ignorant Colombians, who are not able to pay the bills.

Government Expenditures.

On the average, the percent of GNP in relation to Colombian Government expenditures has risen slightly during the Alliance, although the 1961 percentage was not again attained through 1966. In addition, during the Alliance the Government has spent a larger proportion of its available funds for development

111. CR, p. 166.

112. CR, p. 166.

113. CR, p. 167.

purposes. We also noted that at least 6 percent of the 1966 expenditures represented subsidies to various public and private organizations. 114

Central Government expenditures ratio to GNP, 1957 through 1966:

(GNP and expenditures in millions of constant 1958 pesos)

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	5-year Average
GNP	19,786	20,267	21,791	22,787	23,789	21,684
Total Central Govt. Expenditures	1,498	1,673	1,728	2,001	2,811	1,942
As a percent of GNP	7.6	8.3	7.9	8.8	11.8	8.9
	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	5-year Average
GNP	24,909	25,785	27,342	28,141	30,096 ¹	27,255
Total Central Govt. Expenditures	2,561	2,566	2,483	2,833	3,227	2,734
As a percent of GNP	10.3	10.0	9.1	10.1	10.7	10.0

¹ Estimated by AID.

Central Government expenditures by functional distribution:

Function	Amount, period 1957-61		Amount, period 1962-66		Percent of Increase or Decrease (-) during 1962-66
	Amount	Percent of total	Amount	Percent of total	
Local and national defense	2,545	26.2	3,277	24.0	-2.2
Transportation and communication	1,667	17.2	1,903	13.9	-3.3
General administrative expenses	1,583	16.3	1,344	9.8	-6.5
Public debt service	911	9.4	2,230	16.3	6.9
Social welfare and public health	755	7.8	1,224	9.0	1.2
Education & cultural	721	7.4	1,683	12.3	4.9
Water, sewer, and other community services	343	3.5	318	2.3	-1.2

Other economic development	339	3.5	231	1.7	-1.8
Mining and energy	328	3.4	494	3.6	.2
Agriculture and forestry	311	3.2	648	4.7	1.5
Housing	169	1.7	240	1.8	.1
Industry	40	.4	77	.6	.2
<hr/>					
Total	9,712	100.0	13,669	100.0	-----

We have to notice the huge amounts of money the regime spends in the repressive apparatus, for killing peasants of course, when compared for example against what the government expends in schools.

Public Debt.

Another or the surprising things is to see how the "Public Debt Service" is going so high these years. It is because the government, composed of the rich, has made the poor people pay in order that the rich acquire more wealth. It has converted commercial debts of the rich into "National Debts." Let us see what Montana Cuellar says, just about one case during the 1958 devaluation:¹¹⁴

But soon, things started to look clearer. Because of the pressure of the high financiers, the fix change that had been operating for twenty years was substituted for free exchange. The exchange rose up from 4 to 8, and the active in dollars put outside Colombia by the coffee contrabandists, by the ones who earned by double accounting, rose up by 200 percent, the ones who had obtained licenses for buying dollars at 2.50, were in debt of nothing. They had paid its value to the "Banco de la Republica."

114. Montana, op. cit., p. 224.

But the country now was in debt for U.S. \$497,047,000. The first thing for the National Front was to convert the debt into a National Debt, giving it to the Colombian people. In order to pay that debt the next financing was made:

<u>Internal Credit</u>	<u>U.S.</u>
Fondo de estabilizacion	105,735,000
Banco de la Republica	225,332,000
 <u>External Credit</u>	
Emission de pagares	79,400,000
Prestamo de Bancos comerciales norteamericanos	26,560,000
Emprestito del Import and Export Bank	60,000,000
 Total U.S. \$	 497,047,000

Source: Montana, p. 225.

In Colombian money at a value of 6.45 percent average of the price of exchange certificates, the debt was now of \$1,323,413.

In order to pay for it, there was created a 15 percent tax on exports and 10 percent on imports. Thus the "commercial debt made by the merchants and exporters fraud was assumed by the Nation.

At the same time, Carlos Lleras Restrepo (N.B., the actual president of Colombia), politician and financial advisor to the oligarchs, proposed to the Houses the Amnesty Law, for flown capitals in order to have them come back. Thus the fraud was legalized and capitals exported at 2.50 percent, came back to the country at an exchange of 8, while the coffee producers and the consumers paid for the fictitious commercial debt with the 15 and 10 percent taxes.

According to the AID, Colombia's external debt service burden has almost doubled since the beginning of the Alliance, from approximately 34 million in 1961 to about 67 million in 1966. As a result, the percent of Colombia's export earnings needed to service its external debt increased from 7.8 percent in 1961 to 13.1 percent in 1966. Colombia's gross foreign assets declined from an annual average of \$191 million during the pre-Alliance period 1958-1961, to an annual average of \$142 million during the first five years of the Alliance.¹¹⁵

Colombia's External Debt Service.

<u>Year</u>	<u>External debt service burden (in millions U.S.\$)</u>	<u>External debt service burden as percent of exports</u>
1961	\$34	7.8
1962	36	7.8
1963	51	11.4
1964	64	11.7
1965	58	10.8
1966	67	13.1

Considering the level of exports devoted to cover the debt service, CR says that

...a different member of the consultative group had determined earlier that to require the use of 12 percent of export earnings in Colombia to service its external debt would be high and that a ratio of 15 percent would be unsafe.

The debt service payments to AID, however, will increase significantly after 1972 due to (1) expiration of grace periods for repayment of loan

115. CR, p. 132.

principal and (2) increased interest rates which become effective after the expiration of the grace periods. In this regard of the \$264 million AID loaned to Colombia during the period 1962-66, the repayment of principal on \$233.6 million is to start in the 1973-77 period. In addition, interest rates on \$147.5 million of the AID loans will more than double after 1973.

What worries me more is what is Colombia going to do for paying this debt during the 70's. The people cannot be squeezed more, and they have not seen the loans in investments which could pay back for themselves. The loans were for the "National Debt" and for running the apparatus, army, friends, and sharers of the regime.

And in this way we are arriving to the end of this analysis. From pain to pain, we have been discovering the reality of what my country is. From promise to promise the leaders have gone, using words and words, the soft being replaced by the radical ones; in this way we find Colombia today, with a lot of non-accomplished vital promises. Not only with respect to land problems the people have been deceived; we saw what the situation was with respect to schools, hospitals, housing, income distribution; I did not include in this work analysis of how the earnings of the workers have been each year less, of how the rich people hoard money in industrial revenues, and some other important aspects of the economic infrastructure of the country.

Nevertheless, I positively know that they would make darker the Colombian reality.

On the other hand, we saw how a country, the U.S.A., has converted my country into one of its appendages through its domination in all the orders of the national structure. We saw the terms in which the so-called "aid" is given to us; and the terms in which private and official businesses with American concerns are carried out; and the ways our economy is drained out and suffocated by the continuum of this business profiting only one way: the foreign.

And if we want to proceed from now on, after seeing the reality, only one thing comes to our head: that this thing must stop, that this thing must be stopped; that this thing must be changed.

We have to stop this violence which is being exercised against the people for many years; the economic violence each day exercised on the people; the political violence during the last twenty years by using the army and the police, with its 200,000 deaths and its American advisors; the social violence exercised on these people by keeping them ignorant, and in this way converting them into servants; the drainage in our economy by the U.S.A. The time for promises is gone and we know how the pacific waiting of the poor in my country only produces more hunger, death, despair, and promises, and deceiving.

We have to ask ourselves, in front of this long list of failures by the poor to obtain their rights being taken into consideration, and after having talked or organizing, conflict, self-defense: what to do?

On Violence.

Because now a new word comes to our lips, and that is violence. We love peace, but does violence have any meaning to us? Could we think of the poor people of Colombia as having to resort in implementing their self-defense to that which has so largely been used against them by the elites, namely violence? Because certainly violence has been widely employed against the poor people.

By violence I do not mean only the physical force, but I enlarge the meaning of it, to comprise the psychological violence, and the social violence by exclusion, and the economic violence by deprivation of the opponents exercised by some group or groups within a society. These types of violence may be organized in a conscious or unconscious way. Although the ways these types of violence are exercised may not be of physical violence, body hurting, the ends are always body hurting; for example, when a person or a group are subject to violence of the economic type, let us say by deprivation of that person of a job, and so that person does not have the access to food because he does not have money, this type of violence is apparently not body hurting, but

the product of this violence, hunger, is as painful, and as body hurting as a knife. This is only if we talk about the physical product of this apparently not-violent violence; but violence by hunger has intellectual and psychological effects on the person that goes through it; in the case of hunger, degeneration of the person, physical inability to work and mental retardation are the products of it.

In my country, when we start seeing it nearer throughout the study, we discover that violence exists in daily and great amounts, and that we can recognize four types of it; great amounts of this violence are used by the elites for trying to avoid change. These types of violence are:

a. Oppressive violence from the rulers of the country that exercise it on the poor people who dare to speak for their unrecognized rights; this violence may be exercised:

1. by economic means, by a few people earning huge quantities of money while the majority of the people starve;
2. violence exercised on the people by cultural deprivation, by keeping the people illiterate and ignorant, and by keeping the people away from the most elementary rights, these people working for fattening the stomachs of the rich

deserve health facilities, housing facilities,
food, land, rest;

3. by legal means which are used to terrorize those of the poor people who dare to speak for themselves; jails and a puppet legal system in the hands of the rulers are used as instruments for keeping people in their places;

4. military means which are used in terms of the most modern counterinsurgency and anti-guerrilla methods of the world, for fighting and killing peasants. This fact has produced more than 200,000 peasants dead since 1948. The people in power are responsible for this violence.

b. Violence among the members of the ruler class for disagreements when distributing the spoils of the country. This type of violence involved for many years the peasantry following the rulers, but it seems arriving at its end.

c. Violence as a defensive means used by the peasants when they see themselves attacked by the army of the rulers.

d. Violence that may be called "exercised from outside," and of which we recognize three types as existant:

1. violence which is implemented by countries that back the rulers, by countries like the U.S.A., which consists in providing arms and training and "advisors," for the country counter guerrilla operations, and for the police, especially. This type of violence is also reinforced with the continuous menace of "continental forces," marines.

2. violence from outside, from countries that back the rulers, and that is of the economic type, by means of pressures and implicit menaces of cutting credits and grants if some conditions, let us say, facilities for foreign monopolies' operations are not given.

3. violence from outside countries, that oppose the rulers of Colombia. This violence may be of two types:

a. violence which is not exercised inside Colombia; for example, the Cuban revolution brought very fast responses in countries like mine, that by fears of having it at home, passed a law of social agrarian reform, and in countries like the U.S.A., organizing the Alliance for Progress. This type of violence is

likely to repeat if other neighboring countries have revolutions of the socialist type.

b. violence which is exercised inside my country and that consists in giving help, arms, money, and training to guerrillas fighting in my country.

Couldn't we use some elements of organized violence for defending the poor people in such a desperate case?

And what do the scholars say about violence as an agent for social change? Going over the actual trends in opinions about violence, the causes of it, its effects, its relations with processes of social change, I found very different and controversial theories about it. Apparently we know nothing about violence; just a knowledge of its existence.

Let us go, as an example, through one of the most comprehensive analyses of violence and its relations to social change:¹¹⁶

1. Bienen points out with respect to the causes of violence, the existence of many mutually contradictory theories that try to explain it. The two main streams of thought are:

116. For a more detailed explanation, see: Violence and Social Change, University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 99, by Henry Bienen.

- a. an explanation of violence in a so-called structural approach, deriving it from social conditions, viewing violence as the product of a very low ratio of social-want satisfaction versus social-want formation;
 - b. a deviationist position that tries to focus on behavioral and personality factors of the individual, based on the reason that explanations made on social conditions can be cut in so many ways. Bienen does not fail to notice that these approaches that "try to measure anger, frustration, and aggression and are characterized by reliance on quantification, and factor analysis, always deduce them from the social conditions..."¹¹⁷
2. With respect to revolution, revolution is almost always defined in terms of violence; but this does not get us any further because "it amounts to explanation by definition."¹¹⁸
3. On insurgency, we have once more two streams of thought:
- a. the one held by Debray, Mao, Lenin, that "sees violence per se as functional for modernization, as a purging force that makes men modern and makes them whole, thereby preparing them for life in a modernizing society."¹¹⁹

117. Ibid., p. 99.

118. Ibid., p. 100.

119. Ibid., p. 100.

b. the second one "which represents a response by American theorists, e.g., Rostow, considers espousal of violence as an end in itself to be a fundamentally irrational response to the challenges of modernization by a generation of romantic revolutionaries that is passing from the scene. This irrational response is correlated, in this view, with frustrating conditions which have stymied development and is the cry of leaders who have been unable to cope with them. Thus, it can be explained as the violence of the "transitional" period."

But the American literature on counterinsurgency is peculiar in one respect: those who talk about the "transition" also talk about masses apathetic to some degree, as when they espouse a "high military strategy" of withdrawing or making costly "inputs" needed by guerrillas who they assume are operating in a context of mass apathy. Yet the same people talk about a "transition" that is defined by an increase in political participation by the masses. Thus, we see the paradox of holding to a view that sees increasing participation by the masses while simultaneously believing that insurgents can be dealt with on their own terms, abstracted from social conditions. This literature also contains the notion that perhaps we should slow up social mobilization, since it may be "dysfunctional" for a society. This view leads to a turning away from a concern for social reform,

at least in the short run, on the ground that reform may exacerbate conditions or "disequilibrate" political systems, thereby leading to violence.

There are also the works by Mosca and Machiavelli concerned with the uses of violence by elites in order to innovate without losing their positions in society.

4. When revising the writings about ghetto violence, Bienen sees them plagued with the same characteristics found when talking about counter-insurgency, seeing violence in industrial society as anachronistic, as the acts of peoples in "transition" from an underdeveloped to a developed state and hence suggests that it can be treated as we treat insurgency in the new nations.¹²⁰

5. The relations between violence and constant innovation or modernization as system-transformation are revised by Bienen under totalitarianism: "terror is seen as being used in a conscious way by the leaders for system-transformation, leading to the use of such concepts as "permanent revolution" and "permanent purge" (Arendt, Brezezinski, Friedich)."

Bienen finishes by saying that "there is no body of knowledge that one could confidently recommend to American policymakers who now confront violence in America and abroad. We would be hard put to tell

120. Ibid., p. 101.

them whether or not they are in an internal-war situation at home. We would be as hard put to recommend strategies, or even tactics to deal with the violence they confront, and which confronts them."¹²¹ He also states that although violence and change must be linked, they must not be treated conceptually as contingent concepts because some of the most fundamental change does not result from violent revolution. But at the same time Bienen fails to say when fundamental change should be linked to violent revolution.

And here my question comes once more to the forefront: could not we use some elements of organized violence to defend the poor people in Colombia from the elites, and for pushing reforms of the social structure?

We find ourselves in front of a crossroads of opposite sets of theories, clearly identified before, in which, if we take the side of the ones who see the adoption of violence as a means to self-defense, and as a means for changing the social structures, we will be adopting the side and we will be labeled as socialists.

But if socialism means the opportunity for the poor in Colombia to have houses, education, jobs, health facilities, hospitals, food, land, security, justice, a more even distribution of income, no exploitation by nationals or foreigners, I am all for it.

121. Ibid., p. 103.

If violence means houses, schools, hospitals, land, food, security, justice; no exploitation of the poor people in Colombia, the end to the exploitation by foreigners, I am all for it.

If socialist means and ends will bring all this good to the people of my country, I am all for them. I firmly disregard the name of "irrational" given to the use of violence in this desperate occasion my country is going through.

But some people will come to me and say, "But why change through violence; why not change peacefully?" And I would answer: well, by conflict, violent conflict, I cannot exclude the fact that it may happen through blood, by killing people in an organized way. But violence, even if it is not bloody, will have to be exercised over the elites in power in Colombia. We saw already how, for example, the changes in land relations in my country, even the absolutely meaningless laws, have occurred, because of violence exercised by the peasants. These changes, of course, have been of a very partial and short character, because the real power -- the guns -- have continued in the hands of the elites and the peasants' organizations did not prove very effective at the time.

And still, I know, these people will come back, and tell me: "But listen, you cannot guarantee that the leaders will not understand, even if it is in the last effort by the people to convince them, and

will not become conscious of the debts they have to the working class and will not give away their riches." And I would say to them: no, they, the elites in power, are lost, they have lost their opportunity; the last time they could have received a big help for doing this, the help of the U.S.A., is gone. John F. Kennedy is dead and the Alliance for Progress is dead, too. He wanted to give them money, dollars, compensation for the riches they were going to pass to the hands of the poor, and they took the money but they did not give the riches to the poor. Their chance is lost. For four centuries the peasants have waited. Do you believe that the elites are now going to give their riches away, now that nobody is going to compensate them for them?

I would propose to give recognition to and to help coordinate those valiant men who are in the mountains of my country already trying to change by force of arms the fate of their land, in order to learn from them.

Let us go into our third chapter; the form of it is to see Camilo Torres' story; and the content of the chapter is to see through his experiences and failures, the most elementary needs of a revolutionary type of work in Colombia. His case I guess, will serve our purposes very well because as we will later see, his understanding of the causes of the problems of Colombia were very much

like mine. He understood that social change is not occurring in Colombia; he understood the rotten causes of the status quo for keeping us under underdevelopment of all sorts; he dared to defy the regime in all its different strata, went from not bloody to bloody conflict and was killed with the guerrillas in 1966. He did not change the government, but his ideas changed the mentality and opened the eyes of many Colombians. The great difference that I see between Camilo and myself in respect to the perception and attack of the problem, is that he started in a form of pacific reaction to the daily crimes of the regime, experimented through many ways of "democratic" competition with the regime, and step by step went radicalizing his ideas, entered into the area of conflict, and at the end went to the guerrillas and there he was killed. I see myself in a different position than he was, because I think I have learned from his experience already, and because I am very aware that a revolutionary type of work, in a country like Colombia, cannot be developed just as a responsive system of action to the crimes and violence of the regime. It has to be an offensive, creative, decisive, flexible, and disciplined action. It has to be a movement able to organize itself in an economic, social, and political way, the new one, which encourages the undecided to join it; it must be able to take the lead in the action, and cannot be something gradually from total peace to total war, accordingly with the institutionalized tactics of the regime, first bargaining and then

conflict, but must be able to use conflict or bargaining indiscriminately, as the circumstances ask for it.

Camilo represents the prototype for the violent change that I think has to occur in Colombia. His ideas are being felt already throughout the lands of South America, wherever concerned men start working for their land. He died just three years ago.

Chapter Three. Camilo Torres.

Military Communique No. 007.

The command of the V Brigade informs the citizens of the following:

As a consequence of the ambush that an armed group in approximate force of 25 men produced on February 15th against a patrol of this operative unit in the place called "Patio Cemento" of the "Corregimiento de El Carmen," in the Municipality of "San Vicente de Chucuri," with the aftermath that in its opportunity was given to public knowledge, it was proceeded to the identification of the corpses of five subjects downed by the patrol's immediate reaction to the contact, with the next results, when it is still necessary to confirm definitely some of them by the tecnic method of necrodactilia:

1. Camilo Torres Restrepo;
2. Aureliano Plata Espinoza;
3. Salvador Afanador, alias "Saul" or "El tuerto," who participated in the assault to Simacota and was the material author of the death of the first agent of the National Police that lost his life in that opportunity;
4. Paulino Rodriguez Sandoval, alias "Policarpo" who actively participated in the assault to Simacota;
5. N.N., without being identified.

Among the arms recuperated by the troops that intervned in the action there is a gun model M-1 caliber .30 that belonged to one of the soldiers that perished by the hand of the bandoleros in the assault of Simacota the seventh of January of 1965. That gun, distinguished with the number 5.088.554, was found in the hands of whom afterwards was identified as Camilo Torres Restrepo, with technically probed signals of having been shot moments before its capture.

The corpses of the persons enumerated in the above list were buried in a place located within the general area where the referred armed clash occurred.

Bucaramanga, February 17, 1966

(signed)

Colonel Alvaro Valencia Tovar
Commander of the V Brigade

What we read before, a literal translation of a Colombian regime's communique from the armed forces, one of the common, daily military communiques in my country, is the theme of this chapter, in which I will develop the one that may be the most complicated work I ever undertook. Many branches of the social sciences in which I would not boast of dominance I shall use in this chapter.

Before we start on Camilo, I want to go back and see for a moment who the responsible people, the elites, the ones in power are. They are the ones to be blamed, for all that has happened, for all that is happening to my country and for all the violence we will have to use to oust them from their entrenchment. These are the people Camilo Torres tried to engage himself against and they will be necessary for our understanding of the notion of organizing conflict in Colombia; they will be the other party.

The Actors.

Let us give a look to the actors on our stage, Colombia. Some of them like the political parties have been acting for one hundred and fifty years, and at best they have been a continuation of the colonial times under the Spanish; others are of more recent arrival, but nevertheless manage and contribute to the conditions we could observe in the adjunct study.

In order of age, and real power-and-guns-and-dogma, the ones who have played the key roles, and have been the core of the game are:

The Church

The (traditional) Parties:

Conservative
Liberal

The Government

The Executive
The Senate
The Courts
The Police and the Army
The Information Media

The U.S.A.

Now those actors without so much power and guns ... Let's imagine these actors as the ones who have occupied until now, the less organized, less effective strata, in the outside of the core, but potentially more active:

The Abstentionists (non-voters)

The Students

The Peasants

The Workers

The Communists, and Other New and Little Parties

The Guerrillas

Other outsiders, less influential, but each day more active in the game in my country have been mainly spectators, but may change their roles:

The U.S.S.R.

Cuba

Communist China

The Other Countries in Latin America

Comments on the Actors.

Before starting to write about the actors, in order to avoid the naivete of believing the actors as being of homogeneous composition, let us remember that being in government does not necessarily mean detenting power, and power is a matter of very exclusive concern in Latin America; real power has been traditionally very entrenched in the hierarchies, a very usual fact in the Spanish tradition of power.

Mao Tse-Tung has a similar approach when, in his "Methods of Work of Party Committees," he states: "In all mass movements we must make a basic investigation and analysis of the number of active supporters, opponents and neutrals and must not decide problems subjectively and without basis."

This way of appreciating the bureaucratic bodies will be of high value when the moment of policy making comes, for any movement of social

change, in order to look for different strata of dominance and allegiance within the institutions in government.

The Church.

Traditionally, the Church has had to deal with all the supernatural-divine and those nastier -- material -- affairs and goods in my country. Because of a special agreement between the Pope and the Spanish Kings' during the colonial times in Latin America, the Kings had the power of electing the mandatories of the Church, and the Church was rewarded by privileges and protection. After the independence of most of the countries in Latin America in the early eighteenth hundreds, the same positions of predominance continued in the hands of the Church.

But with the French revolutionary ideas leaking into Latin America -- and let us not forget that by that time, and I am afraid still now, France and not the United States was considered the best place by the elites of my country to send their children culture-absorbing -- we had the situation, that at the birth of the first political parties, Clericalism -- the union of State and Church was one of the fundamental issues of party fighting and the French liberalist ideas one of the main forces in action.

This situation sometimes arrived at such stormy times, that the Jesuits were expelled two times out of the country during the last part of the nineteenth century and twice they came back and still remain there. Of course, in time this situation has receded, the parties seem to have forgotten forever their discrepancies, and now the Church represents the National Religion in my country.

In order to keep its position, the Church fought its way back with equal wrath to opposing parties, and has participated, in a natural fashion, in one of the biggest genocides in the history of Latin America, in my country, the killings that have produced more than 200,000 deaths since 1948. Of examples of the encouragement of these acts, from the pulpits, there are many:

Bishop Builles in a 1943 letter to his parishioners, when his party was not in government: "The gravest is that the majority of the dead have fallen by the official bullets and the assassins will continue shedding the blood of their brothers because there is no sanction."

Martinez Madrigal, another bishop, wrote: "What is happening in the countryside by the hands of a gang of wrong-doers devoted to all classes of crimes is but a putsch of the communists that aspire to enslave our country."¹²²

122. Guzman, et al., La Violencia en Colombia, Tercer Mundo, eds., 1964, p. 433.

Economic Assets. The Church participates with its interests in the economic power of my country; besides owning 85% of the educational system, it dominates great portions of economic assets; according to a conservative newspaper, "El Siglo,"¹²³ the Church is worth five billion pesos, cadastral price, without counting the lands of the Church or the personal property of priests and monks.

The biggest worker's union of the country, the U.T.C., is also in the hands of the Church.

Number of priests. According to the U.S. Army Special Warfare Handbook for Colombia, pp. 182-83, there is one priest for 3,650 people, proportion only superated in Latin America by Chile, Ecuador and the Guianas; this percentage represents approximately 5,400 priests and Robert Dix, in Colombia, the Political Dimensions of Change, estimates that half of them are foreigners.

Class Composition of the Church. The Church, of course, has classes inside itself. In the same way as the actual Cardinal, chief in Colombia, is the son of a President, the sons of peasants will be in little parishes, but among the most enlightened of them, we are seeing cases like Camilo Torres, one who challenged the hierarchy, and many others who are active in Colombia now.

123. El Siglo, June 22, 1965.

Church permeates the life of all Colombians during all their lives: Church-parents-marriage-birth-baptism-Church-confirmation-two rites of childhood-kindergarten-Church-school-Church-college-Church-marriage-Church-no divorce-Church-death-Church-heaven or hell-Church; there is no escape.

Summarizing about the Church, I would like to transcribe here what a young Brazilian priest, Sergio Zanella, says of it: "The Church of these days has become an economic enterprise as is General Motors, the Esso Company, the Shell Company, and the rest...The Church inside I live is rotten. It has deceived Christ, as a faithful wife becomes a prostitute, the lover of the State and of the favorable conditions to its opportunism."¹²⁴

So, we must consider the Church, I propose, with its deeds and its allegiances with power and wealth in Colombia, one of the main elements and objectives that should be considered, outside any theological discussion, when considering a program of social change, because of its entrenchment and power, and size.

nevertheless, I want to emphasize that lately, especially during 1969, very encouraging signs are coming from the Church. A bishop and sixty priests for the first time have issued a communique of non-

124. O' Cruzeiro, September 14, 1968.



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by the author.**

agreement with the oligarchy...¹²⁵ When Camilo Torres was alive three years ago, he was the only one...

The Government.

Let us say some words now, about the elements of "Government" in Colombia.

The Traditional Parties and the Administration. Not only the Presidency, but the Congress and Courts are shared equally by the two traditional parties, Conservative and Liberal; they have been on stage for more than a century now.

The structure of the parties is a vertical one. In the top there stay the few leaders of the chosen class. Highly educated, economically powerful and very passionate for maintaining their leadership; then comes the less than medium-size middle class and the ignorant and the miserable, the pueblo. The pueblo is the majority.

If the issues of discrepancy between the parties had any significance in the past, they do not any more.

The Conservatives were pro-Church, pro-centralists in government and interventionists in economic matters. The Liberals, all the contrary --

125. El Tiempo, March 7, 1969.

separationist with the Church, federalists, and liberalists in economics. Actually, the country became centralist, pro-Church, and a mess in economic matters.

The two parties (the leaders), as I said before, have been at peace since 1958. They reformed the Constitution, excluded other parties from government until 1972 at the beginning, then until 1974, and now until 1978, and seem to have a good time, with this array of things. But actually, this was not the norm before. Many civil wars, daily intrigue and strife was the rule. From 1948 on they, I mean the leaders of both parties, started one of the most infamous crimes in the history of my country by pushing, and counselling, and arming the poor ignorant peasants in both parties, to kill themselves; there have been more than 200,000 deaths since then.¹²⁶

What was the motive of all this? The leaders were playing power. Playing to be or not to be presidents, and ministers and lawyers. In 1958, after a military dictatorship, the leaders decided to end the peasants' war. From then on, they declared delinquents those who dared to remain in arms, which they had done by instigation of the leaders. From then on, it seemed as if the Saint Spirit, having descended upon them, having cleaned them, had given them once more eternal powers to declare criminal or good guys, at their discretion.

126. Guzman et al., op. cit., pp. 287-93.

As a final note, some words about the Liberal and Conservative parties; we should say that by no means they constitute homogeneous groups. A great deal of daily factionalism exists among them, always centered on the fluctuations of will among the leaders towards the collaboration in their National Front. But this factionalism seems to be of no danger to the position these sub-groups occupy in the management of the country. Even those among the different personalist intra-party groups which belong to the parties of the National Front, Liberals and Conservatives, and that are sometimes off the cabinet for petty disagreements, nonetheless continue sharing of the goods of power. These tactical moves should not be confused with the lessening of their real economic, social and political power.

The Army and the Police.

The Army and the Police, like the Church, have not been indifferent to the national killing; they have very actively participated. Although in theory apolitic, they have been an instrument, since 1948 mainly in the hands of the Conservative party, for killing women and men and children, and burying, and devastating.

The officials of the Army for a long time have been trained by the United States; they also participated in the war in Korea.

Army Integration. The Army is composed of 32,000 men now. The Corps of officials of the Army in my country, with great similarities to

other Armies in Latin America, is mainly composed of middle-class elements; they of course have an elitist aspiration, a life of "glory," and the business of defending a rotten, legitimated constitution, imposed on the country by the leaders.

The soldiers, they are peasants. Good as cannon-fodder. They are the ones that are forcefully taken from the countryside, given boots and guns and sent back to the countryside to kill their brothers and sisters. These soldier-peasants are used to fight their brother guerrilla-peasants. The high commanders would not go to the ambush; they do not need it. The guerrillas may kill forty soldiers; they will draft eighty peasants.

My final thoughts about the Army are that, potentially, it is one of the most powerful elements for constructive social change in my underdeveloped country, if its qualities were in other ways understood. As a highly organized institution, it has some things like discipline and managerial skills which could be used in other ways than for terrorizing peasants. Their machines -- machine is the wonderful word in an underdeveloped country -- could be used for building. Their barracks could be good for schools and colleges.

But no,
their forces are for killing
and also,
oh I cannot forget;
they build latrines
for buying peasants' wills.

The Associations.

The so-called Associations are a very effective continuation of the people in government into businesses. They include all kinds of elements of production in industry and agriculture; they include people from both parties and their business is to keep labor rights down and preferential tariff treatments by the government in their international deals.

The most powerful Associations:

Colombian Association of Coffee Growers.

National Association of Industrialists - ANDI.

National Federation of Merchants - FENALCO.

Agricultural Society of Colombia - SAC.

And there are along with these, other Associations with not so much power, but the same orientation. One of the interesting things that happen among the Associations is that they do not clash among themselves, let us say agriculture versus industry or commerce; of course they do not; its interests are so interwoven, and their members being participant in different businesses at the same time, no clash occurs; neither does the Government clash with them. On the contrary, the Government usually is the implementer of their policy-making.

Worker Unions. Part of the Associations are the worker unions. There are three main worker union centrals in Colombia: one of them belongs

to the liberal party, the other one is managed by the Jesuits and the third one by the Communists.

The C.T.C. of the liberal party, according to the Dix estimates, has 150,000 members.

The U.T.C. of the Jesuits and the conservatives has 200,000 members.

The FEDETAV of the Communists according to the appreciations of Dix has 50,000 members.

One of the most notorious things about this data is the very small number of members in the Communist unions; there are many reasons we could adduce for this, but I find it very difficult to give an ultimate reason with the very reduced information that I have now.

Nevertheless, I would like to state those factors I consider important now for explaining the weakness of the leftist worker unions:

- a. The worker unions may be weak because of the internal disputes within the left.
- b. The worker unions like the political parties until very recently in my country were used to being identified in the liberal party as the extreme left; even the liberal party's flag is red. Thus we have the case of the two bishops in 1949 forbidding their parishioners to vote for the liberal party candidates who "wish to implant civil marriage, divorce and co-education, which would open the doors to immorality and Communism."

c. We cannot forget either that the violent methods Stalin used for industrializing his country were very well publicized in Latin America as the alternative for those who advocated socialism or Communism.

One important factor we have to consider when making a plan for social change is that the actual membership in the unions does not raise above a level of 10 percent of the labor force (Dix, p. 331), including those workers of agriculture. Undoubtedly many allegiances could be forged around an organization aimed to work for the non-committed workers.

The Information Media.

I cannot go on without stating some words about the role the information media has in government in Colombia. As my country has lived most of the time of this decade and the last one under a state of siege; so the information media although with a face of freedom, is under government hands. But there is not need of a state of siege for this, because the newspapers, radio stations, TV stations (they belong to the government), are owned by the same people in government; this is one of the most powerful arms the regime has for keeping the scene in their hands, as the information media is a very powerful one. Any program of social change not aimed very carefully or prepared to confront this, may be easily twisted, ridiculed and smashed by it.

The U.S.A.

The government of the U. S. has a great stake in the perpetuation of the actual regime in my country because that is good for the U.S. government and industry, in the sense that very few underdeveloped countries show so much servility towards the U.S. as mine, under its actual conditions.

My country is not a banana republic (although the United Fruit Company was there long ago); my country is a colony; we are a coffee republic and the rest of cheap raw materials. One-third of the industry is also already American.

But as most of my naive friends in my country see it, that is good; it is good because, they say, that gives jobs to the people so they do not starve. And that is true and fine. That is what the people of my country get: jobs so they do not starve.

No matter how the situation is, how bad, and the U.S. government has understood that, with no matter what palliatives like the Alliance for Progress, no matter how much the U.S. wants to help the poor, it will not be possible under the present regime, with the present economic arrangements, which vociferously decretes[?] itself as being the keeper of democracy and free enterprise, when in reality what we have is the absolute kingdomcome of the oligarchs and the free right to be exploited by the rich of my country and the foreign enterprises

mercilessly at their will and protected by the "Governments" -- no matter how much interest the U.S. had in "helping" us, any real help does and will arrive to the hands of the rich and the Army and then it disappears.

On the other hand, besides the American economic help and the American economic intervention, other kinds of American intervention are not new in my country. When in 1903, Teddy Roosevelt "took the Isthmus," that meant that my country lost a part of it...of course, we received 25 million dollars for Panama, afterwards.

Not a person interested in social change should be naive and think that the United States is going to allow things to change so easily. After the experience of Cuba, the United States now knows what is going to happen in all the countries in Latin America to all the American industry, if they allow that matter of disorder to continue. And of implementing measures for keeping "order," and "democracy," and "free enterprise," we have very clear in mind the very recent events in the Dominican Republic.

No wide program of social change may occur in any country in Latin America, less in Colombia because of its strategic position, near Venezuela, near Panama, in front of Cuba (oh, no, a Red Axis?) unless, the capabilities of the U.S. intervention are taken in their proper scale; this fact must be borne in the minds of those who want to change their countries with little revolutions and short-range vision.

The Lesser Forces.

Now let us look to the periphery of the system: those groups or institutions with little cohesion or no power, but existent -- and potentially activable as militant institutions or groups.

The Abstentionists.

In spite of the two traditional legitimated political parties, with their traditional "democracy," and "freedom," and "free enterprise," we find that the people, the majority, are not with them and here are the tests in the form of percentages of voters in the elections during the last years. (See table which follows.)

Thus we can see that while during the last twenty years the number of eligible voters has grown by almost five millions, the number of voters has only increased by one million, remaining shamefully low.

These abstentionists are a hole, an empty void. We know it is there, waiting, and we may hope that whenever the non-voters feel moved into action, they will respond. This they will do when they can see an alternative to the present conditions, if the new alternatives fill their aspirations.

I feel this is a very fertile terrain for a social worker; and there is nothing in the near future that can change the present atmosphere,

PER CENT OF THOSE REGISTERED ACTUALLY VOTING IN ELECTIONS, 1946-1966 ⁵⁰

<i>Election</i>	<i>No. of Voters</i>	<i>Eligible Voters</i> ^a	<i>% Voting of Those Eligible</i>
May 1946 (presidential)	1,366,272	2,450,696	56
March 1947 (Chamber)	1,472,689	2,613,586	56
June 1949 (Chamber)	1,719,440	2,773,804	62
Nov. 1949 ^b (presidential)	1,140,646	2,856,339	40
Dec. 1957 (plebiscite)	4,397,090	6,080,342	72
March 1958 (Chamber)	3,693,939	5,365,191	69
May 1958 (presidential)	3,108,567	5,365,191	58
March 1960 (Chamber)	2,542,651	4,397,541	58
March 1962 (Chamber)	3,090,203	5,338,868	58
May 1962 (presidential)	2,634,840	5,404,765	49
March 1964 (Chamber)	2,261,190	6,135,628	37
March 1966 (Chamber)	2,843,450 ^c	7,126,980	40 (est.)
March 1966 (presidential)	2,593,705 ^c	7,126,980 ^d	36 (est.)

50. For all elections except those of 1966, see Registraduría del Estado Civil, *Organización y Estadísticas*, 1964, pp. 134-36. Some of the figures in this table may vary slightly from those in Table 7 since they are taken from different sources. For the two 1966 elections see *El Tiempo*, March 28 and May 6, 1966, respectively.

a. Neither prior registration nor possession of a cédula was required for the 1957 plebiscite. In the 1958 and 1960 elections eligible voters included those in possession of an identity document (cédula), plus those specially inscribed on the electoral rolls. In subsequent elections a cédula has been required, as was generally the case during the 1940s. However, the cedulization process was then less advanced than it is today. Thus while the percentage of those eligible who voted during the 1940s is nearly on a par with the National Front years, the number of eligible voters was proportionately much smaller.

because the actual administrative system has its "legal" rights of existence secure, at least until 1978, according to the last National Front agreements.

The Peasants.

The peasants number half of the country's population and most of them are very poor. They are only articulate as power groups in places where the guerrillas are alive, as we will see below.

The peasants of my country have been the victims of "The Violence," the leaders' ordeal of killing, but they still do not have class consciousness, mainly because of ignorance and hunger.

Some while ago I was reading some theories about the reasons why the peasants in India did not rise against the backwardness and bad distribution of goods in their country and destroy the system by creating a new one. Besides their traditional outlook towards life, and also maybe because of their lack of leaders, it seemed that the reason was that hunger was their main anaesthetic. Some people say that hunger pushes people to rebel against it, but too much hunger weakens and kills. I think this is also a very important consideration for the understanding of the peasants' situation in my country.

But I also could adduce in another direction, how in some of the studies about squatters in underdeveloped countries, it seems that

those who defy the regimes and squatter in other's lands, are generally those people who have already had a taste of their potentiality. Maybe nobody has done any deed for the peasants of my country that demonstrates to them the inherent forces existing in them -- what the American economists call "the demonstration effect."

The Peasants and the Agrarian Reform.

In Colombia, with a land tenure system in which 71.3 percent of the peasants own 5 percent of the agricultural land and 1.1 percent, the landlords, own 55.6 percent of it, and 985,000 of 1,368,000 peasant families do not own the land, now, with the existence of "Agrarian Reform," initiated after the fears of a new Cuba, one thing may happen: as the land tenure structure is inherently attached to the other institutions in my country, any wide change of this structure, at the scale of the exigent conditions, is almost impossible to be thought of because that would be the disturbance and autodestruction of the system; but in a few years more, when this "Social Agrarian Reform" that started in 1961 or 1962 gives evidence to the peasants that it is only a token reform, this agrarian reform itself will be the cause of destruction of the actual system. If someone is able to tell the peasants the truth about it, the people will move to act with desperation in their own behalf.

Bienen in his book, Violence and Social Change, said that among the characteristics of modernization, was the ability to innovate without falling apart.¹²⁹

The elites in my country have had the formal ability to innovate in a negative way, to create new explanations for avoiding change as problems arise. We have to recognize in this ability a dirty trick to fill the peasants' minds with promises.

One factor is with us, though, and it is that speeches go to one point, but an empty belly is very difficult to fill with speeches. The peasants may be turned against their lords; if examples of economic, social, and political ways of liberation are shown to them, the demonstration effect. This is my hypothesis.

I think Colombia is a country where land is still the element which raises the passions. Half of the population still lives in the countryside and a great part of the people now in the cities have had their past in the land. Colombia is still an agricultural country, a crop producing country, and coffee is our best product. Land is the element which provides wealth and prestige or poverty and slavery. Land is the element through which a cross-section of the different strata of the Colombian population have their relations. Land is where the lords meet servants, and where the rich manipulate the poor.

129. Bienen, op. cit., p. 169.

The lords in the land may have in their minds and in their ways of life the most modern gadgets the twentieth century can offer, while their servants are still two or three centuries behind in their ways of living. But land is also the point where, because of its almost overall backwardness, changes occur, and changes may occur in the most unpatterned fashion; changes are likely to occur without a consideration of orderly timing, in big jumps, and changes are very likely to become violent as we will see from the observation of what has happened in recent years.

I think the countryside, more than for tactical, strategic reasons, is where the demonstration effect should take place in order to show the peasants that they can lead a different life from the miserable one they have now. There is a precedent for a demonstration effect point in the countryside, which was created by the peasants themselves and that, if it were invigorated, could give us the main strongholds in the countryside. This new element is called the "independent republics." Independent republics are a creation of the peasants as a response to the attacks by the army of the government. They are formed by farms seized by the peasants in the mountains and where the Army cannot go without risk. The peasants have created their own laws, their popular tribunals, their own taxation system, their own armies and training camps, their own agricultural production, and their new schools. In Colombia at a time there were eleven of these republics, as we will see

later when talking about the guerrillas during the last years. I do not know how many of them still exist. The main handicap to their existence has been their uncoordination to respond to the attacks by the government in an organized way. The government has had the ability to attack them one by one.

My assumption is that those independent republics may become the most striking example of a new revolutionary way of living; not only as an example for the peasants, but also for the people of the cities. In order to be successful, this demonstration effect has to overcome the handicaps of poor communication in a rugged country like mine, where the mass media is in the hands of the government, and it has to overcome the handicaps of poor and scattered organization.

There has not been a sharp sign of the awakening of the peasants in Colombia, that these attempts at self-discovery are being made. I expect that communication from one republic to the other could be the turning point for a demonstration effect campaign, in a comprehensive way. The role, among the peasants, that a highly skilled intermedium system must play in this case, is of paramount importance. I wrote about the intermedium systems somewhere else in this chapter.

The Students.

The students are such a little group in my country! In Guzman, we read:

In 1965 there were no schools for 50 percent of the primary school-age children, neither for 86 percent of the secondary school-age group, and 97 percent of the college age group. 128

The students in my country constitute, as we can see, a very privileged group, and the system seems to absorb them badly, but it does it, when they graduate.

The students are a quite politicized group, but we must notice that "status" is such a lure to them (this is the existent demonstration effect in this case), that in most of the cases the college time rebellion fades away. It seems that Camilo Torres, the dead priest, had a high stake in them for following him, to fight in the mountains. They did not go.

Nevertheless, any attempt for a scheme of social change should count on the students; but it would be very dangerous to have them as the very core, alone, for a program of change, as experience demonstrates.

The Colombian student hopes in general¹²⁹ to raise his status in society; and he does it forgetting or stepping on the ones that remain below. My hypothesis is that if there were any ways of showing the

128. Guzman, op. cit., P. 48.

129. See: Elites in Latin America, Lipset and Solari, eds., Oxford University Press, 1967.

students the kind of life their brother workers and peasants have, while living in the same country and the students not knowing about it, many of them could become instruments of social change.

The Guerrillas.

When talking about the political parties we saw how after 1948, the violence the party leaders ordered in the countryside produced more than 200,000 deaths; for this deed they used the army-peasants and the Church, both conservatives and the liberal and conservative guerrillas. This situation remained until 1958 when the leaders got tired of this game, and decided to declare antisocials the ones who did not want to surrender their arms; this, after having killed the parents, brothers, sisters and friends of those peasants. From then on, these peasants were called "bandoleros," a denegrating term; and indeed, many of these poor ignorant peasants after having passed through such atrocities became killers with lost reason, indiscriminantly accomplishing their deeds.

Many of them also became politicalized by the leftist and communist groups, and today the facts are very different. From an initial number¹³⁰ of 158 guerrilla groups known between 1949 and 1963, 34 of them conservative (plus the army), 76 of them liberal, 14 of them communists and the rest unknown, today the situation has changed,

130. See: Guzman, La Violencia en Colombia, pp. 287-97.

towards a different ideological angle.¹³¹ We have 11 active communist guerrilla groups, and 15 non-active communist guerrilla groups not fighting but practising area defense. There are also 26 non-communist groups divided into 9 liberal ones of which 6 are of the party's left wing, 4 conservative groups of which 3 belong, alas, to the right wing of the party and 7 groups of unknown allegiance. Now I explain the location of these guerrillas in the next map. (See next page.)

The leftist guerrillas now as we can see have duplicated and are in equal number with other kinds (conservative and liberal) and this is a great change from the precedent situation; this fact has a lot of meaning.


First of all and very important, guerrilla fighting has changed from hierarchical parties' allegiances before. to an evenness, to a class party allegiance, giving a different kind of politicalization ideas as occurring among the peasants.

I have read some studies that indicate how the guerrilla fighting, bloody as it was, has obliged the peasants in a very cruel way, to take part in a national life they do not understand, and makes them awaken to the reality of Colombia.

Other things like taxation, legislation and education which are imposed by the guerrillas in the areas they dominate, especially the communist

131. See Appendix B for a survey done by the Jesuits, Revista Javeriana, April, 1968.

MAPA GENERAL



Guerrillas 1968: K - Communist
L - Liberal

C - Conservative
U - Unknown

ones, converting their lands in truly "independent republics" as they are called, have permitted the peasants to grasp the idea that the actual regime in the rest of the country is not convenient for them, unable to give them the most elementary services, and also have given the peasants the opportunity of feeling what a power group is.

I think this is one of the most formidable options for any person interested in social change in Colombia; to try to deal with these existent guerrillas, that although they seem to have no coordination among the, any kind of organization is not impossible to be made, and this could occupy high priority within the struggle for social change. Although the work of a coordinator should very strongly emphasize these countryside fighters with urban links.

I remember Professor Schon at M.I.T. emphasizing that the demonstration effect through an organized and coordinated action in the different independent republics may be the main powerful tool for social change in the countryside; these are the places where the new order will be made by the peasants. Until now the Government has been able to give blows to one after another of the republics without coordinated reaction by them, but this can be changed when the different republics organize among themselves. It is an organized "falling apart" of the country. These will be the bases for launching efforts to take the countryside and then the cities.

The Communist and Other Minor Parties.

The Communist Party is not a big party. It may have according to Dix, 10,000 militants. Although the Communist Party is now divided into the traditional Communist Party and a more militant faction, both of them sustain guerrillas.

The Communist Party has lasted for more than three and a half decades, which provides them with fairly good skills in organization, although Dix says "its leadership seems to have become bureaucratized and unimaginative."

Other minor parties: the M.R.L., the left wing of the Liberal party, is used by the Communists to get elected under the National Front as liberals; the Christian Democrats, the National Democratic Movement, a rightist nationalist group, the Anapo or National Popular Alliance, which follows a military ex-dictator, Rojas Pinilla, draws votes from the liberal and conservative party and exercises considerable opposition to the National Front, are the other parties.

Although most of them, with the exception of the Anapo, are of very small size, all of them, attuned with the rest of national life, try to exercise their existence by very violent means. All of them "have the truth," but the fact is that their interests are more centralized in sharing of the bureaucratic gains of being in office.

Two of them, the M.R.L. and the Anapo (this last one is bi-partisan), participate in elections as conservatives or liberals, and with this

strange way of opposition and dealing, they participate of the National Front goodies.¹³²

The Leftist Groups' Failures.

Many are the sources of the leftist groups' failure to exercise a more powerful rôle in Colombia. But according to Dix (p. 291), their main handicaps are:

- a. Their isolationism; each group putting forth its own solutions to the problems of the country and each expending much of its time and energy denouncing the others: "...each group has wanted unity in its own terms, to keep its autonomy of action and to retain the leadership of the resulting coalition."
- b. It may also be relevant that in the great majority the leaders of the opposition parties are intellectuals. The importance they attach to words compared with pragmatic concerns merely accentuates what is already a feature of the political culture.
- c. The intellectualism of the opposition leaders and their elite, or at least upper-middle-class origins, may also be responsible for the failure of most of them to strike much of a response among the masses.

132. See table on the next page, for the data of vote drawing on each party.

POLITICAL COMPOSITION OF CONGRESS, 1958-1966 ²⁴

	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966
SENATE					
<i>Liberals</i>					
Officialistas	40	40 ^a	37	37	46
MRL	—	—	12	12	7
Línea Blanda	—	—	—	(9) ^b	(7)
Línea Dura	—	—	—	(3) ^b	—
<i>Conservatives</i>					
Ospinistas (Unionistas)	10 ^c	12 ^c	31	31	21
Laureanistas (Alvaristas)	26	28	16	16	14
Independents (incl. Alzatistas in 1958)	4	—	—	—	—
ANAPO	—	—	2	2	18
<i>Total Membership</i>	80	80	98	98	106
Liberals	40	40	49	49	53
Conservatives	40	40	49	49	53
CHAMBER					
<i>Liberals</i>					
Officialistas	74	56	59	59	70
MRL	—	20	33	31	21
Línea Blanda	—	—	—	(23)	(21)
Línea Dura	—	—	—	(8)	—
ANAPO	—	—	—	1	4
MIL (Liberal Left Movement)	—	—	—	1	—
<i>Conservatives</i>					
Ospinistas (Unionistas)	17	37	50	{ 65	38
Laureanistas (Alvaristas)	45	37	36		24
Independents (incl. Alzatistas in 1958)	12	2	—	1	1
ANAPO	—	—	6	26	32
<i>Total Membership</i>	148	152	184	184	190
Liberals	74	76	92	92	95
Conservatives	74	76	92	92	95

a. Senate elected in 1958 before MRL existed.

b. No new Senate election had been held since 1962 but the MRL had divided in that year. Due to fluctuating affiliation figures are approximate.

c. Alzatistas and Independents had generally become identified with the major factions by 1960. Conservative factional figures for 1958 are approximate.

d. Moreover, coupled with intellectualism and elitism. has been a lack of attention to the prosaic minutiae of organization.

These are the main elements of weakness among them and I agree with vix' statements, but none of these failures seem to be impossible to overcome.

The Outsiders.

Let us see now, what influence countries like China, Cuba and the U.S.S.R. have in the future of any scheme of social change in Colombia. Although it seems that all of these countries have different policies towards what they consider liberation movements in Latin America, all of them seem to be fairly active. Thus we saw how in Colombia the Cuban and Russian supported groups maintain guerrillas; the Chinese faction is not strong yet in my country; according to newspaper information I gathered, a strong guerrilla point they sustained in the Choco State had been hard hit at the end of 1968, but once more they are fighting. But I can see in the future a wider range of influence from these countries to help the liberation movements with arms and example. The demonstration effect of the socialist countries may be very influential. For example, it is widely said that the Alliance

for Progress was but an emergency response of the U.S.A. towards the development in Cuba of a socialist revolution.

We can see how important it will be in the future to consider, for any plan of action for social change, those countries as effective instruments of help, not only during the period of struggle for change of power, but in the aftermath in the new economic organization for the countries in Latin America.

The Neighbor Countries.

We cannot underestimate the role that the neighboring countries will have in any event of social change in Colombia. We know very well that the power structure is very similar in the governments of the rest of Latin America, and that all of them seem to be engaged in a rabid rightist race. Any change in any of the continental countries in Latin America would be so dangerous for the present structures of these countries that very few would send their troops to suffocate the danger.

I have in mind the case of the Dominican Republic in 1966, where not only the United States, but Brazil, Paraguay and Costa Rica sent their troops to suffocate the rebellion. Colombia would not be an exception; moreover, because of its continental strategic position, it would be a "must" target. In the case of Bolivia, we also saw the

military men of Argentina and Paraguay getting ready to intervene there.

My hypothesis is that any wide attempt of social change in Colombia must have a parallel work in the neighboring countries, at least to neutralize their potential intervention in Colombia.

Camilo Torres.

We finished seeing the most elemental truths about the elements of power on the stage of our study; now we must pass to see a very short analysis of what Camilo Torres did in order to get killed in 1966.

I will not try to write a biography of Camilo. I remit the person interested in this to the book written by the ex-priest, Guzman, Camilo, el cura guerrillero; what I will do is to enumerate the different enterprises Camilo got engaged in.

Camilo was a priest. He went to study sociology in Lovaine, Belgium, in 1954. There he got interested in and began to learn the problems of Colombia.

In Belgium he organized the "Colombian Team for Socio-Economic Investigation," an elitist intellectual group, non-politically oriented,

rather on a "humanistic" basis as they said; this thing had contacts in Rome, Paris, Lovaine, Madrid, Bonn, Berlin, London, Bogota and some cities in the United States, and it failed mainly because the components were "objective" scientists, Colombian students with no ideological basis for observing the problems of the country.

Then Camilo went back to Colombia, in 1959, as a Chaplain of the National University in Bogota, taught Sociology there, then went to the "Superior School of Public Administration," as Dean of the Institute of Social Administration and also went as delegate of the Cardinal to the Agrarian Reform Institute, and also as an appendix of the Institute of Social Administration he started the Unit of Rural Action in the countryside; then he started a University Students and Professionals Movement for Community Development, and then at last a political movement which he expected would gather all the left of the country for a takeover of power, and when this failed, he joined a guerrilla group and was killed by the Army on the 15th of February of 1966.

As we can see, Camilo Torres was in principle a reformer. Of course, his reformist ideas brought him against the hierarchies he belonged to, the Church, and against the institutions he wanted to change. As we saw before, in touching one a chain reaction would be produced, even against the people he wanted to help.

One of the facts to note about the organizations for social change he founded is that they did not have either electoral or armed power. He had an intellectual tradition and his work was too intellectual. At the end he understood the gravity of the problem he was trying to solve and then he founded his extremist political group which failed because of his organizational weaknesses, the same problems we notice before when talking about the left in Colombia; then he became desperate and went to the mountains. It seems to me that the key for any social worker who wants to work in such environment as Colombia, and who wants to remain in the cities, is to build a base of popular support before committing himself to any of the different active roles he would adopt in order to change the institutions; this popular barrier I consider very necessary as a way of defense against action from the institutions and as a way of avoiding having to go to the mountains, when his presence in the cities would seem indispensable.

Another factor about any program of social change in Colombia is that the actual components of power, as we saw before, are so intermingled within the different spheres of the regime that any attempt -- any -- to change the balances of power in any of the parts of the system will necessarily produce a reaction in the others. Camilo Torres seemed to have understood this, but according to my observations, he failed to recognize the totality of the elements, that could have helped or gone against him, even among the corrupt institutions, and even worse

he had no notion of timing, and I think any person interested in social change programs must be an artist in timing his acts.

Mao Tse-Tung wrote in 1944¹³³ the causes of failure of Camilo in 1966:

To link oneself with the masses, one must act in accordance with the needs and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from their needs and not from the desire of any individuals, however well-intentioned. It often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or determined to make the change. In such cases we should wait patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become conscious of the need and are willing and determined to carry it out. Otherwise we shall isolate ourselves from the masses. Unless they are conscious and willing, any kind of work that requires their participation will turn out to be a mere formality and will fail... There are two principles here: one is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds instead of our making up their minds for them.

Besides the higher and reactionary low hierarchy of the Church that went against Camilo since the beginning, and that contributed the most to isolating him from the ignorant masses, by menacing from all pulpits any allegiances with him as meritorious of the hottest "Hell," the hierarchy against which Camilo spent a lot of his energies, he chose to modify the structures of social relations of the people and the elites in Colombia. Here we are only going to talk about his organization to promote social change through political action; we are explicitly not going to talk about his other organizations, the ones without a political base because they did not represent any new

133. Mao Tse-Tung, The United Front in Cultural Work, October 30, 1944.

idea, neither they had any power form of action in Colombia, and in Colombia, "political" power grows "out of the barrel of the gun."

In Colombia very few people know how to read, but those who do have spent most of the time of the country in futile contemplation and words-playing. This observation does not rise from an anti-intellectualist point of view in me, but from the observation I make that the philosophers in my country, the ones who read, belong to the higher social strata, and as we know, any change in the socio-economic or political conditions of my country undoubtedly represents a loss of the privileged positions of the ones who have them now and of course the philosophers would not want it to happen. Marx very clearly stated also: "The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it." So here, we are only going to speak of the time when Camilo thought in electoral or gun power; as we were saying before, his foes were:

1. not chosen but necessary: the high and low reactionary strata of the Church.

2. chosen: within the

Government: The traditional parties: liberal and conservative.

The Administration.

The Police and the Army.

The Associations.

The U.S. enterprises.

All of these enemies were within the core of the regime. He did not choose enemies at the periphery of it, but he failed to see that necessary enemies were:

- The non-voters, extremely weary and apathetic by that time;
- The majority of the students who are of bourgeoisie extraction;
- The leaders of the few peasant organizations;
- The leaders of most of the worker unions;
- The leftists divided in sub-groups;
- The other minor parties not interested in change but in demagoguery;
- The guerrillas who were uncoordinated.

And among the outside strata, the other countries, it seems to me that he did not even have time to visualize the potentiality of the neighboring countries as enemies.

This, in respect to his enemies, now remembering something about the friends he chose, I want to observe:

- within the Church: he failed to mobilize the low echelons of the Church that could have answered to his call.
- within the Government: within the traditional parties he found as friend the M.R.L., the leftist liberal wing. He failed to differentiate soldiers from

officers in the army for an eventual campaign of politization of the soldiers and the police.

the U.S.A.:

he did not have even the opportunity of mobilizing the help of any of the leftist organizations in the U.S.A.

We talked about his enemies he probably did not see within the inter-medium sector, but nevertheless he believed that his friends were:

the non-voters

the students

the peasants

the workers

the communist and other new and little parties

the guerrillas.

Within the outside sector, I feel he did not know how to mobilize any help from the U.S.S.R. or China or Cuba. His Catholic structure, I feel, made him weary of those contacts at the beginning, and a little later, when he understood that, it was too late for him.

As we saw, his foe was quite enormous, and his friends had many problems and weaknesses.

Solving the Equations.

Let us see now, how he tried to solve his equations; and here I want mainly to go through the very valuable framework of analysis I have

been able to learn with Professor Schon: First a few words about his values and goals. Camilo essentially was a priest, a Catholic priest, and he had all the Catholic moral values. Those are very well received in Colombia, so he did not have any problem when working on this basis although the Church did not interpret those values in the same way. Even when working with Marxists, it can be said that Catholics find many points in common, so he did not have in this point other foes than the Church's interpretations of his idea. And this is a too powerful foe.

His goals, and I have to say his, because he worked the most on the basis of being a leader followed by the masses, were of changing the socio-economic and political structures of the country to what I would call a very rough and advanced, one step, marxist socialism.

This fact may have gone against him, because the peasants are not asking now to share the land they do not have, and the food they do not have, and the schools they do not have; they want land for themselves, food for themselves, schools for themselves, for the first time in their lives. I do not think they give a damn at this moment for any politician who comes to tell them of passing the lands to the State, and the markets to the State, etc. etc.

I feel one of the main difficulties for a policy maker is to understand this fact and be in accordance with it. This may be one of the main failures the communists have had in Latin America, in order to draw more members among the poor.

Strategies. Camilo had many opportunities for an organization of his strategy because of the many possibilities of alliances and positions one can adopt in Colombia for implementing social change. But we saw since the beginning how it was quite difficult for him to differentiate among the components of every institution; for him the army was a foe, the Church a foe, etc., etc.

What positions did he adopt as a strategy? Let us observe his path through the opportunities he had:

- a. influencing the emergence of ideas in good currency;
- b. effecting shifts in social policy;
- c. carrying out a broad program of social change from a central administrative base;
- d. maneuvering among existing institutions;
- e. designing and bringing into being a new institution;
- f. seeking to change an existing institution or systems of institutions from the inside, adopting roles as: manager, champion, guerrilla.
- g. seeking to change an institution or social system from outside, adopting roles as: expert, consultant, therapist, advocate, organizer, revolutionary.

From this huge camp of possibilities Camilo chose a very interesting and what I have considered the best choice, according to the preliminary

situation of the country we saw before, although I feel compelled to make many annotations in this respect.

According to my observations, he chose something like:

- a. influencing the emergence of ideas in good currency, by spreading his ideas;
- b. designing and bringing into being a new institution, a revolutionary movement;
- c. seeking to change the social system from outside, with a revolution;
- d. carrying out a broad program of social change from a central administrative base as a triumphant revolution.

In spite of the goodness of the scheme of action he followed, I doubt he saw other opportunities he had as variants to the main program, to which I do not see possibilities for alternatives. I want very strongly to emphasize this point, because it seems that with the conditions in the country, any attempt to coopt the actual system for change will bring failure with it. Only the destruction of the present classist system will bring about some definite change in Colombia. I want to pass dogmatic on this; I consider that the time for mild answers to this problem is already in history.

But what then, if this program of Camilo was so good, what happened in order for it to fail?

As I see the aftermath, the mistakes were:

1. He tried to implement the four stages at the same time -- no timing.

2. He failed to see the weaknesses among his friends.

He started the creation of his movement by adopting what we may call the intermedium systems in the form of the communist and otherleftist parties. But he failed to see that his friends were divided and as I said before, the absence of timing made him try to build a machine, have it work at its inception, without having tested it.

At last he got a movement bringing people from many leftist factions with only nominal allegiances, a movement without real power because of immense gaps of communication, planning, procedure and structure in its formation, that could but collapse.

3. Another of his failures, one of the main ones, was that he failed to recognize the possibilities he had for a program of social change from inside the institutions as a parallel program to his outside revolution with all the possible friends he had within the power structure. His failure to differentiate among the members of the institutions was great.

4. His failure to see and employ the guerrillas as an existent institution, inspite of the fact that at the end he joined them, almost as an escape.
5. His failure to distinguish between armed struggle and non-armed struggle and the combination and timing of both of them, instead of giving a gradual escalated response to the blows by the regime.
6. His failure to distinguish between the masses of people and the core of a movement. A disciplined core must be the base for any mass organization; not a loose one.

And here I want to revise this concept: Camilo Torres did not have an intermedium system as the core, the hard core for his movement. In Vietnam we find a very clear example of the way people are gathered in a movement. There is a patriotic front with people of all kinds of backgrounds and institutions forming it: religious sects, peasants, soldiers, natives, professionals, and at the center of this popular front is the hard core, the party, the Communist Party. These people are organized in men, women and youth groups; within these groups there are hard cores of decisive forces, and these groups provide the elements for the different types of military organizations; propaganda, fighters, food, shelter, information, etc., that are of different ranges of action (geographically speaking). These main groups of men, women, and youth, may belong to professional, or religious, administrative, etc., institutions, and these allegiances

are also kept alive. They constitute the groups for maneuvering among the different existing institutions within the enemy, and they also constitute new institutions in liberated areas. Camilo did not have them, neither had he the intermedium systems as we saw before. The hard core, the party, is always in command of the workers, women and youth groups.¹³⁴

134. See: Douglas Pike, Vietcong, The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, M.I.T. Press, 1966.

Chapter Four. Some Alternatives I Would Propose.

Would I change for a program of action of mine, some of Camilo's steps?

After this analysis and if I were to organize a program of social change in my country, I would follow very similar ways to the steps followed by Camilo with some variations, and here is where I will sketch my own ideas on how to proceed in this problem. My idea is to follow determined steps of different action, with some which I consider must be fixed points as a base and some variants that may exist or not, as secondary elements. What I propose is to build a delicate machine of human power, with tested effectiveness and able to go through different stages of struggle for implementing social change in my country. Many elements will be quite weak in my actual appreciation of the problem, but I must say that this study is not yet a definite one; so some other ideas and variations will come to mind with more study on the same problem, and with testing in reality.

Values and Goals.

My values starting from the theories on socialism would differ from Camilo's starting from the Catholic religion. My goals would be to introduce a socio-economic and political socialist system in Colombia.

Strategies.

I would follow essentially the same strategies as Camilo. I would follow them because I cannot see a better alternative in the historic

moment of my country. These steps and the order they have I consider potentially very effective:

- a. spreading the word; initiating this specie of crusade;
- b. creating an effective, a disciplined movement among the hard core of the discontent;
- c. launching a very well planned campaign to take power;
- d. implementing reforms of social change when power is acquired.

They are, in this simplistic way, the steps to follow; could we see them put in a different order like reforms before gaining power, or taking power before a strong movement being organized? I am afraid this is not possible and the reasons I stated before .

But in order to follow those steps I would base my strategies on two facts:

- a. that there has been a revolution going on in the countryside of my country for twenty years now, and that is what we call in a mild way, "The Violence, " which is an heroic and respectable rising to arms, not just sporadic outbursts of violence, and that this revolution has now a very strong ideological class base.
- b. that Che Guevara's words of "two, three, many Vietnams, that is the watchword" for Latin America, the revolutionists are trying to follow now, by producing confusing acts of

revolutionary fervor, outbursts like calling the U.S. intervention for helping the "good guys" that are increasingly being menaced by some few "bad guys." But I do not agree with that. No; I feel that in this moment the conditions of Latin America are becoming ripe for a kind of rise to arms of very vast segments of the population in a very fast and effective way and which do not give the opportunity for outsiders to start wandering about helping the "good guys." I think that frustration, mass frustration, will be enhanced in the decade to come mainly because of two factors:

1. the speedy rise of population growth we are experiencing confronted with the inability for countries to cope with the problems of providing services to this new population. Latin America, the same as the United States, has 200 million people now. In the year 2,000, while the United States will have augmented its population to 300 million people, Latin America will have almost 700 million people. Colombia is expected to go from 20 million now to 45 million in the year 2,000.

2. The famines that are expected to start occurring during the next decade. Not that people are not dying of hunger now. But in a few years, this will take the form of mass catastrophes.

In the case of a foreign intervention, a short size rise to arms will not produce a Vietnam; it will produce a Dominican Republic.

And I would add some few things I would have in consideration from the experiences of Camilo:

- a. A wider recognition of the weaknesses of my friends. Discipline and patience must be wide, though. The use of effective intermedium systems will do for it.
- b. A wider recognition of the weaknesses and heterogeneous composition of my enemies. Cooptation within the rank and files of Church, Army, Police, Parties, Workers, Abstentionists, Students and Peasants, and integration of them into groups of men, women, and youth, at village, town, city or regional levels, and with the political and military training being given by the hard core.

When power is taken, these groups will provide the elements for the smooth implementation of socialism in Colombia.

c. The necessity to instigate a parallel liberation movement from inside the institutions, with the reform from outside. The people who will get into the men, women and youth groups, will form special sub-groups for acting within their institutions dominated by the regime.

d. An attempt to utilize those elements Camilo did not utilize, i.e., similar movements and help from other countries, and coordination of the guerrilla action in the countryside with political and armed action in the cities.

e. The insistence on a movement with a very disciplined base of the leftist groups.

Program of Action.

As a program of action, and although I am not in the Communist Party, I fully agree with and adopt the Communist Party of Colombia's Program,¹³⁵ because I consider it completely fits with the ways I see my country, with the exception of the allegiances to Moscow I do not have. I have adopted this program in this way because I felt as if it were a piece of my own invention. Sketches of my own that I have with me about the same point indicate that I was trying to write the same program, but

135. Documentos del decimo congreso del Partido Comunista de Colombia, 1966, pp. 95-109.

with less fortune. Although I consider that this program could be much more refined, let us say in points like the one about urban reform, I still consider that it shows to us a very comprehensive path of action to follow. I know also of a similar program written by Camilo Torres for his political movement, and I think this Communist Program is totally fitting in its context, to my ideas. Further extension of this program would only make this work interminable. The work is divided into two parts. The first one is a summary of Colombia that totally fits the analysis we have followed through my study and that will be included at the end of the study as an appendix. Although I found this program shortly before I concluded my study, this analysis is very much consistent with the same conclusions I had arrived at in my study. The second part is the program itself. I will now translate and copy the program here:

6. Patriotic Government of National Liberation.

The deep anti-imperialist and democratic transformations that the country requires, must be effected by the government that results from the revolutionary struggle within the next program the Communist Party gives to the consideration by the people.

The democratic and popular political regime.

1. Organization of a Popular and Democratic Republic based on the principle that the people is the only font of public power.
2. The people with arms will form the base for the popular army. The armed forces will be the expression of defense of the revolution, peace, independence, and popular freedom. The armed forces will be democratic and will be a factor of material and cultural elevation of its member and of the society. The anti-popular repressive systems will be liquidated.

Foreign politics independent and peaceful.

1. Foreign politics independent and directed towards the preservation of peace and pacific coexistence within nations, based on the respect for the autodetermination of the peoples. Ending of all compromises against the national sovereignty and aggressive interventionist blocks against the independence of other peoples. Ending of the military, technic, economic and cultural missions of the imperialism. Prohibition of the war propaganda. Contribution to the general disarmament, prohibition of nuclear arms and destination of the war budgets for pacific means.

2. Diplomatic cultural and economic relations on the basis of friendship and pacific cooperation, equity, mutual benefit, especially with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp. Collaboration and help with the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa struggling for their liberation.

Economic Independent Development.

1. Confiscation and nationalization of all the enterprises, concessions, mines, transports, banks, insurance companies, financial corporations and plantations exploited by the North American monopolies. Nationalization of the North American shares in mixed enterprises. Annulment of the external debts of the colonialist type. Guarantee to the foreign capital favorable to the economic development of the country.

2. Confiscation of the wealth of the capitalists that deceive the country and the Colombian revolution. Protection of the national economy and of the industrialization favorable to development of heavy industry and the amplification of the industries of consumption goods. Amplification of credit facilities on the basis of work and national conveniences to little and medium industry, commerce and agriculture.

3. Destination of State funds to electrification, and its utilization for the planned industrialization of the country. Defense of all kinds of national transports. Structuring of the railroads and roads into a plan that favors the harmonic development of the economy.

4. Defense of the export products, especially coffee. Control of foreign commerce and orientation towards an independent development.

5. Ending of consumers taxes, and private property. Taxes on capital and benefits. Limitations on benefits. Monetary stabilization with base in the national production and technical measures against inflation. Industrial and commercial control in order to control speculation.

Democratic Agrarian Reform.

1. Democratic agrarian reform which gives land to who works or wants to work it, ending of latifundio, elevation of production and of life standards of the peasant population.

2. Expropriation of latifundios and confiscation of lands occupied by Yankee imperialists. Confiscation of the lands of those owners that deceive the national interests.

3. The distribution of the agrarian reform lands will be done according to the conditions of the land, on the basis that part of the land will be given to the peasants now without land or with too little; it will be given with implements, tools and animals; part of the land will be for cooperative farms and part will be for model state farms of experimentation and that serve to solve the fundamental problems of agrarian production.

4. Small and medium property will be respected and guaranteed, making bigger the former and stronger the last, in the same way that the property rationally exploited of the rich peasants that accept the norms on work, soils, and other defenses that the State establishes.

5. Small and medium farmers that occupy and work lands as sharecroppers, "aparceros, poramberos," etc., or as colonos will receive the titles to the lands on the basis of plans to guarantee rational and technical exploitation. Norms of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation will be liquidated, the same as the debts of the peasants with lenders and speculators.

6. The agrarian reform will be done by the government through the agrarian organizations by which the conditions and modes of execution will be arrived at. Agrarian cooperatives will be stimulated on the basis of education and voluntary affiliation.

7. Planned use of the lands in order to increment agricultural production, cattle, forests, defense, waters, and soil. Guarantee of minimum prices to agricultural producers and increment of productivity for the benefit of consumers.

8. Protection of the Indians, helping them to progress, to incorporate to civilized life, giving them land, their old properties, modernization of seeding systems, education, health, and technical assistance. Help to their autonomous organizations and respect for their meeting forms, customs, languages and art.

Urban Reform.

1. The state will provide for a building and urbanization plan and for expropriation of big urban properties in order to guarantee housing for the Colombian population.

Democratic guarantees and civil rights.

1. Civil rights and social guarantees of thought, meeting, association, organization, manifestation, written and spoken news, for the people. Full religious freedom with independence between Church and State. Abolition of social discrimination against blacks, indians, and equality for all. Suppression of the economic, social, and political discrimination against women, and guarantee for them in order to be able to participate in equal conditions with men. Political rights for men and women older than 18.

2. Home inviolability, respect and protection for the integrity and human dignities, defense of life, honor and personal property of the citizen, popular justice, oral, gratis, public, and administered by judges popularly elected.

People's welfare and work guarantee.

1. The Popular Democratic State will impose the social obligation of working and will give effective guarantee to all the citizens to get a job paid according to the quality and quantity of their work.

2. The Popular Democratic State will have as the main task to continually elevate the living standards and the work conditions of the workers and peasants and medium strata, by establishing: vital minimum salary according to the characteristics of each area; social security extensive to all workers paid by the State and the enterprises and controlled by the worker unions; progressive reduction of the working time, and shorter terms of work in inhospitable lands and at night; equal rights of sex and age to receive an education, to receive equal payment for equal work, in equality of conditions, of capacity, without sex, nationality or age discrimination.

3. Peasant workers will receive the same benefits of the workers in the cities, taking into account the peculiarities of each region.
4. Nurseries, maternity halls, and kindergartens in the city and in the countryside. Protection of maternity and childhood.
5. Effective organization of public health, with medical centers, health centers, hospitals, and preventive medicine. Free social assistance given by the state. Protection for the elderly that cannot work, retirement, health houses, and vacation establishments.

Development of education, culture, and sports.

1. Education in all its degrees will be a social service, free, given by the State. Primary, secondary, university and polytechnic education will be at the reach of all the population and there will be stipends for students of professional technical careers. Massive literacy campaigns. Vocational, technical and professional education in constant relation to work. Democratic processes within the universities with government formed by students, professors and alumni. Increasing of scientific research. Creation and extension of popular libraries.
2. Promotion of the teacher life, better conditions of life and work for them, massive construction of classrooms, schools, and research centers, with adequate implements.
3. Defense and promotion of the national and democratic forms of culture and art. Encouragement to the work of the artists of the people.
4. Promotion of physical culture and sports for all the people. Construction of sport camps, stadiums, and rest homes for the sportsmen.

7. The Patriotic Front of National Liberation.

1. The inauguration of the patriotic government of national liberation which will implement this Program will not be made by the will or action of casual leaders, but it must be the fruit of organization, unity, and struggle of all the people: workers, peasants, students, revolutionary intellectuals, white collar workers, artisans, small industrialists and merchants within a wide movement of patriotic front of national liberation that superates the artificial divisions imposed by the dominant

classes, and able to channel the democratic and popular hopes to national independence, superation of backwardness and people's liberation. This great united front will be able to obtain victory only if it is led by the working class, the most combative and organized, vitally interested in the changes that the country asks, and which historic mission is identified with the future socialist society. Because of this, the unity of the working class is vital to the future of the nation.

The alliance of the proletariat with peasantry is the essential base of this freedom movement. Workers and peasants have common hopes of liberation. The peasants have shown their combative and democratic spirit, defending themselves arms in hand, of the violence and aggression of which they have been victims.

The medium sectors, students, intellectuals, artisans, and white collar workers have a tradition of popular struggle since the days the Republic was founded. Particularly the students play a very high role in the freedom fights, in the process of the Latin American revolution.

In the historic course of formation of the patriotic front of national liberation, sectors of the bourgeoisie will enter into contradiction with the interests of the North American imperialism. These sectors may be gained or neutralized in the anti-imperialist fight, if these contradictions are stimulated.

2. The politics of the patriotic front is the only adequate one within the historic stage that our country goes through, because it allows to recollect and to unify all the forces oppressed by the Yankee imperialism and the internal forces it rests on. This movement is developed in a superior plan, and it is a continuation, in the new conditions of national and world struggle, of our best popular and patriotic traditions and of the frustrated hopes for the establishment of an authentic democracy in Colombia.

3. The transformations this Program enumerates will only be fulfilled with the taking of power by the patriotic front of national liberation, that displaces the actual dominant classes.

4. The Communists want these changes with the least possible sacrifices for the people and the revolutionary forces and for this reason we have looked for pacific ways for our revolution. But the course things take is not in our wishes, but in the attitudes assumed by the dominant classes when confronting the struggles of the masses, for the revolutionary changes and of the correlation of forces that participate in the struggle. The experience of our people teaches that the dominant classes make use of armed violence against the popular masses, when any important transformation is intended and in the measure that the crisis of the system advances, closing the pacific ways for revolutionary transformations. This asks for popular selfdefense, which is a process of politization and mass organization that conduces them to the conviction of the necessity of armed struggle as a superior form of struggle, that opens the roads for revolutionary developments by no pacific means. In the process of our revolution, all the forms of mass struggle will be combined, according to the circumstances, the stage of the struggle, and the attitude of the reactionary forces. Without renouncing any form of mass struggle, the armed struggle is converting itself each day in a more important factor indispensable to the Colombian revolution.

8. The Communist Party, Vanguard of the People.

1. The Communist party, ideology and political organization of the working class, since its foundation fighting intransigently for peace, democracy, national independence and socialism, presents this Program to all the Colombian people in the security that if it is taken into their hands, and if the people unite in the struggle for its objectives, the revolutionary changes that the crisis of the actual social structure asks for will be realized. This program is not only the program of the Communists, but of all the patriotic and progressive forces of the country. Communists will always be in the vanguard showing that we are the most abnegate and consequent fighters within the united front in alliance with the other sectors and political organizations that want to contribute to the struggle.

2. The way for the formation of the patriotic front of national liberation is the accordance on one or various programmatic needs, which urge the necessity for actions and common treaties and concrete platforms that contribute to win the different battles to the final victory.

3. The condition for the working class to become the van guard of the great struggle is in the existence of a powerful Communist Party of masses; identified with their interests, having in its files the best fighters of the people, and armed with the principles of marxism-leninism.

The strengthening of the Communist Party, its quantitative and qualitative growth, and of its auxiliary organization, the Communist Youth of Colombia, is a prerequisite necessary for the Colombian revolution.

To the workers, peasants, white collar people, students, revolutionary intellectuals, to all democrats and patriots that are looking to save Colombia, and the welfare of the people, we invite to adopt these programmatic principles and to contribute by all means to the strengthening and development of our Communist Party.

Tactics.

I have not mentioned tactics when talking about Camilo before, because I think he may have had a certain strategy in mind, but no tactics; or if some, just what the politicians in my country do: to go to different places and give speeches, and I feel that this is not productive on a lone basis.

My tactics as I said before, must have a very careful, step by step, acknowledgement of timing. Each step in the process of building this power machine should be tested after its fabrication in order to prove its effectiveness, and the different steps and order of them should not be confused.

First Step.

For starting I would put as a necessary precondition, a movement to unite the leftist groups of my country on the basis of a very disciplined organization with fixed responsibilities for the members and with a grade of autonomy for the sub-groups to continue existing within the movement.

I consider this step necessary, absolutely -- and without it, I would not launch myself in a suicide movement. The alternative for a failure in this movement of closing the gaps within the left and launching myself to create a whole machine without intermedium systems as a substantial help I see as very remote, very difficult, and not realizable in a country like mine. That the Colombian Communist Party could give me the elements for the intermedium systems, the hard core, is my hypothesis now.

The union of the left, a very difficult and decisive step, must be tried as a means of forging the core of the revolution; it should be tested by some means I do not concoct now. The disputes between pro-Chinese and pro-Russian leftists are very dangerous; the fact that the pro-soviet Communists in Colombia support guerrillas, could be helpful for us to think that it is not very difficult to form a popular front with other leftists. But my guess is that for a definite assessment of the group to coopt for an intermedium system, I need to go and see the reality from within.

Second Step.

The program of action should be in three stages:

1. Based at the beginning in no direct confrontation with the regime, to organize groups of action outside the core of the regime in three groups of people: men, women and youth.
2. Organizing groups of action within the core of the regime with friendly elements: priests, soldiers, police, workers, etc. ;
 - a. this is very important: creating since the beginning among those groups, urban and rural militiae;
 - b. to utilize the core of the movement as coordinators and instructors for the organized groups;
 - c. a huge insistence in the mixing of those groups when possible: no students with students, but students with workers and peasants if possible, or workers with peasants. The men, women, and youth groups will do for this.
 - d. a maximum of utilization of help from other countries.
3. In a more advanced stage, I would test the power of these groups by coordinating urban action with guerrillas in the countryside.

Third Step.

The taking of power. The taking of power is a stage I would not be able to write here: the rythm, moment, the final blow-up, and the

time are things that escape from my imagination. It is almost impossible to write more about it, and I challenge the reader to do it. I can only say that having the proper elements of the play organized, their efficacy tested and the enemy known, the plan will have to be concocted on the spot.

Fourth Step.

Carrying a broad program of institutional change. The fourth step, implementing social change, I permit myself to exclude from the present study, considering it the theme of a very different work of study and comparison with experiences of countries that are at the present going through that stage, like Cuba, that I expect to do in the future.

Nevertheless, many people have asked me: "Well, how will you implement your program for social, political, and economic change, when a revolutionary movement takes over your country?"

I really feel amazed, in front of so many questions that a revolutionary taking of power brings with itself. I have thought a lot, I am exhausted now; I have read books, I have taken courses, assisted in meetings, and my last answer is that I know too little about it. I guess the difficulty stems from the fact that I do not know what the conditions of the country will be like, after a takeover by a revolutionary movement.

How long will it take to take over the country?

Will there be foreign intervention not to allow this to happen?

How many people will the movement have?

How many people will the revolution kill?

How many people will the revolution alienate?

How many people will leave the country?

How many people will go live in the cities because of the revolution?

These are things I positively cannot answer now. There is no fixed pattern to follow with respect to other countries:

China has still one big island, Formosa, with enemies.

Korea is now divided into two parts.

Cuba is not divided.

Vietnam is still divided and at war.

Nevertheless, not knowing what will happen to the people and to the country, assuming the worst difficulties, just assuming that the revolutionary movement took over power, some elemental measures of economy and political and social organization can be thought of.

In terms of political organization, it is evident that the victorious fighters in the revolution will have in peace the command of those political organizations in the country. If implemented through socialism, this will mean giving the political decisive power to the

people in the communities. This is something not very difficult to foresee. Under the actual circumstances, the government of my country is organized in such a way that the people are totally away from any kind of administrative political power, because under the actual Constitution, when people vote and elect a president, he elects then the State governors, and these governors elect the mayors in the cities. What to say then about the 65 percent of potential voters that are abstaining from voting? Giving the political decision facilities to the workers will be done.

Social Organization. Social classes will be abolished. Opportunities in life will cease to come from Daddy and Mom. The people, through the State, will have guarantees specifically for education, health, recreation, jobs, and sharing the wealth of the country among everybody, since the beginning of the revolutionary program.

It is evident that the country will be able, with good leadership, to redirect the economy, even if it has been until now a capitalist "enlightened" economy, like it was in Cuba before.

There are some differences between a revolution in Russia at the beginning of this century, and a revolution like the Cuban, in the sixties. There is not anymore the necessity for a socialist country to direct its economy to a heavy industrialization for producing guns, having the countryside people pay for it. Industrialization must

come; the existing industries will have to be preserved at maximum too. Some of them will be terminated, the ones producing luxury goods for the rich, and new industries will be created, as in Cuba, around the countryside exploitation. The countryside will give us the opportunity of reducing unemployment to zero, to feed our people, most of them for the first time in their lives, and to provide goods and raw materials to be processed for export. What kind of industrialization will the country need, to quickly organize agricultural production? Josue De Castro, in The Black Book of Hunger¹³⁶ gives us a list of those industries necessary to have functioning around agricultural production:

In reality, the catalogue of goods and services required by agriculture covers all the areas of industrial activity, especially if consideration is given to the products necessary "before" and "after" the act of agricultural production in the narrow sense.

1. Work preliminary to agricultural production: water and land improvements; "background" industries: public works.

2. Steps designed to obtain higher vegetable yields: soil plowing, distribution of fertilizer, seeding; "background" industries: agricultural machinery, chemicals, development of selected plants and seed strains.

3. Steps designed to obtain higher livestock yields: stables and feed; "background" industries: construction, cattle fields, food processing (by-products of grain, vegetable oils, etc.)

136. Josue De Castro, The Black Book of Hunger, Beacon Press, Boston, 1967, p. 69.

4. Means of protecting crops and livestock: fungicidal, antiparasitic and similar products; "background" industries: chemical products.
5. Measures necessary for the preservation and storage of agricultural products: equipment for preservation, storing, silos; "background" industries: public works, machinery.
6. Measures necessary for the transport of agricultural products: means of transport; "background" industries: vehicle manufacture.
7. Measures necessary for converting and processing agricultural products: farm and food industries, packing; "background" industries: manufacture of equipment, paper, jute, plastics.
8. Measures necessary for the maintenance and proper functioning of the basic structure: rail and motor fuel, lubricants, spare parts, repair facilities, etc.

The industrialization of an underdeveloped country therefore implies a plan of orientation, the importance of which seems occasionally to elude some of those countries as well as the majority of the Western countries responsible for the spectacular and largely useless accomplishments that are too often encountered in their dependent territories.

The day my country has these industries organized around the countryside, another, further step of problems will arise: more complicated technology will be necessary and the country will be ready to adopt it, with its own technicians.

Timing.

As I said before, and I want to finish this work by stating it once more, the most important condition for this program of social change is timing.

A "good" idea may have a "bad" program of execution but with a well planned timing of it, all kinds of mistakes can be recognized and execution plans changed. Good timing might indicate that all the alternatives I finish with here are just junk.

For arriving to the realization of this idea of bringing peace and social justice in Colombia, this program I propose, even if it has some central points which I consider invariable in their structure, there must be many other collateral ideas and intermedium stages for its implementation, that I cannot see now while having been writing from a comfortable desk.

Nevertheless I consider this sketch as the basis for a further check on reality and a confirmation or abolition of the present ideas about implementing social change in my country.

AUTONOMOUS COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS¹

The 1963 government budget allocations for each decentralized corporation, where available, is given in rounded millions of pesos. Initials just before the budget figures indicate the ministry or department primarily interested in the autonomous agency, as follows: A, Agriculture; C, Communications; CA, Civil Aeronautics; CS, Civil Service; D, Development; E, Education; J, Justice; L, Labor; MP, Mines and Petroleum; PH, Public Health; PW, Public Works; T, Treasury and Public Credit; and W, War.

			MILLIONS OF PESOS
Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Cundinamarca	(Cundinamarca Aqueducts and Sewers)	PW	21
Caja Nacional de Previsión	(National Social Payments Fund)	L	65
Caja de la Vivienda Militar	(Military Housing Fund)	W	68
Compañía Nacional de Navegación	(National Navigation Co.)	D	6
Compañía Colombiana de Gas	(Colombian Gas Co.)	PW	27
Cámaras de Comercio	(Chambers of Commerce)	D	5
Corporación Provedora de Institutos de Asistencia Social, CORPAL	(Social Assistance Institutes Provision Corporation)	L	1
Corporación Autónoma Regional de los Valles del Magdalena y del Sinú, CVM	(Autonomous Regional Corporation of the Valleys of Magdalena and Sinú)	D	9
Corporación Autónoma Regional de la Sabana de Bogotá y de los Valles de Ubaté y Chiquinquirá, CAR	(Autonomous Regional Corporation of the Sabana of Bogotá and the Ubaté and Chiquinquirá Valleys)	D	25
Empresa Puertos de Colombia	(Ports of Colombia Enterprise)	PW	159
Empresa de Cementos Boyacá	(Boyacá Cement Enterprise)	D	13
Empresa Colombiana de Aeródromos	(Colombian Airport Enterprise)	CA	53
Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos, ECOPETROL	(Colombian Petroleum Enterprise)	MP	696

1. The following list was derived from various sources, including a compilation made by Senator Hernando Durán Dussan, the governmental *Manual de organización de la rama ejecutiva del poder público nacional*, and from data furnished by the Office of Organization and Inspection of the Public Administration in the Office of the President of the Republic. It does not purport to be exhaustive.

MILLIONS
OF PESOS

Instituto Behring de Terapéutica Experimental	(Behring Institute of Experimental Therapy)	PH	3
Instituto de Fomento Algodonero, IFA	(Cotton Growers' Development Institute)	A	60
Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria, INCORA	(Colombian Institute for Agricultural Reform)	A	388
La Previsora	(Retirement Fund)	L	1
SENA, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje	(National Apprentice Service)	L	57
SENA, Seccional Cundinamarca	(Cundinamarca Sectional Apprentice Service)	L	12
Universidad Nacional de Colombia	(National University of Colombia)	E	109
Universidad Pedagógica de Bogotá	(Pedagogical University of Bogotá)	E	28
Caja de Previsión Social de Comunicaciones	(Communications Social Payments Fund)	C	20
Fondo Nacional de Caminos Vecinales	(National Fund for Neighborhood Roads)	C	53
Fondo Rotatorio de la Armada Nacional	(National Navy Rotating Fund)	W	1
Fondo Rotatorio del Ejército	(Army Rotating Fund)	W	9
Fondo Rotatorio de la Fuerza Aérea Colombiana	(Colombian Air Force Rotating Fund)	W	1
Fondo Rotatorio de la Policía Nacional	(National Police Rotating Fund)	W	10
Caja de Sueldos de Retiro de las Fuerzas Militares	(Military Forces Retired Pay Fund)	W	69
Caja de Sueldos de Retiro de las Fuerzas de Policía	(Police Force Retired Pay Fund)	W	16
Instituto Nacional de Cancerolo- gía	(National Cancer Institute)	PH	9
Corporación Autónoma Regional del Valle del Cauca, CVC	(Autonomous Regional Corporation of Cauca Valley)	D	136
Universidad Industrial de Santander	(Industrial University of Santander)	E	7
Universidad de Antioquia	(University of Antioquia)	E	6
Universidad del Atlántico	(University of Atlántico)	E	2
Universidad de Cartagena	(University of Cartagena)	E	3
Universidad de Caldas	(University of Caldas)	E	3
Universidad del Cauca	(University of Cauca)	E	3
Universidad de Nariño	(University of Nariño)	E	1
Universidad del Tolima	(University of Tolima)	E	1
Universidad del Valle	(University of Valle)	E	5
Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira	(Technological University of Pereira)	E	1

		MILLIONS OF PESOS
Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, Tunja	(Pedagogical and Technological University of Colombia at Tunja)	E 14
Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales, Seccional Antioquia	(Colombian Social Security Institute, Antioquian Section)	L 48
Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales, Seccional del Quindío y Norte del Valle, en Pereira	(Colombian Social Security Institute, Quindío and North Valle Section at Pereira)	L 13
Caja de Auxilios de los Ramos Postal y Telegráfico	(Postal and Telegraph Auxiliary Fund)	C
Corporación de Ferias y Exposiciones	(Fair and Exposition Corporation)	D
Corporación de Industria Aeronáutica Colombiana	(Air Industry Corporation)	CA
Fondos de Subsidio para el Transporte	(Transport Subsidy Fund)	D
Servicio de Giros y Especies Postales	(Postal Draft Service)	C
Superintendencia de Regulación Económica	(Superintendency of Economic Regulation)	D
Zonas Francas de Comercio y Industria	(Free Zones of Commerce and Industry)	D
Banco Cafetero	(Coffee Growers' Bank)	A-T
Banco Ganadero	(Cattle Raisers' Bank)	A-T
Caja de Crédito Agrario Industrial y Minero	(Agricultural Credit Bank)	A
Consejo Profesional Nacional de Ingeniería y Arquitectura	(National Professional Council of Engineering and Architecture)	PW
Escuela de Aviación Civil Colombiana	(School of Civil Aviation)	CA
Instituto Caro y Cuervo	(Cultural Institute of Language and Literature)	E
Banco Popular	(Popular Bank. Financing small business)	T
Banco de la República	(Bank of the Republic)	T
Caja Colombiana de Ahorros	(Colombian Savings Bank)	T
Caja de Previsión de la Superintendencia de Sociedades Anónimas	(Superintendency of Corporations Social Payments Fund)	D
Caja de Previsión de la Superintendencia Bancaria	(Superintendency of Banking Social Payments Fund)	T
Casa de Moneda de Bogotá	(Mint Museum of Bogotá)	F
Cooperativa Agrícola del Magdalena	(Agricultural Cooperative of Magdalena)	A
Comisión de Aguas de la Sabana de Bogotá	(Water Commission of the Sabana of Bogotá)	PW

MILLIONS
OF PESOS

Empresa de Ferrocarriles Nacionales	(National Railroad Enterprise)	PW	502
Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones	(National Telecommunications Enterprise)	C	143
Empresa Colombiana de Turismo	(Colombian Tourism Enterprise)	D	6
Escuela Superior de Administración Pública	(College of Public Administration)	CS	3
Fondo Rotatorio Judicial	(Judicial Revolving Fund)	J	4
Fondo Universitario Nacional	(National University Fund)	E	7
Gran Mercado de Paloquemao, Ltda.	(Paloquemao Market Ltd.)	D	1
Hospital Militar, Centro Médico Colombiano de Estudios para Graduados	(Military Hospital, Colombian Medical Center for Graduate Studies)	W-PH	14
Industria de Concreto Centrifugado Ltda., INCO	(Concrete Centrifuge Industry, Ltd.)	D	1
Industria Mecánicas Colombianas, S.A.	(Colombian Mechanical Industries, Inc.)	D	1
Industria Militar	(Military Industry)	W	36
Instituto de Asuntos Nucleares	(Nuclear Affairs Institute)	MP-D-E	3
Instituto Nacional de Abastecimientos, INA	(National Supply Institute. Purchase of agricultural products)	A	433
Instituto de Crédito Territorial, ICT	(Territorial Credit Institution. Housing construction)	D	456
Instituto Nacional de Aprovechamiento de Aguas y Fomento Eléctrico	(National Institute to Promote Water and Develop Electricity)	D	129
Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal	(National Institute of Municipal Development)	D	232
Instituto Nacional de Fomento Tabacalero	(National Institute of Tobacco Development)	A	6
Instituto Nacional de Fomento Industrial	(National Institute of Industrial Development)	D	45
Instituto Zooprofiláctico Colombiano	(Colombian Animal Hygiene Institute)	A	10
Instituto Colombiano de Especialización Técnica en el Exterior, ICETEX	(Colombian Institute for Foreign Technical Specialization)	E	12
Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi	(Agustín Codazzi Geographical Institute)	A	28
Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales, Dirección General, ICSS	(Colombian Social Security Institute. General Management)	L	30
Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales, Seccional de Cundinamarca, ICSS	(Colombian Social Security Institute. Cundinamarca Section)	L	84

MILLIONS
OF PESOS

Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil	(National Civil Registration Office)	
Centro Nacional de Productividad	(National Center of Productivity)	L
Superintendencia de Sociedades Anónimas	(Superintendency of Corporations)	D
Superintendencia de Bancaria	(Superintendency of Banking)	T
Superintendencia de Comercio Exterior	(Superintendency of Foreign Commerce)	D-T

A CUADRILLAS ACTIVAS COMUNISTAS:

1) Cabecilla: Fabio Vásquez Castaño (a. Carlos Villarreal), y Victor Manuel Medina Morón (a. Andrés Sierra).

Efectivos: 20 a 30 hombres (enero 1968).

Filiación: ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) de tendencias castristas.

Opera: Departamento de Santander: Barrancabermeja, San Vicente, área general del Opón, Cerro de los Andes, La Colorada y Cordillera de los Cobardes.

Observaciones: La unidad es conocida con el nombre de «Frente José Antonio Galán», y como primera en jerarquía dentro del aparato del ELN.

2) Cabecilla: Ricardo Lara Parada (a. Armando Lazo).

Efectivos: aproximadamente diez hombres (Enero 1968).

Filiación: «ELN» (Unidad dependiente de la anterior y conocida con el nombre de «Frente Camilo Torres»).

Opera en: Margen del Río Sogamoso, Cerro de La Paz; sitios de La Paz, Las Pavas, Marta, La Triga y Centenario, con desplazamientos a El Conchal y línea del ferrocarril Sabana de Torres, Barrancabermeja.

Desbaratada como fue, en 1967, la red urbana del "ELN", estas dos cuadrillas no han vuelto a dar mayores señales de vida. Además del intenso adiestramiento y politización de la población campesina, en las que persisten todavía, sus principales actividades consistieron en varios actos de saqueo a las instalaciones petroleras, emboscadas a patrullas militares o de la policía, y secuestros en ciertas zonas urbanas.

3) Cabecilla: Ciro Trujillo Castaño (a. Mayor Ciro).

Efectivos: 25 a 30 hombres

Filiación: «FARC» (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), de tendencias prosoviéticas y dependientes directamente del Comité Central del PCC.

Opera en: Areas rurales de los municipios de Roncesvalles, Rovira y Ortega, en el Departamento del Tolima; desplazamientos ocasionales hacia el municipio de Natagaima —del mismo departamento—, y hacia el Quindío. (Tenía su asiento anteriormente en Riochiquito, Departamento del Cauca, y llegó a contar entonces con cerca de 250 hombres fuertemente armados).

4) Cabecilla: Rogelio Díaz (a. Teniente Rogelio).

Efectivos: 15 a 20 hombres.

Opera en: Municipios de Rovira y Roncesvalle (Tolima), con desplazamientos frecuentes al Departamento del Valle, especialmente a los municipios de Sevilla y Cartago donde había operado anteriormente.

5) Cabecilla: José de Jesús Rojas Rivas (a. Cartagena).

Efectivos: 20 a 25 hombres.

Filiación: FARC.

Opera en: Municipios tolimenses de Chaparral, Olava Herrera, Ortega y su periferia con desplazamientos hacia el Departamento del Quindío.

6) Cabecilla: Glicerio Gonzalez (a. Abanico).

Efectivos: 18 a 20 hombres.

Filiación: FARC.

Opera en: Municipios de Libano, parte alta de los municipios de Anzoátegui y Santa Isabel y regiones aledañas al Nevado del Tolima.

7) Cabecilla: Fernando Cardona (a. Pielroja).

Efectivos: 5 a 10 hombres.

Filiación: Comunista (Línea Soviética) FARC.

Opera en: Municipios de Salento (Quindío), Rovira (Tolima). Se ha venido moviendo en la parte alta de Ibagué (nevado del Tolima), con desplazamientos hacia el Municipio de Anzoátegui y últimamente hacia la parte alta del Municipio de Anaimé.

8) Cabecilla: Pedro Antonio Marín (a. Tirofijo) jefe «FARC».
Efectivos: 30 hombres.

9) Cabecilla: Juanario Valero (a. Oscar Reyes).
Efectivos: 50 a 60 hombres.

Filiación: FARC.

Opera en: Municipios de Vegalarga, Alceciras, Tello, Rivera y Campolegre, parte alta del municipio de Neiva (Balsillas), en el Departamento del Huila.

10) Cabecilla: Rizo Roberto Lozada (a. Joselo).
Efectivos: 20 a 25 hombres.

Filiación: FARC.

Opera en: Regiones de El Carmen, La Julia, Chapinero, San Luis, Alpecito, Praga y Aipe en el Departamento del Huila y periferia de Marquetalia en Tolima.

11) Cabecilla: Pompilio Vera Ruiz (a. Joselito) dado de baja el 20 de febrero de 1968.

Efectivos: 30 hombres aproximadamente.

Filiación: FARC.

Opera en: Parte alta de los municipios de Baraya, Tello y periferia del Guayabero.

B) CUADRILLAS INACTIVAS COMUNISTAS (En noviembre de 1967).

1) Cabecilla: Gerardo González (a. Capitán Anzola).
Lugariente de Juan de la Cruz Varela.

Efectivos: 25 hombres aproximadamente.

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: Paquillo (Alto Sumapaz).

2) Cabecilla: Samuel Ardila (a. Cabo Ardila).

Efectivos: 8 a 10 hombres.

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: Peñas Blancas y Pueblo Viejo (Alto Sumapaz).

3) Cabecilla: Reinel Camaño.

Efectivos: 10 hombres aproximadamente.

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: Santa Marta (Alto Sumapaz).

4) Cabecilla: Gabriel Cortés.

Efectivos: 12 hombres aproximadamente.

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: Santa Marta (Alto Sumapaz).

5) Cabecilla: Ventura Rojas.

Efectivos: 8 hombres aproximadamente.

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: El Tunal (Alto Sumapaz).

6) Cabecilla: Jesús Morales (a. Capitán Galvis).

Efectivos: 20 a 25 hombres.

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: Salitre-Tunal-El Duda (Alto Sumapaz).

7) Cabecilla: Lázaro Castillo o Pedro Acosta (a. Ct. Tores).

Efectivos: 25 hombres aproximadamente.

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: Santo Domingo-San Juan-Paquillo (Alto Sumapaz).

8) Cabecilla: Julio Rojas (a. Cabo Julio).

Efectivos a 12 hombres.

Tendencia: (?)

Región: Manaure-San Jorge de Oriente-Media Luna.

9) Cabecilla: Tomás Hernández (a. Chipalo).

Efectivos: 6 a 8 hombres.

Tendencia: Prochina.

Región: Riosucio (Chocó).

10) Cabecilla: Julio Guerra, Luis Manco y Lobin Grajales (Capturado el último de los nombrados).

Efectivos: 30 a 50 hombres.

Tendencia: Prochina.

Región: Alto Sinú (Llanos del Tigre) Departamento de Córdoba. Entró en actividad en enero de 1968.

11) Cabecilla: Arcenio Torres Sánchez (a. Faenza). Muerto por el ejército en Septiembre de 1967.

Efectivos: 12 hombres.

Tendencia: Prosoviética (antiguamente operó a nombre del partido liberal. Constituye su caso un ejemplo típico de los bandoleros atraídos por el PCC).

Región: Municipios tolimenses de Cajamarca, Ibagué y Rovira.

12) Cabecilla: Fernando Cardona Giraldo (a. Pielroja).

Efectivos: 10 a 12 hombres (una guerrilla).

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: Municipios de Ibagué, Cajamarca, Pijao Salento, efectuando desplazamientos hacia el Departamento del Quindío, Valle (Córdoba).

13) Cabecilla: Rosendo Colmenares (a. Minuto).

Efectivos: 15 hombres aproximadamente.

Tendencia: Prochina (?).

Región: El Caño de la Hermosa y El Tigre en Casanare, El Viento y La primavera en el Vichada.

14) Cabecilla: Joaquín Fernández Dulce (a. El Llanero).

Efectivos: 9 hombres.

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: Zonas aledañas a Montenegro y Obando.

NOTA: Este bandolero fue dado de baja en septiembre de 1967.

15) Cabecilla: Albertino Villarraga (a. Cariño o Pateperro).

Efectivos: 50 hombres aproximadamente.

Tendencia: Prosoviética.

Región: El Duda, La Francia y Sinaí.

C) CUADRILLAS NO COMUNISTAS

1) Cabecilla: José María Echavarría.

Efectivos: 6 hombres.

Filiación: Liberal.

Región: Yacopí, Topaipí (se encuentra actualmente en receso).

2) Cabecilla: Cenón Bustos.

Efectivos: 8 hombres.

Filiación: Liberal.

Región: Yacopí y Topaipí (se encuentra actualmente en receso).

3) Cabecilla: Rodolfo Rodríguez (muerto).

Efectivos: 10 hombres.

Filiación: Liberal.

Región: Llano Mateo-Terán (Yacopí) (actualmente en receso).

4) Cabecilla: Pedro Beltrán (a. Titán).

Efectivos: 10 hombres.

Filiación: Liberal.

Región: Fandi (actualmente en receso).

5) Cabecilla: Agustín Bonilla (a. El Diablo).

Efectivos: 10 hombres.

Filiación: Liberal.

Región: Guataquí y Pulí (actualmente en receso).

6) Cabecilla: N.N. (a. Resortes).

Efectivos: 8 hombres.

Filiación: Desconocida.

Región: Mariangola, Atanques, Pueblo Bello, Copey (actualmente en receso).

7) Cabecilla: Hermanos Granadillo.

Efectivos: 10 hombres.

Filiación: Desconocida.

Región: San Juan del Cesar, Caracolí (actualmente en receso).

8) Cabecilla: N. N. (a. Caballo Grande).

Efectivos: 7 hombres.

Filiación: Desconocida.

Región: Valledupar, La Paz, Codazzi (actualmente en receso).

9) Cabecilla: José Gómez Higuera (a. El Mágico).

Efectivos: 12 hombres.

Filiación: Liberal (MRL) línea dura.

Región: Peque y Buritica, Corregimientos Urrao y Tabacal (actualmente en receso).

- 10) Cabecilla: N. N. (a. Cartagena).
Efectivos: 7 hombres.
Filiación: Desconocida.
Región: Corregimiento Altamira, Municipio de Betulia (actualmente en receso).
- 11) Cabecilla: Misael Torres Tamayo (a. Cap. Torres, capturado).
Efectivos: 15 a 20 hombres.
Filiación: Liberal (MRL) línea dura.
Región: Salsa y Carepa Arriba (en receso).
- 12) Cabecilla: Caudrilla Jaime Guera Tamayo (a. Capitán Veneno).
Efectivos: 15 hombres dispersos en la zona de operaciones.
Filiación: Liberal MRL.
Región: Segovia y Remedios en las zonas rurales (receso).
- 13) Cabecilla: Alvaro Villa (a. Cabo) ex-suboficial del ejército.
Efectivos: 12 a 16 hombres.
Filiación: Desconocida (Posiblemente de ANAPO).
Región: Márgenes derecha Río Cocorná, región de Pablonía y zona Iglesias (en receso).
- 14) Cabecilla: Alfonso Jiménez Mira (a. Manano).
Efectivos 7 hombres divididos en dos grupos.
Filiación: Conservador (ANAPO).
Región: Municipios de San Carlos, Cocorná y San Luis (en actividad).
- 15) Cabecilla: Moisés Pachón Arias (a. Viejo Negro).
Efectivos: 6 a 8 hombres.
Filiación: Conservador, presumiblemente de ANAPO.
Región: Margen derecha del río Cocorná (en actividad).
- 16) Cabecilla: José Guejía (a. Panela, capturado).
Efectivos: 7 a 8 hombres.
Filiación: Liberal.
Región: Corinto y Miranda (Cauca) (en actividad).
- 17) Cabecilla: Ferney Ramirez Giraldo (Resortes).
Efectivos: Desconocidos.
Filiación: Liberal.
Región: Parte alta de la cordillera de Buga y Cerrito (Departamento del Valle) (en actividad).
- 18) Cabecilla: Julio Vergara y Evelio González.
Efectivos: 20 hombres aproximadamente.
Filiación: Desconocida.
Región: Zona montañosa de Jamundí (Villacolombia). Desembocadura del río Naya, «Guerrilla Gaitán» (en actividad).
- 19) Cabecilla: Mauricio Rojas.
Efectivos: Desconocidos.
Filiación: Liberal (MRL).
Región: Regiones de Caloto, Corinto y Miranda (Departamento del Cauca) (en actividad).
- 20) Cabecilla: N. N.
Efectivos: 6 a 8 hombres.
Filiación: Desconocida.
Región: Carretera Cúcuta, Pamplona, Bucaramanga (en actividad).
- 21) Cabecilla: Luis Rodrigo Sandoval Ortega.
Efectivos: 2 a 4 hombres.
Filiación: Conservador.
Región: Municipios de Pamplonita, Sarare, San José de la Montaña, Toledo, Cúcutilla, Ragonvilla, Chinácota, Herrán y Arboledas (en actividad).
- 22) Cabecilla: Elicer Arias Ruiz (a. El Diablo).
Efectivos: 8 hombres.
Filiación: Desconocida.
Región: Municipios de Cabrera, Barichara, Villeneuve, Curití y San Gil (en actividad).
- 23) Cabecilla: Bernardo Giraldo (a. El Tuerto).
Efectivos: 300 hombres aproximadamente.
Filiación: Liberal M.R.L.
Región: La Playa, Canaguaro, Avichure, Puerto Caldas y San Juan de Arama (en receso).
- 24) Cabecilla: Dumar Aljure (a. Capitán Aljure) (recientemente dado de baja).
Efectivos: 200 a 300 hombres aproximadamente.
Filiación: Liberal oficialista.

Región: San Martín, Granada, Fuente de Oro, Rincón de Bolívar, Candilejas y San Juan del Guaviare (actualmente en descomposición por la acción de las FF. AA.).

25. Cabecilla: Eduardo Fonseca Galán.

Efectivos: 50 hombres aproximadamente.

Filiación: Liberal MRL.

Región: Yopal, Aguazul, Maní, Tauramena, Chamenza y Pajarito (en receso).

26. Cabecilla: Ronaldo Guerrero o Mono Guerrero.

Efectivos: 5 hombres.

Filiación: Liberal.

Región: Regiones de La Estrella, El Retiro, San Antonio, en el municipio de Sevilla (Valle, en actividad).

POVENIR DE LOS GRUPOS ARMADOS. - El dicho hasta ahora alcanza a deslegar cualquier duda e incertidumbre en torno a la responsabilidad que los caudales comunistas prichinos y prichivietos en la vigilancia y la lucha armada.

La aclaración es necesaria, pues son numerosas las personas que creen que la política de "coexistencia pacífica" promovida por Moscú, constituye una regla inquebrantable para los partidos fieles a la línea soviética, y que, en consecuencia, poco o nada tienen que ver con la insurrección y las guerrillas.

Para terminar de disparar equívocos bastaría citar textualmente las palabras pronunciadas por el camarada Luis Morantes, importante miembro del Comité Ejecutivo Central del PCC, con motivo de inaugurarse el "X Congreso del Partido Comunista de Colombia" celebrado en Viota entre el 21 y el 25 de enero de 1966, reproducidas luego, sin ningún reparo, en el semanario "VOZ PROLETARIA", órgano oficial del partido, (Edición N° 11 del 7 de febrero de 1966):

"... Este congreso tiene, además, la importancia de realizarse en los momentos en que el movimiento armado de resistencia va en crecimiento, en el momento en que los fundamentos de los detachamientos guerrilleros esperan del congreso de los comunistas que es su congreso, nuevas formulaciones sobre la lucha armada popular que permitan la elaboración de una estrategia y una táctica militar de guerra que los conduzca a nuevos éxitos y al crecimiento de su prestigio, que es en suma el prestigio del partido, el prestigio de las ideas revolucionarias, el prestigio de la revolución y el comunismo...".

Aclarado este punto, cabe ya insistir en la discrepancia política que en torno a la lucha armada existe entre prichivietos y caudales prichinos. Aquí los no sólo no consideran que sea la única vía de la lucha, tema del pasado, sino que ni siquiera la colocan en el primer lugar.

En el congreso prichino consideramos más bien como un receso, pero como ya se sabe de la presencia de bandos militares bajo su control en distintos puntos del país, facilitando la colaboración del campesinado, o bien porque este obliga a que haya o sea de importantes sumas de dinero, es de supuestos de dinero, o sea de que se hace más delicada la situación económica y se muestra el desmoronamiento de los puntos de desarme prichinos.

Es que, como se sabe, los caudales prichinos de las guerrillas, si bien todo lo que se ha favorecido experimentado, se ha dado en el caso de Castro al respecto, han dividido su actividad, con la ayuda de otros sectores, para poder seguir al PCC, al menos en el caso de la guerra de forma, en política, frente poco sólida y profunda, del que por el momento se guarda más bien de ser una política pacífica, tal como se ha dicho de que se ha producido un cambio de que se ha producido la caída de la "vieja guardia" de los caudales prichinos, en los que se ha producido, en algunas veces, han llevado la peor parte.

El futuro prichino, desde tanto más palabras para los caudales prichinos, como prichinos, en los puntos del mundo, de los que se ha dicho, en el caso de los caudales prichinos, de la caída de la "vieja guardia" prichina, de que se ha producido un cambio de que se ha producido la caída de la "vieja guardia" prichina, en los que se ha producido, en algunas veces, han llevado la peor parte.

Por el lado del gobierno, el PCC, con pocas palabras, se ha dicho, en el caso de los caudales prichinos, de la caída de la "vieja guardia" prichina, de que se ha producido un cambio de que se ha producido la caída de la "vieja guardia" prichina, en los que se ha producido, en algunas veces, han llevado la peor parte.

Desde el punto de vista de los caudales prichinos, se ha dicho, en el caso de los caudales prichinos, de la caída de la "vieja guardia" prichina, de que se ha producido un cambio de que se ha producido la caída de la "vieja guardia" prichina, en los que se ha producido, en algunas veces, han llevado la peor parte.

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Por el lado del gobierno, uno de los factores de éxito más importantes...

Appendix C. Communist Party Analysis of Colombia.

Colombia is a backward country from the point of view of the degree of exploitation of natural resources, the application of technical innovations, the utilization of the labor force existent, and the social organization in the camp of production.

In the countryside where the majority of the population lives, there are maintained semi-feudal relations, and the violent eruption of capitalism destroys materially and morally the lives of the peasants.

The industrial development within light and transformation industry is jammed for the dependence on monopolist foreign capital, predominantly North American, and also by the insufficiency of the demand from the actual solvent population.

The great wealth of the sub-soil, the abundant natural resources and land, are deficiently utilized, for the benefit of minor national and foreign groups.

Most of the labor force works in unproductive or barely productive occupations; the most generalized production means are irrational; raw materials are not used economically, and in general terms there is a great waste and mal-utilization of the productive forces of the society.

There is a big difference between what could be produced with full utilization of the existent resources and the real production, and also between what the population is consuming, and what it should in order to satisfy essential necessities.

The cause of this situation of backwardness is not in the geographical conditions, neither in the character or psychology of the Colombian people, but in the character of the concrete historical development determined by social relations based in the ownership of the basic means of production by minority groups, "latifundists" in the first epoch and now "latifundist" and bourgeoisie allied in the service of imperialism, mainly the Yankee imperialism, that each day dominates more of the material and spiritual life of the country.

A. The Yankee Imperialism Exploitation.

1. After the independence from Spain, and after the economic dependence from English imperialism, Colombia, after the Second World War, fell into the hands of the absolute domination of North American imperialism that was penetrating since the second decade of this century.

Yankee imperialism exploits the Colombian people in a direct and an indirect way: it sacks our natural resources, deforms the national economy, takes away most of the product, dominates external credit and commerce, controls key positions in industry, public services, transports, and imposes on us the prices for what it buys from us and for what it sells to us.

2. More than 80 percent of the oil lands are in the hands of the subsidiaries of the big international monopolies. Millions of hectares of national territory are occupied by the oil companies and maintained as unexploited reserves, aside from the Colombian economy. Sixty percent of the oil production is for exports, but as it belongs to the international monopolies, it does not produce revenues, while the 40 percent for the local refineries for national consumption takes more money out of the country, no matter if it is from the Colombian sub-soil and with costs paid fundamentally with Colombian money. The share of the benefits that the oil companies pay to the State, are the lowest in the world and income and patrimony taxes they should pay are ducked with the systems of exemptions by depletion.

3. Gold and platinum are exploited by imperialist enterprises without effective control by the State and they pay taxes that do not correspond to the real value and volume of production.

4. Besides the sub-soil wealth they already dominate, foreign companies are trying to get also the coal, iron, uranium, the energy's means of production and other metals.

5. The direct North American investments and the mixed capital enterprises have penetrated in the key points of industry. By those inversions and by credit, the North American imperialism pressures and subdues the Colombian bourgeoisie.

6. There is a clear dependence on the foreign commerce. At the same time that the public external debt with enterprises and North American banks grows, the value of our basic export product in the American market goes down. Colombia has lost between 1954 and 1964 half of the income of sales in the external commerce. The external public debt has had a huge augment within the last times as a sign of the way the dominant classes have taken for capitalist development.

The monopoly of the foreign commerce determines the dependence of the Colombian money with respect to the dollar and isolates the country with respect to the wide socialist markets. At the same time it conditions the industrial development to the raw materials, equipment and machinery of North American procedence.

7. Because of these reasons, and because of the each day more overt North American intervention in our national life, in our institutions, in our freedom, in our culture, North American imperialism constitutes the main enemy of the Colombian people because it is the negation of autonomous life and independent development. The main contradiction is the one that confronts the popular classes and the progressive sectors against the North American imperialism and its agents.

The end of the imperialist domination and the march to a full national independence, represent a concrete perspective for struggle. The victory of the Cuban revolution and the fact that a socialist society is being built in the same doors of the Yankee imperialism, shows the path the peoples decided to fight for their freedom must follow.

B. The Semi-Feudal Exploitation of the Land.

1. Maintained by the imperialist domination, the semi-feudal character of the agrarian economy constitutes the other big root of the misery and backwardness of Colombia.

The monopoly of the best lands by a reduced group of landowners that hoard them by keeping them unexploited or irrationally exploited, leaving without land most of the peasants, or in little unproductive spots with the consequent misery, ignorance, lack of health, and servility of the peasant producer; that is in essence the semi-feudal system of rural ownership.

2. More than a million peasant families do not have any land; the huge latifunds engender the minifunds where hundreds of thousands of families vegetate without the minimum levels of subsistence. More than a million agricultural salaried painfully work with salaries that cannot satisfy the living necessities of nutrition, medical attention, hygiene, and education. While the fertile valleys and the plain areas are devoted to extensive cattle raising, the agricultural production takes place in the hills and the slopes where mechanized work is so difficult; relations of the feudal type subsist as the medianeria, the aparceria, the payment of rent in kind, in work or in money; short term renting of plots and the prohibition of permanent or large productivity crops are maintained;

the cultivates are started by putting fire to the lands, one of the factors for the erosion that is the highest danger for the Colombian soil; the life conditions of the agricultural workers are aggravated by the necessity of migrating from one region to the other looking for jobs, by the seasonal employment, the droughts, etc.

3. Feudal relations exist between the lords and the peasants, while the former keep the authorities at their service to annul the workers gains and to take away their civil rights and freedoms guaranteed by the National Constitution.

4. Capitalism advances in uneven form in the countryside existing at the same time as the backward forms of semi-feudal character, mixing the capitalist way of production with the large patterns of ownership. This adds to the semi-feudal serfdom, the capitalist exploitation.

5. The agricultural production for industrial and export ends (cotton, sugar, fats), displaces gradually the production of food for the people, without the country having been able to change from being a mono-exporter.

6. These circumstances lead to a progressive degradation of the agricultural production, the development of which goes slower than population growth and consumption needs. The country imports each time more of its food and agricultural raw materials, expending huge quantities of money that could be used in investments in agriculture or in industry. The foreign dependence on agricultural machinery, fertilizers, drugs and other basic elements for the development of some industries like agriculture, slows the agricultural and industrial advancement.

7. If the situation in the production process is a dramatic one for the peasants, in the exchange process it is much worse. Huge losses of energy, of products; waste of work; high prices for consumers and low and unstable ones for the producers. The growing poverty of the peasants is an obstacle for them to obtain industrial products, reducing the possibilities of industrial expansion and making worse the narrow of the markets.

8. The illiteracy quota in the countryside is a huge one and so are the differences between cities and countryside.

C. The Uneven Development of Capitalism.

1. Capitalism has advanced although very unevenly especially during the last decades. It has developed in the creation of consumption and service industry, with scarce foreign participation.

2. Although capitalist development implies the advancement of the productive forces of the country and the gradual transformation of the semi-feudal structures, the way taken under the direction of the monopolist North American capital does not assume the elevation of the people's standards of life, and it does not lead to national independence. The actual system makes more acute the impoverishment of the masses and slows the economic growth.

3. In recent times the big oligarchs in team with the imperialist penetration make the monopolist tendencies heavier having the State at their service, using the profits for conspicuous consumption and for hoarding money in foreign banks.

4. The capitalist development in Colombia within the mark of imperialism has been limited within the traditional imperialist formula which consists in specializing the backward countries as food exporters, or raw materials or processed articles and keeping those countries tied by selling them products that only the capitalist countries produce.

5. Capitalism has not made the country develop in a harmonious way. Part of the industry belongs to North Americans and part is in competition with these imperialist enterprises that take away from the country high revenues, importing only the patents and finding national credits for their financing.

6. The State enterprises have a rather important place within the economy, and could constitute a break to the imperialist penetration and they are destined to play a higher role as a base of the social economy in the future.

But as the State is not representing the Nation but the dominant classes, then the State ownership of enterprises is being fouled by now.

7. The development of capitalism has left some traits on the Colombian bourgeoisie. Through half a century this class is well entrenched, its

interests in the banks, big industrial and commercial enterprises, and the latifundios in the countryside. Inside the bourgeoisie, there are the sell-outs to imperialism and the ones that sometimes conflict with imperialism but without being able to work within the objectives of national liberation.

8. The national bourgeoisie is limited in existence and development because of the imperialist domination. In spite of this, it cannot lead in the fight for national liberation. Although its interests are in contradiction to imperialism it cannot fight because it is more scared of a social revolution and of the liberation of the masses than of imperialism.

9. For this reason and because the democratic anti-imperialist revolution belongs to the socialist revolutions, the Colombian revolution only can be effected by the popular masses under the direction of the working class united to the peasants, to the revolutionary intellectuals, to the petit bourgeois, and to the most progressive strata of the national bourgeoisie.

D. Political Regime and Historic Parties.

1. Power in the dominant classes makes it easy for the North American imperialism to exploit our people and makes the country more dependent and backward.

2. The State is an instrument of the war politics of the Yankee imperialism. With the secret signing of the bilateral military treaty between the Colombian Government and the United States, national sovereignty does not exist and the Colombian military forces are under the North American military leaders.

3. The reactionary violence and militarism that have gotten hundreds of thousands of victims from the people have filled the national scene within the last times. The result has been the limitation or total suppression of the civil traditions and democratic freedom in our country.

4. Within the armed forces there is a differentiation process: patriotic soldiers and officers see with alarm the lessening of sovereignty and independence and participate with repugnance in repressing the people. The more conscious sector of the armed forces, as the popular struggle grows wider, will play a more important role in the fight for national liberation.

5. Our country does not have an international policy, independent and peaceful. Its actual government and diplomatics act like lackeys of the North Americans, bringing shame on the name of the country.

6. Colombia cannot have commercial and cultural free relations with all the countries because of the systematic obstruction by the North American Government. Free commerce with the socialist world would change the circumstances and solve in part our chronic deficits in balances of payments and commerce.

7. Capitalist influence invades the camps of culture, passing over the best popular, pacific and democratic traditions. The radio, movies, TV, newspapers, the literature and the educational institutes, are utilized for preaching against the spirit of national independence. All the cultural media are used for the war propaganda, the imperialist violence and the slanders of the socialist countries. Universities are gradually penetrated by financing means, behind which comes the anti-national orientation and closing menaces if the line of submission is not maintained.

8. Costs of living go always higher and real salaries go down. There is disequilibrium between income and needs of the workers. The abusive State's and oligarchic intervention within the work movement is a factor of division and disorganization. The division of the working class is imposed by the oligarchs and financed in part by the imperialist monopolies.

9. The intensification of the effort by capitalist methods by incentive, leads to unemployment and to the shortening of the workers lives. Unemployment is a permanent phenomenon for hundreds of thousands of workers.

10. New taxes, asked by the International Monetary Fund, fall on the consumers, while the official budgets go to maintaining the army and the rest of the repressive apparatus, and for paying the loans of the Yankees.

11. Wide segments of the middle sectors see their income decreasing and their difficulties augmenting. Even sectors of the middle bourgeoisie are lessened by the restrictions in credit, by the importation and dollars licensing for the import of raw materials and equipment.

12. There is something peculiar to the Colombian political system: the two ideologies of foreign origin, the liberal and the conservative, that went through many civil wars, still are in government without bringing a radical solution to the problems of the Colombian people.

The apparition of new progressive forces in relation to the concrete problems of the social classes, schemes solutions that the traditional parties are not able to implement. Although the predominant ideology is still that of the oligarchs, the working class has its vanguard party, the Communist Party of Colombia which each day is more consequent with the interests of the country. Differences between liberals and conservatives are disappearing, because both of them keep inside sell-outs to the Yankee imperialism, people from the high bourgeoisie, and from the semi-feudal castes. Within the conservative leaders, there are the most reactionary sectors, the most responsible for the violence of the people within the last twenty years. Under the liberal influence are the sectors of the working class and medium urban classes with the illusions of the democratic past of this party.

13. The liberal and conservative oligarchs are unified for bringing to the Constitution the bipartisan paritary system and the presidential alternation, to maintain their dominance and to isolate the new political currents. The people, oppressed by this system try to orient themselves to struggle for the revolutionary unity of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces of all the parties. As the crisis of the so-called National Front of the oligarchs goes deeper, new political forces take shape that are looking toward fundamentally changing the Colombian life.

14. The crisis of the system is deep in all the sectors. Even within the Church, there are new sectors favorable to revolutionary changes. This is very significant because the Catholic Church has been traditionally in Colombia an instrument of domination of the oligarchs.

E. The Agrarian Anti-imperialist Revolution.

1. Our country needs a radical and revolutionary change to fundamentally modify the economic and political structure to lead to liberation and to lead to superation of backwardness. This radical change cannot be other than the anti-imperialist agrarian revolution.

2. The Colombian Communist Party has as objectives the victory of socialism in Colombia and its superior stage, Communism, that is a society without classes, without exploiters and exploitation, in which the universal development of men, the productive forces, will be able to realize the great principle of "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his necessities."

The purpose of the Communist Party is to struggle at the vanguard of the working class and within a unitary movement of all the national forces to liberate our country from foreign domination and to effect an agrarian and democratic revolution as a first step to the socialist revolution.

3. This revolution of national liberation is the objective of all the peoples in Latin America under the oppression of Yankee imperialism, and as part of the socialist world revolution.

4. In order to make the agrarian anti-imperialist revolution, a necessary condition is the revolutionary conquest of power by the popular classes in order to have a government that effectively represents the popular majority and the general interests of the country. This will be the patriotic government of national liberation.

5. The proletariat with its class party at the vanguard must struggle for being the leading force of that government as a necessary guarantee in order that the revolution is not taken away from its ends, and goes toward the building of socialism.

6. The fight of the Colombian people within international conditions is each day more favorable. We are in the times of change from capitalism to socialism, of the victory of the world socialist system with the Soviet Union at its lead, and of the construction of the material bases for Communism. The advancement of the progressive and peaceful forces stimulates the anti-imperialist movement of all the peoples struggling against it, against colonialism and neo-colonialism, and are solidly in the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

7. In Latin America the victory of the anti-imperialist revolution and the building of socialism started with the glorious Cuban revolution, the process of which started the liberation of the peoples of Latin America and adds more urgency to the necessity of advancing the

revolution in our countries. The Cuban revolution proves that imperialism is in its last epoch, that the revolution of national liberation succeeds only through marxism-leninism and with the socialist aid.

8. The peaceful forces have contributed to detain a third world war because of the imperialist aggressions. The peaceful forces are integrated by the powerful socialist camp, the free countries of Asia and Africa, the national liberation movement, the progressive forces and the working class of the capitalist countries. These forces united can impose peace and stop imperialism or defend themselves from it. It is necessary to be aware; to stop imperialism in time; to increment the national liberation struggle as the highest contribution to the victory over imperialism. It is a response to the forces to impede the peoples' liberation, to increment our revolutionary activity and the solidarity with the peoples under aggression fighting for their independence, as an affirmation of the right of the oppressed peoples to their liberation.

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