Systems Analysis of Crime in Trinidad and Tobago, focusing on the Cocaine Trade

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Abstract

Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) has escalated in the 2000s and the government is struggling to find the best methods to reduce crime and improve national security. Measures such as hiring an external police commissioner, introducing new bills, community policing and implementing a state of emergency have all been tried, but it seems as though these steps have all failed in achieving their desired goals as crime is still increasing. In this paper, I argue that a systems-thinking approach is needed to understand crime in T&T and to evaluate potential interventions. Using systems analysis, international and national datasets, system dynamic models as well as newspaper reports, I review recent experience, compare T&T with other countries, identify key issues and interactions, and suggest planning recommendations that may help to reduce crime. This paper is an effort to identify planning strategies that can bring about sustainable change in T&T.
Dedication

To my grandmother Rica Charles, July 13, 1927 – August 28, 2012

Thank you!
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# Table of Contents

Systems Analysis of Crime in Trinidad & Tobago, focusing on the Cocaine Trade .......... 3

Abstract ................................................................................................................................... 3

Dedication .................................................................................................................................. 4

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 5

Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. 6

Table of Figures .................................................................................................................... 9

List of Acronyms ................................................................................................................... 11

Map of the Caribbean ............................................................................................................ 13

Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................... 14

Why cocaine? .................................................................................................................... 15

The Drug Trade, Crime and Economic Development in the Caribbean ....................... 16

Modeling Crime .................................................................................................................... 19

Chapter Guide ..................................................................................................................... 19

Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 21

Chapter 2: The Drug Trade and Crime in Trinidad and Tobago ....................................... 22

Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 23

Nature of Crime .................................................................................................................... 24

Analysis of Crimes from Newspaper Articles .................................................................... 32

Racial Crime Perceptions .................................................................................................... 37

Crime Against Immigrants .................................................................................................... 39

Deportees and Crime ............................................................................................................ 39

Drug Trade and Terrorism in T&T ....................................................................................... 40

Drug Trade and Terrorism in T&T ....................................................................................... 40
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 40
Chapter 3: Cocaine and the Caribbean ................................................................. 41
The Drug problem in the Caribbean ........................................................................ 41
Geographic Reasons for Caribbean Participation in the Drug Trade .......... 41
Economic/Political Reasons for Participation in the Drug Trade .................... 43
The Supply Chain of Cocaine .................................................................................. 45
The Spillover Effects of the Cocaine Trade ............................................................... 47
Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis ...................................................................... 49
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 60
Chapter 4: The Global Drug Trade ........................................................................ 61
The Cocaine Supply Chain ....................................................................................... 61
Growth of the Drug Trade in West Africa ................................................................. 66
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 72
Chapter 5: The Government’s Response to Crime ................................................ 73
Ministries, Departments & Agencies involved in the Anti-Drug Initiative ........... 74
Timeline of Bills, Programs & International Agreements ...................................... 78
Hiring More Police Officers ...................................................................................... 80
Major Drug/Crime Interventions .............................................................................. 81
Effectiveness ................................................................................................................ 82
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 84
Chapter 6: Public Perception of the Government’s Response ......................... 85
Colonial Legacy .......................................................................................................... 85
Scandals with the Leadership ...................................................................................... 86
The State of Emergency (SOE), Police Racial Profiling and Brutality, Aug-Dec, 2011 88
Corruption Perception ............................................................................................... 89
Table of Figures

Figure 1: Thesis Outline .............................................................................................................................................. 21
Figure 2: Homicide Rate in T&T .......................................................................................................................... 22
Figure 3: Total Serious Crimes .............................................................................................................................. 24
Figure 4: % Convictions for Total Serious Crimes .................................................................................................. 25
Figure 5: Crimes against Persons .......................................................................................................................... 25
Figure 6: % Convictions for Crimes against Persons ............................................................................................. 26
Figure 7: Crimes against Property .......................................................................................................................... 26
Figure 8: Crimes against Property excl. Other .......................................................................................................... 27
Figure 9: % Convictions for Crimes against Property excl. Other ........................................................................ 27
Figure 10: Major & Minor Narcotic Offences .......................................................................................................... 27
Figure 11: Major & Minor Narcotic Offences .......................................................................................................... 28
Figure 12: % Convictions for Narcotic Offences ..................................................................................................... 28
Figure 13: Cocaine Seizures ...................................................................................................................................... 28
Figure 14: Total Minor Crimes & Offences ............................................................................................................. 29
Figure 15: % Convictions for Minor Crimes & Offences .......................................................................................... 29
Figure 16: Total Non-Narcotic Crimes ..................................................................................................................... 29
Figure 17: % Convictions for Non-Narcotic Crimes ................................................................................................. 29
Figure 18: Kidnappings ............................................................................................................................................. 30
Figure 19: Kidnapping Intervention Loop ............................................................................................................. 31
Figure 20: Seizures Summary .................................................................................................................................. 33
Figure 21: Map of the Nationality of People found with cocaine (color) and their intended location (arrows) in T&T .............................................................................................................................................. 34
Figure 22: Homicide Victims by Age ....................................................................................................................... 35
Figure 23: Method of Murder .................................................................................................................................. 36
Figure 24: Motive of Murder ................................................................................................................................... 36
Figure 25: Ethnic Groups in T&T ........................................................................................................................... 37
Figure 26: US Deportees to T&T ........................................................................................................................... 39
Figure 27: How interdictions may have helped the cocaine trade through the Caribbean .................................. 42
Figure 28: Economic Policy Leading to the Growth of the Drug Trade in the Caribbean ................................... 44
Figure 29: Cruise Ships and Pleasure Crafts Arrivals in T&T ................................................................................ 46
Figure 30: Deportees to the Caribbean from the US ............................................................................................... 48
Figure 31: Narco-Transshipment-State Risk Factors .............................................................................................. 50
Figure 32: 2011 Corruption Perception Index, from least corrupt to most corrupt ............................................. 51
Figure 33: 2010 Homicide Rates ........................................................................................................................... 52
Figure 34: 2009 GDP per Capita & 2009 Development Aid as a % of 2009 GDP ..................................................53
Figure 35: 2012 Failed State Index, from least failed to most failed .................................................................55
Figure 36: 2011 UN Human Development Index, from most developed to least developed ...............................56
Figure 37: Vol. of Cocaine seized from 2004-09 ...............................................................................................56
Figure 38: 2010 Trade in Merchandise and Services as a % of GDP ...............................................................57
Figure 39: Global Cultivation of Coca Bush, 2010 ...............................................................................................61
Figure 40: 2009 Cocaine Dist’n by Market ........................................................................................................62
Figure 41: Global Coca Bush Cultivation (ha), 1990-2009 ...............................................................................62
Figure 42: Street Price per gram of Cocaine ......................................................................................................63
Figure 43:..........................................................................................................................................................64
Figure 44: Global Cocaine Flows, 1998 and 2008 .............................................................................................65
Figure 45: Annual Cocaine Seizures in West Africa, 2000-2007 .................................................................67
Figure 46: Possible cocaine transshipment routes in W. Africa .................................................................68
Figure 47: Slave Trade Routes .........................................................................................................................70
Figure 48: Slave Trade Routes, 1400s-1800s ....................................................................................................70
Figure 49: T&T Anti-Drug Initiative ................................................................................................................74
Figure 50: T&T Corruption Perception Index ..................................................................................................90
Figure 51: Potential Reasons for slightly improved CPI ..................................................................................90
Figure 52: Stock & Flow Diagram of Public Perception ...............................................................................92
Figure 53: System Dynamics Model of Gang Membership in Jamaica ..........................................................96
Figure 54: Crime reduction decreases murder rate .........................................................................................97
Figure 55: System Dynamics model of Mexican Cartels .............................................................................100
Figure 56: Illicit Cartel Activity Loop .........................................................................................................101
Figure 57: System Wnablers of Cartels Loop .................................................................................................103
Figure 58: System Dynamics model of Criminal Justice System .............................................................104
Figure 59: System Dynamics model of Crime Theory ...................................................................................107
Figure 60: Regulation of Crime Loop .........................................................................................................108
Figure 61: Reinforcement of Crime Loop ....................................................................................................108
Figure 62: Diagram showing the need for multiple stakeholder engagement ..............................................121
Figure 63: TTPS Organizational Ecosystem ....................................................................................................124
Figure 64: Organizational Change Forces .................................................................................................126
List of Acronyms

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
CARICOM – Caribbean Community
CBO – Community Based Organization
CBSI – Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
CICAD – Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS)
CITES – the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CPI – Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International)
Dep’t – Department
EU – European Union
FSI – Failed State Index (Fund for Peace)
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
Gov’t – Government
HDI – Human Development Index (United Nations)
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IMPACS – Implementation Agency for Crime and Security
INCSR – International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Nat’l – National
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
OAS – Organization of American States
OCNFB – Organized Crime, Narcotics and Firearms Bureau (of the TTPS)
SAP – Structural Adjustment Program
SOE – State of Emergency
T&T – Trinidad and Tobago
TT CSO – Trinidad and Tobago Central Statistical Office
TTPS – Trinidad and Tobago Police Service
UN – United Nations
UNDCP – United Nations International Drug Control Program
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
UN-HRLLS – United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island States

UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Map of the Caribbean

Source: http://www.mapsworldwide.com/online_map.asp?country=61
Chapter 1: Introduction

Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) is the southernmost island of the Caribbean and it is known for its beautiful carnival, its friendly people, its beautiful beaches and recently, for having a high murder rate (UNODC 2007). The murder rate in T&T, which acts as the standard measure for violent crime due to its consistent reporting and tracking when compared to other crimes, more than quadrupled in the 2000s allegedly due to the fall-out from the drug trade in the country (UNODC Homicide dataset 2012). The drug transshipment problem affects not just T&T, but many of the countries in the Caribbean region. In fact, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and local political leaders in the Caribbean have stated that the drug trade is the biggest source of crime in the region (UNODC 2007, Griffith 2011).

"Nothing poses a greater threat to civil society in CARICOM countries than the drug problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional government more. This is the magnitude of the danger drug abuse and drug trafficking hold for our community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormity of the inducement of the illegal drug trade in poor countries." (West India Commission, 1992.)

The Caribbean is ideally located between the major cocaine producers, in South America, and the major markets, in USA and Europe, and as a result, the transshipment of cocaine through the region persists. In this thesis, I consider:

- What can the law enforcement in these countries do to help curb the negative fall-out from the trade?
- What framework could help organizations evaluate possible interdictions in order to determine the best way to allocate funds?

These questions have plagued government officials in T&T and the Caribbean for at least a decade, and though I do not claim to have the answer to these questions, I hope to show how systems analysis techniques and modeling, for example system dynamics, can provide a framework to determine effective interventions. Systems analysis tries to sort out the interactions among policy, action and perception. It not only helps to identify which feedback loops are important, but it also takes into account time delays and tipping points i.e., when rare phenomena become drastically more common or when the buildup of minor changes or incidents trigger a major phenomenon (Grodzins 1958, Gladwell 2000). This form of analysis is ideal
because if there are links between cocaine emergence in the 1980s (Klein 2001) and the skyrocketing of the murder rate in the 2000s, then a systems approach might provide a framework for understanding the linkages.

In this thesis, I start by describing the crime situation in T&T and its posited links to the global cocaine trade. To strengthen the argument that the spillover effect from the illicit movement of cocaine is harmful, I then look at the Caribbean region and its role in the trade. Although this paper focuses on T&T and the Caribbean, I briefly show that illicit trade is neither a new nor a unique problem for the country or the region by looking at the slave trade and the shipment of illicit goods during colonialism. I also discuss the growing transnational cocaine trade in West Africa. After providing this global and temporal perspective, I re-focus on T&T and discuss the various government actions and policies to curb the repercussions of the trade as well the resulting increase in fear and distrust in the community due to the high crime rates. T&T provides an interesting case study because in 1999 a major local drug lord and his gang were tried, convicted and hanged to stem the growth of crime in the country. However, these deaths may have had the unintended consequence of increasing violence, kidnappings and murders as rival gangs, which had been suppressed by the major stronghold tried to claim their part of the business (Figueira 2004). In August 2011, the government of T&T declared a national state of emergency because of the high rate of murder. To date, the repercussions from of this state of emergency are still unknown, therefore, a systems analysis approach would be an essential tool to identify issues and possible consequences.

Further, I use system dynamics literature to analyze potential interventions and to show that this type of modeling is useful in determining long-term strategies to reduce crime. Finally, I apply organizational ecosystem theories to suggest a change implementation strategy for the T&T Police Service (TTPS).

Why cocaine?

My primary reason for choosing the drug trade is its alleged links to the increasing crime and homicide rates in the Caribbean. The most abused illegal substances in the region are marijuana, heroin and cocaine (Griffith 1996); however, marijuana has religious and ethnic
significance in some parts of the Caribbean\(^1\) (Klein 2001) and records of heroin abuse are significantly lower than the other two (Griffith 1996). Consequently, I do not look into the trade or into the impacts of either marijuana or heroin and I focus instead on impacts of the cocaine trade on the Caribbean and potential analytical models of these impacts in T&T. Although consumption of cocaine is a problem in T&T, my primary focus is on the impacts of transshipment as that appears to be the major factor in violence.

The Drug Trade, Crime and Economic Development in the Caribbean

The drug trade affects the Caribbean economically, socially and politically. It increases the costs of doing business, it reduces external investment and it diminishes confidence in the governing authorities. Griffith (2011: 6) posits that some Caribbean countries, including T&T, are being “pushed to the edge of a governance precipice”.

Economically

Tourism is one of the biggest sources of revenue for the Caribbean region, according to the CIA World Factbook (2012). For all countries, excluding Cuba and T&T, tourism is listed as one of the industries that make a major contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), accounting for up to 60% of the GDP in the case of Antigua & Barbuda and the Bahamas (CIA World Factbook 2012). Increases in crime and violence reduce the attractiveness of the Caribbean as a vacation destination and countries suffer economically (Griffith 1995). Although the nation of T&T does not depend on tourism for economic stability, officials in Tobago, the smaller of the two isles and a notable tourist destination, worry about the upsurge in crime. In fact, the President of the Hotel and Tourism Association in Tobago, Carol Ann Birchwood James stressed that murders in Tobago would negatively affect the arrival of tourists\(^2\).

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\(^1\) Rastafarians believe that it is religious herb with spiritual and medicinal value.

Additionally, crime increases the cost of doing business and skews the allocation of resources (Griffith 1995). Companies that want to invest in the Caribbean are obliged to take extra protective measures, for example hiring security guards, to ensure that their employees and property are safe. The President of the T&T Manufacturers’ Association commented, "Crime is a big problem for us, especially if we want to run that night shift." He added, "It is always a problem to get staff to work that. Some companies have to take steps of providing transport at great cost to and from the compound for staff and it's a deterrent for multinationals who are accustomed to working around the clock." ³ In addition, shipping firms and airlines are less likely to want to operate in the Caribbean, as smugglers would be tempted to use these as shipment vehicles, which may cause the company to be fined if cocaine is found on the vessels (Klein 2001). Finally, the government has to spend more money on national security and healthcare, to keep citizens safe and to deal with victims of crime, respectively; these funds are taken from other sections of the national budget.

Logically following from this, there has been a growth in private protection firms and private security mechanisms in the region (Griffith 1995) and, jobs in public security have also boomed. In fact, T&T Police Commissioner Gibbs said in 2011 that the police to civilian ratio is very high ⁴.

Socially

As a result of the increased crime and murders, citizens of T&T are living in fear, and the quality of life both in T&T and the Caribbean has decreased. For example, people report that they no longer take public transportation nor do they walk through the streets at night.⁵ At the killing of 66-year-old Kenrick Raphael at his home in Freeport T&T one neighbor commented, "Just look how this country get. This is a safe area...well it was safe. Now we have to be afraid in

our own community, in our own homes,” the woman said.” Crime curbs social activity that lead to the characteristic congeniality of the ‘Caribbean person’ that existed in decades prior within communities and erodes pride of national identity and trust in the government and the judicial system.

**Politically**

Although this paper does not delve into the issue of sovereignty, prior literature have discussed in detail the role of the drug trade and crime in undermining local government sovereignty (Griffith 1995, Griffith 2011, Klein 2001). This occurs in various ways:

- Crime bosses may step in to meet the needs of the community and thereby gaining the public support. For example, in 2010, Christopher “Dudus” Coke was a criminal in Jamaica wanted for extradition to the US. The people of Tivoli Gardens, where he provided economic support, violently protected him with their lives when the police came for him (Griffith 2011).

- The society may begin to lose faith in the governing party because the criminals have more guns, have more money and seem to have better strategies (Klein 2001).

- International law enforcement bodies step in to help countries curb the drug trade, potentially undermining the local police (Klein 2001, Griffith 1995).

- International institutions demand that countries curb crime and often provide rules that countries should obey. For example, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) assesses each country’s strategy in dealing with their drug problem (INCSR website) and penalties may be placed on countries deemed to not be adequately trying to reduce the drug trade (Klein 2001).

These factors play a combined role to contribute to the decrease in development in T&T and the Caribbean.

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http://www.newsday.co.tt/crime_and_court/0,163467.html
Modeling Crime

Since the 1950s and 1960s, the crime analysts in the US have been using quantitative analysis to examine and predict crime patterns and understand the criminal justice system. Modeling crime has helped to inform decision makers on how to allocate resources and manpower; and, it has been used to find bottlenecks in the system (Bard 1977, Blumstein 2002). In this thesis, I use systems analysis to assess the vulnerabilities of countries to the narco-trade and I show how system dynamics models can be used to understand some interactions between various factors and may help determine interventions. Systems analysis, and particularly system dynamics, provides a good framework for the quantification of stated vulnerabilities in its capacity to combine expert analysis and expert opinions with empirical data and emphasize understanding patterns of behavior (Bard 1977, Sterman 2001). It further highlights which positive feedback loops should be reinforced and which negative loops should be reduced based on these analyses. Moreover, a systems-wide approach helps to identify the roles that stakeholders play in aggravating or alleviating crime and this will inform the policy makers who are determining the solutions to T&T’s crime problem.

Chapter Guide

In Chapter 2, “The Drug Trade and Crime in T&T”, I use international and national data as well as newspaper articles to describe crime in the country.

Spillover crime from the cocaine trade is not specific to T&T, and in Chapter 3, “The Cocaine Trade and Crime in the Caribbean”, I discuss how the cocaine trade affects the region. Morrison (1997) created a metric to determine the likelihood of countries becoming narco-production-states, I tweak this to analyze the risk of countries becoming narco-transshipment states using international data sources. This chapter helps to show the dynamics of being part of a regional system.

In the Chapter 4, “The Global Cocaine trade”, I examine the global cocaine trade and geospatial movement of cocaine based on the data provided by the UNODC, literature on the drug trade and news articles. I show that the ill effects are not specific to the Caribbean, by
briefly discussing the cocaine transshipment ramifications in West Africa, and I show that it is not specific to this time, by briefly discussing the movement of people and goods across the Atlantic Ocean during slavery. This chapter shows that T&T is part of a global system, with respect to the drug trade, and that inherent to this global pattern of trafficking, there exists a path dependence based on its colonial history.

In Chapter 5, “T&T Government’s response”, I return to T&T and look at the various policies and actions that the government has taken to respond to the rise in crime. Some of these include hiring a foreign commissioner of police and declaring a national state of emergency both within the past decade. I argue that the need for system dynamics modeling is great due to the help it proffers to policymakers to determine which interventions may have the strongest impact and how much time they need to wait to see results.

In Chapter 6, “Public Perception of the Government’s Response”, I highlight some of the perceptions that the society holds of the law enforcement institutions because of the rise in crime and alleged corruption due to the drug trade based on information found in newspaper articles and reports.

In Chapter 7, “Analysis of System Dynamic Models of Crime”, I evaluate system dynamics models that look at pertinent crime and extract findings and recommendations that apply to T&T.

In Chapter 8, “Conclusion”, I discuss how system dynamics could be applied to T&T, I briefly analyze the role of stakeholders in bringing about change in T&T, and I use organizational theory to make some planning recommendations for the TTPS.
Methodology

For this thesis, I looked at newspaper articles, international and national data sets and literature written about T&T and the Caribbean, the cocaine trade, crime, West Africa and systems analysis, particularly system dynamics modeling.

The goal of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of how systems thinking could guide policymakers who want to reduce crime and the negative impact of the transnational drug trade in T&T. Through systems analysis and evaluating models that depict various interactions between the drug traders, law enforcement and the community, I show that recommendations can come from this long-range type of analysis. Although, defense-in-depth, where many methods are employed at once, is needed, I hope to highlight some strategies that may be more effective.
Chapter 2: The Drug Trade and Crime in Trinidad and Tobago

In this chapter, I profile the crime situation in T&T through statistics and newspaper articles. To begin with, crime increased in T&T in the 2000s; in fact, the homicide rate, which is used as a proxy for violent crime because its numbers are the most credible, quadrupled from 2000 to 2008, from 9 people per 100,000 (120.0 people), to 41 people per 100,000 (547.0 people). See Figure 2. In 2010, with 506 murders, the homicide rate was 35 people per 100,000, which placed T&T in the 90th percentile or the top 10% of murders in the world (UNODC homicide dataset). These glaring statistics denote that crime is indeed a major problem in T&T and indicates that there was a tipping point whereby the factors cumulated to lead up to this drastic increase in violent crime. I posit that the level of crime and the societal response to crackdowns on smuggling could be influenced by political, institutional and cultural factors.

1) Africans were brought to T&T by European plantation owners as slaves as part of the global economic policy from the days of slavery, later Indians came albeit as indentured laborers and the Syrians also migrated to T&T as traders. These methods of entry established power dynamics that still exists today. (Braithwaite 1953)

2) Following Independence in 1962, the black Trinidadians worked in the public service, but the IMFs Structured Adjustment Program (SAPs) in the 1980s encouraged developing countries to reduce the size of government, which cause many to lose their jobs. These SAPs, which were supposed to increase the profitability of nations, resulted in increased poverty and despair within some of the Afro-Trinidadian communities; as well as widened the inequality gaps in the country. (Klein 2001)

3) With the rapid growth of the drug trade in T&T, the government hanged a major drug dealer who controlled much of the cocaine transshipment in order to reduce crime; however, this
hanging lead to increased gang warfare, crimes and kidnapping in the country. (Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012)

4) The Colombian/Mexican power struggle and the “War on drugs” helped re-institute T&T and the Caribbean as important nodes along the drug trade, which underlies much of the transshipment dynamics in T&T, more in chapter 4. (UNODC 2011)

5) Additionally, in his Small Arms Survey report, “No Other Life: Gangs, Guns, and Governance in Trinidad and Tobago”, Townsend (2009) discusses government corruption and its relationship to gangs and crime, although I think that this issue is pertinent, it is outside the scope of this thesis.

Next, I look at crime statistics for the country.

Methodology

To establish the nature of crime in the T&T, I gather data from four major sources: the UNODC, Police Statistics released by the T&T Central Statistical Office, newspaper articles and literature review.

- The UNODC has various reports profiling crime in T&T and provides statistics on homicides, drug seizures, and kidnappings
- The T&T Central Statistical Office (TT CSO) has provided national data\(^7\), which summarizes the reported crimes by type of crime from 1998 to 2009. The data is categorized as serious crimes, minor crime and minor offences. Additionally, the number of convictions, for each of the same categories, is provided from 1999-2009
- The newspaper articles provide detailed information on the crime situation in T&T.
  - To analyze the recent trends in drug seizures, I conducted an online search of the three major T&T newspapers\(^8\) for the word “cocaine” and I collected information

---


\(^8\) T&T Express, T&T Newsday and T&T Guardian
from 40 articles, from 2010, with “seizures” mentioned in the article and created an Microsoft Excel database.

- To do in-depth analysis of the murders in T&T, I created a dataset of 205 murders based on 103 articles from the three top T&T newspapers. At each newspaper’s online site, I did a search for “murder” and read the most relevant articles that the search returned. Newsday returned 30 articles, of which I read 9, Express returned 4,650 articles of which I read 29 and the Guardian returned 100 articles of which I read 64.

- The literature review helps to set the stage and to provide an understanding for some of the observed crime patterns.

Finally, I draw from my personal experience of living in T&T for 19 years in the 1980s and 1990s as well as from conversations that I had with people living in some of the more notorious regions in the country. For the sake of their safety, I did not interview them officially, nor do I directly quote what they have said; instead, I use their stories to understand the situation in T&T better.

Nature of Crime

Total Serious Crimes

The Central Statistical Office of T&T released crime statistics for 1998 to 2009, with data divided into serious crimes, minor crimes and minor offences. Figure 3 highlights that the serious crimes in T&T grew continuously from 2004, at 16,388 acts, to 2009, at 22,161 acts (TT CSO 2008, 2009). Serious crimes could be further split into 1) crimes against persons, 2) crimes against property, 3)
narcotic offences, 4) forgery and crimes against currency, and 5) other. For this quantitative description of the crime in T&T, I focus on the first three categories.

**Figure 4: % Convictions for Total Serious Crimes**

Additionally, the CSO provides information on the number of convictions from 1999-2009. From this data, the percent of convictions, has decreased from about 10%, in 1999 to just over 2% in 2009. For the decade on average 5% of the serious crimes reported resulted in conviction. This indicates that not only are more ‘serious crimes’ being committed, but the judicial system is less able to convict the perpetrators (TT CSO 2009).

**Crimes against Persons**

‘Murders’, ‘manslaughters’, ‘felonious wounding’, and ‘other’ make-up the crimes against persons category. Manslaughter, which according to Dictionary.com is the crime of killing another human without malice aforethought⁹, decreased over the ten-year period; however, murders and wounding grew steadily. Felonious wounding peaked in 2003, with 784 acts of violence, dropped in 2004, by about 150 acts and

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⁹ http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/manslaughter
then rebounded in 2005 to the highest in the decade of 801 acts as shown in Figure 5. Both murders and felonious wounding dropped off in 2009. (TT CSO 2008, 2009)

As with total serious crimes, the conviction rates dropped for crimes against persons. On average for the decade, less than 1% of the murder charges resulted in conviction, about 2% of the manslaughter charges and about 3% of the felonious wounding charges. The numbers show that the judicial system is inadequate at finding and convicting perpetrators of violent crimes (TT CSO 2009).

**Crimes against Property**

Crimes against property increased 52% from 12,510 acts in 1998 to 19,069 acts in 2009. Breaking & burglary account for about 35% of the crimes against property, robbery, 31%, larceny, 29%, and other, 5% of the crimes over the decade. This shows that not only have violent crimes increased in T&T over the 2000s, but other serious crimes have increased in the nation as well. (TT CSO 2008, 2009)
Conversely, Breaking & Burglary generally decreased over this period, whereas robbery and larceny increased.

![Figure 8: Crimes against Property excl. Other](image)

**Figure 8: Crimes against Property excl. Other**

Crimes Against Property in T&T, excl. Other

- Breaking and Burglary
- Robbery
- Larceny


**Figure 9: % Convictions for Crimes against Property**

% Convictions for Crimes Against Property in T&T, excl. Other

- Breaking and Burglary Convictions
- Robbery Convictions
- Larceny Convictions


Convictions for crimes against property show the same pattern as the other serious crimes with the rate decreasing over the decade.

**Narcotics Offenses**

Unlike crimes against persons and crimes against property that dipped in 2004, narcotic offences peaked in that year. In 2000, the lowest point in the decade narcotic offences were just over 4,000 acts and it grew 65% to over 6,700 in 2004. Total narcotic offences dropped in 2009 by almost 2,000 acts, which

![Figure 10: Major & Minor Narcotic Offences](image)

**Figure 10: Major & Minor Narcotic Offences**

Major and Minor Narcotic Offences in T&T

indicates that either less people were involved with the narcotics trade or the police caught less people doing it. (TT CSO 2008, 2009)

Minor narcotics\textsuperscript{10} offences are on average six times more than major narcotics offences. Although minor narcotic offences grew until 2004 and then dropped, major narcotic offences dropped in 2001 and stayed under 1,000 acts for the rest of the decade. This implies that T&T either has many small actors and/or major players who are not caught (TT CSO 2008, 2009).

The conviction rate for the narcotic offences is much higher than the rates for the serious crimes. Over the past decade, on average 61\% of the minor narcotic offences and 28\% of the major ones have resulted in convictions (TT CSO 2009).

Authorities seized over 4,000 kg of cocaine since 2004 in T&T, according to the UNODC Seizures database, with the highest seizure occurring in 2005. The lower seizures from 2007 and onwards may be the result of better strategies by drug dealers to avoid capture by law enforcement (UNODC WDR 2011, 2011, 2012).\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{10} The data did not state the distinction between major and minor narcotic offences.
Seizures dataset). Conversely, it could be due to drug traders no longer using T&T as a transshipment point because of the major interdictions in 2005 and 2006.

**Minor Crimes & Offences and Non-Narcotic Crimes**

Finally, minor crimes and minor offences\(^\text{11}\), in general have decreased over the timed period with minor offences having a slight uptick in 2009.

![Figure 14: % Convictions for Minor Crimes & Offences](image)

Similarly, non-narcotic crimes decreased in over the decade with a slight increase in 2009.

![Figure 17: % Convictions for Non-Narcotic Crimes](image)

Additionally the percent of convictions, which averaged around 8%, decreased as well (TT CSO 2009).

\(^{11}\) The data did not have notes explaining the difference in minor crimes, minor offences and serious crimes.
Kidnappings during the 2000s were a national epidemic that also took on a racial lens. Allegedly, after the Dole Chadee and his gang were hanged in the 1990s, there were turf wars and kidnappings as rivaling gangs tried to gain control of his piece of the business (Figueira 2004). Starting with the taking of Anthony Sabga, teenage son of one of the local Syrian families, in 2002 (Prentice 2012), kidnappings became a way for people to gain money from the local businesspersons, many of whom were Indian merchants (Figueira 2004). Additionally, many of the money drops occurred in Laventille, a poor black area in the country, so the slanderous perception that the envious black community members were kidnapping the prosperous Indian people promulgated. According to the UNODC Kidnapping Dataset, in 2005 T&T was in the 88th percentile of kidnappings, of the 84 countries with data, with 4.4 persons per 100,000. Although, T&T had a lower rate of kidnappings than Kuwait or Occupied Palestine, it had a higher rate than Colombia or Peru. (UNODC kidnapping dataset, Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012, Temple Raston 200712). The kidnappings increased the tension and fear in the country.

Conversely, after the surge in 2005, kidnappings decreased from 2006 onwards. These results may be the result of successful police intervention and policy in reducing the number of kidnappings. These feedback relationships could be important in determining the ripple effects of public safety measures and this suggests that a system dynamics approach toward modeling the criminal justice system could be useful. Figure 19 below uses system dynamics notation to diagram the feedback relationships.

Figure 18: Kidnappings

Source: UNODC Kidnapping Dataset

**Figure 19: Kidnapping Intervention Loop**

---

**Crime Statistics Correlation**

Using statistical analysis, I examine some of these relationships. For most of the factors, I have at 11 years of data\(^{13}\), from which I calculated the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, \( r \), to determine whether there is correlation among the factors. Pearson correlation returns a value from -1 to +1, where negative numbers indicate negative correlation; conversely, positive numbers indicate positive correlation. The closer than \( r \) is to -1 or +1, the more correlated the two datasets are. Additionally, because the number of terms are 11 for most of the variables, I consider \( r \geq 0.55 \) and \( r \leq -0.55 \) to indicate significant correlation\(^{14}\). Table 1 below shows the Pearson Correlation Coefficient with no lagging of the years to show the general relationships. Future analysis would include doing this analysis several times with various time lags to understand to gain a better understanding of the relationships. The data for this table are the same as mentioned above.

---

\(^{13}\) For Kidnappings and Vol of Cocaine Seized, I only have 6 years of data.

\(^{14}\) For an \( N \) of 10, correlation must be as high as 0.55 to be significant at 0.05, and for an \( N \) of 5, correlation must be as high as 0.80 to be significant at 0.05. (Rummel, R.J., “Understanding Correlation” Honolulu: Department of Political Science University of Hawaii, 1976, Chapter 9.3: Statistical versus Practical Significance)
### Table 1: Pearson Correlation Coefficient, no time lag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Crime</th>
<th>Total Serious Crimes</th>
<th>Minor Crimes &amp; Offences</th>
<th>Total Non-Narcotic Crimes</th>
<th>Major &amp; Minor Narcotic Crimes</th>
<th>Homicides</th>
<th>Wounding (felonious)</th>
<th>Kidnappings</th>
<th>Major Narcotic Offences</th>
<th>Minor Narcotic Offences</th>
<th>Vol of Cocaine Seized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Crime</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Serious Crimes</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Crimes &amp; Offences</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Non-Narcotic Crimes</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major &amp; Minor Narcotic Crimes</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounding (felonious)</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Narcotic Offences</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Narcotic Offences</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol of Cocaine Seized</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;-- more positively correlated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>more negatively correlated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This simple correlation matrix suggests that homicide, which is used as the measure of violent crime, is negatively correlated with total crime, minor crimes & offences and total non-narcotic crimes. Major and minor narcotic crimes are positively correlated homicides and felonious woundings. Additionally, the number of kidnappings and the volume of cocaine seized are positively correlated.

### Analysis of Crimes from Newspaper Articles

The following data comes from a sample of 40 articles where the word “seizures” was mentioned when I searched the online T&T newspapers for the word “cocaine” and all of the seizures occurred in T&T. Of the seizures, 22 occurred in 2010, 14 in 2011 and 4 in 2012. These 40 seizures summed to 308 kg of cocaine, worth about USD $18.7 million and 60 people were implicated in the events. The following diagrams summarize the results.
Most of seizures were made because of TTPS, and particularly the Organised Crime, Firearms and Narcotics Bureau (OCFNB), searches based either on tips or on observations of suspicious activity.
Youth/Gang Violence

Drug lords use their connections in T&T to recruit young males and equip them with weapons to protect and move the drugs as necessary. Allegedly, powerful and wealthy people are bringing guns into the poor areas, such as Laventille, and giving them to the youth in the community (Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012). Unfortunately, although most of the drugs move out of the country, the weapons remain in the hands of the young male gangs members; this results in an underground economy where people rent guns out for others to commit crimes and get reimbursed based on the expected pay-out of the crime (UNODC 2007). Gang violence has increased and certain areas have become crime hotspots, these areas include Chaguanas, Couva,
La Horquetta, Arima and Diego Martin. Other areas such as Port-of-Spain, Morvant and Laventille have long been identified as areas with a high prevalence of crime\textsuperscript{15}.

Repercussions of the increased number of gangs include increased violence, evidenced by the increases in felonious wounding and murders, and a decreasing sense of safety in the communities. Recently, a student was found with a .38 revolver at his school,\textsuperscript{16} which raised alarms because schools are usually considered safe zones even in the most violent areas (Townsend 2009). This ease in access to guns has worsened the quality of life in T&T. News reports indicate that gang violence is the leading cause for murders in the country.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Homicides}

To analyze the homicide data in detail, I built a dataset of 205 murders based on 103 newspaper articles. A profile of the data indicates that most of the victims were young males who were shot; in fact, of the 205 incidents, 87\% of the victims were male and 43\% of the victims were under 29 years old. Figure 22 highlights that most of the victims were in the 20-29 age group, which represents 36\% of the dataset. As a single age group, 35 year olds and 23 year olds were the most killed people with 10 murder victims at each of those ages.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure22.png}
\caption{Homicide Victims by Age}
\end{figure}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Source: Author created database from newspaper articles.}
\end{center}


Hollywood-mafia-styled killings are becoming more prominent in T&T, as drive-by shootings, bullets to the back of the head, and throat slitting described how some people were killed. Oftentimes, people were shot when talking to neighbors just outside their homes. In general, shootings were the most popular method of murder with 71% of the people (140) being killed in this way. Stabbing slightly edged out chopping (with a machete) as the second most popular method of killings, with 16 and 15 deaths respectively. A few people were beaten, strangled, and suffocated as summarized in Figure 23.

Not all of the articles mentioned a cause of death, but of the 112 that did, gang-related or drug-related violence account for 57% of the motives. 9% of the murders involved the killing of law enforcement officials and their family, including the murder of police officers, soldiers and police informants. In one case, the sister of the Director of Public Prosecutions was thrown over the balcony of her house. Figure 24 shows the breakdown of the motives.

The murders occurred in over 70 different locations, but the top 5 locations: Laventille, Arima, Diego Martin, Morvant and Port-of-Spain account for 41% of where the murders took place. These are all urban areas including or with the periphery of Port-of-Spain, the capital and Arima, one of the major towns.
Racial Crime Perceptions

According to the CIA World Factbook, T&T’s population is 40% people of [East] Indian descent (Indians), 38% people of African descent (Africans), 21% mixed races and 2% people of other ethnicities or people who are undefined. These other groups include people of Syrian and Lebanese descent (Syrians), people of Chinese descent (Chinese), and people of European descent, including the British, French, Portuguese, and Spanish (Caucasians); all of whom have been living on the islands in relative peace for the past few centuries.

The Arawaks and Caribs were the first known settlers in the country as indigenous migrants from the South American mainland, many died when the Spanish and French came in the late 1400s and most of the survivors were interbred into the European and African populations. These first Europeans brought over the Africans to cultivate the land as slaves. The British took over in 1797 and during their tenure slavery ended, so they brought in indentured laborers from India who they paid minimally to work the land. The Syrians and the Chinese came to Trinidad as merchants and traders in the late 1800s, early 1900s; they became involved in retail and as a result, they own many of the major stores in the country. (Braithwaite 1953)

In 1962, the black elite rose up and claimed our Independence from the British Empire with the People’s National Movement (PNM). Allegedly, the Syrians and other members of the elite classes funded the PNM and its rise to power (Figueira 2004). After Independence, many people of African descent got jobs in the public service, as they did not own land and these jobs gave them good economic opportunities, whereas many of those of Indian descent decided to continue working the lands awarded to them in payment of their indentureship. With emancipation and rejection of plantation servitude, many of the African people moved to the
hills and valleys just outside the nation’s capital, Port-Of-Spain, in Laventille, Morvant, Belmont and Diego Martin (Griffith 2011, Townsend 2009, Figueira 2004).

In the 1980s, when the IMF purported the Structured Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which encouraged governments to decrease in size, some of the people in the African communities lost their jobs, lost their faith in the government and started to despair. Coincidentally, the price of oil dropped, so T&T, which has an oil-based economy, tail-spun into a recession. Allegedly, this is when the drug trade started taking its hold in T&T, as the wealthy drug lords preyed upon the poor people in the black urban communities, for example Morvant/Laventille, and got them to be foot soldiers in the trade. (Griffith 1996, Klein 2001, Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012).

Over the years, some of the Indians who moved away from agriculture went into retail and became direct competitors with the Syrians. Shopping centers moved away from Port of Spain, which was a Syrian foothold, to other parts of the county, particularly in the South, which have more Indian patronage. These wealthy Indians led to the rise of the other major political party in T&T the United National Congress (UNC). Additionally, these wealthy Indians also became involved in the drug trade, for example: Dole Chadee who was one of the more notorious drug dealers from T&T was of Indian descent (Prentice 2012, Figueira 2004).

The rise in crime has been blamed on the African communities in T&T, but some posit that the young black boys are just pawns in the game being played by wealthier set with the resources to formulate strategy (Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012).

The racial stereotypes in T&T include that:

- The people of African descent are the drug runners, kidnappers and urban gang members (Griffith 2011)
- The wealthy people of Indian descent are involved in the drug transshipment, and the poorer Indians are part of rural gangs involved in drug and gun running and kidnapping (Townsend 2009)
- The wealthy people of Syrians/Lebanese descent are the legacy players in the transshipment of cocaine (Figueira 2004, Townsend 2009)
Crime Against Immigrants

The recent years have seen an influx of Chinese immigrants who have come to work in construction or trade, these immigrants are falling victim to the crime in the country. The Chinese Embassy believes that there is deliberate targeting of Chinese nationals by local criminals. Consequently, they have asked the Minister of National Security to provide them with protection in order to continue doing business in the country, after a Chinese businessman was shot. Michael Lee Kim, president of the Sun Wai Association said, “crime is affecting the economy because people are reluctant to invest” and he added that there is increased fear in the Chinese community. Conversely, police statistics do not verify that Chinese people are being targeted according to Sgt Wayne Mystar, spokesman for the Police Service.

Deportees and Crime

Allegedly, one of the sources of crime in the country is deportees who have been sent back to the country from the US because of illegal activity. Some of the deportees are young men, whose parents took them to the US when they were children, but they never got citizenship.

Figure 26: US Deportees to T&T

![Graph showing US Deportees to T&T from 1998 to 2010]


References:

there, so, when they commit a crime the US government sends them back to T&T. However, many of these young men no longer have family ties in T&T so they get involved in crime and some actually link the criminal networks in T&T to their networks in the US (Griffith 1996). Since 1998, 4,218 people were deported to T&T from the US and 2,433 of them were deported for criminal reasons\(^{23}\), see Figure 26 (US Homeland Security 2011).

**Drug Trade and Terrorism in T&T**

Brigadier Sandy, the head of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), warns that, “T&T is a soft target for terrorists.”\(^{24}\) He posits that through money laundering and other financial schemes terrorists are able to clean their money in T&T. Additionally, Independent Senator Balgobin worries that terrorism money is flowing through T&T. He said, “Terrorism is real, very real, especially for small countries.” He added that it was “quite easy to bring something into Tobago and just put it on the ferry and bring it across, and guess what, that happens.”\(^{25}\)

**Conclusion**

This chapter summarizes some of the crime statistics in T&T and shows that although the total crime in the country is decreasing the homicides, felonious wounding and serious crimes are increasing. Additionally, the narcotic offences are increasing in general although the number of serious narcotic crimes remains steady and the number of minor narcotic offences grows. A systems approach would be useful in identifying feedback mechanisms and relationships that may cause one type of crime to grow, but another type to decrease.

\(^{23}\) 2001 – 2010 come from Table 38 of the 2011 report, 2000 from Table 8 of the 2010 report, 1999 from Table 37 of the 2009 report and 1998 Table 37 of the 2008 report.


Chapter 3: Cocaine and the Caribbean

The challenge of increased crime due to the drug trade is not specific to T&T and is indeed a problem that is faced throughout the Caribbean. In this chapter, I summarize the crime and drug trade conditions for the sovereign nation islands of the Caribbean and then I consider the likelihood of the countries becoming narco-transshipment states.

The Drug problem in the Caribbean

Drug production, consumption and abuse, trafficking and money laundering are the major direct problems of the drug trade in the Caribbean, with increased crime, and more homicides as spillover effects. Cocaine, heroin and marijuana are the major illegal drugs abused in the region, with heroin considered an upper class drug, cocaine a middle lower class drug and marijuana a working class drug. (Griffith 1996, Klein 2001)

The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) in their 2011 Annual Report 2011 said that in the Caribbean and Central American cocaine abuse is above the world average. However, this chapter is limited to the transshipment of cocaine in the Caribbean.

Geographic Reasons for Caribbean Participation in the Drug Trade

The Caribbean is located between cocaine producers and consumers; as a result, illegal drug trafficking is one of the primary causes of crime in the region. In addition to its geo-strategic location between the cocaine producers in South America and the major cocaine markets in the USA and Europe, many Caribbean islands have poorly guarded seashores that make them ideal for use by drug traffickers. Consequently, tonnes of cocaine pass through the Caribbean on an annual basis (UNODC 2011, UNODC 2007). Illegal drug traffickers need people at various points along the supply chain to help them move their goods, so they bribe officials to turn a blind eye, and they hire enforcers, who they supply with weapons, to guard the

---

shipments. Moreover, drug traffickers often pay the people whom they employ with product; as a result, these people become drug dealers in their own countries in order to make money (UNODC 2007).

The northern islands of Jamaica and the Dominican Republic used to be the largest ports for transshipment in the Caribbean due to their long seashores and the nearness to the US; however, as international law enforcement interdictions reduced profit and opportunities arose in other countries, such as T&T, the routes shifted (Griffith 1996).

Additionally, the Mexican cartels took over the trade from the Colombians, the cocaine moved up the Central American coastline to get into the US instead of going through Caribbean, which was the Colombians preferred route. However, US immigration at the Mexican borders began cracking down on the trade thereby greatly reducing the profitability at the same time that the Colombians were actively expanding the trade in the Europe. Consequently, the cocaine routes moved back to the Caribbean both as a means to get to the US, but also to get into Europe. From the trade relationships and vacationing patterns established by the Europeans post Colonialism, trade ships and cruise liners frequently came from Europe to the Caribbean, which increased the attractiveness for the drug trade (Klein 2001, Griffith 1996, UNODC 2011).

Figure 27: How interdictions may have helped the cocaine trade through the Caribbean
The flow chart above shows policy resistance, which is when the interventions that were created to improve a problem may trigger responses that push back and actually exacerbate the problem. In this case, the interdictions, which were meant to stymie the drug trade in the Caribbean as drugs flowed to the US, may have eventually led to a growth of the trade as the drugs flow to Europe.

**Economic/Political Reasons for Participation in the Drug Trade**

The drug trade in the Caribbean accelerated during the 80s and 90s, partly because of the worsening economic conditions in the Caribbean coming from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Structural Adjust Programs (SAPs). As Klein (2001) points out, these programs reduced the faith the country had in the government, because they called for the reduction in the public service sector. Many people lost their jobs, the economy was bad and they had to find alternative sources of revenue; in fact, Klein proposes that the drug trade was the most profitable sector coming out of the Caribbean in the 1980s. Additionally, the SAPs increased inequality and social tension in the Caribbean, causing the gap between the legal and social definitions of crime to increase and poor areas like Laventille, in T&T, and Tivoli Gardens, in Jamaica, to suffer (Klein 2001).

During the Cold War, the US monitored the conditions in the Caribbean for fear that the countries would adopt communist ideology; however, once it was over the US moved resources to the Middle East, leaving the Caribbean vulnerable to the wealthy operators in the drug trade (Klein 2001). Concurrently, with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries lost their preferential trade relationships with Europe. Many Caribbean isles had long traded agricultural products like bananas and sugar cane with European countries; so, the opening of the market negatively affected them, as Caribbean countries were unable to match the prices that bigger countries with larger production could offer. These factors all contributed to the growth of the cocaine trade in the region (UNODC 2011, Klein 2001).

Current poor economic conditions and difficulty in finding jobs contribute to reasons that people get involved with crime and the drug trade (Klein 2001, Prentice 2012). Unemployment over the last five years has been about 14% in the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and St.
Lucia (WB indicators). The drug trade provides a viable alternative to people who are unable to find employment in the licit economy.

Finally, in the 80s and 90s when the trade was growing, the law enforcement could not match the resources of the cocaine shippers. In 1987, the heads of state of CARICOM developed a regional program to control drug trafficking (Klein 2001). Figure 28 below summarizes this information by showing some of the key causal loops.

**Figure 28: Economic Policy Leading to the Growth of the Drug Trade in the Caribbean**
The Supply Chain of Cocaine

Price and Volume

Table 2: Price of Cocaine Salt in Various Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Price (USD $)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Price (USD $)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, cocaine prices increase drastically as the drugs move north. In the production countries of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, drugs sold at under USD $5 a gram. In the transshipment countries, where data is provided, cocaine sold for up to USD $65 in Cuba, with T&T and Dominica having similar prices. However, in the main consumption countries of Europe and USA, prices went up to USD $209 and USD $413, respectively. In Venezuela, a South American cocaine transshipment country, the price of cocaine went up to USD $12 and in Nigeria, a South American transshipment countries, cocaine sold for up to USD $ 41. Additionally, in 2009, an estimated 41% and 29% of the cocaine in tonnes were consumed in North America and Europe, respectively. These numbers confirm that the major markets for cocaine do not lie in the transshipment countries but in the US and Europe as both price and volume are high (UNODC WDR 2011 Cocaine Prices dataset, UNODC 2011 Tables 1-4).

Modes of Shipment

Traffickers use various methods to get the drugs into the US and Europe including:

- Human beings – People are paid to hide drugs and travel to the targeted country. In November 2011, a Venezuelan woman was charged for trafficking drugs in T&T when drug-sniffing
dogs smelt the 49 pellets of cocaine that she had stuffed into her undergarments. Under observations, she excreted 57 more pellets of cocaine that she had ingested earlier. The 52-year old mother of three was discovered when Customs checked, the Sea Prowler, a ship leaving T&T in Chaguaramas. Earlier in the year, a woman was arrested in Princes Town T&T after she complained about feeling unwell and 500 grammes of cocaine were found in her stomach and inserted into her genitals.

- Cruise ships – Thousands of cruise ship passengers pass through the Caribbean, this makes them targets for those trying to get their drug shipments north. Below are figures showing cruise ship passengers and pleasure crafts arrivals in T&T.

![Figure 29: Cruise Ships and Pleasure Crafts Arrivals in T&T](image)

Table 1. Cruise Ship Calls and Cruise Passenger Arrivals 2006-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cruise Ship Calls</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise Passengers</td>
<td>84,113</td>
<td>75,111</td>
<td>35,206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: Port Authority of Trinidad and Tobago
Source: Tourism Development Company Limited

![Figure 1. Pleasure Craft Arrivals 2005-2008](image)

Source: Yacht Services Association of Trinidad and Tobago

Source: T&T Anti-Drug Plan 2008-2012, Table 1 & Figure 1

---

- Small boats – In March 2012, the Coast Guard seized about 1,600 kg of cocaine (3,532 lbs), worth about USD $43 million, in a speedboat coming from the Caribbean off the coast of Miami USA. Four people from the Caribbean were arrested for drug trafficking.  
- Submersibles – In August 2011, about 6,800 kg of cocaine (15,000 lbs), worth about USD $180 million, were seized in a ‘drug sub’ entering the Miami waters from the Caribbean.
- Airplanes
- Cargo/freight ships

The Spillover Effects of the Cocaine Trade

Murder Rates increasing

Drug traffickers usually hire local people and provide them with weapons to guard over the goods; as a result, large amounts of guns are smuggled into Caribbean countries. Additionally, young males are lured into the drug trade because of the money, the power and the sense of belonging that it gives them, these boys become armed and deadly. Consequently, the murder rate has increased. In Dominica, the homicide rate per 100,000 people went from 1 in 2001 to 22 in 2010; in St. Kitts and Nevis, the rate went from 7 in 2000 to 52 in 2009; and in T&T, the rate went from 9 in 2000 to 41 in 2008. Up to 71% of the murders, in T&T, were committed with firearms in 2005 (UNODC Homicide dataset 2012, UNODC 2007). These armed young males are also forming allegiances and creating gangs; consequently, gang-related violence is believed to be the cause of much of the violence perpetrated against young people (Wilks 2007).

The people in the Caribbean have debated the role of deportees in the drug trade and the increase in crime. Since 2001, the US has deported over 72,000 people back to the Caribbean 62% of which were deported for criminal reasons (Homeland Security 2011). Some posit that

http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/03/13/2691262/coast-guard-discloses-nearly-two.html
http://miami.cbslocal.com/tag/caribbean-drug-seizure/
the criminal deportees may be strengthening links between the US gangs and the Caribbean gangs as well as bringing US-styled gang violence to the Caribbean (Griffith 1996).

Figure 30: Deportees to the Caribbean from the US

![Deportees to Caribbean from the US](image)


In addition to the links formed via deportees, the extensive Caribbean Diaspora provides avenues that drug traffickers may try to exploit. Since colonial times, people from the Caribbean have migrated to Europe, particularly the UK, for education and better opportunities. During the recession in the 70s and 80s migration patterns shifted to include the US as a primary destination. Not only do traffickers abuse these networks to get shipments into Europe and the US, but they also create gangs in the new countries to help with the sale of the product (Griffith 1996).

**Other forms of crime**

Kidnapping, money laundering and corruption are other forms of organized crimes that have been linked to the drug trade in the Caribbean (CARICOM 2002, Griffith 1996). In T&T the kidnapping rate doubled from 1999 to 2005 and in Haiti in 2005, the kidnapping rate quadrupled (UNODC 2007). Initially, some people in T&T believed that the kidnappings were
between drug dealers, gangs, bodyguards and others involved in the drug trade (Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012). However, because of the apparent success of first kidnappings, other wealthy people were targeted; eventually, kidnappings became a national epidemic making anyone with real or perceived wealth a target. The consequences of drug trafficking have worsened the crime situation in the Caribbean.

Money laundering is another offshoot from the drug trade as participants need to get their money into the legal system without arising much suspicion so drug money is filtered through business endeavors.

**Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis**

Morrison (1997) created a metric to evaluate which states are at risk of becoming narco-states for the production of drugs. This analysis does not directly apply to transshipment countries; however, I tweak Morrison’s factors to analyze the likelihood of countries in the Caribbean being susceptible to becoming narco-transshipment-states.

A narco-state is defined “an area that has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels and where law enforcement is effectively nonexistent”\(^\text{31}\). Griffith (2011) calls it a place where 1) “the top rulers of a country either collude with drug lords or so fear them that they turn a blind eye to their pursuits (e.g. Afghanistan under Taliban rule)” or 2) “drug dealers exercise effective control over parts of the nation, thereby undermining the nation’s governability by the rulers who reputedly govern it” (e.g. Colombia during 1960s-1990s). Like Griffith, I do not think that any Caribbean country is currently a narco-state; however, I posit that if the conditions continue to worsen and crime keeps rising, some countries may potentially become as such. This analysis is to consider the likelihood of countries becoming narco-transshipment-states.

The factors that Morrison identifies are:

- Corruption ranking

- Armed Conflict/Insurgency
- Rural Economic Insecurity
- Economic Security
- Nature of Existing Industries to identify chemical industries

However, not all of these indicators are valid for transshipment routes. The Rural Economic Security indicator is important to establish whether drug lords can gain a foothold in the agriculture industry in the country to claim for the raw material production. Additionally, it indicates which areas may be more likely to have officials turn a blind eye because the drug production may create jobs and improve the economic condition of the people living there. Finally, the number of chemical industries is less important for transshipment countries than they are for countries where the drugs are produced.

To adjust Morrison’s metrics to get the narco-transshipment risk, I use:

**Figure 31: Narco-Transshipment-State Risk Factors**

Morrison’s (1997) Factors, Adjusted

- Corruption Perception Index
  - Transparency International
- Homicide Rate
  - UNODC
- Economic Risk
  - Development Aid as a % of GDP
  - UNCTAD, World Bank dataBank

Additional Factors for Transshipment Analysis

- Failed State Index
  - Fund For Peace
- UN Human Development Index
  - UN
- Cocaine Seizures
  - UNODC
- Transshipment Risk
  - Exports as a % of GDP
  - UNCTAD
**Corruption ranking:**

The Transparency International devises an index to assess the perception of corruption on a nation-wide level. Countries are ranked from 0 to 10, where a CPI of 0 indicates that there is a high perception of corruption and a CPI of 10 indicates that the perception of corruption is low. New Zealand with a score of 9.5 is perceived as the least corrupt country and Somalia and North Korea, with score of 1.0 are considered the most corrupt countries with rankings of 182. For the countries in the Caribbean where this index is calculates, in 2011, Barbados had the highest score with 7.8, ranking as perceived the 16th least corrupt nation, and Haiti had the lowest score with 1.8, ranking as the perceived 175th least corrupt nation. Trinidad and Tobago has a score of 3.2, ranking as the perceived 91st least corrupt nation. (Transparency Index Report, 2011) For my analysis scores of 10-7 indicate low levels, 4-7 indicate medium levels and 0-4 indicate high levels of perceived corruption. Using this metric, two countries, Bahamas and Barbados, have low perceived corruption, four countries have medium levels of perceived corruption and four countries, including Trinidad and Tobago have high levels of perceived corruption. The figure below shows the Corruption Perception Index, score and rank, for the countries in the Caribbean.

**Figure 32: 2011 Corruption Perception Index, from least corrupt to most corrupt**

**Homicide rates:**

Homicide rate data is more relevant for the Caribbean than Armed Conflict / Insurgency as homicides in the Caribbean are tracked by national governments and are compiled by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Using the 2010 world homicide rate, Singapore has lowest rate of annual homicides at 0.37 persons per 10,000; conversely, Honduras had the highest rate at 82.09 persons per 10,000. For this analysis, I use the 33rd percentile, of the global homicide rate data (2 persons per 10,000) as the upper limit for the low rank and the 66th percentile (11 persons per 10,000) as the upper limit for the medium rank.

The Caribbean has medium to high homicide rates. Cuba and Haiti have two of the lowest rates, and this may be due to errors in the reporting, with 5 persons and 7 persons per 10,000 murdered respectively. Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago all have homicide rates in the 90th percentile in the world. The figure below compares the Caribbean’s homicide rates for 2010 with the rest of the world. (UNODC Homicide dataset 2012)

**Figure 33: 2010 Homicide Rates**

![2010 Homicide Rates per 10,000 persons, annually](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html)
**Rural Economic Security:**

This factor is not relevant for transshipment analysis.

**Economic Risk:**

Morrison (1997) uses unemployment and aid to determine the economic risk of countries. Due to the limited unemployment data for the Caribbean, I use Development Aid received only in order to determine economic security. In Morrison’s analysis, she divided countries by whether or not they received aid; however, as most Caribbean countries get some development assistance from other countries, I use the ratio of the development aid to the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) produces numbers of the amount of development aid that countries receive and the World Bank provides numbers for the Gross Domestic Product. The Bahamas, which had the highest GDP per capita in the Caribbean in 2009, see figure below, was the only Caribbean country not to have received any development aid. Similarly, Haiti, which had the lowest GDP per capita in 2009, received the most development aid. For my analysis, states with development aid making up less than 1% of GDP had low economic risk, states with aid from 1% to 10% had medium economic risk and states with aid making up more than 10% of their GDP had high economic risk.

**Figure 34: 2009 GDP per Capita & 2009 Development Aid as a % of 2009 GDP**

![Image of the bar graph showing GDP per capita and development aid as a percentage of GDP for various Caribbean countries in 2009. The graph includes data from the Bahamas, T&T, Antigua & Barbuda, St. Kitts & Nevis, Barbados, Grenada, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Haiti. The highest GDP per capita in the Caribbean was in the Bahamas, while Haiti received the most development aid.](source: World Bank data, UNCTAD.)
Nature of existing industries:

The nature of industries was used by Morrison to identify countries with many chemical production plants, which may increase the likelihood of drug production. This is less relevant for transshipment analysis.

Additional Factors:

In addition to looking at the factors identified by Morrison in her analysis, I have included statistics on whether countries are failed states, on the level of human development, on cocaine seizures and on trade as indicators of the likelihood of being a narco-transshipment-state.

Failed State Index:

Failed states are more susceptible to being corrupted by the cocaine traffickers because the governance structure is weak and therefore the criminal justice system is at times similarly weak. Additionally people may be more susceptible to bribes and payoffs from the traffickers, this index is a proxy on the state-wide level for people to become involved in the drug trade. The Fund for Peace devises index to assess whether or not countries are failed states. Countries are ranked on 12 difference measures\(^{32}\), each of which has a score of up to 10, which indicates the worse conditions. Finland with a score of 20 is considered the healthiest state, and rank 177, whereas Somalia with a score of 115 is considered the most failed state. (Fund for Peace 2012)

For the Caribbean, Barbados is the healthiest state and Haiti is the most failed. In fact, Haiti is in the top 5\(^{th}\) percentile of the failed states, and the first failed state in the Americas. Of the top 7 failed states, Haiti and Afghanistan are the only two not on the African continent. All of the other Caribbean countries in the study are in the healthy 50\(^{th}\) %-ile, with Barbados and Bahamas making it into the healthy 25\(^{th}\) %-ile. Dominica, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent & the Grenadines were not part of the study. (Fund for Peace 2012)

\(^{32}\) The measures are Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven Development, Poverty and Economic Decline, Legitimacy of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites and External Intervention.
Figure 35: 2012 Failed State Index, from least failed to most failed

United Nations Human Development Index:

Development Aid measures the level of dependence on other countries, but not necessarily the level of development in a country. I use the UN Human Development Index as a means to determine the potential vulnerability on the individual level for involvement in the cocaine trade. The UN devises an index to assess the level of development in a country. It considers factors such as sustainability, education and life expectancy in determining the values. Norway is the nation with the most developed humans, with a score of 0.943 and of the countries studied, the Democratic Republic of Congo is the country with the least developed human, with a score of 0.286 and a rank of 187. (UNDP 2011)

For the Caribbean, Barbados is the most developed nation, falling into the ‘Very High’ category and Haiti is the least developed nation, falling into the ‘Low’ category. Aside from the Dominican Republic, which is in the ‘Med’ category, all of the other countries in the Caribbean have ‘High Human Development’, according to the UN. (UNDP 2011)
**Total Volume Cocaine Seizures:**

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) produces an annual world drug report, which includes the amount of cocaine seized by country. In the Caribbean, since 2004 over 44,000 kg of cocaine have been seized, this represents about 1% of the global cocaine seizures for the same period. This number does not include cocaine seizures in other parts of the world that came from the Caribbean. Dominican Republic has had the largest volume of seizures in the region, of 18,467 kg and Dominica has had the least seizures in the region. The chart below depicts the cocaine seizures for the region (UNODC WDR 2011: Seizures dataset).
Transshipment Risk:

Trade is another factor that may affect the prevalence of the Caribbean as a transshipment narcotics route, with the premise that more trade may increase the likelihood of the trade routes being coopted for nefarious shipments. Openness to trade is a metric created by the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); it is calculated by dividing the value of exports by the GDP for a country. In 2010, Tuvalu in Oceana was the country with the smallest openness to trade ratio at .96% and Singapore was the country that it the most open to trade with a ratio of 208%. Within the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago is the most open to trade ratio at 54% and Haiti the least at 17% (UNCTAD).

Other Factors:

Poverty, inequality, and unemployment are other factors that may have added more robustness to the model; however, this data was not available for more than the five of the countries in the study and this reduces their effectiveness as a comparative measure. Additionally, some of these data sources are available for the 1990s and because part of my claim is that things have changed within the past decade, the numbers would not help with the analysis. However, I believe that the Failed State Index and the Human Development Index capture the dynamics that poverty, inequality and unemployment would add to the comparison.

\[^{33}\text{UNCTAD, Cayman Islands in the Territory with the smallest ratio with 0.50\% and Hong Kong the territory with the most at 221\%. However this report is only looking at country analysis and not at territories.}\]
**Risk of Narco-Transshipment-State:**

The Table 3 below shows the raw statistics for the narco-transshipment-state analysis. The US is included as a point of reference against the Caribbean countries.

**Table 3: Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis: Raw Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2011 Corruption Perception Index</th>
<th>2010 Homicide rate per 10,000 person</th>
<th>Total Volume of Cocaine Seizures, 04-09, in kg</th>
<th>Aid as a % of GDP</th>
<th>2012 Failed State Index</th>
<th>2011 UN Human Development Index</th>
<th>2010, Exports as a % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8,049</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18,467</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5,375</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;T</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4,312</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>874,971</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Table 4 shows the upper limits used to rank segment the values into high, medium and low, where the high represent the highest likelihood of becoming a narco-transshipment state. For ‘Corruption Perception’ and ‘Economic Risk’, I used judgment based on my analysis of the data; for ‘Development’, I used the categories already assigned by the UN HDI and for all other factors, I used the 33rd %ile and the 67th %ile to determine the levels.
Table 4: Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis: Upper Limits for Risk Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corruption Perception</th>
<th>Homicide Rate</th>
<th>Drug Seizures</th>
<th>Economic Risk</th>
<th>Failed State</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Transshipment Risk</th>
<th>Narco-State Risk</th>
<th>Narco-State Risk Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>Very High, High</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>875,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>114.9</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>222%</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the buckets above, I segment the factors into high, medium, and low with a score of 3, 2, and 1, respectively. Summing these factors, I derive the likelihood of the country becoming a narco-transshipment state. The following Table 5 my analysis:

Table 5: Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis: Risk Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Corruption Perception Risk</th>
<th>Homicide Rate Risk</th>
<th>Drug Seizure Rate Risk</th>
<th>Economic Risk</th>
<th>Failed State Risk</th>
<th>Development Risk</th>
<th>Transshipment Risk</th>
<th>Narco-Transshipment State Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this analysis, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago are at high risk; Dominica and Grenada are at low risk, and all of the other countries are at a medium risk of becoming narco-transshipment-nations.
This systems approach highlights that the Caribbean is not vulnerable to the cocaine trade because of the lack of development. It implies that the geographic may be the bigger reason for the prevalence of the trade in the region. However, the lack of employment data in the analysis reduces the credibility of this finding somewhat.

**Conclusion**

The leadership of the Caribbean has taken steps to deal with the transshipment of cocaine, including (Klein 2001: 206-207):

- **ACCP** – Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police based in Barbados
  - 1997 – Operation Summer Storm under the ACCP in 25 countries, resulting in 828 arrests and 57 kg of cocaine being seized
- **REDTRAC** – Regional Drug Training Centre based in Jamaica
- **CCLEC** – Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCELC) in St. Lucia, 1977
- **CFATF** – Caribbean financial Action Task Force in T&T
- **PMO** – Project Maritime Office, European Union supported
  - **JIHQ** – Joint Intelligence Headquarters
- **CBSI** – Caribbean basin Security Initiative with the US in 2009 (Griffith 2011)

However, because of the geostrategic importance of the region, the trade persists. The following chapter considers the global cocaine trade and the places the Caribbean into the geospatial cocaine system.
Chapter 4: The Global Drug Trade

The chapter zooms out from the regional scale to the global scale of the cocaine trade. I show how T&T and the Caribbean are part of a global system, and that they are not the only victims of the transnational cocaine trade as West African nations are prey for the traffickers. First, I discuss the cocaine supply chain and briefly talk about the global production and consumption patterns. Then, I focus on the reasons for the cocaine trade in West Africa, and I posit that unlike the Caribbean, some West African nations are more vulnerable to the allure of the cocaine trade. Following that, I argue that geostrategic location of the Caribbean, and West Africa, has made them prey to historical transnational trade routes by showing some maps of the transatlantic slave trade. Finally, I discuss the legacy of colonialism as it not only impacts crime, but it also affects the type of government actions and community responses to crime that will be discussed later in the thesis.

This chapter highlights the unintended consequences of interdictions, the effect of path dependency, and the need for systems thinking when determining global cocaine interdictions.

The Cocaine Supply Chain

Production

Most of the coca bush, which is used to make cocaine, is grown in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, see Figure 39, with Peru cultivating 61,200 ha, 41%, Colombia 57,000 ha, 38% and Bolivia approximately 30,900 ha, 21%, in 2010 (UNODC WDR 2011: Table 20). Peru used the be the world’s larger producer of coca leaves from World War II until 1997, when because of law enforcement interdictions, Colombia took over as the largest producer. Similarly, Peru is
once again taking over as law Colombia’s prominence declines. Much of the refinement of the coca leaves into cocaine has occurred in Colombia since the 1970s (UNODC 2011).

Although Peru and Bolivia are once again increasing the production, global supply of coca leaves decreased as production decreased in Colombia, which was the biggest supplier on the market. According to the UNODC, drug enforcement interdictions, such as eradication, reduced Colombia’s output (UNODC 2011).
**Consumption: Demand and Price**

In 2009, of the USD $85 billion in cocaine consumed globally, an estimated USD $37 billion, 44%, was consumed in the USA and USD $36 billion, 42%, was consumed in Europe, i.e. $73 billion, 86%, of the global cocaine consumption occurred in the US and Europe. By weight, 157 tonnes, 36%, and 129 tonnes, 29%, of the cocaine was consumed in the US and Europe, respectively. Using value, 2% and 0.2% of the cocaine were consumed in Africa and the Caribbean, respectively. Figure 41 shows the percent breakdown of the regional global market in 2009, by value and weight. And, Figure 42, shows the decrease of the US and the rise of the European cocaine markets over time. (UNODC 2011: Table 5).

The street price per gram of cocaine is the highest in Europe and USA, which is why producer want to sell their product in these countries, as the profitability is the highest. These numbers also reflect the risk involved in selling in Europe and in the USA. Figure 42 shows the price per gram of cocaine in selected countries.

Demand for cocaine has increased in Europe for various reasons, one of which is because of the unintended consequence of the drug battles in the Americas. First, the conflict between the Colombian and Mexican cartels in moving drugs to the US, resulted in the Colombians actively developing the European markets. Additionally, as the US drug enforcement agents successfully started seizing drugs and restricting the trade of cocaine, the trade expanded to other regions to make a profit. Finally, the demand for cocaine in the US declined as Americans moved to other types of stimulants for pleasure (UNODC 2011). All of these factors contributed to the expansion of the drug trade into Europe. With a good understanding of the
global relationships, system
dynamics modeling may help to
illuminate these potential long-
term side effects.

**Transshipment**

Due to the “War on Drugs”
and various enforcement interdictions, drugs cannot freely enter the US or Europe and vessels
coming from Bolivia, Colombia and Peru are under severe immigration scrutiny, so that
subterfuge and intermediary countries are needed to get the cocaine from the producers to the
major consumers. Consequently, Central America, the Caribbean and Africa, particularly West
Africa, have become heavily involved in the drug trade. As recently as 2011, a ‘drug sub was
seized off the coast of Miami, coming from the Caribbean, with 15,000 lbs of cocaine with street
value of USD $180 million. Although some cocaine is consumed in these countries, their major
role is to be a transshipment point to get the drugs north (UNODC 2011).

As the Mexicans gained more control over the drug trade, cocaine started flowing up the
Central American coastline, as the Mexicans preferred those routes versus the Caribbean routes
that the Colombians preferred. However, with the growth of the drug trade in Europe, and the
Colombians gaining control of those markets, the trade through the Caribbean has increased.
Additionally, West African countries are being used more because of the African diaspora in
Europe, the poverty of many of the people and the lack of the governance in some of the
countries (UNODC 2011, Shaw 2002).

---

Transshipment regions such as the Caribbean and West Africa face comparable consequences from the drug trade. William F. Wechsler, US Pentagon’s top counter-narcotics officer, commented, “West Africa is now facing a situation analogous to the Caribbean in the 1980s, where small, developing, vulnerable countries along major drug-trafficking routes toward rich consumers are vastly under-resourced to deal with the wave of dirty money coming their way”.

Growth of the Drug Trade in West Africa

Economic/Political Reasons for Participation in the Drug Trade

Africa contains some of the poorest countries in the world. In fact, thirty-three of the forty-eight least-developed countries, as defined by the United Nations (UN), are located in Africa (UN-OHRLLS 2011)\(^\text{36}\). Additionally, the UN has created a Human Development Index and categorized the results into Very High, High, Medium, and Low, many countries fall into the Low category (UNDP 2010). This lack of socio-economic development has caused some African countries to be vulnerable to the drug trade and other criminal activity (De Andres 2008, Mair 2003, Terdman 2007, Kasrilis 2007).

The increase in illicit drug consumption in Europe and the worsening social, political and economic conditions in some parts of Africa have created ideal conditions for the growth of the transnational illicit drug trade on the continent (Akeampong 2005, McConnell 2009, Shaw 2002). Increased European consumption, in the 2000s, improved the profitability for participants along the South American-African-European cocaine supply chain\(^\text{37}\). Additionally, the internal fighting and civil wars have weakened the government in many countries and their ability to secure their nation’s borders; consequently, the porous borders, ease of movement and lack of monitoring helped illicit drug trafficking to increase (Akeampong 2005, McConnell 2009, Shaw 2002, Wyler et al 2009, UNODC 2008).

The Illicit Drug Transnational Network

According to the UNODC (2009), some African countries have well-entrenched illegal transnational networks and a widespread Diaspora that the trafficking groups can use. In 2009, the UNODC in “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment” reported that US$3 billion of oil, cocaine, cigarettes and people were trafficked in West Africa (UNODC 2009).

\(^{36}\) See map in Figure 6 of Appendix 1.
\(^{37}\) Nigerians were involved since the late 1970s and early 1980s when their economy went through recession (Shaw 2002).
Narcotic seizures in Africa have grown exponentially within the past decade with over 46 tonnes of cocaine were seized from Africa to Europe in 2008 (UNODC 2008; Wyler et al 2009). Senegal, Nigeria, Guinea and Mali have been identified that are the source of the most drugs trafficked from Africa. Over 1,300 couriers were detected smuggling drugs to Europe from Africa and 57% of these were from Nigeria (UNODC 2008, Shaw 2002). Figure 45 shows the increase in cocaine seizures in West Africa.

**Figure 45: Annual Cocaine Seizures in West Africa, 2000-2007**

![Graph showing annual cocaine seizures in West Africa, 2000-2007](image)

*preliminary data for 2006 based on available data as of November 2007
** from data collected by UNODC between January – November 2007

Source: UNODC 2008: Figure 3.

According to Shaw (2002), a former research fellow at the Crime in Transitions Project at the South African Institute of International Affairs, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, the transnational movement of illicit drugs in Africa involves many countries and players. South American drug cartels use Angola as a key shipment point because of the Portuguese link with the Brazilians. From the ports in Luanda, Angola, drugs are driven down through Namibia, Botswana or Zimbabwe to get to South Africa, which is the biggest market for illicit drugs in the Sub-Saharan African region. White South Africans, especially ones with European Union passports are recruited as couriers because they are more likely than others to get through customs undetected. Mozambique is also a key shipment point for drugs and Pakistani,
Nigerian, and Mozambican groups operate there (Shaw 2002). Figure 46 suggests some shipping routes.

![Possible cocaine transshipment routes in W. Africa](image)


**Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis**

Using the same metrics from the Caribbean analysis, I evaluate the conditions in West Africa, as defined by ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States[^38]. Table 6 shows the factors that determine the likelihood of becoming a narco-transshipment-state. The numbers in Table 6 come from the same sources as the numbers in Table 3. Following that, Table 7 shows the analysis, using the same limits identified in Table 4. These numbers confirm that West African countries are vulnerable to the drug traffickers particularly because of their lack of human development, weak governance and dependence on aid.

[^38]: [http://www.ecowas.int/](http://www.ecowas.int/)
### Table 6: Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis: Raw Statistics, West Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2011 Corruption Perception Index</th>
<th>2008 Homicide rate per 10,000 person</th>
<th>Total Volume of Cocaine Seizures, 04-09, in kg</th>
<th>Aid as % of GDP</th>
<th>2012 Failed State Index</th>
<th>2011 UN Human Development Index</th>
<th>2010, Exports as a % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5,375</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>2,402</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2,562</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;T</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>4,312</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 7: Narco-Transshipment-State-Analysis: Risk Evaluation
Comparison to the Transatlantic Slave Trade Routes

Figures 47 and 48 above, show the transatlantic slave and trade routes as they existed from the 1400s to the 1800s. These routes are comparable to the 2008 cocaine routes, in Figure 44 above, as Europe and the US remain the major destinations and the journey traverses the Caribbean and West Africa. Additionally, Klein (2001) posits that the economic foundation of the Caribbean was built on stimulants because the Caribbean provided sugar, rum, tobacco, and coffee to many other parts of the world. He adds that, “On an operational level of distribution and production, the drug economy fits neatly into an underground economy, which has flourished in the region since the days of piracy”. This implies that the geo-political conditions necessary to promulgate the growth of the drug trade in the Caribbean were established since the days of slavery.

The Legacy of Colonialism

Europeans once colonized most countries in West Africa and the Caribbean and they imposed their rules and norms on the people that they governed. The colonial regime divided people and created borders to suit their needs and to make governing easier. Additionally, they
granted favors to tribal leaders who did their bidding and helped them to retain their dominance over others in the society, thereby creating "patron-client" systems still apparent in some African and Caribbean leadership models (Berman 1998, UNODC 2005). They used violence as an action of the state, under the "state of emergency", to oppress the people that they ruled. Furthermore, they used the "divide-and-conquer" model, which encouraged tribes to secure wealth internally and not support other tribes. (Rajagopal 2003, Berman 1998, Ong’ayo 2008, UNODC 2005).

Economically and institutionally, the colonials left their countries deprived, as they did not develop the institutions, the government or the capacity of many of the people in order to keep their dominance over them (arguably, this is more prevalent in some parts of Africa than in the Caribbean). They did not develop manufacturing and left the countries with commodity-based economies that were volatile to shifts in the market. As a result, the new leaders had to work with underdeveloped institutions and weak economies post-colonialism (Berman 1998, Mabogunje 2000, Ong’ayo 2008).

Additionally, some locals did not consider it improper to engage in activities outside the purview of the established colonial legal system, as it was a way of defying the sometimes-oppressive authority (UNODC 2005). Furthermore, economists and sociologists who study the informal economy (of which some criminal activities are a part) believe that many informal activities are a direct result of capitalism and capitalist growth (Castells and Portes 1989). Hernando de Soto, an economist, argues that the informal economy comes because of the hostile legal environment in which parties find themselves within the formal system (de Soto 1989). Consequently, the gap between the legal definition of crime and the social definition for some people increases especially during tough economic times.
Conclusion

In thinking about the appropriate interdictions to reduce crime in the T&T and the Caribbean, understanding the global system is important, as is observing the effects of the trade on other regions of the world. This can help to inform policymakers when considering strategies; for example, decriminalization of traffickers may be one strategy, if T&T considers that they are unable to affect the global cocaine flows. Similarly, understanding the role of colonialism on people’s perceptions of crime and government helps to establish what types of interdictions would garner the best response from the community. In the next section, I return to T&T and consider the government’s actions in response to the drug trade and the rising crime rates.
Chapter 5: The Government’s Response to Crime

In this chapter, I discuss the government’s response to crime, particularly to the crime derived from the drug trade, which builds off the previous chapters. In chapter 2, I described the crime conditions in T&T in terms of the rise of violent crime particularly of murders and attacks. Additionally, I gave some examples of how the crime in T&T was linked to the global cocaine trafficking network. In chapter 3, I broadened my geographic scope to show that the conditions in T&T were not unique and that other countries in the Caribbean were struggling with increased crime. I also tried to show some vulnerabilities that countries in the region face with respect to citizens becoming involved in the drug trade. In chapter 4, I expanded to the global level to discuss the cocaine trade and to identify the major countries in the supply chain. In that chapter, I also showed that the West African region was susceptible to the cocaine trade and I briefly touched upon the role of the transatlantic slave trade, which has scarred both the Caribbean and West Africa, and established historical links between the regions for illicit trade. Finally, I looked at how the shared colonial legacy created still-lingering animosity between the state and the society.

Now, I examine some of the measures that the government has taken to reduce crime. First, I list the institutions involved in decreasing the drug impacts on the country. These institutions can be categorized by their work on demand reduction, supply reduction and support, although there is overlap in what the groups do. Following that, I create a timeline that lists some of the policies, bills and regional agreements that the government established to deal with the drug problem, most of this information comes from the “National Anti-Drug Plan 2008-2012” (Ministry of National Security). Then I look at the Police Service (TTPS), which is the primary law enforcement agency tasked with dealing with the community and I touch upon two major drug interdictions, the hanging of drug baron Dole Chadee, 1999, and the State of Emergency, 2011. Finally, I discuss how to measure the effectiveness of the government policy interventions.
Ministries, Departments & Agencies involved in the Anti-Drug Initiative

Figure 49: T&T Anti-Drug Initiative Organizational Chart

Source: National Anti-Drug Plan of T&T 2008-2012: Figure 2
The diagram above shows the public agencies that are working to lessen the effects of the drug trade in T&T. Over 17 agencies and departments within the Ministries of National Security, Finance, Health, and Social Development as well as the Office of the Attorney General are assigned to create and execute various drug interdictions. The Organized Crime, Narcotics & Firearms Bureau, OCNFB, of the TTPS, is well known in the community, as they are responsible for many of the drug busts in the country, this was evidenced from the drug sample dataset, in chapter 2, created by reading the newspapers.

Table 8: Agencies that work to reduce the affects of drugs in T&T

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Demand Reduction</th>
<th>Supply Reduction – Operational Units</th>
<th>Supply Reduction – Secondary Agencies</th>
<th>Other/Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Association of Substance Abuse Prevention Organizations, ASAPO (2001)</td>
<td>Organized Crime Narcotics &amp; Firearms Bureau, OCNFB within the TTPS</td>
<td>Drugs Inspectorate / Chemistry Food &amp; Drug Division</td>
<td>National Inter-Agency Coordinating Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Defense Force – Regiment &amp; Coast Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forensic Sciences Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Customs &amp; Excise Division</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Anti-Crime Unit of T&amp;T, SAUTT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian Conservation Corp, Youth Outreach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the National Anti-Drug Plan of T&T 2008-2012

The former Minister of National Security, Brigadier Sandy, suggests that more coordination is necessary for these agencies to be more effective. He discusses establishing a National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to help with coordination. However, coordination is complicated and expensive; additionally too much coordination invites vulnerability to the infiltration of corruption. Before a coordinating body takes over, in-depth institutional analysis should be conducted to take stock of the role that each of the institutions plays in addressing the cocaine problem in T&T. This system-wide analysis would identify effective programs that

should be supported, as well as failed programs that should be stopped. The analysis would also show where there are redundancies in what the agencies do. Some redundancy is good because it means that more than one group of people are looking at an issue. Other redundancy might lead to nothing happening, because each group thinks that the other group is working on the issue. Finally, the analysis, which could include comparison to other areas also dealing with cocaine transshipment spillovers, could identify where there are gaps in the system.

**Institutions Focusing on the Control of Illicit Drug Trafficking**

Table 9 below shows the number of departments or institutions working towards the control of illicit drug trafficking for a few countries in the Caribbean and the US. This data is the Evaluation of Progress in Drug Control 2007-2009 report for each country, Section IV. Control Measures, A. Illicit Drug Trafficking. Table 10 shows the count of agencies that focus on each of the categories.

**Table 9: Regional Departments that Look at Illicit Drug Trafficking**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National Authorities Responsible for Controlling Illicit Drug Trafficking</th>
<th>Specifically, Port Security</th>
<th>Specifically, Maritime</th>
<th>Specifically, Aerial</th>
<th>1) Coordination / collaboration mechanism</th>
<th>2) Info sharing mechanism</th>
<th>3) Common Interagency Database</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>1) Police, and 2) Customs &amp; Excise</td>
<td>1) Customs, 2) Police, 3) Port Inc., and 4) Coast Guard</td>
<td>1) Customs, 2) Police (Coordinator), and 3) Coast Guard</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>1) None</td>
<td>2) Intelligence sharing and networking</td>
<td>3) None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1) the Nat’l Drug Control Directorate (NDCD), 2) Police, 3) Military, 4) Customs, 5) Port Authority, 6) Port Security Authority, 7) Nat’l Bureau of Investigations (DNI), 8) Attorney General’s Office, and 1) Port Security Authority</td>
<td>1) Nat’l Guard, 2) Navy (Coordinator), 3) Coast Guard (Coordinator), 4) Police, 5) Customs, and 6) Prosecutor’s Office</td>
<td>1) Police, 2) Nat’l Guard, 3) Coast Guard, 4) Navy, 5) Armed Forces, 6) Prosecutor’s Office, 7) Customs, 8) NDCD, and 9) NDI</td>
<td>1) None</td>
<td>1) None</td>
<td>2) Joint operations, training, inter-institutional network systems</td>
<td>3) None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National Authorities Responsible for</th>
<th>Controlling Illicit Drug Trafficking</th>
<th>Specifically, Port Security</th>
<th>Specifically, Maritime</th>
<th>Specifically, Aerial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;T</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 10: The Count of Agencies working on the Illicit Drug trade

This data indicates T&T is on par with the other Caribbean countries, but below the US with respect to the number of agencies that work toward reducing the illicit drug trade.
However, the US has the most comprehensive coordination system and an interagency database that allows the departments to share information. If the US could be considered the standard, then these results imply that redundancy in institutional roles may be necessary in dealing with drug trafficking once there is a good mechanism for feedback and information sharing.

**Timeline of Bills, Programs & International Agreements**

Unless otherwise noted, the data comes from the National Anti-Drug Plan of T&T.

- 1961 – UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (amended by the 1974 protocol)
- 1971 – UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances
- 1971 – Inter-American Convention to Prevent & Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crimes Against Persons & Related Extortion that are of International Significance
- 1987 – Venezuela-T&T, Agreement on Counter Narcotics
- 1987 – CARICOM heads of state develop a regional program for the control of drug trafficking
- 1988 – UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances
- 1989 – T&T campaign to create a permanent international criminal court to deal with the drug trade problem
- 1991 – Dangerous Drugs Act, TT
- 1992, Jul – TT$35 million cocaine seized at Cali Bay, Tobago from Venezuela (Griffith 1996)
- 1994 – The Bail Act, TT
- 1992, Jan. – December 1994 – Caribbean, Operation Sting which seized 9 tonnes of cocaine and USD$90 in cash and assets (Griffith 1996)
- 1996 – Community Policing (Wallace 2011)
- 1996 – Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
- 1997 – Counter Drug Crime Task Force (CDCTF) set up within the MNS to collect data on drug-related activity
- 1997 – Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacture of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives & Other Related Materials
- 1997 – Operation Summer Storm under the ACCP in 25 countries, resulting in 828 arrests and 57 kg of cocaine being seized
- 1998 – Community Mediation Act, TT, Community Service Orders Act, TT
- 1999 – Dole Chadee and 8 of his men hung (Fineman 1999)
- 1999 – Cuba-T&T, Cooperation Agreement to Combat Drug Trafficking

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- 2000 – UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime
- 2000 – Venezuela-T&T, Agreement to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding between the maritime surveillance & control authorities, outlining programmes of exchange of visits & establishing information exchange mechanisms for facilitating joint action
- 2000 – Integrity in Public Life Act, TT, Proceeds of Crime Act, TT, Electronic Transfer of Funds Act, TT, Sentencing Commission Act, TT
- 2001 – Association of Substance Abuse Prevention Organizations (ASAPO) formed to support NGOs that work on drug treatment and rehabilitation
- 2002 – Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), Youth Outreach under the MNS
- 2002 – Community Policing re-established (Wallace 2011)
- 2002 – Inter-American Convention on Terrorism
- 2004 – National Drug Observatory to integrate data collection, analysis and statistics for drug-related matters
- 2005 – Caribbean Court of Justice Act, TT
- 2006 – Police Service Act, TT, Police Complaints Authority Act, TT
- 2006 – Established the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, IMPACS (Griffith 2011)
- 2007 – TTPS established a Crime and Problem Analysis branch to utilize data processing for crime analysis and prediction (National Anti-Drug Plan) and start the “Policing for the People” initiative (Wallace 2011)
- 2008, Apr – CARICOM held a crime and security summit in T&T that led to the adoption of a Strategy and Plan of Action on Crime and Security
- 2009 – US initiated Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
- 2011 – T&T State of Emergency (BBC Latin America 2011)
- 2011 – FBI led Financial crimes training in T&T and officers from TTPS take part in additional Financial Investigations training

**Key:** Supply Reduction: International, Regional, Local | Demand Reduction | Capacity Building | Bilateral Agreements | Major Local Interventions

In addition to the programs highlighted above, T&T also has:

- Regional and international agreements
  - Bilateral agreements with Canada, Colombia, Mexico, St Kitts & Nevis, the UK and USA
  - Draft treaties to Argentina, Costa Rica and Ukraine (through CARICOM)

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International and hemispheric plans of action within the Summit of the Americas, the Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere, the Caribbean Forum of African Caribbean and Pacific States and the Panama Action Plan

Regional Plans of Action through the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Regional Justice Protection Plan, the Inter-Governmental Task Force on Drugs and the Plan of Action for Drug Control, co-ordination and Co-operation in the Caribbean

- Crime Stoppers at 800-TIPS (8477)
- Officers participate in various training programs. The former Minister of National Security said, “It is expected that training programmes, such as these provided by BGTT, will help officers develop the skills and competency that will improve service quality and reverse the low levels of public confidence,”
- Plans to increase use of CCTV cameras
- Plans to bring back the death penalty

Hiring More Police Officers

Another response has been to hire more police officers. Currently, there are over 6,500 officers, divided topically into twenty-five departments, and geographically into nine divisions, with a total of eighty-eight stations and substations, which are located in the more populous regions in the country. Comm. Gibbs said that better alignment of Police Forces and not more police officers are needed to improve the crime situation. He added that the Police to citizen ratio in the country was high when compared to others. In fact, Florquin (2011), in the Small Arms Survey 2011, reported on the ratio of police officers and private security to the population. In that survey, of the 70 countries profiled, T&T had the 7th highest Police rate in 2010, at 493 officers per 100,000 people. This rate is 1.6 times both Jamaica’s 2010 rate and the Dominican

Republic’s 2008 rate. Additionally, it is 1.7 times the US’s 2007, 2.2 times the UK’s 2009 rate and 2.9 times Nicaragua’s 2008 rate. Finally, the police per 100,000 population rate in T&T in 1992 was 379, so the Police Force has grown by 30% although the population has grown by just 9% (Annex 4.1 of the Small Arms Survey 2011: Florquin 2011).

**Major Drug/Crime Interventions**

There were two dramatic ways that the government has shown force to signal that they are committed to reducing violence and the drug trade. In 1999, nine men, including local drug lord Dole Chadee were hung for murder and other crimes and in 2011, the country was placed in a state of emergency because of the rising level of violence.

- **Dole Chadee’s Hanging**
  
  On June 4, 1999, Nankissoon ‘Dole Chadee’ Boodram and eight of his henchmen were hanged for brutal murders of citizens, the first set of hangings since 1994 and the last hangings since. Dole Chadee was a major drug dealer allegedly responsible for most of T&T’s drug trafficking, smuggling tonnes of cocaine for the Colombians through the country. Although he was accused many times of drug trafficking, he was never convicted, which added to his notoriety. It was only when he ordered a hit on a rival family, did a member of his gang go to the police to turn him in. While in jail, Dole Chadee was able to order the killing of the witness, but luckily, another member came forward to ensure that the charges against Dole Chadee stuck. The Attorney General used the hangings to “build confidence in law and justice” and to show that no one was above the law.\(^47\)

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No one in T&T has been hung since the Dole Chadee gang in 1999, but in 2012, the current government is trying to bring back the death penalty to deter crime.48

- The State of Emergency (SOE) in T&T, 2011

On August 21, 2011, the government declared a SOE allegedly because of the increased levels of violent crimes and murders over the past few weeks in the country (BBC Latin America 2011). During the SOE, a curfew was enforced in certain crime hotspots and police officers were given the authority to act without warrants.

Effectiveness

Effectiveness in interdiction efforts could be determined via reduction of crime and reduction in the volume of cocaine trafficked. However, it is beyond my capacity to determine whether the volume of cocaine trafficked through T&T has decreased. In fact, the UNODC (2011) has indicated that a reduction in seizures may just mean that the traffickers have found more savvy ways to move the product that avoids capture. Instead, for each year between 1998 and 2009, the years have the national police statistics, I list the policies or programs started and I show the change in the level of crime for that period. This is not an apples-to-apples comparison as policies and programs need time to take effect.

Table 11: Government Action and Change in Crime Rate in T&T

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government Action</th>
<th>Change in Major &amp; Minor Narcotic Offences</th>
<th>Change in all non-Narcotic Offences</th>
<th>Change in the Vol. of Cocaine Seized</th>
<th>Change in the # of Homicides</th>
<th>Change in Minor Crimes &amp; Offences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Community Mediation Act, TT, Community Service Orders Act, TT</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Dole Chadee and 8 of his men hung, Cuba-T&amp;T, Cooperation Agreement to Combat Drug Trafficking</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Venezuela-T&amp;T, Agreement to negotiate a MOU between the maritime surveillance &amp; control authorities, Integrity in Public Life Act, TT, Proceeds of Crime Act, TT, Electronic Transfer of Funds Act, TT, Sentencing Commission Act, TT</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Association of Substance Abuse Prevention Organizations formed to support NGOs that work on drug treatment and rehabilitation, CARICOM Task Force on Crime and Security</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Civilian Conservation Corps, Community Policing re-established</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>National Drug Observatory</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Caribbean Court of Justice Act, TT</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Police Service Act, TT, Police Complaints Authority Act, TT, Implementation Agency for Crime and Security</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>TTPS Crime and Problem Analysis branch and Policing for the People</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>CARICOM Strategy and Plan of Action on Crime and Security</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>US Caribbean Basin Security Initiative</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From this juxtaposition, we see that in the 11-year period beginning in 1998, there was a decrease in non-narcotic crimes, but an increase in homicides. There was an increase in narcotic offences, which could mean that either the TTPS became more effective at catching people or more people became involved in the narcotics economy. These numbers include all narcotics, not just cocaine.}

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49 These numbers include all narcotics, not just cocaine.
could mean that either less cocaine was trafficked through T&T after 2006 or that the traffickers became better at evading capture. However, people tend to equate the murder rate with the crime rate (Wilks 2007), and ultimately, that may be the main measure of the effectiveness of the policies against crime.

Moreover, there are pressures on the government from the community, from businessmen and from outside parties to deal with crime. As a result, the government has to show that it is working to protect the community and to reduce crime; consequently, the policy documents may be a signaling mechanism for the government to gain legitimacy, and may not reflect what is actually happening. For example, Wallace (2011) talks about the failure of community policing, yet community policing is a section of the TTPS website.

Conclusion

The Government of T&T has established a defense-in-depth approach to dealing with crime in the country through various policies and actions; including youth outreach, community policing and major shows of force. This response is similar to that of the other Caribbean countries and somewhat less than the US. The overall level of crime has decreased, which suggests that the various policing initiatives have been effective at reducing crime. However, because violent crime, including homicides, has increased public perception of safety has worsened. Due to the numerous policies and programs, it would be hard to suggest which ones have brought about the best results; however, system dynamics modeling may help to identify which ones are more successful. Additionally, it could help evaluate the expected time taken for the ripple effects of the arrests, hangings and seizures to play out.
Chapter 6: Public Perception of the Government’s Response

In this chapter, I discuss the public perception of the government’s response to crime by focusing on the TTPS and giving a few reasons for the society’s lack of faith in national security service. I believe that this doubt in the protective services has contributed to the increase in violence and has reduced the efficacy of programs set up by TTPS to work with the community to reduce crime and participation in the drug trade. Understanding the interactions between the TTPS and the society will help to explain the policy resistance and, consequently, to inform the policy makers who look at ways to reduce crime in the country. This analysis is based mainly on newspaper articles and literature reviews.

Although there have been various scandals regarding the TTPS, the biggest thing working against them is that the crime has not decreased and people no longer feel safe. I briefly look at its destructive colonial legacy and some of the scandals affecting the TTPS, including scandals against the leadership, examples of police participation in the drug trade, and the fallout from the SOE. Finally, I talk about the perception of police corruption and incompetence. All of these contribute to why people have lost their faith in the system.

Colonial Legacy

Following the colonial system of law enforcement, some police officers came across as unsympathetic, lacking in respect and violent in their attempt to gain the community’s fear and respect. Wallace (2011), in his paper on the failure of community policing in T&T, highlights that policing started as the slave masters used select slaves to control the slave population and prevent revolt. Policing, then, was a response to the slave owner’s fear and a method of domination. Rajagopal (2003), who theorizes that colonial rulers used state violence to keep the peace, confirms Wallace’s (2011) viewpoint. Consequently, part of the British legacy is that some police officers sometimes appear to be bullies in the society. Additionally, when dealing with young males some of the officers sometimes incite their anger instead of encouraging positive change (Klein 2001).
Scandals with the Leadership

- The Minister of National Security, Hon. Jack Warner

Since June 2012, Jack Warner holds the post as the head of the Ministry of National Security. This appointment is rife with conflict because Hon. Warner resigned from his position as a FIFA vice president under suspicion of bribery and corruption in 2011. According to Sondre Kaajford, a member of FIFA’s ethics committee, had Hon. Warner not resigned he would have been convicted for accessory to corruption. Hon. Warner denied these allegations and the Attorney General reminded the country that Hon. Warner is “innocent until proven guilty”. Additionally, in July 2012, members of parliament from the Opposition requested that the Integrity Commission investigate a million dollar US bank account opened in Hon. Warner’s name.

- The former head of the Security Intelligence Agency (SIA), Reshmi Ramnarine

In the early 2000s, the prior political party while in power started the SIA, which conducted covert operations, including phone taps, to determine drug lords and crime risks as well as to weed out criminals. The present political party, which was elected in 2010, hired Reshmi Ramnarine to be the director of the agency, in January 2011, although she was grossly under qualified. When this news was leaked eight days after her appointment there was a national scandal because of her lack of qualifications and the manner in which she was appointed. Additionally, the Prime Minister Bissesar revealed

the SIA’s methods of investigation\textsuperscript{54} and accused the PNM of spying on the country, adding to the society’s lack of faith in the law enforcement system.\textsuperscript{55}

- The Police Commissioner, Dwayne Gibbs\textsuperscript{56}

In 2010, after 48 years of independence, the government appointed a foreign commissioner of Police (Fraser 2010), Canadian Dwayne Gibbs who served as a superintendent of Police in Alberta, Canada (Connelly 2010) before being chosen as the new head of Police in T&T. I believe that this appointment served to signal outside interests that the government was serious about dealing with the corruption in the Police Force; however, it also served as a slap-in-the-face to the senior local police officers, because it implied that they were either corrupt or incompetent.

Additionally, there was public outrage over the salaries of Comm. Gibbs and the Deputy Comm. Jack Ewatski, also brought in from Canada\textsuperscript{57}. In 2010, Comm. Gibbs made USD 20,784 monthly and DCP Ewatski made USD 16,627 monthly; these salaries were more than three times their next in commands and more than double what they would have made in Canada\textsuperscript{58}. This added to the belief that the men came to the country for financial reasons rather than to help the country. Consequently, some called for Comm. Gibbs to be removed, as he had failed to achieve what was expected of him\textsuperscript{59}; although, the government, who was responsible for determining whether the commissioner performed effectively, did not find fault with his performance.

Perceived corruption and incompetence of the leadership of the Ministry of National Security and the TTPS diminish the trust of the community.

\textsuperscript{54} T&T Guardian, “... House should condemn PM on ‘spy tapes’”, T&T Guardian, December 21, 2010. \url{http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2010/12/21/house-should-condemn-pm-spy-tapes}
\textsuperscript{56} Since the writing of this paper, Comm. Gibbs and Deputy Comm. Ewatski resigned from their posts. 
\textsuperscript{59} Seelal, Nadine, “Send Gibbs home!”, T&T Newsday, August 23, 2011. \url{http://www.newsday.co.tt/crime and court/0.146077.html}
The State of Emergency (SOE), Police Racial Profiling and Brutality, Aug-Dec, 2011

AS mentioned in Chapter 5, in August 2011, the government called an SOE in response to a sudden increase in homicides. Although there were many arrests and raids, some thought that the SOE was uncalled for because it restricted citizens’ actions\(^\text{60}\) without making a meaningful dent in the crime situation. In fact, more than 400 of the people detained during the SOE were released when it was completed\(^\text{61}\). Some people felt that the SOE was neither justified nor constitutional. Columnist Richard Ramoutar states that there is a “stark difference between what constitutes threats to national security (drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, illegal firearms, environmental disasters, climate change) and how a state of emergency is described under international law”. He pulls from international law to state that, “As such, internal conflict and unrest that do not constitute a grave and imminent threat to the life of the nation and cannot justify derogations under Article 4 of the ICCPR. A mere local crisis should not be used as a cover for a state of emergency (SoE).”\(^\text{62}\).

Although it showed that the TTPS was serious about reducing crime, the SOE also tarnished the reputation of the force as allegedly police brutality and profiling against black people\(^\text{63}\) increased during the SOE, for example:

- Garfield Butler, a 45-year old man accused the Police of beating him for no reason\(^\text{64}\).
- Keon Quow, a 22-year old black boy living in Beetham Gardens, one of the crime hot-spots, was wrongfully arrested during the SOE, because he lived in the wrong neighborhood\(^\text{65}\).
- Fear of Police reprisal limited the number of complaints against them, posits the Gillian Lucky, chair of the Police complaints authority\(^\text{66}\).

Conversely, some people supported the SOE and called for it to be extended beyond the allotted period (Aug.-Dec., 2011), including the San Fernando Business Association. Additionally, some citizens have started calling into the Police hotline and providing information to officers since the SOE; indicating that confidence in the TTPS has increased.

These mixed reviews suggest that it may take a few more months to determine whether the SOE was a success or failure. If people start cooperating more with police officers and continue to use the Police hotline to report criminal activity, then the SOE would have been a partial success. However, if it increased the rift between certain groups in the community, particularly the young males, and the police officers, then the SOE would have been a partial failure. Finally, if there were increased investment by foreign funders in projects because they decide that the government is seriously working to reduce crime, then for the government, the SOE would have been a financial success.

**Corruption Perception**

Below are a few examples of police officers allegedly involved in criminal activities, which add to the belief that some officers are participants in the drug trade:

- On December 31, 2009, T&T Newsday reported that US$94,000 of money from a drug bust went missing from the Couva Police Station (Seelal, 2009).
- On January 14, 2010, T&T Guardian reported that guns and ammunition went missing from the Diego Martin Police station (Kowlessar, 2010).
- On February 27, 2010, T&T Newsday reported that about USD $250,000 of cocaine went missing at the St James Police Station (Seelal, 2010).

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67 Alexander, Gail, October 4, 2011.

The perception that police officers are involved in the drug trade or are corrupt have allegedly stopped people from reporting crime. Transparency International creates an annual corruption perception index (CPI), which measures the believed level of corruption in the nation. A CPI of 10 indicates no corruption and a CPI of 1 indicates extreme corruption. In 2001, T&T’s CPI was above 5, but since then it has remained below the half mark. Additionally, the CPI decreased steadily until 2006, indicating the actual corruption perception increased during this period. From 2006 to 2010, the perception of corruption in the country improved, but then it dropped again in 2011. This change in perception could be linked to many factors, I suggest a few below.

Figure 51: Potential Reasons for slightly improved CPI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major drug busts in 2005 &amp; 2006</th>
<th>Decrease in Firearms &amp; Ammunition reports from 2004</th>
<th>Rapid decrease in Minor Crimes and Offences after 2004</th>
<th>Decrease in Kidnappings from 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vol of Cocaine Seized</td>
<td>Possession of Firearms and Ammunition</td>
<td>Minor Crimes and Minor Offences</td>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: UNODC</td>
<td>Source: TT CSO</td>
<td>Source: TT CSO</td>
<td>Source: UNODC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perception of Police Incompetence

Although some believe that police officers are corrupt, others think that they are unable to match the strategic capabilities of the national and international criminals and drug lords (Klein 2001). In fact, the former Minister of National Security said in 2011, “For too long the T&T Police Service has been unable to provide the kind of service the public demands and rightly deserves”\(^7^0\), when discussing the new training program.

In addition to the Reshmi Ramnarine debacle, the government’s decision to unite the Special Anti-Crime Unit (SAUTT), the SIA and the Strategic Services Agency (SSA) under the umbrella of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) has been cause for ridicule. Keith Rowley, the leader of the Opposition Party said,

> “The Government has succeeded in making a total mess of the country’s security intelligence system, whether it be the SSA, the SIA or the NIA, because the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing”. He added that the lack of cohesive and efficient national security agencies has made T&T a laughing stock by major drug traffickers. “T&T is now a paradise for drug and arms trafficking,” he said.

> “There have been serious complaints raised by our Caribbean counterparts in light of the fact that our national security system is in total shambles. “The drug dealers will have a field day because our eastern and northern coasts remain unprotected.” \(^7^1\)

Conclusion

This chapter provides suggests reasons why some members of the community do not trust the national security system and, consequently, do not report crimes nor identify culprits; thereby weakening the criminal justice system. Keith Scotland the attorney of Junnette Bascombe, wife of a man killed by the Police, is asking that the FBI be called in to investigate the killings. “My clients do not have any trust in the local Police,” Scotland said.\(^7^2\) Additionally, Noriega, whose brother was shot by police officers, feared for his life in 2011, because he believed that that the Police killed his brother and would be after him next.\(^7^3\) Many people are living in fear in T&T;

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they want the police to be effective in reducing crime, but some do not trust the police and therefore do not help them to fight crime. For example, many people who witness crimes do not come forward\textsuperscript{74}, as they do not trust the police to protect them because of the murdering of state witnesses in the past.\textsuperscript{75}

Public perception could be represented in a system dynamics model as a stock variable that increases or decreases based on government action and the resulting level of crime. The level of good public perception of the government would decrease when violent crimes increase, but then increase when the government appears to have working plans for how to reduce crime.

\textbf{Figure 52: Stock & Flow Diagram of Public Perception}

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\textsuperscript{74} Ragoonath, Reshma, “Murdered man’s wife begs witnesses to come forward”, Trinidad Guardian, September, 2011. \url{http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/09/05/murdered-man-s-wife-begs-witnesses-come-forward}.


Chapter 7: Modeling Crime

Systems analysis techniques have been used in city planning, and particularly for the criminal justice system, because they take into account the feedback mechanisms and repercussions from various policies and actions. As Baynes (2009) put it, “The main strength of complex systems science is not in adding greater precision to prediction...The strength of the complexity thinking and approaches lies in developing a better understanding of system function and complex interactions”. In this chapter, (1) I summarize literature on various modeling techniques used in urban planning and criminal justice system; (2) I discuss the benefits of using systems approaches to analyzing crime; (3) I pull from four specific system science papers on drug and crime in analogous situations to do an analysis of the resulting policy analysis and; (4) I derive policy recommendations and strategies for T&T based on (3).

Types of Models

Econometric models have been used to analyze crime patterns and the efficacy of policy interventions; for example: Friedman et al. (1989) investigated whether the crime rate was positively correlated to police spending by doing statistical analysis on long-term and short-term effects. Rydell et al. (1996) used econometric methods to model the market for cocaine by using data and creating formulas to estimate supply and demand. Once they modeled the market, they analyzed the cost of government interventions to determine the economic costs to society of cocaine and its prevention. Machin and Meghir (2004) studied the effect of unemployment and low wages on the crime rate, using regression analysis, and they found that crime is more correlated with low wages than with unemployment.

Agent based models and cellular automata are other types of models used in modeling complex systems that have been utilized within criminology. Agent based models involve grouping people into categories based on prior criteria and using rules to determine their

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movement in time and space. Conversely, cellular automata models segment the system spatially and consider crime patterns in terms of disease diffusion (Brantigam et al. 2011).

System Dynamics

System dynamics, a type of ‘agent-based’ model emphasizes the interactions among various components within the system and the role of feedback mechanisms. Jay Forrester (1969) developed system dynamics for industrial analysis and planning and first applied it to urban phenomenon in 1969. Since then, other social scientists (Bard 1977, Blumstein 2002, Lopez & Zuniga 2001) have applied it to the criminal justice system. This type of analysis helps to illuminate cause-and-effect loops, identify information feedback characteristics and distinguish interactive roles within the system (Bard 1977, Barney 1971, Tucker 2005). Additionally, it helps to evaluate the unintended consequences and can include qualitative measures, such as perceptions of safety or inclination to commit a crime and patterns of behavior (Lopez & Zuniga 2001, Hovmand 2005, Tucker 2005, Bard 1977).

System dynamics also identifies reinforcing loops (Tucker 2005), which in this case may be interventions that have helped reduce the crime rate. It allows for sensitivity testing, scenario analysis, and it includes time delays, all of which help crime analysts and decision makers. Finally, it looks at the issue of policy resistance, where the interventions to help a problem make the situation worse, and try to identify the causes of the failure (Sterman 2001). Understanding what interventions are working, would inform decisions on which programs to continue and which to curtail. (Tucker 2005, Lopez and Zuniga 2001, Sterman 2001)

Examples of System Dynamics Models in Criminal Analysis

- Rod McDonald and Mohammad Mojtabahedzadeh (2007) used system dynamics to model the New York State criminal justice system.

- Dan Bernstein (1994) used system dynamics to model the dynamics of the New York City Court system.
- Homer (1990) modeled cocaine prevalence

Although there has been work applying systems thinking to the drug trade for the US (Caulkins & Rueter 2010, Caulkins 2002), they do not directly apply to T&T because they deal with modeling the demand the drugs and policies that work to reduce the local demand and supply of drugs in communities. Additionally, there has been research conducted on the dynamics of the supply side (Jaen & Dyner 2011), but this is outside the scope of my analysis.

As this paper deals with the transnational nature of the drug trade, I focus instead on the models done on drug shipment in Mexico, crime in Jamaica, and crime in Colombia. For each paper, I 1) show the models that the authors built; 2) briefly describe their methodology and analysis; 3) summarize their recommendation and; 4) highlight how their recommendations may lead to policy application for T&T.

**Analysis of System Dynamics Models that Pertain to the Situation in T&T**

1.


**Goal:** Wilks et al., use system dynamics modeling to determine whether reducing gang membership, increasing policing or increasing welfare would be most effective in reducing crime and prison sentencing in Jamaica.
Figure 53: System Dynamics Model of Gang Membership in Jamaica

Source: Wilks et al., 2007
Methodology: Using data on Jamaica and expert opinion, Wilks et al. determine how gang violence, the economy, poverty and the criminal justice system interact with each other. They use gang-members as the unit of analysis because males 15-24, who were part of gangs, committed most of the violent crimes and therefore, they determined that the best interventions would come by analyzing this group. As a result, the key feedback loop that they consider revolves around the gang membership and its impacts on the society and economy. Additionally, they incorporate social disorganization theory and rational choice theory to determine the criminal behavior that underlies the model. Modeling from 1990-2030, they estimate how changes in the rate of gang membership, government law enforcement intervention and welfare programs affect ‘gang related shootings’, the ‘real gdp at market prices’, ‘total employment’, ‘average share of population below the poverty line’ and the ‘prison population’.

To conduct their analysis, first they test their model with data back 15 years to 1990 to ascertain that their assumptions work, then they test three different scenarios for 25 years, until 2030. They simulate what happens when 1) gang membership is reduced by 20% by 2030 (crime reduction); 2) government expenditure in national security doubles by 2030 (security); and 3) government increases Welfare from 2.9 billion Jamaican dollars to 5 billion Jamaican dollars and increases the share of welfare to the lowest quintile from 0.5 to 0.8. Each scenario is tested against the baseline of what is expected to happen if no intervention occurs. The picture below shows a sample of their results.

Figure 54: Crime reduction decreases murder rate

![Graph showing crime reduction decreases murder rate](source: Wilks et al. 2007)
Findings/Recommendations: They find that

- In the base case, gang related murders and shooting will eventually taper off by 2022, which is 17 years from the modeling year. The prison population, however, will continue to increase during the period.

- All scenarios show an improvement when compared to the base case, so government intervention can reduce crime on the long run, i.e. crime still grows, but at a lower rate than if there was no intervention
  - In the crime reduction scenario, murders start dropping off by 2015 (in 10 years) and the prison population is slightly higher than the base case.
  - In the security scenario, murders start dropping off by 2017, and it drops lower than the crime reduction scenario (1,291 vs 1,598). The prison population is much higher under this scenario.
  - In the welfare scenario, murders are slightly less than the base case scenario and the prison population is about the same.

- Increasing the Welfare to poor families has less impact on gang related murder and the prison population than doubling the Police Force or reducing gang membership.

- Direct measures are more effective than indirect measures.

- Crime reduction programs scenario resulted in less gang related murders in aggregate over the time modeled.

- With increasing the security, the prison population increases dramatically resulting in a strain on the judicial system.

Applicability to T&T: This study applies to T&T because

- Gang-related murder is the leading cause of murder in both T&T and Jamaica. Learning from their data will help policy makers avoid some of the mistakes that they made in devising strategies to deal with crime.

- Young males are the major participants in gang violence in both countries.
- Like T&T, Jamaica is a Caribbean island devastated by the side effects of the cocaine trade. Unlike T&T, Jamaica has a larger marijuana production market and is closer to USA so that conditions there are more aggravated

**Critique:** The authors went to low income neighborhoods (garrisons) and used young males as their study set, because most of the violent crimes are perpetrated by this demographic. However, their analysis does not incorporate the institutional, economic and social challenges that have occurred over decades to form these garrisons. As a result, it is not surprising that their findings indicate that indirect measures, geared toward improving economic conditions, are less effective at reducing crime.

2.


**Goal:** To evaluate the drug cartel problem in Mexico, with systems thinking, and to determine the relationships within the Mexican society that reinforces the cartels. This paper also analyzes the interventions of the Merida program, which was set up by the Obama administration to aid Mexico in dealing with crime.
Figure 4: Complete Causal Loop Diagram of Mexico’s Cartel Problem

Source: McGee et al. 2011
**Methodology:** McGee et al. use the Conceptagon, a stepwise approach to systems thinking to evaluate the cartel situation in Mexico. With publicly available data and literature, they try to determine the key activities by the society that enable the cartels to grow. They focus on three systemic failures, namely, the failure of the economic system, the education system and judicial system to determine the expansion of the cartels in Mexico. Although they do not run the model, nor do they provide quantitative evaluation, they use the feedback loop diagrams to highlight important feedback mechanisms that could inform policymakers.

Highlight of the model that pertains to T&T:

This section depicts the relationship between the drug trafficking and the arms smuggling. This relationship is crucial in understanding the rise in homicide rate in T&T.

Source McGee et al 2011.

**Figure 56: Illicit Cartel Activity Loop**

**Figure 1: Illicit Cartel Activities**

**Findings/Recommendations:** They find that

- Although quick strong responses to crime have immediate results, these results are not long lasting. They consider these results to be low leverage and posit that high leverage long term results are needed to improve the cartel problem in Mexico.
- Criminal justice reform, education reform and economic development are needed simultaneously to bring about long term change and partial responses will not be effective.
- Exogenous factors, such as the US demand for cocaine, so improving policing on the US side of the border, to decrease the movement of guns, drugs and money is necessary to reduce cartel growth in Mexico.

- For the Merida project, the authors caution against having mainly technical improvement to the Police Service and not larger institutional change.

- Although the long term changes require resources, they are worth the investment.

- Future systems research, modeling and simulation is needed because it takes a holistic understanding of the problem, and a dynamic method of simulation, to devise effective long term solutions.

**Applicability to T&T:**

- Mexico is also part of the transnational drug trafficking trade, as cocaine moves from South America into the US through Mexico. Unlike T&T, because of the border with the US, Mexican cartels power in the network.

- Human trafficking and immigration components of the model not relevant for T&T.

- The SOE in T&T was an example of a low leverage intervention which had immediate effects but seems unlikely to affect the trade in the long term and may actually exacerbate crime.

- Exogenous factors are the main drivers of the drug trade through T&T, and if that is not addressed local interventions may be unsuccessful.

- Obama Administration invested hundreds of millions of dollars to deal with drug enforcement in Mexico through the Merida Initiative, this is similar to the millions that the Administration is contributing to the Caribbean through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) to deal with the drug problem.
Critique: Although the authors use the system dynamics model to explore growth of cartels system in Mexico thoroughly, they do not provide much information on how they would actually run the model to get results. This takes away from the practicality of the paper.

Regarding their assumptions, the model blames corruption for the failures in the criminal justice system (see Figure 56), however, the failure could be due to a lack of capacity by the system to deal with the crime that results from having these drug trade cartels. Additionally, it does not consider how the severity of the penalty may also affect the likelihood of criminal participation. The model implies that if the law enforcement had more money than the drug cartels, then the influence of the cartels world decrease, but this may not be the case. Finally, it does not take into account individual’s penchant for risk and it does not cite any major criminal behavior theory for underlying its model.

3.


Goal: Lopez & Zuniga look at the externalities that come with growing crime. Using System Dynamics, they model how increased law enforcement activity might actually lead to more crimes being committed.
Model:

Figure 58: System Dynamics model of Criminal Justice System

Methodology: Lopez and Zuniga use literature review and data available for the US, Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica to build their model showing the relationship between criminal acts and the likelihood of punishment. This perception is based on the efficiency of the criminal justice system. They simulate various scenarios over 60 years to see the long run effects of changes in the judicial system to crime.

First, they analyze the data and use econometric literature on crime to derive formulas and make assumptions for the model. For example:

- Formula $\text{Pending cases}_t = \text{Pending cases}_{t-1} + \delta t (\text{Arrests} - \text{Dropped} - \text{Trials})$ (page 10)

- Assumptions
  - “the individual propensity to report a crime will decrease when the judicial workload is high” (page 9)
Then they run the model over a 60-year horizon.

**Findings/Recommendations:** Lopez & Zuniga suggest from their model

- Increasing the number of police officers reduces crime in the short run, but may increase crime in the long run, because the criminal justice system becomes overburdened.
- Once the perception that the probability of punishment decreases, adding resources to deal with the crime issue may not immediately remove this perception as it takes about 15 years for the perceived probability of punishment to increase once it has started decreasing.
- There is a 15-year time lag between investment in the justice system and long-term reduction in time, therefore a politician probably would not see results during his/her tenure in office.
- The return on investment into the apprehension-based programs will be less than anticipated because of potential overcrowding effects in the judicial system.

**Applicability to T&T:** This model applies to T&T because

- T&T has increased its Police Force by almost 2,000 people and it has a high rate of police officer per capita.
- Government acts like the SOE focus on apprehension.
- The model is based on countries like Brazil and Costa Rica which are also impacted by cocaine trafficking.
- This model suggests weakness of a ‘get tough’ policy without attention to the whole criminal justice system.
Critique: The model places much weight on jail capacity and sentencing as it assumes that once the capacity is reached judges will change their sentencing patterns and less people will report crimes. His analysis implies that building more and improving the capacity of judges would increase the number of crimes reported and reduce increases the number of arrests and convictions. This would result in a higher perception of punishment and a reduction in crime. To validate his argument, he should show where areas with more jails have less crime.

4.


Goal: Olaya et al. use system dynamics to create a theory of crime that includes “i) its indigenous character and ii) its dynamic nature”. They investigate possible reasons why people commit crime, in Colombia, using a systems thinking approach.
Model:

Figure 59: System Dynamics model of Crime Theory

Figure 1. A first dynamic theory of crime based for the Colombian society
Source: Olaya 2010
Highlighted loops that pertain to T&T as they show feedback mechanisms that occur from regulation and other crime interventions:

Figure 60: Regulation of Crime Loop

These loops highlight how state effort affects the inclination to crime in individuals.

Figure 61: Reinforcement of Crime Loop

These loops depict how crime may be reinforced and how criminal learning occurs.

Methodology: First, they discuss existing theories of criminal behavior, such as the rational choice theory, and they discuss the need for systems thinking to understand criminal actions better. Then, they use the model to show ways that criminal learning affect criminal behavior. The authors did not run the model.
Findings/Recommendations: Olaya et al.’s recommend that the government:

- Create policies that take into account that people learn from other criminals. For example, the judicial system should penalize people based on their level within the criminal organization, because less seasoned criminals may learn to become experts from more experienced ones otherwise
- Create crime theories that take into account dynamic relationship and local conditions; then design policies based on these crime theories
- Design models and test theories through simulation

Applicability to T&T: I chose this model because

- Unlike the other models, it focuses on the individual level and it provides an individualistic theory of criminal behavior that can inform policymakers. Understanding why people turn to crime is pertinent to figuring out how to get them to change their behavior
- Colombia is also a victim of the drug trade and the resulting criminal activity
- The model takes into account drug trafficking

Critique: Unlike the other models examined on the paper, this one tries to model individual behavior and inclinations. As a result, it considers system effects but focuses more on the decision patterns of an individual. It provides more of a conceptual framework than a system dynamics model that could be run. Moreover, it does not try to provide any metrics for quantitative analysis using the model.
## Comparison of Models

### Table 12: Comparison of the Major Features of Finding of the Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Wilks et al. 2007</th>
<th>McGee et al. 2011</th>
<th>Lopez et al. 2001</th>
<th>Olaya et al. 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>a generic model based on literature and data from Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and USA</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>Cartels</td>
<td>Criminal Justice System (CJS)</td>
<td>Individual inclination to crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did the run the model?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Horizon</strong></td>
<td>1990-2005 (current) 2005-2030</td>
<td>2000-2060</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason for selection</strong></td>
<td>Gang violence also the main cause of violence in T&amp;T Young males make up the gangs in both T&amp;T and Jamaica Compares the results of 3 main types of interventions</td>
<td>Cartels in Mexico have grown because of cocaine transshipment</td>
<td>To understand the impact of interventions to the CJS</td>
<td>To understand how system dynamics models can be used to show factors that influence individual choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Findings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Lags</strong></td>
<td>Years for gang-related murder rate to drop: With no intervention: 17 With gang reduction plan: 10 With more govt spending on security: 12 With increased welfare: 22</td>
<td>15 year time lag between the investment in the CJS and sustainable decrease in crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Finding</strong></td>
<td>Direct measures, such as gang reduction and increased security, more effective than indirect measures, such as increasing welfare</td>
<td>Criminal justice, economic and educational reform needed for long term reduction in crime. Partial response will not be effective</td>
<td>Increasing policing decreases crime in the short run, but may increase crime in the long run because of back up in the CJS</td>
<td>Create policies that take into account that people may learn from more seasoned criminals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the findings seem to be contradictory, I think that they all have value that can be applied to T&T. In the Lopez et al. (2001) paper, the increased policing resulted in increased crime because the criminal justice system was not able to handle the increased arrests and people
got lighter sentences thereby reducing the role of penalties as a crime deterrent. This implies that with the increase of police officers, there should also be an improvement of the criminal justice system, which is what the McGee et al. (2011) paper suggests. Although the Wilks et al. (2007) paper finds that direct strategies are most effective, it also finds that the economic strategy reduces crime, when compared to the base case. The Wilks et al. (2007) paper only compared partial strategies and did not look at the result of combination strategies, as is what the McGee et al. (2011) paper implies. The Olaya et al. (2010) paper is not as comparable to the others.

**Recommendations for the Government of T&T**

The following table summarizes the finding and recommendations and I have added some policy suggestions:

**Table 13: Policy Suggestions for T&T based on System Dynamics Findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Area of Study</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Policy Suggestions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wilks et al.</td>
<td>A Dynamic Analysis of Organized Crime in Jamaica</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Government intervention can reduce crime on the long run</td>
<td>Give programs a chance to mature and the government should create an education campaign to let people know that the plans will take a few years before sustainable results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing the Welfare to poor families has less impact on gang related murder and the prison population than doubling the Police Force or reducing gang membership</td>
<td>Improve the Community Policing program to work with CBOs and NGOs to reach out to young males, the demographic group most likely to involved in gang violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct measures are more effective than indirect measures</td>
<td>Set realistic goals for programs that target welfare provision to reduce crime. These programs are necessary, but will not drastically reduce crime in the short run</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crime reduction programs scenario resulted in less gang related murders in aggregate over the time modeled</td>
<td>Support programs geared towards Reducing gang membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>With increasing the security, the prison population increases as well as the strain on the judicial system</td>
<td>If the government is going to hire more police officers, they should ensure that there are enough lawyers, judges, jails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>McGee et al. 2011</td>
<td>Mexico's Cartel Problem: A Systems Thinking Perspective</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Low leverage interventions bring quick results, but high leverage interventions are needed for sustainable improvements</td>
<td>Continue to invest in improving police capacity through education and involvement in international training programs</td>
<td>Low leverage interventions bring quick results, but high leverage interventions are needed for sustainable improvements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal justice reform, education reform &amp; Economic development are needed to bring about long term change and partial responses will not be effective</td>
<td>Improve criminal justice system by increasing capacity, one such way is to award scholarships for students wanting to be police officers, lawyers and judges</td>
<td>Continue to work with the CARICOM as well as other international and regional programs such as the US CBSI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exogenous factors, such as the US demand for cocaine, need to be addressed in order to improve the Mexican situation</td>
<td>Continue to work with the CARICOM as well as other international and regional programs such as the US CBSI</td>
<td>Lower leverage interventions bring quick results, but high leverage interventions are needed for sustainable improvements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Although the long term changes require a lot of resources, they are worth the investment</td>
<td>Educate the public about the intervention programs and the time and effort that they require is important to getting their approval the programs expenses</td>
<td>Continue to work with the CARICOM as well as other international and regional programs such as the US CBSI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Future systems research, modeling and simulation is needed because it takes a holistic understanding of the problem, and a dynamic method of simulation, to devise effective long term solutions</td>
<td>Continue to direct resources into TTIPS Crime and Problem Analysis Branch and the National Drug Observatory to collect data and use it for crime modeling and simulation</td>
<td>Future systems research, modeling and simulation is needed because it takes a holistic understanding of the problem, and a dynamic method of simulation, to devise effective long term solutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Lopez &amp; Zuniga 2001</th>
<th>A System Dynamics Model of Crime</th>
<th>a generic model based on literature and data from Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Increasing the number of police officers reduces crime in the short run, but may increase crime in the long run, because the criminal justice system become overburdened</td>
<td>Do not hire more police officers, but instead continue to work on increasing their capacity and productivity</td>
<td>Increasing the number of police officers reduces crime in the short run, but may increase crime in the long run, because the criminal justice system become overburdened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once individuals perceive that the likelihood of punishment decreases, adding resources to deal with the crime issue may take about 15 years to remove this perception</td>
<td>Increase conviction rates</td>
<td>Once individuals perceive that the likelihood of punishment decreases, adding resources to deal with the crime issue may take about 15 years to remove this perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There may be a 15-year time lag between investment in the justice system and long-term reduction in time, therefore a politician probably would not see results during his/her tenure in office</td>
<td>Have patience that the procedures are working and be cautious of doing major showy interventions, that may in turn worsen conditions</td>
<td>There may be a 15-year time lag between investment in the justice system and long-term reduction in time, therefore a politician probably would not see results during his/her tenure in office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The return on investment into the apprehension-based programs will be less than anticipated because of potential overcrowding effects in the judicial system</td>
<td>Ensure that there are enough jails, prison officers, judges and other professions needed to support the criminal justice system</td>
<td>The return on investment into the apprehension-based programs will be less than anticipated because of potential overcrowding effects in the judicial system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

112
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theorizing About Crime: Elements for a Contribution of System Dynamics to Criminology</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Create policies that take into account that people learn from other criminals</td>
<td>Continue to encourage community service and other punishments for people convicted of minor felonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create crime theories that take into account dynamic relationship and local conditions; then design policies based on these crime theories</td>
<td>Work with universities and other research partners to ensure that long term analysis of crime conditions are being considered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design models and test theories through simulation</td>
<td>Hire systems analysis consultants and planners to run the models and to evaluate performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

The system dynamics analysis highlights that there is at least a 10-year time lag for projects to take effect and for sustainable changes to occur. In T&T, projects and programs need time to grow and the government should set realistic expectations of what the program should accomplish and the time that it would take. The multi-year and multi-faceted approach that is required to bring about sustained change suggests that a planner should be hired to direct the change and keep projects going over time.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

In this chapter, I summarize my findings regarding the crime problem in T&T and systems analysis approaches to address them. Then, I do a brief stakeholder and institutional analysis which will aid in identifying planning options and pathways as well as in adopting and implementing appropriate policies. Following that, I finish with further research and conclusions.

In previous chapters, I established that crime was a major problem in T&T and I showed the rapid growth in crime since the 2000s. I posited that this growth was because of the drug trade in the T&T, which caused an increase in accessibility of guns, and the creation of gangs, who are the major perpetrators of violence. To validate my position, I looked at the increasing crime rate in many Caribbean countries. Additionally, I did a narco-transshipment state analysis, which identified some of the vulnerabilities that Caribbean countries face. Further, I looked at the global cocaine system and the role that the Caribbean played, and I compared the Caribbean region to the West African region, which is a growing transshipment node for cocaine.

After demonstrating that the cocaine trade could indeed be a major cause of the increase in violence in T&T, I returned to the local scale to describe the government’s response. According to the Anti-Drug National Plan,

- between 1998-2009 there have been 9 Acts passed to address some aspect of the trade
- there are 17 operational groups that look at ways to reduce its impacts
- T&T has bilateral agreements with 8 countries, or rather 11 countries if the agreements through CARICOM are considered
- T&T is in about ten international conventions and plans
- TTPS has established Civilian Conservation Corps to reach out to youth, a National Drug Observatory to collect and analyze drug-related crime data, and a Crime and Problem Analysis branch

Additionally, T&T has hired a foreign police commissioner, hung a drug lord and held a state of emergency in order to reduce crime.
The effectiveness of these responses is undetermined as the murder rate remains high and people’s perceptions of the government’s actions remain low. However, changes in crime fighting strategies can take some time to be realized as many factors and institutions are involved.

The crime and law enforcement situation in T&T needs systems analysis to determine the major levers that trigger or curb crime and how best to invest national resources to reduce it. On August 15, 2012, the head of the Ministry of National Security (MNS), Hon. Warner was budgeted an additional TTD $289 million (USD $45 million) to continue the fight against crime in T&T\textsuperscript{77}. This is a 12\% increase on the 2012 estimated budgetary expenditure for ‘Police and Fire Protection’ and 6\% on the expenditure for ‘Defence/Public Order and Safety’\textsuperscript{78}. Hon Warner laid out his plan to spend the money, which included hiring 5,000 more police officers, but he did not mention his analysis or his criteria for coming up with the plan. I argue in this paper that a systems analysis approach is needed to understand the causes of the crime and to create a framework to devise solutions that are interconnected and sustainable. To strengthen this argument, I analyzed four specific system dynamics models that look at comparable cases and I applied their findings to T&T.

System dynamics findings and T&T

The models indicate that it would take at least 10 years for some of the interventions to take effect and bring about sustainable reduction in crime. Unfortunately, because crime is a major political topic in T&T and elections occur every five years, the government has not been able to invest in long-term systemic change that takes at least to decade to realize. Once the government selects a plan of action, it should launch education campaigns and other promotional events explaining that the plans would take at least ten years to see the results.

Additionally, the models imply the importance of an integrative approach, which a planner would provide, as various organizations and groups need to work together to bring about

\textsuperscript{77} Ramdass, Anna, “Jack gets $289m to fight crime”, T&T Express, August 16, 2012. 
\textsuperscript{78} Republic of T&T Draft Estimate of Expenditure for the Financial Year 2012. Text prepared by the Ministry of Finance - Printed by the Government Printer, POS. Page 40.
change. Planners could determine the sequence of actions to address the system effects as well as put in checks and balances at the appropriate times. Moreover, planners would be able to continuously monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of programs that are put in place.

**Building a system dynamics model for T&T**

To build a system dynamics model for T&T, the potential variables, the stocks and flows and the key interactions need to be considered. Below are some suggestions for each of these categories based on factors identified in this study.

**Potential Variables**

- **Drug Business**
  - Volume of drugs trafficked through the T&T and the Caribbean (derived from the UNODC data)
  - Volume of drugs seized (UNODC)
- **Crime**
  - Crime rates (TT CSO for all except kidnapping), Kidnapping rates (UNODC)
- **Socio-Economic Conditions**
  - Human Development Index (UN)
- **Government Action**
  - Government Expenditure of Defense and Security (Annual Budget Expenditure Estimates)
  - Police per 100,000 population (Small Arms Survey)
- **Public Perception**
  - Corruption perception (Transparency International)
  - Codifying newspaper articles
- **Miscellaneous**
  - Number of Deportees (US Department of Homeland Security)
**Stocks and Flows**

In system dynamics modeling, stocks represent things that can be accumulated and flows represent the input or output from the stock. A simple example is that of a bathtub, the tub represents the stock which can be filled up or emptied of water and the faucet and the drain are the flows. The faucet would be the input flow and the drain the output flow. For T&T, here are some examples:

- Of stocks: level of crime, number of murders, public trust, and number of police officers
- Of flows: rate of arrests, and rate of convictions

**Key interactions and feedbacks**

The interactions and feedback that should be considered depend on the agency doing the modeling. The government, for example, might be interested in potential destabilization after removing a drug lord, economic impact of hiring more police officers, strain on the judicial system for more arrests or level of public trust after a major intervention. Additionally, the government may want to know whether to invest more money into education, welfare programs, security or into attracting international companies that bring jobs. As a result, the interactions that they consider should include how education affects young people joining gangs or how crime discourages foreign investors from bringing their businesses into the country. Similarly, other stakeholders would look at the interactions pertinent to their reason for analysis.

**Participatory Modeling**

Various stakeholders could use systems analysis, particularly system dynamics modeling, to analyze how they could contribute to the crime reduction strategies. Additionally, the analysis might make government efforts more transparent and assist in evaluating the government's

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interdiction efforts and related policy initiatives. In the following section, I do a brief stakeholder analysis, identifying some of the key players in the local system.

Stakeholder Analysis of the Narcotics Trade in T&T

The system dynamics approach illuminates the roles that stakeholders play. The key stakeholders can be divided into the governing bodies, the local community and the international bodies. Drug lords and gang members may fall into the local community or international bodies, but for the purposes of this analysis, I consider them separately.

Governing bodies
- Government: wants a reduction in crime in order to win legitimacy and votes for the next election and to attract international investment which will improve economic conditions in the country
- The Police Force: wants a reduction in crime because it improves their relationship with the community and the prestige of their titles. Additionally, reduced crime can make their jobs easier and support for crime prevention can keep their budget and manpower high

Local Community
- Community, general: want to not live in fear and want crime to stop
- Civic Leaders: represent the community and want crime to stop
- Church Officials: implement programs to get young people out of the gangs and into more productive projects
- Deportees: many of whom are young men with limited ties to the country and are sometimes viewed as criminals
- Youth, some: want financial security, protection or a sense of belonging so they are tempted to join gangs
- Local Businessmen: want less crime because crime increases the costs of doing business. A notable exception are security firms, which may be thriving due to the high crime rate and insecurity (Griffith 1996)
- Media: controls the information that the community receives and the manner that they receive it

Perpetrators
- Drug Lords (also part of community or international players): want to increase their business without trouble from the police
- Gang members (also part of community): want to make a living, protect their families and themselves as well as gain power and wealth. They do not want the police interfering with their business

International bodies
- International law enforcement: want to stop the flow of cocaine through the T&T so that the cocaine does not come to their countries
- Businessmen: want to invest in T&T without the additional security risks and costs
- International NGOs: want a reduction in crime as they usually serve the poor and needy in the community, who are the most vulnerable to crime
Stakeholder Control/Power Matrix

The table below highlights some of the key power relationships among the stakeholders. I recognize that this is a generalized list, as within each stakeholder group there are differing incentives and desires. The table reads: the [column] has control over the [row]:

Table 14: Control/Power Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Governing bodies</th>
<th>Local community</th>
<th>Criminals</th>
<th>International bodies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governing bodies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control resources, can hurt the reputation of the country, may determine socio-economic conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>Enforce laws, allocate funding, establish social programs</td>
<td>Elects them back in office, may strike or protest if they disagree with their actions</td>
<td>Increase fear, prey on the vulnerable to increase their numbers</td>
<td>Control resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminals</td>
<td>Can make arrest, reduce profits from criminal activity</td>
<td>Can report them to the police</td>
<td></td>
<td>Can help the local law enforcement reduce criminal activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International bodies</td>
<td>Can restrict accessibility to country's resources and people</td>
<td>Can choose not to participate in their programs</td>
<td>Cause them not to invest in T&amp;T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alternatives to current global law enforcement strategies

Otto Perez Molina, President of Guatemala has stated that the war on drugs has failed and he suggests that participation in the cocaine trade should be decriminalized and the cocaine trade regulated. In fact, he thinks that drugs should be treated as a public health issue. Due to the exogenous nature of the cocaine trade for T&T, if the global system decriminalized and regulated the cocaine trade, it would be more sustainable. However, there are challenges in implementing such a system. As shown in Figure 62, the lack of support from community programs established will not work at reducing crime. Without community support, these actions would be ineffective in the long run. The local community lacks institutional and law enforcement support and also lacks adequate funding, which is dependent on the goodwill of companies or individuals. The international bodies lack local legitimacy and accessibility, and the space where sustainable crime and drug reduction programs are created is also little legislative power, without institutional support sustainability may be reduced.

regulated the trade, then the spillover effects would potentially lessen. If the shipping of cocaine were legal, other types of protection, like auto-id tags or bar codes, could be used when moving the goods and the need for guns, bribery and subterfuge would be reduced.

However, in isolation, T&T could not reduce penalties for those involved in transshipment, because that would increase trafficking through T&T, and make local people more vulnerable to becoming drug mules. Additionally, it would worsen immigration actions against Trinidadians and Tobagonians when they travel, as they will all be seen as potential traffickers (Griffith 1996). Decriminalization would need to be done on a global scale, and not only on a local one.

**Recommendations for the Trinidad & Tobago Police Service (TTPS)**

In the previous chapters, I identified, through the review of literature and analysis of the crime situation in T&T, that one of the problems that led to higher crime in the country is the lack of faith in the TTPS. Additionally, I noted policies that the government should focus on to deal with the rising crime levels and the drug trade through the country. In this section, I consider steps that the leadership of TTPS could take to bring about change both within the organization and in the community to improve their reputation. I use Andrew’s (2010) “Big Stuck”, Pritchett’s (2010) “Isomorphic Mimicry” and Kezar’s (2001) theories on organizational change to come up with a preliminary implementation plan for the TTPS.

The TTPS is in a “Big Stuck” situation, as described by Andrews et al. (2010), whereby the need for change is great, as the TTPS realizes that their current actions are not reducing crime, but the method of change is unknown and the space for change is questionable. Problems are usually a good medium to introduce change, and for the TTPS the increasing crime and murder rate provide an opening for change agents.

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‘Isomorphic mimicry’, a term coined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and used by Pritchett (2010), describes the situation where organizations, who depend on external legitimacy for funding and support but do not have the capability to perform, act as expected in order to continue receiving the support. For example, the government of T&T has 17 agencies that look at the drug problem and passing about 9 bills in 11 years, all of which follow external best practices that the government adopts to show that it is working to reduce crime. As a result, on paper, the government is doing many crime interdictions, but it may just be rhetoric and not in practice.

In this section, I make some suggestions about ways to bring about change for the TTPS. First, I look at the Evolutionary ecosystem for the TTPS to determine whether there is space for change within the TTPS. Following that, I look at some organizational change theory and consider what TTPS’s motivations for change are. Finally, I make some recommendations that may help TTPS open the space for change and improve their relationship with the community.
The space for change

The TTPS is part of an organizational ecosystem, and at the lowest level are the ‘Agents’, the police officers and the commissioner, who interact directly with the community. At the top level is the system where the TTPS exists; this system includes the Ministry of National Security, the government, the community, as all of these are external bodies that give TTPS its legitimacy. In the figure above, the right hand side describes an open organization that is easily adaptable and the left hand side describes a closed organization that is unable to meet its challenges. Matthews et al. (2012) state that organizations that operate on the left fall victim to capability traps and often times the agents are blamed for failure of the system.

From my assessment of the TTPS, through reading policies, talking to people and newspaper articles, I posit that
- the system is ‘open’ as the TTPS is investing in new programs, such as Crime and Problem Analysis Branch and the National Drug Observatory
- the actions of the TTPS are determined by the current government whose goals are short-sighted because they need to show results in order to be re-elected. As a result, the evaluation of novelty is determined by the TTPS’s ‘agenda conformity’
- the ‘organizational effectiveness’ come from ‘external legitimacy’ and demonstrated success. Although demonstrated success is important, the organization’s effectiveness depends on whether the community or the government sees them as being successful. Case in point, the crime rate in T&T is decreasing, but the TTPS is still seen as being ineffective
- the police officers and their leadership have many regulations to follow as such their choices are limited; however, they are given some leeway to make change. As a result, the ‘agents’ component of the system could go in both directions

Consequently, overall TTPS is open to change.

**Current Evolutionary Ecosystem**

Using Kezar’s (2001) theories on organizational change, political, cultural and social cognition forces are the most dominant ones acting on the TTPS.

**Political:** The demands for reduced crime by the government and for protection by citizens interplay with the increased use of violence by criminals and counteract the request that the TTPS is more community friendly; these factors contribute to the political system that the TTPS faces.

**Cultural:** As the criminal element becomes more powerful in T&T, the culture of the country is changing; people are living in fear and their actions reflect their insecurity; criminals are becoming more violent and bold as they lose respect for the police and institutions in the country. The TTPS is charged with keeping their legitimacy as all of these changes occur in the society around them; this lends Kezar’s cultural theory for change.
Social Cognition: Internally, the TTPS recognizes that their modus operandi has not been effective in curbing crime and that they need to re-think their strategies and ways of doing business, Kezar's social cognition theory, this is evident through their adoption of new programs and strategies.

Isomorphism: The combination of the above evolutionary life cycles support Maggio's (1983) isomorphic theory of change as the TTPS has political forces acting on it, it needs to maintain its legitimacy, and it answers to many external actors (Maggio & Powell 1983). The biggest threat to the validity of the Police Force is the perception of the people; when people lose all respect and trust in the TTPS, then it will be most ineffective.

Organization Change Motivation

Based on my analysis, the major motivation of the TTPS is the “external who”, i.e., the actions are fueled by the need for external legitimacy. As officers are motivated by how they are perceived both by the government, who controls their resources, and by the community. Decreasing the crime rate in T&T also motivates officers, in that sense the “what”, or the results, contributes to their actions. The “how” motivator is a minor factor because police officers follow a set of guidelines that have been set up in the system, so their actual procedures have been handed to them. The “internal who” motivator is also a minor factor in this category, because promotions are historically based on seniority, so employee satisfaction matters because low salaries and frustration at the job may create susceptibility to bribe taking. (Andrews 2011, September 14)
Strategies for the TTPS

The TTPS has started many initiatives to help improve its capacity and its relationship with the community, this section highlights some of the programs that should be implemented, reinforced or re-instituted.

Change 1: Improve Messaging

The TTPS should not have a “War on Crime” campaign, like the SOE, instead they should frame their approach as more of a “Police In the Community” or a “We Care” plan. The “War on Crime” just increases the distrust between the communities and the police, whereas a softer campaign would hopefully get the groups together. This is similar to the re-branding that the TTPS tried in 2007 with the ‘Policing for the People’ initiative that according to Wallace (2011) was discontinued for no known reason.

Change 2: Build Acceptance

The TTPS leadership needs to identify the major problems within the Police Force through feedback programs both within the force and externally. The Police Complaints Authority Act allows for external feedback; so the following steps are for internal feedback systems. The TTPS leadership should:

- Conduct a two-phase anonymous survey. Let Phase 1 be open-ended questions to the officers about their thoughts on the identifying the deficiencies of the TTPS. Based on the responses in Phase 1, do another survey with similar questions, but with multiple choice answers, to identify what officers think are the biggest problems affecting the TTPS.

- Form two types of groups within the Police Force to look at change in the TTPS, one type made up with the senior officers because they know the system well. The second type should be with a demographically diverse range of officers who leadership has identified as invested in serving the country.
- Invite members of the community to form voluntary groups to discuss what is needed to improve the TTPS. These meetings should be held regionally once a quarter and a meal should be provided to encourage attendance. This suggested process differs from the Police Complaints Authority’s work because it is not only for citizens to bring forward failures of the TTPS, but also for citizens to work with the TTPS to come up with solutions. Wallace (2011) suggests that although there have been seemingly similar efforts to get community involvement, genuine and regular outreach was lacking. Additionally, there should be a forum for anonymous suggestions to be made for those community members who may be afraid of speaking up openly.

- Form a discussion group with incarcerated individuals to discuss the failures in the criminal justice system as some of the convicts may have many grievances with the system and may be willing to speak about them. Social workers may be needed to facilitate the conversations to ensure that they are constructive.

- Compensate officers based on clearly defined performance measures. I was unable to ascertain how officers were paid, so the TTPS may already be doing this. However, if they are not, the leadership should ensure that a transparent compensation process exists that considers various performance metrics, as well as level seniority, to determine salaries. From the information that I could gather, in 2010, many police officers were protesting to get the promised salary increases\(^\text{82}\) and in one case, a police officer needed two jobs in order to support his family\(^\text{83}\). Paying police officers sufficiently would indicate that their work is being valued and will help them to buy into the change implementation plan.


Change 3: Improve Ability

The TTPS leadership should:

Get social workers to train police officers in how to deal with the truant young men in the community, as was suggested by Hon Warner in his new plan to combat crime. For young men pride and honor are very important, so when the police officers are derisive or condescending the young men will become defensive and less open to change. Social workers who focus on the youth should be hired to have workshops with the officers on how to deal with young people.

Continue to work with other ministries and agencies that already work in communities. The Ministry of Culture has organized sporting events for the youth in the towns and villages, although police officers already serve as security for these events, they should play a greater role that would allow them more interaction with the young people. Additionally, the TTPS could reach out to non-governmental and community-based organizations that have youth programs and help them re-establish community activities that were stopped for safety reasons, especially in the crime hotspots and areas with continuously high levels of crime. Some such activities could be:

- Workshops on
  - Domestic violence,
  - Parenting – to help parents deal with wayward children, because many parents do not know what to do, and
  - How to deal with bullying

These activities would also create jobs for social workers, tutors and coordinators.

Other ways the police could improve their relationship with the community:

- Re-open outposts in areas with high crime prevalence and in the crime hotspots
- More foot patrols, as was started in the 21st Century Policing Initiative

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- Use more female officers in communities with young children
- Expand the Police Service Youth Group:
  - Offer scholarships and help to arrange transportation to schools to students who do not have the means to get to school, especially in the crime hotspots
  - Target troubled youth to become more involved with the police youth group
- Use Social Workers (welfare officers) to help deal with trauma in these communities and to help deal with the repercussions of violence

Further, the government should work with the local university to create a center or think tank that focuses on analyzing police behavior and improving its efficiency. This would be different from the Police Complaints Board, where the community can call in to report police misbehavior, although it can use these reports to guide their analysis. Similarly, it should be different from the Crime and Problem Analysis Branch of the Police Force that analyzes crime statistics. This center should be mainly academic and it should look 1) at improvements in law enforcement globally, and suitable ways for adapting them to T&T and 2) at creating metrics to determine the effectiveness of the TTPS. This oversight component should protect against ‘isomorphic mimicry’, i.e. new plans and solutions that get put on paper, but never come to reality.

In addition to the academic center, a civilian oversight board for the TTPS that meets once every 6 months should be created and some of the leaders from the local religious bodies, the NGOs and the CBOs should be invited to join. Additionally, one or two retired principals, who would undoubtedly understand how to work with truant young people, should be invited to join as well. The committee should be comprised of people from all the major ethnic groups and have both men and women on it. Further, the committee should include at least one person in his or her twenties who could share the issues facing young people with respect to the Police Service and cocaine.

The suggestions list is short, as more ideas would be generated based on the discussions of the focus groups and surveys.

**TTPS Recommendations Conclusion**

Changing the public’s view about the TTPS would be a long and tiresome process, according to Lopez et al.’s (2001) model, it may take up to 15 years, but it is necessary for T&T to see sustained decreases in crime. The Police in T&T have long been seen as the enforcers for the elite class and there is a legacy of distrust between the groups; however, the police officers come from the community and this perception could be changed for good. Change in behavior, in addition to improvements in expertise, is needed to improve the relationship between the community and the police and in so doing reduce the crime rate.

Of course, implementing such a change requires those in leadership positions within the institution to recognize the linkages and to be willing to prioritize meaningful change rather than simply respond to ‘establishment’ pressure to promote stability and stifle social unrest by simply getting tougher on crime.

**Future Research**

- Institutional Analysis of the departments and agencies that deal with some aspect of the cocaine problem in T&T, to identify effective programs that should be supported, and failed programs that should be stopped, as well as to determine gaps in what agencies are doing and what needs to be done

- System dynamics modeling of the potential interventions to determine which ones may be more effective in reducing the crime rate and to estimate expected times for projects to work and which combinations are most important

- Case study analysis of how the police and community were able to reduce the kidnapping rate. Using system dynamics or another modeling tools, feedback mechanisms should be identified that created the conditions for success
Concluding Remarks

Results from the systems analysis indicate the importance of coordinated, credible, sustained efforts as change does not happen immediately. In his April, 2012, announcement, Minister of National Security, Hon. Warner implied that his new plan will bring change to the country immediately. He stated “Let me advise you once again, that you shall feel the effects of the plan, when the plan is implemented it shall be swift, it shall be surgical, it shall be clinical and this country shall begin a new era of safety”\(^{86}\). This language is problematic, because it sets false expectations of results and timing and if the plans fail to reduce crime quickly, the TTPS would be blamed. Moreover, it may lead to plans being scrapped and new initiatives started within the next few years, as with other security and policing initiatives.

Although numerous projects have been tried in the past, the overall efforts seem scattered and/or are victims of isomorphic mimicry. A concerted planning strategy is needed to determine what level of coordination should occur, which local and international groups should be working together, and what sequence of events are necessary to make sustainable change. As the changes may take at least ten years to bring about real results, considerable management and planning skill must be available to keep the project going over time.

Systems analysis may help provide the framework to determine interventions and to test their efficacy through modeling. Although this thesis focuses on the government, and particularly, the TTPS as the modelers, this type of analysis could be useful to make of the involved organizations. Several of the international NGOs, international corporations and community-based organizations that are vested in the crime situation in T&T may want to collaborate on the development and use of this approach to analyze and evaluate conditions in the country and then advise the government and the community on how to make improvements.

## Appendix 1 – Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Departments

### List of Police Service Departments in Trinidad and Tobago

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anti-Kidnapping Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Community Policing Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Court and Process Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Crime and Problem Analysis Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Criminal Investigations Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Criminal Records Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Finance Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fraud Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Guard and Emergency Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Homicide Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Human Resource Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Inter Agency task Force (IATF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Interpol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Modus Operandi</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mounted and Canine Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Photography Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Planning and Development Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Police Armour Shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Police Band</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Police Training College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Repeat Offenders Programme (ROP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Special Reserve Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Stolen Vehicles Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>The Special Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Transport and Telecommunications Branch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.ttps.gov.tt/AboutTTPS/Departments.aspx](http://www.ttps.gov.tt/AboutTTPS/Departments.aspx)
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