THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS
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Trygve Lie, in assessing the performance of the Powers at the United Nations, wrote some years ago: "Russian reasoning is always more difficult to understand. Even after seven years as Secretary-General, I cannot pretend to speak with assurance as to how the Soviet mind is made up." Mr. Lie's uncertainty is indicative of the unique problems that confront the analyst of Soviet international behavior generally and at the United Nations in particular.

Friends and foes agree on the constancy and continuity of Soviet long-range objectives. The motivation of the Soviet leadership—and its representatives abroad, however, has over the course of years remained a matter of intense speculation and dispute. How relevant are ultimate goals to current Soviet conduct? How "sincere" is Soviet participation in international organizations? To what extent can Soviet moves and pronouncements be taken at face value? There are no simple or certain answers. One basic difficulty is of course the outsider's inability ever to know to what extent words express genuine attitudes or to what extent overt behavior corresponds to intent.

If performance is taken as an index to motives, Soviet action at the United Nations only adds to the puzzlement. As in other sectors of Soviet conduct, Moscow has over the years reversed its policies to the extent that its analysis of political constellations and opportunities changed. In 1945-1946 Moscow favored a strong Secretary-General for the United Nations; in 1952 it charged the Secretary-General with exceeding his authority. Until recently the Soviet delegation made itself the watchdog of the prerogatives of the Security Council, opposing all attempts to strengthen the General Assembly—only to wind up submitting issues to the latter. Are these changes of style or of substance?

In attempting an analysis of Soviet views the observer is greatly handicapped by an enforced reliance solely on the standard, official sources. We have no direct knowledge of the decision-making process, let alone the "inside" reasoning of the Kremlin. We have no reliable measure of Soviet "public opinion" --which tends to be either a "private" opinion, carefully kept out of public earshot, or else a stilted echo of the official "line." Thus the Soviet view of the United Nations can be inferred only from a combination of general assumptions about Soviet intent, specific Soviet pronouncements and moves at the United Nations, and comments about it by Soviet personnel and in Soviet publications.

The following is an attempt to uncover the Soviet view of the United Nations by a process perhaps comparable to triangulation--or, rather, moving in on the object from several relatively specific areas of analysis: (1) the broad ideological assumptions and commitments of the Soviet leadership with regard to international relations and organizations; (2) the historical perspective, on the assumptions that (everything else being equal) a continuity of policy and outlook is more likely than not to eventuate; and (3) some functional analysis of the practice of the Soviet Union and its objectives at the United Nations. Indeed, the Soviet view of the United Nations--as, no doubt, that of other states--is overwhelmingly a derivative of broader policy.

The record of the United Nations is rapidly growing voluminous to the point where it becomes an unwieldy and forbidding mountain of primary information. All the more surprising, then, is the near-absence of systematic published studies of Soviet performance at the United Nations except for some highly competent but rather specialized articles and monographs. All the more reason, too, for documenting the present essay more thoroughly than is perhaps otherwise called for in a survey of this sort--wherever possible referring to English-language sources.
The Soviet outlook on world affairs amounts to an extension of the Communist view of domestic politics. It is deeply rooted in a perception of the historical process as progress through struggle. Both elements, progress and struggle, are inalterable parts of the dialectic process, expressed during the present historical epoch primarily in the conflict between capitalism and proletariat (and, by extension, other downtrodden classes and peoples). The international arena in the age of imperialism—its itself viewed as the highest stage of capitalism—is typified by conflicts among competing imperialist powers, such as the first World War, and by conflicts between the exploiters and the exploited, such as the struggle between the colonial powers and the "suppressed" colonies, or (since 1917) between the Soviet and the capitalist states. While the first type of conflict leads to "unjust" wars, the latter type represents, as it were, a horizontal geographical projection of the class struggle from the national onto the international stage.

The "classic" Communist outlook—ampley reiterated of late by Nikita Khrushchev—includes in its essentials belief in "Marxism-Leninism" as the only truly "scientific" analysis of social and political processes; a vision of ultimate goals, and an abiding faith in their inevitable attainment. The inevitable triumph of the "exploited," whom the Soviet state purports to represent and champion, logically and explicitly entails the downfall of their "exploitors" and enemies—in substance, the non-Communist world as a political and socio-economic system. And, while individual tenets of the Bolshevik faith may be amended or even discarded (as Khrushchev has shown himself capable of doing) and others may be elaborated (in the name of "creative" Marxism), the commitment to, and acceptance of, such simple formulae as the inevitable victory of communism over capitalism and the identification of the Soviet state with Good and the non-Soviet world with Evil have been so thoroughly engrained over years and generations that they are scarcely
It is precisely the permanence of long-range objectives that permits—and commands—maximum flexibility of means in the struggle for their attainment. Both Lenin and Khrushchev are explicit on this point. The zigzags in Soviet tactics, the enigmatic switches of "line," the seeming caprice and stubbornness, the peculiarities in negotiatory techniques are all to a large extent explicable in these terms; they are a logical part of the system, not aberrations or deviations from it. At the same time, it is important to remember that Soviet policy-makers are neither omniscient nor faultless, that they are not all of one mind at all times, and that Soviet policy itself does not remain static. To stress the continuity of the outlook and its ideological underpinnings is not to suggest the absence of variations in intensity, in realism, in method, and in competence. Changing Soviet participation in international organizations is itself an example of such alterations over the course of time.

Another trend has been the shift from the early days of "proletarian culture" to the present era of striped pants; from open defiance of conventional diplomacy to secret treaties; from studied unconventionality to Daily Post. The Soviet concern for appearance—the analog to "bourgeois" values in foreign conduct—has grown remarkably as the Soviet Union has striven to become a full-fledged member of the family of nations.

The concern for form and convention has not, however, led to any appreciable doubt about the inevitability of the global transformation in which the Soviet Union must play a central role. Nor has it produced any serious questioning of the perception of tension and struggle, not as exceptions but as norms of civil and international conduct. Whether or not the international atmosphere becomes more clement at a given moment, the basic structure of relations between the Soviet Union and the non-communist world, as perceived in Moscow, is an antagonistic one—expressed in the oft-repeated formula of kto-kovo: "who—whom?"

In the Communist view, history moves in stages, and each stage is achieved in successive rounds. The basic difficulty of the present epoch arises from the happens-tance that both political types, the old and the new—the capitalist and the communist—exist side by side; hence, the problems of "coexistence" until the inevitable victory of the new. Soviet policy must be calculated to assist and speed this victory.

One problem with the Soviet analysis of the present world scene—and the United Nations in particular—goes back to a dilemma which the Kremlin may be scarcely aware of: the tension between the impulses toward universality and exclusiveness in the Communist appeal. Ever since its beginnings Bolshevism has tried to cope with the dilemma posed by the impulse, on the one hand, to "go it alone," to limit the movement to a small elite of pure, devoted, professional revolutionaries, and, on the other hand, to seek a mass following, a broad social base and support even outside the proletariat. A sense of uniqueness, superiority, and mission have thus clashed with an urge to identify with the majority of mankind. The result is a split in attitudes and behavior, which contains elements of inferiority and superiority, and a conflict between the search for world-wide legitimacy and a sense of self-sufficiency.

This condition has contributed to the "dual code" of Soviet conduct. In crudest terms, it has meant keeping others out of Soviet territory but trying to intrude or infiltrate and gather information abroad. There is yet another dilemma: the Soviet Union has striven to become a legitimate nation-state; yet it has continued to employ the international Communist apparatus to work in its behalf abroad. The Soviet difficulty at the United Nations has thus been part of the general difficulty of a "revolutionary" regime which does not feel bound by capitalist rules operating in a fundamentally alien or hostile environment. It is the problem of a state with


The Soviet Union is "revolutionary," of course, in a sui generis sense: while it strives to upset the international balance in its favor, it is, as has been suggested, supremely conservative in many respects both within the Soviet orbit and at the United Nations.
a "two-camp" dialectic trying to operate in a "one-world" organization.

Moscow does not view the United Nations and the International Court of Justice as above classes and politics. The state and its institutions are, in conventional Marxist terms, instruments of compulsion wielded by the ruling class. If this is true of law, which is itself a product of the bourgeois era and is bound to disappear once a communist society is built, what international law can there be for "socialist" and "capitalist" societies? The problems here suggested have been the subject of vigorous, tortuous, and at times fatal debate since the Bolsheviks came to power.

From the original "purist" outlook that the bourgeois forms of state, law, and morals cannot be filled with socialist content (as Pashukanis argued), the Soviet Union moved in the 1920's to the view that laws must remain, "but our laws are at all moments determined by revolutionary necessity." The soon came the reaffirmation that law expresses the will of the ruling class and strives to establish or safeguard an order advantageous for it. Vyshinsky was to reiterate this view ad nauseam. But here was the rub: if both the Soviet state and a foreign country, the two having different social systems and ruling classes, had distinct laws as parts of their superstructure, how could they share a common set of international law and rules of order? On the level of theory the problem proved refractory. If international law was socialist, it could not have antedated 1917 and could not bind capitalist states; if it was capitalist, it could not bind the Soviet Union; to say that it was classless was patently anti-Marxist. Finally, after some debate in 1954 the view prevailed that international law was the totality of elements common to both capitalist and socialist superstructures just as criminal law under socialism and capitalism shared certain features. In similar fashion, one may


4. See Sovetskoe ispravlenie i pravo (Moscow), particularly, 1951, no. 84.
suggest, Moscow would describe the rules of international organizations as the common denominator of two systems.

Characteristically, the discussion ended with an editorial admonition to explore the practice (rather than the theory) of international law—and here the ground was simpler to cover. After the Communist Party's Central Committee decided in 1946 that international law could be used to Soviet advantage, the 1948 textbook by Kozhevnikov (now Soviet judge on the International Court) made plain that the Soviet Union recognizes those parts of international law "which can facilitate the execution of the stated tasks of the USSR" and rejects those "which conflict in any manner with these purposes." Since in the Communist view international law is not a set of changeless rules either of divine origin or the essence of reason, the Soviet state can be selective and manipulative in its use of it, frankly accepting it as an instrument of state policy. In the words of a leading Soviet international lawyer, "the Soviet government's practice in international law is shaped under the influence of the objectives and principles of its foreign policy, which flow from the very nature of the Soviet state."5a

Yet the problem has remained whether international law is the same the world over or whether there is not a socialist international law to guide the relations among the states of the Soviet orbit (and Communist China). In 1938 Vyshinsky (arguing against Korovin) condemned the latter view. But with the emergence of the "people's democracies" and the substitution (in Soviet parlance) of the "world system of socialist states" for the previously lone Soviet Union, and with the growing gulf between East and West (accepting, for the sake of convenience, these basically misleading labels), Moscow reaffirmed in 1949 that "it is already possible

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to speak of the birth of elements of socialist international law." The view now was that under socialism, even if the forms remain the same, international law obtains new and qualitatively superior content.\(^6\)

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Momentarily, during the post-Stalin "thaw" of 1955-1956, Soviet jurists were prepared to acknowledge that the theory of distinct socialist international law was nonsense. But the general tightening of the post-Hungary era also witnessed an explicit reassertion of unique and superior socialist law. It has been correctly suggested that the Soviet Union would rather have two different sets of law and models of international behavior—one pertaining to the Soviet orbit, and the other to the outside world. New Korovin is prepared to argue that bourgeois concepts, such as equality, independence, and sovereignty, are fully achieved only under socialist conditions—and socialist international law. In addition, socialist relations "make it necessary to create new legal forms that are adequately suited to the new content"; "proletarian internationalism" is the main formula to describe them. Or, to put it more bluntly, "in the same way that the victory of socialism throughout the world is inevitable, so too is in the complete triumph of corresponding relations between peoples. At the base of these lie the great and tested principles of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism." Capitalism "has outlived its epoch, and the same is equally true of the corresponding type of international relations." Finally, early in 1959 the head of the Legal and Treaty Division of the Soviet foreign office reaffirmed the new view: relations among socialist states were subject to unique and qualitatively superior rules. In fact, "one cannot reduce the international-legal principles of relations among the countries of the

socialist camp to principles of common international law. To do so would be to
"roll down onto the tracks of barbarism, to slide into the quagmire of bour-
gegeois normativism."

A strict purist (and thoroughly impractical) reading of the doctrine might
lead one to think that the Soviet leaders would see no justification for partici-
pating in the United Nations or other organizations cutting across "world systems"
and not controlled by them. Yet in fact the Soviet Union has remained a member
(though for some years with serious misgivings)—largely out of a practical calculus
which suggests that membership is preferable to absence in terms of risks and rewards.
Actual policy decisions, then, are made on levels remote from abstruse theorizing.

On one level of analysis we encounter continued evidence of Soviet exclu-
siveness—in theory and in visceral response. Once an international organiza-
tion becomes a political force impinging on the latitude of choice and plenitude
of sovereignty of member states, the Soviet Union hastens to oppose such auth-
ority. It has consistently fought all schemes of world states and world fed-
erations (under other than Communist auspices). It has insisted that the United
Nations represents governments, not peoples. It cannot share the UNESCO outlook,
based on "idealist bourgeois conceptions concerning the causes of wars, con-
cerning the "non-partisan character" of science and culture," or its hope that a
philosophical synthesis of East and West can be produced. It has arrogated
to itself the role of speaking for "all progressive classes" and for "all toilers
of the world," It has assumed that the Soviet Union and the socialist camp cannot
be wrong. As one writer has put it, the subjective criteria in Soviet international
law and outlook amount to "class justice" pro-


11. Vladislav Ribnikar replying to Julian Huxley, at first UNESCO General Confer-
ence, and Uchitel'skai а gazeta (Moscow), January 20, 1951; cited in John A.
Armstrong, "The Soviet Attitude toward UNESCO," International Organization,
jected abroad. On this level, a Soviet observer would concur with the view that if states are so fundamentally divided that international society is essentially an arena of national struggle rather than a community, there is no real possibility that an international government or international organization can be anything other than an instrument which competitive states and blocs seek to capture for use in waging the bitter struggle.

On another level this outlook does not prevent the Soviet Union from participating in international activities along with non-Communist states. The course of Soviet conduct over forty years has been, after all, dotted with compromise. If, as someone, Russia has witnessed a "great retreat," it has been a retreat from pure theory to a mastery of politics as the art of the possible. It has been the abandonment of what Lenin called the "infantile disease" of Leftism for the sake of greater effectiveness, greater success, and greater rewards. From the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the acceptance of monetary incentives for production, from the establishment of collective (rather than state-owned) farms to the perpetuation of the army, law, and conventional diplomacy, Soviet policy has seen a "temporary" acquiescence in an imperfect present and the indefinite postponement of a better future. The attitude toward international organization has undergone corresponding change.

Consciously divorcing the "revolutionary" Party from the state, Moscow has been prepared to assume obligations in the community of nations and to institutionalize the duality of its conduct by signing treaties and joining the League and the United Nations while promoting the Communist International or similar organizations. The problem has been amoral; it has been entirely a practical one. As Oliver J. Lissitzyn has shown, "the basic Soviet conception of international law is intensely practical. International law is accepted to the extent that it serves the interests..."

12. Blumenthal, op. cit., pp. 10-14. Soviet authorities continue to hold that international law has a "class, superstructural character" (e.g., Aka-Lenina nauka, Institut prava, Ezhgodnarnodne pravo (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1957), pp. 3, 6).

of the Soviet state." Hence also "practical" Soviet acceptance of membership in the United Nations--without unwarranted blindness or enthusiasm. The "two-camp" outlook does not prelude coexistence. To the extent that both "camps" accept it, international law (in its widest sense) is thus a measure of the existing balance of power in the "transitional" phase.\textsuperscript{15}

There is no doubt that Soviet policy has been shaped overwhelmingly in terms of power relations outside the United Nations, which has not conventionally been conceived of as a major force. Moscow has never been particularly hopeful about international organizations not controlled by the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{16} It is precisely because of the special truce-like and transitional character of covenants between the "socialist camp" and the outside world that Moscow has insisted (as Emerson and Claude correctly put it some years ago)\textsuperscript{16a} that the United Nations amounted to a treaty relationship, to be "held within a strict construction of its contractual terms."

There will be occasion to review the consequences of this outlook, from which, as will be seen, stem Soviet "conservatism" and commitment to strict and literal interpretation of the Charter. Hence also Soviet insistence on national sovereignty and veto power, since in Moscow's view any extension of UN authority is bound to weaken the weaker party. In the bipolar view, the Soviet bloc has (at least until the recent past) been the perpetual minority--and some of Moscow's behavior at the United Nations has stemmed from its awareness of this inferior status. Hence also Soviet hostility to compulsory arbitration and to acceptance of the decisions of

\textsuperscript{14} Oliver J. Lissitzyn, "Recent Soviet Literature on International Law," \textit{American Slavic and East European Review}, December, 1952, pp. 262-63. See also Frankel, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 70-73.

\textsuperscript{15} See, e.g., Korovin's article, in \textit{Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia} (Moscow, 1954, 2d ed.), XXVII, 23.


of the International Court; as suggested above, the "socialist camp" cannot be found wrong, and certainly not by a capitalist or even mixed jury.\textsuperscript{17} Hence also Soviet insistence on unanimity and preference for non-political bodies. Hence Soviet rejection of reformism as a basic philosophy of peaceful, gradual change.

And hence also the Soviet difficulty in participating in an organization where the art of compromise is of the essence for effective operation. Unfamiliar with the tradition of loyal minority participation, the Bolsheviks have found a basic block in their own make-up when confronted with an organization which requires tolerance and restraint amidst widely divergent views, and which by its nature cannot operate on the basis of either Soviet domination or Soviet absence.

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Fullter, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 143-44; and Issaitzyn, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 263.
Lenin and International Organization

The Russian Bolsheviks, like Marxists elsewhere, envisaged the eventual emergence of a voluntary international commonwealth. Until the state and with it all organs of compulsion "withered" there was needed an International—a league of Communist parties and perhaps Communist nations, but surely not of capitalist states.

Lenin had toyed briefly with the slogan of a United States of Europe, but he came to recognize that its realization under capitalism was impossible, in Marxist terms, except as a "reactionary" bloc against a socialist state (or perhaps the United States). Given his conviction that war was inevitable as long as capitalism existed, Lenin was bound to reject international organizations as effective instruments to safeguard world peace. Peace, moreover, was not the supreme objective of the Bolsheviks, adept though their use of the peace slogan has been. Surely no revolutionary state would abandon its elan and mission or subordinate its decision-making to a super-national body controlled by "enemy" states. 1

When the League of Nations came to life, the Soviet leadership was bound to view it with scorn and hostility. On the one hand, it could secure only a "mirage" of peace; in Lenin's terms, real and lasting peace could be assured only under socialism (just as in later years, it was claimed that "real" sovereignty could be secured only under Soviet conditions). On the other hand, the League was created by, and inevitably made an instrument of, "imperialist" powers. The Bolshevik theory of capitalism, the reality of Allied intervention, the a priori assumption of a "capitalist encirclement," and the belief in the ability of socialist states alone to solve international problems all combined to make Moscow denounce the League—into which, moreover, the Soviet state had not been invited.

It was natural therefore for Lenin to describe the League either as a coalition of the hostile Versailles powers or as an ineffective instrumentality rent asunder by "contradictions" within the capitalist fold. If the League was the symbol of the capitalist victors, the Third International became the rallying point of the down-trodden in the bipolar dialectic of the Bolshevik world view.

The League of Nations, 1919-1934: The League as an Anti-Soviet Bloc

The view of the League as an enemy headquarters remained substantially unshaken for the following decade. Occasionally a political crisis would elicit confirmation that Moscow had not changed its mind. In the wake of Locarno the Soviet leadership feared that Germany—Russia's major friend and potential ally among the "have-not" powers of Europe—might be lured into membership of the League of Nations and claimed to fear that it would serve, with Poland, as an approach route for enemy forces against Soviet Russia. Soviet policy in cementing a Russia-centered series of alliances with Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Germany amounted indeed to what one analyst has called an "Anti-League," predicated on the assumption that the League itself was bound to constitute an offensive bloc directed against the Soviet Union. Foreign Commissar Chicherin was reported as planning to set up a "League of Peoples" to juxtapose to the capitalists assembled at Geneva.

2. "The so-called League of Nations is nothing but an insurance policy in which the victors mutually guarantee each other their prey." (Lenin, "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, August 1920, presented to the Second Congress of the Communist International.)

3. "It has been proven that the League of Nations actually does not exist, that the Union of capitalist powers is simply a deception, and that it represents two vultures trying to tear the prey from each other." (Lenin in October 1920 on the Franco-British disagreements heightened by the Soviet-Polish war.) See Xenia Budin and Harold H. Fisher, eds., Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927 (Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 121-22, 152.

4. Paul Milukov, La politique extéri u e des Soviets (Paris, 1934), goes so far as to entitle the chapter on the mid-'twenties "L'Anti-Ligue."

During the crisis of December 1925 Chicherin in an interview with the German Communist paper *Rote Fahne* explained with candor that the incompatibility of the Soviet Union and the League was due to the fact that they "are built on different principles" and therefore no community of assumptions and methods was possible between them. "Never, under any circumstances," he was quoted as saying, "will Russia join the League of Nations [which is]...an instrument of capitalist machinations against the weak countries and the colonial peoples." 6

A somewhat more practical consideration was advanced, among others, by Christian Rakovsky (in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1926): since Soviet Russia needed peace and security to "build socialism," in the existing circumstances its foreign policy had to avoid all entangling alliances and commitments such as League membership required.

And yet the Soviet Union was beginning to adjust to "peaceful coexistence" with a system of capitalist states which were experiencing a "temporary stabilization." Moscow established diplomatic relations and concluded treaties. Its policy toward the League and other international organs varied with the requirements of general strategy. It was proud to be invited to the Genoa Conference in 1922—where the Soviets went, in Lenin's words, not as Communists but as businessmen. Moscow began to cooperate with non-political and technical agencies, such as the League's Epidemic Commission. 7 Moscow offered to attend an international conference on naval disarmament. In a characteristic note, it informed the Secretary-General

6. Cited in Milliukov, op. cit., p. 304. Alexei Rykov declared on December 5, 1925: "The League of Nations is a little business undertaking that deals in peoples; it passes them over, as it sees fit, in the form of mandates, to the so-called states of high culture, which defend their mandate rights by force of arms and mercilessly enslave the peoples under their tutelage. For this reason the East would naturally regard us as traitors if we were to stand behind the counter of this shop. We shall not do so..." (Cited in Eudin and Fisher, op. cit., p. 321.) Commenting on the new Soviet treaty with Turkey, Izvestia editorialized on December 24, 1925: "The peoples of the USSR and of the East will...regulate their relations...without recourse to the League of Nations, outside the League and in spite of the League, which legalizes robbery and violence by the strong against the weak states."

of the League of Nations on March 15, 1923:

The Soviet government still believes that this quasi-international institution actually serves as a screen to conceal from the masses the predatory imperialist purposes of some great powers and their vassals. Without in the least deviating in principle from its attitude toward the League of Nations, the Soviet government is nevertheless prepared to consider the proposed conference as an assembly of representatives of individual states.... The Soviet government believes that without the participation of Russia and her allies this conference will prove fruitless. 8

Principled hostility—and qualitative transformation of the enemy body into a useful one when the Soviet Union adhered—were to remain part of the Soviet response.

From about 1927 on, Moscow's hostility toward the League weakened further. Stalin and the advocates of "socialism in one country" had now triumphed in Moscow. Weimar Germany was a member of the League and would presumably help prevent an anti-Soviet move. And while the Communist International—formally divorced from the Soviet state—continued to fulminate against Geneva, 9 the Soviet foreign office smoothed the path for Russian participation in the World Economic Conference and the Preparatory Commission for the disarmament conference in 1927-28. The strategy toward the League was thus evolving in unison with broader Soviet foreign policy decisions. The period from 1928 to 1933 was characterized by the giant exertions of forced collectivization of agriculture and the first Five-Year Plan in Soviet Russia. Abroad, Moscow pursued a dual course of "ultra-leftism" in the Comintern and moderate alliances on the diplomatic level. Increasing Soviet participation in international organizations went hand in hand with endorsement of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the sponsorship of the Moscow Protocol of 1929.

8. Iu. V. Kliuchnikov and A. Sabanin, Nezhdunernaia politika... (Moscow: NKID, 1929), III, 238. Other aspects of Soviet disarmament policy are discussed below, on pp.

9. The Sixth Congress of the Communist International resolved in Moscow in 1928: "The League of Nations...is itself more and more becoming a direct instrument for preparing and carrying out the war against the Soviet Union. The alliances and pacts concluded under the protection of the League of Nations are direct means for camouflaging preparations for war and are themselves instruments for the preparation of war, and especially war against the Soviet Union." (Cited in "The Struggle against Imperialist War and the tasks of the Communists," in William Henry Chamberlin, ed., Blueprint for World Conquest (Washington: Human Events, 1946).
Moscow left no doubt that such cooperation meant no romantic acceptance of the League system or reconciliation with its sponsors. It was symptomatic that the Soviet Union rather consistently rejected arbitration of international disputes. As Maxim Litvinov had declared in 1922, it would be impossible to find impartial judges in view of the abyss of hatred between communism and capitalism. The "two-world" view still prevailed.

The League of Nations, 1934-1939: The Soviet Union as a Member

Until 1933 the Soviet leadership had apparently hoped that the economic depression, coupled with an intransigent radicalism of Communists abroad, would usher in a new second round of revolutionary upheavals. Instead, it found itself confronted with the double menace of an expansionist Japan and a Nazi Germany—each with designs on Soviet territory. After first trying to ignore, appease, or rationalize the intentions of his two new rivals, Stalin by the end of 1933 reversed strategies, and began to hunt for allies abroad. Before long the Soviet Union signed treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia; and in 1935 the Seventh (and last) Comintern Congress replaced the "ultraleftist" course of 1928 with an endorsement of the "popular front." No longer were all non-Communists equally bad; no longer was it a matter of letting the enemies fight it out among themselves. Now the strategy was to ally with the lesser foes against the greater—the German-Japanese menace. Soviet entry into the League was a logical part of this strategic reversal. The shift was heralded by Stalin when he declared on December 25, 1933, in reply to a question by Walter Duranty of The New York Times, whether his attitude to the League was "always wholly negative":

"No, not always and not in all circumstances. Perhaps you do not quite understand... The League may act in some degree like a brake, retarding or preventing the outbreak of hostilities. If that were so, if the League were to turn out an obstacle, even a small one, that made war more difficult, while it furthered, even to a small extent, the cause of peace, then we would not be against the League."

10. I. V. Stalin, Sochineniya (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1951), XIII, 280.
It was primarily the French who, in the course of their negotiations with Moscow in 1934, pressed for Soviet entry into the League. After some reluctance the Soviet authorities consented, stressing that Soviet participation would change the League's character. The Soviet Union became a member of the League of Nations on September 18, 1934, and Maxim Litvinov, the persuasive Soviet foreign commissar who came to personify the League's "collective security" endeavors of the next four years, that very day explained to the Assembly the Soviet reasoning behind the adherence. Neither the notion of an association of states nor peaceful coexistence among capitalist and "socialist" countries was objectionable. As Litvinov carefully put it,

The idea in itself of an association of nations contains nothing theoretically unacceptable for the Soviet state and its ideology. The Soviet Union is itself a league of nations in the best sense of the word....The Soviet state has never excluded the possibility of some form of brother of association with states having a different political and social system, so long as there is no mutual hostility and if it is for the attainment of common aims....The Soviet Union is entering into the League today as representative of a new social-economic system, not renouncing any of its special features and—like the other states represented here—preserving intact its personality.

Here was the crux of the matter. So long as Moscow could "preserve intact its personality," it was prepared to cooperate—and could only gain from doing so—in the search for "collective security."

Peace and security were the primary and perhaps sole Soviet objectives in the League. As Litvinov declared in 1935, the Soviet Union had joined "with the sole purpose and with the sole promise to collaborate in every possible way with other nations in the maintenance of indivisible peace." Even in retrospect Moscow makes no claim to have sought to promote international amity or cooperation. The current Soviet formula is that the Soviet Union joined the League in order to

"utilize it as at least a certain hurdle on the aggressors' road to war and as an international forum for exposing the aggressors and their abettors." 13 It failed because "the principal capitalist countries... turned the League of Nations into a screen behind which the second World War was prepared." 13a


To the extent that the League's endeavors aimed at stemming aggression by Germany, Italy, or Japan, the Soviet Union loyally cooperated, and Litvinov seemed to be a model participant, pressing indeed for the delegation of greater authority to the League so as to enable it to enforce its decisions. The Soviet Union applied the arms embargo against Paraguay and carried out economic sanctions against Italy. However, its participation in the organization did not seem to involve any basic change of attitudes. And its commitment inevitably grew more tenuous as the League proved itself impotent on occasion after occasion and even appeasement proved to be no answer. Poland, France, and Britain learned this in 1939, and Soviet Russia did in 1941.

There is no evidence that Moscow had ever seriously considered the League a "brake" on war. Over a variety of issues—from the Spanish Civil War to the treatment of Germany in 1938—the strategy of cooperation with the "bourgeois democracies" failed, as did the popular fronts themselves. By 1939 Moscow was again "going it alone"—and going off eventually into the solitary encounter that resulted in the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23. Its secret clauses in effect "ceded" Finland, along with Eastern Poland and the Baltic States, to the Soviet Union, and it was in an attempt to implement this provision—and to bolster its defensive position before Leningrad—that the Red Army invaded Finland on November 30, 1939. In December the League decided that this action constituted aggression in the terms which Maxim Litvinov himself had helped define, and it excluded the Soviet Union from membership. Seven months earlier Stalin had jettisoned Litvinov as foreign commissar. The League had failed to prevent war, and Soviet efforts

14. It has been argued, however, that it fulfilled the letter but not the spirit of the economic sanction agreement. See Lowell R. Tillett, "The Soviet Role in League Sanctions against Italy." American Slavic and East European Review, February 1956.
15. This is apparent, for instance, from current affairs commentaries in International Press Correspondence, the press service of the Comintern. The Soviet Union joined many medical and some international communications and transportation specialized organizations in addition to the League itself. Of the over 100 humanitarian and religious organizations, it joined only two; of over forty in law and administration also only two. (L. B. Schapiro, "Soviet Participation in International Institutions," Yearbook of World Affairs, 1949, London, p. 214.)
to make use of it to prevent aggression against itself had collapsed as part of the total effort; indeed, once Stalin had convinced himself that the League had failed—and that he would not ally himself with the Western democracies under existing conditions—he made the outbreak of war inevitable by untying Hitler's hands in signing the non-aggression pact with Germany. For Moscow, the Geneva experiment had been an unmerciful boomerang.

The Second World War: The Road to the United Nations

It is safe to say that Stalin gave little thought to the League in the years following 1939. It was part of that general failure that characterized, in the Soviet view, the "bourgeois" interwar system.\footnote{The Second World War: The Road to the United Nations, by Isser Wolovich, 1940.}

The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 prompted a resumption of Soviet cooperation with the West, leading soon to the formation of the wartime alliance which in 1942 came to be known as the United Nations. In the Soviet view the alliance had as its aim the prosecution of specific and limited aims, vast though they were in cost and effort, centering on the defeat of the Axis powers. In the course of the common war effort—or, more correctly, the simultaneous war efforts in the east and west, fought virtually in separate compartments—no great intimacy developed between the West and the Soviet Union, even though after 1942 Soviet prestige abroad reached what was probably an unprecedented high. Moreover, the victorious association with Roosevelt and Churchill ostensibly legitimized Stalin's regime as a Great Power on the side of good.

After the taxing defeats and strains of the first two war years the allies began to plan more systematically for the postwar world. The dissolution of the Communist International in 1943 seemed to some Westerners to betoken the end of the "two-world" outlook in Moscow and the reintegration of the new Russia into the ranks of the "peace-loving" powers. Soviet propaganda surely contributed to this
image. If the contours of the fundamental disagreements between Moscow and its "Western" allies were not to unfold fully for several more years, it was soon apparent, however, that the Soviet leadership was thinking ahead in terms far more concrete and hardheaded, more realistic, and more attuned to its self-interest than were the less explicit though similarly practical British and the more fuzzy, more idealistic, and more confused American statesmen. 17

Talks on the nature of a desired international organization in the postwar world led, in October 1943, to the publication of a declaration by the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow. From here to San Francisco, one and one-half years later, the road was long and perhaps thornier than any of the Big Three had envisaged. Since the pre-natal course of the United Nations Organization—over Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta—has often been described, it will suffice here to summarize Soviet attitudes on a few matters.

(1) In the Soviet view the United Nations organization, much like the League and the wartime alliance, was to serve primarily the specific and relatively limited objective of maintaining peace. It was not conceived as a "bridge" between different systems of cultures; nor was it thought of as a first step on the road to closer union. Soviet wartime spokesmen hinted that it was unrealistic to expect the future United Nations to establish lasting, universal peace so long as conflicting socio-economic and political systems existed. The common denominator of the Soviet and non-Soviet camps, assuming cooperation among the powers, was the joint commitment to prevent war and aggression. 18

It followed from this that Moscow would frown on the proliferation of institutional functions, and contacts under the aegis of the United Nations. Indeed, Moscow

18. This theme is well developed in Irene Blumenthal, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations," chapter IV.
originally wanted an organization solely for the maintenance of peace, with no provision for economic and social functions. At Dumbarton Oaks the Soviet representative argued that one of the reasons for the League's failure had been the multiplicity of its tasks. Although he finally yielded on the inclusion of other functions in the future United Nations, the Kremlin was not, and for another ten years was not to be, interested in the many social, economic, and cultural activities of the Organization.

(2) This limited view of the United Nations' future functions harmonized with Moscow's insistence on the broadest interpretation of national sovereignty on the part of all member nations (and Great Powers in particular); and on reserving for itself the greatest possible freedom of action.

The Soviet concept of sovereignty remained to be developed in the postwar years; that of Great Power status became clear at an earlier date. At the Moscow Conference in October 1943 the Soviet delegates stressed the concept of the "guiding nucleus"—in substance similar to the Big Four (or Big Three) "policemen" scheme of President Roosevelt. The special place befitting the Great Powers was implicit in Stalin's pronouncements and outlook. Indeed, they inhered in his view of power and his repeated stress that the realization of Leninism was "largely a problem of power." There is enough substance in the numerous anecdotes of the "How many divisions has the Pope?" variety to accept the view that Stalin felt that the stronger states deserved special rights and had special obligations. At Yalta he made fun of Albania (much as Khrushchev was to consider ludicrous the placement of the Soviet Union on the same level as Luxembourg) and, according to Stettinius,

declared that "he would never agree to having any action of any of the Great Powers submitted to the judgement of the small powers."  

This position was semi-officially expounded in an article by "Malinin" (whom diplomats in Moscow considered to be the pseudonym of a Soviet foreign office official) in the August 1944 Zvezda. The League of Nations had failed, the author insisted, for a variety of reasons but perhaps above all because it had been conceived in sin—as one bloc of powers amassed against Soviet Russia. Harmony among the Great Powers was essential for the success of a security organization, Malinin continued, proceeding to outline the position subsequently taken at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco—the need for a strong Security Council with unimpaired Great Power sovereignty and veto power.

It soon became clear that the Soviet Union was not prepared to delegate decisions on any sort of enforcement action to any body in which it did not possess veto power. In practice this reflected the deep-seated Soviet expectation (and fear) of representing a minority position and risking being outvoted. Hence Soviet insistence on the veto must be taken not as rooted in perversity but in a firm and early determination on Moscow's part to make this a sine qua non of Soviet participation. When Andrei Gromyko on September 18, 1944 told Secretary Stettinius that "the Russian position on voting in the Council will never be departed from," Stettinius countered that this might torpedo the United Nations. Gromyko was prepared for this; he was ready to say that no world organization would exist in which the Soviet Union (or any other major power) was denied the right to vote in any dispute, even if it was a participant therein.


Moscow was playing with fire in a peculiar way. Either Gromyko was bluffing—expecting his opposite numbers to yield, as they had on other occasions; or else the Kremlin did not think much of the United Nations and was prepared to do without it. The same "take-it-or-leave-it" approach colored Stalin's November 7, 1944 speech: "The actions of this world organization...will be effective if the Great Powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated." And again at Yalta, recalling Russia's exclusion from the League, Stalin asked for "guarantees that this sort of thing will not happen again."23

(j) It followed that the Soviet Union evinced little interest and faith in the future world organization. Compared with its own direct action to achieve security through territorial expansion, military defeat of present enemies, socio-economic and political transformation of the areas lying in what momentarily was a power vacuum, and economic reconstruction and development—compared to all these the United Nations was at best a second-rate "also-ran" in the Soviet stable of political horses.

Stalin exhibited virtually no interest in the United Nations at the various wartime conferences with the British and Americans. When the Dumbarton Oaks conference left open the question whether procedural matters were subject to Great Power veto in the Security Council, the United States submitted to Stalin a voting formula on December 5, 1944. At Yalta, Secretary James F. Byrnes recalled, "I was deeply disturbed by the clear evidence that Stalin had not considered or even read our proposal...If in those 63 days he had not familiarized himself with the subject, he could not be greatly interested in the United Nations Organization."24

At San Francisco, three months later, Molotov's absence was generally interpreted "as a blunt confession that the Soviet government did not attach much importance to the conference. This was a very serious blasting of the high hopes that the peoples' representatives would actually build at San Francisco the foundation for the permanent structure of world peace." Indeed, Stalin's shift to cooperation in early June only confirms this verdict. After Molotov had proved to be recalcitrant to the point of permitting speculation whether he personally was not prepared to torpedo the new United Nations, Harry Hopkins was dispatched to Moscow to iron out the remaining difficulties in the voting formula. After the bitterness of weeks of debate, it turned out that Stalin was simply unaware of the problem. The United States' record of the Hopkins interview with Stalin and Molotov on June 6 makes it clear "that the Marshal had not understood the issues involved and had not had them explained to him. During this conversation Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought it was an insignificant matter"--and proceeded to yield to the Western view that parties to a dispute, under Chapter VI, must abstain from voting. Even at the subsequent London Preparatory Commission the Soviet delegates played a barely perfunctory part and seemed to attribute little importance to its work.

All this fitted in with Stalin's assessment of power--and the realization that the United Nations as an abstraction had none in measurable terms. It also fitted in with the Soviet preference for bilateralism based on Moscow. Even before the United Nations was established, Moscow had sponsored the Free Germany Committee, the Union of Polish patriots, and other refugee committees; it had concluded an alliance with Czechoslovakia and was negotiating with other exile groups. Its plans for early action--by its own forces and resources, and by local Communists throughout East-Central Europe were well along by 1943. Clearly the overwhelming Soviet emphasis lay outside the framework of any future world organization.

Moscow was rather outspoken, even at the time of the San Francisco conference.

in its preference for direct commitments. The peoples had suffered too much to pin their hopes on the United Nations, it declared; hard-and-fast bilateral treaties were far more tangible warrants of peace. Yet the Soviet Union went along, worked along, and made a variety of concessions in the process of hammering out the United Nations Charter.

On the negative side of the ledger, it preferred—then and later—to join in so as to avoid non-participation which might make the body a hostile camp. Provided with the veto, the Soviet Union was certain that the United Nations could not be used against it. Moreover, the onus of self-exclusion from the organization would have been severe indeed. Beyond this, Moscow in all likelihood considered the United Nations as probably useful in reinforcing the network of direct controls and bilateral agreements which it was rapidly weaving. And it certainly welcomed it as a forum for the dissemination of Soviet opinion. Finally, it may well have viewed the United Nations as the institutional symbol of the recognition of the Soviet Union as one of the Big Three. So long as "Great Power unanimity" was accepted, it had nothing to lose—and perhaps something to gain.

The Soviet Union signed the Charter with a more cynical but more realistic assessment of the United Nations capacities and prospects than many of its fellow-members. Ideological and power-political considerations—and the experience of earlier years—combined to make the United Nations at best an ancillary instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

One may usefully identify three major phases in the development of Moscow's policy toward the United Nations. That policy, which has never been an independent variable but consistently a by-product of more general Soviet strategies, has in its broad features followed the zigzags of declining cooperation, cold war and Korean War, and limited "thaw."

Conflict

Soviet conduct from the end of the Second World War to the blossoming of the "cold war" some three years later reflected a reinfusion of Communist orthodoxy, militancy, and Party control. Outside the Soviet Union these years saw the extension and consolidation of Soviet predominance over Eastern Europe, and failure to secure control over Northern Iran, Manchuria, and the West German economy. The revival of the "two-camp" view of the world in Soviet propaganda implied the expectation of new conflicts with "capitalists." Paradoxically, the unique accretion in Communist power—from "socialism in one country" to the "world system" of ten or more Communist states—took place at a time of domestic weakness due to the ravages of war and at a time of relative international weakness due to the American monopoly of the atomic bomb. Soviet foreign policy was designed to take advantage of the opportunities—primarily the power vacuums created by the defeat of Germany and Japan—without exposing itself to undue risks at a time of reconstruction and reconsolidation.

In 1944 Moscow had told the French Communists not to revolt or to seize power, but in 1947—with the Italian and French Communist parties out of the coalition governments, the Truman Doctrine proclaimed, and the "cold war" exacerbated—the Cominform was established and its leaders privately urged a more militant course on the West European and South Asian parties. The break with Tito and Soviet refusal to accept Marshall Plan aid tended only to deepen the gulf between what was coming to
While Stalin clearly endeavored to drain the maximum benefit from the remaining reservoir of "great power amity," he never seemed to have had any doubt about the basic choice before him. He opted for the extension of Soviet predominance at the expense of "friendship" abroad. Security by territorial accretion (and the concomitant socio-economic transformations that it involved) went hand in hand with the sincere belief in Russia's communizing mission and in ultimate world-wide victory. To Stalin such an orientation was both logical and historically preferable to the cultivation of good will with states which by their economic and political interests were bound to be unreliable friends and, in all likelihood, would sooner or later line up against the Soviet Union.

Important for the shaping of Soviet attitudes toward the United Nations in these formative years, then, is the spirit of suspicion and self-isolation, the reliance on the Soviet Union's own strength rather than on joint international action, and the withdrawal from even the limited give-and-take that had characterized the wartime conferences of the Big Three.

The Soviet attitude after San Francisco was a mixture of hope and skepticism. At a time when both camps tried to maintain the appearances of amity (and many of the issues dividing them had not yet become apparent), Moscow seems to have hoped for a more successful or powerful position for itself in the United Nations. Perhaps the Iranian complaint about Soviet occupation and interference in domestic affairs and the overwhelmingly anti-Soviet sentiment generated in the ensuing debates contributed to a crystallization of Soviet sentiment and strategy. By March 1946 Stalin felt compelled to reassert that (in spite of Soviet defiance and "walk-out") the United Nations was a "serious instrument for the preservation of peace." Yet in fact Moscow had tasted the bitter fruit of leading an apparently static bloc

of five or six delegates (Soviet Union, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) which was invariably outvoted. World opinion seemed to sway with the United Nations majority, impervious to Soviet claims to be defending the organization against hostile onslaughts.

The crux of the problem as it now unfolded was the fact that—unlike the Holy Alliance or League of Nations—the United Nations was established before a new balance of power had been attained. Moscow was striving to devise techniques to reduce the anti-Soviet majority, to clip its wings, so to speak, and accordingly to insist on a strict and literal construction of the United Nations Charter, which it had endorsed and accepted. As more and more areas of friction became visible, Moscow insisted on the careful observance of "great power unanimity" and sovereign rights of all member states as conditions of effective U.N. operation. Only under "certain conditions" was "fruitful cooperation quite possible." Such statements concealed the Soviet view that (as Moscow later averred) an "activization of aggressive forces" took place at the United Nations as early as 1945.

As early as the work of the first session of the Assembly [a Soviet commentary explains] it became clear that two distinct courses were being pursued in the United Nations: the Soviet Union and the democratic countries supporting it in full accord with the Charter strove for the adoption of decisions aimed to strengthen peace and the authority of the United Nations; the ruling circles of the USA on the contrary


3. New Times (Moscow), 1947, no. 1, p. 1. There is some indication that Moscow was not from the outset prepared to laugh off the whole organization, even though Stalin was relatively flexible when the terms of the United Nations had to be settled in terms of greater political issues. Not only the desire for multiple votes (discussed below), but also the demand, for instance, that a Soviet national fill the premier Assistant Secretaryship was an index of seriousness of intentions. Trygve Lie (op. cit., pp. 45-46) relates how he suggested Alexei Roshchin, whom he had known from London, for this position; Andrei Vyshinsky instead proposed Arkady Sobolev, who had attended the Dumbarton Oaks conference and had been political advisor to Marshal Zhukov.
intended to subordinate the United Nations to the aims of their policy, opposing the fulfillment by the United Nations of the tasks intended for it by the Charter, and thereby weakening its authority and significance.

The bipolar world was a reality, and Moscow was determined to "exploit and sharpen" the "contradictions" which it assumed existed within the capitalist fold—conflicts between different "imperialist" powers, such as the United States and United Kingdom, conflicts between colonies and mother countries, and conflicts within any capitalist state.

Such Soviet attempts through the United Nations may be classified in several categories. Some aimed at identifying the Soviet Union with the leadership of "progressive causes." Thus its (and the Polish) delegation led the way in a condemnation of Franco Spain (leading, after a double veto in the Security Council, to the adoption of a somewhat similar resolution in the General Assembly). Likewise, attacks on racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa were calculated to make the Soviet Union the spokesman for "decent" principles.

More widespread and more lasting were Soviet efforts to identify itself with anti-Western, anti-imperialist, or anti-capitalist campaigns. Thus the Ukrainian SSR brought the Indonesian case before the Security Council, lodging a complaint about the British use of Japanese troops and requesting the restoration of peace under UN auspices. Likewise, the Soviet bloc sided with Egypt and the Sudan against Britain, and with Syria, Lebanon, and North Africa against France, in the several cases involving these regions.

All these cases were later described by Moscow as having been supported in defense of national sovereignty. The same rationale was provided for the Soviet stand on the Greek dispute. Rather characteristically, the Soviet delegation found

5. The subsequent Soviet votes against the Indonesian settlement were apparently due to an attempt to embarrass the West by charging that United States and Netherlands interests continued to maintain a "stranglehold" on the Indonesian economy and hence politics. See also J. F. Collins, "United Nations and Indonesia," International Conciliation, vol. 459 (1950).
counter-charges the most effective means of neutralizing hostile allegations. After turning down Soviet charges against Greece and Britain, the Security Council in December 1946 voted to investigate complaints against Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and Albanian interference in the Greek civil war. But while the majority of the investigating commission found the three budding "people's democracies" guilty of assisting the Greek rebels, its Soviet and Polish members found fault with the Greek authorities only (with the Soviet delegate casting five vetoes and refusing to transfer the issue to the General Assembly). Moscow was later to charge that the decisions on the reports of the Balkan Commission as well as those on Korea (at the 2d Session of the Assembly) were "illegal."

It may be well to add that the Soviet stance was not always well thought out or consistent. The priority of attention in Moscow during the early postwar years (also indicative of the Soviet perception of the United Nations as a secondary arena of contest) seems to have involved neglect of certain areas where Soviet interests were less seriously involved. Such a lack of definition is apparent in Soviet foreign policy toward Southeast Asia in 1945-48; and it is reflected at the United Nations, for instance, in the Soviet abstentions (or voting with the majority) in the Kashmir dispute. Moreover, the Soviet opposition to the terms (acceptable to the Djakarta authorities) by which the Indonesian dispute was settled reflected a dogmatic re-evaluation of colonial revolutions in Moscow, which had led to the temporary rejection of "bourgeois nationalism" as treacherous and of independence as fictitious. Doctrinal rigidity—and political consequences stemming from it, such as the round of Communist-led revolts throughout Southeast Asia in 1948—thus made it impossible for the Soviet Union to capitalize to the fullest on the potential political opportunities.

Finally, on certain issues Moscow's stand wavered. Thus, with regard to Palestine the Soviet Union was consistent only so far as its anti-British objectives were concerned, otherwise joining the United States in supporting the UNSCOP

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partition plan but striving to avoid alienating the Arab world. 7

Everything considered, Soviet propaganda efforts—in the broadest political sense—were not utter successes. On various key issues, from the Greek Civil War to the Berlin blockade, the onus of public opinion—in and out of the United Nations—was on the Soviet Union and its dependencies. In general the Soviet attitude in the United Nations tended to be a product of the shifting parallelogram of forces outside the United Nations. The Soviet position was complicated by the fact that on certain issues Moscow stood for the status quo while on others it opposed it. Actually, as Professor Triska has pointed out, the formula behind Soviet policy was relatively obvious. Where its own interests and position tended to benefit from change—as in Iran, Greece, Berlin, or China—Moscow (in and out of the United Nations) favored change. It also favored change where the effect of change was a setback for the capitalist West (Indonesia, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Italian colonies, Egypt, North Africa). When the Soviet Union or one of its allies was accused or attacked (Corfu, Korea, eit of Soviet wives), on the other hand, it rallied to the defense of sovereignty and the status quo (which, Moscow was ready to claim, were screens for abuse in the case of Spain or South Africa). 8

By 1948 the situation in the United Nations substantially mirrored the general drift toward world tension and "cold war."

Crisis

The attention paid by the Soviet Union to the possibility of withdrawing from membership in the United Nations has been markedly greater than that of other powers. Indeed it has been the only member repeatedly to stress the legality of leaving. At San Francisco it was Gromyko who insisted on an explicit interpretation of membership in this sense.

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"In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, one cannot condemn beforehand the motives which may compel a State to use its right
to leave the Organization. This right is the expression of State sovereignty..."  
Since the Soviet Union was clearly not eager to prepare a face-saving exit for one of its potential enemies, this statement is of considerable interest in confirming the hypothesis that, as early as San Francisco, Moscow anticipated international crises which might oblige the Soviet Union to pull out.

Such statements—as will be shown—were to be repeated in the following years. Particularly during the period of most complete deterioration of Soviet-United Nations relationships, 1949-53, did the Soviet Union seem on several occasions to be on the verge of pulling out. What was the purpose behind such statements? They could have been intended to stress the voluntary and dissoluble nature of the United Nations, to underscore the imperfections of its operations, which might force some members to abandon it, to prepare "public opinion" for such a departure, or to warn the United Nations' majority to mend its ways. Finally, one may speculate whether a muted dialogue was not being conducted within Soviet ranks between advocates of continued Soviet operation in the United Nations, frustrating though it might be, and spokesmen of the "left" intransigent wing of the Party (temporarily victorious in 1947-48), favoring a go-it-alone policy, much in the nature of the Sixth Comintern Congress program of 1928 and now momentarily represented by Andrei Zhdanov, Marshal Tito, and others. There are enough suggestions of such a debate behind the scene and some firm evidence of a left-right split at this time over other issues in international Communism to support such an hypothesis. Moreover, such a division would be entirely consistent with the traditional split in Communist ranks between purists and realists, ultra-leftist "self-isolationsists" and moderate united-fronters.

In early 1949 the official attitude, according to a prepared statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on January 29, 1949, was still one of continued participation:

Every one sees that the United Nations Organization is being undermined, since this organization at least to a certain extent hampers and curbs the aggressive circles in their policy of aggression and unleashing a new war. In view of this situation the Soviet Union has to struggle with even more firmness and persistence against the undermining and destruction of the United Nations Organization by aggressive elements and their accomplices, and must see to it that the United Nations Organization does not connive with such elements as is often the case now.

Yet in fact the Soviet Union and the increasingly sovietized satellites began to disengage themselves from United Nations activities, particularly of course during the period of voluntary Soviet absence between January and August 1950 over the question of seating a Chinese representative. During the subsequent years of the Korean war Soviet participation continued often to be more token than real. More and more the Soviet image was one of the United Nations doomed, reduced either to futility or to an enemy tool.

One analyst who examined the record of Soviet propaganda in this period concludes:

Probably the strongest and most persistent theme of Soviet propaganda was that the Western powers, led by the United States, wish to undermine the United Nations. This argument emerged as soon as the conflict between East and West broke into the open. It increased in sharpness and bitterness as the political situation deteriorated; since 1949, it took frequently the form of accusations that the West actually wanted to destroy the United Nations. Towards the end of our period [1951], indications were given in Soviet propaganda that the United Nations, despite all Soviet efforts to save it, was in fact already doomed and in the process of disintegration because of machinations of the imperialists.

Indeed, the legality of leaving was stressed even after the crisis had passed. Thus the summary article on the United Nations appearing in the revised edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (signed February 1955) singled out the members' right to withdraw from the Organization—a right, though not explicitly in the

Charter, confirmed by a special committee resolution adopted at San Francisco. 11

In actual practice, Poland and Czechoslovakia withdrew from UNESCO. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania as non-members refused to discuss charges, levelled in the General Assembly, of having violated human rights guaranteed in the peace treaties signed by them. (Bulgaria and Albania, though non-members, had in the preceding period willingly testified before the United Nations.) Non-participation was equally striking in commercial affairs. "What constructive work was done by the United Nations concerning international trade was the result of cooperation solely among the non-Soviet states. Soviet abstention from these activities was complete." 12

Finally, the Communist German Democratic Republic in 1952 refused access to the UN ad hoc commission to investigate conditions precedent to all German free elections—as North Korea had earlier and Hungary was to do four years later in the case of other UN commissions.

In 1949 the Soviet Union began to invoke an additional argument that strained the ties still further. In the face of U.S. efforts to cement military alliances in the non-Soviet world, Moscow proclaimed the incompatibility of membership in the United Nations—by definition, "peace-loving"—with participation in "aggressive" blocs like European Defense Community or North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Vyshinsky, ostensibly defending the Charter, declared:

The principles and aims of the United Nations require no explanation on our part—they are clearly stated in the Charter signed in San Francisco in June 1945. But it is enough to compare these goals and tasks of the United Nations as expressed in the Charter, with the activity of the Atlantic bloc...to convince oneself of the utter incompatibility of participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc with membership in

the United Nations. 13

One may surmise, however, that the purpose of this double-edged sword was to wreck NATO and its analogs, not to destroy the United Nations. For, after all is said and done, the Soviet Union remained in the United Nations even when the latter was waging war on its allies, stooges, and friends.

Once again the effect of changes wrought in the operation of the United Nations was to weaken the ability of the Soviet bloc to throw obstacles in the path of the non-Communist majority—and once again Moscow resisted all such changes, sticking to the letter of the Charter. This was true of the "Uniting-for-Peace" resolution, which permitted the majority to by-pass the veto-bound Security Council, the extension of Secretary-General Lie's term of office, over Soviet opposition, and various proposals to circumscribe or eliminate the requirements of "great power unanimity." 14

The Soviet "walk-out" of January 1950 over the Chinese question thus came in an atmosphere already heavily laden with charges and counter-charges. For over a year, the Soviet Union and its friends had prepared alternatives to the United Nations—a narrow and rigid one in the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) uniting nine national parties; and a far more effective, appealing, and diffuse one in the World Peace Council and the World Congress of Partisans of Peace, explicitly played up as an alternative to the United Nations. Coinciding with the ambitious "peace pact" and various disarmament proposals submitted to the Fourth session of the General Assembly (and the simultaneous Soviet announcement that the Soviet Union had mastered the secrets of the atom), the many-faceted "peace" campaign was


intended as a mass movement with literally "hundreds of millions" of endorsements, countering the "rank and file" of the world there represented against the majority of United Nations delegations speaking for no one but narrow "ruling circles."\(^\text{15}\)

Soviet reasoning behind the absence of its delegates from the Security Council when the Korean conflict broke out on June 25, 1950 has been amply debated—without definitive solution. Whatever the original Soviet intent—a face-saving device for disengagement from UN activities, or dramatic support for Communist China, or an attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Soviet Union could not be ignored with impunity—by May 1950 the Chinese membership question seemed well on its way toward a solution. But in all likelihood this had not been the central stimulus for the Soviet walkout. Trygve Lie, who saw Stalin in mid-May, relates how in all their talks "Stalin had not uttered a word" on the seating of Communist China. And to Lie's efforts to impress on Stalin the value of the United Nations Stalin "said little in answer. Recalling that the Soviet Union had been one of the founders of the United Nations, he remarked, "We will try to do everything we can to work along a course determined by our own and the world's best interests."\(^\text{16}\) In Stalin's terms, this was a statement typically cautious and leaving open the possibility of a Soviet break.

It is probably safe to say that Moscow had anticipated neither the protracted warfare that resulted from the North Korean invasion of the south nor the "intervention" of the United Nations. The same sedulously cultivated optimism—faith in history and time as allies of Communism and the Soviet Union—which had led Stalin into other blunders was apparent once again. It was compounded by Stalin's scorn for the small and weak—as with Finland in 1939—and his faith in the efficacy of demonstrations of force—as in the case of Tito. The same view of "power" on the

world scene as the corporeal product of material resources, manpower, and organization led him to continue to view the United Nations as nothing significant to reckon with.

It seems most plausible to surmise that this basic failure to take the United Nations seriously as an obstacle on the road to aggression combined with a failure of coordination at the highest Soviet decision-making levels—i.e., between the organs responsible for broad policy in Korea and Soviet strategy at the United Nations—to keep the Soviet delegates away from the United Nations when the emergency session was convened on June 25, 1950.17 If this is so, Soviet failure—in the form of UN action in Korea was to a large extent home-made: Stalin was the victim of his own concept of power. It did Moscow little good thereafter to insist that the Security Council action was "illegal" because two of its five members (the Soviet Union and, in the Soviet reading, Communist China) were not present. On July 27 Yakov Malik informed Trygve Lie that, in accordance with the monthly rotation of the Security Council presidency, he would assume the chair on August 1. On that date the Soviet delegation returned.

Stalin was obviously aware of the setback the UN action constituted—and also the further defeat represented by the General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951, branding the Chinese Communists as aggressors. He felt called upon to retort bitterly that the United Nations had become "an instrument of aggressive war," having "ceased to be an international organization of nations enjoying equal rights. The United Nations is now not so much a world organization as an organization for the Americans, an organization acting on behalf of the requirements of the American aggressors." He concluded with another threat: "The United Nations Organization

17. An alternative but not necessarily conflicting interpretation would be a conscious Soviet decision not to tip its hand by having the Soviet delegation return prior to the Korean operation. At any rate, Moscow clearly expected to have the latter completed before long. One writer claims to know that there were indications that various Soviet delegates to UN organs expected to return by September 1950. (William R. Kintner, "The Soviet Union's Use of the UN", p. 24.) See also Leland Goodrich, Korea (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956).
is therefore taking the inglorious road of the League of Nations. In this way it is burying its moral prestige and dooming itself
Indeed, Soviet press comment in the following weeks spoke with unprecedented bluntness in "either-or" terms of the United Nations. And still the Soviet Union did not pull out. In addition to suggesting a measure of caution and calculation that belies the image of Soviet action as entirely irrational in these last, erratic years of Joseph Stalin, the decision (like the decision for the Soviet Union not to become directly involved in the Korean fighting) was based, no doubt, on an assessment of what it stood to gain and lose from leaving the United Nations. Everything considered, it lost nothing from membership; certainly the presence on East River imposed no inhibitions on Soviet officialdom and policy-makers. By staying in, the Soviet Union was not cutting itself off from the rest of the world—not only from the "imperialist" foe, that is, but also from the customarily uncommitted, whom it sought to woo. By staying in, it kept an opportunity to discuss, negotiate, and feel out—and the February 1949 Makik-Jessup talks that had paved the way to ending the Berlin Blockade impasse suggested the mutual utility of such opportunities. By staying in, the Soviet Union kept a well-attended, well-publicized forum to air its views—which, after all, had been one of the virtues of membership as Moscow conceived it. Lastly, by staying in the Soviet Union avoided the stigma of having slammed a door which at some future date it might wish to reopen.

Thus the Soviet Union managed to have its cake and eat it too. But, if its strategy was astute, it also involved the Soviet Union in costly adventure. Above all, it permitted the uniting of the non-Communist world around the United Nations. By 1951 the Soviet bloc was virtually an outcast—an enemy anomalously unnamed and continuing to sit amidst those who voted for the military and political operations they were jointly waging against the Soviet Union's dependents and allies.

"Coexistence."

The ups and downs in the Soviet view of--and position at--the United Nations have been predominantly a function of other policy decisions. Just as the Korean war was not planned (or even thought through) in terms of the United Nations, so the improvement and relaxation that ensued touched the United Nations by indirection. But the new and peculiar music emanating from Moscow was to find its echoes on the East River, too.

One can point to various causes and stimuli to explain the "turning point" in Soviet conduct which we are about to discuss. There were some harbingers prior to Stalin's death--the appeal to colonial and national movements at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in October 1952; the international economic conference in Moscow; and in January 1953 Soviet agreement (after years of refusal) to join in trade consultations with the Economic Council for Europe, as suggested by Gunnar Myrdal. There is more evidence that Stalin's death, on March 5, 1953, freed the hands and minds of his would-be successors and permitted them to chart and rethink the course of Soviet policy so as to extract the Soviet orbit from the sterilities, obsolescence, and idiosyncracies of the Stalin era without sacrificing the power position abroad. And finally, one can point to the spring and summer of 1955 as the beginnings of the "Khrushchev era." Whatever the balance of these contributing factors, they had their impact on the Soviet Union at the United Nations.

The total change is indeed remarkable if one compares Soviet stature and behavior as of 1957 with the ostracism of 1952. As late as 1956 as realistic an observer as Hans J. Morgenthau could write that "in its relations with the Soviet bloc the new United Nations is a grand alliance opposing another grand alliance." In its

19. Ray L. Thurston, of the Department of State, has stated that "even before Stalin's death, vitriolic criticism of American racial policies had been toned down in Soviet discussions in the United Nations. It has been noted that a change of Soviet personnel has occurred; there is more geniality." (C. Grove Haines, ed., The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954, pp. 118-19.)

new phase Soviet policy has striven to demonstrate, assert, and reaffirm its affinity for the United Nations in various ways.

The first opportunity (along with the election of a new Secretary-General) was, naturally enough, the termination of the Korean war. The protracted negotiations that had left the prisoner-of-war question unresolved led, a month after Stalin's death, to the acceptance of the Indian compromise formula and on June 27 to cessation of hostilities. Almost simultaneously—and apparently constituting an elaboration of economic feelers begun during preceding months—the Soviet Union for the first time contributed to and joined the work of the UN Technical Assistance Program. 21

Yet the real "thaw" was yet to come. After an outwardly quiescent 1954 (concealing a bitter fight behind the Kremlin facade, as we now know), Nikita Khrushchev (with Nikolai Bulganin as his temporary frontman) replaced Georgii Malenkov and promptly embarked on a series of hasty moves at home and abroad to achieve a measure of relaxation without shattering the totalitarian controls. After hesitant overtures in 1954, May 1955 saw the resumption of serious talks on disarmament and nuclear controls for the first time in some seven years. The timing so closely coincided with the establishment of Soviet diplomatic relations with West Germany and Japan, the signing of the Austrian peace treaty, and the improvement of Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and Finland that it seems clear that the proposal was part of an ambitious and systematic strategy. One may suggest that sometime in early spring of 1955 a series of policy decisions was adopted in Moscow, including the necessity of capitalizing on the United Nations. 21 It is known from


* The Soviet Union joined UNESCO on April 21, 1955. Perhaps the move is an indication of a policy decision preceding it by some days or weeks.
other sources that at the July 1955 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU Khrushchev recapitulated the new strategy—in substance, a determination to wage "peaceful coexistence," i.e., avoiding war, holding the line in Europe, but taking maximum advantage of the underdeveloped areas, which were now bracketed with the Soviet orbit as a new "zone of peace." It is in this light that the present writer sees the Soviet endeavor, since 1955, to transform the United Nations, in the long run, into a serviceable instrument of the "socialist camp."22

Suddenly the tone of Soviet commentary on the United Nations changed. As late as February 1955 Moscow argued not only that the United Nations was born in the feud of two conflicting conceptions—that of the Soviet Union (peaceful) and that of the West (imperialist)—but also that the United States had tried to make the United Nations a tool of aggression against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. "Full responsibility" for the "illegal" UN actions remained squarely with the United States and its allies.23 Yet a few months later Moscow could argue (through the mouths of two prominent international lawyers) that the United Nations had been based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Without fully ignoring the negative features in its work (as Moscow saw them), a collection of documents on the United Nations—itself a new departure in Russia—emphasized the "positive facets" of its work.24

The 10th Session of the General Assembly in 1955 was the object of unusually favorable Soviet press comment. Moscow hailed the end of American "push-button majorities," the admission of sixteen new members as a reflection of "positive" Soviet policy, and the increasingly successful Soviet leadership of "peace forces"

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23. BoJ'shaia, op. cit., XXXI, 144, 146.

in the world. 25

It is true that the Hungarian crisis—and the severe setback it involved for the Soviet Union at the United Nations—temporarily put in question this increasingly enthusiastic motif. But it was balanced, after all, by the Suez action, so that the score was evened and Moscow could comment that "Time will show whether the United Nations will muster the strength to accomplish the tasks entrusted to it by mankind." 26 Within a few months the Hungarian experience receded into the background, and the Soviet press resumed its attempts to make Moscow the main champion and defender of the United Nations and the principles it stands for.

Perhaps for the first time since the creation of the UN, Soviet policy at the highest level explicitly, and not by indirection, aimed at exploiting the new potential—much in the fashion of earlier attempts to permeate "front organizations." On March 22, 1956, a meeting in Moscow decided to establish a United Nations Association in the Soviet Union—an unmistakable index of the new Soviet "line." In September of that year the World Federation of United Nations Associations accepted the Soviet Union as a member and placed the chairman of the Soviet group, historian Anna Pankratova (a loyal Party veteran), on its Executive. 27 By July 1957 Professor Eugene Korovin, a leading Soviet specialist on international relations and international law, could deliver a talk pushing the new "line" even further. He claimed that the Soviet Union "had priority" among the great powers in establishing the United Nations, that the Soviet Union had initiated both the Moscow Conference of 1943 and the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944, and that the Soviet Union had introduced a number of specific elements in the UN Charter which had determined its spirit (though the examples cited hardly provided a convincing

27. See International Affairs (Moscow), 1956, no. 5, pp. 157-60; and no. 10, p. 179.
The constant growth of Soviet economic and defensive might, of the moral authority of the USSR, the merger of the entire socialist camp on the basis of proletarian internationalism and its growing strength, the support of its international policy by the partisans of peace throughout the world vividly testify to the fact that the realization of the democratic principles of the UN Charter becomes increasingly the unanimous demand of all peace-loving humanity. 

Here was a characteristic formulation, indicative—for all its verbiage—of the new Soviet self-image, its "position of strength," and its attempts to identify itself with and lead the proponents of peace and the "democratic principles" of the United Nations. For better or for worse, the changed perception of Soviet opportunities was not without basis in fact.

National Sovereignty

The Soviet notion of sovereignty has undergone drastic reconsideration in the years since the Russian Revolution. Initially it was considered part of the bourgeois paraphernalia that had no room in a world where "the proletariat has no fatherland." But the beginnings of an espousal of sovereignty are apparent as early as 1917 in Lenin's shift from "defeatism" to "defensism" the day after seizing power and in the persistent protest against foreign intervention in Russia in 1918-1919. As the Soviet state became stronger, it could insist more and more firmly and vociferously that it would tolerate no infringement of its national sovereignty--or, for that matter, of that of other victims of the imperialist West.

To be sure, the Soviet leaders reserved to themselves the right to impinge, through the medium of the Communist International, on what other states might consider their sovereign rights. Moreover, as leading theorists of law (such as Kozhevenikov and Korovin) asserted down to at least 1930, the slogan of the international working class was not national sovereignty but proletarian dictatorship. And, perhaps most important, the concept of sovereign rights turned out to be as manipulative and political in application as other concepts in Soviet (domestic as well as international) law. On occasion Moscow has condemned the recourse to sovereign prerogatives by others who attempted to shirk international obligations. Thus Litvinov in 1936 attacked those who sought to evade enforcement of League of Nations sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian war. And after World War II the Soviet Union assailed references to domestic jurisdiction when invoked by Spain and the Union of South Africa.

The political and practical aspects are readily apparent also in Soviet ratification of the UN Genocide Convention (March 1954), and the coincident warning that the proposed draft covenant on human rights was intended to give the occupation...
powers "a doctrinal basis for the policy of interference in the domestic matters of other states." 1

The Soviet position thus has and its rational and irrational components. Among the latter one might count Stalin's extreme fear of foreign infiltration, his suspicion of "agents," and his obsession with purges. Even in the experience of UNRRA, which was an early experiment in international organization clearly intended to benefit the Soviet Union, Soviet insistence on going it alone was apparent. After the war Professor Korovin implied that attempts to limit or subvert the plenitude of national sovereignty were a legal expression of the American policy of "liberation" for Eastern Europe. 2

More rational is the argument—never articulated by Soviet spokesmen—that a totalitarian state demands the undivided loyalty of its citizens and can brook no competitive foci of authority; and that it cannot afford free access to installations (be they missile bases or forced labor camps) which are not normally publicized or open to non-Soviet eyes. The Soviet insistence on sovereignty in opposing effective inspection and control schemes with regard to conventional or nuclear disarmament is of course intimately related to this point. Likewise related is Soviet refusal to accept the argument (made by Philip C. Jessup and others) that individuals be recognized as subjects of international law. Once again, the effect would be to reduce the monopoly of Soviet political controls over its citizens. 3

The conservatism and literalism of the Soviet position on international law have,


When in the International Law Commission of the UN the British submitted a formula to the effect that diplomats enjoy "complete freedom of movement" in the country of their stay, the Soviet Union objected, invoking security reasons against its adoption. (International Affairs (Moscow), 1957, no. 12, p. 19.

3. See also John N. Hazard, Law and Social Change in the USSR, p. 299; and Lewis, op. cit., p. 68.
as noted earlier, traditionally resulted in considering formal treaty provisions as
the major source of international order. It is true that after World War II a
quiet debate was waged in Soviet international law circles about the acceptance
of certain UN decisions as sources of law (e.g., Krylov in 1947). V. I. Lisovsky
even went so far, in a text published in 1955, as to argue that decisions of inter-
national organizations were obligatory for non-members. But Durdenevsky and other
stalwarts promptly protested that such a view would be tantamount to a limitation
of national sovereignty. 4

In this sector at least practice has customarily determined the line of theory;
and practice has required "national sovereignty" to be the cornerstone of the
Soviet version of international law. In the name of sovereignty as a shield of
self-interest, the Soviet Union was unwilling, at least until 1955, to give eco-
nomic and statistical information to the United Nations. It has also striven
propagandistically to exploit the "sovereignty" theme with the Soviet Union posing
as defender of national sovereignty of all peoples. 5 Reference to "sovereignty"
has even had some self-defeating consequences, as exemplified in Soviet opposition
to all ECCSCC work on crime, training in public administration, double taxation,
and passport regulations as ultra vires. 6

The fundamental reason for the tenacious Soviet insistence on "sovereignty"
has thus been a desire to maintain maximum freedom of action and keep outside
interference in Soviet affairs to a minimum. This basically conservative doc-
trine springs logically from a sense of inferiority. Given the bipolar view of
world (and UN) affairs, any abolition or restriction of sovereignty (just as any
Charter revisions or amendment of the veto power) was bound to benefit the

4. See Jan F. Triska and Robert H. Slusser, "Treaties and Other Sources of Order
in International Relations: The Soviet View," _American Journal of International

5. A chapter in Samarsky, _op. cit._, is entitled "The Struggle of the Soviet Union
in the United Nations in Defense of the Sovereignty and Independence of Peoples."

6. See, for instance, Harold Karan Jacobson, "The Soviet Union and the Economic and
Social Activities of the United Nations," Doctoral Dissertation, Yale University,
bloc. One may speculate that a Soviet Union in command of a working majority in the United Nations might choose to abandon the traditional rigidity and be prepared to jettison "sovereignty" for the sake of greater political benefit.

It follows that the Soviet Union, rejecting the Western one-world romanticism of yore, opposes the quest for world law and compulsory international courts. Theoretically and practically, the Soviet Union can see no grounds for delegating or abdicating its authority to a body over which it has no significant measure of control for purposes of arbitration of compulsory jurisdiction. Hence the practical Soviet view that the "prospects of the International Court of Justice contributing to the peaceful regulation of international relations are extremely meager." 7

In line with the change of political "line" toward UN organs, the present attitude toward the Court is not quite so negative. Yet, while granting that the Court has served the cause of international legality and coexistence, Justice Krylov's final assessment (1958) was that "a number of decisions and opinions of the Court are unsatisfactory." Its majority "pursued a discriminatory policy" toward the East European states and in a variety of cases "assumed the position of the position of the colonialists" or "defended the interests of the imperialist powers." 7a

Indeed, says the recent Soviet Juridical Dictionary, "since the representatives of imperialist states make up the majority of the International Court, the large capitalist countries can almost always count on a decision of the International Court corresponding to their interests." 7b


7a. S. B. Krylov, Mezhdunarodnyi sud Organizatsii Ob'edinnennykh Natsii (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1958), pp. 4, 163-64.

Equally consistent has been Soviet rejection of "world federalism" and other attempts to promote world government or even regional federations outside the Soviet Union. Moscow has opposed coalitions of anti- and non-Soviet powers as apt to weaken the relative position of the Soviet Union and it has opposed federations of Soviet with non-Soviet states as naively impossible. After all, the Soviet formula of competitive—if peaceful—coexistence rejects all fusion of the two systems and subordination of both blocs to a common higher authority.

8. "It is scarcely possible that the contemporary gravediggers of sovereignty are so naive as to believe in earnest that peace and harmony on earth can be assured by creating an international parliament." (Bolsheviki (Moscow), 1916, no. 22, p. 51.)

9. See Eliot R. Goodman, The Soviet Union and the World State (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming, 1960). This opposition has extended both to hostile states (such as the cordon sanitaire before World War II) and to other members of the "socialist camp" (such as the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation schemes of 1947–48). See also O. E. Polents, Teoria vsemirnogo gosudarstva kak orudie amerikanskogo imperializma (Moscow, 1950).
Sovereignty—and Soviet security considerations, in the unique Soviet sense—likewise explain Moscow's failure to agree to a United Nations armed force or police force system, as envisaged by Article 43 of the Charter. And, without reviewing the intricacies of the arguments relating to other proposals for creating UN observer corps, peace observation commissions, etc., suffice it to say that the Soviet Union has consistently argued—whatever the political motives of its stand—that permanent United Nations forces must be stationed on the territory of the contributing states; to do otherwise would be to violate national sovereignty. 10

When in November 1956 the General Assembly, in special session, established a UN Emergency Force, the Soviet Union abstained, "considering that the General Assembly [must get the United Kingdom, France, and Israel to cease fighting] before occupying itself with details on the future mechanics of observation..." It likewise abstained from endorsing the principle of a UNEF, Moscow said, because under Chapter VII of the Charter such forces must be created by the Security Council, not the General Assembly. 11 It has refused to pay its assessed share of the UNEF budget on the grounds that its establishment was "unlawful."

President Eisenhower's advocacy to the Special UN Assembly Session on the Middle East in 1957 of a permanent United Nations force, along the lines of UNEF, evoked bitter comment from Russia. The demand for such a force was described as an "old U.S. trick." Moscow explained that it would be in violation of the Charter to let the Secretary-General run a police force (even though Mr. Hammerskjold was prepared to do so) since what the Charter called for was an international force under the Security Council. 12 Needless to say, the insistence on the Security Council stemmed from the fact that its permanent members disposed of the veto.

10. See, for instance, Fuller, op. cit., p. 147; Levin, op. cit., p. 167; and Walter Meder, "Die Stellung der Sowjetunion zur UNO," Jahrbuch für internationales und ausländisches öffentliches Recht (Hamburg), 1949, p. 764.
power—that most effective of all expressions of national sovereignty within the framework of the United Nations.

The extreme caution displayed by the Secretary-General and the other powers on this issue since the fall of 1958 in the face of known Soviet opposition is itself a measure of the political power of the Soviet bloc in the United Nations.

The Veto

According to a Soviet monograph specially devoted to this question, the "principle of great power unanimity" is the "cornerstone" of the UN edifice. The stubborn and unflinching insistence on the veto power, as it has come to be known, is a highly practical matter for the Soviet Union. A Soviet textbook on international affairs calls it a "most important" victory to have the principle inserted in the UN Charter: "It offers the possibility not to tolerate the adoption by the Anglo-American bloc of decisions directed against peace and security, against the interests and rights of peace-loving peoples." 14

The Soviet Union has viewed the veto as the padlock on the door of the United Nations. It was seen originally as a device to prevent action against itself or its allies; and it has been available to the Soviet delegate on the Security Council as a means of frustrating any significant move differing from Soviet policy. There has been nothing mysterious or malicious in its use. Moscow has availed itself of the veto not so much in order to wreck the United Nations as to compensate for the Soviet minority position. Indeed, it has explained its need precisely in terms of the "other" powers' numerical superiority—a sort of political stilts to enable it to be on a level with its rivals. "The veto..." Andrei Vyshinsky once declared, "is a means of self-defense."

There is an element of logic in the Soviet contention that the proper resolution

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of international disputes cannot be achieved by accidental arithmetic constellations.

"Arithmetic is arithmetic. But notarithmetic can solve questions," such as war and peace. Vyshinsky explained.  

In a revealing speech that bears reflection in terms of future possibilities, Vyshinsky told the *ad hoc* Political Committee on November 24, 1948:

> The veto is a powerful political tool. There are no such simpletons here as would let it drop. Perhaps we use it more than others, but that is because we are in the minority and the veto balances power. If we were in the majority we could make such grandiloquent gestures as offering to waive the veto on this or that. 

Soviet practice has followed accordingly. It will be recalled that the Soviet Union insisted initially on the inclusion of procedural questions under the scope of the veto (and has used the so-called "double veto" to prevent issues from being considered procedural). In fact, the veto (which the Soviet Union has been almost--but by no means completely--alone among the Great Powers to wield) has often been applied to trivial matters. More than half the vetoes were cast to turn down new members (later admitted under the legally dubious "package deal"). Other vetoes canceled a condemnation of Albania in the Corfu Channel dispute; prevented an investigation of Soviet bacteriological warfare charges in Korea, of the Czechoslovak change of government in 1948, and of the violation of Manchurian air space in 1950; and stalled the election of a new Secretary-General of the United Nations.

> There is little doubt that Moscow views the veto power as a *sine qua non* of participation in the organization.  

In this light, the widespread debate on the ways of correcting either the abuse of its exercise or the extent of its applicability seems futile at best. The veto controversy was a consequence of Great

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17. "He who raises his hand against the principle of unanimity...raises it against the very existence of the United Nations...The abolition of the principle of unanimity...would in practice mean the liquidation of the UN" (New Times (Moscow), 1948, No. 42, p. 5). Renouncing the veto "would mean in fact renouncing the chief task of the Organization. The crude guillotine of [majority] voting...would be a real threat to the principle of sovereignty." (I.D. Levin, "Problema suvereniteta v ustave OON," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1947, No. 1, p. 18.)
Power disagreement—not its cause—and was intended, at least by the Soviet Union, precisely for such a contingency.

There is an ambiguity—or inherent contradiction—in the Soviet stand on Great Power prerogatives at the same time as Moscow champions the equality of nations. The problem can be traced back to the conflict between egalitarian and elitist strains in Communist thinking. Moscow has often defended "equality" on the international, as on an intra-national, level. Stalin in his interview with Eddie Gilmore in 1946 stated that the strength of the United Nations "lies in the fact that it is based on the principle of equality of states and not on the principle of the domination of some over others." More recently Soviet propaganda has stressed the fact that the UN Charter is based on "principles of sovereign equality and self-determination of peoples..." ¹⁸

At the same time, the Soviet leaders have been full of scorn for the small, the weak, and the backward. Stalin once warned the powers not to deal with Russia "as if it were Central Africa." At Yalta, Stettinius recorded, Stalin made fun of little Albania; and in the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco his delegates made clear that there was and could be in fact no equality of great and small states, and that some problems must remain the prerogative of the senior members of the family of nations. A Soviet writer in 1951¹⁹ maintained that the one-state, one-vote formula was absurd anyway; for what reason was there for the Soviet Union and India to have just one vote each, as did the Dominican Republic? In February 1959 the Soviet envoy to Tehran rebuked the Iranian authorities for dealing with the Soviet Union "as if it were Luxembourg."

Russian Communists have a long experience in opposing "formal majorities." Here again the Soviet view of the world scene seems to correspond substantially

¹⁸. E.g., Durdenevsky and Krylov, op. cit., p. 3.
to the domestic view. "Democratic centralism" recognizes the equality of all members but leaves prerogatives of decision-making to a small central body—in this instance, the Permanent Members of the Security Council. 20

In fact, Moscow readily grants, sovereign states are "of course" unequal, and one cannot expect the Soviet Union to abide by the same limitations and majority decisions as does Luxembourg. 21 Hence the veto power is here to stay—so long as the Soviet bloc is not in clear control. The unmistakable implication is the Soviet determination to adhere to United Nations decisions on a selective, pick-and-choose basis in the absence of any effective enforcement machinery. Such an approach is fully in harmony with the eclectic Soviet view of international law.

Organization and Charter Revision

The prevalent Soviet policy has been to press for and defend a stronger Security Council as a kind of super-power executive organ, and to limit the General Assembly to a minimum of (largely consultative) power. This was the Soviet position before and at San Francisco, and this it remained for the following years. Fully consistent with the basic Soviet approach, it was also responsible in some considerable measure for the failure of the Security Council to do the job for which it was intended—in the view of some, the most striking failure of the United Nations. 22 It is well to bear in mind, of course, that the United Nations was not set up to act against any of the great powers; and to that extent Soviet insistence on Great Power accord was in keeping with the original assumptions. Yet in fact the necessity of trying to cope with issues which the Security Council could not or would not deal with (largely because of the veto) has resulted in a dramatic shift from the Council to the General Assembly—particularly as a cond-

sequence of the "Uniting-for-Peace" resolution.23

By and large, the Soviet Union has bitterly deplored this trend. So long as it is in the minority, a shift from the Council to the Assembly tends to weaken its ability to obstruct the hostile majority. In November 1956 it abstained on the Assembly's resolution approving of the UNEF because it considered the Council the proper agent for its creation (or so it claimed).

On other occasions, however, it has been prepared to throw items into the Assembly--when the Security Council would not act the way Moscow wanted (e.g., because of the French and British vetoes on the Suez issue) or when "mass" sentiment among the smaller powers or particular blocs represented in the Assembly (particularly, the Afro-Asian bloc) was likely to assure passage of resolutions in accord with Soviet desires (Spain, Suez, Lebanon). Especially in recent years, as the Soviet bloc has no longer found itself mechanically outvoted on practically all occasions, as formerly, it has been more attuned to the opportunities of the General Assembly, a new departure to which we shall have occasion to return.24

The Soviet bloc has stubbornly opposed all efforts to alter the United Nations


24. Equally opportunistic has been the shift in Soviet position on the powers of the Secretary-General. Here personalities have also played their part. Moscow considered Trygve Lie basically hostile to the Soviet camp and, after UN action in Korea began, labeled him an "accessory to the American aggressors." The Soviet bloc opposed the extension of his term of office and throughout his "extended term" refused to deal with him, corresponding with his office but not with him personally. (See Lie, op. cit., pp. 20, 320-21, 369, 370, 408.) On the other hand, Soviet consent to the election of Dag Hammarskjöld was one of the first tokens of the post-Stalin "thaw" at the UN. By 1956 the USSR backed the Secretary-General's initiative in the Palestine question. In 1958 Khrushchev included him among the persons invited to a summit conference over the Middle Eastern crisis (which never met). And in 1959 Moscow was prepared to deal with him in an informal capacity of intermediary in conjunction with the new Berlin crisis. As for the prerogatives of the Secretary-General, Moscow is keeping an open mind. "It is not clear whether he has made the necessary efforts to overcome the resistance of those who... have no intention of carrying out" the General Assembly resolutions. (International Affairs, 1958, no. 10, p. 38.) The test, in other words, is the extent to which Mr. Hammarskjöld emancipates or dissociates himself from the Western position.
Charter. It has assumed, with good reason, that any change aiming at greater "effectiveness" of a body dominated by forces hostile to it was bound to result in changes detrimental to its own interests. Hence the Soviet Union, true to its conservative strategy, has made itself the guardian of the Charter. From 1947 on, when Australia and Argentina proposed a conference to revise the Charter, the Soviet delegation has assumed a position of uncompromising hostility. It has reiterated time and again that "the Charter does not need revision"; and that the advocates of revision were agents promoting American plans to abolish the veto so as to "use the United Nations for its own purposes." In 1955 the Soviet Union refused to participate in discussions on organizational reform; the Soviet bloc abstained from voting for a general conference to revise the Charter, and it was largely in deference to the Soviet position that the committee appointed to study the advisability of revision decided to delay its recommendations until at least 1959.25

A volume published in 1957 under the sponsorship of the Academy of Sciences of Czechoslovakia found acclaim in Moscow.26 It stressed the fact that the veto power (which has been the major target of revisionist efforts) was not a voting device but a fundamental United Nations concept. The Charter could not be tampered with, for, just as the United Nations itself, it was a typical product of the transitional era in which capitalist and Communist states could "coexist"; as a common denominator it was deemed "adequate for contemporary international conditions."

There was a characteristic contradiction implicit in Soviet criticism of the United Nations and the conservative defense of the "adequacy" of the Charter. Time and again Moscow has replied to critics that all that is needed is to live up to its terms.

25. For the Soviet view, see International Affairs, 1956, no. 1, pp. 38-39; and 1957, no. 7, p. 110; and Samarsky, op. cit. One of the aims of the Durdenevsky-Krylov collection of documents, published in 1956, was to show that there existed no need for Charter revision.

It is not inconceivable, however, that before long the Soviet Union will be prepared to accept certain, admittedly minor, organizational changes, while still rejecting reform in toto (and any tampering with the veto in particular). Moscow has since 1957 declared itself willing to discuss "enlarging the major United Nations bodies." But it quickly became apparent that this meant the admission of Communist China as a prerequisite for other changes; and then, as the next step, willingness to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council—presumably boosting the representation of Afro-Asian and East European states. This is likely to be the extent of Charter revision acceptable to the Soviet Union.

A word is in order on the Soviet view of United Nations membership. The initial formula for the United Nations, just as that in the League (where Moscow opposed participation of Germany and Japan), was a selective one. Participation in the Second World War against the Axis powers and/or Japan was made a precondition of admission. Originally, neutral and enemy states were thus discriminated against. Moreover, at Dumbarton Oaks it was the Soviet delegation that insisted on some mechanism for the expulsion of members from the future United Nations. To Moscow, membership was thus from the outset a political issue.

Once again political utility helped to water down "principles" when it came to admitting ex-enemy states now in the Soviet camp and (as of 1949-50) Communist China. As has been remarked, the Soviet position amounted to an attempt to "have its cake and eat it" by invoking universalist arguments in favor of the admission of its allies and raising conditions when it came to barring nations which it considered potentially inimical.

The insistence on Chinese Communist representation led, of course, to the

27. International Affairs, 1957, no. 7, pp. 109-10; and Bol'shaja sovetskaia entsiklopedija, Ezhegodnik 1957, p. 481.

protracted walk-out of 1950. The return of the Soviet delegation did not end the problem. The logjam on admissions—complicated by a variety of vetoes—was finally broken when in 1955 a "package" of sixteen new states was admitted to membership. The Soviet Union had no hesitation in accepting the log-rolling device, which the West had first rejected as immoral but finally came around to endorsing. Since then the Soviet bloc has argued in favor of increasing universality of UN membership. Indeed, the new composition of the Organization tends to increase the representation of the Soviet orbit and of the "fledgling states." This change, Moscow has commented, has its "favorable effect" in that the United States finds it "increasingly hard to maneuver."29

The Afro-Asian States

"The future historian," writes Hans Kohn, "may regard as the greatest 'revolution' of the twentieth century not Lenin's overthrow of the short-lived free regime in Russia in November, 1917, but the less conspicuous ... and, yet, more far-reaching process which brought Europe's four hundred years old dominion of the globe to an end," In recent years the Soviet Union, though under Stalin slow to perceive and utilize this perspective, has moved to ride the anti-Western tide for its own purposes. Earlier Soviet attempts to strike at the "imperialist" powers through their colonial back doors (such as in China in 1926-27) had either failed or boomeranged.

28a. On the UN's fourteenth anniversary, Moscow complained that "it had not yet become a world-wide organization. The contemptible game played by the United States in the matter of restoring lawful rights in the United Nations to the great People's Republic of China continues to be a flagrant violation of the Charter, seriously undermining the international authority and the role of the United Nations ..."


It was not until the postwar world witnessed the emergence of the new fledgling states that Moscow determined to launch a vigorous and imaginative campaign extending moral and material aid to the budding assemblage of nations from the Gold Coast to the Sea of Japan, rapidly growing in numbers, political entities,
and specific weight in the international arena. In doing so it could point to its own experience of rapid economic development which could serve as a model, its somewhat diluted doctrines of social progress and the vision of a more perfect society, and the common anti-Western and anti-imperialist animus that permitted it to cement a bloc of the down-trodden. It could also capitalize on the errors and failures of Western policy, which contributed to the alienation of much of this vast and crucial tier.

Soviet strategy toward the "colonial and semi-colonial" areas, as Moscow used to call them, was set in 1955. It found expression in the far-reaching Soviet support for the Bandung and Cairo Conferences and in the Khrushchevite formula of a "zone of peace," which for the first time bracketed the "socialist camp" with the uncommitted nations against the US-led coalition. At last Moscow seemed to depart from the time-honored Communist dictum of "He who is not with me, is against me," to support—if only temporarily—any one prepared to go along with the Soviet Union. The success of this strategy has been gratifying to Moscow; both its broader political effects and its consequences within the United Nations specifically have contributed to the Soviet re-evaluation of opportunities and prospects.

Some Soviet moves have, of course, been welcome to uncommitted delegations. Thus Soviet attacks on racial discrimination in South Africa and British West Africa, and Soviet support for Afro-Asian resolutions, especially apparent since the Suez crisis, naturally evoked favorable comment among the neutrals. By 1956 Soviet cooperation at the United Nations and, at least equally important, Soviet political and economic help outside the United Nations have been widely publicized by Moscow. "The stand taken by the Soviet delegation," it declared with reference to the 10th Assembly session, "confirmed once again that in the Soviet Union the
peoples of Asia and Africa have a genuine friend." At the 11th Assembly session the "socialist" states "strengthened their prestige in the eyes of the peoples of Asia, Africa and the whole world and on a number of important issues...were able to rally the peace-loving forces in the UN." The Soviet commentary, stressing the Communists' "united front with those from the Afro-Asian countries," concluded with marked satisfaction that the Western countries "cannot rule the UN roost as they used to."  

Two of the most hopeful aspects of the changing UN scene, then, in Moscow's eyes, are the increasing role played by the Afro-Asian countries and the increasing influence exercised over them by the Soviet Union. Indeed, the changing composition of the United Nations adds to this optimism. New admissions tend to increase the numerical strength of precisely this bloc, and further changes in this sense are anticipated for the years ahead. Moscow's optimism about the automatic alliance which, it trusts, will be forged between the non-Communist and the Communist states in the "zone of peace" may, it is true, be excessive; the Soviet Union has almost invariably tended to see the world scene in more favorable hues than others and has failed to appreciate the extent to which Soviet actions tend also to antagonize the uncommitted. And the recipe of temporary cooperation may be more transparent in terms of ultimate objective than Moscow is prepared to believe. Yet Soviet efforts in this direction have been patently successful. Their success has been aided by the Soviet position with regard to trusteeships and to technical and economic aid.

Soviet attacks on colonialism are of course nothing new; Soviet criticism of the League's mandate system had also been severe. However, in 1944-45 Soviet intern-

est in the trusteeship system was considerable. It appears to have been due, first, to a hope of gaining a direct voice in colonial affairs, since in the Soviet view it behooved a great power to be consulted on all matters (and not, as the Charter provided, only where "directly concerned"); and, second, to an attempt to obtain a trust territory for the Soviet Union to administer—specifically, Italian Tripolitania. The latter effort failed, as did a Soviet attempt to secure joint supervision with Italy—contrary to the general Soviet hostility to joint trusteeships.

After this failure the Soviet attitude cooled. When the first eight trusteeship agreements were completed, the Soviet delegate refused to participate in the election of the Trusteeship Council in December 1946, claiming that the agreements were in conflict with the Charter. The Soviet Union thus absented itself from the Trusteeship Council until April 1948; then once again political considerations decided it to appear when the Palestine issue was before the Council.

The Soviet Union and its allies have since used the Trusteeship Council as a forum for propaganda aimed particularly toward the colonial peoples themselves. Advancing stock recommendations and recipes substantially similar for all areas involved, Moscow has charged that the administering powers have been guilty of flagrant violations and of resorting to veiled annexation or purposive stagnation of the territories. In a demagogic appeal for Afro-Asian support at the 11th General Assembly session it proposed independence for trust territories within three to five years. But, whatever the schedule, Moscow was prepared to affirm

33. Molotov advanced the view that all great powers were "directly concerned" in all trusteeship agreements when in December 1945 the United States asked to administer the formerly Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific. For a discussion of the issues involved, see also R.N. Chowdhuri, International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 77, 87; and Joseph J. Sisco, "Soviet Attitude toward the Trusteeship System," Doctoral Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1950.

34. See also James F. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 96.

35. Chowdhuri, op. cit., pp. 57-58. Fuller (op. cit., p. 150) has correctly remarked that the USSR departed from its habitual strict construction of the Charter when it was politically desirable to obtain a voice over other states' trust territories.
that "time is working against the colonialists." Increasingly the voice of the colonial peoples (as interpreted and assisted by Moscow) can be heard.\(^{36}\)

Fundamentally, of course, trusteeship conditions cannot, in the Soviet view, provide an acceptable "solution" to the colonial question. Why, then, Soviet support for the institution? A Soviet monograph explains with unusual candor and co...ency:

The international system of trusteeship represents an attempt to solve the national-colonial question by means of reforms, through a partial improvement in the conditions of the colonial peoples, without threatening the foundations of imperialism. This system as it were legalizes the colonial system.\...

How then can one explain that the Soviet Union signed the Charter of the UN and consequently has recognized the trusteeship system? Is not such an attitude toward trusteeship equivalent to a renunciation by the USSR of the revolutionary solution of the national-colonial question?\...

So long as the trusteeship system contributes to the struggle of the colonial peoples for freedom, the Soviet Union will continue to support it, since trusteeship not only legalizes the colonial system but also amounts to a vehicle for attaining independence.\...
The Soviet Union does not idealize the trusteeship system, considering it merely as an insignificant concession on the part of the colonial powers, due to the struggle of the colonies' population. It has stood and unalterably stands for the revolutionary method of solving the national-colonial question.\(^{37}\)

**Specialized Agencies**

The Soviet interest in both the League and United Nations has been traditionally centered on the problems of peace and security. Correspondingly, the Soviet Union has displayed little enthusiasm for or initiative in the various specialized agencies under the Economic and Social Council or otherwise affiliated with the United Nations. This priority of interest is not new. At the time of Munich, in 1938, Litvinov curtly dismissed the other members' interest in...
decisions regarding the drug traffic, assistance to refugees, establishment of an international system of signaling at grade crossings, and the results of the statistical and other searches of our various commissions. But what have all these questions, important as they are in themselves, in common with the maintenance of peace, the main object for which the League was set up? 38

In the 1944-45 negotiations the Soviet delegates repeatedly attempted to keep the social and economic tasks (which they considered expendable, anyway) entirely separate from security concerns. Indeed, neither the philosophy of UNESCO—cosmopolitan, humanitarian, and broadly cross-cultural—nor the assumptions underlying capitalist international economic organizations were apt to prove acceptable to the Soviet Union. Hence Soviet participation in social and economic agencies generally has proved little more than perfunctory. 39

Soviet membership and activity have been eclectic. From the outset the Soviet Union refused to join the International Civil Aviation Organization because Spain, Portugal, Switzerland belonged to it. It repeatedly assailed the International Refugee Organization as an anti-Soviet tool. By 1946 the Soviet Union had joined only 7 out of 22 international specialized agencies under the United Nations. When asked why it failed to keep up membership in the World Health Organization, Gromyko described the WHO as "useless" and therefore not deserving participation. 40 In 1951 Andrei Vyshinsky replied to charges by Selwyn Lloyd that the Soviet Union ignored these bodies. "What do these organizations amount to?" Vyshinsky inquired. The IRO, "instead of helping to return the refugees home, has become a recruiting and supplying bureau for cheap contract labor to plantation owners, for the recruitment of hired traitors, and for the organization of armed groups to engage in subversive and diversionary activity inside the USSR and the countries of people's democracy...." And so it went for each group Moscow

39. This is also the conclusion of Harold K. Jacobson, "The Soviet Union and the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations," p. 402 ff. See also Raymond Dennett, and Joseph E. Johnson eds., Negotiating with the Russians (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951), pp. 106 and passim.
40. Trygve Lie, op. cit., p. 304.
did not care for.

It is worth noting that Vyshinsky singled out for approval some strictly technical, non-political bodies. "The USSR takes an active part in international organizations which are useful—e.g., the International Meteorological Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and others."\(^41\)

As the cold war grew colder, the Soviet Union and the satellites left some of the bodies to which they had earlier belonged. In February 1949 the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia withdrew from WHO; in the following year Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania followed suit. In December 1949 Czechoslovakia left the Food and Agricultural Organization; in 1950 Czechoslovakia and Poland withdrew from the International Monetary Fund.

Until 1953 the Soviet bloc displayed no initiative in the non-political field. Moscow likewise barred many of the specialized agencies from operating in Eastern Europe. Soviet unwillingness to make available other than strictly selective statistics on its economy and society further contributed to the Soviet withdrawal.\(^42\) By 1950-1951 the Soviet Union had come to view the specialized agencies, by and large, as enemy tools in the war.

After the nadir of 1952, however, the Soviet appraisal and conduct gradually became more realistic. As Harold Jacobson has suggested, in the course of time the Soviet Union became "more and more aware of the possibilities that this work afforded and took an increasingly active role in it."\(^43\) On April 26, 1954 it joined the International Labor Organization; on April 21, 1955 it adhered to UNESCO; and on January 27, 1956 it resumed membership in WHO. (It had kept up membership in the Postal, Telecommunications, and Meteorological Unions.)

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bership in UNESCO in particular—after years of labeling it an "auxiliary of the U.S. State Department" promoting imperialism "under the flag of cosmopolitanism"—betokened at the very least a change of style. 44

It is significant, on the other hand, that Soviet adherence remained selective. Soviet hostility toward the International Monetary Fund and Bank has not mellowed. These remain capitalist instruments which Moscow does not wish to support; their ties with the United Nations "serve merely as a cover for activities actually conducted in the interests of monopolies" of certain Western countries. 44a

The most significant changes were reserved for the economic field. Once again changes at the United Nations reflected broader alterations of Soviet strategy. The Khrushchev era has seen the Soviet Union embark on an extensive and dynamic program of economic and technical assistance abroad. 45 Earlier Soviet efforts in this field were typified by attempts to have such aid channeled through the United Nations. In a characteristic departure from customary Soviet determination to limit United Nations authority, Moscow has preferred a neutral UN label on foreign to a US or UK label—just as in disarmament Moscow argued for United Nations (rather than United States) custody of nuclear stockpiles so long as the Soviet Union itself had none to contribute. United Nations control of economic aid, in other words, was a desirable policy when Moscow was not actively offering such aid.

Even in the present phase, however, the Soviet Union can expect to benefit as a well-advertised "giver" through United Nations media. Now, moreover, Mos- cow insists as part of its "cooperation" in this field that the United Nations (rather than the United States) sponsor a vast program to develop the economies of underdeveloped countries. 46

44. See Armstrong, op. cit., p. 222, and passim.


and enhance Soviet prestige and influence in the underdeveloped countries.\textsuperscript{48}

The shift in Soviet strategy with regard to the International Trade Organization has been substantially similar. Originally the Soviet Union insisted on bilateralism and displayed a marked lack of enthusiasm for supporting capitalist free-trade schemes. It voted for none of the ECOSOC resolutions on the mechanics of trade, including conventions on samples, advertising, and elimination of double taxation, claiming that they violated the sovereignty of member states. Yet from early 1953 on Moscow has displayed a more cooperative attitude, favoring an expansion of East-West trade and attacking "artificial barriers" to world commerce, such as the United States ban on strategic exports.

The Soviet stand has been pliable in accordance with the needs of policy, possessing a flexibility perhaps best illustrated by the Soviet efforts in the field of labor. Traditionally hostile to the ILO (from which it withdrew in 1940 and did not return, even when invited, in the war years), the Soviet Union may have hoped to build up the World Federation of Trade Unions into a (Soviet-controlled) rival or substitute for the ILO. Hence at San Francisco and during the following year the Soviet Union ardently pushed the cause of the WFTU, backing its demand for a privileged status on the Economic and Social Council and even for a seat in the General Assembly, while opposing similar rights for the American Federation of Labor and the International Cooperative Alliance.


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The United States contribution amounts to $38 million.
After the failure of these efforts, late in 1946 the Soviet Union adopted a less active policy in the labor field. But with the return to the ILO in 1954, a new and typically dynamic Soviet effort began, intended to capture the world trade union movement and to make itself the spokesman for the cause of labor everywhere. 49

The Soviet attitude toward the specialized agencies has thus vacillated from fear and scorn to a desire to capitalize on them for political ends. In periods of increasing strength and imagination the latter policy seems to have had the upper hand, and it is likely to prevail—without entailing any basic change in the Soviet view of such groups as ILO, IMF, and UNESCO as ancillary at best and noxious at worst. The ones fully accepted by Moscow as constructive are the technical, "innocent" bodies allocating radio wave lengths, exchanging technical know-how, or pooling meteorological information.

**Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons**

None of the endeavors at the United Nations has been more arduous, more fruitless, and perhaps more tragic than the efforts to reach some agreement on effective reduction in armaments—either in conventional or in nuclear weapons.

Were one to measure Soviet intent solely by the attention paid in Soviet domestic and foreign propaganda alike, the Soviet "struggle for peace" would lead (along with the "struggle for independence and sovereignty of nations") as the foremost cause pursued by the Soviet Union. In fact, the long record of disarmament talks since 1922 has shown, time and again, an uncanny Soviet ability to

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identify itself with "peace-loving" forces but to resist disarmament schemes involving effective controls and inspection. Indeed, in the 1920's, when Moscow expressed its views more candidly than it has of late, it was frank to say that it could not believe in the international equivalent of "class peace"; and that therefore disarmament in a world dominated by powers hostile to the Soviet Union was an invitation to suicide. It acknowledged that "the signing of the Kellogg Pact by the Soviet Union must be considered above all as a propaganda act which once more demonstrates our peaceful tendencies." Justice Kozhevnikov in 1931 attacked a volume on disarmament (by Korovin and V. V. Egorov) because after reading it one has the impression that the USSR, in announcing its plans of total and partial disarmament, genuinely believes in the objective possibility of their realization to a lesser or greater extent. The specificity of our policy of struggle for 'disarmament' has not been shown....

And the Sixth Comintern Congress stated publicly with regard to the Litvinov proposals at Geneva that

the aim of the Soviet proposals was not to spread pacifist illusions but to destroy them....Disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only with the fall of capitalism....It goes without saying that not a single Communist thought for a moment that the imperialist world would accept the Soviet disarmament proposals.

Since World War II Moscow has again made strenuous and successful efforts to assume the leadership of the "camp of peace." Along with its efforts outside the United Nations, its proposals for drastic arms cuts have helped its propaganda endeavors.

"Even in the absence of nuclear disarmament, a drastic cutback in armed forces and conventional weapons, Moscow has reasoned, would shift the balance of power

52. The Sixth Congress of the Communist International (Moscow, 1928), p. 37. See also Triska, op. cit., p. 301.
in favor of the Soviet Union because of the natural advantage it would possess with regard to manpower (and also propaganda machinery and perhaps Communist Parties throughout the world). Given "peaceful coexistence" as a non-military contest, Moscow was bound to seek ways and means for the relative weakening of the "other" side. And once the "other" side made objections, the Soviet propaganda machine was quick to exploit Western "procrastinations" and "sabotage" for its ends.

The details of the negotiations need not be re-examined here. From the outset, the Soviet Union has rejected the initially generous American proposals for international control and ownership such as the Baruch Plan. Beginning with the insistence that atomic energy problems be subject to Security Council veto and ending with a Soviet veto of the three UN AEC reports in June 1947, the Soviet delegation protested all attempted "infringements of national sovereignty" and intelligence operations in the guise of nuclear weapons controls; it countered with a proposal amounting to (1) a declarative prohibition on the production and use of atomic weapons, and (2) subsequent negotiations about international controls. It was willing to support international inspection to the extent that it was compatible with the "sovereign rights of states."

Thus, while the Soviet Union had no atomic weapons until 1949, it was interested in avoiding foreign interference in its own activities; in embarrassing the United States; and in attempting to induce the United States to turn over its stockpiles to international control or to destroy them. Since it was the weaker party, it stood to gain from dragging out negotiations in the hope of speaking before long from a position of greater strength. In the meanwhile it insisted on the application of the veto in international controls (particularly with

regard to sanctions against violators of international agreements) and on the
declarative prohibition of nuclear weapons prior to inspection or disclosure
precisely the opposite of the Western position.

So long as there was a non-Communist majority in the United Nations, the
Soviet Union deemed internationalization more harmful than the status quo.
After the interlude of 1949-54, during which the atomic energy negotiations were
deadlocked, Moscow from May 1955 on made new proposals consonant with the broader
aspects of Khrushchevite foreign policy and also more fully aware of the impli-
cations of nuclear warfare than had been apparent (and permissible) so long as
Stalinist military doctrine reigned supreme.

Yet the Soviet position, more flexible and gradually closer to that of the
Western powers, has not proved to be significantly more tractable on key issues
such as effective inspection. Indeed, when it failed to secure the "parity" of
representation it insisted on (as discussed below), the Soviet Union in November
1957 declared a boycott of the United Nations Disarmament Commission—precisely
at a time when the tone and content of Soviet proposals had made some Western
observers believe that nuclear weapon bans or controls had moved into the field
of "negotiable" issues.

How to explain this paradox?

The most likely answer is that Soviet policy-makers had indeed come to
attribute greater importance to nuclear weapons and to the necessity of exploring
test bans and weapons prohibitions more thoroughly. It was precisely for this
reason—and because of the increasing insistence on equal representation rather
than the routine of being "outvoted" in United Nations organs—that Moscow shifted
its emphasis from the United Nations to direct talks with the United States and
the United Kingdom.* Here is one reason why it has preferred "summit" meetings
and special conferences in Geneva to the United Nations procedure.

* This manuscript was completed before it became known that the Soviet Union and
the Western powers had apparently agreed to create a new ten-nation commission
on disarmament, with parity of representation for the Soviet bloc, and in effect
While continuing to attack the United States for its failure to agree to far-reaching and well-publicized Soviet proposals of drastic arms reductions, declarative prohibitions, and peace resolutions—and thus exploiting the United Nations for propaganda purposes, the Soviet Union appears to be committed to making real progress (if any) toward agreement in this field through direct dealings. Disarmament talks, Gromyko indicated some years ago, had become "a political matter." Whether or not the Soviet Union wants or fears agreement; whether or not it will, in the interest of survival, eventually overcome its deeply-ingrained fear of foreign inspection; whether or not it agrees to controls before prohibitions, as the West insists—it is unlikely that the United Nations will be the arena of agreement. There propaganda efforts have taken the upper hand. As one analyst has well summed it up, the Soviet delegation has rejected Western proposals but avoided the appearance of doing so; it has often evaded answers rather than causing a total breakdown of negotiations; it has sought to link its policies with popular aspirations for "peace and security"; it has portrayed the United States as aggressive; it has striven to keep the United States and United Kingdom from using their atomic weapons for political advantage; and it has staked for time to advance its own standing in the "nuclear club." 54

In a peculiar way, the Soviet position has thus been consistent in this field too. So long as it was weak, it sought to maintain maximum freedom of action in the nuclear field. And more recently, when it assumes that it has at least matched the West, it has sought to utilize this freedom of action as a weapon in dealing with the West. Throughout this period it has rejected foreign controls, in harmony with its position on sovereignty, which has a hard core of practical self-interest. It is likely not to tie its hands so long as it can, adhering to the admonition recently reiterated in Moscow that

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the Soviet armed forces must constantly improve their military readiness so that at any moment they can not only repel an aggressor's surprise attack against our country but can immediately deal him a retaliatory blow of the kind that will once and for all put an end to any and all attempts to disturb by armed force the ordained movement of the Soviet people to communism.

On the other hand, the last word on Soviet willingness to conclude bans on weapons tests (or, for that matter, on surprise attacks and prohibitions of certain types of weapons) has not yet been spoken. Just as in Washington and other capitals, there are likely to be different views in Moscow with regard to the imperative or feasibility of agreement in this field. In the balance sheet of arguments, economic and financial considerations along with a greater awareness of what nuclear warfare would mean, weigh against the traditional and (in their terms) well-founded Soviet fear of independent foreign inspection on Soviet soil. The continued arguments over inspection of nuclear weapon tests and the Soviet veto of the American Arctic inspection proposal—and some revealing statements by the Soviet leadership—suggest that the negative still prevails over the willingness to accept watertight inspection.

While this crucial issue remains open, it may be safe to say that for the United Nations it is likely to continue largely as a subject of charges and countercharges. It would be easy to dismiss it were it not so vital a matter. The record to date invites little optimism, for it is likely that disarmament—just as the United Nations itself—can be the object of effective agreement only when it is not needed to preserve world peace.

THE DOMESTIC IMAGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

To speak of "public opinion" in the Soviet Union is to refer either to the private and habitually unuttered views of Soviet citizens, or else to the official "line" issued and reiterated from above. We have no meaningful measure of "public" opinion in the sense in which sociologists commonly speak of it in open societies. What we do know suggests that, however substantial the grievances and doubts of the Soviet citizenry, the rank and file is prepared--especially in the field of foreign relations--to leave policy decisions to the government.

The impressions of recent travelers permit the hypothesis that the United Nations occupy at best a very minor place in the thinking of Soviet men and women not involved in the conduct or analysis of foreign affairs.

Nevertheless, one may seek to examine the image of the United Nations which the Soviet authorities strive to convey in their domestic propaganda as at least one of several imperfect indices to their own thinking about the United Nations.

Soviet publications generally have given little attention to international organizations other than those controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet press covers extensively and dramatizes the speeches of Soviet delegates at the United Nations, but the general tenor of press comment does not suggest that the United Nations is of great import.*

* It remains to be investigated how selective or complete Soviet coverage of UN sessions has been even where reports (and sometimes verbatim reports) have appeared in the Soviet press.
One content analysis of the Soviet press for 1945-1951 notes that Moscow "has little interest in publicizing the United Nations thoroughly and throughout the year to the public at large. It does seek to keep the Soviet public abreast of major developments during the General Assembly sessions and in the event of important Security Council decisions. However, the government seems singularly uninterested in presenting systematic reports on current issues in the United Nations."  

Soviet citizens must have been somewhat confused and certainly imperfectly informed about the nature of United Nations activities at least until 1955. Even now the Moscow press and radio produce a composite picture which, taken at face value, depicts the Soviet Union as the valiant champion of all good causes against the forces of evil represented by the "ruling circles"—monopolists, militarists, imperialists—of the major Western powers. Developments at the United Nations—and outside of it—constituting Soviet setbacks, or debates revealing seamier aspects of Soviet and satellite life, have been passed over in silence or, more often, have been dismissed with a few vitriolic adjectives and barbs intelligible only to the initiated. After Stalin's death, it is true, the situation—in this as in many other fields—did change perceptibly. During the preceding eight years almost no monographic work, text books, manuals, or mass

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consumption pamphlets on the United Nations appeared in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. (Even journal articles were generally limited to polemics or brief factual summaries of proceedings.) After Stalin's death some collections of documents on the United Nations appeared with introductory comments by the compilers (notably, the compendium by Durdenevsky and Krylov). As already noted, a United Nations Association was established; so was a Soviet Association on International Law, in April 1957. For wider dissemination, a few pamphlets appeared. Finally, a separate volume on the role of the Soviet Union in the United Nations appeared in 20,000 copies in 1957. Unfortunately the book is neither particularly original nor helpful in gaining other than strictly official, formal information.

Since 1956–1957 textbooks on international law as well as Soviet surveys of international affairs and encyclopedia yearbooks (themselves innovations) have customarily included a section on "international organizations,"

2. In addition to a few United Nations documents, S.B. Krylov edited a volume of Materials for the History of the United Nations (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1949); only the first volume appeared. Other exceptions were two studies of the Trusteeship system (Boris Shtein and B. Shushalov) and the International Court of Justice (Nikolai Poliansky and Krylov). Some technical works have appeared on questions such as international regulation of radio broadcasting.

3. In 1955, G.P. Zadoroshnyi, Organizatsiia Ob'edinennykh Natsii i mezhunarodnaia bezopasnost' (Moscow, 1955); in 1956 the pamphlets by Samarsky and Ushakov cited earlier; in 1957, A.P. Movchan, OON i mirnoe sosushchestvovanie (Moscow, 1957), and a brief account by a Ukrainian delegate to the General Assembly, Vera Bilai, Na XI sesii Gen. Asamblei ... notatki delegata (Kiev, 1957); and in 1958, G.P. Zadoroshnyi, OON i mirnoe sosushchestvovanie gosudarstv (Moscow, 1958). Most of these were originally delivered as public lectures.

with the United Nations prominently covered. While limited to fairly
gen-committal substantive coverage from the Soviet point of view,
these surveys do nonetheless make information on developments at the
United Nations systematically available to the Soviet reader. At
the same time, the State Publishing House of Political Literature has
complained that no research or books on the United Nations were
scheduled. This was part of a broad attack being waged on behalf
of stepped-up work in the whole field of international relations.

While the situation has thus improved, there are severe limitations
still present. Though formally disseminated through Mezhdunarodnaja
Kniga, the official Soviet agency purchasing and selling books abroad,
United Nations publications and documents are not normally available
to Soviet citizens. Even where the United Nations is referred to in
the schools, it is often a perfunctory mention. If one turns to the syllabus
of Soviet foreign policy and international relations makes no mention of the

5. E.g., Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia, Ezhegodnik 1957; and Mezhdunarodnyi
politiko-ekonomichekii ezhegodnik, 1958.
6a. During a visit to the Soviet Union in July 1959, the author attempted to
determine whether there was in Moscow a United Nations Information Center
(as he had been told there was). If such an agency indeed exists, it is so
well concealed as to be useless as a center for the dissemination of data
about the United Nations. Repeated inquiries with Intourist guides and
representatives of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries brought out either blank stares, or comments that they had never
heard of such a center, or else promises to inquire further—which never
yielded additional information. None of the several Moscow city directories
(1958 and 1959 imprints) list a UN Information Center in the Soviet capital.
United Nations as a distinct topic or problem. Likewise, the model outline of the lecture on Soviet foreign policy and world affairs for 1945-1953 makes no mention of the United Nations. Even the major Soviet libraries have highly selective holdings on the United Nations.

7a. The catalog of the Lenin Library in Moscow (the largest in the Soviet Union) lists (as of July 1959) under the subject heading, United Nations, most of the Soviet items cited above, as well as selected United Nations publications. Among American books on the United Nations, some compilations and descriptive accounts (such as Asher et al., and Goodrich and Simons) are available. Those not available include, among others, the books by Bloomfield, Claude, and Morgenthau.

7. CPSU, Central Committee, Section of Propaganda and Agitation, Uchebnye plany i programmy na 1956-1957 god (Moscow, 1956). More recent issues are not available.
Indicative of official thinking, one may assume, are also the publications of the Institute of International Relations, which amounts to a foreign service institute. A recent such publication, referring to the handling of the Hungarian issue at the United Nations describes the Special UN report on Hungary as slanderous, tendentious, and fictitious. In substance, the diplomatic counterrevolution against Hungary at the United Nations failed just as the military pressures and the revolt inside the country had failed, Moscow avers; and raising the "Hungarian question" did harm only to the United Nations itself and revealed the face of those who raised it. Moscow points to the failure of the United Nations to pursue the issue further at the 12th General Assembly session—a failure due to "the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Union and the accomplishments of Soviet science and technology [the first sputnik had meanwhile gone up] as well as the stabilization of conditions in Hungary as a result of the energetic efforts of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government.

1958 also saw the publication of the first Soviet textbook on foreign policy. In line with the current assertion that the Soviet Union was in the forefront of the sponsors of the world organization, it asserts that "in fighting for peace along all lines, the USSR attributed great importance to the United Nations"; and it points to Soviet disarmament proposals and related moves as accomplishments—largely in

the propaganda sphere. "It is not hard to imagine what tremendous significance for the strengthening of peace the acceptance of these constructive proposals of the USSR would have which were met with warm approval by broad circles of the public in all countries of the globe." United States and British reactionary circles have sought to make the United Nations an obedient tool "in the struggle against the USSR and all democratic forces, for world hegemony." Such statements convey the flavor of current Soviet writing on the subject.

Interesting also is the contrast between Soviet domestic and foreign propaganda. While in appeals to foreign "targets" Moscow acknowledges the work of UNICEF, stressing particularly how much the Soviet government has done along similar lines in Soviet Central Asia in recent decades, it is obviously not interested in giving extensive coverage to positive UN activities for the average Soviet audience. "A film which Danny Kaye did on his travels for the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund was shown on Moscow TV--but a month and a half later than in 25 other member countries of UNICEF, and in far shorter form. The 90-minute film of Kaye's travels to hospitals, camps, and other institutions to entertain underprivileged children was cut to precisely eleven minutes."

9. Ivan Ivashin, Ocherki istorii vneshnei politiki SSR (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958), pp. 425, 482, 484.
Very few UN activities have taken place in the Soviet Union itself. It is probably still true that the United Nations plays a very subordinate part in the Soviet citizen's thinking about the world scene.

Soviet policy-makers have no doubt considered the possible effect of United Nations activities on their citizens. There is not only a noticeable difference in tone between their portrayal of the United Nations abroad and at home but also between the fairly factual, extensive, and technical discussion among the "professionals" in world affairs and the virtual silence in media representing those who hold the real levers of power, as illustrated by the Higher School of the Central Committee and the key monthly organ of the Communist Party, Kommunist.

No doubt, with the multiplication of contacts with the outside world, and with the striking interest of Soviet citizens in non-Soviet developments and opinions, the United Nations too may come into sharper focus. Yet even a mildly optimistic appraisal must discard as too rosy the forecast that with respect to the Soviet Union international activities, and UNESCO in particular, "may act as a yeast whose ferment will overflow the limits supposed to contain its expansion."12

The selection, training, and competence of Soviet citizens assigned to the United Nations remain to be studied on the spot. What follows are merely a few impressions garnered from inconclusive data.

The Soviet Union in 1945 found itself with a shortage of personnel trained in world affairs. It wished to perform well in international dealings but was unwilling to denude the Foreign Office and the foreign service of qualified personnel. As a result, the Soviet staff at the United Nations in the first years included men not obviously competent for their specific positions and some who were serving part of their diplomatic apprenticeship at the United Nations.

While much of the early "nyet" era of walkouts and vituperation was calculated, something in the style of Soviet performance suggested a lack of familiarity not only with the give-and-take of parliamentary procedure but also with the general atmosphere of diplomatic intercourse. If it is generally true that in the present age of "instant diplomacy", as Dana Adams Schmidt has called it, the envoy becomes a glorified messenger, the Soviet diplomat in particular has been deprived of freedom of action to a remarkable degree. Until recently, moreover,
Soviet delegates and their families, and even Soviet secretarial personnel, were harder to meet in related and informal surroundings than virtually anyone else at the United Nations.

Yet here, too, the passage of time—and the passage of Stalin—have wrought some changes. More personnel have been trained and are now available for UN duties. More flexibility and, within narrow limits, some observers feel, greater initiative are now allowed Soviet representatives without prior reference to Moscow. More understanding of how the West operates may be responsible for some decline in clichés about Western conspiracies against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. One may speak of the gradual development of a Soviet "UN type," represented at the higher echelons by Arkady Sobolev—a man who according to associates "knows the ropes," gets around, and has gained the respect of others.

Characteristic in his career has been the dual exposure to Secretariat and Soviet delegation. Indeed, the dividing line between the two is not so sharply drawn by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic as by other nations, personnel being transferred from one to the other. At least some Soviet citizens serving as UN officials keep closer contact with the Soviet delegation than would appear proper. On some occasions, Trygve Lie relates, a high Soviet member of his secretariat (Konstantin Zinchenko) would openly tip off Lie that an important Soviet note was about to come. 1

1. Trygve Lie, op. cit., p. 341, Thus on July 26, 1950, Zinchenko made clear that Malik would return by August 1.
Until about 1955 the Soviet Union failed to fill all the positions that were available to its citizens under the rules governing geographic apportionment of Secretariat jobs. There are more than one thousand employees at the UN headquarters in Grade 8 or above. Of these, in 1951, 14 were Soviet citizens; in 1955, there were 19 in the secretariat—with a quota of 131-175 Soviet nationals. In recent years Moscow has made a serious effort to fill vacancies, and has most recently begun to complain of discrimination against Soviet candidates.

There has been only one case of proven espionage among Secretariat personnel—that of Valentin Gubichev, who was deported, not for spying but for receiving documents for transmission. There are perhaps others who have not been uncovered. Yet there is reason to assume that the number of "agents" Moscow maintains at the United Nations for espionage purposes is not likely to be great. One may guess that Moscow knows too well the risks of the game, and if need be, it has perhaps less conspicuous individuals at its disposal in the United Nations.

The Soviet Foreign Office, which now has seven Western and four Eastern geographic divisions, also has a department for international organization and another on international economic organization. As of 1959, the section dealing with international organizations is

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in the hands of Semion K. Tsarapkin, who has considerable first-hand experience with North American diplomacy. It is through this department that Moscow maintains contact with its delegation at the United Nations.

Little need be said about Soviet negotiatory behavior, other comments having substantially covered the field, but it may be useful here to note a few facets of Soviet conduct. Striking among these are the refusal to "play" when miffed, outraged, or uninstructed. The long list of "walk-outs", from the Iranian case in early 1946 to the most recent boycotts of the sub-committee on disarmament and the refusal to take a seat on the Committee on Outer Space, is not, however, a monument to impulsiveness. Soviet walk-outs and boycotts have been calculated tactics terminated whenever practical reasons of sufficient magnitude have appeared. Thus the Soviet absence from the Security Council in 1950 was ended when Moscow decided to interfere with the UN war effort in Korea; Soviet refusal to take a seat on the Trusteeship Council was waived when in 1948 the Palestine issue came up on its agenda.

In addition to the dexterity in the uninhibited use of the absence-and-presence game, the Soviet delegation has made a mark for itself.

by its virtuosity in the use of legal and verbal technicalities to defend its point of view, often against heavy odds of logic and fact. It has tried to wear down the opposition by reiteration. It has been quick to level counter-charges whenever accused of wrongdoing. When Iran complained of Soviet interference in its internal affairs, Vyshinsky filed charges against British interference in Greece, and Dmitri Manuilsky (for the Ukrainian delegation) accused the British of intervention in Indonesia: 'for one charge, two counter-charges' seemed to be the simple Soviet prescription. It has remained substantially the same down to the Soviet response to the Hungarian case of 1956-1957. Finally, Russia has seen fit to ignore the United Nations whenever such a course was convenient. In substance, the range of Soviet behavior has thus amounted to an adaptation, or a selective projection, of earlier Bolshevik experience at home.

It may be well to add, however, that Soviet tactics have not always been a success. Several observers of the United Nations scene have pointed out that, especially in the Stalin era, the Soviet Union antagonized the small powers by treating them cavalierly as appendages of the "imperialists" or as "obedient lackeys" of the United States. There was good reason to wonder why the Soviet delegation wrote them off, as it were, in advance. More than that, in a very real sense, "the Soviet Union [was] itself responsible for
the consistently large majorities which the United States [was] able
to muster on political questions." 4"  

Those days are past. Part of the new era in Soviet diplomacy
has been a greater consciousness of "public relations," a greater
ability to differentiate among nuances of hostility, and a greater
dexterity in dealing with non-Communist forces.

The Soviet Bloc

Even though pressing for continued Great-Power hegemony, Moscow
foresaw the future scramble for votes among international entities
as early as 1943. On December 19, 1943, it asked that in the future
world organization all sixteen constituent Republics of the Soviet
Union be given separate representation. This was indeed one of the
reasons behind the constitutional amendments adopted on February 1,
1944, granting the Union Republics the right to enter into direct
diplomatic and treaty relations with foreign states. At Dumbarton

of Illinois Press, 1958), p. 40. See also Sterling Hale Fuller, "The
Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the League and United Nations."

Occasionally Soviet behavior had its humorous overtones, as
when the Soviet delegation replied to the Secretary General regarding
forced labor in the following terms:

The Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to
the United Nations presents its compliments to the United
Nations Secretariat and herewith returns, unexamined, the docu-
ments attached to the Secretariat's letter of November 22,
1952, since these documents contain slanderous fabrications
concerning the Soviet Union.

(Cited in Robert Asher et al., The United Nations and Promotion of
p. 773n.)
Oaks the Soviet delegation accordingly asked for sixteen seats in the United Nations—a request which promptly ran into Western opposition. At Yalta Stalin offered to whittle down this demand to three votes (adding separate delegations for the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSR's to the Soviet Union's own) as part of a larger settlement; and President Roosevelt, who had left Washington determined to prevent this, found himself accepting this proposition (as did British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden) in return for a Soviet promise to support the grant of three votes to the United States. Within less than two months the three-vote deal "leaked" out in the American press, producing "one of the worst all-around botches of the war" and necessarily leading to a US statement renouncing its extra two votes. The Soviet Union, however, stood firm on its demand and obtained the three seats at San Francisco.

Moscow has never explained the rather illogical situation by which two of the Union Republics are in the United Nations while the remaining ones—legally on equal footing—are not. It has made some use of the quasi-independent status of these republics to have them conclude treaties and agreements (e.g., with UNRRA in 1945; peace treaties in 1947; the Warsaw Pact in 1955). The Ukrainian SSR held one of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council in 1948—

1949 and has served on various other UN bodies, as has the Byelorussian Republic. The situation has remained anomalous, for these Republics have repeatedly refused to establish direct diplomatic relations with, for example, the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the General Assembly session in the fall of 1950 was attended by the "foreign ministers" of the Uzbek and Kazakh SSR's, which are not separately represented at the United Nations.  

With the passage of time the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegations (elevated to permanent missions at the United Nations in April 1958) have come to be accepted as appendages to the Soviet representation. They have not acted independently; they have been useful as additional votes and speakers, and sometimes as "frontmen" when the Soviet ventriloquists have preferred to remain silent.  

6. There is probably some reality to the resentment voiced by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek Republic, Manzur Mirza-Akhmedov, to the group headed by Adlai Stevenson in the Summer of 1958. Robert C. Tucker reported that Akhmedov gave the impression the Uzbek Republic had expected UN membership. "He spoke, for example, of the disappointed Uzbek hopes at the time of the founding of the United Nations....The general tenor of his remarks was such as to suggest that the continued non-membership of sovereign independent Uzbekistan in the UN is one of the regrettable and serious anomalies of the world situation and ought to be remedied at the world's first opportunity." (Robert C. Tucker, Impressions of Russia in 1958, Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1958, P-1570, p. 33.)  

7. For students of international law and especially Ukrainian and Byelorussian nationalists, the representation does raise interesting opportunity for speculation. See Roman Yakemtchouk, L'Ukraine en droit international (Louvain: Centre Ukrainien d'études en Belgique, 1954); and Vsevolod Holub, Ukraina v Ob'ednanych Natsiakh (Munich: Suchasna Ukraina, 1953).
More difficult and in many respects far more important to the Soviet Union has been the cementing of a "bloc" with the other countries of the "socialist camp." It has been eminently successful in this endeavor. The three Soviet votes, originally augmented by the Polish and Yugoslav votes, constituted a solid bloc—counting, after 1948, on Czecho-Slovakia but losing Yugoslav support after the Stalin-Tito break. With the admission of 16 additional states in December 1955, the Soviet contingent rose to nine, thanks to the addition of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

As Mr. Thomas Hovet has demonstrated in an excellent study, the Soviet bloc operates with more cohesion and unanimity than any other combination of states in the United Nations. The Soviet and satellite delegations have regular joint meetings; their decisions are binding; and their voting is virtually unanimous. Whatever the strains among the Communist delegations (and their home states), Soviet control over them (and their home states) has proved effective to this date. As a matter of principle, prestige, and—in this case—above all, practical import, Moscow will undoubtedly continue to insist on the "unanimity of the socialist camp."

8—See Thomas Hovet, Jr. "Bloc Politics in the UN," unpublished MS, Center for International Studies, MIT, pp. 58-64. If on occasion, because of alphabetical voting order, a satellite proves to have voted differently from the USSR, it usually requests amendment of its vote after the Soviet vote has been cast.
The United Nations was established at a time when no world order existed; none was imposed by the victors whose coalition first assumed that name, and none could later be agreed upon among them. A major share of the blame for this has commonly been assigned to the Soviet Union and not without reason. The Soviet view, however, has not been the product of perversity or malice. It has followed with iron logic from the world view of the Communist leadership, which refuses to see in the United Nations (any more than in the League of Nations) the budding parliament of man or the instrument of human brotherhood, but instead sees it as essentially another arena for the struggle between the two dialectic opposites of our age.

The Soviet view feeds on a complex admixture of ideological commitments and realistic appraisals. It amounts to an elusive balance concealed behind walls of words and slogans, clichés and rituals. It has been marked by striking tenacity and continuity; and when genuine evolutions of view have taken place, they have not usually been so announced. Yet continued attachment to the same basic beliefs and expectations has permitted—nay, invited—a wide variety of means in the pursuit of their attainment.
In the United Nations the Soviet position and outlook have faced conceptual problems that go back to the essence of Communist strategy. One has been the place of a "revolutionary" power such as the Soviet Union in an assembly committed, if not to the status quo, at least to "reformist", peaceful change. Another has been the conflict between claims of Communist superiority and the Soviet commitment to operating in the United Nations as one of a number of equal states. A third has been the necessity of working among colleagues whom the doctrine describes as eventually moribund. The Soviet Union has heaped scorn and ridicule on the United Nations—and steadfastly sought recognition for its friends, allies, and dependents within it.

The Soviet Union has participated in the United Nations for limited purposes and perhaps for a limited time. In its view, membership is a contract based on the mutuality of certain interests. The key to Soviet strategy within the organization is to be found in the assessment of Soviet strength and weakness, both in and out of the United Nations. In brief, four distinct variants can offer themselves to its policy-makers:

1) Non-participation. This policy commended itself until 1934 and was rejected for the United Nations.

2) An isolationist strategy, restrictive in its interpretation of United Nations rights. This policy has prevailed when the Soviet bloc has been in a consistent minority position, for it tends to minimize outside infringements, stresses Soviet prerogatives of sovereignty, and denies UN jurisdiction; it has been the typical position since 1945.
3) A broad, expansive strategy in which the Soviet Union seeks to maximize UN power. This is the typical Soviet policy for a Communist "front" organization; no doubt Moscow hopes that some day the Soviet bloc may control the United Nations adequately for such a course, but clearly the day is not at hand.

4) A strategy of helpful cooperation, practised when the Soviet Union needs the United Nations against a third power much as the Soviet Union sought to buttress its own position vis-à-vis Germany and Japan in 1934-1939. While no one will admit this, China may at least theoretically be such a problem at some future date.

Until 1955-1956 there could be little doubt that Moscow (and the rest of the world) saw the Soviet bloc as a permanently weak minority within the organization. It followed that the United Nations, being overwhelmingly hostile to the Soviet Union, must be kept weak. Soviet membership and the United Nations itself were held to be almost expendable; at times participation was deemed useful (1945, 1948), at others detrimental (1950). In theory and practice the United Nations often went counter to Soviet views and interests, but to Soviet policy-makers the advantages of belonging clearly outweighed the advantages of leaving.

Since then, in the Khrushchev era, Moscow has tended to look upon the United Nations as a real weapon. Both in and out of the United Nations the world situation has been generally favorable to the Soviet bloc, and Moscow has perceived the new trend with marked elation and more than habitual optimism. For the first time there is serious expectation of having the Soviet-led "socialist camp" lead
the majority of mankind. Since late 1957 Moscow has reiterated with increasing intensity and perhaps conviction the view that the Soviet orbit is rapidly gaining pre-eminence and is ever growing in strength.

The projection of this trend extends to the expectation of Soviet ascendency in the United Nations too. The events of recent years have confirmed Moscow in the reality of Soviet emancipation from its protracted status of an embattled, consistently outvoted minority—a status to which it seemed doomed as recently as four years ago. This trend has been encouraged, in the Soviet view, both by the changing attitude of some states toward West and East and by the changing composition of the United Nations. The trend in the increase of UN membership favors the non-Western nations, thus giving the combination of Soviet-oriented and uncommitted states a distinct edge: this is precisely the range of nations which current Soviet efforts seek to bracket as the "zone of peace" and to juxtapose to the "imperialist" powers.

An important place in increasing the role of the United Nations (Moscow writes) is due to the recent entry into the UN of a number of countries of Asia and Africa, which together with the Soviet Union and other socialist states come out for a strengthening of international peace and security.1

1. Voprosy vneshnei politiki SSSR, p. 68.
An examination of voting patterns, Soviet analysts find, shows "that the United States is steadily losing support." While it may still formally command a majority, it no longer controls a "machine" vote—a trend which amounts to a "serious moral and political defeat" for the Western "ruling circles." ²

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2. See, e.g., V. Alexandrov, "The 13th UN General Assembly," *International Affairs*, 1958, no. 12, p. 16. Another recent Soviet statement elaborates: "The time is not far off when the whole system of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations will be over, and when every formerly enslaved people, having formed its sovereign state, will be an equal and full-fledged member of the United Nations... This will... strengthen the position of those states which conduct an anti-imperialist struggle. ... and will contribute to the isolation in the United Nations of... the architects of... 'the cold war.'" (Zadoroshnyi, *OON i mirnoe sosuchchestvovanie gosudarstv*, p. 10.)
This greater confidence in the UN membership—and the United Nations as a whole—has been reflected in a recent Soviet effort to secure more administrative positions for itself and in the greater willingness and even initiative to submit issues to the General Assembly, which previously the Soviet Union avoided because of the absence of the veto power there. Adlai Stevenson relates his conversation with Khrushchev in August 1958, at the time of the Middle Eastern crises, when the Soviet Premier rejected the Security Council as the forum for a high-level conference. "He proposed a special meeting of the General Assembly 'with all countries participating, to condemn the aggressors and demand the withdrawal of their troops' from Lebanon and Jordan. I suppose he was fearful that any such condemnation would be voted down overwhelmingly in the Security Council. . . . It was apparent that the General Assembly looked to him like a better forum for a Soviet effort to mobilize opinion against Britain and America." Such an attitude has indeed been reflected in Soviet maneuvers at the United Nations. Soviet officials have rather openly envisaged a future situation in which the Soviet Union and Communist China would be joined by another permanent member and a majority of non-permanent members on the Security Council, and then (to quote a remark attributed to a Soviet delegate)... the United States will be glad to have the veto power.

Such a forecast is not quite so far-fetched as it might appear at first sight. Without abandoning its long-range exclusive aspirations, the Soviet Union has striven to arrive at a modus vivendi that permits the investment of time and effort—both of which are deemed to be inevitably allies of the Communist cause—to secure Soviet advances without recourse to force. "Peaceful coexistence" is an old Communist formula, but it has never been used with such vigor—and in our thermo-nuclear age, with such vital intensity—as at present.

Lenin insisted that international organizations in an overwhelmingly non-Communist world were fictions because war was inevitable under capitalist conditions. Since 1956 Moscow no longer deems wars "fatally" inevitable. Does this shift have implications for the Soviet view of international organizations? If so, Moscow has not spelled them out. The change of outlook probably means that international organizations—along with other institutions of the transitional era of coexistence—can be serviceable tools for advancing Soviet predominance without war. Indeed, Soviet criticism of the West for the past three years has stressed Western failure to recognize the passing of its "position of strength" and its refusal to concede the reality of the pro-Soviet trend in the world. What the West must do, Moscow has reiterated time and again, is to adopt a "position of reason" (i.e., a willingness to yield) in place of its previous "position of strength."
World tensions remain because of the "unwillingness of Western foreign policy to reckon with facts and its open opposition to reasonable compromise on the outstanding issues."\(^4\) What the United Nations needs, then, to contribute to world peace and security is some "good will."\(^5\)

As is readily apparent, on all three levels conflicts are likely to arise in the future: in Soviet relations within the "socialist camp", in Soviet dealings with the non-Communist partners of the self-styled "zone of peace", and in Soviet efforts to persuade the other powers of the reality of "peaceful coexistence." In the last analysis, other Communist-led states have proved to be far more refractory than Moscow (or Bolshevik theory) had anticipated; and the two latter strategies have from the outset, and explicitly, been intended only for a "given historical epoch"—the transitional era in which "capitalist" and "socialist" states exist side by side. Moscow has been frank in stating that the principle of "proletarian internationalism" among Communist nations is intended "for a longer period of time" than the principles of "peaceful coexistence" and adherence to conventional, "bourgeois" international law.\(^6\)

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6. M. Airapetian, Leninskie printsipy vneshnei politiki sovetskogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957), p. 65. In his interview with Timoo Hirooka, editor of the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, on June 18, 1957, Khrushchev likewise affirmed the superiority of "proletarian internationalism" over "peaceful coexistence." A recent Soviet study confirms that coexistence is "based on the deep conviction that... from this competition the socialist system will inevitably emerge victorious." (Levin, op. cit., p. 9.)
Even if Moscow looks forward to a United Nations as a Soviet "front" organization, it clearly does not and cannot afford to bank on such an eventuality. For the next few years the Soviet bloc cannot control a UN majority. Hence its strategy is likely to continue imaginative but on the whole cautious enough not to gamble all to win or lose all. Indeed, at present the Soviet leaders—in spite of their elation over recent propaganda victories in it, still see the United Nations largely as an American captive. Khrushchev has been remarkably outspoken in his comments, which indicate unmistakably that the United Nations is not by any means central in his thinking on world affairs. In an interview with Turner Catledge of The New York Times, on May 10, 1957, Khrushchev discussed European security:

Perhaps it would be expedient to set up some kind of special body where the participants in a European security system could exchange views to prevent tension in the relations between countries. If enough confidence was established, then in that case perhaps the need for a special body would fall away and problems could be examined in the United Nations....

When thereupon Mr. Catledge asked, "Do you regard the United Nations as an important international instrument for the settlement of international problems?" the answer he received was:

The United Nations can of course be regarded as a useful instrument. But I would be going against my conscience if I called it an important instrument for the settlement of international problems today. So long as a situation exists in the UNO where everything is bossed by the United States, where the United States commands countries receiving sops from it, that organization
will in effect be not an international organization but a branch of the USA. Of course, even today it happens that the UN expresses the aspirations and desires of the peoples. But, regretfully, such cases are rare.  

A few months later Khrushchev again explained, in an interview with correspondent Henry Shapiro:

Some of the UN delegations often vote with the United States, but after the voting they come up to our delegation and apologize for not having voted for the Soviet proposals even though they believe them to be correct (what can we do, we depend on American credits). How can the many member nations of the United Nations which are in debt to the United States act independently?

The United Nations of course does something useful and that is why we belong to it. But it is a mechanism that stalls in its work. This must be taken into account.

And when Anastas Mikoyan visited the United States, he replied with reference to the UN resolution on Hungary: "It was adopted through the voting machine, the majority [of] which is at the disposal of the United States." Izvestia confirms: "The drill sergeant system that American representatives have imposed on the United Nations for fourteen years is the main reason that the organization has not lived up to the hopes resting upon it."

There is undoubtedly an element of convenient apology in this assertion that anti-Soviet votes are not really anti-Soviet, but


8. Ibid., p. 274 (interview of November 14, 1957).

9. The New York Times, January 19, 1959. The Russian original of the statement (before being diplomatically weakened by the Soviet interpreter) was, "which obeys the United States."

merely reflections of economic indebtedness to the United States (a situation apt to end, as Moscow sees it, as Soviet economic might and economic contacts abroad grow apace in the years ahead). Yet one need not doubt the major point made by Khrushchev: Soviet membership in the United Nations and the organisation itself are still
considered "useful" but not "important."\textsuperscript{10}

In Moscow's view, the present transitional phase is marked by the fact that, although the political inferiority of the Soviet Union is already a matter of the past, the "socialist bloc" does not yet have the edge. Thanks to Afro-Asian support, the camp led by the Soviet Union is gaining in strength in its contest with the Western camp, which (Moscow tells us) relies on military alliances, armament race, and the suppression of national liberation movements to "impose an American diktat upon other countries."\textsuperscript{11} The formula for Soviet policy at the United Nations in this intermediate period is to seek (1) sanction for the status quo; (2) a peculiar sort of truce, in which the several states may individually gird for combat and wage economic and ideological strife but the United Nations would be directed, for instance, to avoid "controversial" issues in making information available to member states; and (3) "parity" in representation.

\textsuperscript{10} This has been the attitude for over a decade. In 1947 the Soviet textbook of international law declared: "The importance of international organizations must not be overestimated. Such organizations materially facilitate relations among states and to a certain extent promote technical and scientific development....They certainly do not put an end to the inherent contradictions of the capitalist world." (Durdenevsky and Krylov, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo, 1947, p. 409.)

\textsuperscript{11} V. A. Zorin, statement at press conference on conclusion of 13th session of the General Assembly, December 12, 1958.
The latter drive has apparently not been the subject of extensive "theoretical" formulations. Indeed, its spirit is difficult to reconcile with Soviet propaganda in favor of equality of member states; for, in essence, it demands that representation in important bodies—concerned, for instance, with nuclear weapons or outer space—correspond to power realities rather than to ratios of membership in the United Nations. Reflecting the Soviet sense of power, so typical of the sputnik age, the Soviet delegation has refused to participate in the work of the UN Disarmament Commission, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and the Committee on Space Research, unless the total number of Soviet and neutralist members on these bodies at least equaled that of the Western nations there represented.¹¹

This stance has dramatized the sense of might and independence of the Soviet Union—and has led India and the United Arab Republic to join in abstaining from meetings of the outer space committee. In fact, to be effective, operational recommendations of such committees must have the wholehearted and unanimous support of members, whatever the arithmetic of representation. In terms of political prestige, however, the drive for parity implies a significant Soviet demand to have the United States acknowledge its status as co-equal on the world scene. While it feels that it cannot yet ask for more, Moscow feels that it need settle for no less—meanwhile safeguarding its freedom of action and immunity from foreign inspection.⁰


⁰ The sense of being outnumbered was reflected in Khrushchev's conversation with a group of nine American governors (which the author attended) in July 1959. Seeking to monopolize the conversation, Khrushchev kept the governors from interrupting, with the remark, "Don't gang up on me; let me talk! What do you think this is, the United Nations?"
It is possible that there is some disagreement in the Soviet leadership over the precise place of the United Nations—as there has been, in recent years, over a wide range of foreign policy issues, from Yugoslavia to cultural exchanges. The neo-Stalinists, until 1957 represented by Molotov, have in effect advocated a boycott or "conspiracy of silence" of inconvenient activities and decisions of the United Nations. The Khrushchevites, on the other hand, flexible and opti-
mistic, have been prepared to work with the United Nations to a greater extent but without any intention of weakening ways and means of warding off UN "attacks" on national sovereignty and the veto power. These defenses have served the Soviet Union well—as in the Hungarian crisis of 1956.

Within the Soviet leadership, it is safe to assume that the military tends to ignore the United Nations and that the Communist Party apparatchiks likewise view it with a mixture of cynicism and disdain. The dominant view, then, is apt to be distinctly manipulative and eclectic: The United Nations is an organization to be "used" if and when convenient. Both major groups—the more isolationist and the more expansive wings—reject, as all Communists must, the "one-world" aspects and implications of United Nations activities. In this regard, there is no change apparent. The Soviet Union views the United Nations as a vehicle of policy, not as a bridge or meeting-ground to compromise negotiable differences of ideology, social philosophy, or theories of interpersonal and international relations.

The determinants of Soviet policy toward the United Nations are to be found outside the United Nations. Moscow has learned to ignore the United Nations with impunity. Soviet leaders have traditionally preferred bilateral negotiations to mass assemblies not stage-managed by themselves. The Soviet press has claimed, for instance, that the Iran crisis of 1946 was resolved not by the United Nations but by direct negotiation. On the whole the United Nations has acted either "under pressure from the USA" (as in Korea) or else as "nothing more than a passive registrar of world events." The United Nations had nothing to do with easing international tensions: the Geneva spirit was a product of the great powers' own endeavors. Recent Soviet insistence on summit talks and apparent

rebuff of efforts of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to assist in the solution of the German crisis point in the same direction. The initial Soviet strategy and all the zigzags thereafter can be traced to changes outside the United Nations.

The Soviet Union has insisted, in recent years, on Western recognition of the status quo. What this amounts to in the UN context is the realization that the Soviet Union can ignore the outside world—and the United Nations—when it comes to issues within the "socialist camp" at the same time that it can seek to exploit the United Nations on problems concerning other nations. Moscow has insisted that conditions and relations within the Soviet orbit are outside the purview of the United Nations or anyone else. As Khrushchev suggested in recent interviews with Walter Lippmann, Adlai Stevenson, and others, the real status quo today is revolution itself. Thus the convenient formula of the status quo means with respect to Eastern Europe (and China) acquiescence in the present system; while the status quo in the outside world means recognition of the unalterable "revolutionary" process, i.e., the world drift toward Communist victory. "Peaceful coexistence" is not international conciliation but a means of combat.

What does Moscow expect to gain from the pursuit of its efforts through the United Nations?

Membership, even at times of considerable adversity, has conferred on the Soviet Union valuable opportunities for the settlement of some relatively minor disputes, for information-gathering and international contacts, for gaining prestige and respectability as a major power in the family of nations; and, of utmost importance, for propaganda. Soviet analysts have candidly discussed in what ways there is "need and viability for this international organization founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence." They have noted that the United Nations has value as an "international forum"; as a gathering point of increasing universality, including especially "young states of the Asian and African conti-
ments”; and as a vehicle for the dissemination of Soviet declarative proposals (such as the suggestions, at the 12th session of the General Assembly, to adopt declarations on peaceful coexistence, on stopping nuclear weapons tests, and on obligations not to employ nuclear weapons). These presumably outweigh such "shameful pages" as Korea and Hungary in the record of the United Nations. What is needed above all is for the United States to stop "flagrantly violating the United Nations Charter", and its "undeviating observance by all the members of the Organization."13

Such an outlook foretells the type of issues which Moscow is likely to submit to the United Nations in the next few years—selecting them in arbitrary and opportunistic fashion whenever there is promise of success: issues of Western racial and trade discrimination in dealings with other peoples; charges of colonialism, as over West Irian and Goa; attacks on "imperialism," of the Suez or Lebanese crises type; demands for the evacuation of foreign troops and foreign bases; insistence on universal membership, including the admission of Communist China and the Mongolian People's Republic; and various proposals on disarmament, weapons testing, and declarative prohibitions on certain categories of arms and forces. As in the past, the Soviet Union will oppose the use of the United Nations for issues where it can negotiate more effectively on a bilateral basis from a "position of strength" or where majority opinion (and, to some extent, public opinion outside the United Nations) is hostile to the Soviet stand.

What this suggests is a shift in the ideal image of the United Nations in the Soviet mind from a security organization to a "front" organization. The initial Soviet commitment to participate in the League and in the United Nations can safely be taken as due primarily to an endeavor to buttress Russian security. This, it would appear, has been a receding consideration. With Great Power dis-

putes and qualitatively crucial developments in weapons technology, with the relative growth of Soviet military and economic power, and with a deeply-ingrained reluctance to trust in the mechanics of a "non-power" debating club, the Soviet Union has not and will not rely on the United Nations for its security. On the other hand, the United Nations emerges in the set of Khrushchevite strategies as a super-Bandung or super-Cairo, an extension of world peace congresses and other institutions which, behind the scenes, Communists strive to control and manipulate.

The world is far from seeing the United Nations converted into a Soviet "front." Indeed, once that effort succeeded, the need for it would disappear, for the United Nations in its present complexion and outlook can have no place in the future commonwealth of communist nations. In the interim, it can be a serviceable tool. How realistic is this Soviet outlook? On the whole, it has been realistic about the balance of power, about the capabilities and vulnerabilities of states. It has tended, and not without reason, to ignore the United Nations as a crucial or powerful obstacle on its path. Indeed what could the United Nations do in the face of Soviet hostility? "The United Nations in this situation is not powerless, but neither is it indispensable," Raymond Aron has said. "If the United Nations did not exist it is to be doubted whether the Soviet Union would invade Iran or Yugoslavia."

Armanment may or may not forestall wars; surely international organizations do not. Yet a substantial unrealism intervenes when Soviet analysis concerns a pluralist world. The Soviet world view invites dialectic, dichotomic perception: bipolarity is the natural shape to which Moscow imagines the universe to tend. Indeed, the Soviet image of the United Nations has been—from the formula contained in the major encyclopedia to the summary in the

basic text on foreign affairs—one of struggle between "two opposite political lines"—with the Soviet bloc faithfully defending the organization against the American-led "gravediggers of sovereignty," proponents of colonialism, advocates of militarism and racism, tools of monopoly capitalism. So long as such bipolarity prevails, Soviet analysis is simple (sometimes too simple to fit the facts) and often shrewd.

It is precisely with regard to neutralism—the crucial "third" element in this bipolar complex—that this analysis is apt to run into difficulty. Moscow assumes—probably correctly that sooner or later the neutrals must fall into line. In the long run, they cannot sit on the fence. "Either here or there," has been Khrushchev's comment about Tito and others who have sought to avoid identification with either camp. The muting of specifically Communist objectives is admittedly a strategem to attract fellow-travelers who may wish to go part of but not all the way on the same road as the Soviet Union. As a Communist official of the Indian state of Kerala told Averell Harriman in early 1959, the fact that you expect to be a dog in your next incarnation does not need to make you bark now. Which way the uncommitted will go when forced by the logic of international strife and Soviet (and American) prodding to "align" themselves remains in doubt. There is here an area of fluidity which can be turned to Moscow's disadvantage. Soviet insistence on ultimate bipolarity itself is apt to contribute to antagonizing this "third force."

Otherwise Soviet conduct—rigid in many respects—has been increasingly flexible. Soviet behavior at the United Nations has been less and less gauche. Soviet performance and personnel have been more and more competent. There has been time to train Soviet UN specialists, who have an integral part in Soviet foreign office and foreign policy structure and strategy.

As for the basic Soviet relationship with the United States and the other

non-Communist great powers, Moscow does not expect any basic changes to result from and through the United Nations. Those difficulties have their roots outside the organization and go well beyond it. In this one respect "their" and "our" view is likely to coincide. In the words of George F. Kennan,

it is not fair to the Organization today to ask it to resolve the predicaments of the past as well as of the present. No international organization can be stronger than the structure of relationships among the Great Powers that underlies it; and to look to such an organization to resolve deep-seated conflicts of interest among the Great Powers is to ignore its limitations and to jeopardize its usefulness in other fields.