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WOMEN IN POLITICS: A CROSS-NATIONAL DEMAND AND
SUPPLY ANALYSIS

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
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By

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ABSTRACT

It is striking that the sharp increase in the number of countries moving towards self-governance and democracy has not been accompanied by more equal political representation of women. What is equally puzzling is the contrast in the share of women in positions of political authority observed between countries, with many developed nations having fewer women legislators than a number of lesser-developed countries. Why are there so few women in most parliaments and why is there such variation across countries?

To understand gender-based inequality in political authority, we look at the various stages of candidacy and identify potential bottlenecks to women participation and election into public office. There are three stages which one must pass through successfully to become a legislator. The first is becoming eligible and a part of the pool from which politicians are drawn, then being selected as a candidate and finally being elected to office. Potential barriers to entry for women in the legislative process may exist at any or all of these three stages.

Each of these candidacy stages is discussed through a cross-national analysis and a case study of India. The cross-national data is for 175 countries at three points in time: 1975,

1985 and 1995. The Indian case study looks at women in parliament from the first general elections in 1951-1952 and focuses most on the 1996 parliamentary data.

We argue that the key factor limiting the recruitment of women into politics is women's sparse representation in the pool from which politicians are recruited. Just as in the case of men, women are drawn from an elite pool based on their occupational achievements. Countries that have a greater share of women in their professional and managerial labor force are able to recruit more women into politics. Having women well represented in the eligibility pool for political candidates, broadly the elite professions is necessary to provide a conduit for women into politics.

While female labor force participation has increased dramatically in the last three decades, the relative position of women in highly paid/high status professions has increased only marginally. So it is not a case of active discrimination against women in politics or a case of different gender preferences, with women having less interest in politics. It is fundamentally a case of women being less represented in the specific labor pool from which politicians are drawn.

In a number of developing countries, secluded labor markets have provided access for women from elite families into top industry and professional leadership positions. This has led to a relatively larger proportion of women in the political eligibility pool and consequently to a higher level of female recruitment in politics than in countries in which women comprise a smaller part of the elite professional pool. However, in many countries, the process of industrialization has generated economic and social pressures that have imposed greater restrictions on women in the economic, and consequently, political sphere. This suggests that economic development, while it opens some opportunities for women, can also make achievement of higher leadership positions more difficult.

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1 Introduction

It is striking that the sharp increase in the number of countries moving towards self-governance and democracy has not been accompanied by more equal political representation of women. The number of nations with democratic governments has jumped from 26 in 1945 to 176 in 1995. The proportion of women in national legislatures has increased only modestly, from 3% to 12% in the same time period (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1999). While the commitment to representative governance has been quite rapidly spreading across the world, equality for women in positions of political authority remain a distant dream.

What is equally puzzling is the contrast in the share of women in positions of political authority observed between countries, with developed nations like the United States, Great Britain and Japan having women legislators below the world average and lesser developed countries like Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Mozambique and Cameroon having relatively large proportion of women in positions of political power (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1999).

Across regions as well the pattern of women's political authority is confounding. Asia has on average, a higher proportion women legislatures in the lower house of parliament than Europe (excluding the Scandinavian Countries). Sub-Saharan Africa, which lags behind in most socio-economic indicators, performs better than the Pacific Rim countries in this regard and is only a few percentage points behind Europe and the Americas in the percentage of women parliamentarians.¹

Figure 1-1: Cross regional variations in proportion of women legislators

<i>Region</i>	<i>% Women in Single House or lower House</i>
Nordic countries	38.7
Europe - OSCE member countries including Nordic countries	16.7
Americas	15.4

¹ The percentage of women parliamentarians in each country in the mid 1970s, 1980s and 1990s is listed in the appendix.

Asia	15.1
Europe - OSCE member countries (excluding Nordic countries)	14.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	11.8
Pacific	11.7
Arab States	4.6

Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2001

Why are there so few women in most parliaments and why is there such variation across countries? The most common explanation for the limited political power of women is that patriarchal structures in societies limit female participation in the public sphere. Although there is some truth in this explanation there are, nevertheless, puzzling facts that need to be addressed. First, even though women have entered the labor force in increasing numbers, political careers have been a notable exception. Why are there so few women politicians? Second, we would expect countries that have the most patriarchal structures, such as those in Asia, to have the least number of women in political authority. But, as noted before, quite paradoxically, these regions have a higher proportion of women in political power than Western Europe, if we exclude the Scandinavian countries (IPU 2001). Countries such as Argentina and Spain are often considered more *machista* than Britain or Canada but nevertheless have a greater proportion of female parliamentarians. Similarly, Venezuela and Colombia have more female political leaders than France (*Economist*: March 11, 2000; p.116). Obviously, more factors than culture and patriarchy are influencing women's share of political power.

1.1 Why is it important to study women in politics?

When we examine why women fought for the equal right to stand for elections, they perceived that women in parliaments would bring more gender relevant set of issues on the table. Australia led the world in 1894 by becoming the first jurisdiction to grant women the right to stand for parliament. As Mary Lee put it in 1893: "... how can men represent women? Men cannot think for women because they cannot think as women, and they cannot think as women because they are not women' (Voice 21 April 1893, pp. 77).

This is not to say that women have unified interests and speak with a common voice. Gender is often not the only or even the overriding identity in most cases, for women. Class, race, ethnicity and religion may provide more relevant motivations at different moments in time. Does that mean that gender is an irrelevant category as one studies representation of groups in politics?

There is often a psychological reluctance to view women as a distinct interest group because such groups can be adversarial, pitting themselves against each other to gain control over political or economic resources. The characterization of women and men as competing groups in the public sphere coexists uncomfortably with the ideal of both sexes sharing selflessly with each other in the private sphere. A large part of the resistance to acknowledging gender as a distinct political entity has to do with the tension between the public and private sphere. There is an unspoken fear that legitimizing women and men as two distinct groups with divergent and often competing interests will somehow weaken the 'natural' and apolitical ties between the sexes in the private sphere. This sentiment was most clearly expressed during debates to grant women the right to vote. The argument against giving women a political identity, was that "the suffrage movement strikes a blow at the home and the marriage relation, and that the ballot is demanded by its advocates for the purpose of making women independent of the present social order."² (in Detroit Free Press review of Helen Kendrick Johnson, 1897) Women have achieved the right to vote in almost all countries, but the acknowledgment that women and men may have separate and often conflicting interests has been slower in coming.

The invasion of rational choice theory into the household unit has opened the private sphere and household relations to inquiry. Even though early studies of the rational economic behavior of households were based on the notion of a gender-neutral joint utility function, this assumption has been gradually challenged. A growing body of economic and sociological research argues now in favor of an analysis based on separate utility functions and strategic bargaining of partners.³ Depending on their resources and fall-back positions, scholars note that women and men assume different roles within the household. The

² Other arguments were made as well for why women should not get the right to vote. In the U.S. granting blacks the right to vote was also tied up with the women's suffrage issue.

³ The seminal research on this was by Gary Becker (1965). In his work on household economics, he demonstrated how neoclassical economic laws could be applied to not only traditional realm of firm level organization but also to household behavior. Many scholars have challenged the single household utility

household has thus moved from being one of 'natural' association between women and men to an arena where power and interests shape the relations between the two sexes. With the sanctity of the concept of inseparable interests of women and men within the private sphere being challenged, the notion that gender is a valid category in interest group politics is being taken more seriously.

Indeed, research has shown that women do have concerns that are distinct. Issues such as greater protection against domestic violence, inheritance and custody rights and maternity benefits affect women's well being throughout the world. Furthermore, general problems, such as war, the rise of religious identities and economic crises affect women in a way that is different and more debilitating than men. It has been quite well documented that sexual violence against women is often an instrument of war and that women and children are vulnerable targets, especially in civil wars where the combatant zones are within civilian areas. The spread of religious fundamentalism often means more restrictions for women than men, the extreme case being the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which banned women from attending school and engaging in professional work. Economic shocks, while they affect both men and women, have been shown to affect women even more adversely. Studies of the structural adjustment programs in Latin America, for example, have shown that women and especially female-headed households have suffered the greatest economic deprivation and malnutrition.

Having a political voice to reflect these concerns involves not only advocacy from outside of government, but influence from within government. Those in power are able to influence policy based on their own interests and identity.⁴ But just having a few women in legislatures cannot take care of gender concerns. The seminal work by Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) on tokenism and gender, and many subsequent studies on the subject show that when a group is highly skewed, with most members from one group and only a few, typically under 15% from another group, the members of the minority group suffer from

function employed by Becker. For example, see Bolak 1997, Calasanti and Bailey 1991, Ferree 1990, Okin 1989.

⁴ For example recent studies by Kalt and Zupan (1984) show that the legislator's own policy preferences are a primary determinant of roll call voting behavior in U.S. legislatures. Pandev(2002) demonstrates how legislators from ethnic minority communities, such as the lower castes in India, influences government policies and government transfers. Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2001) present empirical evidence from a controlled experiment on how women in local councils in India bring different issue interests into political discourse.

social isolation and are impaired in their ability to work effectively. Only when the ratio approaches 65:35 do the minority group members feel they can more comfortably carve a space for themselves in the group and push forward their own ideas in the workplace. Almost all the parliaments in the world fall short of this criteria with regard to women! Some studies on women in politics do show that with even less percentage of women in parliament, around 15% or so, gender concerns do get vocalized, but only to a limited extent.⁵ Thus being marginal in the echelons of policy-making is not benign for women.

The sparse representation of women in national legislatures is reflected at other levels of government. Table 1-1 indicates that from the data available, women are equal, if not worse of, in their representation at the municipal level.

Table 1-1: Women and Political Authority in Select Regions, 1990-1994

Region	Female Council members (%)	Female mayors (%)	Female Legislators in Upper & Lower Chamber of the National Parliament (%)	Women at Ministerial Level (%)
Latin America and the Caribbean	10	4	10	8
European Union	16	5	14	16
Nordic Countries	29	17	35	31

Source: Human Development Report, 1995

Our study focuses on the national legislatures, specifically at the lower house of parliament. The reason for this is two-fold. From a normative standpoint, across countries, irrespective of whether they are federal or unitary in decision-making, a significant part of policy-making is done at the center. The proportion of women in national politics is therefore important. Second, from a practical perspective, there is much more commonality at the national level across countries in how legislatures are structured and function. More data is available at this level as well. This facilitates a more comprehensive and robust cross-country comparison.

⁵ See for example Grey 2001 and Thomas 1994.


1.2 Why are there such few women in politics?

To understand gender-based inequality in political authority, we look at the various stages of candidacy and identify potential bottlenecks to women participation and election into public office. There are three stages which one must pass through successfully to become a legislator. The first is becoming eligible and a part of the pool from which politicians are drawn, then being selected as a candidate and finally being elected to office. Potential barriers to entry for women in the legislative process may exist at any or all of these three stages and can be categorized as supply side or demand side obstacles.

Supply side impediments are those that make women less likely to enter politics. They are restrictions on the available pool of women who would be suitable to enter politics. Demand side barriers, on the other hand, are recruitment hurdles ranging from selection of candidates by parties to selection of candidates by voters. This distinction can be understood more clearly with an analogy to an economic product. With various inputs, the factory manufactures and supplies some products. The distributors and retailers can choose which of the goods to sell. Out of the goods on display, consumers can choose which ones they want to purchase. From the most upstream point in the value chain, the manufacturer is the ultimate supplier of goods, and the transactions downstream with the distributor/retailer and the final customers represents demand for the good. So in the political sphere, the people come forward from society to offer themselves as political candidates. Often political parties act as the intermediary and choose which ones they will endorse. Finally the voters make their selection out of the contestants and the lucky few get chosen as legislators.

Factors that play into the supply and demand for women politicians are enumerated in Figure 1-2.

Figure 1-2: Candidacy Stages and Supply and Demand Factors



On the supply side, gender attitudes towards formal politics, time to commit to political activities, kinship ties with political leaders, the level of economic development and presence of women in the pool from which politicians are drawn could affect the share of women who come forward to join politics. On the demand side, recruiters, mainly political parties, may vary in their willingness to sponsor women's candidacy depending on the electoral structure and party characteristics. Finally, voters may vary in their desire to elect women candidates for a number of reasons, such as lingering prejudice, experience of the candidates and the attractiveness of the party platform on which they contest.

Each of these candidacy stages is discussed in the subsequent chapters through a cross-national analysis and a case study of India. The cross-national data is for 175 countries at three points in time: 1975, 1985 and 1995. The Indian case study looks at women in

parliament from the first general elections in 1951-1952 and focuses most on the 1996 parliamentary data. Since gaining independence from the British in 1947, India has been a democracy. It has two houses of parliament, the Upper House called the *Rajya Sabha* and the Lower House called the *Lok Sabha*. The Upper House has 245 members indirectly elected by the elected members of State Legislative Assemblies. The lower house of parliament can have a maximum of 550 representatives, elected directly by the people every five years. The election system is simple plurality; one in which each district or constituency elects one member based on which candidate gets the most votes. Our study focuses on the lower house of parliament, which has approximately 9% women as of 2002 (Election Commission of India).

The choice of India as a case study is particularly relevant for two reasons. First, there are numerous studies looking at women's political representation in the industrialized countries, but as scholars within the field have generally recognized, there is a very little understanding of the systematic factors affecting women's representation in politics in the developing world. Are the factors influencing women's entry into politics different in industrialized and developing countries? Second, India is a relevant case study not only because it is a developing country, but also because it is the largest democracy in the world. One out of every four voters in the world resides in India, and so understanding women's political representation within the country is quite important if we want to understand women's political representation in democracies.

The combination of a large N study with a more detailed analysis of a specific country attempts to capture the benefits of both techniques of analysis, and at the same time, minimize their shortcomings. Using cross-national data helps us discern common patterns across countries. It allows us to see on average, how the variables of interest move and interact with each other. Just looking at a single country may lead us to conclusions that may not reflect general trends but instead be biased by the idiosyncratic characteristics of our specific case study. In a statistical sense, these cases would be outliers and may be interesting for many reasons, but building generalizable theories on these can be misleading. Even if we do identify a single case that can be considered 'normal', it is hard to tell which aspects of the variation we see are case specific and which are more broadly applicable.

But looking at cross-national statistical effects alone is not altogether satisfying as it provides a granular picture. Countries vary around the general trend, and examining a

country in some detail provides a richer, contextual narrative. Seeing to what extent the general pattern actually holds within a country, and how country-specific attributes shape outcomes helps us get a more nuanced understanding of the complex forces at play. Examining a specific country also helps us test hypotheses for which there isn't cross-country data. In the social sciences, a number of variables are difficult to quantify and it is even more difficult to assign standardized values that would apply across countries. For example, characterizing a political party as being centralized or decentralized in its organizational structure is difficult enough. But if one adds in the cross-national dimension, what may be a relatively centralized party in one country may actually be quite decentralized in another country, in comparison with the parties there. In this case, it may not be possible to perform a meaningful cross-national comparison. A within country analysis would be more suitable, even though the conclusions would not be as definitive. The methodology, which combines a cross-national large N analysis with a more in-depth country investigation provides a robust structure through which we can identify the systematic factors affecting women entry into politics in developing and developed countries.

1.3 Structure and Chapter Outline

The puzzle we are trying to understand is why few women enter political careers around the world, and the contrast in the proportion of women in legislatures across countries. The dissertation is divided into three major sections, each comprised of a cross-national chapter and an Indian case study chapter. Starting from demand-side theories, Chapter 2 formulates and tests various voting behavior hypotheses to see if the women are less likely than men to get voted into power. It examines voting behavior theories and evaluates if women are disadvantaged while contesting elections. Three things voters look at in a candidate – personal traits, qualifications and party platform– may work against women contestants. If there are gender prejudices among the electorate, then a key personal attribute may be the sex of the candidate, with women finding it difficult to get elected because voters prefer male political leaders. Second, even voters who are rational about their preferences and vote on the basis of the competency of different candidates could put women contestants at a disadvantage. This is because women, on average, are thought to be new

entrants to politics and thus possessing less experience than men, who have traditionally dominated the political scene. Finally, swings in voter preferences for political parties could affect the electoral chances of women, through a clustering effect. If women candidates are predominantly clustered in one party, then their chances of getting elected would depend in part on the popularity of their party platform. If this latter hypothesis is true, then variations in the number of women elected across countries and over time within a country may be reflecting swings in voter preferences between political parties.

If it is indeed the case that women candidates, on average, have a low probability of winning, this could possibly have negative backward linkages with political parties being more reluctant to field female candidates and women being more reluctant to enter politics. Electoral behavior would then pose a serious bottleneck to women's entry into politics, affecting their availability to join politics, their recruitment by political parties and selection to the legislature.

The cross-national data analysis provides two findings. First, averaging across the world, the probability of winning for women candidates is almost equal to that of men. Overall, there is not much evidence of gender bias amongst the electorate. Political experience or lack thereof also does not seem to diminish women candidates' chances at the polls. Thus the paucity of women parliamentarians in the world cannot be attributed to low probability of winning for women candidates. Second, contrary to common perception, there is no evidence that religious beliefs or education levels give rise to gender prejudices in electoral behavior and women have a relatively high probability of winning in many developing countries. Nor can variations in the proportion of women in parliaments be attributed to whether leftist or right-wing parties are in power, as leftist parties are not more likely to field women candidates than conservative parties. More generally, variations in the proportion of women parliamentarians across countries cannot be explained by differences in the electoral chances of women

Chapter 3 examines the voting behavior hypotheses in India. Moving from a more general analysis, to a specific case study, we examine the voting behavior hypotheses through the lens of India. Are there gender biases in the electorate and are states with higher level of education more likely to elect women candidates? Do the voters care about political qualifications of candidates and are women candidates inexperienced? Across time, are

variations in the proportion of women legislators in India due to clustering of women candidates in the left parties, and swings in votes from left to right parties?

The evidence from India suggests that voting behavior, whether based on gender preconceptions, experience of candidates or their political party, is a not the barrier to women's entry into higher political office, and some these factors may even give women an electoral advantage. The empirical evidence from India the supports the cross-national patterns discussed in the previous chapter, that women candidates have an equal, if not better chance of winning elections as compared to male contestants.

Although women are attractive to voters when they are chosen as candidates, there are simply very few females contesting elections. It is not low electoral chances, but actually getting women to contest elections, which seems the real bottleneck to increasing women's presence in the national parliament. Why are so few women contesting in national elections?

The second section of the dissertation evaluates the effects of electoral and political party systems on recruitment of women into politics. Chapter 4 examines differences in electoral systems. Most scholars focus on the design of the electoral system as the dominant factor affecting recruitment of women in politics. Electoral systems that have proportional representation are seen as much more likely to have women legislators than simple plurality systems. It examines two types of arguments for why Proportional Representation (PR) systems will recruit more women in legislatures than simple plurality systems, the first a structural one and the second an agency argument. The structural argument explores the cube law in the context of gender and how having a small vote shares may lead to even fewer seats being allocated to women. The agency theory examines if parties are more or less likely to recruit women under a plurality vs. PR system. The cross-national data shows that PR systems have significantly more women in parliament than simple plurality systems, but it is hard to infer causality based on electoral system variations, because these two categories of countries also differ significantly in key socioeconomic variables. Multivariate regression analysis reveals that some socioeconomic factors have significantly greater impact on women's access to political power than the type of electoral system.

In Chapter 5, through the lens of India, we look at party structures. Prior research has suggested that the degree of centralization and degree of institutionalization of political parties may have an impact on the selection of women candidates. We focus on three major political parties in India and find that there is no systematic relationship between the

organizational characteristics of political parties and their propensity to recruit women candidates. In fact, political parties in general seem quite open to recruiting women, but the complaint is that there don't seem to be enough eligible women candidates.

Turning to the factors constraining the supply of women in politics, in Chapter 6 we look at issues affecting women's decision to enter politics through a simple utility function. We argue that women face the same incentives for joining politics as men. The key factor limiting the recruitment of women into politics is women's sparse representation in the pool from which politicians are recruited. Just as in the case of men, women are drawn from an elite pool based on their occupational achievements. Rather than political kinship ties, as is commonly perceived, the chief trait of women politicians is their professional accomplishments. Countries that have a greater share of women in their professional and managerial labor force are able to recruit more women into politics. Having women well represented in the eligibility pool for political candidates, broadly the elite professions is necessary to provide a conduit for women into politics.

The proportion of women in parliament has increased on average, by only 2% over the last three decades because it is dependent on the prevalence of women in upper echelons of professions such as law. While women have entered the labor force in increasing numbers, their share in elite occupations is small. For example, there are only 12.5 % women in high managerial in US (*Working Women's Magazine*, March 2001). Female labor force participation has increased dramatically in the last three decades, the relative position of women in highly paid/high status professions has increased only marginally. So it is not a case of active discrimination against women in politics or a case of different gender preferences, with women having less interest in politics. It is fundamentally a case of women being less represented in the specific labor pool from which politicians are drawn.

In a number of developing countries, secluded labor markets have provided access for women from elite families into top industry and professional leadership positions. This has led to a relatively larger proportion of women in the political eligibility pool and consequently to a higher level of female recruitment in politics than in countries in which women comprise a smaller part of the elite professional pool. However, in many countries, the process of industrialization has generated economic and social pressures that have imposed greater restrictions on women in the economic, and consequently, political sphere.

This suggests that economic development, while it opens some opportunities for women, can also make achievement of higher leadership positions more difficult.

The argument by no means assumes that the composition of the political elite is static and unchangeable. As economic development affects the composition of women in the managerial and professional occupations, so may economic development simultaneously alter the characteristics of the political elite. It is, we claim, that despite shifts in the groups that attain political power, the unchanging factor is that the bulk of parliamentarians come from elite managerial and professional backgrounds. In Chapter 7 we look at the case of India to get a more detailed look at the pool from which politicians are drawn, and the dynamic and enduring characteristics of the political elite. We argue that despite changes in the groups that gain political power, the common characteristic of political leaders, women and men, is that they are drawn from an elite socio-economic background. Across countries and within India, the majority of political figures come from an elite economic class, with managerial and professional background in law, academia and elite cadres of the civil services or managerial services. Even those drawn from labor unions or lower castes, as usually well educated and leaders or economic elites within their communities. The proportion of women in the group from which the political elite are drawn, chiefly the managerial and professional pool, then gets reflected in their numbers in parliament. The conclusion summarizes the arguments presented and discusses some policy implications of our findings.

2 Voting Behavior

Can the paucity and variations in the number of women legislators in the world be explained by electoral behavior? One common perception is that women are just not viable candidates and that voters may, for a variety of psychological and rational reasons, prefer to vote for male political contestants.⁶ Three things voters look at in a candidate – personal traits, qualifications and party platform- may work against women contestants. If there are gender prejudices among the electorate, then a key personal attribute may be the sex of the candidate, with women finding it difficult to get elected because voters prefer male political leaders. Second, even voters who are rational about their preferences and vote on the basis of the competency of different candidates could put women contestants at a disadvantage. This is because women, on average, are thought to be new entrants to politics and thus possessing less experience than men, who have traditionally dominated the political scene. Finally, swings in voter preferences for political parties could affect the electoral chances of women, through a clustering effect. If women candidates are predominantly clustered in one party, then their chances of getting elected would depend in part on the popularity of their party platform. If this latter hypothesis is true, then variations in the number of women elected across countries and over time within a country might be reflecting, to some extent, swings in voter preferences between political parties.

If it is indeed the case that women candidates, on average, have a low probability of winning, this could possibly have negative backward linkages with political parties being more reluctant to field female candidates and women being more reluctant to enter politics. Electoral behavior would then pose a serious bottleneck to women's entry into politics, affecting their availability to join politics, their recruitment by political parties and selection to the legislature.

The following sections examine if women candidates have a lower chance of winning elections than men. The first section looks at gender bias among voters and its impact on women's electoral chances. The second section examines the political qualifications of women candidates and the effect of these on voter decisions. In the next section we discuss

⁶ See discussion in Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994, Frankovic and Gelb 1992, Jonathan Kelley

the effects of party preferences on women candidates and whether swings in the party getting the majority vote accounts for variations in the number of women elected. Finally, we test the arguments more formally with a statistical analysis.

2.1 Gender Prejudice

It is common for scholars to discuss voting behavior in terms of political parties and issues such as abortion and education, but very few raise the issue of whether the electorate has any biases in terms of the candidate's gender. Are people likely to prefer male over female candidates? Voters should only care about the various party platforms and the qualifications of the candidates. Nevertheless, there is evidence of gender stereotyping among some voters, which could potentially affect women's chances of winning.

A few decades ago, George Gallup noted in the U.S., that the "strongest remaining prejudice regarding a presidential candidate is the prejudice against a woman." Gallup Poll results from a national survey in the U.S. in the early seventies revealed that 84% of the respondents would vote for a qualified Catholic, 77% would vote for a qualified Jew and only 55% would vote for a woman, no matter how good her qualifications (in Paul Foley 1964). Similarly a Euroborometer survey of Western European nations in 1975, asking if people had more confidence in a male or female legislative representatives, showed many people being more comfortable with men at the helm in politics. Although half to two thirds of the respondents were neutral, a substantial number, ranging from 30% to 50% of those surveyed did have a preference, with the bulk expressing confidence in male representatives (Euroborometer 1975 in Baxter and Lansing 1983).

In more recent years, this bias seems to have diminished. A Gallup poll in the US in 1999 revealed that 92% of respondents would be willing to vote for a female presidential candidate. While this is much higher than the number in previous decades, it indicates that 7% of the respondents still carry a prejudice (1% were undecided), and may potentially be biased against women candidates contesting high-level political office (The Gallup Poll 1999 in Kennedy 2001).

and Ian McAllister 1984, and Sigelman and Welch 1984.

The bias against women in politics could well be higher than these polls show, as people may be reluctant to voice their prejudices so bluntly. When the question is framed in a more subtle way, we see that attitudes towards women in politics may still contain some stereotypes. For example a survey in the U.S. asked if men and women are equally fit to enter politics, or if men are emotionally more suited for politics. In 1974, 44% of the respondents said that they think men are more suited to politics. This perception has decreased over the years, but in the early 1980s, still a little over one third of the respondents viewed men to be more suited for politics (General Social Survey 1972-1984 in Darcy, Welch and Clark 1987). Another survey in the U.S. in 1996 shows that a number of people still view women primarily as home-makers and 16% of the respondents in the survey agreed with the statement that women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men (General Social Survey 1996 in Kennedy 2001). It is not inconceivable that these people might be biased when it comes to voting, and if other considerations are satisfied, be more likely to vote for the male candidates. The underlying bias against women, even if it is not the main consideration for the majority of voters, could affect the chances of a female contestant winning elections, especially in potentially close elections or where there is not much difference between party platforms.

These preconceptions of women may be present in many countries, but could vary in degree and intensity across societies. Among the general population and scholars alike, religion is viewed as is seen as a key variable shaping cultural norms and as an aspect of that, attitudes towards women (Norris and Inglehart 2000, Paxton 1997, Rule 1987). People often point to Islam and Muslim societies as being more suppressive towards women.⁷ The spectrum of “oppressive practices” in Islamic societies range from the wearing of a head-cover by many Muslim women across Islamic societies to constraints on women’s education and their prohibition to go out and work by the radical Islamic governments. If the private lives of women are so circumscribed in Islamic societies, then how can women in these countries achieve public and political authority?

Many scholars of Islam hotly contest the viewpoint that their religion is oppressive towards women. They argue that Islam is in essence as egalitarian, if not more, than other

⁷ Religious orthodoxy towards women is discussed not only in the context of Islam, but also in Catholicism. See, for example, F.A Sabbah, 1984 for this in Islam, L. Kenworthy & Malami, 1999 for women’s oppression in Catholicism. The effects of Islam on women’s rights and power are often viewed as the most

religions (Kandiyoti 1991). Furthermore, the large variation in women's rights within Muslim countries indicates that factors other than simply religion are shaping norms. The problem, from this perspective, is that it is not religion, but socio-economic variables, especially education or the lack thereof, which are a key factor influencing gender attitudes (Shukri 1999, Jalal 1991, Kandiyoti 1991, Bassouni 1988).

The notion that education shapes attitudes, with higher education leading to more egalitarian beliefs, is central to most of the literature on development, and dates back to the modernization and political development theories of the 1960s and 1970s. Modernization theorists argued that increasing education levels would alleviate irrational prejudices. This would then promote a political culture where potential political leaders would be chosen on the basis of their abilities, not sex, race or any other "primordial" characteristic (Almond and Verba 1965, Lerner 1958). It is now widely accepted that education is the primary factor in inducing egalitarian norms among people. Thus countries with an educated populace are considered more likely to regard women as equal to men and are likely to be gender neutral in their voting preferences (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Matland 1998). We would expect the more educated societies of the West to be receptive to female candidates in political leadership roles. Conversely, in the developing world, especially in countries with high levels of illiteracy, we would expect more hostility towards women candidates, and consequently, fewer women elected.


However, if we compare the proportion of women elected in the Western Europe (excluding the Nordic countries) and the South African Development Community (SADC) in the late 1990s, these differences do not appear. In the European countries 14% of those elected were women, while in the African nations, 18.4 % of the elected representatives were women. Within the SADC countries, in Tanzania, for example, 16.4% of those elected were women, even though 32% the population is illiterate and the Muslim population is very large, and in Botswana, with 30% illiteracy, 17% of the elected legislators were women.⁸

If there is a bias against women candidates, this should be reflected in their probability of getting elected. The probability of a woman getting elected is the number of women elected divided by the number of women contesting elections. Figure 2-1 provides a regional comparison of the probability of winning for female and male candidates in national

influential and negative, amongst religious patriarchal norms.

elections, and illustrates that the links between education, egalitarian norms and women’s electoral chances are not so clear-cut.

Figure 2-1: Probability of winning for female and male candidates in national elections, 1995-1996



Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997

The chart indicates that on average, there is not a significant difference in the probability of winning for female and male candidates. There is some cross-national variation, with women in Europe and North America and Asia-Pacific facing a lower probability of winning than men. Women’s electoral chances are equal or higher than men, in South America, the Middle East and Africa. Quite paradoxically, low levels of education characterize the latter two regions. In the Middle East and parts of Africa the practice of Islam is also widespread. So these two factors do not seem to have a negative impact on women’s probability of winning.

We more rigorously test if education or religious norms impact women’s electoral chances in the last section of the chapter, but the evidence so far seems to indicate that variations in women’s electoral chances have little to do with education or religion. It is thus more likely that voting decisions are more strongly influenced by factors other than gender

⁸ Data from www.ipu.org, www.cisa.org.za, and www.cia.gov.

prejudice, and these other considerations have a greater impact on women's chances of winning.

2.2 Political qualifications

Concerns of the electorate, such as the competence of candidates and the appeal of their political platform may weigh heavily in the minds of voters. Turning first to issues of competency, regardless of sex, the electorate could be quite concerned about the qualifications of the candidates. If on average, women candidates are less competent than the male contestants, they would face a lower probability of being elected. Some scholars speculate that women candidates are relatively less qualified and that this presumably translates into fewer women elected into political office (Norris 1996). Women are then caught in a vicious cycle- they cannot gain the relevant political expertise not having been elected into office, and face a lower chance of getting elected because they lack the experience. Could this be the bottleneck to women's entry into national politics?

The issue of "competence" is not straightforward and is based to a degree on subjective judgments. If women's qualifications are suspect because of their gender, then we are back to the issues of biases, albeit disguised in the form of rational considerations rather than simple prejudice. People may be skeptical of women's political qualifications if they see them as less well "suited" for politics and female candidates may have a hard time persuading voters to elect them.

Even if some objective scale is applied, it may still be used unequally on male and female candidates. For example, if a measure such as prior political experience of candidates is used, there could be differences in the importance voters attach to qualifications for female candidates vis-à-vis male candidates. There is some indication of this in a recent study on the political experience of men and women in Europe. Table 2-1 compares the prior experience of men and women contesting and elected to political office. In the figures for the national parliament, the percentage of women candidates with prior national experience is marginally less than that of male candidates. But of the elected members, 12.3% of the women have experience as compared to 7.7 % of the men. If these numbers are anything to go by, they indicate that voters are more likely to choose candidates with experience from

the pool of women, while in the pool of male candidates, only a small proportion of those chosen have prior political experience. In other words, political experience or lack thereof may be more of an issue in the case of women candidates.

Table 2-1: Prior Political Experience of Candidates in European Politics

% of candidates responding in the affirmative to the question of prior experience in these offices		
Office	Men	Women
European Parliament		
Candidate	23.8	25.6
Elected	8	9.5
National Parliament		
Candidate	38.9	34.1
Elected	7.7	12.3
Member of Government	4.9	7.6
Local Government		
Candidate	59.7	55.2
Elected	38.9	33.1

Source: European Candidate Study (data file, 1994) in Norris, 1996

Does this imply that women face an electoral disadvantage? A greater emphasis on qualifications in the case of women candidates may not matter very much if women have similar political background and experience as men. It could adversely affect women candidates, but only if they are relatively inexperienced. The data for Europe, for example, shows that male and female candidates at the national level have similar levels of political experience, and if this is the case in other places as well, voter preferences for political experience in women candidates would not, on average, lower women's chances of winning. But even if women have less prior political training or are perceived as being less experienced, it is not necessarily a drawback. Voters may be just as likely to give a chance to a "fresh face" or an "outsider" as they are to a political veteran, especially if they want a change in how politics is conducted. In these situations, it would actually be to the benefit of the candidate to be a new entrant to politics, and women who are novices may actually do well in this scenario. Besides, the European data shows that that over 85% of men and women elected did not have prior experience in the national legislature. The issue of experience does not seem to be a central concern for voters in their overall selection of legislators.

While we would like to think that people make rational and informed decisions based on thorough information, most voters in reality, do not even know the names of the

candidates when they go into vote, let alone be cognizant of their background and experience. In an study of American national elections for example, 80% of the voters could not name the candidates that contested from their district and 65% could not even name the incumbent.⁹ Voters are more likely to be interested in the political platform of the candidate, and vote according to the party platform and stance of the party with regard to issues salient to them. This means that the party affiliations of women candidates and the popularity of their platform with the voters would strongly influence their chances of winning.

2.3 Political parties

The probability of women winning and the number elected into national legislatures could be affected by swings in voter preferences for different political parties through a clustering effect. If women are predominant in one party, and their party platform is not appealing to voters, they will, overall, have a lower probability of being elected.

In one of the earliest studies of gender inequality, Duverger found left-wing parties to be more open to women in some European countries (Duverger, 1955). Since then, more generally across the world, left-wing parties are considered more likely to include women because of their egalitarian commitments and concern for underrepresented groups (see review in Caul 1997, also Kenworthy & Malami 1999, Lovenduski & Norris 1993). For example, Matland and Studlar propose that left-wing parties “feel a need to be sensitive to groups traditionally excluded from the circles of power...” (in Caul 1997, p.4). Moreover, in many countries, the women’s movement has traditionally been linked to the left-wing parties and these are considered attractive to the majority of women politicians because of their liberal stance on women’s issues such as abortion, education and welfare (Jensen 1982). Conservative parties on the other hand, are viewed as being less open and less attractive to women because they espouse traditional gender roles (Rule 1987).


If women are clustered in left-wing parties, when conservative parties are elected to power, we would expect to see a drop in women legislators, and conversely when left-wing parties become dominant we would expect an upward swing in the number of women being

⁹ CPS American National Election Study Post Election Survey 1982 in Darcy, Welch and Clark 1987.

elected. Differences in the number of women legislators between countries and in different time periods within a country may simply reflect switches in the ruling party.

Are leftist parties more gender-friendly than conservative parties? A survey by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2000) of over 1000 political parties across the ideological spectrum in 176 countries reveals that there is no major difference between left and right parties in how they view women candidates. In response to a question whether the party has a policy to nominate at least one women candidate per constituency, 47.2 % of the left parties 52.2 % of the right parties and 50% of the centrist parties replied in the affirmative. So right-wing parties seem slightly more willing to field women candidates.

Figure 2-2: Response of political parties to the question whether they have a policy to nominate at least one woman candidate in each political district



Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2000.

Although there is little variation in the general endorsement of women candidates across political parties, here may be differences in how strongly the parties actually support women's candidacy. Data on whether parties actively try to nominate women in constituencies that are supportive of the party indicate that left-parties are a bit more inclined to putting women in winning positions than conservative parties, with 11% percent

willing to do so as compared to 9% of right-wing ones. Centrist parties seem the most favorable to women with 30% claiming that they make an effort to put women in winning constituencies (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1999).

From these survey questions, it is ambiguous if left-wing or right-wing parties are similar or vary in their treatment of potential women candidates and whether there is any significant difference in the proportion of women elected when either type of party comes to power. Some scholars claim that party ideology does matter (Caul 1999) while others argue that the percentage of seats held by right-wing or left-wing parties is unrelated to levels of female representation (Matland 1998).

2.4 Empirical tests of voting behavior hypotheses

We more formally test the arguments in the chapter through regression analysis of women's electoral chances. We first test if probability of electing a woman candidate varies based on education and religion. We do this by using the odds of winning ratio, which compares the odds of a woman candidate winning to the odds of a male candidate winning.¹⁰ Intuitively, if there is no gender prejudice in voting behavior, the odds of a woman winning should be equal to that of a man winning, and thus the ratio is equal to one.¹¹ If the ratio is less than one, it implies that women candidates have a lower chance of being elected than male candidates, while an odds ratio greater than one means that women candidates are more likely to win than their male counterparts. Since each country has a different odds ratio and they vary in education attainment levels and religious composition, we can pool data across countries and test the impact of education and religion on the odds ratio.¹² We run the following regression model on cross-national data from the mid-nineties.

¹⁰ We actually use the log of the odds ratio in the regression as this is normally distributed.

¹¹ Strictly speaking, lower odds of women winning may not be solely due to gender prejudice. If voters have some objective criteria on which they judge a candidate and women are on average below male candidates on the criteria, then women would have a lower odds of winning. The problem arises in that it is not clear how "objective" any criteria is and it is possible that stereotyping and prejudices affect how we formulate criteria, and the way we evaluate on these criteria. The discussion on qualifications of candidates raised this concern.

¹² One may argue that using time series data is more appropriate to capture changes in attitudes, as cross-national regressions are more prone to capturing either spurious relationships or effects of omitted variables. These criticisms are valid and while we would like to do time series analysis, we unfortunately don't

$$\ln Y = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\alpha}X + \varepsilon$$

$$\text{where } Y = \frac{\text{Odds of a woman winning}}{\text{Odds of a man winning}} \\ = \frac{(\text{Pr}(\text{woman winning})/\text{Pr}(\text{woman losing}))}{(\text{Pr}(\text{man winning})/\text{Pr}(\text{man losing}))}$$

The model is run with three specifications, first with education as the independent variable, then with a religion dummy as the independent variable and finally with education, religion and a dummy for electoral system as the independent variables.¹³ –

Equation (1):

$$\text{Log odds of a woman winning} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ Education} + \varepsilon$$

Equation (2):

$$\text{Log odds of a woman winning} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ Religion} + \varepsilon$$

Equation (3):

$$\text{Log odds of a woman winning} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ Education} + b_2 \text{ Religion} + b_3 \text{ Electoral system} + \varepsilon$$

We also test if more women are elected when a left-wing party comes into power as compared to a Conservative Party. Party ideology is coded in two different ways, as a dummy variable and alternatively as a scale variable. We test the different coding in the following equations:

Equation (4):

$$\text{Women elected} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ Dcenter} + b_2 \text{ Dright} + b_3 \text{ Opposition} + \varepsilon$$

Equation (5):

$$\text{Women elected} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ Party ideology} + b_3 \text{ Opposition} + \varepsilon$$

have the data for it. But even if the data were available, we could test for effects of education within a country, but not religion, as ethnic/religious composition tends to alter very slowly within a nation. The cross-national study thus provides variation on the religious variable.

¹³ We control for the effects of electoral system, because women may have different odds of winning under proportional representation or first-past-the-post systems. The impact of the electoral system on women's candidacy and election to national legislatures is explored in greater detail in the subsequent chapter.

We estimate equations (4) and (5) with OLS as well as Tobit regressions. The latter deals explicitly with the issue of left censoring arising from some of the countries having no women in parliament. Since the dependent variable, the proportion of women, is zero for some observations, conventional OLS regression analysis fails to account for the qualitative difference between limit (zero) observations and non-limit (continuous) observations.¹⁴ Researchers dealing with similar problems have extensively used the Tobit model.¹⁵ In our analysis, the number of observations with no women parliamentarians is small, and the results from the Tobit model are substantively similar to the OLS results. We report the Tobit results here and the OLS results are in the appendix. The description and sources of the variables used is below.

Table 2-2: Data Description and Sources

Variable	Definition	Year	Description (Min, Mean, Max)	Source
Log-Odds of a Woman winning	Log of odds of a woman winning the elections as compared to a man	1995	-2, -0.12, 2.5	Inter Parliamentary Union
Education	Average years of higher schooling in the total population over age 25.	1994	0.003, 0.3, 1.5	Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee
Religion	50% or over of the population is Muslim	1995	Dummy variable. Coded 1 if 50% or more of population is Muslim, 0 if not.	CIA World Factbook
Electoral System	Proportional Representation system, First-Past-the-Post systems or Mixed system	1995	Pr=1, Mixed system=0.5 and First-Past-the-Post systems =0.	Political Handbook of the World & Database of Political Institutions.
Women elected	Percentage of women elected out of total candidates	1995	0, 13.3, 40.4	Inter Parliamentary Union
Dcenter, Dright	Party ideology of the ruling party –centrist or conservative	1995	A separate dummy variable for each party type. Eg. Dcenter=1 if party is centrist, 0 otherwise.	Database of Political Institutions.

¹⁴ See discussion in Greene, 1997 pg. 958-974.

¹⁵ For example, the Tobit model is used by Fair, 1977, 1978 to study extramarital affairs; by Quester and Green, 1982 for the number of hours worked by a woman in the labor force; and by Witte, 1980, examining the number of arrests after release from prison. Greene, 1997, has a more detailed listing of cases where the Tobit model is used.

Party ideology:	Party ideology of the ruling party –centrist or conservative		A scale with as Leftist=0, Centrist=.5, Right-wing=1	Database of Political Institutions.
Opposition	Percentage of seats held by opposition parties	1995	0, 20, 60	Database of Political Institutions. WISTAT

The results in column (1) of Table 2-2 indicate that if the average number of years of higher schooling of the population aged 25 and over, increases from .04 to .58 (i.e. one standard deviation around the mean) the probability of a woman winning as compared to a man *decreases* from .49 to .44.¹⁶ Similarly, in the case for religion, moving from a country which is Islamic (has 50% or greater Islamic population) to a non-Islamic country decreases the probability of a woman winning as compared to a man from .49 to .47. These results however have wide margins of error, and thus there is really no statistically significant impact of years of higher schooling or religion on the probability of a woman winning as compared to a man.

Table 2-3: Factors affecting possibility of winning and election of women legislators


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log Odds Ratio	Log Odds Ratio	Log Odds Ratio	% of women in parliament	% of women in parliament
Education	-0.381 (0.387)		-0.322 (0.424)		
Religion		0.061 (0.286)	0.241 (0.381)		
Electoral System			0.024 (0.394)		
Dcenter				-10.325 (4.203)*	
Dright				-5.026 (3.218)	
Party Ideology					-12.654 (6.706)
Opposition				14.300 (10.348)	4.494 (12.336)
Constant	-0.006 (0.198)	-0.126 (0.121)	-0.070 (0.279)	13.536 (2.559)**	23.934 (5.008)**
Observations	42	53	42	48	37
R-squared	0.01	0.00	0.02		

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

¹⁶ The results do not significantly alter when we use other measures of education, such as illiteracy or data on the 15+ age group instead of the 25+ age group, or when we code electoral system as a dummy variable instead of a scale.

The relationship between education and potential biases against women candidates can be visually assessed through the following graph depicting the odds of a woman winning as compared to a man based on results from regression model specifications in Table 2-3 column 3.¹⁷ Since the slope is very slight (and in fact negative), and the confidence intervals very large, we can conclude that cross-country variation is not significantly linked to the level of education.

Figure 2-3: Predicted odds of a woman being elected to the national legislature as compared to a man



Column (4) of Table 2-3 shows that significantly fewer women get elected when centrist parties come to power. There are on average, 10% fewer women elected in countries when the main party is centrist. This result should be treated with caution, as the number of governments headed by centrist parties in our sample is very small, and is only 6 out of the 48 countries in our sample.¹⁸ Comparing left-wing and right-wing parties, there is no obvious difference in the proportion of women elected when either comes to power. The results in

¹⁷ It should be noted that the slope of the line is of interest here, not the vertical position, as the former varies according to values we assign to education and electoral system, which here are held constant at their mean.

¹⁸ The countries with centrist governments in our sample are - Bolivia, Chile, Mali, Philippines, Romania and Samoa.

column (5), which employs a different coding of the party ideology variable, further confirms that differences in the proportion of women legislators cannot be explained by swings in leftist and conservative parties coming to power.

The relatively strong presence of women in right-wing parties is not that surprising. Despite common perceptions, it has not been any harder for women to gain entry into conservative parties as compared to leftist ones. In fact historically, in countries like England and Canada, women first gained entry to the political arena through the conservative parties. This may be because conservative parties often have strong links to religious institutions, while left parties have ties to labor unions. Women tend to be more prominent in churches as compared to labor unions, making it easier for them to be recruited into conservative parties. Since there is not any substantive difference between leftist and conservative parties in their selection of women candidates, swings between left and right wing parties victories cannot sufficiently explain variations in the proportion of women legislators over time and across countries.

Variations in electoral chances and the probability of winning for women candidates do not explain the pattern of women parliamentarians across countries. Looking at women's probability of winning as compared to that of men and their actual numbers in parliament show that there isn't a positive correlation between the two. For example, women in the Middle East have a much higher probability of winning elections than men, but the region also has the lowest proportion of women legislators in the world. A regression on the odds of a woman winning elections on the actual proportion of women legislatures bears this out.

Percentage of women parliament = $0.126(1.3) + 0.28(1.7)$ Log-odds of a woman winning.

This means that at the 95% confidence level, the marginal effects of a small increase in the odds of a woman winning can result in a negative 3% to a positive 4% change in the proportion of women legislatures. This is a very wide bound and the high standard error of 1.7 and a t-stat of only 0.2. Differences in the actual proportion of women legislators across countries is not significantly affected by the probability of winning for female vs. male candidates, but may be explained by how many women actually contest elections. So even though women in the Middle East may have a higher chance of winning once they stand for elections, very few of them may actually come forward to contest elections. In the mid

1990s, for example, on average only 6% of the candidates contesting national elections in the Middle East were women, as compared to 27% in the Western countries (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1999). Thus, variations in the proportion of women elected cannot be explained by electoral chances of women candidates per se, and is more likely due to the variations in the percentage of women who contest elections.

$$\text{Percentage of women parliament} = 0.15 (3.7) + 1.5 (.19) \text{ percentage of women candidates}$$

The percentage of women candidates to the total number of candidates has a highly significant impact on the proportion of women legislators. At the 99% significance level, a small increase in the number of women who contest elections, will lead to a 1% to 2% increase in the proportion of women in parliament. Thus the issue is why are there fewer women running for elections are compared to men, and what explains the variations in the number of women who come forward to contest elections across countries.

To summarize, the cross-national data indicate that averaging across the world, the probability of winning for women candidates is almost equal to that of men. So overall, there is not much evidence of gender bias amongst the electorate. Political experience or lack thereof also does not seem to diminish women candidates' chances at the polls. Thus the paucity of women parliamentarians in the world cannot be attributed to low probability of winning for women candidates.

Further, looking at variations across countries, contrary to common perception, there is no evidence that religious beliefs or education levels explain differences in electoral chances of women candidates. Nor can variations in the proportion of women in parliaments be attributed to whether leftist or right-wing parties are in power, as leftist parties are not more likely to field women candidates than conservative parties. More generally, variations in our variable of interest, the proportion of women parliamentarians across countries, cannot be explained by differences in the electoral chances of women. Rather, the share of women candidates to the total number of candidates significantly impacts the proportion of women elected. Given that women have a high probability of winning, why are there overall fewer women running for office as compared to men, and across countries, why are there variations in the number of women contesting elections?

Before we address these questions, we explore the voting behavior hypotheses in the context of India. We see to what extent the cross-national findings hold in the Indian case, and try to get an insight into the puzzling finding that women candidates in many developing countries have a high, if not greater probability of winning than male candidates.

3 Women Candidates and Voting Behavior in India

Moving from a general analysis, to a specific case study, we examine the voting behavior hypotheses through the lens of India. Are there gender biases in the electorate and are states with higher level of education more likely to elect women candidates? Do the voters care about political qualifications of candidates and are women candidates inexperienced? Across time, are variations in the proportion of women legislators in India due to clustering of women candidates in the left parties, and swings in votes from left to right parties?

3.1 Prejudice, Education and the Electoral Chances of Women Candidates

India is a heterogeneous country with many subcultures and wide disparities in levels of socio-economic development across states. The northern plains, where the vast majority lives, has low levels of education and life expectancy. The region is also predominantly patriarchal in structure, with men making decisions and controlling access to resources. In the South, on the other hand, literacy levels and life expectancy are much higher. Some southern states also have matrilineal societies, with women having greater autonomy and control than in the north.¹⁹ Looking at two states, Uttar Pradesh in the north and Kerala in the south, we get a glimpse of the sharp contrasts in women's status within India.

¹⁹ Matrilineal is not the same as matriarchal, with the latter implying that women actually head the household. Even though this was not the case in Kerala, matriliney gave women many rights that other Indian

Table 3-1: Gender Differences in Two States in India

Indicator	India	% of Total Population	
		Uttar Pradesh	Kerala
Literacy rate			
Male	64	55	95
Female	39	26	87
Life expectancy at birth			
Male	59	57	69
Female	59	55	74
Autonomy to make personal decisions (e.g. with regard to own healthcare)	52	45	73

Source: Data from India Census, 1991, Dreze and Sen, 1998, and NFHS-2, 1998-99

Egalitarian attitudes seem far more prevalent in Kerala. Women have access to basic education and healthcare and are relatively free to make personal decisions, such as on their own healthcare. The numbers tell a different story for Uttar Pradesh, as women are disadvantaged in all these aspects. Women have lower access to basic education and have worse life expectancy figures than men. Over half of women have no autonomy over personal aspects of their lives

The limited access of women to basic resources such as education and healthcare indicate the overall low status of women in Uttar Pradesh. The seriousness of the various disadvantages faced by women can be gauged by looking at the male-female ratio within the state. This measure was popularised by Amartya Sen (1992) in his essay, titled “Missing Women” where he argues that the male-female ratio is a good indicator of women’s status in society. Women by nature have greater longevity, so if men and women have equal living standards, then women should outnumber men in society. A ratio less than unity implies low regard for women with either women having lower standards of living, less access to health care or selective killing of the female sex. The latter often takes the form of female infanticide or selective abortions, which are considered prevalent in Asia, especially India and China.

Within India, Uttar Pradesh has one of the lowest female-male ratio, with only 88 women per hundred men. To put this in context, in Kerala the ratio is 1.04, while the

women did not have and the trend continues till date. For a detailed discussion, please see Ramachandran 1998.

national average is .93. The female-male ratio in Uttar Pradesh is among the lowest in the world, just above countries like Kuwait, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates. The high level of illiteracy and the unequal access of resources implied by the number of “missing women” in Uttar Pradesh are indicative of patriarchal norms, where men are “valued” more than women. We would expect the attitudes to spill over in politics, with male candidates preferred to female candidates by the electorate.


Yet Uttar Pradesh has a much better track record of electing women into the national legislature. In 1996, for example, 8% of the female contestants were voted into power in the state, while none were elected in Kerala. In other states, such as Gujarat, which has 60% literacy and is considered relatively egalitarian in gender issues, only 1% of the women contesting elections were actually voted into power. In fact, if we look across the different states of India with considerable variations in literacy rates, there appears to be no clear relationship between education, and the electoral chances of women as compared to a male candidate.

Figure 3-1 shows the odds of a woman winning elections as compared to the odds of a man winning across the states in India²⁰. Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, states with low literacy and strong patriarchal structures, nevertheless provide high odds for a woman to get elected into the national legislature. One may argue that female candidates have a greater chance of winning because those who contest elections from these states have strong kinship ties to the political elite. They benefit from traditional attitudes and voting along kinship lines. But in many states, a large number of contestants, irrespective of gender, have strong kinship ties with the political and economic elite, so it does not explain why the women on average have a higher odds of winning than the men (Sharma & Kumar, 1992).²¹

²⁰ The odds ratio of a woman getting elected = odds of a woman elected/odds of a man elected. The odds of a woman getting elected = number of women who won/number of women who lost. Probability of winning and odds of winning are related and Probability = odds/(1+odds). We use the log odds in the table because it provides symmetric confidence intervals around the mean. This does not alter the interpretation of the data.

²¹ The issue of kinship ties as an entry route into politics for women is discussed in Chapter 6.

Figure 3-1: State-wise Log Odds Ratio of Women Candidates Winning as Compared to Male Candidates in the Indian National Legislature Elections, 1996



Note: Includes only states which elected a woman into the National Legislature in the 1996 elections.
 Source: Calculated with data from the Election Commission of India, 1999.

In a statistical test of the relationship between literacy and the chances of a woman winning, the correlation coefficient on probability of a woman winning is -0.5. This would indicate that education level in society is negatively related to the willingness of voters to elect women candidates. But this correlation is very sensitive to outliers, and if we use ranking of states instead of the actual numbers to minimize the impact of outlier states such as Uttar Pradesh, there is a positive link of 0.6 between literacy and the odds of women winning. Increasing literacy therefore, would have a positive effect on women's electoral chances. But the large differences in results depending on how we code the dependent variable show that in the case of India, the link between education and propensity to vote for women is not straightforward. It is perplexing that states with very high levels of illiteracy and male-dominated social structures, such as Uttar Pradesh, still provide good chances of winning to female political candidates.

Can a part of the success of women at the polls be explained by the experience of women candidates? Is it the case, that voters really care more about political experience and that women have an advantage over men in this regard?

3.2 Political qualifications

In India, women candidates seem to have less political experience as compared to male candidates. The biographical data for all the contestants is not available, but judging from the elected members, the median number of years of political experience for women parliamentarians in India in 1996 was six years as compared to seventeen and a half years for men. Women overall could not then be attracting more votes on the basis of their qualifications. There is some variation between states, and one might speculate that the women candidates in Uttar Pradesh are relatively more qualified. This would help explain their high odds of winning. But this is not the case and in the state as well, women on average have less experience than male politicians.

Table 3-2: Prior Political Experience of Members of the National Legislature, 1996

	Number of Politicians	Average Years of Experience (Median)	Confidence Interval
All India			
Women	40	6	(1-10)
Men	500	17.5	(17-19)
Uttar Pradesh			
Women	8	4	(1-7)
Men	75	17	(10-20)
India (excluding Uttar Pradesh)			
Women	32	6.5	(1-5)
Men	425	19	(17-20)

Source: Calculated from biography of members of national parliament in Lok Sabha Who's Who, 1997.

Furthermore, out of the total 42 women elected at the national level in 1996, 13 had no training in local, state or national politics and 73 of the 507 men elected were also

political novices²². In other words, 30% of the women and 14% of the men elected had no prior political experience. It seems that prior political experience is not such a big issue for Indian voters, especially in the case of women candidates. People may often be choosing “fresh faces” over veteran politicians for a variety of reasons. For example, corruption could be an important issue for many voters and newer entrants may be viewed as being less corrupt. Women would especially benefit from concerns about honesty of politicians, as there are perceptions that women are less corruptible (Kumari and Kidwai 1998). In reality, of course, many women politicians are as dishonest as their male counterparts, but for new women politicians, the general perceptions may work in their favor.

Shifts in the economic preferences of voters may also benefit new entrants. In the 1990s, liberalization and free-market philosophies have become popular with middle-class voters. Many of the older political figures who touted self-reliance philosophies in the past decades are now regarded old fashioned with many voters preferring newer, more economically up-to-date political representatives. Also, as agrarian and caste politics have been on the rise, newer political actors have come into the political arena appealing to these interests. Women candidates entering the political fray from these groups may again have an electoral advantage that could potentially balance any hesitations on the voters regarding lack of political experience.


3.3 Gender Advantage in Elections

Despite high levels of illiteracy in India and the relative lack of experience among many women politicians, women candidates actually have a higher probability of winning than men, since independence. Figure 2 shows that over the last five decades, on average 27% of women contestants are able to win elections, while only 15% of men are successful. In recent years the gap has narrowed, but still in the 1990s, 11% of women candidates won as compared to 7% of male contestants.²³

²² The lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha) has 545 seats, with 543 elected members and 2 nominated. The numbers in this context adds up to more than 545 because a few members died, and some gave up their seats and new people were elected in their place. The biographical records of all the elected members were used in compiling the results.

²³ Most of the women contestants who win have done so in constituencies in which the other three

Figure 3-2: Likelihood of winning for female candidates as compared to male candidates (1952 to 1998)



Source: calculated with data from Election Commission of India,

What accounts for the more favorable attitude of voters towards women candidates? While it is hard to make any general observations about something as complex as political attitudes towards women, nevertheless a few aspects of Indian culture may elucidate at least part of the reason why women candidates have an electoral advantage.

First, there is perhaps a disconnect between private and public attitudes towards women. While patriarchal norms exist within family structures, in the public sphere people could be more willing to have women in positions of authority. Esther Boserup (1970) in her seminal work on development in third world countries argued that status of women within the family and status of women in the public sphere were two different things. Historically, in India and other developing countries, women from influential families participated in the public and political arena, even though women in general were secluded from these activities. Elite women formed a visible part of the early stages of the freedom struggle, and were accepted by the common people as leaders. Later, under Gandhi, ordinary women

leading candidates (in number of votes) are men. For example in the 1996, elections, out of the 42 women contestants who won, only 3 faced other women candidates in the top 3 contestants.

came out in large numbers to protest against the British rule. Gandhi legitimized, and even elevated the role of women in the political sphere and stated that

“The full freedom of India will be an impossibility unless the daughters stand side by side with the sons in the battle for freedom...on absolutely equal terms” and “...unless women of India work side by side with men, there is no salvation for India, salvation in more senses than one. I mean political salvation in the greater sense, and I mean the economic salvation and spiritual salvation also.”²⁴

Political activism by women has been quite pronounced ever since, with women participating in and leading political movements such as the Chipko conservation effort and the controversial ban against liquor in the state of Andhra Pradesh.

The dichotomy in society, where a woman can be a leader and a figure of authority in the public sphere, yet conform to a traditional role in the private sphere, may be bewildering to those from Western societies where the line between public and private norms with regard to women are not so distinct. An example from the time of the British colonial rule illustrates this. In the early 1920s, the British government was considering constitutional reforms to include representation by Indians in the legislatures, by setting up provincial legislatures comprised of Indians. A small delegation of women demanded that Indian women should be granted the same rights of representation as men.

The British government thought that the demand was ludicrous as women in most Western countries still did not have the right to vote, and the Southborough Committee scathingly noted, “the extension of the vote to women would be premature in a society which continued to enforce *purdah* and prohibitions against female education.”²⁵ Instead of rejecting the demand outright, the British government left it to each provincial legislature to decide if they wanted to extend the franchise to women. As Kishwar (1996) notes, the “assumption was that since Indians were so ‘backward’, they would never accept the idea of equal political rights for women.” But all the provincial councils without much ado voted to have women represented at par with men. This characteristic of Indian culture, which sees

²⁴ Gandhi’s speech at a public meeting in Paganeri, 27 September 1927 and at Women’s Christian College, Madras, 24 March, 1925, in Kasturi & Mazumdar 1994.

²⁵ In Kishwar 1996. The whole discussion on women’s representation in the provincial legislatures of the 1920s is from the article.

political norms as distinct from social customs, helps women in politics, especially when it comes to the national legislature, an arena so distant from the daily life of the people.

Second, within the patriarchal Indian society, there is, paradoxically, veneration of women's strength or *shakti* through the worship of the mythological goddess figure of Kali. Every village worships their own home-grown versions of this goddess by deifying the image of "ordinary human women who are cheated into marrying untouchables or raped by a local villain or killed or buried by cruel brothers. Out of such desecrations they rise in fury, grow in stature to become figures that span heaven and earth, with powers of destruction that terrify the village into submission, sacrifice and worship." (Ramanujan 1992, p.10)

Women who are strong and powerful are revered by society as manifestations of female *shakti* in the human form (Hiltebeitel and Erndl 2000, Kishwar 1999, Ratte 1985). Both women and men look up to women who stand up in the political arena and portray an image of power and strength in Indian politics. For example, Jayalalitha, who has established herself as the reigning queen of the AIADMK party "commands even more fear and exacts even more groveling obedience from her party members than did Indira Gandhi from hers. It is customary for her party colleagues to routinely touch her feet as a mark of obeisance. There are many temples in the state where she is ensconced as the presiding deity. She is deified by her followers as Mother Mary, *Shakti* and even *Bharat Mata* (Mother India)." (Kishwar 1999)

Many of the dominant female figures in Indian politics play up to the image of the vengeful goddess *Kali* as a way of wooing the voters. Kishwar (1999) notes that "as with all the ferocious goddesses of Indian mythology and village lore, Jayalalitha justifies her authoritarian ways and her vindictive politics as the legitimate response of a woman long wronged and exploited by men, till she rose in fury and decided to give tit for tat, and gave ten kicks for every one she received. Mamta, leader of the Trimool Congress has built her political career more in the tradition of an avenging deity than a politician. She presents herself as a victim of the CPM's dictatorship who will not rest till she has destroyed their power. Mayawati, who heads the caste-based BSP party, does not use any personal history of persecution but claims to be avenging the collective, historic insults heaped upon the entire Dalit community." Thus women politicians, especially the aggressive ones, may find it easier to win public adulation and support than their counterparts in the West.

Third, on a more prosaic note, the rise of factional politics has made the party or caste identity of the candidate more important than their gender. Women candidates are more likely to get votes from their caste members than a man from another caste, even if there are gender prejudices among the members of their caste. In situations where a number of parties are fielding candidates from the same caste, the women candidates may still find their probability of winning quite high, because of the acceptance of female political figures in the Indian public, as is discussed in the preceding sections.

The interaction of the three facets of Indian political attitudes can be quite clearly seen in the case of Phoolan Devi, an illiterate, lower caste woman from a poor family, who was elected as a member of India's national legislature in 1996, from the state of Uttar Pradesh. Devi was married off at the age of eleven years to an abusive, much older man and was shunned by her community when she ran away from him and joined a group of bandits. Devi was captured in a fight with an upper caste gang of dacoits (bandits), and was repeatedly beaten, gang-raped and paraded naked around villages by the upper caste gang-members to humiliate her and as a warning to the lower caste community. She managed to escape and it is alleged that Devi returned with a gang after a year to massacre 22 upper caste men in a village in Uttar Pradesh. She eluded police for two years and then finally turned herself in 1983, in a public ceremony where she laid down her weapons in front of the Chief Minister amidst cheers from her lower caste supporters. After being detained for 11 years in prison, but never convicted for any charge, Devi was freed in 1994, and became the protégé of Mulayam Singh Yadav, the leader of the Samajwadi Party (SP), whose electoral bank largely comprised of the lower castes. In 1996, Devi contested elections as a candidate for the SP and won the election. She also contested successfully in the 1999 elections and was granted a ministerial portfolio.

Phoolan Devi's success in politics illustrates the confluence of all three factors shaping the Indian attitude towards political women. The fact that she left her husband and was raped would be unacceptable to most people within the private sphere. Socially, she was shunned from her community when she left her husband, and being raped carries a heavy social stigma. But yet the very same people, the community from which she came, supported her in the polls. In the public arena, she has become a heroic figure and is seen like the Goddess Durga, the vengeful and all-powerful woman. Margaret Alva, an educated, upper class, senior member of the Upper House of parliament is not a radical feminist by any

standard, but she nevertheless praises Devi saying “Phoolan is a woman of courage who will be an inspiration to those who have been used by a male-dominated society and caste-dominated local leaders. She fought back against a society that failed to give her justice or protection. Her actions were justified and I have every respect for her.”²⁶ This attitude reflects the general sentiments that Devi is an acceptable and indeed admirable political figure as she is strong and fought against injustices. Also, as noted by Alva, there is the caste element, and Devi has become a symbol of the lower castes’ struggle to end the domination of the upper castes.²⁷

Female political figures, therefore, especially those who can take advantage of all the three facets of the cultural attitude towards women- (i) to strive for authority in what is clearly in the public domain such as the national legislature, (ii) to present themselves as strong and powerful figures and (iii) appeal to certain ethnic sections of the population- stand a good chance of being elected by the public.

3.4 Political Parties

Cultural attitudes can explain why women are more likely to get elected, but what accounts for variations in the number of women elected into the national legislature over time? Since social norms tend to change very slowly, these presumably cannot explain why women get elected into parliament in greater numbers some election years over others. Other factors such voter preferences on salient issues and party platforms, which vary more frequently, may be affecting the chances of a woman candidate winning. Swings in party preferences among the electorate would translate, on average, into a lower or higher vote share for women candidates, only if there is a significant difference in the number of women fielded by political parties. If women are clustered in one party, then the popularity of that party amongst the public in the election will affect the probability of women getting elected. On the other hand, if the number of women candidates is roughly the same in all the major

²⁶ Ms. Margaret Alva quoted in Lisa Vaugan. “Phoolan Devi: The Outlaw Who Hung Up Her Guns.” *Financial Times*. August 1, 1997.

²⁷ Phoolan Devi was shot dead by unknown assailants in 2001.

political parties, then any swings in party preferences among the voters will not impact the average odds of a woman candidate winning.


In India, the Indian National Congress (INC), or the Congress Party, as it is often called, has been the dominant political party for most of the post-independence era. It is considered a center-left party and also has the image of being more pro-women candidates than other political parties. The most well known Indian woman politician, Indira Gandhi was the head of this party for almost three decades from the mid 1960s to 1984. The other major party, the Hindu chauvanist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been becoming increasingly popular, and since 1996, has formed the national government.²⁸ It is considered to be more conservative in outlook and it advocates more traditional gender roles. If it is indeed the case that Congress fields more women candidates, the rising strength of the BJP should translate into less women being elected because of the Congress losing seats in parliament.

Even though the Congress Party does field more women than the BJP, there is really not a 'clustering' of women within any party. For example, in the 1996 elections, 9% of the candidates fielded by the Congress were women, and out of the legislators elected from the party, 11% were women. In the BJP, women comprised 6% of the candidates and 9% of those elected. Similarly in the 1992 elections, when the Congress came into power, 9.5% of the candidates elected from the Congress party were women, while the number was slightly lower for the BJP, at 8.5%. In the 1977 elections, when Congress lost badly, the proportion of women legislators in the Congress was 3.7% compared to 2.7% for the BJP. There seems to have been an overall decline in the percentage of women elected from both parties in the 1970s, and an increase for both parties in subsequent decades.

Overall, looking at the trend in women getting elected since independence, in Figure 3-3, there is a downward slide from 1967 to 1977, followed by an upward movement, with a spike in 1984. The downward trend is consistent with the decline in the seat share of the Congress Party. However, the upward trend, especially in the 1990s has occurred during the time Congress has been losing seat share and BJP winning the majority of seats. Hence it is not really possible to explain changes in the proportion of women getting elected based on seat share of the left-wing Congress party.

²⁸ It was also a part of the coalition that came into power in 1977. The history of these political

Figure 3-3: Seat share of the Congress Party and overall proportion of women elected



*Seat share of Congress party is divided by a factor of 10
 Source: Election Commission of India, 1999.

The evidence from India suggests that voting behavior, whether based on gender preconceptions, experience of candidates or their political party, is not the barrier to women's entry into higher political office, and some of these factors may even give women an electoral advantage. The cross-national and India discussion show that women candidates have a good chance of winning elections. This finding supports prior research that indicates female contestants do as well as their male counterparts when facing the voters directly (Matland 1998, Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994, Welch and Sigelman 1982).

Although women stand an equal, if not better chance of winning elections than men once they are chosen as candidates, there are simply very few females contesting elections. If we look at the number of women fielded for elections in India we see that a very low proportion of the candidates are women, and on average they comprise only 3% of the contestants.

parties is discussed in the next chapter.

Table 3-3: Male- Female Candidates Contesting National Elections

Election Year	Total number of Candidates	Number of Male Candidates	Number of Female Candidates	% Male Candidates	% Female Candidates
1952	1,874	-	-		
1957	1,518	1,473	45	97	3
1962	1,985	1,915	70	96	4
1967	2,369	2,302	67	97	3
1971	2,784	2,698	86	97	3
1977	2,439	2,369	70	97	3
1980	4,620	4,478	142	97	3
1984	5,574	5,406	164	97	3
1989	6,160	5,962	198	97	3
1991	8,699	8,374	325	96	4
1996	13,952	13,353	599	96	4
1998	4,750	4,476	274	94	6

Source: Election Commission of India, 1999

It is not low electoral chances, but actually getting women to contest elections which seems the real bottleneck to increasing women's presence in the national parliament. Why are so few women contesting in national elections? We examine this issue in subsequent chapters.

4 Electoral Systems

Most scholars focus on the design of the electoral system as the dominant factor affecting recruitment of women in politics (Vengroff, Creevey and Krisch 2000, Matland 1998 & 1995, Norris 1996, Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994, Rule 1987). In a broader context, electoral systems are often considered to be redistributive institutions, impacting the representation of groups in political offices (Tsebelis 1990, Lijpart 1990). A substantial body of research in this area indicates that minorities are usually better politically represented in proportional representation systems rather than simple plurality systems where the winner takes all. Mirroring this finding, scholars argue that electoral systems that have proportional representation are much more likely to have women legislators than simple plurality systems. Darcy, Welch and Clarke (1994) note, “on average twice the proportion of women (20.2 percent) are currently elected to list PR systems as compared to SMD (10.2 percent)” (p. 42). Looking at industrialized countries, Matland (1998) predicts that “changing from a majoritarian to a PR system will result in a 15.6% jump in the female proportion of the national legislature” (p. 115).

Although there is near unanimous agreement among political scientists that electoral systems are the most important variable in explaining variations in proportion of women legislators, different explanations are given for why this is the case. There are broadly two types of arguments for why PR systems will recruit more women in legislatures than simple plurality systems, the first a structural one and the second an agency argument.

The first argument looks at how vote shares get transformed into seat shares. One of the oldest exposition on the effects of electoral systems on representation of groups is the cube law, formulated around 1910 (Kendall & Stuart 1950). According to this rule, in plurality systems, the seat share of political parties can be estimated by cubing the vote share of these parties.²⁹ This means that the vote shares get magnified for the party with higher

²⁹ Taagepera (1986) provides a reformulation of the cube law, which puts the ratio of vote shares and seat shares in a more general manner, so it can be used to estimate seat shares based on vote shares for all kinds of political systems, whether plurality or variants of proportional representation (PR) system. The relationship of seat shares to vote shares in the modified model does not have to be cubic, but is a parameter ‘n’ which can vary depending on electoral system features such as district magnitude. In his analysis of vote and seat share of political parties in some plurality systems, ‘n’ ranges from 2.5 to 4.

votes, and greatly reduced for the party with fewer votes. Putting this in the context of gender, the seat share of female and male candidates in plurality system, is the cube of their vote shares:


$$S_w/(1-S_w)=[V_w/(1-V_w)]^3$$

Where S_w =seat share of women

V_w =vote share of women

In contrast, in the ideal PR system, the vote share should translate directly into seat share with a one-to-one mapping with distortion. So if women have even a slightly lower vote share, in a plurality system that would result in a proportionately much greater reduction in seats. This is illustrated in the graph below –

Figure 4-1: A Hypothetical Illustration of the Cube Law and Seat Share for Women Candidates based on Vote Shares



Plurality systems may not always disadvantage groups that get a lower overall share of votes. If a group is geographically clustered, then a simple majority system may actually work to the benefit of that group. To understand the logic for this, consider a case where there are 10 districts with one seat each, and two groups contesting, A and B. Also suppose supporters of group B are not evenly dispersed amongst the 10 districts, but geographically concentrated in two districts. If group B gets 51% of the vote share in two districts, and zero votes in other districts, translating into a little over 10% of overall vote share for group B. In a PR system, that should translate into roughly 10% of the seats for group B, i.e. one seat.

But in a first-past-the-post system, this would result in two seats for group B. Some empirical evidence does support the argument that geographically clustered minority groups can do well in a plurality system (see Moncrief & Thompson 1992, Darcy, Welch & Clark 1987, Grofman, Migalski & Noviello 1986).

But if the supporters of the minority group are dispersed, then one would expect a plurality system to be disadvantageous in getting a higher seat-vote ratio. This is precisely the argument made for women: female candidates are likely to get fewer votes than men, and the supporters for women candidates, presumably other women, are a geographically dispersed group, so plurality systems will convert the low vote share for women candidates into an even lower seat share (Welch & Studlar 1990, Rule 1987, Norris 1985).

Thus the cube law, coupled with the fact that supporters for women candidates are geographically dispersed, should lead to fewer women being elected in plurality systems as compared to PR systems. The assumption, on which this hinges, is that women candidates tend to get fewer votes than male candidates. Think about this in terms of one district where a man and a woman are standing for elections. In a single-member plurality system, if the woman gets 33% of the votes, she will have lost the election. Now consider the case of a PR multi-member district, with three seats. In this case, with 33% of the vote, the woman candidate will get elected. If, however, the woman gets the same number of votes as the man, then she would be equally well off under either system.³⁰

But how true is the assumption that voters systematically discriminate against women candidates? Darcy & Schramm (1977) note that observations on this have been largely speculative. In the previous chapters we saw that women candidates have an almost equal or even higher probability of winning than male candidates across countries. Other studies have also shown that voters do not discriminate against women candidates and “that when women run, they are treated like similar male candidates” (Darcy, Welch & Clark 1994, p. 101).

The second type of argument on why PR systems benefit women does not depend on the assumption that women are likely to get fewer votes than male candidates. Instead, it looks at recruiting incentives within each electoral system. In this argument, PR systems are more inclined towards recruiting women candidates than plurality systems, because the costs

³⁰ This is also evident in Figure 4-1. When men and women get equal number of votes, i.e., the 0.5

of recruitment for are comparatively lower, and the benefits higher. Matland and Studlar (1996) provide the clearest discussion of this on their discussion of contagion and women candidates.³¹ According to them, the process of contagion starts when a small party, usually on the political fringe starts to actively recruit women candidates. Mainstream parties will move to increase their share of women candidates, with the party closest in ideology to the extreme party following the example of the fringe party first, so as to prevent voters from switching to the innovating party. Then, “over time as each party reacts to a felt threat from close political rivals on the issue of equity in representation, the perceived need to nominate women will flow across the political system to virtually all parties.” (Matland & Studlar 1996, p.712)

The contagion will be swifter in PR systems for three reasons. First, smaller fringe parties are more often found in PR systems, while plurality systems usually have two mainstream parties. Hence the possibility of having a smaller party that ‘innovates’ on the gender front is far less in the latter electoral system. Second, the costs of having more women candidates are lower for mainstream parties in a PR system. Strictly speaking, the costs depend on district magnitude, which is the number of seats in a district. Since PR systems have multi-member districts and plurality systems are often comprised (though not always) of single-member districts at the national level, analysis of the impact of district magnitude has usually been conducted within the context of evaluating plurality and PR systems. Parties in multi-member districts can balance the ticket with regard to gender without removing all other male candidates. As candidate selection is not a zero sum game within each district the chances of antagonizing powerful male candidates is lower for a party trying to increase the number of women candidates. Thus there should be less resistance to increasing the number of women candidates in a PR system or other multi-member district systems. Finally, the benefits of each incremental vote gained from having a balanced ticket with regard to gender, is higher in PR systems. In plurality systems, parties focus more on just winning, and increasing the margin of votes is a minor concern, especially in safe seats. Hence parties would feel less pressure to have more women candidates.

Does the empirical evidence support this hypothesis? With regard to small parties and contagion, a study on 98 political parties across 21 countries in 1996 shows that smaller

point on the x-axis, their seat share is the same under a PR and plurality system.

parties are usually not that gender friendly.³² The researchers looked at the effective candidacy of women, as measured by the election rate (ratio of women elected to total candidates elected) in a number of political parties. They found that this indicator “is lowest at the extremes, that is, the smallest parties and, to a lesser extent, in the strong parties or those with an absolute majority” (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1997, p. 127). So the prevalence of smaller parties in a PR system may not channel more women into the parliament.

It is not clear if parties in general in PR systems are more likely to recruit women candidates. One measure of whether a party is gender-friendly, is if it openly commits to having more women candidates, usually through the establishment of a quota of seats reserved for women. In PR systems, three of the five Scandinavian countries - Sweden, Norway and Denmark - have party quotas for women, along with parties in others PR systems like Israel doing the same. But some simple plurality systems like those of Britain and Bangladesh have also instituted reservations for women. India is undergoing vigorous debate over the issue of reserving seats for women at the national level (these already exist at the local level). The main impediment to establishing quotas is not the simple plurality electoral system, but the desire of some members to make the quota further subdivided on the basis of caste.

Further, even if quotas are instituted, it is again unclear if these actually lead to more women being elected, regardless of electoral system type. Since the issue of upsetting vested interests is often at stake, in PR systems, the women candidates may simply be pushed to the bottom of party lists. Thus Vengroff et. al (2000) found that even if some PR systems have quotas, these may not be actually increasing the number of women elected. They cite the example of Italy where although there was 50% quota for women on party lists, party leaders put male candidates in winning positions and female candidates had a lower probability of being elected.

To add to the debate on the effect of the electoral system, recent studies by Matland (1998) and Reynolds (1997) found that electoral system is correlated with the proportion of women in legislatures in developed countries, but not in developing countries. In developing countries, according to these studies, electoral system variables seem to have no substantive effect on female political authority.

³¹ The next several paragraphs are an exposition of Matland and Studlar’s argument on contagion.

While these arguments are not conclusive, the most striking evidence in support of the thesis that electoral systems significantly impact gender representation is the fact that the countries that top the list on gender representation all have some form of proportional representation electoral system.³³

Table 4-1: Countries with highest proportion of women in lower house of parliament, 1997

Country	Electoral System	% Women
Finland	PR	39
Norway	PR	36
Sweden	PR	34
Denmark	PR	33
Netherlands	PR	29
Seychelles	Mixed System	27
Germany	Mixed System	26
Iceland	PR	24

Source: IPU, 1999

Not surprisingly, the Scandinavian countries are at the forefront, with Finland having 39% women legislators. But are these cases representative of other PR countries? Can we make generalizations about PR systems based on these examples? The Scandinavian countries are well known for their egalitarian societies, with low levels of economic inequality. A simple difference of means between the top eight and the other PR systems reveals that the means of these two subgroups differ significantly with respect to the proportion of women legislators and economic equality.

Table 4-2 implies that the top eight countries are distinct from other PR countries in terms of the representation of women in the national legislature and in socio-economic

³² Whether small parties are gender friendly is discussed with regard to the Indian case in Chapter 7.

³³ Looking at the bottom of the list, countries with the least percentage of women in parliament have mainly plurality systems. These are Kiribati, Jordan, Egypt, Mali, Singapore, Kenya, Nepal and Burkina Faso with the proportion of women elected ranging from 0-4% in the mid 1990s.

characteristics. So we should be careful in generalizing from these special cases to the rest of the PR countries.

Table 4-2: Differences within countries with Proportional Representation electoral systems

Variable	Mean for top 8 PR countries ¹	Mean for other PR countries ²	T statistic for Difference in Means ³
Proportion of Women in Parliament	32.8	10.8	9.11**
Economic Inequality	30	41	4.38**

** significant at 99% confidence level

¹ Countries with PR electoral system and very high proportion of women in parliament. i.e., over 1.5 standard deviations away from the mean of female legislators around the world (the eight countries listed in the preceding table)

² All other countries with proportional representation electoral systems, leaving out the top eight in women's political representation (38 countries).

³ The two sub-groups are not assumed to have equal variances

Between PR and plurality systems, there are differences in the proportion of women parliamentarians, but there is also considerable variation in socio-economic characteristics. Looking at the proportion of women in managerial and professional occupations, a variable we focus on in subsequent chapters, we see that there is a significant difference in means between countries with PR and plurality electoral systems.

Table 4-3: Differences between countries with different electoral systems

Socio-economic variables	Mean for PR countries	Mean for Plurality countries	T statistic for Difference in Means
Proportion of women legislators	12.8	6.3	4.4**
Proportion of women in managerial and professional positions	55.8	44.4	3.6**

**significant at 99% confidence level

The two sub-groups are not assumed to have equal variances

This suggests that even though at first sight the evidence seems to support the claim that electoral system affects the selections of women legislators, sufficient variations in some other socio-economic variables make it unclear what is actually the moving force behind variations in political authority of women. Is it the variation in electoral system or variations in economic variables or a combination of both which affect women's representation in national legislatures?

To test if differences in electoral system or socio-economic variables account for variations in the proportion of women in parliament across the world, we run a multivariate regression with electoral system, inequality and women in managerial and professional occupations as the independent variables. We also control for whether countries are democratic or not and for district magnitude.³⁴ The description and sources of the variables are below.

Table 4-4: Data description and sources

Variable	Definition	Year	Description (Min, Mean, Max)	Source
WIP	Proportion of seats in lower house of parliament held by women	1990-1995	0, 8.5, 39	WISTAT (composite). PAF24, PAF26 and Inter Parliamentary Union
Women Cand	Proportion of total candidates who are women	1990-1995	.6, 15.5, 50.4	Inter Parliamentary Union
Electoral System	Proportional Representation system, First-Past-the-Post systems or Mixed system	1995	Pr=1, Mixed system=0.5 and First-Past-the-Post systems =0.	"Political Handbook of the world. A. Banks et. al. and Database of Political Institutions. Beck, Clarke and Keefer et. al.
WIM	Women in managerial, professional and technical positions	1990	10.7, 38.8, 63.6	WISTAT ECO3.1
GINI	Income inequality measure - GINI coefficient.	1990	24.5, 40.9, 62.3 (Higher number means more inequality)	Deininger and Squire (only numbers deemed "acceptable" for comparison by authors, nearest year used)
LDC	Lesser-developed countries. All the countries in geographic location	1995		Coded by author

³⁴ We use the Freedom House assessment of the political freedom in a country. However, after a careful review of the criteria and judgments used by the Freedom House, we decided the detailed rankings are quite arbitrary. For example, according to the Freedom House Index, India has an overall ranking of partially free while Israel is considered fully free. Is Israel really a more open political and civil society than India? India got this lower rating in part because criteria such as how many journalists were killed and whether marriages are arranged. Since the government, atleast in India, is not carrying out these activities, it is hard to see what relevance they have to the question of political and civil liberties guaranteed by the State. There are a number of other countries as well whose ranking is questionable. For example, the Principality of Liechtenstein has a hereditary constitutional monarchy. It also has an elected legislative body, but the Prince has political power, including veto rights in appointment of judges in the courts. Yet the country gets the highest coding of 1 on the political and civil liberties scale. Uneasy with a number of the rankings, we recoded the Freedom House ranking into a two category scale, free and not free, which more accurately distinguishes between democratic and non-democratic for our purposes. We also looked at a number of other data sources that rank countries on political freedom, but found that almost all use Freedom House Index as one of their primary data-sources. Hence we decided to use the modified Freedom House Index, as we were not sure what biases were incorporated in these alternative measures.

DEM	excluding Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Democracy - state of political rights	1995	Dummy variable. 1=free or partially free, 0=not free	Freedom House
District	District magnitude – number of seats per political district	1995	1, 7.5, 120	Database of Political Institutions. Beck, Clarke and Keefer et. al.

We use a Tobit regression model to deal explicitly with the issue of left censoring arising from some of the countries having no women in parliament.³⁵ We also run OLS regressions with robust standard errors. The results are substantively similar and we report the Tobit coefficients.³⁶ From column (1) and (2) of Table 4-5 we see that the share of women in managerial and professional occupations is the key predictor to the proportion of women legislators across countries. This holds when we control for whether a country is democratic or not. Column (3a) indicates that having women in managerial occupations is the key variable in developing countries. In the case of developed countries, column (3b), there are too few observations to come up with definite results.

Table 4-5: Effect of electoral system and economic variables on the proportion of women legislators

Dependent variable: Proportion of women in the lower house of parliament				
Variables	(1) % of women in parliament (WIP)	(2) % of women in parliament (WIP)	(3a) WIP in Lesser Developed Countries	(3b) WIP in Industrialized nations
Electoral System	5.737 (2.966)	5.444 (2.964)	2.431 (1.604)	11.897 (6.498)
WIM	0.376 (0.108)**	0.333 (0.114)**	0.159 (0.062)*	0.497 (0.245)
GINI	-0.196 (0.113)	-0.227 (0.115)		
DEM		5.200 (4.605)		
Constant	1.309 (6.796)	-0.347 (6.987)	-0.130 (2.380)	-11.670 (11.754)
Observations	57	57	55	21

Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

³⁵ This has been discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

³⁶ The OLS results with robust standard errors are in the appendix. We also tested different coding of the variables and the results are stable to these variations.

As mentioned before, the agency argument, which discusses rates of contagion in PR and non-PR systems, is largely an argument about district magnitude. The central hypothesis is that if there are more seats per district, parties face lower costs and greater benefits by putting forward women candidates and thus more women will be fielded in these districts.

The cautionary argument is that even if more women are fielded in situations where there are strong vested interests of other candidates, they may well be put in losing seats or on a low position on the party lists. The results in Table 4-6, Column (3) and (4) show that indeed more women candidates are fielded in countries with a higher district magnitude, but this does not translate into a higher proportion of women elected in these countries, as can be seen in column (1) and (2). The proportion of women in managerial and professional occupations, however, is a consistently significant explanatory variable.

Table 4-6: Effects of district magnitude on proportion of women in parliament and proportion of women candidates

Variables	(1) % of women in parliament (WIP)	(2) % of women in parliament (WIP)	(3) % of women candidates	(4) % of women candidates
Electoral System	7.844 (4.177)		7.337 (4.965)	
District	0.176 (0.214)	0.373 (0.197)	0.554 (0.255)*	0.738 (0.230)**
WIM	0.532 (0.155)**	0.594 (0.160)**	0.386 (0.185)*	0.444 (0.187)*
Constant	-12.128 (6.205)	-11.606 (6.542)	-6.060 (7.376)	-5.572 (7.624)
Observations	31	31	31	31


Standard errors in parentheses ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

The regression results reveal that differences in electoral systems have only a small and statistically insignificant effect, when we control for socioeconomic factors.³⁷ In Figure 4-2, simulation graphs show that hypothetically, if a country moves from a simple plurality to a PR system, holding the other variables in Table 4-5 column (1) at their means, the expected increase in women parliamentarians is minimal and statistically insignificant. But, on the other hand, if a country increases its proportion of women professionals from 25% to 43%

³⁷ Some other researchers studying women in politics and electoral systems have also found the link between electoral systems and women's representation to be weak (Jones 1998, Welch and Studlar 1990).

(from minus one to plus one standard deviation from the mean), the expected number of women in legislatures increases by 50%, jumping from 8% of the seats to 12%.

Figure 4-2: Simulations for proportion of women in parliament: Effects of Electoral System and Economic Variables



Most of the scholars who argue that differences in electoral systems explain variations in female political participation have also noted that socio-economic variables have a significant impact on the proportion of women in national legislatures (Matland 1998, Norris 1996, Moncrief and Thompson 1992, Rule 1987). The results here bolster that finding and show clearly that socio-economic variables are far more important in explaining variations in the percentage of women in parliament than electoral systems.

While the ballot rules in the electoral system do not systematically impact the recruitment and selection of women in politics, other, more micro-features of political systems such as party structures could have relevance to the election of women. Parties are considered the primary conduit through which ordinary citizens enter the active political foray, first as members, then office bearers, and finally as selected candidates for public office. There is a prevalent notion that party bosses somehow discriminate against women and that these “gatekeepers” of the political bastion are biased against women when it comes to selecting candidates for national office. The quintessential image of a “smoke-filled room with old men with cigars choosing who should run for political office” reinforces the

sentiments that process of recruitment must be the barrier to the entry of women into higher political office.

While the image of smoke-filled rooms is evocative, how far is it true when it comes to describing the actual recruitment process for political candidates? In reality, there seems myriad ways through which political parties select candidates, ranging from the patronage selection method described above, to decentralized, bureaucratic selection methods where candidates are chosen through a relatively standard, transparent procedure (Caul 1997, Norris 1996).

Party organizations are typically complex, and it is hard to develop a typology that faithfully represents party decision-making and selection structures. Moreover, the de facto process of recruiting candidates may differ substantially from that stated in the party constitution, and it may be hard to discern how selection decisions are typically made. So although one can try to compare party structures across countries, the impact of this on gender recruitment is in a sense idiosyncratic and case-specific and as such does not lend itself easily to statistical analysis. The influence of party structures on women's political recruitment can more clearly be understood by detailed country case analysis. The subsequent section on India explores the special features of the Indian party system and examines the extent to which these impact women's political participation.

5 Party Characteristics and Recruitment of Women in India

India has a vibrant political system in that there are a large number of political parties, which, in often a bewildering fashion, split and merge and metamorphose according to electoral imperatives. The average number of political parties, excluding the huge number contesting the first elections after independence is 27 and the average number of national parties from 1957 onwards has hovered at seven. This is large number considering that Indian elections are based on a first-past-the-post system.

Table 5-1: Number of Political Parties in India

Years	1952	1957	1962 ³⁸	1967	1971	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996	1998
Recognized Parties	74	16	16	21	25	23	25	26	28	36	38	42
National parties	14	4	N/A	N/A	8	5	6	7	8	9	8	7

Source: Election Commission of India, 2000

To examine the effect of party characteristics on women's legislative recruitment, this chapter looks at three things. First it lays out the theoretical arguments for how party organizational structure can impact the recruitment of women. The next section focuses on the most long-standing national parties, the Indian National Congress, Bharatiya Janata Party and the Communist Parties and categorizes them according to their organization structure.³⁹ This is followed by a discussion on the impact of varying party characteristics on women's legislative recruitment. It concludes that the impact of organizational structure of parties on the legislative recruitment of women is ambiguous. Prior scholarship indicates that centralized and rule-based party structures are more conducive to the inculcation of minorities and women. But variations in the share of women in legislative cadre of parties in

³⁸ In 1962 and 1967, parties were granted only state and not national status. Parties that received 3% of the vote in national and state legislative elections were granted state status.

³⁹ We do not look at the smaller regional and caste based parties here. There are simply too many of them and delineating the organizational structure of each would be cumbersome. Moreover, many of these have had only sporadic national presence and any historical comparison with other parties would not be possible. We do examine caste-based and other smaller parties in Chapter 7, where we do a micro-study of the

India do not fit this theory. More generally, the paucity of women in politics seems to have little to do with organizational features of political parties or gender biases embedded within party structures.

5.1 Organizational Structure

The degree of centralization and degree of institutionalization of political parties may have an impact on the selection of women candidates (Caul 1997, Norris 1996). In a centralized system national committee or leaders of the party make the selection of candidates, while in a localized system the local or state units of the party largely do this. Having decision-making power reside at the center, may be more beneficial for women (Caul 1997, Matland & Studlar 1996). This is in part because party leaders in centralized organizational structures, has a greater degree of control over who gets nominated for contesting elections. So in centralized political parties, if the leaders wish to increase the diversity among their group of legislators, they can more easily implement affirmative recruitment policies towards underrepresented groups such as women. In addition, groups that are keen to see more women in politics, have a single group of people they can appeal to, and hold accountable for the diversity, or lack thereof, in the party's candidate selection. Caul (1997) argues "a central party organization can more directly be held accountable for low proportion of female candidates. Groups pressuring for increased representation have a central target at which to aim their demands...in a more decentralized system each region or locality must be individually pressured to support women" (p. 2). An example of this is the move by the African National Congress leadership to institute quotas for women in the 1994 and 1999 elections and guarantee that 30% of its candidates were women. Arguably, the centralized leadership structure of the ANC facilitated this move as the party elite could impose ideas on the party (Ballington 2000).

The degree of institutionalization refers to whether decision-making within the political party is rule-based or leader-driven. In a leader-driven decision making systems the candidates for national legislatures are chosen by a small group of party leaders often based

1996 elections and women legislators.

on patronage relationships and personal ties. The procedures for selection are not clear and change depending on the coterie in power. In such situations, being a part of the exclusive network and in the good books of the national elite is the way to get one's candidacy approved. In a rule-based system, the selection process is based on formal rules and often some type of voting process selects the candidates. Rank and file members who have put in considerable time and effort in the party programs are usually prime contenders, and selection decisions are made through some type of open criteria such as all party members voting to choose the final party candidates. Caul (1997) claims that "highly institutionalized parties provide all potential MPs, especially those without ties to the power-center, with a set of understandable rules...if the rules do not discriminate against women, and the rules are the same for everyone, we might expect that women would have a better chance in a highly institutionalized environment (p. 3). Further, Guadagnini (1993) argues that in weakly institutional or "leader-driven" parties, the nomination of candidates is often based on personal political capital acquired with key party leaders or from an important group outside the party. This type of recruitment may work against women candidates, especially if they have on average fewer years of political experience and therefore less time to accumulate this resource base. Thus, taken together, centralized and rule-based party structures may be considered most beneficial to women's nomination.⁴⁰

Gauging the degree of centralization and institutionalization in a political party can be quite difficult. With regard to degree of centralization, one can examine the party constitution and formal hierarchical structure. But it may be that the party constitution states that selection of candidates is done by local/state bodies while in actuality it is the central leadership making the decisions, or vice versa. Along with studying party constitutions, one way to determine where the decision-making power actual resides is to examine where the nodes of influence lie within the party. In a centralized system, national elites are the focal points in the organization and they determine party policies, while in a localized system there

⁴⁰ In some parties it could be the case that leaders would like to increase women's visibility within the party. They may be able to implement the policy only in a situation where the a small caucus makes the selection decisions as in a rule-based system there may be greater resistance to such moves, especially if this involves circumventing the general party procedures for selecting candidates. In this case though, the fate of women candidates lies solely at the discretion of a small group of people. Having women's candidacy based on more sustainable grounds, such as through following transparent rules or amending existing rules, may serve the general interests of women better. Even though there are pros and cons, in net, it may be argued, a rule-based centralized system should be the most beneficial to having women and other minorities recruited into political leadership positions (Caul 1997).

may be various local groups wielding influence within the party, jointly or in a competitive manner, shaping party behavior. The relative power of local party units or lack thereof, may indicate whether candidates for the national legislature are selected by local, influential party bodies or from the national committee.

It may also be difficult to judge which a party is rule-based or leader-driven in the selection of candidates. Contestants for national elections are typically chosen only once every four or five years and in these periods, other issues such as overall party campaign strategies and finances may detract attention from how the candidates are being selected. To get a sense of how rule-based or leader-driven the decision-making in the party actually is, one can look at the internal functioning of the party especially during non-election times and see if party officers are selected through some rule-based method or not.

5.2 Historical Overview of Political Parties in India

Historically, the most important party in India's political landscape has been the Indian National Congress (INC), or as it is commonly referred to, the Congress Party. Founded in 1885 as a social movement against the British rule, it transformed into a mass membership political party in the 1920s emerged as the national ruling party when India gained its independence in 1947 (Brass 1994).

From independence to 1966, the dominance of the Congress party on national politics was so complete, that Rajni Kothari (1964) a prominent political scientist dubbed the Indian party system as the "Congress system. This term captured two aspects of the INC. First, it was the ruling party and captured over two thirds of seats in every election and controlled most of the state assemblies in the two decades after independence. A few other national parties existed, but they mainly had support in only a limited number of states, and were in essence, regional players. The communist party had a stronghold in a few states such as West Bengal and its small neighboring states of Tripura and Manipur, and Kerala where the communist parties had a stronghold. The socialist parties had support in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Bombay, the Jana Sangh in the northern Hindi belt. Some parties had their support base in a single state, such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu and the Akali Dal in Punjab (Weiner 1967).

Second, the INC itself was not a homogenous, cohesive party, but was more of a ruling party and the opposition combined under one umbrella. It was a factional mosaic containing built-in opposition through different ideologies and pressure groups interacting in a continuous process of pressure, adjustment and accommodation (Kothari 1964). At the center, the Congress sold itself as a secular party representing all the heterogeneous parts of society without pandering to the demands on any one group. At the state and local level however, it actively sought the loyalty of different ethnic groups by drawing on an intricate patronage network that spanned metropolitan cities to the villages. At the village level, political fixers called *dalals* or *gaon ka neta* in Northern India and *pyraveekar* in the southern states acted as brokers linking village level loyalty networks to politicians (Mitra 1991, Reddy & Haragopal 1985). These politicians in turn had ties with specific regional bosses leading to factions of power within states, with those with the largest and strongest network emerging as the state party boss. The local and regional politicians were crucial to the Congress party in maintaining its widespread appeal and studying the Congress during the 50s and 60s, Myron Weiner (1967) noted “In its effort to win, Congress adapts itself to the local power structure. It recruits from among those who have local power and influence...” (p.15).

The organizational structure of the Congress reflected the political imperatives facing it. There was tension between central leadership on one hand, and the powerful state and local bosses on the other. Despite the fact that party decisions were ultimately made by the central party leadership, local and regional bosses had a strong foothold in the running of the party and deciding election strategies for their states in elections. Nehru, who was chosen as the Prime Minister in 1947 and was the elected head of the INC in 1951, acceded power to the state bosses.

The most direct reflection of this was the introduction of the Kamraj Plan in 1963. Kamraj was a Congress party man who entered the party at the age of 16 by organizing rallies at his local district in the state of Tamil Nadu. He pulled himself through the party hierarchy and was also elected as a member of the state assembly and then the national legislature. But he chose to renounce his national legislative membership to gain control over the party, and under his plan Congress members who were in the national parliamentary wing of the party were asked to voluntarily resign from their party posts. This resulted in the “induction of state party bosses into positions of power at the national level, with Kamraj at the helm of the organization as new Congress president” (Hardgrave &

Kochanek 1993, p. 232). Till 1966, the “Syndicate”, headed by Kamraj and other powerful Congress state bosses dominated the Congress party.

Even though strong personalities occupied center-stage in the Congress, adherence to the rules and regulations of the Congress constitution ensured that the organization was run remarkably smoothly. Routine elections were held to the All-India Congress Committee and the Working Committee of the party. All members of the Pradesh (State) Congress Committees elected the president for a two-year term. The Central Parliamentary Board comprised of eight members and the State Parliamentary Board were decisive in nominating candidates for national and state legislatures. There was intense competition between factions to gain control of these committees through garnering support from local members in the internal elections and this kept the organization structure resilient and decentralized.

When Indira Gandhi, daughter of Nehru, took over the mantle of Prime Minister in 1966, after the death of her father in 1964 and the death of the subsequent Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966, she challenged the existing power structure within the Congress Party. Not wishing to be a puppet in the hands of the Syndicate, she took steps to weaken their control, which climaxed in her decision to support V.V Giri in the 1969 presidential contest, contrary to the wishes of the Central Working Committee of the party. She was promptly expelled by the leadership, and the Congress party split into two in the same year, with one faction under Indira Gandhi called INC(R) as it was formed in an emergency Requisitioned meeting by Mrs. Gandhi. To consolidate her control over the party, Gandhi sought to bypass any political intermediaries and state bosses who could potentially be a challenge to her authority. She sacked Chief Ministers, who had supported her against the Syndicate, but had entrenched support among Congress members and the grassroots in their states. In their place, she put in people who had personal loyalty to her alone. She centralized what had essentially been a federal party, in an attempt to eliminate any dissent against her. Contrasting her autocratic leadership style with her father’s more gentle, consensus-building mode, Indira Gandhi noted that “ My father was a statesman, I’m a political woman. My father was a saint, I’m not.” (in Fallachi 1975)

Mrs. Gandhi was able to get her own way because under her the party won stunning victories in the 1971 national and 1972 state elections, in part due to India winning the war against Pakistan and successfully liberating Bangladesh. But the party was eroding its local bases of support that had been cultivated by the old, powerful Congress bosses. The new

state leaders instituted by Gandhi had minimal local networks and could not draw different groups into the Congress fold. In addition, economic development had increased the mobilization of new groups such as farmers, dalits (untouchables) and other lower castes who demanded greater political voice, prominent examples being the rise of agrarian unrest and social movements in Bihar and Gujarat.


The drought in late 1971 and 1972, as well as the rise of oil prices in 1973-74 by the OPEC contributed to increasing social unrest, which gained momentum under the leadership of Jai Prakash Narayan who called for a “total revolution.” In 1975, in a struggle to maintain control after a series of adverse events for Mrs. Gandhi culminating in the High Court of Allahbad declaring her 1971 election invalid because of technical violations, she declared a national emergency, under Article 352 of the Constitution. None of the Cabinet ministers were consulted and even the Home Minister was not informed in advance. The main leaders of the opposition were arrested under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) and press censorship was imposed. After 21 months of emergency rule, Mrs. Gandhi agreed to hold general elections, confident that her party would win. Instead, the Congress (R) was routed and the Janata Party, a coalition of opposition parties organized under the philosophy of Jai Prakash Narayan, won (Hardgrave & Kochanek 1993).

In 1978, the Congress (R) split, with one section condemning the emergency, and the other section under Indira Gandhi, called Congress (I), for Indira, forming a breakaway party. The new party under Mrs. Gandhi and on her death under Rajiv Gandhi performed fairly well in the 1980 and 1984 elections. But as Kohli (1996) notes, the “Congress faction (I) led by Indira Gandhi never acquired the hallmarks of an organized party, such as regular membership, internal party elections, or a lower tier of leaders with genuine grassroots support” (p. 116). Rajiv Gandhi tried to bring around some changes to revitalize and decentralize the party, but was not successful. On the national front, he was able to build momentum for giving local government and the panchayats (village councils) greater powers, but was unable to do sustain momentum for rebuilding the grassroots structures for the Congress party. After Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991, Narsimha Rao won the struggle to become the Parliamentary and party leader of the Congress, and he tried to introduce intra party elections in 1991, the first in twenty years. The old guards in the party were reluctant to institute changes and he quickly abandoned his attempts and fought to maintain

his own position within the party. Till date under Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi's widow, the party remains centralist and based on personalistic and dynastic rule.

Modernization has eroded the dominance of the Congress party. It has given rise to more social tensions with caste and agrarian groups clamoring for a larger share of the political pie.⁴¹ As the Congress struggles to maintain its position in Indian politics, opposition parties, especially regional parties have grown. Tamil nationalist party DMK in Tamil Nadu, religious/regional party Akali Dal in Punjab became more powerful and more recently caste-based parties in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have gained strength. The biggest winner, however, has been the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has increased its seat share from 3% in 1962 to 30% in 1996.⁴²

Figure 5-1: Seat Share of Political Parties in Indian National Elections (1952-1996)



Source: Election Commission of India, 2000

The BJP has its direct roots in the Bharatiya Jana Sangh party, which functioned from 1951 to 1977, after which it merged with the Janata Party for a brief spell from 1977-1979 and emerged as the BJP in 1980. Unlike the current state of the Congress Party, the BJP has a strong organizational structure and is considered to be a very disciplined party. At

⁴¹ This is in line with the prediction by Samuel Huntington (1968) that modernization will create social unrest as more groups insist on a share of the pie, but institutions are not developed enough to cope with the demand.

the apex, there are national level councils, the main ones being the plenary, the national council and the national executive. The council and executive also exist at the state level with regional bodies below them, followed by district, mandal, gram and local committees. Progression through the party ranks is largely based on elections, with each committee having a president, general secretary and treasurer. Members of the national and state councils elect the overall President of the BJP. The President is chosen for three years and a member can hold this post only for one term. This rule helps minimize the possibility of entrenched leadership in the party as happened in the Congress.

The BJP draws its political cadres mainly from its two religious right-wing parent organizations, the *Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh* (RSS) and the *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* (VHP) these together, called the *Sangh Parivar* influence the party's ideology and function. The party rose into prominence in the national arena in 1989, over their demands on the abolishment of a mosque in Ayodhya that was presumably built over the birth site of a major Hindu god. The Sangh Parivar, through the BJP, stridently pushed the message of "Hindutva", which literally translates into "Hindu principles." But this was more than just a religious message; it was a political slogan advocating cultural nationalism based on the concept of "one people, one culture, one nation" (Ganguli 1999). This message resonated with millions of Hindus who felt that the Congress Party had pandered to minorities, especially Muslims. The BJP message also created a sense of nationalistic pride among the Hindu youth, and a sense that India was finally emerging with its own identity, moving away from the shadows of the colonial past.

From the 1996 elections the BJP has toned down considerably its chauvinistic rhetoric and tried to distance itself from the RSS and VHP, presenting a more moderate image. This has created tensions within the Sangh Parivar with three competing centers of power. The first one the Prime Minister and members of his office, who are not elected officials but appointed by him, similar to the White House staff. This seems to be the most moderate group, trying to focus on economic reform. The second is the parliamentary wing of the party who represent a mix between those who have risen on the nationalist message and those representing a more diverse constituency. The third are the leaders of the BJP party organization who are closely aligned with the VHP and RSS, stridently advocating

⁴² The Communist parties however have not been able to increase their presence as much.

Hindutva. The three disparate loci of power are comprised of national-level leaders. Power within the party still resides at the national level, unlike the Congress in the pre 1967 era where factionalism was more at the state level.

These centralized factions play into the selection of members for parliamentary elections, which is done by the central election committee in conjunction with the state election committee which passes on the names of candidates. The election committee is comprised of members of the parliamentary board and eight other members elected by the National Executive. The parliamentary board consists of the party president and the leader of the party in parliament and seven other members. However, the process although centralized, is comparatively rule-based as compared to the Congress party.


Unlike the INC and the BJP, the Communist parties have had a fairly steady level of popularity among the electorate. Internally though, the communists have struggled with tensions between various factions and “since its inception in 1928 the Communist Party of India has been divided in its social character, its base of support, and its ideological stance” (Hardgrave & Kochanek 1993, p. 294). The Communist Party of India (CPI) arose on the basis of trade union support, and traditionally maintained ties with Moscow. It was initially hostile to the Congress party under Nehru, and viewed it as a stooge of the West. In the 1950s however, the central party leadership, following Moscow’s initiative, decided to cooperate with the Congress Party and support its development policies. This created tension within the party, with a more radical faction viewing this move as cooptation with the bourgeois elite at the cost of the workers and peasants. Matters came to a head in the mid 1960s, after a series of national and international events. In 1962, unrest broke out in the state of Kerala, which was governed by the CPI, and the Congress government put the state under direct Presidential rule. Many of the CPI leaders saw this as a hostile act. In the international arena, the sharpening Sino-Soviet conflict and the invasion of parts of India by China highlighted the splits within the CPI, with some sections in favor of the Soviet Union and others preferring the Chinese model of communism. Unhappy with the alliance with the Congress Party and the leaning of the CPI towards Moscow, a splinter group resigned from the party secretariat and formed the Communist Party of India-Marxist, or CPI (M). The new party focused on active mobilization of peasants and workers against the Congress. In 1969 extremist wings within CPI (M) broke away for the party. Calling themselves the Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist, or CPI (M-L) the leaders of this group

renounced electoral representation, and advocated armed movements to liberate peasants (Hardgrave & Kochanek 1993).

Of all variants of the communist party, the CPI (M) has the strongest support base, followed by the CPI. This support however is not spread across India and is concentrated in a few regions, mainly Kerala, West Bengal and some Northeastern states. The party organization is in a sense, regional as well, as the party leaders are drawn from these two states. Despite their regional base, both communist parties, by their own description, have a “centralized democratic organization structure.”⁴³ The Central Committee is the apex body and the branch is the primary unit. In between there are various layers, with area units, followed by zonal, district and state party units. Elections are held every three years at the party congress meeting. Candidates for elections are chosen by the central committee and are picked from within the rank and file of the party by deliberations within the central committee and the state party units.

⁴³ Communist Party of India Constitution.

Figure 5-2: Organizational structure of political parties in India



In Figure 5-2, putting the parties along a continuum in, Congress prior to 1968 falls in the northeast quadrant as it had a competitive party structure, that is the party was both localized and rule-based. Since then the Congress organization structure has declined into dynastic rule. This is reflected in its relegation to the leader-driven, centralized quadrant. The BJP and Communist parties have routine internal elections and set procedures for their functioning. They are also more centralized than the Congress was in its earlier years and thus fall in the southeast quadrant of centralized and rule-based parties. No major party fits into the northwest quadrant of personalistic, localized parties, although some regional parties such as the Bhartiya Kranti Dal and the Bhartiya Krantikari Kisan Sangh, which contested national elections in 1971 and 1989 respectively, may fall into that category.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ We examine some of the smaller regional and caste based political parties in Chapter 7.

5.3 Recruitment of Women

It is not clear if differences in party organization structures influence the strength of women within the party. Even though the main three political parties, the Congress, BJP and the CPI(M) are not congruent in their party organization, they all have some type of a women's association within or linked to the party and none seem to have much authority within their parties. The Congress party was affiliated with the All India Women's Conference before Independence, but also has a women's wing within the party, called Mahila Mandal. This organization was moribund for a long time, but was rejuvenated in the 1980s. It was a vibrant group for a short while and actively mobilize and recruit women at the grassroots, but now is in considerable disarray. It has never had any elections since its inception and the president of the women's wing has remained unchanged from the 1980s. She is now over 70 years old and shows little interest in building the wing (Kumari & Kidwai 1998).

The BJP had ties with the *Rashtriya Sevika Samiti*, the women's organization within the RSS but formed the *Mahila Morcha*, a women's political group within the party, in 1980. Currently, 75% of the 406 districts have branches with the women's wing form 20% of BJP members. However, like the Congress, no elections have been held in the women's group since its inception. Instead, the women's wing President and Secretary are nominated by BJP party president, who then along with the party nominate state *Mahila Morcha* leaders. It is questionable how independent and influential the women's wing is, since the party controls their leadership (Kumari & Kidwai 1998).

The CPI(M) had a women's group, called the *Mahila Raksha Samiti* (MARS) in West Bengal in as early as 1942. But as the Communist party tried to widen its base of support, specific attention to gender issues took a back burner and the initiative of the party's women petered out. In recent years, the All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA) has close links to CPI (M), although formally AIDWA members are not CPI (M) members (Kumari & Kidwai 1998).

Comparing across parties, on the continuum of leader-driven and rule-based parties, according to the hypothesis that rule-based parties have more women in legislative positions, one would expect rule-based BJP and Communist parties to have more women leaders among their ranks than the personalistic leader-based Congress party. But the difference between the Congress and the BJP is quite insignificant, with 9.5% and 11% women

parliamentarians from the Congress ranks in 1991 and 1996 respectively as compared to 8.5 % from the BJP. One may argue that different ideologies of the two parties account for this, with Congress as a centrist party with a pro-women image fielding more women candidates than would be normally expected from personalistic parties and the BJP has fewer women because it is chauvinistic. But there is no evidence that BJP is against women, and the party has actually instituted a policy of reserving a number of seats in the party hierarchy for women (Kumari & Kidwai 1998).

Also, with regard to ideology, communist parties are traditionally regarded as the most gender friendly (Kenworthy & Malami 1999, Caul 1997). In India, the communist parties have a rule-based organizational structure, yet only 6.3% of CPI/CPI (M) parliamentarians were women in 1991, a smaller proportion as compared to the Congress or BJP. So the question arises, why does a personalistic party such as the Congress have slightly more women parliamentarians than rule-based parties such as the BJP and Communist parties? Comparing within similar category of organizational structures, why does BJP have more women parliamentarians in its cadres than the CPI and CPI (M) which are ideologically more inclined towards women's issues?

In terms of centralized and localized party structures, again no clear picture emerges. In the 1990s, the Congress party and the BJP, both centralized in their decision-making structures, have had fairly similar proportion of women parliamentarians. However, in the 1960s, the Congress under a decentralized structure had more female legislators than the centralized BJP (then called JS) or the communist parties in 1967, with the latter having only 2.9 % and 2.4% of women legislators in their midst.⁴⁵ There does not seem to be any definitive relationship between organizational structure and a political party's propensity to select women candidates, as parties with similar organizational structure, such as the BJP and communist parties vary significantly in their share of women legislators. At the same time, parties with different organizational structures can also have roughly similar proportion of women in their legislative ranks, such as the BJP and Congress in the 1990s, with the former being rule-based and the latter, leadership-driven.

⁴⁵ We look at the percent of women elected out of total number of candidates elected from the party instead of the proportion of women actually fielded. A party might field a lot of women candidates, but make them contest in constituencies where the party has little chance of winning. In countries where party lists are used, women may be at the bottom of the list, with no chance of getting elected. This is why looking at the proportion of the women elected is a better measure of how gender-friendly the party actually is.

Thus the impact of organizational structure of parties on the legislative recruitment of women is ambiguous. Prior scholarship indicates that centralized and rule-based party structures are more conducive to the inculcation of minorities and women. But variations in the share of women in legislative cadre of parties in India do not fit this theory.

What is striking, is that overall, the percentage of women legislators is very small, with no political party having more than 11% women among their parliament members. Does this reflect some general bias against women candidates by political gatekeepers? Do party recruitment structures, irrespective of their degree of centralization and institutionalization, discourage the selection of female candidates? On the surface the answer seems yes, as this number of women legislators is very small. The situation is even more damning if we look at the actual number of women candidates fielded, as compared to the female membership in the parties. Women form around 20% of party membership, so one would expect that in a situation of equality, around 20% of those recruited to contest elections would be women as well. In reality, only 5 % to 9% of the legislative candidates fielded by a party are women. In 1996 for example, the Congress fielded 49 women candidates out of a total of 529 contestants from the party. The BJP had 27 women contestants out of a total of 471. The Communist parties fielded 8 women out of a 143 candidates.

But if attitudes within political parties are truly the cause for the sparse number of women contesting elections, women with thwarted political ambitions have an alternative channel in Indian politics, which is to stand as independent candidates. Unlike many countries in the West, the entry into the political arena is not only through rigid channels of political parties. A large number of people stand for elections on their own, as the requirements to contest elections are minimal. A candidate needed to deposit only five hundred rupees (\$11), which was recently raised to ten thousand rupees (\$222). Scheduled caste and tribe members have to pay only half of the sum. This deposit is refunded if the candidate gets one sixth of the valid votes cast in the constituency. Along with the deposit, an independent candidate needs just ten electors to sign off on his/her candidacy. Moreover, candidates can contest from two constituencies, granting them greater possibility of winning. There are also strict limits on how much a candidate can spend out of her own pocket in campaigning, although parties can spend unlimited amounts on candidates, as long as they can document the source of funds. In reality, parties have limited funds and direct their


resources mainly on few high-profile candidates and seats, while most other party contenders rely on their own funds and personal networks.

In this scenario, running on a party platform does not provide significantly more monetary resources than contesting as an independent candidate. The number of independent candidates has increased rapidly over the years, doubling from around 30% to 60%. Since Independence, on average 50% of all contestants run as independent candidates (Election Commission of India 1999).⁴⁶

If political parties are the bottleneck in getting women the candidacy to stand for elections, then presumably we expect women to have a greater presence in the pool of independent candidates. However, the percentage of women is by far smaller in this group as is in the case of political parties. In 1996, for example, 419 women contested independently, out of a total of 10,635 independent contestants, while 180 out of the 3,317 contestants from political parties were women. This means that women comprised 3.9% of independent candidates as compared to 5.4% from political parties. Thus, women seem to be even less politically visible in situations where political parties are not channeling aspirants. Thus political parties have done a relatively better job of pushing women from their ranks to the forefront of national politics than the political free market in which independents operate.

⁴⁶ Not surprisingly, with the increasing free-for-all nature of the election process, the number of contestants per seat has jumped from 3.8 in 1952 to 25.6 in 1996. The number can sometimes reach ridiculous proportions as in the case of the Nalgonda constituency in Andhra Pradesh where 480 candidates fought for a single seat to the national legislature, in 1996.

Figure 5-3: Recruitment of women through political parties and as independent candidates



Note: data for 1971 and 1991 calculated by averaging previous and subsequent year figures.
 Source: Calculated with data from Election Commission of India, 2000.

This is not to deny that within parties, women have to struggle to assert their candidacy, but there does not seem to be systematic discrimination against women in parties. After all, as mentioned in Chapter 3, in India five parties have women chiefs, and they wield considerable power, controlling one third of the national parliamentary members in the 1990s. A number of women politicians attest to the fact that while they have had to deal with male chauvinism many times, political parties have not tried to curb their political aspirations. For example, from the far left, Kanak Mukherjee member of Central Committee of CPI(M), notes that “she has never felt at a disadvantage in the party and says that women have to change their attitude and help themselves” to the political right, Sushma Swaraj of the BJP concurs, saying “I disagree with the image of the BJP as an anti-woman party. As a woman I have not faced any discrimination in the party.” (Kumari & Kidwai 1998, p. 155 and p. 109).

Is India a special case or are political parties really not the main bottleneck to women's legislative representation? It is hard to generalize, but similar findings have emerged from some studies of women's legislative recruitment elsewhere. Looking towards other developing countries, in Mexico, for example, Ai Camp notes that once women were in politics, there was really no prejudice against their obtaining higher office (Ai Camp 1995, p. 159). In South Africa, as noted before, the dominant political party, the African National Congress, is not hostile to women and has instituted a positive discrimination policy towards their legislative recruitment. In the case of Western countries, a study of male and female candidates to European parliaments reveals that "contrary to expectations, women candidates reported receiving much the same or greater support than men reported across most categories of gatekeepers, including party officials, local party members and national leaders" (Norris 1996, p. 210). Delving deeper into one country, England, Norris (1995) notes that in "the only detailed study of attitudes among labor party selectors, by Bochel and Denver in the mid-1970s, found no evidence for discrimination by gender, although black candidates faced some disadvantage" (p. 123). In her own work on female politicians in England, Norris (1995) substantiates the prior research, and observes, "Party members frequently claim they would like to select more women, ethnic minorities, or manual workers, but few come forward" (p. 108).

The problem thus seems to be in the supply of women candidates, and there just do not seem to be enough women coming forward to participate in the national political arena. To explain why women have such limited presence in national parliaments around the world and the variations across time and space we turn to supply side variables.

6 Cross-National Supply–Side Analysis

Why do people seek to enter politics? The political science literature provides a range of theories from macro-level sociological and institutional explanations to micro level psychological and rational choice models of individual behavior. Macro level theories focus on social and institutional structures that shape and constrain political careers.⁴⁷ Micro level theories, on the other hand, take the individual actor as the pivotal variable affecting candidacy to political positions⁴⁸. Both macro and micro approaches capture important aspects of political candidacy, and are equally relevant for our study on the supply of women candidates in politics. Starting from a micro approach, we attempt to elucidate the role of preferences and structural variables, and capture the key bottlenecks affecting women’s entry to politics.

For our purposes, we formulate a simple utility function with a constraint⁴⁹:

$$U = P(B - C_{L,S}) - (1 - P)C_s \geq \alpha$$

⁴⁷ Early sociological theories within this framework were largely static, providing descriptive and biographical compilations of political leaders and their social class (review in Fowler 1993, Seligman 1961, Matthews 1954, 1960). Subsequent scholars have directed their attention to the effects of political structure on political aspirants. Introducing an element of dynamism in the analysis, these scholars examine how interest groups, political parties, and legislative incentives shape political recruitment and careers. Within the broad rubric of this approach are some influential theories, which are distinct in the processes they focus on, but similar in their general emphasis on structures influencing political choices and outcomes. For example, Robert Dahl (1962) looked at the changing structure of dominant interest groups within a political community as shaping patterns of leadership and who gets to be political leaders. Others study the role of political parties and the effects of party organization on candidate selection (Haerberle 1985, Weiner 1967, Brass 1965, 1984). Another set of scholars, the pioneer being Schlesinger (1966), attempt to explain how opportunities provided by legislative structures shape individual ambition and political career tracks. Yet an alternative strand of process-based research is new institutionalism, which looks at the “rules of the game” such as electoral system, to determine the character and mix of political parties and based on that the type of candidates who enter the political arena (For example, see Hibbin 1991, Canon 1990, Keynes, Tobin and Danziger 1979, Mezey 1970).

⁴⁸ The early work in this field, was inspired by Lasswell (1930), a Freudian who looked at personality and emotional pre-dispositions of actors, and argued that psychology, especially childhood conflicts with parental authority, were instrumental in shaping political aspirations. While there are still proponents of this approach, the micro-field has been largely overtaken by body of work focusing on strategic decision-making by rational actors. The crux of rational decision-making by political aspirants to enter politics or not, hinges on whether the benefits of joining outweigh the costs (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1987, Rohde 1979, Black 1972).

⁴⁹ This utility function draws on the well known model by Black (1972) that $U(o) = (PB) - R$ as well as the notion of opportunity costs in the work by Francesco Caselli and Morelli (2000), which focuses on competence and honesty of elected officials.

Where P = probability of winning;

B = benefits from political office;

C_L = long-term costs of being in public office;

C_S = short-run costs of running for public office, i.e. campaigning costs;

α = opportunity costs, i.e. net benefits of current occupation

The individual decision-function basically states that the net rewards of political office, taking into account the risk involved in running, should equal or outweigh the net benefits from alternative career choices. Two things to note are that the variables reflect a mix of individual preferences and institutional structures, and that these variables can, and often do, interact with each other.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines each aspect of the utility function with regard to gender and argues that the main factor affecting entry into politics is the opportunity costs, i.e. the current occupational status of the individual. People who are successful and hold leadership positions in industry and the professions are more likely to enter politics. Cross-national data for political leaders in general confirms that the economic elite dominates the eligibility pool from which politicians are drawn. The second section explores the different entry routes into politics for women. It starts by examining the common perception that kinship is the dominant entry route for women, for developed and developing countries. Finding only partial support for the kinship hypothesis, it argues that there is more compelling evidence that women enter politics the same way as men, and the key factor for women is their presence in the managerial and professional pool from which politicians are recruited. The final section discusses temporal and cross-national variations in women's labor force and occupational participation and its impact on their representation in positions of political leadership.

6.1 Utility Function for Joining Politics

6.1.1 Probability of winning

Starting from the left-hand side of the equation, P , the probability of winning is according to most rational choice theorists, a measure of risk based on the actual feasibility of the candidate winning. P , as an objective measure, is a function of perceptions of voters about the qualifications of the candidate, their party affiliation and salient issues in the elections. Are there any systematic differences between male and female probabilities of winning? Voter perceptions of the gender of candidates and its impact on their chances of winning, has already been discussed in chapter 2, with the conclusion this does not lead to any systematic differences in the probability of winning for men or women.⁵⁰

Realistically, for risk to play into the decision-making of an individual, the subjective assessment of one's chances of winning should be roughly in line with the true underlying probability. This may not always hold, with some individuals having a higher opinion of themselves than warranted and others down-playing their worth. Overall though, this does not seem to be a major issue in terms of gender, as pomposity and self-effacement are probably distributed fairly evenly over the population. What may differ more systematically between men and women is their willingness to deal with the uncertainty in taking up a political career. The probability P should be weighed by a personal risk-aversion factor, as two people may not view a probability of winning, of say, 0.5, in the same way. To illustrate, let the risk-aversion factor range from zero to one with zero being very risk averse. For heuristic purposes, if one person is 0.3 on the scale and the other 0.7, i.e. the former is more risk averse than the latter. Then, the probability of winning of 0.5 should actually be scaled down to 0.15 and 0.35 for the more risk-averse and risk-taking persons respectively.

⁵⁰ An issue not discussed there directly is the effects of opportunity costs α , on voter perception of qualifications of candidates. People with higher opportunity costs are those who are more successful and well-placed in their professions and these people may well be perceived as being most competent by voters. The opportunity costs for women could potentially affect their probability of winning and thus impact their decision to enter politics or not. This is discussed in greater detail in 4.14.

On average, do men and women have different tolerance for risk? The stereotype is that women are more risk-averse than men and there are a number of studies to bolster this perception. There is no empirical work on women's risk tolerance in politics per se, but there are a number of studies that look at risk preferences of men and women in economics. For example, in studies of pension investments, some scholars have found that women are more risk-averse than men, and tend to allocate their contributions to conservative assets, *ceteris paribus* (Bajtelsmit, Bernasek & Jianakopulos 1998). Similarly, Grossman, Eckel, Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998) look at data on extended warranty purchases by men and women on consumer goods such as computers and find that holding all else constant, women are more likely to purchase extended warranties, thus displaying risk-averse behavior. Looking at risk-aversion from the angle of strategic business decision-making, a number of studies have concluded that women entrepreneurs have lower preference for risk and that "women are more cautious, less confident, less aggressive, easier to persuade, and have inferior leadership and problem solving abilities when making decisions under risk" (Johnson & Powell 1994. Also see Hudgens & Fatkin 1985, Sexton and Bowman-Upton 1990).

But by no means is there unanimity that women are more risk-averse. Scholars have also produced evidence to the contrary, and argued that there is no difference in risk preferences between men and women. Both sexes have also been found to make similar decisions in the face of risk (Hudgens and Fatkin 1985) and single women, even more than single men, are likely to invest in risky stock-based pension plans (Papke 1998). Some gambling experiments reveal interesting insights on differences between men and women depending on the type of risk involved. In situations where there is a known probability of outcomes, women are more risk averse than men in potential gains are involved, but the reverse holds true with respect to losses. This behavior pattern is only accentuated in situations where the probability of outcomes is ambiguous (Schubert 2001). With regard to risk in joining politics, this may imply that since there are potential gains involved with public office, women may be more risk-averse than men, and thus their net benefits from joining politics should be more heavily discounted by their lower risk-tolerance. However, this is still largely speculative as there is paucity of studies assessing the political risk preferences of men and women, and the results from the economics realm, although plentiful, are inconclusive.

6.1.2 Benefits

Although gender attitudes towards political risks have not been studied, there has been some work on differences between the sexes in terms of benefits from political activities, the second factor on the LHS of the utility function. The benefits from public office can be conceptualized as monetary and psychological. The monetary benefits include immediate income streams from holding political office as well as anticipated future cash flows, discounted by some temporal and risk factor. Along with pay, the income figures incorporate perks from the job, such as housing, travel, medical and other allowances.⁵¹ These can be considered to be gender neutral in the sense that on average, both men and women would weigh the monetary benefits equally.

However, when we turn to psychological benefits from public office, there are scholars who argue that women and men get differential emotional satisfaction from political activities. In general, women are considered to be less interested in politics than men, and therefore get less psychological gratification from participating in politics. A famous study by political scientists in the 1970s examining political participation and its correlates across fourteen countries, claims that women are less likely to be politically active. The study looked at two factors affecting political participation, apathy and inhibition with the notion that apathy arises from ignorance and lack of education while inhibition, on the other hand, is based on natural tendencies. The authors argue that in the case of women it is inhibition, not apathy, which makes them less likely to participate in political activities and that “women, even if they had the same level of educational resources would be less active” (Verba Nie and Kim 1978, pp.237-245).

Some scholars have argued that women are biologically wired to be more caring and nurturing and that the aggressive, adversarial nature of politics deters women from political careers (See discussion in Schlozman, Burns, Verba, and Donahue 1995, Eisler 1990, Sapiro 1993, 1981). For example, a study by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) notes that “political life is organized according to male norms


⁵¹ With regard to monetary benefits, pay is not the only measure of income. Political office often confers perks that may not be easily visible, such as business and bureaucratic contacts, directorship in boards of companies etc, which can add to the income associated with political office. The weighing of monetary benefits and costs would involve not only pay, but also present and future income streams from the perks associated with political office.

and values, and in some cases, even male lifestyles. For example, the political model is based on the idea of 'winners and losers', competition and confrontation, rather than on mutual respect, collaboration and consensus building. This environment is alien to women, both to their natures and to their experiences" (Nadezdha Shvedova 1998). Since electoral politics is organized along adversarial lines, women are not able to relate to or draw satisfaction from that environment. Women instead prefer to work with an "integrative leadership style which is "attentive to the feelings of others and values collaboration and mutual satisfaction" (Rosenthal 1998, p.27) Thus one would be more likely to see women in volunteer and community activities rather than elected office.

Women may also be less inclined to political careers than men because of different issue interests. Women are perceived to have greater "altruistic and communal" goals as compared to men. Elisabeth Cady Stanton, for instance, claimed that female suffrage in the US would "exalt purity, virtue, morality, true religion, to lift man up into the higher realms of thought," and Julia Ward Howe argued that "the intensity of our feelings...gives us the power of loving and working outside our homes, to redeem the world as love and work only can" (in Randall 1982, p.47). In more recent times, Scholzman et. al. (1995) note that "we would expect women to be more likely than men to anchor their participation in the concern for the good of the community; to be active on behalf of issues involving children and families, human welfare, broadly shared interests such as consumer or environmental concerns, and international peace; and to derive civic gratifications from their participation" (p. 268). These goals may be more easily expressed through social movements, rather than formal politics, where practicalities of governance may affect policy positions, at the cost of ideals. Randall (1982) argues that women are "more radical than men" (p. 58) and Cockburn (1987) asserts that "Women...in action tend to be intractable and uncompromising...Women are often total in their demands" (pp. 63-4). Since women are considered to be more ethical than men and uncompromising in their ideals, they would eschew the legislative arena, where their agenda may be compromised.

If the above explanations are indeed true, then women have very steep indifference curves, indicating a low marginal rate of return from politics. This is illustrated in Figure I with women's indifference curves indicating low substitutability between participation in formal politics and other types of activities.

Figure 6-1: Marginal rates of return from politics for men and women



The X axis indicates the hours available to a person and on the Y axis are political returns, which can be regarded as a bundle containing the benefits from political engagement, such as satisfaction, prestige, status, authority and/or monetary benefits. The indifference curve for men indicates that to give up some hours towards political work would require a additional return over X, to point Y, to have overall the same utility as before. But in the case of women the steepness of their indifference curve implies that to give up some time from leisure or other work activities, to maintain their level of utility the return from political participation must be much greater, at point Z, which is higher than Y. Thus women would be less likely then men to give up other activities to participate in politics.

But how true is this model? Is there evidence to back the notion that women are not really interested in politics? One could of course say that since we do not have many women in positions of political authority, that they are not interested in politics. But that becomes a bit tautological – we know that there a few women in political positions, so that must be because women dislike politics. And we can show that women don't like politics, because they are few women in this arena. In fact, this type of argument is made routinely in economics literature about the glass ceiling for women. But if one looks across a variety of political acts such as voting, campaign contributions, contacting government officials and

being affiliated with political parties and organizations, women and men do not behave that differently. They engage in the same type of acts, and although women are less active than men, the difference is slight (Schlozman, Burns, Verba and Donahue 1995, Basu 1992). The stark difference in role of men and women is in positions of political power, where there are so few women.


6.1.3 Costs

Scholars who disagree with a psychological assessment of differences in male and female attitudes towards politics argue that it is not lower psychological benefits, but tighter constraints facing women as compared to men, that explains why women are less likely to be involved in electoral politics. According to this perspective, lower involvement stems not from some genetic predisposition, but from economic and social constraints that limit women.

One of the major factors that may hinder women's participation in the public sphere is their domestic responsibility. The primary caretaker of the home and family is often still the woman. Women on average take care of around two thirds of the household tasks and in some cases, do close to 90% of such labor, often in addition to their paid labor (Human Development Report 1995). Women who are unemployed do most of the household labor, and employed married women still do about twice as much housework as employed married men (Lennon and Rosenfield 1994, Goldschneider and Waite 1991, Ross 1987).

We can thus reformulate Figure 1 with men and women having similar preferences but very different time constraints. The results are similar to the prior model, that is women will spend less time in political activities than men but the mechanisms at play are very different. In this case, men and women get similar returns from each hour spent on political to other activities. But women, because of their larger household labor, have less free time than men. This is depicted through the parallel budget constraints, with women having a greater time constraint. Consequently, if women spend the same time as men in other leisure activities, they have less time to spend in political activities and at equilibrium level, they will spend time P_f on politics as compared to P_m for men, with the latter comprising of a larger number of hours.

Figure 6-2: Time constraints, leisure and political participation



Within the category of gender, there could be varying degrees of time constraints across countries. This may be for two reasons. First, the development of labor-saving devices to decrease household labor time and second, the inculcation of egalitarian norms with higher levels of education tends to diminish gender differences. Technological development and economic affluence can reduce the household work burden of women, by providing labor saving devices such as washing machines and dishwashers. As domestic drudgery eases for women, they have more time to spend on political activities. Duverger (1955), noted that


The preoccupation with family and domestic life, which is over-burdening among women of the poorer classes, forms an obstacle to outside interest, and to the development of political consciousness. With a rise in the income level, this economic social pressure lessens, and integration into a social unit larger than the family becomes easier. In the particular case of women, as in general, the emergence of real political freedom is thus linked up with a rise in the standard of living.

In the case of developing countries, according to Duverger and later the modernization school, industrialization would be the catalyst for change, increasing the affluence in society in general and also bringing about greater technological innovations.

Women in developed countries, therefore, in the course of industrialization, will have fewer household chores to take care of leaving them more free to participate in the public arena.

But if we look at the time spent on household labor between developed and developing countries, the time spent on these tasks seems to have decreased only marginally. From Figure 6-3, men and women in developing countries spend a combined 444 minutes a day in household work as compared to 422 minutes by their counterparts in industrialized countries. A larger difference is evident in the time spent on paid work, with men and women in developing countries spending 519 hours on paid labor as compared to 416 hours in the developed countries sample. Under the assumption of sexual division of labor with men in greater proportion in the paid labor force and women predominantly taking care of domestic tasks, the time-saving benefit men in the developed countries much more than women.

Figure 6-3: Time spent on market activities and household and other activities



Economic development and affluence, however, may influence the sexual division of labor. Industrialization is typically accompanied by a steady increase in the female labor force participation, having implications for how division of labor is performed within the household. Standard “pocketbook” economic models posit that women in return for

economic support provide household labor, and this maximizes the household utility function.⁵² But when women go out to work, their dependency decrease or even disappears, and they would perform less household labor, with their spouses presumably picking up the slack.

In addition, as countries progress, more people get educated and concomitantly egalitarian norms develop easing the social restrictions on women (Di Palma 1970, Almond and Verba 1963). One manifestation of this trend is a greater focus on equality between sexes and equal division of household labor. A century or so ago John Stuart Mill observed “Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a woman marries, it may in general be understood that she makes choice of the management of a household and the bringing up of a family, as the first call upon her exertions, during as many years of her life as may be required for the purpose; and that she renounces...all [other occupations] which are not consistent with this” (in Wolgast 1980, p.20).

The blatant expectation that women will assume responsibility in the domestic sphere is no longer viewed as ‘natural’ or inevitable, and modern thinking is that both men and women should be free to join the labor force and both must share the chores of the house (Brines 1994, Goldscheider and Waite 1991, Bernado et al. 1987). Equal sharing of household responsibilities would no doubt provide women with more time to engage in the public sphere. In addition, it would carry an important symbolic message as well, that the family and children are not the primary responsibility of women. Not surprisingly, the Human Development Report (1995) notes that “More equal sharing of responsibilities is fundamental to ensuring equal opportunities for women to participate in paid employment and politics” (p. 105).


Since the 1970s the increase in the percentage of women in the paid labor force is remarkable, but the increase in the time men spend on household work remains very modest.⁵³ Women across the world assume the major burden of domestic labor, and the

⁵² The best-known exposition of this is by Gary Becker. He argues that the household has one joint utility function, which is maximized when the partner with higher wage potential goes out to work while the spouse takes care of household labor. Since there is a male-female gender gap, men will specialize in paid labor and women in household work. This model, especially the assumption of common preferences between the partners has been challenged. Nash bargaining models with separate utility functions for the partners indicate that under conditions of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior, as well as with different fall back positions, it may not be the case that the division of labor will hold. (See Becker 1991, Walby 1986)

⁵³ Studies indicate that wives’ employment leads to only a very slight increase, of one or two hours in husbands’ household labour. Other studies examining the impact of egalitarian attitudes show either a very

situation of women in developed and developing countries is not so different in this regard. Despite higher levels of education supposedly greater egalitarian norms, women in developed countries spend they spend around two-thirds of their time on household labor, similar to the average time spent by women in developing countries, with men devoting only one-third of their time on household activities. This holds true for the Nordic countries as well (Human Development Report 1995).⁵⁴

Figure 6-4: Division of Household Labor Between Men and Women



small positive increase in husband’s household work or have not found any significant relationship between norms and actual work patterns (Berardo, Shehan, and Leslie 1987, Berk 1985, Coverman 1983 on wives’ employment; Blumstein and Schwartz 1991, Berk 1985, Ferree 1990 on small positive effects of egalitarian norms; Pleck 1985 on insignificant relationship between egalitarian norms and husband’s household labor, in Brines 1994)

⁵⁴ An interesting hypothesis to explain the slow change in household division of labor is that household division of labor is not just a result of economic bargaining, but is a symbol of one’s gender. Women when they do housework display their femininity and men when they avoid housework assert their masculinity (Youm and Laumann, 1999). In a similar vein Brines notes that marriage is an institution that “provides a stage for the enactment of claims, particularly those attached to the deepest sense of what one is – one’s gender identity ... the division of household labor can be viewed as part of the scaffolding that supports the interpersonal enactment of gender within marriage (Brines, 1994 p. 661-2). Consistent with this explanation, she finds that the more husbands rely on their wives for economic support, the *less* housework they do, presumably in an attempt to assert their masculinity at home.

We can think of the unequal division of labor impacting women's entry into politics in two ways. First is the straightforward manner laid out in the hypothesis discussed in the start of section 4.13: i.e., women have a tighter time budget constraint, which curtails their political activities. The second is that time constrains affect career advancement more generally, which in turn affects women's political activities through the opportunity cost variable.

With regard to the first issue, the fact that women have less time would affect their ability to participate in politics, especially contesting elections and working as legislators, which are time-intensive activities. But in context to other professions, political careers may offer some advantages. Politicians, especially national legislators tend to be in the age group of 41-60, an age at which most women are past the childbearing and early rearing stage. The Human Development Report (1995) notes "married women who are employed and have children under 15 carry the heaviest burden" (p. 96), but the women entering politics are often passed that stage. The nature of politics, which provides multiple nodes of entry, allows for open access to all age groups. Aspiring politicians can enter into the arena in their early twenties or enter in mid-life. Moreover, political careers are more often marked with discontinuities and periods in which politicians do not contest for office but engage in other activities. A late start or discontinuities in a political career usually carry lower, if any, negative repercussions as compared to other professions. It is hard to imagine a banker or professor reach the peak of their respective profession if they start out on their chosen track in their forties, take breaks to pursue other activities, or both

In marked contrast, people who enter politics later in their lives may well be more successful in their bid for higher offices such as the national legislature than those who have risen through the ranks. For example, Schlesinger (1966) notes with reference to American political opportunity structure that "the earliest starters, those entering public office before the age of 25, are not the speediest runners in politics. In terms of the age at which they receive their major nomination, the early starters run behind many of the older starters; a higher proportion of those entering public office in their early forties achieve their nomination before the age of 55 than those who have started their careers in their early twenties. Within the open structure of American politics, the precocious do not appear to enjoy any marked advantage over the man who comes to politics in early maturity; the early

starter is perhaps even at a slight disadvantage in the race for higher office. In this sense, American politics appears to be markedly different from the other professions” (p. 182).

This phenomenon is not unique to the U.S., in other countries as well national politics seems more permeable to new entrants. As observed in Chapter 2, prior political experience is not a prerequisite for being successful in national politics. Irrespective of prior experience, the largest number of successful candidates to the national legislatures are in the age group of 40 to 60 years of age. Assuming that the sample in Table 6-1 is representative, developed and developing countries exhibit similar age structures of their members of parliament.

Table 6-1: Age Distribution of Legislators

Country	Year	% in age group					
		21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	70+
Overall Average		2	18	34	33	12	1
Developing Countries							
Belize	1998	14	21	31	28	7	0
China	1997	2	10	24	46	17	1
Costa Rica	1998	0	31	42	17	10	0
Mali	1997	0	8	43	39	10	0
Republic of Korea	2000	0	5	26	41	26	1
Seychelles	1998	0	56	32	12	0	0
Singapore	1997	0	19	52	24	4	1
Trinidad & Tobago	2000	0	0	22	42	36	0
Vietnam	1997	0	18	34	34	8	6
Average		2	19	34	31	13	1
Industrial countries							
Australia	1998	2	18	41	33	6	0
Belgium	1999	3	22	35	33	7	0
Canada	2000	2	9	29	47	12	2
Denmark	1998	1	11	20	50	16	2
Finland	1999	7	20	24	45	5	0
France	1998	0	9	27	45	16	3
Germany	1998	1	8	24	48	18	1
Luxemborg	1999	0	15	48	20	17	0
Poland	1997	3	18	44	30	5	1
Turkey	1999	9	40	39	9	3	0
United Kingdom	1992	0	12	39	33	15	0
Average		3	17	34	36	11	1

Source: Norris, 1996 and Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1999

Because it is not necessary to have spent one’s whole career in politics to be a successful politician, and because those in the age group of 40-60 do quite well in this arena, entry into national politics should be relatively gender-friendly. Women in their forties and fifties often have passed the stage when their family responsibilities are overwhelming and

have children who are old enough to take care of themselves. They should thus be able to enter politics without having any major disadvantage in terms of age or experience. However, there are some credentials required for politicians, and the household responsibilities of women in their younger years may indirectly impact women's political ambitions, by affecting the qualifications women need for entering politics. These credentials are closely related to the opportunity costs discussed below.

6.1.4 Opportunity costs

Opportunity costs, as mentioned before, are the alternative career paths available to aspiring politicians. People with greater opportunity costs, i.e., those with high levels of education and professional backgrounds, form the bulk of political actors. Successful entry into national level politics seems to be largely confined to a narrow pool of potential applicants comprising of people who are well educated, in professional occupations such as law and teaching and are integrated in a network of civic associations. These are elite, but still professional occupations achieved by upper-middle class families around the world and by those from the lower strata in society who are ambitious. Why are politicians drawn from these ranks? This is a question which has attracted a fair amount of scrutiny and some focus on the effects of occupation on voter perceptions and the probability of winning while others focus on costs and benefits to political actors.

At first sight, it seems an anomaly that people with higher opportunity costs are more likely to enter politics. After all, if the RHS of the equation is low, then the LHS factors do not have to be very compelling – people with a low probability of winning, and those with low benefits or high costs, should still find it worth their while to enter politics. Imagine a situation in which there are two people, one with a job as a banker, and the other a homeless man. The one who is a banker will need to think long and hard before she decides to give up their job to pursue politics. The person has prestige, is earning well and so there is a definite opportunity cost, of lost income, at minimum, in entering politics. The homeless person on the other hand, has nothing to lose. Her alternatives are practically nil and so their opportunity cost is close to zero. In that case, we should expect them to be more inclined towards politics.

But lower opportunity costs may not, on balance, increase the probability of entering politics. This is because the RHS affects the LHS variables in the utility function. The occupational background of political aspirants can matter to voters and thus impact the probability of winning. In addition, the benefits and costs associated with political office may vary substantially depending on the background of politicians. As is discussed below, a professional background often increases the probability of winning. In addition, costs associated with political office may be lower and perceived benefits greater, in the case of people with professional backgrounds, such as law.⁵⁵

The effect of occupational background on probability of winning, *ceteris paribus*, may be quite significant. People are more likely to accept as their politicians, people who have been successful in other fields. Politicians are in a sense, leaders of the community and as such must be those who have exhibited managerial qualities and leadership skills. They must be “someone with enough standing to command the respect of as large a group of voters as possible” (Dahl 1962, p. 232). Thus for successful entrants to politics, “we should expect these individuals to enjoy even more clearly established positions in society...In this group, extra political accomplishment is required, more often than not, to give added luster to a political candidacy” (Schlesinger 1991, p. 72).

Being successful not only imparts an aura of leadership skills and competence to a candidate, it can also decrease the costs associated with running for political office. Success often comes with increased visibility as people who are doing well at their career and rise up in their profession, meet a number of people along the way and get to interact more intensely with those at senior levels, creating an invaluable network of social contacts. These contacts play two roles. First, they can decrease informational costs involved in running for office. For the average person, even if they are interested in politics, it is bewildering how one actually enters the arena. What are the steps involved in running for office, how much does it cost, and whom to approach, are often quite daunting questions. But if one is well connected and moves in the right circles, this information may be fairly easy to get. There is often a sort of path dependency in political institutions, where occupational backgrounds get

⁵⁵ To see how probability of winning changes with occupational background, we take the partial derivative of the utility function. Rearranging the terms, $P = \alpha / (B - C_L + C_s) + C_s$. Taking the first derivative to see how a small increase in occupational status affects probability of winning, $\delta P / \delta \alpha = 1 / (B - C_L + C_s)$. Assuming that net long-term benefits are positive, this means that as occupational status increases, probability of winning increases, although at a diminishing marginal rate.

reinforced. So if at the inception of the political system, a number of lawyers enter politics, this pattern will get reinforced as other lawyers interested in politics will be able to tap into their occupational network and will have relatively easier access to information than many others.

Contacts can also play another vital role for political aspirants. In political environments where raising campaign funds is important, these networks can be critical to a successful entry into the legislative arena. To raise money one needs to have some visibility and credibility among potential donors. An affluent and respected network of contacts can help establish the credentials of a candidate. It is no coincidence then, that in the United States of America, where campaigning is based so heavily on monetary resources, people such as Michael Bloomberg a self-made billionaire running for mayor of New York in 2001 and John Corzine, chairman of an investment bank who purportedly spent \$60 million of his personal fortune to run for office in the US Senate, can contest and win political office, based on their own finances and their network of affluent colleagues.

Even in countries where campaign financing is not such a big issue, the costs of entering politics may not be trivial. Having a successful career means that the person probably has accumulated sufficient financial resources to incur the costs, which range from the actual expenditures incurred in becoming a candidate to the opportunity costs associated with giving up or cutting down the time spent on one's prior job. As Norris and Lovenduski (1995) note in the case of British politics "applicants first face interview costs, the initial expenses associated with pursuing a seat: travel to successive meetings in different constituencies, suitable clothes for interviews, local research, overnight or weekend accommodation, attending regional training sessions and party conferences. Unlike standard practices in the private sector, applicants attending interviews around the country usually pay their own expenses." (p. 145) Although local party committees may try to help to defray these costs, often in the initial stages of a political career, these costs are borne by the aspirants. In addition, there can be significant career displacement costs, with a loss in present and future income streams from the occupation prior to a political career. The latter costs may be defrayed to an extent in certain professions. Again, using the example of law, one may still be able to practice one's profession along with a political career.

In terms of benefits too, people from professional backgrounds may be at an advantage. While monetary benefits may not be a compelling factor for most professionals,

they may derive greater physiological benefits from political careers than others may. Dahl (1962) argues that “political skills are in many respects middle-class skills; the task of political officials are white-collar tasks; hence no matter where he may have started in life a political official necessarily pursues a calling more akin to that of a white-collar worker than that of a laborer.” (p. 232) Professional workers may be more likely to be suited for political careers and thus derive greater satisfaction from it.


Well-educated people of high socio-economic status, arguably, also have a greater interest in politics. Working class people, on the other hand, may generally have less of the skills and interest to pursue a political career. A number of studies in the United States of America, and some cross-national analysis support this thesis and have found that education positively correlates with political interest. For example, some studies have found that well educated people with white collar jobs are more likely to participate in political activities while “the wage earner makes fewer attempts to exert influence than the white-collar worker; he votes less often, is less likely to participate in campaigns” (Dahl 1962, p231. Also see Schlozman, Burns et. al. 1995, Verba, Nie and Kim 1978).⁵⁶

It is not surprising therefore, that a cross-national survey of occupational backgrounds of politicians reveals that overall, industrialists and managers are 18 times more likely to be in politics than blue collar trade unionists. Along with managerial occupations, academia, law and civil services account for 19%, 10% and 8% respectively of the occupational background of politicians (please see table in appendix). In aggregate, around half of politicians come from professional and technical backgrounds and approximately one out of five politicians held a managerial position. There is not much difference between

⁵⁶ In the case of mobilized groups, however, be they along ethnic lines or class interests, the link between socio-economic status and political participation becomes more complex. People within these groups may be more active than those with higher education and income outside the group. Class and/or ethnic “institutions mobilize their particular support groups to higher levels of political activity than they would ordinarily reach on the basis of their individual resources and motivation. When the mobilized groups come on the average from the lower reaches of the SERL (Socioeconomic Resource Level) scale, this mobilization tends to reverse the usual relationship between socioeconomic level and activity.”(Verba, Nie, Kim 1978, p.206). *Within* these groups, though, political participation is often greater among those who have higher education levels and socio-economic status. Verba et. al. cite the example of farmers in Austria and Japan, religious groups in the Netherlands and African-Americans in the U.S., as groups which are more politically active than one would expect based on the general socio-economic status of members. They argue that however, within these groups, the link between socio-economic variables and political participation prevails and those who are educated and are more affluent are the more active. (ibid. p.206)

developed and developing countries, and in both cases over 40% of legislators are from managerial and professional backgrounds, as can be seen in Figure 6-5.

Figure 6-5: Occupational Background of Politicians for Developing and Developed Countries



Source: Norris, 1996 and Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1999

6.2 Route into Politics for Women: Kinship ties

Is occupational background crucial in the case of aspiring women politicians? Unlike the case of men, the main route to political prominence for women is perceived to be through marriage and kinship ties. A father or spouse in politics is considered the foremost entry path for women politicians. In a study of women national leaders, Michael Genovese (1993) states “In an examination of the career patterns of the women who have become national leaders one characteristic stands out above all others. Very few of the women rose to power ‘on their own.’ Most of the women... ‘inherited’ power from family, father or husband. (p. 214)

There are at least two things about this assertion, which are problematic. The first, normative, concern is the idea that women who have kinship political connections somehow

are just handed power. This implies lack of agency – the women are passive ‘inheritors’ of the position rather than active participants in politics seeking higher office based on their own achievements. The second incorrect assumption is that ‘most’ women gain political power through family political ties. Both of these are discussed below.

In an essay on the generalizations surrounding widows of politicians, Diane Kincaid (1978) astutely observes “conventional wisdom projects not only a frequent but an easy succession model. The words most frequently used in connection with this process are that the widow ‘inherited’ or ‘was give’ the office; that she was ‘named’, ‘placed’ or ‘put into’ the seat...the widow, by strong implication is the inactive object of action by others. Even those few transitive verbs sometimes employed, that she ‘filled the vacancy’ or succeeded to the office’ strongly suggest that the process was entirely *pro forma* and the candidate herself was personally disengaged” (pp. 97-98) The myth does not hold up on closer scrutiny. In Kincaid’s examination of widows in the U.S. political process, for example, out of the sample of 31 widows considering political careers, 26 had to over come significant opposition at the primary and general election level. In a footnote she describes the case of one widow, Hazel Abel who was seen as being “called upon” to serve and considered “lacking in political ambition” while in reality Abel had to beat 15 Republicans in the primary and a Democrat in the general elections to win the seat. Furthermore, after leaving the Senate she attempted to advance her political career and entered the Republican primary for governor. (ibid., p.97)

In the international arena, if we look at women national leaders, Indira Gandhi in India, Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, Gloria Arroyo in the Philippines, Megawati Sukurnaputri in Indonesia, Gro Harlem Brundland in Norway and Margaret Thatcher in England all had fathers who were politicians. But does that mean they just came to power based on kinship? Let us consider the case of Benazir Bhutto, who was first elected the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1988. Of all these leaders, one would assume that she is the most likely candidate for having achieved her position based on kinship ties. She is from a developing country, and moreover a Muslim one. Her father was a very prominent politician in the Pakistan government, first as a Foreign Minister during the military rule of Ayub Khan and later the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the early 1970s. It can thus be argued that she became politically prominent simply because of family connections.

But it is by no means obvious that Benazir Bhutto should become a national leader just because of her father. After all, in a supposedly restrictive Muslim society, any political benefits accruing from Zulfikar Bhutto's position should have gone to her two brothers. In fact both sons were politically active, and Nusrat Bhutto, Zulfikar's widow, actively supported her older son's efforts. But instead it was Benazir who rose to political power as the leader of the Popular People's Political Party (PPP) and became the prime minister of Pakistan when her party won the elections in 1988. How did that happen?

Examining Benazir Bhutto's rise to power, we see that she had to struggle to gain power and that grit and determination, along with any kinship benefits, marked her political rise. As is the case with many political figures, she displayed strong ideological beliefs and ambition early on, in her university days. She went to Radcliffe College and studied government and law and then later went to Oxford University, and was the "first foreign woman elected president of the Oxford Union, the prestigious university debating society." When Zia overthrew and jailed her father in 1977 and instated military rule, Benazir actively entered politics and fought against the new dictatorship. She was jailed and suffered "various degrees of detention for almost seven years" (Anderson 1993, p. 48). After being allowed to leave in 1984, Bhutto went to England and connected with the party started by her father, the Popular Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which was agitating to restore Pakistan's democracy. She was elected head of the PPP there, no doubt in part because of her family ties but also because the imprisonment and suffering she had undergone highlighted the party's cause and increased the legitimacy of its claim for restoring democracy.

Even though her father's political position may have helped Benazir Bhutto in her politics, it was largely thorough her own efforts that she rose to political prominence. Similarly, political leaders like Indira Gandhi, Chandrika Kumarantunge and Gro Harlem Brundtland, to name a few, came from politically prominent families, and this fact no doubt helped them advance their own political careers. But they too struggled to build their support bases and displayed drive, initiative and leadership qualities in the face of adversities from a young age. With a few exceptions, most of the women political leaders coming from political families, display comparable qualities and qualifications of the general pool of successful political figures. Observing women politicians in Sri Lanka, Kearney (1981) argues "It is not uncommon for the wife of a member of parliament to assume responsibilities for work within her husband's constituency. Consequently, she may become well acquainted

with the local political situation and the affairs of the constituency association or party branches. In the event of a sudden vacancy due to the death or disqualification of the husband, the wife may in fact be the most knowledgeable and favorably suited candidate to succeed him” (p. 739). So in that sense, to imply that these women were just handed power or ‘inherited’ it and to dismiss their political achievements by portraying it as being “given” to them is a vile caricature of the hard work put in and the battles many of them faced.

Moreover, the large majority of women who enter politics do not have a parent or spouse in politics. If we look at the backgrounds of women who have been Prime Minister or President across the world, from figure 6, we see that over two-thirds do not have politically prominent families and have made it entirely on their own. Drawing a generalization about political kinship connections of women in legislatures from the characteristics of female national leaders, this number probably reflects an upper bound, as we would expect that higher the office, the greater the probability of family connections. In relatively less prominent positions, such as the national legislature, probably even more of the women have made it without kinship connections.

Is there a difference between industrialized and developing countries in this regard? Some scholars argue that women politicians from developing countries come predominantly through family connections and that “women in less developed societies are more dependent on spousal or family position than are women in more developed societies” (Genovese 1993, p. 214).⁵⁷ This may be because lesser developed countries have more traditional, patriarchal societies and so most women are ‘socialized’ into traditional roles and only those with strong, supportive role models, i.e. a father in politics have been pushed to develop an interest in politics (Kearney 1981). In addition women in general in lesser developed countries may be less organized and have not created ‘demand’ for their inclusion, so only a select, connected few get in (Matland 1998).

Another common explanation is that that most politicians in general in lesser-developed countries come from aristocratic, politically influential backgrounds, and so it is likely that the women in power as well will be drawn from this pool. For example, in a study of women in politics in Sri Lanka, Robert Kearney (1981) notes “those elected to parliament as well as those contesting seats unsuccessfully – came from political families or had close

⁵⁷ Interestingly in his own analysis, Genovese had a higher percentage of women in developed

male relatives in politics...this circumstance, however, is not limited to women; many of the men who have sought or held elective office also have come from political families and have had close relatives in office...within developing countries although the notions of women's roles as excluding public life remain prevalent, a relatively low or uneven level of institutionalization and the enduring strength of kinship permit a wife or daughter to succeed to a vacated public office as a symbol of or stand-in for the former male occupant, in absence of a suitable male heir." (pp. 738-39). Similarly, in a discussion on women politicians in India, Mary Katzenstein (1978) argues that "in many developing societies...a regularized, stable process whereby succession of political leaders is assured is not entirely established; hence there would be a greater probability that kinship factors would enter into the succession process. In a situation where kinship is important, it is not unlikely that a daughter, widow, or sister might succeed to office." (p. 481).

Thus low levels of institutionalization of politics makes it likely for more women (and men) to enter politics based on kinship ties. There are a number of possible reasons why politics may be less institutionalized in developing countries. It could be attributed to the relatively small period of time many developing countries have been 'free'. Countries that were colonized in Asia and Africa, have been functioning as democracies for only a short period of time and political institutions may thus be fragile. While Western countries have been free to develop and strengthen their parliamentary form of government for over 100 years, many developing countries were able to throw off the yoke of colonial rule only after the second-world war, some getting their freedom as recently as a couple of decades ago. One would expect the new democratic institutions to take time to fully develop. In addition, a number of countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa have had democracy alternating with military rule. Countries with strong military presence may find that routinized political recruitment and functioning interrupted by military interference, leaving political institutions weak.

One could also argue for the prevalence of kinship ties in politics in developing countries by considering the trajectory of development of political institutions in relation to economic development. To explain why there may be concentration of political power in the hands of a few elite in developing countries, we could look at Robert Dahl's (1961)

countries from political families.

explanation of political development and the progression from cumulative to dispersed inequalities in politics with economic change. At early stages of industrialization, political power may be concentrated in the hands of a few powerful, elite families who control economic and political resources. This is the stage of cumulative inequalities as social, economic and political power goes hand –in-hand. But in the course of industrialization, as new economic elite and entrepreneurs emerge, political power may pass over to the new leaders of business. Over time, as other groups become prominent, be they trade unions, environmental groups like Greenpeace or ethnic minorities, political power gradually would become more dispersed and held in part by each of these organized groups in society. This is the stage of dispersed inequalities, with social economic and political power held by often disparate groups in society. If one assumes that developing countries are in the nascent stage of industrialization, then one would expect social, economic and political to be concentrated in the hands of a few elite families.

Thus there seem to be a variety of reasons to argue that politicians, and for our purposes, female political figures, will be drawn from political families in developing countries. If we look at the data on women leaders, at first glance, it seems to be the case that a larger percentage in the developing countries come from political families, 46% as compared to 12% in the developed world. But in terms of actual figures, there is not much difference in the number of women from non-political families in the developing and developed countries. There have been 24 women leaders from the developing world, out of which 13 come from non-political families. A smaller number of women leaders have come from the industrialized countries, 17, out of which 15 are not from political dynasties. Further, looking at variations across regions, we see that in Asia most of the women leaders have political kinship ties, but in the rest of the world, there is really not much difference between industrialized and developing regions.

Table 6-2: Women political leaders from political families

	Number of Female PMs/Presidents	Number from political families	Number from non-political families	% from non- political families
World	41	13	28	68%
Developing Countries	24	11	13	54%
Industrialized Countries	17	2	15	88%
Region				
Asia	9	8	1	..
Latin America and Caribbean	10	3	7	..
Middle East and Africa	5	0	5	..
Western Europe	10	2	8	..
Eastern Europe	5	0	5	..
Americas	1	0	1	..
Oceania	1	0	1	..

Source: Coded by author from Genovese, 1993 and biographical sources.

It is not surprising that authors who talk about weak institutionalization of politics and the prevalence of kinship ties are often discussing women in Asian politics. But why would issues of political institutionalization or level of economic development and cumulative political inequalities pertain only to Asia and not other developing countries?

Another point to note is that we are looking at national leaders and while that gives us a glimpse of the political recruitment in the countries, it is only an imperfect measure.⁵⁸ As mentioned before, the role of kinship in political entry is probably over-stated, as it is relatively easier to enter the national legislatures than it is to become the national leader.

What the evidence on women leaders indicates is that in both developing and developed nations, the majority of women who enter politics are not from prominent political families. Although kinship is one of the paths for women entering politics, it is by no means the only or even the key shared characteristic among women politicians. Rather than a political family connection, what is more common among these women is their high level of education and professional background, with many being lawyers, professors or businesswomen. As Camp (1995) notes in his study of Mexico, "Women politicians, like

⁵⁸ Especially since a number of countries have not had women Prime Ministers or Presidents and so we get little inkling of the potential kinship ties of national level politicians in those countries. In part, this may not be such a big issue if the region to which they belong provides adequate data points as our analysis is really looking at differences between developing and developed countries as a group and differences between geographic regions. In the regional analysis, North America is not well represented as we have only one data

their male counterparts, must be in the right place at the right time to achieve success. They must associate in institutions where the future political elite gathers” (pp. 160-61).⁵⁹

6.3 Occupational Pool and Entry into Politics

Just as in the case of men, women are drawn for an elite pool based on their occupational achievements. Countries that have a greater share of women in their professional and managerial labor force are able to recruit more women into politics. This is not simply a correlation argument, but is one of causality. In other words, it is not simply the case that having women in high-status professional occupations and in national politics are correlated because they both indicate the egalitarian position of women in society, but that having women well-represented in the eligibility pool for political candidates, broadly the elite professions, is necessary to provide a conduit for women into politics. It is a difficult argument to test, as we lack cross-national biographies of women in legislatures. We try to get at the link by looking at what aggregate cross-national data there is available.

As a first cut, we plot the raw data on percentage of women in parliament and those in managerial positions to see if countries which do not have a large pool of women in elite professions are able to have a large number in politics.⁶⁰ The data for women in managerial

point from this area.


⁵⁹ In fact, his data on the credentials of first-time office holders in Mexico indicates that women politicians are less likely to have kinship ties than male politicians - 15% of women office-holders had a relative in politics as compared to 28% of men. With regard to education, 26% of women and 25% of men had graduate degrees (ibid.)

⁶⁰ The women’s occupational data is from the International Labor Organization. It has an International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) which is the most widely used standard for occupation classification. In this, there are 12 main categories with more detailed subcategories within them. Two of these categories are not very informative, as they consist of “other” and “unknown”. The other ten are –managers and legislators and senior professionals, professionals, technicians and associated professionals, clerks, service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and related trade workers, plant and machinery operators and assemblers, elementary occupations, and armed forces. The cross-national data often lumps together some of the categories. For example, category 2, which is professional occupations, is often combined with category 3, which consists of technicians and associated professionals. These categories often appear together for gender occupational breakdowns in the ILO statistical yearbook and other government and non-government statistics. Peter Elias and Margaret Birch (1994) provide more detailed information on the ISO classification.

The caveat is that the combined category of women workers in managerial, professional and technical occupations from the ILO classification is quite broad and encompasses more than women in elite industry positions. So we get a rather inflated figure, which is much larger than the actual proportion of women in influential managerial and professional positions. But presumably a larger proportion of women in the

and professional positions is lagged by a few years since there is presumably some lag time between women attaining positions of power in industry and the entry of a portion of these into politics. The upper left quadrant of Figure 6-6 shows that countries that have fewer than average women in administrative and professional positions rarely have above average representation of women in political offices. This is true for the 1970s as much as for the 1990s. In the 1970's, only 3 out of the 59 countries in the graph, Switzerland, Indonesia and the Netherlands had lower than average representation of women in elite professions but higher representation of women in politics. In the 1990s Bangladesh, Malawi, Zambia and Australia had relatively greater presence of women in parliament than their participation in elite professions. This is not very surprising, since most of these countries have had and are continuing to have either government or party stipulated quotas for women in politics (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1997). The data substantiates that having women in the elite pool of professional and managerial professions is necessary for having women represented in positions of political power.

Figure 6-6: Deviations from the mean- women in parliament and women in elite occupations 1970 and 1990



managerial and professional pool in country A over B, probably implies a larger proportion of women in the elite positions as well. So the data is useful in that it gives us a rough estimate of the relative status of women in

We also run some regressions to test the relationship between the political power and economic status of women. The dependent variable is the percentage of women in national legislatures. A description of the data and sources is below.

Table 6-3: Data Description and Sources

Variable	Definition	Year	Description (Min, Mean, Max)	Source
WIP	Proportion of seats in lower house of parliament held by women	1985, 1985, 1995	0, 8.2, 39	WISTAT (composite). PAF24, PAF26
WIM	Women in managerial, professional and technical positions	1970, 1980, 1990	5.6, 35.4, 63.6	WISTAT ECO3.1
GDP per capita	In US dollars	1970, 1980, 1990	45.23, 3216, 34226.4	WBSI
FERT	Estimate/projection of female fertility - Number of Children per 1000 women between the ages 15-19;	1970, 1980, 1990	3.4, 74.6, 271.9	WBSI (1970) WISTAT (1980, 1990)
FIL	Percentage women between the ages of 15-19 with no schooling	1970, 1980, 1990	0, 20.4, 97.2 (Higher number means more illiteracy)	WISTAT. EDU12220
GINI	Income inequality measure - GINI coefficient.	1970, 1980, 1990	20.97, 40.8, 70 (Higher number means more inequality)	Deiningner and Squire (only numbers deemed "acceptable" for comparison by authors, nearest year used)
Geographic Location	Asia/Pacific, Latin American/Caribbean, N. Africa/Middle East; Sub-Saharan Africa		Coded as dummies (0 and 1) for each geographic region	Coded by author and James Fowler
LDC	Lesser-developed countries. All the countries in geographic location excluding Australia, New Zealand and Japan.		Coded 1 if lesser developed country, 0 otherwise	Coded by author
DEM	Democracy - state of political rights	1975, 1985, 1995	Dummy variable. 1=free or partially free, 0=not free	Freedom House

In regressions 1-3 in Table 6-4 the independent variables are the proportion of women in managerial and professional positions, the degree of democracy, whether the country is industrialized or developing, gross national product per capita as a measure for the

the work force across countries.

level of economic development and dummies for capturing temporal effects. We test the following equations with a Tobit regression model to deal with left censoring and to control for the fact that countries with no women in parliament are probably different from the majority that do have some female political representation.

Equation (1):

Percentage Women in Parliament = $b_0 + b_1$ (Lag of % Women in managerial and professional positions WIM) + b_2 (democracy DEM) + b_3 (developing country LDC) + b_4 (dummy for the decade 1980s D1980) + b_4 (dummy for the decade 1990s D1990) + ε

Equation (2):

Women in Parliament = $b_0 + b_1$ (Lag of % Women in managerial and professional positions WIM) + b_2 (democracy DEM) + b_3 (dummy for developing country LDC) + b_4 (Lag of logged GDP per capita GDPPC) + b_5 (dummy for the decade 1980s D1980) + b_6 (dummy for the decade 1990s D1990) + ε

Equation (3):

(a) Women in Parliament = $b_0 + b_1$ (Lag of % Women in managerial and professional positions WIM) + b_2 (democracy DEM) + b_3 (Lag of logged GDP per capita GDPPC) + b_4 (dummy for the decade 1980s D1980) + b_5 (dummy for the decade 1990s D1990) + ε if dummy for developing countries = 1;

(b) Women in Parliament = $b_0 + b_1$ (Lag of % Women in managerial and professional positions WIM) + b_2 (democracy DEM) + b_3 (Lag of logged GDP per capita GDPPC) + b_4 (dummy for the decade 1980s D1980) + b_5 (dummy for the decade 1990s D1990) + ε if dummy for developing countries = 0.

Table 6-4: Effects of having women in elite professions on female political leadership

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)
WIM	0.216 (0.045)**	0.206 (0.046)**	0.597 (0.126)**	0.109 (0.043)*
DEM	-4.453 (1.215)**	-4.285 (1.220)**	-5.551 (3.921)	-2.920 (1.122)*
LDC	-7.539 (1.075)**	-6.405 (1.421)**		
D1985	3.063 (1.215)*	2.556 (1.312)	3.553 (2.396)	2.065 (1.262)
D1995	2.979 (1.252)*	2.538 (1.403)	4.503 (2.688)	1.339 (1.287)
GDPPC (ln)		0.662 (0.522)		
Constant	6.873 (2.089)**	1.752 (4.023)	-8.336 (6.688)	3.086 (1.670)
Observations	225	222	66	159

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

The democracy variable is highly significant capturing the high share of women in the communist countries as compared to most democracies. In addition, developing countries have a lower average number of women in national legislatures, but as can be seen from column (1) and (2), the proportion of women in managerial and professional jobs is highly significant across countries. Column (3a) and (3b) further show that having women in elite professions impacts the proportion of women in national legislatures for developing and developed countries. To further test the hypothesis that having women in elite professions is critical to their entry into politics, we run a fuller model including variables such as literacy and fertility, economic inequality and controls for democracy and other cross-sectional and temporal variations. We run various specifications and test for robustness of the results. The 4 regression equations are:

Equation (1):

Women in Parliament = $b_0 + b_1$ (Lagged log of Gross Domestic Product per capita GDPPC) + b_2 (Lagged % Women in managerial and professional positions WIM) + b_3 (Lagged fertility rates FERT) + b_4 (Lagged Gini coefficient to measure economic inequality GINI) + ε

Equation (2):

Women in Parliament = $b_0 + b_1$ (Lagged log of Gross Domestic Product per capita GDPPC) + b_2 (Lagged % Women in managerial and professional positions WIM) + b_3 (Lagged fertility rates FERT) + b_4 (Lagged Gini coefficient to measure economic inequality GINI) + b_5 (Lagged % of women in the 15-19 age group with no schooling FIL) + ε

Equation (3):

Women in Parliament = $b_0 + b_1$ (Lagged log of Gross Domestic Product per capita GDPPC) + b_2 (Lagged % Women in managerial and professional positions WIM) + b_3 (Lagged fertility rates FERT) + b_4 (Lagged Gini coefficient to measure economic inequality GINI) + b_5 (dummy for Asia & the Pacific region ASIAP) + b_6 (dummy for Latin America & the Caribbean LAME) + b_7 (dummy for North Africa & Middle East NA/ME) + b_8 (dummy for Subs Saharan Africa SUBSA) + b_9 (dummy for the decade 1980s D1980) + b_{10} (dummy for the decade 1990s D1990) + ε

Equation (4):

Women in Parliament = $b_0 + b_1$ (Lagged log of Gross Domestic Product per capita GDPPC) + b_2 (Lagged % Women in managerial and professional positions WIM) + b_3 (Lagged fertility rates FERT) + b_4 (Lagged Gini coefficient to measure economic inequality GINI) + b_5 (Lagged % of women in the 15-19 age group with no schooling FIL) + b_6 (democracy DEM) + b_7 (dummy for Asia & the Pacific region ASIAP) + b_8 (dummy for Latin America & the Caribbean LAME) + b_9 (dummy for North Africa & Middle East NA/ME) + b_{10} (dummy for Subs Saharan Africa SUBSA) + b_{11} (dummy for the decade 1980s D1980) + b_{12} (dummy for the decade 1990s D1990) + ε

Table 6-5: Effects of socio-economic variables on women's political participation

Dependent variable: Percentage of women in national legislatures (lower house of parliament)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GDPPC (ln)	1.897 (0.508)**	0.933 (0.684)	0.893 (0.694)	1.699 (1.042)
WIM	0.255 (0.059)**	0.223 (0.088)*	0.238 (0.063)**	0.251 (0.096)*
FERT	0.035 (0.017)*	0.019 (0.024)	0.017 (0.022)	0.020 (0.026)
GINI	-0.352 (0.071)**	-0.407 (0.088)**	-0.306 (0.090)**	-0.368 (0.119)**
FIL		0.024 (0.051)		0.068 (0.053)
ASLAP			-3.015 (2.114)	0.849 (2.871)
LAME			-3.125 (2.287)	-1.300 (2.743)
NA/ME			-5.443 (2.538)*	-6.432 (3.472)
SUBSA			0.804 (3.509)	3.186 (5.743)
D1985			2.568 (1.555)	1.425 (1.816)
D1995			2.989 (1.643)	-0.183 (2.408)
DEM				-5.974 (2.259)*
Constant	-3.196 (5.168)	7.430 (7.073)	4.176 (6.995)	3.836 (10.486)
Observations	147	68	147	67

Standard errors in parentheses; significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

In Table 6-5, column (1) and (2) test the effects of socio-economic variables on the proportion of women in legislatures. Women in managerial positions and the Gini coefficient for inequality are highly significant in both. Column (3) adds regional variables to see if there is any of the variation in women in parliament can be attributed to unexplained regional characteristics. North Africa and the Middle East region have significantly fewer women in legislatures than other regions. But once we add female illiteracy and freedom to the equation, the North Africa and Middle East dummy loses its significance. A further joint significance test for the regional variables in equation 4 shows that the regional variables are not jointly significant either. A variable that is consistently significant is the Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality. From column (1), roughly a 3% decrease in the Gini coefficient of inequality will lead, on average, to a one percent increase the proportion of women in

parliament, holding everything else constant. This variable, in part, may be capturing the effects of the Scandinavian countries, which have a high proportion of women in parliament and very low inequality.

Besides the economic inequality measure, all the regression results indicate that the proportion of women in managerial and professional positions is very significantly related to their proportion in parliament. In column (1), a one percent increase in the proportion of women in professional and management positions will increase the percentage of women in national legislatures, on average, by around a fourth of a percent. In other words, roughly a 4% rise in the proportion of women in elite occupations will increase the proportion of women in legislatures by one percent⁶¹. Thus, in developing and developed countries, the presence of women in upper echelons of the business workplace is crucial for the entry of women into politics. If the proportion of women in this pool is low, then fewer women are available to enter the political arena. The identification of the critical constraint to women's entry into politics helps explain the only marginal increase in the proportion of women politicians over the last three decades, and the patterns of women's political authority in developing and developed countries.

6.4 Temporal and Cross National Effects of Women's Occupational Distribution on Their Political Representation


Women have entered the labor force in increasing numbers over the last three decades, but the proportion of women in top professional and managerial positions is still shockingly small. At the very top, there are only six women CEOs in leading Fortune 500 companies, translating to a little over 1% women leaders in industry. If we look at the Fortune 1000 firms, the ratio holds, with only 11 having women at the helm. (Fortune.com, 2002). Of course, if we look down below the pinnacles of industry positions, women have

⁶¹ However, considering that the WIM captures a somewhat broader category of occupations such as technical jobs, the WIM variable may actually be providing the upper bound for the proportion of women in high-status professions. So a 4% increase in this variable may actually only imply a much smaller increase in the proportion of women in the top managerial and professional jobs which may be more in line with the percentage increase in women in parliament.

made greater inroads into elite professional and managerial positions. It is difficult to get exact figures, as the data collected across countries and within countries are quite granular. We know that the number lies somewhere between the roughly fifty-fifty ratio of women and men in graduate school and professional education to the 1:99 ratio in apex managerial positions.

The cross-national data on the ratio of women in managerial and professional positions provides a guide to the relative status of women in elite jobs across countries. In the nineteen seventies, there were on average 12% on women in managerial positions and 33% women in managerial, professional and technical positions combined. In mid 1990s, this increased to 18% and 39% respectively, registering a rise of approximately 6%. As mentioned before, these numbers are probably inflating the actual size of the contingent of women leaders in industry, as they are lumping together female mid level managers with those in senior management. So not surprisingly, in the table below, the percentage of women in managerial, professional and technical jobs is much higher than their representation in parliament. But leaving aside the issue of inflated data on women in elite occupations, there are three interesting things to note about the cross-national time-series trends.

Figure 6-7: Cross-national variation in women in parliament and elite professions



First, in the 1970s, all regions of the world have about the same proportion of women parliamentarians. In fact, comparing across developing and developed countries, in

that period Latin America and Africa actually have a greater proportion of women in parliament than Western Europe and North America, excluding the Nordic countries. Second, the increase in women parliamentarians over three decades is more pronounced in Western Europe and North America than in any other region in the world. Finally, the developing world, except for Latin America, witnessed an actual decrease in the proportion of women parliamentarians in the 1990s as compared to the previous decade.⁶²

6.4.1 Temporal Variations

What explains the changes in the proportion of women political leaders over time across the various regions? Turning to the theoretical literature for guidance, there are two major schools of thought- the economic development and the economic discrimination approaches.

The most pervasive school of thought under the rubric of the economic development approach is modernization theory. Scholars within this approach posit that that societies with higher rates of growth, increased education for women and greater female labor force participation levels have higher number of women in parliament than other societies (Matland 1998, Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994, Rule 1987, Di Palma 1970, Almond and Verba 1963). Women who have higher education enter the labor force and are able to rise to positions of power in industry. By working outside their homes, women also gain a better understanding of political processes and hence are more able to participate in political activities and stand for national legislatures. Economic development theories therefore assume that as societies become more “modern” and economically developed, women are able to participate more actively in politics. From this perspective, societies with higher rates of growth, increased education for women and greater female labor force participation levels would all have more women in parliament than other societies. Equality of women in political authority should occur fairly rapidly with industrialization, as there is a positive

⁶² This holds true for Eastern Europe as well, which had the most dramatic fall in the percentage of women parliamentarians from the 1980s to the 1990s, but that is probably due to the fall of Communism. Communist regimes, it is well accepted, were quite committed to having substantial, if not equal, female political representation.

diffusion effect. As women become more educated, they become powerful in the economic arena and are able to enter the political arena in greater numbers.

However, scholars from the economic discrimination school challenge the modernization theorists who view economic development and modernization as a continual progress towards gender equality (Clark 1991). They argue that as women and other minority status groups enter the labor force in greater numbers, they are pushed into low-status, lower paying jobs. When marginalized segments of the population, such as women, participate in the cash economy in increasing numbers, there is greater motive for the more powerful to block the upward movement of the group, than in the case when there is very little economic participation by the disadvantaged sections. Thus, “the smaller the number of women the better are their relative odds of joining higher-status, better paid occupations” (Semyonov and Shenhav 1988, p.976). Proponents of this theory point to a large body of ecological research that highlights a positive correlation between percent minority population in the workforce and occupational segregation (Jacobs and Lim 1992, Semyonov and Shenhav 1988, Wilcox and Roof 1978). This literature is not explicit about the causal links between economic discrimination and representation of women in the legislature. But some scholars have inferred that economic development and increased female labor force participation would lead to a lower ratio of women in economic authority positions which would lead to a smaller proportion of women in political power as well. They argue that one should expect to see a negative relationship between the number of women in the labor force and women with political authority (Moore and Shackman 1996).

The women in development approach pioneered by Esther Boserup (1970) reaches a similar conclusion. Scholars within this approach argue that the process of industrialization can be detrimental for women in the labor force. In many developing countries, a relatively greater proportion of women had professional jobs in the early stages of industrialization. This is due to a couple of reasons. First, people from elite families dominated the professional labor market in the early stages of industrialization. Women who came from high-status backgrounds were able to join the professional and managerial ranks while men from less privileged backgrounds found it harder to break into the managerial ranks. Second, colonial rule in the lesser developed countries was accompanied by the establishment of a public bureaucracy, and the clerical positions in these were mainly held by local, educated men, and these positions were considered quite desirable at that time. As the countries

industrialized, new jobs opened up in the private sector which elite women were able to take advantage of and secure for themselves.

However, as countries developed economically, old traditions were breaking down and people become less accepting of familial ties as basis for occupying powerful positions. At the same time, deepening economic inequality in the process of industrialization pushed new entrants, especially women, into lower paying jobs.⁶³ So while greater industrialization leads to greater number of women in labor force, economic and social pressures are created in the process of industrialization, which create the potential for greater restrictions on women. In many western countries, in contrast, women traditionally entered the formal labor force through factory jobs and then secretarial positions. While in developing countries, colonialism created a historical legacy in which men performed the clerical jobs, in developed countries this was almost exclusively a female domain. It is only from the 1970s onwards that women in the developed world started making greater inroads into elite, managerial and professional jobs.

According to this perspective, there should be a u-shape curve of gender equality, and women are in positions of economic and political power at two extremes of industrialization: In least industrialized societies with relatively lower levels of female labor force participation, where economic inequality is low and traditional or ascriptive norms of social relations prevail, and in the most economically advanced and modern industrialized societies with high levels of female labor force participation. Women's participation in elite professions and through that, their political recruitment, should be the least in the middle stages of industrialization where economic inequality is likely to be the sharpest.⁶⁴

We compare the socio-economic theories of political representation by looking at the impact of industrialization (as measured by GDP per capita) on the proportion of women in parliament and see if they can explain the patterns of gender representation we have seen over the past few decades. According to the modernization theory, the proportion

⁶³ Economic development and the social changes accompanying industrialization often create social instability. One hypothesis for women being pushed into lower status jobs is that norms of equality imposed by the market clash with traditional social hierarchies and group roles. Tension between the two cultures may result in a backlash, and imposition of more restrictive norms which often translate into limited ability of women to obtain high-status professional and managerial jobs (See for example Tetreault, 1995 and Susan Faludi 1991)

⁶⁴ Simon Kuznets (1955) suggested that in the process of industrialization economic inequality first increase and then decreases. The purported 'U' shape relationship between economic development and economic inequality has since then been called the Kuznets curve.

of women in national legislatures should increase with industrialization, because higher levels of education, increased women's participation in the labor force and the spread of egalitarian norms should result in more women in elite professions and facilitate their entry into politics. Thus there should be a linear, upward sloping relationship between economic development as measured by GDP per capita and the proportion of women in national legislatures.

But the economic discrimination theory, however claims that industrialization while it increases the number of women in the labor force, it paradoxically decreases their odds of getting status jobs and political authority, in part due to rising economic inequality. In later stages of industrialization, inequality decreases and increased female labor force participation will increase the number of women in elite professions and their share in political leadership positions. Under this hypothesis, industrialization has a 'U' shape relationship with the proportion of women in national legislatures, bottoming out at the middle stage of industrialization, where inequality is often considered to be the greatest.

Table 6-6: Relationship between Industrialization and Women in Politics


Dependent variable: Percentage of women in national legislatures (lower house of parliament)

	<i>WTP</i>
Lagged Logged GDPPC	-8.290 (2.366)**
Lagged Logged GDPPC squared	0.700 (0.162)**
Constant	29.937 (8.381)**
Observations	349

Standard errors in parentheses;
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

We run a regression model with logged GDP per capita and its square to check for functional form. If the modernization hypothesis is true, then logged GDP should have a positive sign and the squared term should not be significant. The regression results in Table 6-6 indicate that industrialization has a 'U' shape relationship with political power of women.


Figure 6-8: Estimated relationship between economic growth and share of women in parliament



The results support the economic discrimination thesis over the modernization one. Furthermore, the previous regression results in Table 6-5 indicate that none of the modernization variables such as literacy or fertility rates are significant. On the other hand, the Gini coefficient is substantive and significant, indicating that as economic inequality goes up, there is a negative impact on the proportion of women in politics.

We don't have detailed data on India, but this pattern seems to hold in this case as well. Plotting the percentage of women in parliament against industrialization and inequality in Figure 6-9, we see that in the early course of industrialization with relatively lower inequality, there are roughly 7% women parliamentarians. But as inequality increases from the 1960s onwards, and more sharply in the 1970s, the proportion of women in the national legislature drops to around 4%. In the 1980s, as inequality starts decreasing, the proportion of women in parliament rises again to 5% and reaches 7% in the early 1990s.

Figure 6-9: Economic development and women in parliament in India



Source: Election Commission of India, 2002; International Labor Organization, 2002

Time series data on women in the managerial and professional occupations is not available. Limited statistics are available on the proportion of women in the services sector. The proportion of women in the services sector, although it lumps together a variety of occupations, provides a rough gauge of the possible pool of women elite professional and managerial occupations. The data indicates that the proportion of women in service occupations fell by 1%, from 16% in the 1960s to the 15% in the 1970s and then rose again in the 1980s and 1990s (International Labor Organization 2002). We don't know how much this impacted women in elite professions, but a few studies on women in the labor force in India have argued that there was a significant worsening of the economic situation for women from the 1960s onwards to the 1970s (Karen Leonard 1979).

Overall in the last three decades, we see women's political participation either going down, or increasing at a slow rate in most developing countries, as compared to industrialized nations. Economic development, while it opens some opportunities for women, also makes achievement of higher leadership positions more difficult, at least in the

short run. And the short run is not trivial as it can span a few decades, if not more in many developing countries. The notion that countries just need to develop economically and gender equality will come naturally is not really true. Other forces unleashed in the process of industrialization, especially the dramatic increase in inequality have a negative impact on women's ability to progress in the economic, and through that, the political sphere. This suggests that there is no simple route to increasing women's political participation.

To summarize, in the utility function, the key constraint to women's entry into politics is their opportunity cost, i.e., occupational position. People who have higher opportunity costs are, paradoxically, the most likely to join politics. Since women have lower representation than men do in elite professions, they have a lower rate of entry into politics. Moreover, increasing inequality and occupational stratification often accompany the process of economic development, at least in the short run, making it harder for women to make significant inroads into industry leadership positions. Consequently, countries experience a sluggish increase, and often a decline, in the political power of women in the course of industrialization.

The argument by no means assumes that the composition of the political elite is static and unchangeable. As economic development affects the composition of women in the managerial and professional occupations, so may economic development simultaneously alter the characteristics of the political elite. It is, we claim, that despite shifts in the groups that attain political power, the unchanging factor is that the bulk of parliamentarians come from elite managerial and professional backgrounds. We turn to the case of India to get a more detailed look at the pool from which politicians are drawn, and the dynamic and enduring characteristics of the political elite.

7 Supply of Female Candidates in India

What is the pool from which politicians, especially female politicians are drawn in India? To get an insight into this question, we turn to a microanalysis of the composition of elected representatives in the 1996 parliament. The 1996 parliament is a good representation of the political elite as reflects the trends in the preceding decades and encapsulates the macro shifts in the groups that have gained political power. The unusually detailed biographies of the members of parliament also provide socio-economic characteristics of the political elite and allow us to perform comparative analysis. We first describe the data and look at the general make-up of the politicians in terms of sex, age, number of children and education and occupational characteristics. Then we provide a historical analysis of the shifts in political power and explore differences and similarities in the various groups that gain political prominence in terms of education levels and occupational background. Finally, we perform a more formal statistical test of the hypothesis that female and male politicians are drawn from the same pool.

The Indian national parliament has two houses, the Rajya Sabha (upper house) and the Lok Sabha (lower house). The populace elects the members of the Lok Sabha, while the members of the state assemblies indirectly elect the members of the Rajya Sabha. Our analysis focuses on the members of the Lok Sabha. The “Who’s Who” for the 1996 election provides biographical sketches of the members of the eleventh Lok Sabha.⁶⁵ The primary source of the data are the members themselves, with the Election Commission providing supplementary information and authenticating some of the data provided by members. There are usually 545 members of the lower house of parliament including two appointed from the Anglo-Indian community by the President of India. Twenty two percent of the total seats are reserved for the scheduled caste and tribes, keeping in line with their numbers in the total population. In these constituencies, only a member of the Scheduled Castes or Tribes can contest the polls, although all electors have voting rights.

In the 1996 elections, 543 members were elected and 2 appointed from the Anglo-Indian community. Subsequently four members died and three resigned and by elections

⁶⁵ Who’s Who 11th Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1997.

were held to replace some of them, increasing the total number of observations to 550. Out of the 545 members, 42 or roughly 8% are women. Fourteen of the women have been elected from the scheduled caste and tribes reserved seats. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 16 women are from the Congress party, 14 from the BJP and 2 from the communist parties. In addition, one was appointed from the Anglo-Indian community and the other 9 are from smaller regional parties.⁶⁶

7.1 Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of politicians

As a legal requirement, all members of the Lok Sabha have to be at least twenty-five years old. Most members are comfortably over this threshold with the mean age of the legislators being 52 years. The distribution of members according to age group is shown in Table 7-1.

Table 7-1: Age distribution of members of parliament

<i>Age</i>	<i>All (%)</i>	<i>Women (%)</i>	<i>Men (%)</i>
25-30	2	-	3
31-40	16	33	15
41-50	31	36	31
51-60	26	19	27
61-70	17	5	18
70+	7	7	7

May not sum to 100% because of rounding.

Source: Who's Who 11th Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1997.

There are a couple of things to note here. First, the age distribution of political leaders in India is very similar to the cross-national pattern of age of politicians observed in Chapter 6, with the highest percentage of parliamentarians in the age group of 41-50. What is a bit unusual is the high percentage of septuagenarians. The Indian parliament in 1996 had 7% members over the age of 70, while in a similar time period; the average for a number of other countries is only 1%. One possible reason for this is that those who had participated in India's freedom struggle against the British colonizers still hold sway in the public sphere.

⁶⁶ Three women members from Rashtriya Janata Dal, two from Janata Dal, two from Samajwadi party, one from Shiromani Akali Dal, one from Telugu Desam party.

Around 40% of those above the age of 70 in the Indian parliament had been freedom fighters. There doesn't seem to be any other common theme in this group and they come from the full spectrum of parties, from the communist parties in the extreme left to the BJP on the right and from the mammoth Congress to smaller regional parties like the Asom Gana Parishad.

Secondly, while on average women legislators are younger than their male counterparts, with the mean age of the women in parliament being 47, as compared to 52 for men, there are no really young women in the legislature, i.e. those less than 31 years old⁶⁷. This is consistent with the arguments in Chapter 6 that young women bear a disproportionate burden of household labor, especially if they have small children and thus in their younger years, women are far less likely to enter national politics. In contrast, there are 13 men in the national legislature who are between the ages of 25 and 30. Seven of them have prior political experience, ranging from one to nine years. Five of the young men are from the scheduled caste and tribes reserved constituencies and three had experience at the local village council level. In addition, one member from the scheduled caste/tribe seat gained experience from the age of 20 at the Socialist Revolutionary party. Three others who came from the open seats had participated in state legislatures. So there are a small number of politicians who start their career early and are successful at a very young age, but these seem more likely to be men than women. In early adulthood women probably are less able to engage in time-consuming political activity, as household tasks for them are the greatest in those years.

Looking at the issue of marriage and child rearing, the average age of marriage for all members was 25 years, with the mean marriage age for the female and male members being 22 and 25 respectively. This is a bit above the mean marriage age for the Indians in general, with 18 year and 23 years being the marriage age for women and men.⁶⁸ Moreover, 12% of the female legislators and 3% of the men have never been married. Politicians in generally, and especially the women also tend to have fewer children. The parliamentary data shows that the women members had on average two children and their male counterparts had three

⁶⁷ Not to overstate the case, there are some women elected to the parliament who are within this age group. For example, in the 12th Lok Sabha, one of the women elected was 30 years old. The point is that very few women and relatively a larger proportion of men in this age group join the parliament.

⁶⁸ The general population data is from the United Nations data publication WISTAT. It pertains to the 1980s. The Indian census data from 1991 puts the marriage age for women a bit lower than that, at 17.7

children. The average number of children borne per woman is double that of the women parliamentarians, and stands at four children.⁶⁹ Thus members of the parliament marry later and have fewer children than the average Indian. This trend is more pronounced for the women parliamentarians.

The difference between the members of parliament and the general population is even more marked when we look at educational achievements. Almost 80% of the members of parliament have at least an undergraduate degree, as compared to 6% of the total percentage of Indians with a bachelor's degree.⁷⁰ In fact, over half of the parliamentarians have a master's degree or two bachelor degrees. The members who are from the scheduled caste & tribes are very highly educated as well, and 70% have bachelor degrees or higher, with the bulk having a master's degree. Considering that the general socio-economic condition of these communities is even lower than the so-called "upper" castes, this indicates even more clearly that the political leaders are largely drawn from a small, elite cadre. Twenty-four parliament members have obtained higher degrees from abroad, mainly the USA and UK. Almost all of these are men, with only one woman, who obtained her Ph.D. in the USA. Although most of the women members are educated within India, most of them have high educational qualifications. Thirty-one out of the 42 female legislators have a bachelor's degree out of which 17 have a master's degree and 2 hold a doctorate.

Table 7-2: Educational Achievements of Members of Parliament

<i>Education Level</i>	<i>%</i>
Less than High School	1
High School	20
Bachelor's degree	27
Master's degree or two or more bachelor's degrees	49
Doctorate	3

May not sum to 100% because of rounding.

Source: Who's Who 11th Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1997.

The members of parliament are exceptional not only in their educational qualifications, but also in terms of occupational background. The largest bloc is from

years.

⁶⁹ Indian census data from 1991. It is the average of the number of children born and number of children who have survived, for women between the ages of 45-49 years.

⁷⁰ Education figures for Indian population from Census of Indian, 1991.

managerial and professional occupations. Forty two percent of the legislators held prior jobs in law, medicine, engineering, teaching and journalism as well as business management. In the case of women legislators, 45% of them come from the managerial and professional occupations. Given that only 4.6% of Indian workers hold such occupations, the politicians are not chosen randomly across professions but are for the most part selected from a small coterie of elite professionals.⁷¹ This is consistent with the findings from other developing and developed countries in Chapter 6.

Table 7-3: What is the occupational background of members of parliament?

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>%</i>
Managerial & Professional Occupations	42
Agriculture	32
Political worker	14
Trade Union	4
Civil & Military services	3
Sports and Artists	2
Social worker	2
Former ruler	1
Religious Missionary	1
Other	0.4

May not sum to 100% because of rounding.

Source: Who's Who 11th Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1997.


What is quite different is the second largest group from which politicians are drawn, namely the ones from agriculture. Over the last fifty years of independence, the proportion of politicians who state their profession as agriculture has increased. In 1952, 36% of the members of the Lok Sabha listed their occupation as law and a smaller percentage, 22% listed their occupation as agriculture. In 1996 more members cited agriculture as their occupation, with 32% of the parliamentarians coming from a farming background.⁷² No

⁷¹ Data on size of managerial workforce from Census of India 1991. Part Table C-1, B - 19(F) - Economic Tables

⁷² In the classic analysis of the political elite, Robert Dahl in "Who Governs" discussed in detail the changing nature of the political elite from the landed gentry to the immigrant classes in a small town, New Haven, in the USA. He noted that in the early stages of industrialization, when there is a concentration of social and economic power, the political elite comes from the landed gentry. Over time, as new groups, in Dahl's case immigrant groups, become economically powerful, political power shifts into the hands of these entrepreneurs, who gain political prominence. With the rise of a new middle class, political power again shifts to accommodate the interests of this new constituency and the political elite increasing get drawn from the managerial and professional ranks of the middle class. By the early to the middle of the twentieth century, in the USA and most other developed countries the most dominant group from which political figures have been drawn is the

other developing or developed country from our cross-national sample in the mid-nineties had quite as large a contingent from the rural sector.

Figure 7-1: Changes in occupational background of politicians



Part of the discrepancy arises from the fact that the politicians in 1996 list multiple professions and they may be gentleman farmers owning agricultural property, rather than actually engaging in agriculture as their primary activity. Out of the 309 who list agriculture as a profession, 210 also list an alternative occupation, with 68 being lawyers and 44 in academia and journalism. Ninety-nine members, comprising 18% of the total group, list only agriculture as their profession. Out of these, thirty have a bachelor's degree, 22 have a master's degree and one even has a Ph.D. So the number of politicians who are actually engaged in farming may be lot smaller than first seems on surface. However, the fact that people choose to list agriculture as their profession begs the question why they would do so

professional and managerial classes. For most developing countries of today, the process of industrialization had already begun prior to independence and nationhood. The political elite in these countries at the time of independence were the ones who had fought against colonial rule- often lawyers and other educated professionals. Thus there were a large number of lawyers in the 1952 parliament, in newly independent India.

and if an agricultural background is considered an asset in politics. To get an insight into this we look at the shifts in political power of different interest groups in India.

7.2 Historical Shifts in Political Power

Agricultural interests have always played an important role in Indian politics. In the pre-independence era to the late 1960s these have usually played out at the state level. The main issue has been land reform, which pitted the tenant farmers against the landlords. For example, in the state of Uttar Pradesh in 1930-1932, when agricultural prices crashed, the Indian National Congress launched a “no-revenue no-rent” campaign, which was supported by the rural poor against the landlord classes. Similarly, the sharecroppers’ agitation in West Bengal from 1938-1950 pitted the poor peasants against landlords with the former demanding a right to two-thirds of their produce and protection against eviction. The Communist Party championed this cause in 1947-1947, and these were pushed into law in 1950. In yet another state, Andhra Pradesh, the famous Telengana rebellion took place in 1946 to 1951. This was an armed struggle of peasants against landlords, with the intent of destroying the entrenched political base of landlords. The communist party in the state again supported the peasants, and achieved electoral success in the state based on this issue.

(Siddiqi 1997)

The rising clout of agrarian interests in national politics as against state level can be seen from the 1970s onwards. The sharp increase in inequality in the 1970s, especially with regard to the urban-rural divide mobilized small as well as large farmers and together these posed a formidable interest group at the national level (Varshney 1995). Since it was more cohesive, in some ways, as it pitted the rural sector as a whole, against urban interests, it provided a larger constituency to viably push their agenda at the national level. Chaudhary Charan Singh a powerful peasant was able to put farmer-based parties on the national scene. His peasant and agricultural based Indian Revolutionary Party allied with the Janata Dal in the 1977 elections. On their victory, he served as home minister, then deputy prime minister and finally prime minister, albeit for a very brief period. In 1982 he formed the Lok Dal party to represent a broad coalition of agricultural interests. Subsequently, the Haryana Lok

Dal Rashtriya, formed by Devi Lal and the Bharatiya Kissan Kamgar party established by Ajit Singh, Chaudhary Charan Singh's son, kept agricultural groups in national politics.

Other parties also entered the national arena in the 1980s and 1990s. For example the Bahujan Samaj party was formed in the 1980s to represent the oppressed and backward castes. Its leaders Kanshi Ram and Mayawati are both lower castes who champion the cause of the untouchables. Even though the party was formed in Uttar Pradesh, it gained a more diverse constituency and won eleven seats (out of a total of five hundred and forty five seats), of which six were in the state of Uttar Pradesh, three in Punjab and two in Madhya Pradesh. This is a big jump from the sole seat won by Kanshi Ram himself in the previous national elections. Other parties in which the ideology is not so clear-cut, such as the Samajwadi party and the Samata party were formed in the 1990s and they have made fair strides in national politics winning seventeen and five seats respectively. Regional parties such as the Shiv Sena from Maharashtra, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Telugu Desam Party from Andhra Pradesh have gained prominence in the national arena, winning around 15 to 20 seats each in the national legislature of 1996.

The rise of the agricultural and caste based parties are in part due to the decline in the electoral strength of the Congress party. The weakening of the Congress provided space for new parties to emerge. The first significant and successful national pressure group against the Congress was the anti-corruption movement lead by Jai Prakash Narayan in the 1970s. Protesting against the perceived corruption and anti-democratic actions of the Congress party, the movement culminated in the electoral success of the Janata Dal, a coalition of many small parties in the 1977 elections. The shift in power from the established dominant party to small players allowed a variety of interest groups to gain prominence and establish parties representing their constituencies. Even with the rise of the BJP in the late 1980s, there has remained space for the smaller parties to flourish and form strategic alliances with the major parties.

What is the socio-economic background of the people who came in from these smaller parties? The leaders of these parties are extremely well educated and have a high-profile career. For example, Chaudhary Charan Singh was an erudite lawyer who wrote extensively on agricultural practices and the urban-rural divide. Jai Prakash Narayan, although he did not enter formal politics, was educated in the United States and a well-known member of the freedom struggle against colonialism. Kanshi Ram, quite unusual for

a lower caste, comes from a land-owning family. Again remarkable for a lower caste person in India, he has a Bachelor of Science degree and worked with the Department of Defense. He was a leader of government-employee groups to fight discrimination against lower castes. Mayawati, Kanshi Ram's protégé and leader within the BSP, is also from a lower caste family. She is the daughter of a minor government official in Delhi, and has a bachelor's degree and a law degree from the University of Delhi. She was active in student union politics and has asserted herself in lower caste politics. Bal Thackeray, the founder and leader of the Shiv Sena Party, is a well-known cartoonist whose work has appeared in the Asahi Shimboon, Tokyo and Sunday edition of *The New York Times*. He is also a publisher-cum-editor of a couple of weekly magazines.⁷³

While the leaders of these fledgling non-mainstream parties are well educated and elites within their communities, what about other members? In all these parties the bulk, a little over 60%, of their elected representatives have college degrees. Around 60% come from a managerial and professional background. So the majority of prominent members of the smaller parties still come from educated, professional backgrounds. There is, however, in contrast, with the Congress party and the BJP, a greater spread in the socio-economic characteristics of the rank-and-file. The Congress and BJP are more elite and over 80% of the elected representatives from their parties have a bachelor's degree and many have masters or professional degrees. Moreover, 65% come from elite professions. One is thus more likely to find high-ranking party members with lower educational and occupational background in smaller parties than the bigger parties.

The reasons for this can be traced back to the utility function in the previous chapter. The probability of winning elections from a smaller party are usually smaller, and the perceived benefits, such as prestige and future financial compensation are lower for these parties as compared to the established ones.⁷⁴ From the side of the political party, the recruitment process is also likely to be less rigorous. For example, in a study of the Shiv Sena in Bombay, Mary Katzenstein (1977) observes "The leadership of the Congress... was composed of people nominate and elected by the local ward committees or by their elected representatives. The smaller parties, which had difficulty establishing committees...in certain

⁷³ The biographical data on the leaders is from the web-sites of the parties

⁷⁴ As an analogy, consider the business world, where (atleast prior to the dot.com anomaly) well-known, prestigious companies are more likely to attract top talent.

wards, accepted whoever was willing to volunteer the time and effort (p. 235). So in equilibrium, the candidates who come forward and the selection process of smaller parties tend to favor a more ideologically cohesive group, although, on average with lesser credentials than candidates from elite, established parties.⁷⁵

Furthermore, in societies characterized by deep economic inequality and where the inequality divide corresponds with political identities, political parties representing the interests of the weaker group will comprise of individuals who are comparatively less elite than those from parties representing the more wealthy groups. Again, take the example of the Shiv Sena, which was formed to protest that jobs in the state Maharashtra were mainly held by non-Marathas (the indigenous linguistic group of that state), and that the Marathas were relegated to lowly jobs within their own territory. The target group of this message, the young and often unemployed Maharastrians responded enthusiastically. As Katzenstein (1977) notes for the Shiv Sena, “the occupational list of the 37 Shakha [branch leaders] and party activists read like a directory to lower-middle class occupations, excluding on the one hand both professionals (teachers, doctors, lawyers), big businessmen and unskilled or menial workers on the other. Rather, the job descriptions – accounts clerk, bookshop owner...suggest that Shiv Sena organizational leaders were predominantly of middle and lower-middle class backgrounds” (p. 234). In contrast, the Congress party, representing the interests of the affluent Gujarati and Parsi communities in the state, had leaders who largely well educated and had professional backgrounds in law, academia or were in business (Ibid). Similarly, the parties organized around agricultural interests, such as the Lok Dal or Samajwadi Party, have relatively less elite leaders than parties such as the Congress and BJP which are more representative of urban interests.⁷⁶ It should be pointed out that these leaders may be elite within their communities, but in comparison to other communities, their occupational achievements may not be so outstanding.⁷⁷ Thus in cases where the income

⁷⁵ This might explain the roughly 10-percentage point difference between the proportion of legislators from managerial and professional backgrounds in developed and developing countries noted in the previous chapter. In developed countries, where the national legislature is made up of a few well-established parties, one would expect that the benefits of winning will be higher and the majority of parliamentarians will come from elite backgrounds.

⁷⁶ The Bahujan Samajwadi Party is an exception and stands out among the smaller parties because its leaders are well-educated and around 80% of its elected members having at least an undergraduate education, a figure comparable to the BJP and Congress party.

⁷⁷ To make this point clearer, turn to the USA for a moment. In the African-American community, Jesse Jackson is a black political leader who received a bachelor's degree from the North Carolina Agricultural

inequality is high and corresponds to cleavages in political identities, then leaders from the weaker community will have leaders, although privileged within their own communities, are nevertheless simply not from the same socio-economic standing as the elite from the richer communities.

Are these smaller parties, which have comparatively lower educational and occupational bars for entry more open to women leaders? The literature on women in politics indicates that smaller parties, especially those that have sprung up in response to social movements more likely to include women. The scholars state argue that women are more likely to engage in social activism and this is a friendlier conduit for them into politics (Gelb 1989, Randall 1982). The data in the Indian case does not support this claim. Looking at the 1996 Lok Sabha membership, 5% of the seats won by the smaller parties were held by women, while double that figure, 10% of the seats won by the Congress and BJP had women candidates. In general, leaving aside the specific political parties, only a small percentage of women entered through social movements. The freedom struggle, the Jai Prakash Narayan anti-corruption movement and the Kissan (agricultural) agitation, were social movements that led to the emergence of new political actors in India. The data shows that most of the parliamentarians did not actively participated in these social movements and women were even less likely to come from a social activist background.⁷⁸ Approximately 4% of women legislators, in contrast to 11% of male legislators, entered politics through social movements. Membership and often leadership in student unions is a more cited source for entry into politics and roughly 7% of female and male legislators had that in their background. Active membership in trade unions is another characteristic of male politicians, though none of the women listed that in their political activities. The most common characteristic for female and male politicians is their ascent through party ranks, with 31% out both sexes having risen through the party ranks. A large number of women and men had prior experience in local and state legislatures, although as noted before in Chapter 3, more male parliamentarians had more experience in this than the women.

and Technical College and later become a Baptist minister. His educational and professional background, are not that outstanding when compared to achievements of the elite in the white community who, by and large, attend more prestigious schools and has higher professional achievement.

⁷⁸ This is in contrast to social welfare activities, which many politicians list as an occupation. These are usually worded quite vaguely as “working for the upliftment of the poor”. Both women and men list this in their biographical profile and whether the women members are more likely to have engaged in social welfare activities is tested in the subsequent section.

Table 7-4: Are women political leaders more likely to enter politics through social movements?

	<i>Total members</i>	<i>% Female</i>	<i>% Male</i>
Freedom Fighter	31	2	6
JP Movement	17	2	3
Kissan Movement	10	..	2
Trade Union	53	..	10
Student Union	45	7	8
Party Ranks	173	31	31
Local	125	17	23
State	229	24	43
Reserved Lower Caste Seats	118	33	20

Source: Who's Who 11th Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1997.

A significant group of women legislators come through the reserved seats for the lower castes (scheduled caste and tribes reserved seats can only have candidates from these backgrounds contesting from these constituencies). The women parliamentarians from these reserved constituencies are highly educated. Out of the 14, eleven have bachelor degrees, and seven have a master's degree as well or additional professional degrees. In terms of their occupational background, two are lawyers, two teachers and one in a businesswoman while the rest list agriculture or political work as their occupation. While this occupational spread may not seem very elite, compared to the fact that only 30%-35% of lower castes are literate (as compared to 60% for rest of India), they are certainly the privileged in their communities. Economic class seems to be the overarching commonality among the women legislators. A similar conclusion is reached by an analysis on the Indian parliament in prior elections. The study observes- "the class from which most of the women MPs come is perhaps the most important factor in their successful inclusion into the political system" (Rai 1998).

7.3 Statistical Analysis of Socio-economic Background

So what, if any, are the differences between female and male legislators in terms of socio-economic background and entry routes into politics? To get at this question more formally, we run logit regression. The dependent variable is gender, with female legislators

coded as one and male members coded as zero. The variables in the regression are listed below-

Table 7-5: Description of variables

Gender	A dummy variable. 1=Female/0=Male
Age	Age as of 1996.
Number of children	Count variable.
Level of education	0- Never completed high school; 1-High school; 2-Bachelors degree; 3-Masters degree or two or more Bachelor degrees; 4-Ph.D.
Profession	Managerial or Professional Occupation. 1=Yes/ 0=No
Party ranks	Risen through party ranks. 1=Yes/0=No
Student union	If ever member of Student Union. 1=Yes/0=No
Social worker	If involved in social work. 1=Yes/0=No
Freedom struggle	If ever participated in the Independence struggle. 1=Yes/0=No
JP movement	If ever participated in the Jai Prakash anti-corruption movement. 1=Yes/0=No
Kissan movement	If ever participated in the Kissan movement. 1=Yes/0=No
Sc-St	If member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. 1=Yes/0=No
Political Experience	Years of active participation in politics. 1996 – (year first entered local/state legislature or held any political office)

Source: Who's Who 11th Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1997.

The results in column (1) and (2) indicate that women in parliament tend have fewer children than their male counterparts. When other variables are added, this effect still remains significant and is robust to different specifications. This is consistent with our discussion in Chapter 6 that women's household responsibilities possibly limit their professional advancement and their entry into politics. In addition, as noted in Chapter 3, women politicians at the national level, on average, have less prior political experience than their male colleagues. This again may be due to combined work and family pressures in their younger years. As discussed before, this does not negatively impact women's electoral chances and their entry into politics.

With regard to various entry routes into politics political variables, there is not any significant difference between female and male legislators and they seem to be drawn largely from the same pool. The one variable in this regard that does seem to matter is the Kissan movement, but its effects could not be picked up because of multicollinearity. Ten of the male parliamentarians noted that they participated in this movement, and no women did so. Hence the Kissan movement variable was dropped, as it is perfectly collinear with the gender dummy being zero. So out of the various social movements which led to the rise of

political parties, the farmer's movement seem to be almost exclusively led by men. However, the general fallout that agricultural backgrounds are an asset in politics have benefited women as well, but in conjunction with other channels, such as caste based politics. As noted before, some women have come into politics through parties that link rural and communal/caste politics.

Table 7-6: Is there a difference between female and male legislators in their background characteristics?

Dependent variable	(1)	(2)
	Gender dummy: 1=Female Legislator	Gender dummy: 1=Female Legislator
Age	-0.025 (0.015)	0.023 (0.019)
Number of children	-0.291 (0.108)**	-0.350 (0.121)**
Level of education	-0.124 (0.221)	-0.243 (0.232)
Profession	-0.361 (0.378)	-0.418 (0.416)
Party ranks		0.662 (0.402)
Student union		0.048 (0.669)
Social worker		0.136 (1.104)
Freedom struggle		0.497 (1.152)
JP-call		0.589 (1.133)
Sc-St		0.291 (0.417)
Political Experience		-0.083 (0.021)**
Constant	-0.085 (0.851)	-1.317 (0.945)
Observations	538	520

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Overall, though, there is no evidence to support the common perception that social movements somehow provide greater access to women into politics. Most of the female politicians, and indeed, politicians in general in India come from the two main parties, the Congress and BJP and the largest proportion rise up through party ranks. A significant background characteristic of the politicians, male and female is that they come from an elite economic class.

To conclude, in its most general form, our argument is that that women and men politicians are drawn from the same 'political' pool in proportion to their presence in that group. What is the main characteristic of this pool? Across countries and within India, the majority of political figures come from an elite economic class, with managerial and professional background in law, academia and elite cadres of the civil services or managerial services. Even those drawn from labor unions or lower castes, as usually well educated and leaders or economic elites within their communities. The proportion of women in the group from which the political elite are drawn, chiefly the managerial and professional pool, then gets reflected in their numbers in parliament.

8 Conclusion

The central finding of the study is that the critical factor limiting the recruitment of women into politics is women's sparse representation in the pool from which politicians are recruited. Like men, women are drawn from an elite pool based on their occupational achievements. Rather than political kinship ties, as is commonly perceived, the chief trait of women politicians is their professional accomplishments. Countries that have a greater share of women in their professional and managerial labor force are able to recruit more women into politics. Having women well represented in the eligibility pool for political candidates, broadly the elite professions, is necessary to provide a conduit for women into politics.

Starting from demand-side theories, Chapter 2 formulated and tested various voting behavior hypotheses to see if the women are less likely than men to get voted into power. It examined voting behavior theories and evaluated if women are disadvantaged while contesting elections. Chapter 3 examined the voting behaviour hypotheses in India. The cross-national data as well as the Indian study reveal that women are in fact, just as likely and in many cases even have a higher odds of winning, than male candidates.

The second section evaluated the effects of electoral and political party systems on recruitment of women into politics. Chapter 4 examined differences in electoral systems and tested if proportional representation systems (PR) outperform simple plurality electoral systems. PR systems have significantly more women in parliament than simple plurality systems, but it is difficult to infer causality based on electoral system variations, because these two categories of countries also differ significantly in key socioeconomic variables. Multivariate regression analysis reveals that socioeconomic factors, especially the proportion of women in managerial and professional positions, has significantly greater impact on women's access to political power than the type of electoral system. In Chapter 5, through the lens of India, we looked at party structures. We argued that there is no systematic relationship between the organizational characteristics of political parties and their propensity to recruit women candidates. In fact, political parties in general seem quite open to recruiting women, but the complaint is that there don't seem to be enough eligible women candidates.

Turning to the factors constraining the supply of women in politics, in Chapter 6 we looked at issues affecting women's decision to enter politics through a simple utility function. We argue that women face the same incentives for joining politics as men. The key factor limiting the recruitment of women into politics is women's sparse representation in the pool from which politicians are recruited. Just as in the case of men, women are drawn from an elite pool based on their occupational achievements. Rather than political kinship ties, as is commonly perceived, the chief trait of women politicians is their professional accomplishments. Countries that have a greater share of women in their professional and managerial labor force are able to recruit more women into politics. Having women well represented in the eligibility pool for political candidates, broadly the elite professions, is necessary to provide a conduit for women into politics.

Secluded labor markets in many developing countries have provided access for women from elite families into top industry and professional leadership positions. This has led to a relatively larger proportion of women in the political eligibility pool and consequently to a higher level of female recruitment in politics than in countries in which women comprise a smaller part of the elite professional pool. However, in many countries, the process of industrialization has generated economic and social pressures that have imposed greater restrictions on women in the economic, and consequently, political sphere. This suggests that economic development, while it opens some opportunities for women, can also make achievement of higher leadership positions more difficult.

In Chapter 7 we took a closer look at political elites in India and demonstrate that despite changes in the groups that gain political power, the common characteristic of political leaders, women and men, is that they are drawn from an elite socio-economic background.

A low proportion of women in the managerial and professional pool would generally mean fewer women entering politics. In the short-run, this can be rectified by artificially inflating the numbers recruited into politics through quotas. But this may not be a short-term fix, not lasting cure. Until the increase in women legislators actually alters the composition of women in the occupational pool from which politicians are drawn, quotas can only be a precarious remedy. Women's political power will rest on shaky grounds because it won't necessarily alter the underlying inequality between men and women in elite professions, the key variable affecting women's representation. Instead, it may create a false

sense of security, a feeling that women are progressing in society when in actuality they may be the same or worse off in the economic sphere.

If the quotas are removed, will women's representation in politics remain at those high levels? The evidence from Easter Europe is troubling. The dramatic fall in the proportion of women legislators in Russia after the fall of the Communist regimes shows clearly the effects of removing formal or informal quotas for women in politics. The Soviet Union required that women constitute 33% of the Congress of People's Deputies. The abolition of this quota resulted in a decline of women in the Russian legislature from around 30-40% to only 5% in 1990. (Nadezhda Shvedova 1998).⁷⁹ This is a vast decline from the number of women in the legislature when the quotas were in place.

Quotas may help when a country is industrializing and may counteract the negative impact of economic development on women. But there is no magic pill to improve the representation of women in politics, through one act of instituting quotas or even changing electoral design. Increasing the proportion of women in elite professions is the only way of sustainable increasing women's political authority. More research on gender labor market segregation in elite professions across developing and developed countries is needed. This should help policy-makers design mechanisms and safeguards to improve women's numbers in political offices. We still have a long way to go before women reach their equal share in economic and political leadership.

⁷⁹ The proportion of women in the Russian parliament is 7.6% as of 2002 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2002).

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Proportion of Women in Parliament in 1975, 1985 and 1995.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Proportion of Women in National legislature, 1975</i>	<i>Proportion of Women in National legislature, 1985</i>	<i>Proportion of Women in National legislature, 1995</i>	<i>Change from 1975-1985</i>	<i>Change from 1985-1995</i>	<i>Change from 1975-1995</i>	<i>Change in total number of seats from 1975-1995</i>
Mean	6.96	9.88	10.03	2.92	0.15	3.07	5.68
Albania	33.20	28.80	5.71	-4.40	-23.09	-27.49	-110
Algeria	3.83	2.37	10.00	-1.46	7.63	6.17	-201
Angola	3.93	15.41	9.55	11.48	-5.86	5.62	-9
Argentina	7.82	4.72	5.02	-3.09	0.29	-2.80	16
Austria	7.65	10.93	21.31	3.28	10.38	13.66	0
Bangladesh	4.76	9.09	10.30	4.33	1.21	5.54	15
Barbados	8.33	3.70	3.57	-4.63	-0.13	-4.76	4
Benin	8.33	4.08	6.25	-4.25	2.17	-2.08	-272
Bhutan	1.33	1.33	0.00	0.00	-1.33	-1.33	0
Bolivia	0.97	3.08	6.92	2.11	3.85	5.95	27
Brazil	0.27	5.34	5.96	5.06	0.63	5.69	139
Bulgaria	18.75	21.00	12.92	2.25	-8.08	-5.83	-160
Cameroon	5.83	14.17	12.22	8.33	-1.94	6.39	60
Canada	3.41	9.57	13.22	6.17	3.65	9.81	31
Cape Verde	1.79	12.05	7.59	10.26	-4.45	5.81	23
Central African Republic	0.00	3.85	3.85	3.85	0.00	3.85	2
China	22.63	21.22	21.02	-1.41	-0.20	-1.61	93
Comoros	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4
Costa Rica	5.26	10.53	12.28	5.26	1.75	7.02	0
Cote d'Ivoire	9.17	5.71	4.57	-3.45	-1.14	-4.60	55
Cyprus	0.00	1.25	5.36	1.25	4.11	5.36	6
Denmark	26.00	29.05	32.96	3.05	3.91	6.96	-21
Djibouti	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
Dominica	13.33	10.00	12.90	-3.33	2.90	-0.43	1
Dominican Republic	4.05	5.00	11.67	0.95	6.67	7.61	46
Egypt	1.94	3.93	2.20	1.99	-1.73	0.26	94
Equatorial Guinea	5.71	3.33	3.33	-2.38	0.00	-2.38	25
Finland	23.00	31.50	39.00	8.50	7.50	16.00	0
France	1.63	5.89	6.07	4.26	0.17	4.43	87
Gabon	4.29	13.33	5.83	9.05	-7.50	1.55	50
Gambia	0.00	7.84	7.84	7.84	0.00	7.84	10
Germany, Federal Republic of [-1990]	5.79	15.41	15.41	9.62	0.00	9.62	1
Greece	2.00	4.33	5.33	2.33	1.00	3.33	0
Grenada	20.00	12.50	13.33	-7.50	0.83	-6.67	0
Guatemala	4.00	7.00	5.17	3.00	-1.83	1.17	66
Guyana	11.86	36.92	36.92	25.06	0.00	25.06	6
Hungary	28.69	20.93	7.25	-7.76	-13.68	-21.44	34
Iceland	5.00	20.63	23.81	15.63	3.17	18.81	3
India	4.22	7.90	7.34	3.68	-0.56	3.12	10

Indonesia	7.17	12.40	12.20	5.23	-0.20	5.03	40
Iran, Islamic Republic of	1.48	1.48	3.45	0.00	1.97	1.97	-9
Iraq	6.40	13.20	10.80	6.80	-2.40	4.40	0
Ireland	2.80	8.43	12.12	5.64	3.69	9.32	22
Israel	6.67	8.33	9.17	1.67	0.83	2.50	0
Italy	3.81	12.86	8.10	9.05	-4.76	4.29	0
Jamaica	3.77	11.67	11.67	7.89	0.00	7.89	7
Japan	1.43	1.37	2.34	-0.06	0.98	0.92	21
Kiribati	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4
Korea D. People's R.	20.89	21.07	20.09	0.18	-0.98	-0.80	146
Korea, Republic of	5.48	2.90	1.00	-2.58	-1.90	-4.48	80
Madagascar	2.92	1.46	6.52	-1.46	5.06	3.60	1
Malawi	6.67	9.82	11.64	3.15	1.82	4.98	86
Malaysia	3.25	5.08	5.00	1.84	-0.08	1.75	26
Malta	3.64	2.90	1.54	-0.74	-1.36	-2.10	10
Mauritius	4.29	7.14	3.03	2.86	-4.11	-1.26	-4
Mexico	6.19	10.50	7.60	4.31	-2.90	1.41	290
Mongolia	22.92	24.86	3.95	1.95	-20.92	-18.97	-260
Morocco	0.00	0.00	0.65	0.00	0.65	0.65	66
Mozambique	12.38	15.66	15.66	3.28	0.00	3.28	39
Netherlands	9.33	20.00	29.33	10.67	9.33	20.00	0
New Zealand	4.60	14.43	16.49	9.84	2.06	11.90	10
Nicaragua	9.00	14.58	16.30	5.58	1.72	7.30	-8
Panama	0.00	5.97	7.46	5.97	1.49	7.46	51
Papua New Guinea	2.75	0.00	0.00	-2.75	0.00	-2.75	0
Paraguay	5.00	1.67	2.50	-3.33	0.83	-2.50	20
Peru	5.56	5.56	6.25	0.00	0.69	0.69	-100
Philippines	2.73	9.00	10.55	6.27	1.55	7.83	89
Poland	15.87	20.22	9.57	4.35	-10.65	-6.30	0
Portugal	8.00	7.60	8.70	-0.40	1.10	0.70	-20
Romania	15.19	34.42	3.52	19.23	-30.90	-11.67	-8
Saint Lucia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	10.53	5.26	9.52	-5.26	4.26	-1.00	2
Sao Tome and Principe	18.18	11.76	10.91	-6.42	-0.86	-7.27	22
Senegal	4.00	10.83	11.67	6.83	0.83	7.67	20
Seychelles	4.00	16.00	45.83	12.00	29.83	41.83	-1
Singapore	0.00	3.80	3.70	3.80	-0.09	3.70	16
Somalia	0.00	3.95	3.95	3.95	0.00	3.95	53
Spain	1.11	9.43	16.00	8.32	6.57	14.89	-464
Sri Lanka	3.82	2.38	4.89	-1.44	2.51	1.07	68
Suriname	5.13	7.84	5.88	2.71	-1.96	0.75	12
Sweden	21.43	30.95	33.52	9.52	2.58	12.10	-1
Switzerland	7.50	14.00	17.50	6.50	3.50	10.00	0
Syrian Arab Republic	2.69	9.23	8.40	6.54	-0.83	5.71	64
Tonga	0.00	0.00	3.33	0.00	3.33	3.33	7
Trinidad and Tobago	2.78	16.67	13.51	13.89	-3.15	10.74	1
Tunisia	2.54	5.60	4.26	3.06	-1.34	1.71	23

United Kingdom	4.25	6.31	9.22	2.06	2.91	4.96	16
United States	3.68	5.29	11.03	1.61	5.75	7.36	0
Uruguay	0.00	0.00	6.06	0.00	6.06	6.06	0
Venezuela	2.72	3.94	9.95	1.22	6.01	7.23	17
Viet Nam	26.83	17.74	18.48	-9.09	0.74	-8.35	-97
Zaire	11.07	5.41	5.41	-5.66	0.00	-5.66	-22
Zambia	5.15	2.94	6.67	-2.21	3.73	1.52	14
Zimbabwe	8.00	11.00	12.00	3.00	1.00	4.00	50

Chapter 2 Regressions using OLS with Robust Standard Errors

Are More Women Elected When Left-wing Parties Win?

	(1)	(2)
	% of women in parliament	% of women in parliament
Dcenter	-9.103 (4.613)	
Dright	-4.236 (3.533)	
Opposition	13.410 (11.358)	4.324 (14.300)
Party Ideology		-11.749 (7.774)
Constant	12.522 (2.809)**	22.570 (5.806)**
Observations	48	37
R-squared	0.10	0.06
Standard errors in parentheses		
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%		

Chapter 3 Regressions using OLS with Robust Standard Errors

Effects of Electoral System and Economic Variables on the Proportion of Women Legislators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	% of Women in Parliament	% of Women in Parliament	% of Women in Parliament	% of Women in Parliament
Electoral System	2.719 (2.822)	3.183 (3.034)	1.226 (1.764)	17.324 (9.709)
WIM	0.256 (0.102) *	0.254 (0.117) *	0.164 (0.072) *	0.429 (0.388)
GINI	-0.136 (0.107)	-0.187 (0.119)	0.076 (0.079)	-0.762 (0.679)
DEM		2.511 (4.450)		
Constant	3.873 (6.348)	3.984 (6.845)	-3.556 (3.869)	16.855 (32.410)
Observations	57	57	38	19
R-squared	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.37
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%				

Chapter 3 Regressions using OLS with Robust Standard Errors

Effects of District Magnitude on the Proportion of Women in Parliament

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	% of women in parliament	% of women in parliament	% of women candidates	% of women candidates
Electoral System	7.406 (4.954)		6.906 (5.987)	
District	0.189 (0.254)	0.361 (0.227)	0.592 (0.307)	0.758 (0.274)**
WIM	0.550 (0.184)**	0.611 (0.185)**	0.425 (0.223)	0.496 (0.223)*
Constant	-12.761 (7.361)	-12.610 (7.556)	-7.959 (8.895)	-8.937 (9.099)
Observations	31	31	31	31
R-squared	0.42	0.36	0.39	0.35
Standard errors in parentheses				
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%				

Chapter 4 Regressions using OLS with Robust Standard Errors

Effects of Having Women in Elite Professions on Female Political Leadership

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	% of women in parliament	% of women in parliament	% of women in parliament	% of women in parliament
WIM	0.135 (0.037)**	0.123 (0.037)**	0.607 (0.141)**	0.070 (0.033)*
DEM	-3.777 (0.979)**	-3.559 (0.979)**	-5.408 (4.380)	-1.955 (0.872)*
LDC	-5.335 (0.871)**	-4.757 (1.145)**		
D1985	2.358 (0.979)*	2.154 (1.051)*	3.288 (2.677)	1.592 (0.979)
D1995	2.113 (1.009)*	2.050 (1.126)	4.231 (3.002)	1.341 (0.999)
GDPPC (ln)		0.197 (0.420)		
Constant	7.541 (1.683)**	5.906 (3.239)	-8.922 (7.471)	3.519 (1.293)**
Observations	225	222	66	159
R-squared	0.24	0.24	0.37	0.06
Standard errors in parentheses				
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%				

Chapter 4 Regressions using OLS with Robust Standard Errors

Effects of Socio-Economic Variables on Women's Political Participation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	% of women in parliament	% of women in parliament	% of women in parliament	% of women in parliament
GDPPC (ln)	1.627 (0.478)**	0.639 (0.587)	0.601 (0.671)	0.321 (0.995)
WIM	0.209 (0.055)**	0.121 (0.075)	0.185 (0.061)**	0.127 (0.092)
FERT	0.038 (0.016)*	0.020 (0.021)	0.022 (0.021)	0.012 (0.025)
GINI	-0.304 (0.067)**	-0.286 (0.076)**	-0.254 (0.087)**	-0.295 (0.114)*
FIL		-0.005 (0.044)		0.012 (0.051)
ASIAP			-2.932 (2.040)	-1.172 (2.728)
LAME			-2.706 (2.213)	-1.061 (2.617)
NA/ME			-4.524 (2.434)	-6.096 (3.313)
SUBSA			-0.302 (3.392)	1.258 (5.481)
D1985			2.725 (1.498)	2.797 (1.726)
D1995			2.397 (1.580)	0.438 (2.286)
DEM				-5.204 (2.153)*
Constant	-2.057 (4.854)	8.196 (6.066)	5.424 (6.754)	15.571 (10.019)
Observations	147	68	147	67
R-squared	0.32	0.28	0.34	0.43
Standard errors in parentheses				
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%				

Occupational background of Politicians in Select Countries (based on data availability)

Country	Year	Occupational background														TOTAL				
		Law	Civil Servants	Medical Professionals	Engineers	Generalists	Economists	Politicians	Journalists	Liberal professions	Accountants	Managers/Trade	Clerical workers	Farmers	Armed forces		Actors	Others	Religious	
Andorra	1997	0	0	0	11	18	0	0	0	29	0	29	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	100
Argentina	1997	9	0	11	7	23	4	2	2	0	7	19	9	0	0	0	0	4	0	100
Belarus	2000	4	0	1	0	1	44	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	48	0	100
Belgium	1999	0	15	0	19	27	0	0	1	25	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	100
Burkina Faso	1997	6	0	3	10	10	12	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	45	0	100
China	1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	34	11	0	0	0	0	17	0	100
Costa Rica	1998	24	4	7	6	13	4	0	4	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	100
Denmark	1998	0	37	0	0	0	0	20	0	21	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
France	1997	0	17	0	0	26	0	0	0	31	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	100
Gambia	1997	0	0	0	0	29	0	0	0	8	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	31	0	100
Greece	2000	28	7	14	14	7	7	0	3	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	100
Mali	1997	1	0	7	11	44	0	0	0	0	4	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Philippines	1998	25	35	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	31	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	100
Poland	1997	16	0	5	27	14	10	5	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	15	0	100
Seychelles	1998	11	25	11	0	0	0	29	0	0	0	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Singapore	1997	11	0	2	2	14	0	11	7	0	0	36	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	100
Turkey	1999	13	4	10	19	18	7	0	2	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	100
US	1990	35	0	1	1	11	0	11	5	0	0	30	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	100
Average		10	8	4	7	14	5	4	3	6	1	18	2	1	0	0	0	13	0	100