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# MIGRATION AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

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
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July 1976



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## MIGRATION AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

The population of Mexico City has grown from 724,000 at the eve of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 (Stern and Kahl 1968:11) to almost seven million in 1970 (Perfil Demografico de México 1971:58).<sup>1</sup> The economic level (standard of living and income) of residents of Mexico City is, by and large, better than that of people in other parts of the country (Yates 1962; Solís 1967: 83-84). However, as the city has grown in size poverty has become more widespread. In large part this new poverty has displaced rural poverty (González Cosío 1961:55).

Is the upsurge of urban poverty a temporary phenomenon, owing to the cultural background of migrants? In this paper several possible explanations dealing with the relationship between rural-urban background and socio-economic status are examined among a sample of men in three lower class areas of Mexico City. Other explanations of socio-economic status dealing with class background and area of residence are also considered. The analysis shows that the job status of the men interviewed depends primarily on their education and personal contacts, not their rural-urban background or the type of area in which they live. Their schooling and contacts, in turn, depend largely on their social class background.<sup>2</sup> The implications of these findings for the future economic prospects of migrants and their offspring are discussed in the final section of the paper.

METHODOLOGY1. The Selection of the Three Urban Communities and the Sample of Residents

The data are based on a study done by the author in 1967-68 of residents in a center city area, in an area formed by an illegally organized land invasion, and in a low-cost housing project. The three areas, each containing approximately 80,000 people, were chosen on the basis of consultations with leading social scientists, housing experts and professionals familiar with the socio-economic composition of residential sections of Mexico City; analyses of demographic data on Mexico City; and personal visits to several dozen areas of the city. The center city area, settled before the Conquest, is physically deteriorated, crime-ridden and densely populated. Families there primarily live in poorly ventilated rented rooms in one-story tenements (vecindades).<sup>3</sup> The squatter settlement (a colonia proletaria), formed initially in 1954, is now legally recognized by the government.<sup>4</sup> It is much less densely populated than the center city area and superficially resembles a provincial community. The majority of people there live in 1-2 room homes which are in various states of completion and of varying quality, depending on the financial resources of the owners. The housing project, a spacious and fully urbanized "community" with a variety of social services, contains homes which are better constructed than most homes in the other two areas.

Social workers and sociology students who had interview experience administered a formal questionnaire to 50 men in each of the areas.<sup>5</sup> The information used in the analysis below derives from this questionnaire. Since no detailed household census of the areas was available from which a sample could be drawn, a census was made of randomly selected blocks in each area. From this census material the designated number of men were randomly selected.

In the twelve cases when there was no male head of household and in the two cases when men refused to collaborate with the interviewers, a neighboring household was selected.

## 2. Occupational Classification

In Mexico, persons enjoy distinct economic and non-economic prerogatives depending on their occupational group affiliation. Income, prestige and social security benefits (which include medical insurance, compensation for work-related disabilities, old-age pensions and job security) generally are occupationally linked. Consequently, occupational status is used here as the main indicator of socio-economic status. Income, subjective class identification and education, which are sometimes used as indicators of socio-economic status, are not used for the following reasons. Income data is highly unreliable, as Mexicans are reluctant to report their real income. Subjective economic status does not necessarily measure objective economic status. And, education is largely a determinant of socio-economic status, not a defining attribute of it.

The criteria used in the classificatory schema are 1) skill and level of technology employed; 2) scale of enterprise and 3) ownership/non-ownership of the means of production. The criteria were selected because they were assumed to measure the following phenomena:

- skill: the complexity of the work an individual performs;
- scale: the complexity of the administrative or production process in which an individual is involved and the benefits to which he is entitled;
- ownership/non-ownership: control exercised by an individual within his immediate work setting.

The occupational categories used in the analysis below are ones based on the following combinations of these three factors:

- a. Peon, unskilled, semi-skilled worker: a person employed by someone else in a place employing less than twenty

persons; the work done by such a person is generally believed to require little skill in comparison to the skills demanded of factory and white collar jobs; examples include a gardener, domestic servant, artisan employed in a small shop, janitor, and night watchman;

- b. factory worker or unskilled worker in large enterprise: a person employed in an enterprise with twenty or more employees, as a factory hand or in some other manual capacity; the work he does generally requires skill and coordination of labor with other workers;
- c. salaried white collar employee: a person not independently employed; the work he does generally offers job security, requires some formal training and is defined as non-manual; examples include bureaucrats, secretaries and shop clerks in stores;
- d. independently employed:
  - (1) penny capitalist: a person self-employed without hired assistance; he lacks resources, and possibly also training requisite for jobs in industry and administration; examples include independent artisans and market vendors;
  - (2) small businessman or professional with little specialized training: a person who is self-employed, with sufficient skill and resources (e.g., hired capital, employees, technology) to define himself as a proprietor, e.g., proprietors of artisan shops and stores; non-certified or minimally qualified professionals, e.g., non-titled doctors and lawyers; since there are few persons in the sample so employed, they are considered in the following analysis together with the penny capitalists.<sup>6</sup>

The occupational categories are logically distinct, and in the analysis are not scaled or ranked. The men are classified according to their principal occupation only.<sup>7</sup>

RURAL-URBAN BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS

Most hypotheses dealing with the relationship between rural-urban background and economic success assume that people's economic status is primarily determined by their values, norms and attitudes. Accordingly, change on the part of individuals (e.g., in their values, norms and attitudes) generates structural change (e.g., in technology and stratification). Several such hypotheses are discussed below.

1. Rural-Urban Exposure

One school of thought argues that the culture of rural and urban areas differs, and that people's economic status consequently depends on the degree to which they are exposed to provincial communities or cities. The argument depicts rural and urban communities as culturally distinct (Durkheim 1947; Tönnies 1963; Redfield 1947; Wirth 1938), and people brought up in the two types of communities as, therefore, different. For instance, people raised in small towns and villages are said to have different and much lower expectations than people brought up in urban centers (Foster 1967; Banfield 1958). The mass exodus to capital cities in Mexico and other Latin American countries demonstrates that provincial people may acquire aspirations which cannot be satisfied within the confines of their places of origin. However, they may also have lower aspirations than people born in cities. Provincial people are described as more culturally and socially "marginal," that is, less "integrated" into national institutions and so-called "modern" life styles than city dwellers (Vekemans and Giusti 1969-70; Mattelart and Garreton 196 ; Cabezas and Durán 1970; González Casanova 1970). Assuming culture is territorially linked and economic success culturally determined, non-migrants should be more successful than migrants because they have been more exposed to urban values, norms and attitudes. For similar reasons, the younger migrants are when they

move to the city and the longer they have lived in the city, the more successful they should be.

Secondly, the argument has been made that each successive generation of city-dwellers is more successful occupationally than the preceding one, largely because each generation is succeeded by a wave of new immigrants (e.g., Burgess 1925; Wirth 1928; Kitano 1969). This interpretation draws heavily on the experience of immigrants to the United States, where the national economy has been expanding and children of immigrants generally have been more successful economically than their parents. As a consequence, Americans have tended to conclude optimistically that mobility is more or less inevitable, merely a question of time.<sup>8</sup> Proponents of this thesis argue that poverty in the United States has declined over the years because, on the one hand, immigration has been cut back, and on the other hand, the offspring of immigrants have assimilated American middle class culture. Were this argument correct, urban poverty would be a temporary phenomenon, owing to the recency of mass migration to cities, and children of migrants would be more successful economically than their parents.

Alternatively, the size of the community in which people are born or grow up possibly influences the aspirations and expectations that migrants hold for themselves. The size of community in which people are born and raised could be important not only because different cultural ethos prevail in different sized communities, but also because education and occupational opportunities vary according to the size of communities. Different objective opportunities may affect the range of jobs with which people become familiar, people's career orientations and their actual career opportunities (Lipset and Bendix 1967:23-26). Whether viewed in cultural or structural terms, if the type or size of community in which people grow up sets limits on their "life

chances," then the earlier in life that people are exposed to large metropolises, the more successful they should be in the long run. They thereby have more time to acquire the values and skills which would drive them and enable them to take advantage of urban economic opportunities.

More recently, however, studies have suggested that the nature of people's social contacts has a greater impact on people's values, norms and attitudes and "life chances" than the physically delineated community in which they live or were raised. (Lewis 1965; Gans 1962; especially 197-226). For example, city-dwellers who maintain close contact with paisanos (fellow villagers) in the provinces or cities may be less inclined to forget values and customs generally regarded as provincial than city-dwellers who do not have such contacts. If rural culture is a major impediment to economic development in rural areas, than city-dwellers would have to abandon such "rural" beliefs and customs before they could prosper in the city.

Were occupational fate largely a function of rural-urban upbringing, then among our sample of men we would expect to find that:

a. the men raised in Mexico City are more successful occupationally than those raised in provincial Mexican communities [since we have no data on the number of generations that the families of men born in Mexico City have lived in the City, we cannot verify whether each generation of City-born men is more successful than the one preceding];

b. the earlier in life men migrated and the longer they have lived in Mexico City, the more successful they now are; and

c. the less contact the men presently have with the provinces or with people who live in the provinces, the more economically successful they are.

The experiences of the men living in the three areas under study disprove each of these theses <sup>9</sup> (Table 1). Job-wise, the migrants from small towns compete favorably with those who have lived in the capital all their lives.

TABLE 1

OCCUPATION OF MEN IN THE THREE AREAS  
ACCORDING TO PROVINCIALISM

	<u>Semi and unskilled in small enterprises</u>	<u>Indepen- dently employed</u>	<u>Factory/ large enterprise</u>	<u>Salaried non- manual</u>	<u>Total</u>
Size town when 15 <sup>a</sup> less than 10,000	24%*	35	12*	29	100% (17)
10,000/less than Federal District	13%*	38	25	25	101% (24)
Federal District	26%	29	21	25	101% (94)
Age migrated <sup>b</sup>					
didn't migrate	26%	26	22	26	100% (77)
1-15 years old	22%*	39	17*	22*	100% (18)
16-29	24%	29	22	24	99% (41)
30 or over	14%	50	21*	14*	99% (14)
Time lived in Federal District <sup>c</sup>					
5 years or less	33%*	33*	33*	--	99% (6)
6-15 years	22%	22	33	22	99% (18)
16-29 years	18%	27	20	26	101% (51)
30 or more years	27%	28	19	26	100% (74)
If ever see people <sup>d</sup> who live in provinces	27%	28	19	26	100% (96)
If ever go to provinces <sup>e</sup>	21%	26	24	29	100% (110)

Based on the questions:

- "Where did you live when you were fifteen?"
- "How old were you when you came to Mexico City?"
- "What is your age?" and "How old were you when you came to Mexico City?"
- "Do you have close relatives or friends who live in the provinces? IF YES: "How frequently do you see them?"
- "How frequently do you go to the provinces?"

\*"N" is less than 5.



Those who were raised in areas with few occupational opportunities are not now at a disadvantage economically. They are as likely as men who grew up in Mexico City to have white collar jobs. Moreover, close contact with the hinterland does not seem to jeopardize the men's job prospects as most men, independently of the type of work they do, periodically go to the provinces to visit people who live there. While people with rural contacts might have experienced more occupational mobility had they confined their contacts to Mexico City residents, certainly periodic exposure to rural society has not had the negative economic effect assumed by some. The one rural-urban factor which apparently has a decisive bearing on the men's job prospects is the age at which they migrate. Men over thirty who move to the capital have difficulty finding employment. Yet it is undoubtedly their age, not their rural origin, which puts them at a disadvantage. Employers discriminate against middle-aged people, particularly those over forty, be they of urban or rural origin.

## 2. The Selectivity of Migrants

Other social scientists argue that it is not migrant background per se which determines occupational success within cities but the socio-economic background of migrants: the more education migrants have, the more economically successful they are likely to be<sup>10</sup> (Browning 1968). This thesis is premised on the assumption that education is a main criterion by which people are selected for jobs. It allows for the fact that people raised within any given type of community or any given sized community are not socially and culturally homogeneous, and that they therefore are not likely to do equally well economically if they migrate.

If this thesis is correct, migrants should be more successful economically than city-born people (or those who migrated before they were fifteen) if they are more educated, and they should be as successful as city-born people if they

TABLE 2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RURAL-URBAN BACKGROUND AND  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, HOLDING EDUCATION CONSTANT

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Less than 6 years of schooling<sup>a</sup></u>		<u>More than 6 years of schooling</u>	
	<u>Did not migrate/ migrated when less than 16 years old<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>Migrated when 16+ years old</u>	<u>Did not migrate/ migrated when less than 16 years old</u>	<u>Migrated when 16+ years old</u>
semi/unskilled job small scale enterprise	37%	29%	45%	35%
independently employed	26%	41%	21%	30%
factory/large enterprise	22%	21%	24%	22%
salaried non- manual	15%	9%	11%*	13%*
Total	100% (46)	100% (34)	101% (38)	100% (23)

Based on the questions: a. "How much schooling have you had?"  
b. "Where did you live when you were 15?"

\*"N" is less than 5.

are equally educated. As shown in Table 2, migrants fare comparatively well in the City. The men with six or more years of schooling who grew up in Mexico City are less likely to be salaried white collar workers than the men with comparable education who migrated when they were sixteen years or older. Likewise, the men with less than a primary school education who grew up in the capital tend to do no better occupationally than those who migrated as adults (sixteen or more years old).

Hence, the men's socio-economic status is not attributable to their rural or urban background, but to their educational achievement. In the next section we examine the extent to which their economic status is a function of their socio-economic background and the general nature of the production process.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION1. Education, Personal Contacts and Class Background

Capitalist economies for the most part are oriented towards maximizing profit, and profit is associated with productivity. Productivity in turn depends largely on skill, for skill affects the uses to which capital are put. To the extent that skills are acquired through schooling, capitalists would be likely to vary in their success according to their training and they would be likely to give preference in hiring to educated workers, particularly when jobs require expertise. Consequently, even though capitalists can directly transfer their line of work on to their children, they would be motivated to educate their children. Likewise, non-capitalists would be motivated to educate their children well so that their children can attain socially and economically rewarding jobs, particularly since they cannot directly pass on their line of work to their children. However, families are unlikely to be equally able to afford keeping their children out of the work force and therefore not equally able to educate their children. The more successful that parents are economically, the more likely are they to be able to afford educating their children and the more successful their children, in turn, are likely to be. Contrary to Marx, education may be more important than property ownership in determining most people's "life chances," especially if most coveted jobs cannot be directly inherited.

People differ not only in their ability but also in their desire to have their children follow in their footsteps. For instance, small-scale capitalists (self-employed persons whose labor generates little income) could directly pass on their line of work to their children. However, in contrast to medium and large-scale capitalists, they are not likely to wish their occupational fate

on their children, for they enjoy little social and economic security. Similarly, manual workers who enjoy little social and economic security, would not be likely to wish their occupational fate on their children.

There is also reason to believe, however, that people are hired on the basis of so-called "particularistic" criteria as well, especially when coveted jobs are scarce. Among people equally qualified for jobs, employers may prefer to hire persons known either to them or to someone working for them as such workers are more likely to be loyal and cooperative when offered a job than workers hired through impersonal channels.<sup>11</sup> Should people's social contacts in general and job contacts in particular primarily be with persons of their own socio-economic class,<sup>12</sup> this informal mechanism, in addition, would serve to perpetuate differential access to jobs from one generation to the next along family lines.

Among the sample of men, those with the socially and economically most rewarding jobs tend to be the most educated<sup>13</sup> (Table 3A). The salaried white collar employees generally have at least a primary school education (six or more years of schooling). However, a primary school education in itself does not guarantee the men white collar jobs (Table 3B). Education is a less important prerequisite for factory work than white collar work, but clearly factory workers are more educated than artisans.<sup>14</sup> Almost as many independently employed men pursuing entrepreneurial activities rarely seem to do so by choice, for only about 6% of them want their children to follow in their footsteps. They apparently pursue such work because job opportunities have not increased in response to the changing skill level of the population.<sup>15</sup> Since they prefer self-employment to the jobs available, they start their own small businesses -- utilizing their limited capital and skills. Not all independently employed men, however, have an education. In contrast to the other small-scale entrepreneurs,

TABLE 3

## RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION

## AMONG MEN IN THE THREE AREAS

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Education</u> <sup>a</sup>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>none</u>	<u>some primary</u>	<u>primary</u>	
A. <u>percentaged on occupation</u>				
semi and unskilled in small enterprise	6%*	67	28	101% (36)
independently employed	24%	35	42	101% (46)
factory/large enterprise	9%*	44	47	100% (32)
salaried non-manual	8%*	19	72	99% (36)
TOTAL	13% (19)	41% (61)	46% (70)	
B. <u>percentaged on education</u>				
semi and unskilled in small enterprise	11%*	39%	14%	24%
independently employed	58	26	27	31
factory/large enterprise	16*	23	21	21
salaried non-manual	16*	11	37	24
TOTAL	101% (19)	99% (61)	99% (70)	100% (150)

<sup>a</sup>Classification based on the question: "How much schooling have you had?"  
Primary school consists of six grades.

\*"N" is less than 5.

these men probably were unable to secure other work since employers (according to Table 3A) rarely hire uneducated men. While these "penny capitalists" generally lack skills and capital, they have few options but to pursue such activities in order to subsist. Schooling, in sum, seems generally to be a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for well-paying and prestigious jobs. In view of the schooling the men would like their children to obtain, their personal regret that they themselves did not acquire more formal training, and the importance they attribute to education as a channel of mobility, it seems unlikely that they are poorly educated by choice.<sup>16</sup> Class background appears to be a primary obstacle to schooling. For one, the men in the sample of highest occupational status entertain the highest educational aspirations and expectations for their children, no doubt because they can best afford to keep their children out of the work force.<sup>17</sup> Secondly, the quality and quantity of school facilities seems to reinforce the importance family background has on children's education, for government school allocations are class biased. For instance, school facilities are inequitably distributed between rich and poor regions of the country (Myers 1965), urban and rural communities (Myers 1965), and rich and poor sections within cities.<sup>18</sup> However, without knowing the nature of school facilities in the communities where and when the men in the sample grew up, we cannot determine the extent to which the men interviewed were handicapped by the government's inegalitarian school policy. Nevertheless, given the national pattern one can assume that it was important for at least some of the men, particularly those of rural origin.<sup>19</sup> To the extent that it was important, formal as well as informal pressures have restricted the education opportunities of the men. And differences in school facilities within the three areas suggest that the same forces seem to be affecting the educational prospects of the men's children.

In addition, personal contacts are crucial for jobs, particularly for

ones in the "modern" sector of the economy. For instance, about 38% of the men with factory and white collar jobs said they obtained their work through a personal acquaintance, whereas only one-fourth of the men in small-scale enterprises said they obtained their jobs in this manner. Although the men are not entirely restricted in their close contacts to people of their own socio-economic strata, those employed as factory and white collar workers are friendliest with persons holding jobs of comparable status (Table 4). Consequently, the men's range of job contacts tend to be class-linked. Since the men rely primarily on kin to help them secure work and since kin tend to be of similar socio-economic background, personal contacts generally serve to perpetuate differential access to jobs from one generation to the next along family lines, just as schooling does.<sup>20</sup>

## 2. Prior Job Experience, Age and Present Occupational Success

An analysis which focuses on channels of recruitment at a single point in time overlooks the mobility that people experience within the course of their lifetime. The apparent importance of class of origin could merely be a function of the particular time at which the investigation was done.<sup>21</sup>

However, the men in fact seem not to undergo much vertical intragenerational mobility.<sup>22</sup> While we do not have data on their entire work histories, a comparison of the last two jobs the men have held reveals that most men have either experienced no mobility or "horizontal" mobility (that is, jobs within the same occupational category); that once men secure white collar status they rarely forsake it; and that factory workers who are vertically mobile are more downwardly mobile than upwardly mobile<sup>23</sup> (Table 5).

If people do not experience much job mobility within their lifetimes, the jobs available when they entered the labor force may affect their entire



TABLE 4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF CLOSE NETWORK  
MEMBERS AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF MEN IN THE THREE AREAS  
(Percentaged on men's occupations)

	<u>semi and un- skilled in small enterprise</u>	<u>independently employed</u>	<u>factory/ enterprise</u>	<u>salaried non-manual</u>
% with any of 3 closest <sup>a</sup>				
Relatives who are non-manual	26% (35)	26% (43)	31% (29)	57% (35)
Godparents who are non-manual	20% (35)	25% (44)	22% (32)	54% (35)
Friends who are non-manual	17% (36)	32% (44)	25% (32)	61% (36)
Relatives, godparents <u>or</u> friends who are non-manual	47% (34)	60% (40)	52% (29)	85% (34)
Relatives who are factory workers	26% (35)	31% (43)	22% (29)	56% (35)
Godparents who are factory workers	23% (35)	32% (44)	18% (32)	45% (35)
Friends who are factory workers	52% (36)	53% (44)	41% (32)	83% (36)
Relatives, godparents <u>or</u> friends who are factory workers	6%* (34)	23% (40)	22% (29)	38% (34)

<sup>a</sup>Based on the question: "What type of work do they do?" (asked in reference to their three closest relatives, friends and compadres)

\*"N" is less than 5.

TABLE 5

## INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY AMONG MEN IN THE THREE AREAS:

## RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAST JOB AND PRESENT JOB

<u>Present Job</u>	<u>Last Job<sup>a</sup></u>				
	<u>no previous job</u>	<u>semi and un- skilled job in small-scale enterprises</u>	<u>independ- dently employed</u>	<u>factory/ large enterprise</u>	<u>salaried non- manual</u>
semi and unskilled in small enterprises	46%	41% <sup>b</sup>	14%*	-%*	7%*
independently employed	23	20	36 <sup>b</sup>	39	14
factory/large enterprise	16	20	27	46 <sup>b</sup>	7*
salaried non-manual	14	18	23	15*	71 <sup>b</sup>
TOTAL	99% (43)	99% (49)	100% (22)	100% (13)	99% (14)

<sup>a</sup>Based on the question: "What type of job did you have before your present job?"

<sup>b</sup>These figures refer to non-mobile persons.

\*"N" is less than 5.

careers. Given the country's high rate of economic growth since World War II, one might expect the men who have entered the work force in recent decades to be the most successful occupationally. Yet the younger generation of men in the three areas do not enjoy a great economic advantage over the older generation of men. Interestingly, the men under forty seem no more likely than those over forty to hold salaried white collar jobs, even though in the country as a whole white collar employees either are not recruited from this stratum of the population or they tend not to settle in areas such as these.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, neither job experience nor age of entry into the work force seem to have a large bearing on the men's occupational fate.

### 3. Intergenerational Occupational Mobility

In sum, family background limits the men's job prospects, but not because the men directly inherit their father's line of work. Jobs for the most part are not directly passed down from father to son. Fathers who could pass on their line of work to their sons rarely do<sup>25</sup> (Table 6). The children who in fact are least likely to pursue careers similar to their fathers are the sons of men who were independently employed. Family wealth, power and prestige, not ownership of the "means of production" largely determine the son's occupational fate. However, the effect is primarily indirect, for sons of salaried white collar workers were most likely to be white collar workers even though they could not directly inherit jobs from their fathers.<sup>26</sup>

Yet independently of the wealth, power and prestige of parents, sons of certain class backgrounds tend to be more mobile than others.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, not all sons who have been mobile have moved up the socio-economic hierarchy. For instance, workers' sons are more likely to be employed artisans or "peons" than salaried white collar employees. As to those persons who have been

TABLE 6

## INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY AMONG MEN IN THE THREE AREAS

<u>respondent's occupation</u>	<u>campesino</u>	<u>semi and un- skilled in small enterprises</u>	<u>independently employed</u>	<u>factory/ large enterprise</u>	<u>salaried non- manual</u>
semi and unskilled in small enterprises	21%	43% <sup>b</sup>	21%	33%*	11%
independently employed	34	32	35 <sup>b</sup>	17*	19
factory/large enterprise	24	11	21	42 <sup>b</sup>	22
salaried non-manual	21	14	24	8*	48 <sup>b</sup>
TOTAL	100% (38)	100% (28)	101% (34)	100% (12)	100% (27)

<sup>a</sup>Based on the question: "What type of work did your father do most of his life?" The classification includes only those persons who knew their father and how he earned a living.

<sup>b</sup>These figures refer to non-mobile persons.

\*"N" is less than 5.

fortunate enough to be upwardly mobile, many do not come from what has been conventionally labeled "adjacent" strata. Most recruits into the working class have not come from artisan backgrounds,<sup>28</sup> and most white collar recruits have not come from working class backgrounds.<sup>29</sup>

The most upwardly mobile are the sons of campesinos and independently employed men.<sup>30</sup> Their relative success may be an indirect consequence of the control or autonomy which their fathers enjoyed over their work situation, employer preference for workers or rural origin, the types of families who migrate and/or the effect migration has on families. Contrary to the literature dealing with the culture of rural and urban communities, migrant background seems not to impede urban mobility.

Work experience may indirectly serve to perpetuate inequality from one generation to the next. For one, parents who exert independence and assume a position of dominance may raise children, consciously or not, to take initiative.<sup>31</sup> In contrast, "peons", employed artisans and workers (particularly workers in the small, old paternalistic factories in which most of the workers interviewed are employed) may extend the hierarchical and paternalistic cultural and behavioral patterns learned at work and/or reinforced at work to relations within their homes.<sup>32</sup> They may assume within the family the dominant role denied them in the firm, and consequently raise their children to be dependent and reluctant to take risks (Lipset, 1960: 87-126, and the references therein). However, some sons of employed manual workers are independent small-scale capitalists. Consequently, this explanation is inadequate, unless the men pursue such work by default, i.e., because they are unable to secure other employment.

According to social-psychological studies, at least of Americans, children trained early in life to be independent are more motivated to achieve and assume responsibilities than people who are brought up protected. (For a

comprehensive summary of psychological studies of socialization in the United States, see Brofenbrenner 1966 and the references therein.) In contemporary America, training in independence is generally restricted to the middle class -- particularly to the self-employed middle class.<sup>33</sup> In other words, those Americans who exercise greatest independence and autonomy in their work situation employ childrearing techniques which result in their offspring learning both to be independent and flexible and to exercise control over their environment. Although these studies attribute the training in independence to middle class upbringing, other socio-economic strata of family experiences could conceivably induce people to employ similar childrearing practices. Should other occupations and experiences -- particularly in societies stratified along different lines than the U.S. -- demand workers to be independent and responsible, the effect of work autonomy on family relations might be similar to that experienced by independently employed middle class persons in the U.S. If this line of argument is correct, it is not surprising that the children of independently employed men and campesinos in our sample have been more upwardly mobile than employed workers.

In addition, economic constraints prevent the children of poorly paid manual workers from enjoying much upward mobility. For instance, fathers who are artisans often for financial reasons either have their sons assist them (particularly if they are paid on a piecework basis) or have their sons get absorbed into craft activities before they are old enough to select a career on their own.

As to migrant families, they undoubtedly are a select group.<sup>34</sup> Compared to the average person they leave behind in the provinces, they are better educated, they probably also are more self-confident and willing to take initiative and risks or they would not have moved. Moreover, some campesinos

in the provinces exert considerable autonomy over their work situation, just as independently employed workers in the city do. Should such campesinos be the most inclined to migrate, their prior experience should help them adapt to life in the capital.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, relative to families native to Mexico City, they may be more determined to succeed, in order to justify their move.<sup>36</sup> And employers may prefer hiring migrants as migrants are likely to accept lower wages and be more docile than city-born people.

There are, therefore, reasons to believe that socio-economic factors largely determine the occupational status of fathers and sons.

THE DWELLING ENVIRONMENT THESIS: AREA OF RESIDENCE

Alternatively, people's economic fate may directly or indirectly depend on where they live (1) because physical surroundings may affect people's motivation to work, (2) because economic prospects may depend on proximity to sources of employment, and/or (3) because housing may be an economic asset. These possibilities are discussed in turn below.

1. The Impact of Physical and Social Environment

The center city area appears to be an "area of blight", whereas the housing project resembles a middle class style residential community. Consequently, if there is any relationship between physical or social environment and individual well-being, as both social scientists and planners have suggested (e.g., Burgess 1925; Perry 1929), then people in the center city area should be least successful economically, project dwellers the most successful. Because the colonia is neither as deteriorated as the center city area nor as posh as the housing project, colonos (residents of colonias proletarias) should occupy a post in between. [Stokes (1962) calls such colonias "slums of hope"!]

According to the survey, center-city dwellers are least successful in securing factory and white collar employment (Table 7). Their low occupational status is particularly striking given, on the one hand, the substantial number of small and medium-sized factories located locally and the various government offices located in the near vicinity and, on the other hand, their educational qualifications. Since there are no factories and few places hiring white collar workers in either of the other areas, proximity to centers of employment in itself does not determine their job prospects.<sup>38</sup> Only 27% of the center city dwellers with six or more years of schooling hold salaried white collar jobs, whereas 40% of the colonos and 46% of the project dwellers with comparable education do.



TABLE 7

## OCCUPATION AMONG MEN IN EACH OF THE THREE AREAS

	<u>Area of Residence</u>		
	<u>center city</u>	<u>project</u>	<u>colonia</u>
semi and unskilled in small enterprises	28%	20%	25%
independently employed	45	22	27
factory/large enterprise	9	33	21
salaried non-manual	19	26	27
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	101% (47)	101% (51)	100% (52)

Center city dwellers' failure to get the types of jobs they ostensibly merit and ideally want (judging particularly for the aspirations they entertain for their children) stems largely from their class background and limited personal contacts with factory and white collar workers, and from the socio-economic history of the area.

Businesses in the center city area obviously are not there because they find it propitious to be situated near a qualified pool of workers. Rather, factories are situated there for historical reasons: they were established at a time when the city was smaller and when it was legally easier to locate firms in residential areas than it is now.

Class background seems to be important for the following reasons. For one, more center city dwellers (33%) than project dwellers (21%) or colonos (20%) had fathers who were independently employed. As previously mentioned, sons are more likely to pursue the same type of work as their fathers than any other specific type of work (although this is least true of sons of independently employed men). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, economic opportunities for penny capitalists and small businessmen tend to be better in the center city area than in either of the other two areas. Under such circumstances men no doubt are more inclined to start their own business. Thirdly, the area has been an important center of cottage industry and small-scale commerce historically. Consequently, children raised locally have been exposed to this type of work since they were young. The exposure, combined with the contacts center city dwellers have locally with people employed in such activities, probably increases the likelihood that residents pursue these occupations. Furthermore, their limited contacts with factory and white collar workers inhibit their mobility prospects. Fewer center city dwellers than project dwellers or colonos are friendly with factory or white collar

employees.

In addition, artisans and comerciantes in the center city area tend not to move away because they enjoy the convenience of living near where they work (if they do not work at home) and near where they purchase their work supplies. In contrast, residents who attain white collar jobs are inclined to move away. Their values and life-style are at odds with those of most local artisans and comerciantes (small-scale tradesmen). The latter place less emphasis on "conspicuous consumption." Informal interviews with people in the three areas suggest that white collar workers in the center city area are more likely to change neighborhoods than people similarly employed in the other two areas.<sup>39</sup>

In sum, center city dwellers' low occupational status does not stem from lack of schooling, distance from factory and white collar jobs or the deteriorated environment in which they live.

Nevertheless, the success which project dwellers enjoy in contrast to residents of the other two areas suggests that "middle class" housing may in fact have a positive economic effect on inhabitants. However, their job status is also indirectly attributable to their class background, not to their housing environment. For one, many more project dwellers (32%) than center city dwellers (19%) or colonos (8%) had fathers who were white collar workers. As previously pointed out, sons of salaried white collar employees are more likely than sons of other occupational backgrounds to secure white collar jobs. Secondly, recent arrivals to the project are of higher occupational status than the original settlers, even though they have been less exposed to the middle class ambience of the area. Consequently, residency in the middle class styled environment cannot in itself account for the men's occupational fate. Thirdly, almost all of the factory and white collar project dwellers had their jobs before moving to the project. They actually moved to the housing development

because of the types of jobs they held (even though the project was supposed to house persons displaced by public works and impoverished persons living in areas the government wished to demolish). Some of the factory and white collar employees obtained houses through their unions, for various unions were allotted houses in the project. Other workers and salaried white collar employees obtained homes through political contacts or by illegally buying them from people who had originally been allotted homes by the government. In moving to the project such persons merely "consolidated" their overall socio-economic status. They did not in the process improve their occupational standing.

## 2. Home Ownership and Capital Accumulation

Urban land tends to increase in value over the years. Consequently, it is a "long-term" investment.<sup>40</sup> In addition, land can be used for generating the following "short-term" economic gains:

1. rooms can be sublet or used as a shop or workplace;
2. animals and vegetables can be raised on the property, for business and/or subsistence purposes (Turner 1968; Leeds 1966).

Tenants, by contrast, can use their quarters as a workshop, but for little else economically.

Since most center city dwellers, unlike colonos and project dwellers, rent the quarters in which they live, the comparatively low socio-economic status of center city dwellers could possibly stem from their being primarily tenants. However, it does not. For one, center city dwellers are the most likely to be self-employed and the most likely to work in the area where they live. Secondly, self-employed center city dwellers earn more than people similarly employed in either of the other areas. Thirdly, within each occupational grouping the total family income of center city dwellers tends to be no less than that of residents in the other two areas.

Thus, even if government housing and land programs create favorable dwelling environments and provide people with a modicum of social and economic security which tenants do not enjoy, they tend to create "favorable investment climates" or job opportunities for people of humble origins. Housing, therefore, does not in itself significantly alter the "life chances" of people of humble origins.

CONCLUSION

Since the sample is not representative of the total population of Mexico, the findings of this study are suggestive rather than conclusive.<sup>41</sup> According to the analysis, rural background and rural ties do not in themselves impede people's economic prospects in the capital. In fact, people of provincial background have experienced more mobility than City-born people of humble background. If these findings reflect a general pattern, urban poverty would not necessarily diminish were migration to decline.

Socio-economic factors in large part seem to influence people's "life chances", particularly schooling and personal contacts, and class background indirectly. Children whose fathers hold positions of dominance either over their immediate work situation or the general market situation apparently have an advantage over other children.<sup>42</sup> They tend to receive the best education and have the best network of contacts to help them secure jobs. They also are socialized to want and expect coveted jobs which are not directly inheritable.

The data also suggest that skills and values disseminated through schools and the type of area in which people live have little direct effect on people's job prospects. Consequently, urban renewal, legalization of squatter settlements and programs aimed at expanding the education system will not eradicate poverty. New jobs need to be created which offer social and economic security. To equalize access to jobs, the government must provide social services, such as child-care centers, so that children of diverse family backgrounds can be exposed to similar socialization experiences and similar opportunities from the time they are born. The government also must develop an educational system that provides all students with the same quality and quantity of education.

## FOOTNOTES

1. The population of capital cities in other Latin American countries also has increased rapidly in recent decades (Unikel 1968).
2. The terms class, socio-economic status, and occupation are used interchangeably. The term class does not imply class consciousness.
3. For detailed case studies of families within this center city area see Lewis (1959, 1961).
4. Such areas are known by different names in other Latin American countries: for example, as callampas (Chile), villas miserias (Argentina), and bariades (Peru).
5. The study also included interviews with 50 women in each of the three areas. Women are excluded from this analysis since men generally are the main breadwinners and since employment conditions for women tend to be somewhat different.
6. The following types of occupations, based on other combinations of skill, scale, and ownership, are not included in this analysis. However, they might be useful in studies including a wider range of socio-economic strata:
  - a. Highly skilled employees in small-scale enterprises: for example, persons employed as accountants or as technical advisors in small businesses;
  - b. Skilled persons who work at jobs generally not requiring a dependent work force: for example, self-employed "credentialed" professionals;
  - c. Large-scale capitalists: e.g., owners of major industrial firms.

7. No analysis is made here of the secondary sources of employment which some men have. If men had no job at the time of the interview, they were asked about their most recently held job.
8. Racial and sexual differences among successive generations of Americans are ignored by proponents of this thesis.
9. Other studies of Mexicans, likewise, show that migrants compare favorably occupationally with city-born people. See Cornelius (1969); Browning and Feindt (1968: 183-204); Balán et al. (1973); Kahl (1968: 175-182). Migrants seem not to compare as favorably with city-born people at the top echelons of the socio-economic hierarchy in Mexico. [Vernon (1963: 157)]. In the United States, Blau and Duncan (1967) found that migrants on the whole were more successful than people born in cities with comparable levels of schooling. Likewise, according to a study of migrants and city-born in Milan, migrants tend not to be at a disadvantage occupationally except that they tend to be overrepresented among the least skilled workers and underrepresented among lower white collar workers. (Paci 1966: 43). Rural-urban background may be more consequential in a declining economy than in an expanding economy. For example, Germani (1961), in his study of Argentine barriadas, found that the type of work people did in part varied according to the length of time people lived in Buenos Aires.
10. In the U.S. the success of Jews and Japanese has been attributed to their education and the value they place on education. See Kitano (1969) and Wirth (1928).
11. On the problem of labor commitment in reference to early industrialization,



see Moore and Feldman (1960).

12. For a more detailed discussion of social class and network relations see Eckstein (1972: Chapter 2).

13. Financially, for instance, whereas over three-fourths of the salaried white collar workers interviewed reported earning \$80 or more per month, only 30%, 35% and 63% of the semi and unskilled employed workers (in small-scale firms), independently employed and factory workers, respectively, reported earning that amount. In contrast, only 11% of the salaried white collar workers said they earned \$60 or less, whereas 39%, 35% and 13% of the semi and unskilled workers, the independently employed and factory workers, respectively, said that they did. Other studies of stratification in Mexico show similar correlations between income and occupation. See Stern and Kahl (1968) and the references therein.

14. Some employers actually prefer workers who are not well educated, as educated workers may be familiar with the Labor Code and therefore demand benefits which less educated workers would not demand. (Kazin 1972: Chapter 9). On the question of "overeducation" of labor in the United States, see Berg (1970).

15. The education prerequisites for certain jobs are determined less by the requirements of the job itself than by the general educational level prevailing in a particular society. For example, automobile workers in different countries will have different educational backgrounds even though they perform the same work. See, for example, Form (1969).

16. About half of the men would like their children to attend the university. A similar number of men consider education to be the most important requisite for success. And almost without exception the men wish they themselves would have received more formal education.

17. For data on the relationship between education and class background in Mexico see the following sources: Kahl (1968: 72-88); Carnoy (1967: 363); Anuario Estadístico (1966); and Barkin (1970). These studies show that the education children receive varies according to their class background despite the avowed commitment of the post-Revolutionary governments to education. Such unequal access to education is not, however, unique either to Latin America (Liebman, et al., 1971) or to capitalist regimes in general. For example, the class backgrounds of university students in Poland in 1965-66 were as follows: 53.3% were intelligentsia, 26.1% were working class, 14.1% were peasantry, 5.1% were self-employed artisans, 1.4% were miscellaneous Fiszman (1971). Likewise, in the Soviet Union, where ownership of the means of production is also not in private hands, the level of schooling people hope their children attain and the level their children actually attain varies in accordance with the amount and nature of control men exercise over the means of production. See Inkeles and Bauer (1969: 25).

18. For instance, in the colonia, three to four times as many children could not enter first grade as could enter. All but a few hundred children could enter primary school in the center city area, but post-primary school education was limited since the local post-primary school was a vocational school. In 1968 there was also insufficient space in the schools for local children in the more middle class housing project. However, those project dwellers who were fortunate enough to enter primary school had access to a local

academic (i.e., non-vocational) secondary school.

19. The data supports Lipset's thesis (1970: 127) that a particularistic society needs to put more emphasis on universalistic standards, particularly in the most productive sectors of the economy, in order that people be motivated to acquire skills. For an analysis of network ties among employees of a textile factory, a subsidiary of a large foreign-owned firm, and a large domestic firm, see Wilson (1969).

20. The data suggests that personalismo is important for socio-economic, not cultural reasons. The men who depend most on personal contacts are, by and large, as educated as those who obtained their jobs through other means. If men have contacts they obviously make use of them, for labor unions, employment agencies, political parties, advertisements and other impersonal market mechanisms are of little use to men in search of work. However, personalismo is frequently said to be culturally determined. Gillin (1966: 24-27), for example, considers personalismo to be a distinctively Latin cultural trait, as does Parsons (1951: 198-200). Since a 1960 study shows that 38% of Americans aged 21-45 obtained their most recent job through a member of their family or a friend, personalismo is not unique to a semi-industrialized country. Crain (1970: 593-606).

21. The upward mobility which in fact occurs at the bottom of the urban socio-economic hierarchy does not signify that Mexico as a whole is a very "open" society, for excluded from our sample are campesinos and large-scale capitalists, the two groups which are most likely to be self-perpetuating -- in one case by choice, in the other case partly by choice and partly by default. Vernon (1963) argues that the Mexican business elite are not entirely recruited from off-

spring of businessmen. However, his study dealt with executives who were not necessarily the owners of the businesses. His study, at any rate, showed that few people of humble origins make it to the top.

22. In advanced capitalist industrial societies, intra-generational mobility, likewise, tends to be limited. Lipset and Bendix (1967: 156-81).

23. In Monterrey, job and occupational mobility also is limited. The mobility which men do experience tends to be before age 25. See Browning and Feindt (1968).

24. While the salaried white collar stratum is expanding more rapidly than the working class, it may be that the sector is not expanding sufficiently rapidly, given the high rate of population growth, to absorb persons from other class backgrounds. Alternatively, men who move into white collar jobs may choose to live in more well-to-do sections of the city.

25. For a general statement of this thesis see Bowles (1971).

26. In the Soviet Union, where individuals do not own the means of production, family background, likewise, largely determines people's "life chances." Inkeles and Bauer (1959: 89). The same is true in the United States and Western Europe. Lipset and Bendix (1967: 11-75).

27. The intergenerational mobility pattern described here appears to hold even when education is taken into account (introduced as a "control"). However, due to the small size of the sample it is difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy how important class background is in determining people's

occupational fate, independently of schooling.

28. There is evidence that in nineteenth century America factory hands were not primarily declassé artisans either. Thernstrom (1966: 605, 607). According to Miller's (1960) analysis of mobility between the blue and white collar strata -- in either direction -- in industrial societies, only about 25-30% of the people in most countries experience mobility. See also Goldthorpe (1966: 648-60). For a contrary interpretation of intergenerational occupational mobility, based on more broadly defined occupational categories, see Lipset and Bendix (1967).

29. Kahl (1968: 175) argues that the low blue-white collar mobility in Mexico stems from the fact that the country still is in an early stage of industrialization. To substantiate his point he compares mobility rates in Mexico, Brazil and Puerto Rico with rates in such industrialized societies as the United States, Denmark and France. Due to the way in which Mexico is developing it is doubtful, however, that mobility in the country will ever approximate that of the highly industrialized countries. Thernstrom (1964) argues still another point of view -- that the amount of mobility which occurred historically in the United States has remained more or less constant since the nineteenth century and that the amount never was very great. Likewise, Rogoff (1953) argues that the growth of the non-manual sector in twentieth century America reflects an upward movement of the entire occupational structure and not individual mobility. In contrast, Lipset and Bendix (1967: especially 11-75) argue that the "requisites" of industrialization are such that countries at a comparable level of economic development have comparable rates of mobility, independently of the cultural emphasis on mobility. If this were true, the pattern of mobility in Mexico would reflect the stage of industrialization

and not the pattern of industrialization. However, on the basis of S.M. Miller's data (1960) the validity of this thesis is questionable.

30. Findings of other studies substantiate this point. Zeitlin (1970: 142), for example, notes that among Cuban workers the children of "petit" bourgeois background are more likely to hold "skilled" jobs, even though their "life chances," as measured by education, theoretically put them at a disadvantage in comparison to workers of other class backgrounds. In reference to Brazil, see Hutchinson (1960).

31. For a theoretical discussion of the impact autonomy has on rates of inter-generational mobility see Bowles (1971).

32. As is evident by the dual set of activities which employers provide for their manual and non-manual employees, the two types of workers are considered different kinds of people -- like distinct castes. Mexican factories, for instance, often provide separate washing and dining facilities for blue and white collar workers. Such differential treatment reinforces social and economic distinctions based on the type of work people do. Thus, the relations within the firm and within the society at large tend to be similar, both serving to perpetuate occupationally linked inequality. See Davis (1967: 52-80).

33. In making comparisons between child-rearing practices in the United States and Mexico I do not wish to imply that people holding comparable positions in the two countries have been trained equally to be independent, but that in comparison to the other workers in their respective countries they perhaps have been. In general I would expect Mexicans of all socio-economic strata to be trained to be more submissive than their American counterparts and more

reluctant to take risks.

34. Likewise, Lipset and Bendix (1967) found that in all countries they studied except the United States sons of farmers in non-farm occupations had a better chance of attaining non-manual work than did sons of manual workers. However, Rogoff's (1953: 45) study of occupational mobility in Indianapolis shows that at a period of industrialization more or less comparable to present-day Mexico's level -- in 1910 -- approximately the same proportion of sons of farmers achieved white collar status as presently do in the United States. Compared to Chessa's study (cited in Lipset and Bendix 1967:37) of mobility in Rome in 1908, people of agrarian background have a greater chance -- though only slightly greater -- of attaining non-manual jobs. Likewise, Bowles (1971) finds in his study of occupational mobility in the United States that children whose fathers are self-employed are more likely to attain white collar positions than children of fathers who are otherwise employed.

35. Fromm and Maccoby (1970) discuss social, psychological and economic differences among campesinos. Our data, unfortunately, is not sufficiently detailed to test whether campesinos of diverse backgrounds have adjusted differently to the city.

36. A study of performance on entrance examinations for institutions of higher learning in Poland also shows that students of peasant background are more successful than those of working class background. Peasants who have made it through the secondary school perhaps are more motivated to get ahead because they have had more obstacles to overcome. They therefore are more diligent and hard-working. If such differences between offspring of peasants and workers are characteristic of both capitalist and non-capitalist societies

we have added reason to believe that there are informal class-linked mechanisms which serve to perpetuate social-economic inequalities from one generation to the next along family lines, independently of ownership of the means of production. See Fiszman (1971).

37. The owner of a large factory in the center city area, for example, deliberately recruited his workers from the town from which he migrated. When an American firm bought the company it continued the practice of the original owner in order not to upset workers already employed in the factory and people in the provincial community. For a discussion of the types of Mexican firms which prefer hiring rural rather than urban-born people, see Davis (1967).

38. In the United States as well, residential propinquity to centers of employment is no guarantee of work, particularly for Blacks. According to Galbraith (1958), the problem of ghetto dwellers stems from their "homing instinct", that is, their desire to spend their life at or near their place of birth. He claims that such a desire to be "insulated" from the surrounding society results in a continued commitment to unproductive, episodic or otherwise unremunerative work. While it is true that center city dwellers do not succeed at attaining economically and socially rewarding jobs, it is not, as Galbraith posits, because they only have access to limited educational facilities owing to their refusal to move from their place of birth. Galbraith used the concept of "insular poverty" in reference to poverty in the United States where only a minority rather than a majority of the population is poor. Were his thesis correct, there is no reason why from a logical point of view it would not be applicable to countries where most people are poor.

39. To the extent that salaried white collar workers have moved away from



the center city area, center city dwellers actually have experienced more upward mobility than is apparent from the interviews.

40. Only about 10% of the men interviewed in the center city lived in quarters that they owned. The majority of men in the other two areas, especially in the housing project, either owned their own home or were purchasing the property they inhabited.

41. The processes which determine what type of work men in the three areas under study do are not necessarily representative of the processes operating in Mexico as a whole since the areas were not selected randomly. Furthermore, our sample unfortunately excludes the people who have experienced marked upward or downward mobility, i.e., the people who have been sufficiently successful to afford housing in more exclusive sections of Mexico City or so unsuccessful that they have been compelled to move to areas of the city with a lower cost of living or back to the provinces from where they initially migrated. In the housing project the majority of families who have moved away have been ones unable to afford living there. In the area formed by squatters few families have moved away relative to the number who have settled in the area subsequent to the invasion. According to the residents and local elites initially people left because they were unable or unwilling to pay for the land. Subsequently others have moved away because they could afford better housing. However, the people who have moved into the area over the years have generally been of higher social-economic status than the earlier settlers and many more people have moved into the area than out of the area. Population-wise, the area presently is approximately twelve times larger than it was the first few years after the area was settled. In the center city area, the population has remained relatively stable for the last couple of decades. The

people who have moved away seem to have moved because they wanted and could afford better and more spacious housing. Hence, our findings probably underestimate slightly the amount of occupational mobility which center city dwellers have experienced over the years, whereas our findings most likely overestimate actual occupational mobility in the housing project and the squatter settlement.

42. In the case of sons brought up fatherless, their "life chances" probably depend on the socio-economic status of their mothers or some father surrogate. Whether in fact the same processes operate in such cases is beyond the scope of this paper, but the problem merits systematic analysis.

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