ALBANIA'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is a brief, preliminary analysis of Albania's efforts to bring about the "revolutionization of the country's life," and the relationship of Tirana's revolution to Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.* Its conclusions therefore, whether explicit or implicit, can only be regarded as tentative.

In the course of analysis, a number of questions have suggested themselves as worthy of a closer examination. For example, why has the question of the "emancipation of woman" assumed such importance for the Albanian leadership and the Albanian economy? What is the significance of Albania's heavy stress on the struggle against backward customs and vain beliefs, which has swept away the religious establishment in the country? By what methods and means has Enver Hoxha sought to communicate with and control Albanian intellectuals, and what has been the result of his efforts?

An exploration of such questions would probably make for a better understanding of Albania's current cultural and ideological revolution, and its influence on the country's position in international affairs.

* I wish to express my thanks to Professor William E. Griffith, Professor Donald L. M. Blackmer and to Dr. Robin Remington for their encouragement in the writing of this paper.
The future and fate of socialist construction in Albania, considered a closed question in 1961, remains an open one in 1966; and the tone of confidence and optimism, so evident in 1961, has given way five years later to uncertainty and an attitude of watchful caution against alien ideologies which would subvert socialism.

The ideological distance travelled by Albania in the span of five years, indeed, the impact of China's Cultural Revolution on the thinking of the Albanian leadership becomes evident from the difference in content and tone of certain statements made by Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu in 1961 and 1966 respectively.

For example, in his report to the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor (APL) (February 1961), the Party's First Secretary Enver Hoxha said:

On the basis of the magnificent successes and profound revolutionary transformations that have occurred in all countries of the world socialist system, the complete and final victory of socialism has now been assured not only in the Soviet Union, but also within the framework of the entire socialist system. The internal economic and social conditions for the restoration of capitalism have now been eliminated. 1

At the party's Fifth Congress, held nearly six years later, in November 1966, Hoxha had modified his enthusiasm. He said:

As long as the complete victory of the socialist revolution in the fields of ideology and culture has not been assured, neither can there be any security or guarantee of the gains of the socialist revolution in the political and economic fields. That is why the struggle on the ideological front, for the complete destruction of the bourgeois and revisionist ideology, at bottom concerns the question: can socialism and communism be constructed and the restoration of capitalism be evaded. . . .

Albania's Prime Minister, Mehmet Shehu, for his part, triumphantly told the 1961 APL Congress, that the question "Who shall win?" in Albania, as between socialism and capitalism, has been "irrevocably resolved in favor of socialism," while at the Fifth Party Congress he warned that "the class struggle will continue not one or five years but throughout the entire historical epoch of the construction of socialism.


In the period between the Fourth and Fifth Congresses of the APL, Albania broke with the Soviet Union, openly allied herself with the Chinese People's Republic, (becoming almost totally dependent on Peking for her economic needs), isolated herself from Eastern Europe, and for all practical purposes withdrew both from the Warsaw Pact and CMEA. In the meantime, China's split with the Soviet Union widened and as of November 1965, fully a year before Albania's Fifth Party Congress, China embarked on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with the avowed aim of preventing the tragedy of Soviet Revisionism from overtaking socialist China, i.e. to block the restoration of capitalism.

In the nearly three years since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in China, a cultural revolution of sorts seems to have taken place in Albania. Its nature, scope and influence on the country's life is barely known as yet. However, that such a revolution should take place in Albania is perhaps not surprising in view of the background of China and Albania, their history, their experiences with the U.S.S.R., their geographic isolation and Albania's special relation to the CPR.


Both China and Albania have known great poverty—a factor which possibly accounts, to a degree, for their impatience to industrialize, and their willingness to try radical measures to achieve industrialization. Both have a keen memory of the exploitation and humiliation they have suffered at the hands of foreigners, hence their xenophobic attitude. Both feel betrayed by the "revisionist Khrushchevite leadership" of the CPSU. Both feel encircled and threatened by enemies—Albania by the "capitalist-revisionist-fascist encirclement" of Yugoslavia, Greece, the U.S. Sixth Fleet and Italy, and China by the "Ring of Fire" forged by the U.S., U.S.S.R., India and Japan. Both retain their great respect for Stalin and practice Stalinist domestic policies. Moreover, both Peking and Tirana are intensely nationalistic.

To this list of common features and grievances may perhaps be added the traumatic experiences that Mao and Hoxha have had with their respective parties, and which have tended to make both men prone to adopt authoritarian, radical measures to consolidate their power and position and to facilitate the implementation of their policies. One must not forget the 1959 Lushan Plenum of the CCP Central Committee which nearly toppled Mao, and the 1948 power struggle within the APL between Hoxha's faction and the Tito-backed which faction of Koxi Xoxe, came close to costing Hoxha his life. 6

This is not to suggest that the cultural revolution—such as it is—now going on in Albania was a spontaneous and independent development. Albania's

special relation to China, i.e. her dependency, first of all, on China for economic and technical aid, the strong political and ideological support she receives from Peking, as well as implicit Chinese pledges of military assistance should she come under attack, made it almost inevitable for Albania to react more or less positively to Mao's Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the Chinese leaders could ill afford to have tolerated an attitude of indifference on the part of their closest and most costly ally to the greatest event taking place in their country, especially in view of the series of diplomatic setbacks China has suffered in other world revolutionary fronts in the course of the current revolution. And Hoxha is too astute a leader not to realize that there had to be some echo, some reflection of China's Proletarian Revolution in Albania—even if conditions within the country did not especially call for a development of this kind—if she were to remain in the good graces of her giant and powerful ally.

A cursory examination of China's and Albania's cultural revolutions seems to show that the differences between them are greater, and probably more meaningful, than the similarities. One difference between them is rooted in

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a subtle shift in terminology, for while the Chinese call their movement the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Albanians call theirs "revolutioniza-
tion," though sometimes they use the term "cultural and ideological revolution."
Furthermore, while the Chinese speak of the "permanent revolution" to describe
the nature of their movement, the Albanians refer to their movement as the
"uninterrupted revolution," thus implying that their revolution is not the
direct offspring of Mao's, but a continuation and deepening of policies, pro-
grams and efforts undertaken by Albania over a period of some twenty years.

A main feature of the Chinese revolution has been the constant, noisy
and indeed hysterical preoccupation with Mao, his thinking, and his "unique"
position in the world Communist movement at present. In the Albanian picture,
at least so far, Enver Hoxha has not been the main focus of attention, the
object of adulation or of scorn, as the case may be, nor has loyalty and
personal devotion to him been made the yardstick of the true Albanian Com-
munist and revolutionary. Lately, though, he has been identified more and
more with the revolutionary developments in the country, as may be gathered
from increasing references in the Albanian press to "Hoxha's teachings," and
the recent publication of the first volume of "Hoxha's works." But whether
he will attain the symbolic and mystical stature in the Albanian revolution,
which Mao apparently enjoys in China, remains to be seen.

Moreover, the references of the Albanian leadership and press to Chairman
Mao have been consistently guarded and restrained in contrast to the enthusiastic

(June 1968), pp. 3-14.
and exalted terms employed by their Chinese counterparts, and to a lesser degree even by certain non-Chinese leftist groups. The Chinese hail Mao as a creative "genius" in the realm of Communist theory and ideology; he is "the reddest Sun" in the hearts of revolutionaries and "the Lenin of our time," whose thought is of "epoch making significance," and has lifted Marxism "to a completely new stage, the stage of Mao Tse-tung's thought."

Hoxha, Shehu, and other Albanian leaders, however, have to date been much more uninhibited in their praise of the Chinese Cultural Revolution than of Mao personally. Shehu, for example, has called Mao's revolution, "the most important historical event of our time," and the "broadest most profound and most gigantic revolutionary mass movement history has ever known." But in speaking of Mao himself, the Albanian leaders have confined themselves to such terms as "distinguished," "outstanding" or "great Marxist-Leninist," and, in general have been reluctant to differentiate and separate Mao's thinking from classic Marxist-Leninist ideology. They speak of "the Marxist-Leninist teachings" of Mao, or "the great Marxist-Leninist ideas of Comrade Mao Tse-tung," but do not acknowledge that the Chinese leader's thinking constitutes "a new stage" in the history of Marxist thought, nor do they rank Mao alongside Marx and Lenin.

Somewhat ironically, Tirana's depicting of Mao is less laudatory, for example, than that of the Communist Party of New Zealand (NZCP) or the Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR) of Uruguay. A recent MIR statement specifically praised Comrade Mao as "the Lenin of our era" and V. G. Wilcox, head of the NZCP has stated that today, "the test of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary is the way he appraises the theory and practice of Mao Tse-tung."
The Albanians have never gone so far. Their comparatively guarded praise of Mao takes on added interest in view of the general ideological stance of Tirana and Peking. For Albania is undoubtedly China's closest ideological ally in the world today.

Yet perhaps more crucial than Tirana's failure to join in the adulation of Mao personally is the role played by the APL in the "revolutionization" of Albanian life.

In China, "the cultural revolution has been preeminently a struggle within the Party,"\(^\text{10}\) and therefore a struggle for power, involving a number of very powerful figures, including members of the Politburo, such as P'eng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and, of course, Liu Shao-ch'i. Such a thing has not happened in Albania. As far as one can see, Hoxha is in firm command of the Party and Government, and outwardly at least the top party leaders seem to be united and to work in harmony. Had the upheaval within the CCP produced its counterpart in Albania, it would mean, for example, that Mehmet Shehu, the Number Two man in the APL; Manush Myftiu, top man in the Tirana Party Committee; and Remis Alia, the czar of culture and the arts, would have fallen from power, and would today bear the odious label of "revisionists" and persons of authority within the APL "taking the capitalist road." To date, neither the structure nor the line and authority of the APL seem to have been notably affected by the revolutionary events that have taken place in the country over the past two and a half years.

One also searches in vain in the Albanian press for pictures showing Beqir Balluku, Albania's Minister of Defense, standing or sitting to the right of Comrade Hoxha, or references to him as Hoxha's "close comrade-in-arms." Unlike the People's Liberation Army, which has played an unusual and indeed dominant role, both in the inception and evolution of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Albanian People's Army has remained distinctly in the background, and has been more of an object than a catalyst of the reforms that have occurred in the country in the course of the revolution. The army endorsed the reform measures decreed by the Sixteenth Plenum of the APL Central Committee in March of 1966, two of which stipulated the abolition of military ranks and the reappointment of political commissars in military units. These measures, incidentally, won the enthusiastic approval of the Chinese, who very likely and correctly saw them as the product of their own revolution, and therefore as a concrete example of the influence of Mao's revolution beyond the borders of China. By comparison with the PLA, however, the role of the Albanian army in the developing revolution in Albania has been passive and relatively unimportant.

Many other events in China, generated by the Cultural Revolution, do not seem to have their counterparts in Albania. There have been no Albanian Red Guards, no campaigns of terror against bourgeois and revisionist elements, no

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11 Zëri i Popullit, March 8, 1966.


13 A Red Guard delegation visited Albania, June 21-July 10, 1967 on the
violent clashes with opponents of reforms, no influx of supporters of the revolution from the provinces to Tirana, and no massive parades in the streets of the capital, involving thousands of youth, all shouting slogans in praise of Hoxha, the revolution, or socialism. There have been no public purges, no turmoil in the State University of Tirana or dislocation of the school system, and no damaging blow to the economy as a result of changes brought on by the revolution. The psychological excesses engendered by the revolution in China, the irrationalism, the feverish emotionalism, the fanaticism and hysteria, especially since the rise of the Red Guard movement, seem to be absent from the Albanian scene, or to exist only to a minor degree in the official vocabulary of "revolutionization." One notable exception to this has been the abolition in Albania of public religious worship and religious institutions. This development, which reportedly took place in early summer of 1967, marks the most novel and striking event to date in the unfolding of Albania's cultural revolution, and probably has aroused considerable emotion among the older population.

Yet in other areas, the resemblance between the two revolutions is apparent, and on occasion striking. Both the Chinese and Albanian leaderships have shown a deep and abiding distrust of intellectuals, whom they regard as an unreliable element, easily influenced by alien ideology and propaganda.

occasion of the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Union of Working Youth. It was received by Hoxha on July 8, an event which the Peking Review described as "unforgettable." This was the first time a Red Guard delegation had gone abroad. "Red Guard Delegation Returns from Albania," Peking Review, Vol. 10, No. 30 (July 21, 1967), pp. 7, 39.
As early as 1964, Mao openly expressed fear of the formation of a Chinese Petőfi Club,\textsuperscript{14} and Enver Hoxha, although an intellectual himself,\textsuperscript{15} appears to have been deeply disturbed by the role played by writers and intellectuals in the Hungarian Revolution.\textsuperscript{16} Such motives of distrust and fear of intellectuals seem to have been a chief factor in Hoxha's decision early in 1966 to dispatch several dozen Albanian writers and artists to the countryside, to work and live there and draw close to the laboring masses.\textsuperscript{17} The fact that this step was taken at the very beginning of the drive for the "revolutionization" of the country is an indication of the Albanian leaders' preoccupation with the problem of intellectuals, and their interest in finding a solution to it.


\textsuperscript{15} Enver Hoxha is a university graduate. After attending the French Lyceum in Kërçë, Albania, he went to France, where he studied natural sciences at Montpellier University. In 1934 he took a law course at Brussels University. Returning to Albania, he obtained a position as Professor of French at the Kërçë Lyceum. He continued to teach until Mussolini invaded Albania in 1939.

\textsuperscript{16} "The Working Class In Revisionist Countries Must Take the Field and Reestablish the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," Zëri i Popullit editorial, March 24, 1968 (pamphlet in English). The article places heavy blame on the intellectuals for the Hungarian revolution, recent developments in Czechoslovakia, and the "revisionist road" taken by the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{17} "Raising Still Higher the Banner of Socialist Realism," Nëndori, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (March 1966), pp. 3-7.
As in China, the Communist leadership of Albania views literature and the arts as an ideological weapon for the construction of socialism, and in particular for the formation of "the new Communist man," who places the collective interest above his personal interest. Albanian propaganda in the current revolutionary drive has made great efforts to strengthen and develop this didactic, strictly partisan conception of the arts, but it is not clear how successful such propaganda has been to date.

A chief target of the cultural revolution in China and Albania has been the educational system, its place and function in the socialist society, and its role in the development and transformation of students into reliable revolutionaries. Like China, Albania has instituted a part-work, part-study program for its students, designed to eliminate the gap between theory and practice, mental and physical labor. The results of this and other educational reforms have not been entirely satisfactory, and last spring Hoxha initiated a new movement to revolutionize the educational system, advising educators not to accept uncritically the Soviet educational system--upon which the Albanian system was modelled--and calling for a purge of all textbooks containing idealistic and theological ideas. Unlike China, however, where the

18 Enver Hoxha, "For the Further Revolutionization of Our Education," Zëri i Popullit, March 10, 1968. In calling for a purge of textbooks containing harmful, anti-social materials, Hoxha did not spare even the classic works in Albanian literature; i.e. the writings of such men as Naim Frashëri, Çajupi and Ndër Mjeda, whom the Albanian leaders have heretofore praised and honored for their strong proletarian sympathies and concern for social justice.
school system collapsed beneath the shock of the Cultural Revolution, the Albanian educational system has continued to function more or less normally—another sign of the comparatively mild and non-traumatic character of the Albanian experiment.

The wall poster, which has been the chief means of communication and criticism in the hands of pro- and anti-Mao factions in China, has made its appearance in Albania as well. But whereas in China the wall poster has been used for political and ideological ends, in Albania it has been used almost entirely for economic ends; i.e. to stimulate agricultural production, improve the organization and methods of work in industry and so on. Furthermore, in China the poster was used freely by both pro- and anti-Mao factions, while in Albania it has been used—so far as is known—only by pro-party elements, to serve clearly defined party goals and objectives. It may be added here that Albanian propaganda seems especially anxious to press "the struggle against bureaucracy, the struggle for the full emancipation of woman, and the struggle against backward customs and religious beliefs"—the three great stumbling blocks, in the eyes of APL, on the path of Albania's economic and social development.

In both countries the Communist leadership seeks to arouse and involve the masses in the revolutionary process. Here again an important difference appears in the type of appeal made to the masses in China and Albania, and the correspondent response of the masses to those appeals. Speaking at a rally of the Red Guards on November 3, 1966, Lin Piao said that the masses must be encouraged "to criticize and supervise the party and government leaders . . . at all levels." The Red Guards, according to reports, responded to such suggestions
by criticizing every major governmental and CCP figure, save Mao and Lin Piao.

No such phenomenon has occurred in the Albanian People's Republic. True, the Albanian Party has encouraged the masses and cadres to practice criticism and to fear no reprisals, but this criticism is not political in nature, and in general falls within the framework of the Albanian slogan to "build faster, better and cheaper." Such criticism may reach as far as the Ministries of Government, but where the party is concerned it does not seem to go beyond the level of the district party committee. 19

Nor have the Albanians appeared entirely comfortable at the lengths to which Peking has pushed the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 20 For example, a check of the Albanian press reveals that there was a drop of Chinese materials amounting to approximately 55 per cent between the January-April period of 1967 and the same period for 1968 (See Table I).

19 Beginning with spring of 1967 Hoxha has succeeded in carrying on a genuine and apparently fruitful dialogue with the masses through correspondence published in the daily press. One interesting by-product of this dialogue has been the breaking down, in large measure, of the traditional barrier between Ghegs and Tosks, and the fostering of a sense of unity and collaboration between Northern and Southern Albanians, Zëri i Popullit, February 7, 1968, March 7, 1968.

20 In this respect, the attitude of the Albanians does not seem to differ much from that of the hated Kremlin leaders, since both fear mass participation in the political process. Thus Moscow could tolerate Albanian dogmatic deviation in the direction of intensified control, but felt compelled to invade Czechoslovakia to prevent spontaneous democratization sanctioned by the Czech Communist Party. Hoxha's lack of enthusiasm for the Chinese Red Guards appears to stem from a similar distrust of even the institutionalized expression by the masses currently being experimented with by Peking, being aware that such expression could well lead to drastic and disorderly changes in the country.
Table I

INCIDENCE OF CHINESE MATERIALS IN ALBANIAN PRESS

(A Comparison of First Four Months of 1967 and 1968)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of Items</th>
<th>Daily Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The decline set in not long after the visit to China in October 1967 by an Albanian Government delegation, headed by Premier Mehmet Shehu, thus raising the suspicion that there may be a cause-effect relationship between the Shehu visit and the decline in the reportage of Chinese materials.

The unusually high incidence shown for January 1967, is mostly due to the presence in China at the time of three Albanian delegations, including the Beqir Balluku delegation, another headed by Politburo member Hysni Kapo, and a third made up of the Albanian State Song and Dance Ensemble. Together, news coverage for these delegations accounted for about one-third of the total for January. But even allowing for this coverage, the incidence for January 1967 is still roughly double that of January 1968.

Moreover, while in 1967 there was no issue of Zëri i Popullit or Bashkimi, the two leading Albanian dailies, that did not contain at least one item of news from China for the period shown, in the comparable period for 1968 there is a blank of Chinese materials for a total of 21 publishing days, or more than one-fifth of the period under consideration.
Table II

BREAKDOWN OF CHINESE MATERIALS IN THE ALBANIAN PRESS AS SHOWN IN THE PRECEDING TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of News Coverage</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January '67</td>
<td>February '67</td>
<td>March '67</td>
<td>April '67</td>
<td>'67</td>
<td>'68</td>
<td>'67</td>
<td>'68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Internal Affairs including Cultural Revol.¹</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania²</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR³</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam⁴</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The breakdown of news items into specific categories is more or less arbitrary and indefinite, since there is considerable overlapping between one item and another. Nevertheless, certain trends seem to emerge which call for some comment.
Perhaps the most important trend is the drop in the reportage of Chinese internal affairs\(^1\)--which in effect means a curtailment of news about the Cultural Revolution--from 72 items in 1967 to 43 items in 1968, a difference of 41 per cent.

The drop in Chinese news relating to Albania\(^2\) is mostly due to the fact that there were no significant Albanian delegations in China during the first four months of 1968. The decline amounts to a further decrease of news about China's Cultural Revolution, since the Chinese made good use of the presence of major Albanian delegations in early 1967 to advertise Mao's revolution in Albania.

The sharp drop in items concerning the USSR\(^3\) during 1968 is probably without significance, inasmuch as the Chinese usually managed to intersperse their attacks on the Soviet leadership in a large variety of items or categories in the Table.

The Table also shows an absence of news from China on Vietnam for April 1968, an indication presumably of Chinese displeasure with the opening of peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam.

In sum, the general decline in the incidence of Chinese materials in the Albanian press in 1968 as against 1967 seems to indicate a certain disapproval of Chinese policy on the part of Albania, though it is not clear what exactly the nature or areas of disagreement are. Indeed, although the emphasis and methods of the Albanian cultural and ideological revolution differ in several respects from those of the Chinese revolution, the basic premises of the two revolutions appear to be identical. One such premise is that human nature is plastic, and that by means of political and ideological indoctrination,
a new man, the Communist Man, can be forged, who places the good of society
above his personal good, and shuns no sacrifice in the effort to build the
socialist and eventually the Communist society. A minor premise is the con-
cept of the class struggle as an integral part of life in the socialist
society—a struggle that must be waged relentlessly against internal and ex-
ternal enemies of socialism for generations and even centuries to come, until
the final triumph of communism in the world. On a practical level, the two
premises apparently derive their motive power in part from fear—the obsessive
fear of revisionism and the restoration of capitalism, which the Chinese and
Albanian leaders seem bent on instilling into the consciousness of the people
they govern—and in part out of an almost religious fervor to maintain and
transmit intact to future generations the revolutionary purity that both Mao
and Hoxha have known and lived.