WAR AVOIDANCE THROUGH COLLECTIVE SECURITY-
SEEKING PRACTICES SINCE 1945

by

HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR. AND FRANK L. SHERMAN*

REFLECTIVE LOGICS FOR RESOLVING INSECURITY DILEMMAS
WAR AVOIDANCE THROUGH COLLECTIVE SECURITY -
SEEKING PRACTICES SINCE 1945

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Determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, the leaders of the victorious states in World War II set up a system for the avoidance or speedy termination of future wars. Centered in the Security Council of the new United Nations Organization, this system had two often contradictory bases: 1) Wilsonian universal moral obligations "to provide [collective] security for all states, by the action of all states, against all states which might challenge the existing order by the arbitrary [aggressive] unleashing of their power"; and 2) the even older primary reliance on the "Concert of the Great Powers" for the effective management of such a system.

The new version of a collective security system actualized its contradictory bases when major differences among the Great Powers themselves arose. Not only was the reality of "collective security of the Great Powers, for the Small Powers, when the Great Powers could agree" less glowing a path to world peace than many had hitherto supposed; collective security as a world order concept "halfway...between the terminal points of international anarchy and world government" became a rationale for Cold War "collective self-defense" organizations like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in part legitimated in such purposes by the United Nations' ambiguous Charter language endorsing these and other "Regional arrangements." Since the smaller, ex-colonial and often non-aligned powers themselves have taken increasing control over their own destinies, a process in which UN decolonialization efforts and the Great Powers played a significant role, the Secretary General and the General Assembly have enhanced and qualitatively changed their security-seeking efforts. Preventive diplomacy designed to keep Great Powers out of Third World conflicts coincided with the "balancing" role of nonaligned states on Cold War issues and the growth in importance of regional organizations among Arab, African and American States.
performing both dispute settlement, collective security and collective
defense functions. Great Power security concerns have led to greater
reliance on unilateral actions, buttressed by alliance relationships, and
moderated by changing patterns of mutual recognition, détente and competitive
coexistence. Recently we can detect the partial reappearance of a multipolar
power balancing process associated with both recognized and contested spheres
of influence, and controversial regional doctrines of asymmetric collective
security responsibilities.

Ironically, the "new and more wholesome diplomacy" of Wilsonian "collective"
security system has led to the incomplete but real return of competitive, loosely
bihegemonial, power balancing practices rather like those that it was designed
to supplant. Pessimistic political Realists could easily attribute such a
return to eternal dismal truths of human nature; Marxian global systems theorists
might see the continued reproduction, as well as the self-contradictory develop-
ment of world capitalism through the adaptive restructuring of its global
economic markets and its multipolar political parts. While interested in such
larger issues, as peace researchers of operational collective security systems --
those both politically real and scientifically analyzable -- we wish primarily
in the program of research outlined here to find practical lessons about war
avoidance.

This research program -- named in the title of this paper and illustrated
throughout it -- relies heavily on historical reanalysis of the successes and
failures of recent more or less collective efforts to achieve international
peace and security in a rapidly changing world. As opposed to Security Council
centered studies of a few collective security successes and many more substantial
failures, our broadened range of concern explicitly encompasses the operation
of regional collective-defense and dispute settlement organizations, super power
efforts to establish mutual limits on arms races in strategic and conventional
weapons, community building, dispute resolution and conflict management efforts outside of regular collective security-seeking organizations, and the operations of power-balancing systems that do limit the frequency or severity of war. An important consequence of this broader conception is the need to study, in a less state-centric way, the agenda processes whereby some institutionalized, collectively organized security-seeking practices handle certain kinds of conflicts, while others ignore them; these agenda processes may reveal important reasons for, and causes of, the successes and failures of inter-state war-avoidance efforts.

Our reasons for this wider focus of attention are several, and should become more fully apparent below. Briefly here we note the evident fact that collective efforts to overcome driving national insecurities have taken such a variety of forms that a flexible multi-arena focus is appropriate in order to comprehend the most important responses to these insecurities. Our larger universe of concern contains a much greater fraction of security-relevant policy behavior, although its actual measurement is much more difficult than merely noting the large fraction of serious international disputes that does in some respect eventually get on the agenda of some collective conflict management organization. Also, our concern is to catch and help clarify fascinating, theory-relevant, rapid international system transformations, some of which have just been tentatively summarized. It is our belief that a focus on concrete security-seeking practices will allow us both empirically to ascertain (rather than assume) the existence of less than globally shared, systemic features of these practices, and avoid the trap of an overly static empiricism that misses significant systemic restructuration processes. The plethora of recent empirical studies, almost entirely by North American scholars, of the collective conflict management practices of post-war
international organizations (Butterworth, 1978a, 1978b; Ruggie, 1974; Holsti, 1966 and 1972; Bloomfield and Leiss, 1969; James, 1969; Alker and Greenberg, 1971), makes us worry whether significant new knowledge can be gained and widely shared on this important subject. We do not want such studies to enter an era of diminishing returns, associated with mechanical replications using the same research designs extended to a few new cases by North American graduate students.

We wish to reinvigorate the scientific study of collective security systems by redirecting its focus toward more or less collective security-seeking systems, by trying to conceptualize these phenomena of concern in a more dialectical fashion, and by furthering the more universal participation of peace researchers in such investigations. We wish to do this without giving up the hard insights gained, and regularities ascertained, by those working in primarily positivistic, North American empirical traditions. Because for us Istvan Kende's episodically organized empirical studies of international conflicts represent exemplary (but rare) contributions from an East European, Marxist peace research perspective (Kende, 1971, 1978), we shall depend heavily on them, even though they only indirectly address collective efforts to avoid or resolve such conflicts.5

We shall rely on previous epistemological discussions of dialectical-hermeneutical and Marxist-Leninist social science research, especially as they are sympathetically understood in Western Europe and North America (Alker, 1979, 1980), in order to correct certain limitations we see (and have in part already indicated) in the empirical literature we have cited. Our hope, stated technically in the language of the (Alker, 1979) study, is that there is enough common ground politically, epistemologically and substantively to define one or several cross-paradigm, empirically oriented research programs oriented toward convergent practical learning about war avoidance. Our concern
to be explicit about the need for, and components of, an internationally sharable conception of scientific knowledge accumulation derives from the realistic concern that such standards be communicable to national political leaders who decisively influence war and peace processes and research thereon, as well as national citizenry bearing the primary financial burdens of such activities.

A reasonable breakdown of the topics of subsequent discussion in this paper can now be given. Our next concern will be to contribute to the operational reconceptualization of key terms in the collective security seeking, war avoidance literature: "order," "security," "collective," "aggression," "peace" and "war." Then we shall discuss operational ways in which richer, less state-centric, contextually sensitive, yet still scientifically operational characterizations of international disputes might be undertaken. After this follows some remarks on the fuller characterization of conflict and management practices. Our concern to be more dialectically sensitive about security seeking practices goes beyond the need to be sensitive to the narrowing effects and the different boundaries of relevant experience associated with different research paradigms; it leads us to a more general interest in ways in which more or less collective security seeking practices themselves should be studied and understood. Some important comparative case studies not focused on the UN collective security system suggest numerous insights about war avoidance. In particular we have some specific ideas how collective security seeking agenda processes might be better studied. Finally, our concern to develop and analyze less static and less episodic "natural histories" of security seeking practices brings us to some rather dialectical ideas about the transformative development and decay of collective security seeking systems.
II On the 'Collectivization' of Relevant Research Concepts

Within the "pure" Wilsonian Collective Security system, it is assumed that the world is essentially made up of sovereign, territorially integrated nation states widely recognized by each other as legitimate international system members. (Historically, colonial territories had something of an anomalous status, but were assumed eventually in the League system to become self-determining, at least those that had belonged to the states defeated in World War I; World War II led to a similar provision in the UN Charter.) Moreover, a democratically enforced, consensually legitimated normative world "order" exists which has as its key deterrent component, the illegitimacy of inter-state "aggression." A state's "international peace and security" means at least that it is not faced with the immanent threat, or actuality, of cross-border military intervention from another state. If deterrence fails, all such substantial, recognizable and nonaccidental inter-state interventions are to be considered "aggressive," requiring an appropriate punitive collective response.

Politically, the Wilsonian Collective Security ideal failed, at least in large part. The popular democratic forces that were necessary to energize such a system turned (or were turned) sufficiently against its normative universalism so that the United States never joined the League. Wilson himself was at least partially competing in his liberal-internationalist world order design with Lenin's own stirring (and for many frightening) revolutionary pronouncements about the birth of a socialist world order (Levin, 1970). The universalism of the League system to which an isolated, cautious Soviet state was eventually admitted, suffered mortal blows from Japanese, Italian, German and Soviet "aggressions," against which League members were unable or unwilling effectively to retaliate. Only World War II and its decisive but
costly victory over the Axis powers could be said sufficiently to have "collectivized" or "concerted" political wills so a revised collective security system was reborn.

A. Wars, Just Wars, and Aggressor States

We add this brief account of the League system to our equally brief overview of the UN system in order to highlight key political and conceptual issues in the scientific study of collective security seeking systems. For it is our belief that the major problems in developing a more universal, more valid empirical research program on this topic are at least in part derivative from the recent political past. Do not League history and the failure of UN diplomats (until a few years ago) to define in general and apply in particular such a pejorative label as "the aggressor" (before or during the Cold War) give us pause? Even nowadays, Americans believing the American-Vietnamese war was a "noble cause" would not consider the United States as the "aggressor" pictured in either contemporary NLF, Soviet or Chinese statements or new Vietnamese history books; neither will many Soviet scholars allow the current Soviet military intervention into Afghanistan to be labeled "aggressive," as most Americans now think.

Can scholars who maintain their political allegiances, hopefully with some critical detachment, do significantly better? Kende and Zacher take rather different, but not completely opposed positions. Zacher takes what we would characterize as a Liberal/Wilsonian positivist position. He does not debate the justifications people give for wars; rather (1979, p. 6f) he takes an objectivist, empirically operational stance defining "aggression" descriptively, but in a way that corresponds quite clearly to the pure Wilson/liberal world order conception sketched above. An "aggressor is a state
that threatens to employ or does employ military personnel against the citizens of another country."

Kende thinks, at least concerning internal political wars fought with foreign participation (1971, pl. 6f and note 9), that "who the immediate initiator is, who fires the first shot... seems besides the point, and in addition, can often not be determined." He takes an explicit Marxian position, arguing in terms of a preferred distinction between just and unjust wars, roughly as follows. Most, but not all, internal wars since 1945 have been anti-regime wars, either of anti-colonial or class war sort. The Marxian position is much less ambiguous about anti-colonialism than Wilsonian liberalism. In both such cases and class wars an aggressor and an oppressed party can be identified, and revolt is, in general, justified. Whether the oppressed (in revolt) or the oppressor (as a deterrent) initiates the conflict may vary. But the difference between the 1946 Indo-China war (initiated by the French in a recolonialization effort) and the Algerian initiated anti-colonial war of 1954 is not very important because even the latter "initiative was brought about by colonialist oppression. It would be hard to dispute that these two wars were very similar in character even if the circumstances of their beginning were dissimilar."

Are we at a point of scholarly deadlock when Zacher and Kende must talk completely past each other? Surely the justifiability of anti-colonial wars, at least in some extreme cases, has wider legitimacy than the universe of recently independent, ex-colonial states; which wars have been class wars, and which parties deserve the label of certified "oppressor" are more likely a much longer debate.

But Kende takes an important tack that preserves a meaningful universe of scientific argument and analysis. From a definite political point of view
(his own, or that of different parties to a conflict), he admits it is frequently difficult (as in the Biafran war) to decide whether the war is just or unjust. When such differences are the case, "no reliable results can be achieved in a scientific survey," so he shifts to a causally and historically sensitive substantive classification. Although pre-1945 studies of wars (like Quincy Wright's and L.F. Richardson's) emphasized (like Zacher's and Wilson's views already noted) the prevalence of inter-state "frontier wars" often without the participation of nonbordering parties, times have changed. Internal wars fought on the territory of one country are much more frequent; internally-oriented tribal, religious and related border adjustment disputes, as well as anti-regime wars, should be distinguished both from classical cross-frontier wars. His resulting typology (for which reasonably clear operational definitions are suggested) distinguishes six types of war by determining whether the two internal and one international (frontier) wars occur with or without the actual largescale participation of foreign military personnel in advisory and/or combat roles. Delivery of arms and other lesser forms of support are not deemed sufficient grounds for the positive "foreign participation" label.

Although Zacher sticks to an elaboration of an aggressor/victim and alignment-non-alignment classifications for his basic analyses, and does not address the decolonialization issue very directly, he does recognize in a deviant case analysis (p. 211 note) that the "response to the Rhodesian interventions into Mozambique in 1976 and 1977 actually indicates a consensual element in the global system -- opposition to the White-dominated regimes of southern Africa and their attempts to retaliate against nationalist rebels operating from outside their borders." Furthermore, in his elaboration of his definition of an aggressor he looks beyond what Kende would call an international/
frontier war perspective to include anti-regime rebellions. He labels as an aggressor any foreign government militarily supporting (or opposing) an incumbent regime. Thus:

While an aggressing state will generally use its forces against the official forces of another country, it may alternatively use its forces to fight on behalf of another official government against a rebel group seeking to overthrow or secede from it. Such participation in a civil war is often not viewed as aggression, but it is very included in this study's definition of the term. (Zacher, 1979, p. 6f)

Thus we find a real basis for further discussion, and the likelihood of significant (but not total) convergence between Zacher's "aggressors" and "unjust" parties, were Kende to elaborate upon his judgments in these matters and Zacher to entertain the reasonable possibility that in some internal wars (dare we ask about the American civil war?) the aggressor/victim distinction is difficult to defend in a deep, meaningful way.

Cross-paradigm communication is a form of dialectical hermeneutics with empirical consequences. At least three types of empirical studies are opened up by the above remarks. First, taking definitional issues into account, do the different, empirically-oriented perspectives see and agree on the same universe of wars, crises or disputes threatening international peace and security? Secondly, how much agreement exists concerning substantive typologies of types of wars, like Kende's sixfold distinction mentioned above; are differences arguably reconcilable? Thirdly, if we can get enough agreement on a common universe of relevant cases to justify the testing of competing hypotheses, what might we ascertain about conflict causes, or about the effectiveness of collective security "managers" of such conflicts? Are the "lessons" to be derived from their record of successes and failures?

Briefly, Table 1 and 2 give us some clues to the first kind of inquiry which might take place. Despite some slight definitional
Table 1: A Comparison of Crisis, War and Dispute Universes in Published Kende, Zacher and Butterworth-Scranton Studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crises*</th>
<th>Wars**</th>
<th>Disputes***</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kende List (&quot;53-72&quot;)</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacher List (&quot;66-77&quot;)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>93 (70 Wars; 23 Military Interventions)</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butterworth/Scranton List (&quot;67-77&quot;)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Crises have been defined in two ways: (1) those cases listed by Zacher as having been coded as crises, and (2) those cases in the Butterworth/Scranton MIC study that entered Phase II but did not intensify into Phase III (Hostilities).

** Wars were defined as (1) Kende coding category; (2) Zacher's coding categories of wars and military interventions; and, (3) a Butterworth/Scranton MIC case that intensified into Phase III (Hostilities).

*** A Dispute was defined as a Butterworth/Scranton case that did not intensify past Phase I (Dispute).

† To Kende's list we have added (for comparative purposes) the 1977/8 Zaire invasion by Katangan exiles, Cubans, etc., which is outside his time range, but mentioned in his text in B/L terms.

Butterworth and Scranton list 247 separate cases; 4 additional cases were added in our revisions, due to the splitting off of Indian independence, Mongolian UN membership, Chinese UN representation and Naga Uprisings from other Butterworth-Scranton cases.
Table 2: A Comparison of Zacher, Kende and Updated Butterworth/Scranton* Case Lists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interstate</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>Inter</th>
<th>Colonial</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Cold</td>
<td>Non-Cold</td>
<td>Cold</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>War</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Butterworth/Scranton Issue Categories</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kende:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(52) A/1:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Regime</td>
<td>3 (3%)</td>
<td>10 (9%)</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
<td>25 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with Foreign</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) A/2:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Regime</td>
<td>3 (3%)</td>
<td>5 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)X</td>
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<tr>
<td>without</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>(13) E/1:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tribal Wars</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>6 (5%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>4 (4%)X</td>
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<tr>
<td>with Foreign</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(16) B/2:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tribal Wars</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>12 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)X</td>
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<td>without</td>
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<td>Foreign</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) C/1:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Frontier Wars</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)X</td>
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<tr>
<td>with Foreign</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>(12) C/2:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frontier Wars</td>
<td>7 (6%)</td>
<td>5 (4%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>without</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>17 (15%)</td>
<td>38 (34%)</td>
<td>15 (13%)</td>
<td>10 (9%)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Butterworth/Scranton:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(308) All Cases</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>119 (39%)</td>
<td>66 (21%)</td>
<td>15 (5%)</td>
<td>41 (13%)</td>
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</table>

* The updated Butterworth/Scranton list includes 57 newer informally omitted cases, plus our own 4 split off cases.

+ Our own expectations concerning how Kende's categories should fit into Butterworth/Scranton categories are as follows: "\( \)" means "cases expected;" "/" means "cases not expected and not found;" "X" means "cases found contrary to expectations;" "?" means "deviations possibly due to differences in definitions."
differences, there is quite high an overlap between the "war universes" of Zacher's and Kende's studies (keeping the time period of each comparable.) Moreover, an additional comparison with a recent augmented version of the published Butterworth-Scranton data set shows, for comparable definitions and time periods, even higher agreement, except usually for some relatively low level hostilities that various authors might genuinely have missed. (One problem accounting for some discrepancies in their estimations concerning the universe of relevant cases, comes from different practices in different research groups as to how to cluster different episodes of the same, or closely related conflicts.) Preliminary comparisons from both tables suggest overlaps are high, with Butterworth's being the more inclusive data set.

Turning to Table 2, we see a matched comparison concerning Kende's six categories of war and the augmented Butterworth classification, where both data sets include a particular conflict. In general, a fairly high correspondence exists across studies. This means more work can and should be done in checking Kende's very provocative generalizations about post-1945 trends in wars -- in particular his claims that U.S., France; UK and Portugal-involved anti-regime wars (mostly class wars or wars of independence) have dominated the post-1945 era, rising in frequency and length until about 1967 (later in Asia) and then significantly diminishing during an era (1967-76) of real detente. Treating "internal cold war" issued differently, with Butterworth's DARPA funded data set, we may or may not sustain such historical accounts.

More ambitiously, we believe that a variant of Kende's claims that internal anti-regime wars with foreign participation are the most prevalent of wars since 1945 ought to be more thoroughly investigated. To put it more graphically, is not the anti-colonial or anti-dependency "revolt against the West" (in Barraclough's terms) a key alternative explanation of conflict
managers' involvement records? Could it not do as well as Zacher's alignment categories of states in explaining management involvements, non-involvements, successes and failures? Alker and Greenberg (1971) and (Ruggie, 1974) have found multivariate explanations to account for significantly more variance in manager involvement and success than any single variable explanation. Kende's views cry for a serious reanalysis of Zacher's or Butterworth's data sets in a way that seeks to root conflicts in a relevant historical past. Conclusions about the fundamental explanatory power of colonial past, or politico-economic dependency require some stiff competitive research testing, which we are looking forward to in the near future.

B. Are Insecurity Dilemmas Resolvable through the Provision of Imperfect Collective Goods?

Our programmatic concern with the "collective" aspect of security-seeking practices is neither naive internationalism nor a call to collectivize the defense industries of the world. It is grounded in a conceptual analysis of the way important international conflicts have arisen and been peacefully or nonpeacefully resolved. This understanding of war/peace decisions sees them typically (but not always) as emerging from shared (or collective in this sense) insecurity dilemmas.

By collective insecurity dilemmas, we mean multiparty situations characterizable in terms of conflicting security-seeking rationales; typically these rationales evidence social contradictions [in the sense of (Elster, 1978)] between the (short run) security concerns or interests of individual actors and the (shorter or longer run) security concerns or interests of larger collectivities of which these actors are a part... Security dilemmas may be said either to reside in the reflective consciousness of a particular actor, or to challenge existing or potentially emergent collective social unities (in particular, the identities, loyalties, organizing principles or collective capacities of groups, communities, nations or cross-national systems).

(Alker, Bennett, Mefford, 1980)
An important structural feature of security dilemmas is the interdependence of their action-outcome alternatives. What one party achieves with its actions depends on the responses of the other to the same situation. Put more technically, security dilemmas arise because of the "public" or "collective" nature of "security" or "public order" (usually considered a "collective good") and "insecurity" (a public bad). A large literature exists (see especially (Ruggie, 1972) and the critical summary by Oppenheim (1978)) studying the provision of security goods by alliances and other public goods by international organizations. We treat this literature as providing concepts relevant to collective security-seeking practices, but concepts needing a degree of "collectivization" before they can be used in a cross-paradigm research program.

Despite our admiration for Samuelson-Olson public goods theory, we see a certain liberal bias in its concepts. The contradiction public goods theory seeks to overcome derives from theorems showing that even idealized competitive markets which achieve Pareto efficient production-allocation outcomes in the case of private goods, do not do so for "public goods."

Private goods are described not in terms of who owns or controls them, but in terms of their consumption patterns: when A consumes/drives his Chevrolet car, B cannot consume/drive it at the same time. Alternatively, when B uses the ocean for a swim or breathes some clean air, A can do the same: she enjoys such public goods in a way (subject to imperfections of crowding, proximity, etc.) that does not deprive A of his access to them. Now beach entrance may be restricted, but forbidding breathing is much harder to do: liberal political economy sometimes adds to the "consumption-externality" aspect of public goods the "nonexcludability" aspect. Typically,
as with a long, open, unfenced beach that costs taxpayers significant money
to preserve in good shape, interlopers from another town would be called
"free riders" who enjoy a public consumption good from which it is hard to
exclude them. Into this peculiarly capitalist dilemma, a liberal, inter-
ventionist state must come along and coercively require taxes of all beach users
so that a fairly paid for, sufficiently clean beach is maintained.

Does this notion extend to international security as a collective good?
Yes and No. The large literature on mixed interest conflict games like
Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken can be thought of as discussing the insecurity
dilemmas, the social contradictions arising from trying to achieve security
or prestige through unilateral action. (See especially Snyder and Diesing, 1977)
Like disarmament or a deterrence stalemate, "security," in such idealized
situations is "shared" or nondestructively consumed by all participants.
Some third party not paying its costs might consume or "free ride" in enjoying
its benefits. Smaller alliance members, it has been argued, "free ride" on
the exceptional contributions of the superpower. As a result Pareto optimal
levels of security collective defense are not provided for (this argument is
sure to appeal in both Washington and Moscow but perhaps not elsewhere.)

At least four important, research generating conceptual revisions are
called for before such literatures can become an important part of a cross-
paradigm research program on collective security-seeking practices. First,
when we look at the "security" provided by defense expenditures, we must
distinguish between "defense goods" (those used for protection in case of
attack) and "deterrent goods" (those used for the avoidance of attack).
Early warning systems and inaccurate, second-strike, submarine-launched,
nuclear ballistic missiles would be fairly clear examples of the former and
the latter. Using earlier work by Sandler and Cauley, Oppenheim (1978, p. 402)
argues that only deterrence goods are to be considered (within an alliance) pure collective goods in the classic sense. "Since deterrence provides benefits (or costs) that each resident of an alliance can share without diminution of benefits, irrespective of location or the number of residents involved."

The empirical questions this distinction gives rise to include the determination of the types of functions military forces primarily provide (e.g., are they defense or deterrence goods), plus an investigation of whether collective deterrence goods are underprovided because of the sovereign tenacity or free-riding irresponsibility of the smaller members. But clearly the recognition that "defense" is not a pure (widely shared) public good suggests a closer, comparative look at what are the real, driving insecurities facing contemporary nation-states. Kende's results suggest internal regime preservation/transformation politics is a primary factor, and a much more private good (vis a vis dominated groups or classes) than is usually supposed. Just as Mushakoji and others have argued that "peace" must be mutually and plurally defined, so "security" itself, and what states do to try and achieve it, deserves a careful look in terms of the degree of "publicness" actually generated.8

This point leads to our second comment with research implications. Clearly the definition of insecurity perceptions and resolutioinal practices must be dynamically investigated. Here is an example of what might be called a liberal bias in game theory, both more generally and as applied to insecurity dilemmas. Preferences, alternatives and outcome evaluations are assumed fixed in the relevant mathematical statements, in a way consonant with the liberal ideal of consumer sovereignty. Taste shaping or distorting processes are left to advertisers, and not modeled in elegant
economic theorems because the mathematics is seen as too difficult or "intractible."

But just as Sandler and Oppenheim, from within a liberal political economy perspective, have enlivened the defense/security as a public good literature, so Snyder and Diesing (1977) have helped transform conventional game theory, making it far more relevant to the collective security-seeking program. Combining strategic and peace research perspectives, they have introduced the beginning of a truly dynamic understanding of ways in which collective insecurity dilemmas have developed and been resolved (in peaceful or warlike ways).

As a single example of an insecurity dilemma with profound relevance for detente, we review Snyder and Diesing's discussion of the 1958-1962 Berlin Crisis. Its 1958 phase is represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game in Figure 1 (R stands for "reward" payoff, S for "sucker" payoff, T for "temptation" payoff, P for "penalty" payoff; ranks and verbal descriptions are shown in the payoff triangles for the Soviet Union and the United States).

In November, 1958, Khrushchev challenged the West by proposing a general peace settlement with each of the two Germanies separately that would make West Berlin a "free," neutral city with no security ties to the West, threatening otherwise to end 4 power responsibility for Berlin through a unilateral settlement with the Ulbricht regime. Snyder and Diesing estimate that Khrushchev feared for the subversion and collapse of a pro-Soviet Eastern Germany, expected negotiations, with the possibility of a brief but intensive military engagement and subsequent negotiations in case a deadlock(P,P) situation developed. From the Soviet viewpoint, "[T]his was a Prisoner's Dilemma structure, with T, a settlement on Soviet terms, \( \geq R, \)
Figure 1  The 1958 Phase of the Berlin Crisis as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

*Source, Figure 2-27 in (Snyder and Diesing, 1977, p. 92).
a compromise settlement, $\triangleright P$, some fighting and a compromise settlement $\triangleright S$, demoralization and retreat." (p. 93) The demoralization of NATO, the neutralization and harassment of West Berlin by the East Germans represented a very intolerable $S$ payoff for the U.S., worse than the risk of war ($S < P$).

"A highly preferable outcome would be $R$, a compromise settlement that would satisfy legitimate Soviet grievance and...stabilize the status quo; and best of all would be a firm rebuff to the 'aggressor' with no concessions." (ie. $T \triangleright R \triangleright P \triangleright S$; Snyder and Diesing, 1977, p. 93).

From an examination of both the two successful and the one unsuccessful historical cases (Morocco, Berlin and August, 1914, respectively), Snyder and Diesing develop a general model of PD play. It expresses a view of collective security dilemmas more optimistic than liberal political economy's demand for a coercive state to reachieve Pareto efficiency. Initial misperceptions are typical within at least the challenger state (Austria-Germany, France in Morocco and the Soviet Union in Berlin), which thinks that its opponent lacks resolve, and is bluffing in its coercive gestures. Thus, the other is seen as a chicken situation ($T \triangleright R \triangleright S \triangleright P$) in which it would prefer to back down ($S$) rather than go to war ($P,P$). Successful bargaining out of a ($P,P$) deadlock involves roughly symmetrical and sequential clarifications of war-willingness ($P$), then $T$ and $S$ aspects of the bargaining situation (moderated $T$s and mutual realization that $T \triangleright R \triangleright S \triangleright P$ for each), followed by the clarification of the accommodative ($R$ values) aspect.

In the Berlin case, mutual recognition of essential goals: -- basic Western rights in Berlin and Eastern prevention of regime-undermining movements (the Wall) -- defused a war prone crisis in 1961 and 1962. Accommodative bargaining did not resolve the major issues until 1971 treaty arrangements were made. World War I resulted, however, because it never became clear
(through diminished Ts and moderation of the opponent's S) that the Austrian-German side, with its fait accompli strategy, was not aggressively bent on conquest and humiliation, because ample bargaining time was not available, and because of "the virulent simultaneous-move Prisoner's Dilemma...inherent in military plans and technology." (Ibid, pp. 88-106, especially p. 105) At this point we shall not assess the merits of these modelled interpretations; rather we sketch them to show that for Snyder and Diesing, P, T, S, and R are bargaining subprocesses, no longer precalculated utility payoffs!

Looking at the Snyder-Diesing interpretations, one sees quite a considerable departure from the original public goods production dilemma of standard liberal political economy. The "learning to be rational" theme takes on new meaning. A whole theory of sequential bargaining subprocesses within a particular payoff situation is suggested, involving the correction of misperceptions and a more fundamental dynamic modification of possible outcomes and their payoff values. Mistrust and suspicion, mixed motives and changing strategies, bluff, betrayal and reflective reconsideration abound in such historical accounts.

A third respecification in the collective goods literature is truly a collectivization -- the enlarging of public goods calculations to include the benefits or losses to opposed alliance members and the nonaligned. True, the "pureness" of public deterrent goods becomes much less clear. Great superiority in deterrence goods (like inaccurate SLBMs) does not always increase the security of a country with missile armed submarines ringing its shores. But these real imperfections, and the arms race dynamics they help engender, suggest heavy discounting of future "security benefits/dollar or rouble" is necessary. Surely a wide range of research possibilities exist here for economic specialists in strategic studies.
Finally, we note an important liberal bias in public goods theory. The collectivization of production (e.g., a national defense department) is only an incidental feature of the theory. But we feel that the public-ness or "collective" nature of security has an essential political feature understated by liberal economic theory (which does not have a good term for the distinction we want to make): the communal nature of security, legitimacy and other political public good production processes. One altruist can produce public goods like an unpolluted beach, public goods that many collectively or jointly consume. But disarmament by one side in a conflict does not maximize the public security of both sides when suspicion exists about the likely misuse of dominant power. International security, like any genuine political order, must be communally co-produced.

We are reminded of Rousseau's oft-cited parable of the stag and the hare, taken by some as an analogue to contemporary security dilemmas. (e.g., Jervis, 1978) We note, and think it worth studying in much greater detail, that it is not that the stag being chased by a is big enough so that each can eat his fill without diminishing the enjoyment of the others that is important. Rather it is the jointness, or communal nature of any stag-catching effort that deserves our further reflection.

If "collective" security-seeking practices are now seen as those involving the concerting of wills and understanding by two or more internationally relevant actors in the pursuit of their security goals, and these goals are recognized as imperfectly involving both "public" and "communal" aspects necessarily or sufficiently associated with their full realization, our program of work has an important, widely shareable basis for future scientific research. And the "collectivist" bias of our studies can be grounded in
the mathematically provable theorem that in a variety of circumstances unilateral or unipolar efforts to achieve security will necessarily lead to individually and/or collectively sub-optimal results.

III Beyond Ahistorical, State-Centric Positivism in Coding Security-Seeking Practices

What our discussion has least adequately addressed to date however, is the meaning of individual and collective security-seeking practices. These include the actions of participants in a dispute and the activities of what are now usually called dispute managers, which of course include collective security organizations of which participants may be members. We include within the practices of such actors (participants or parties and agents) the actions they take, their interpretive perspectives, the phasing or sequencing of actions cum perspectives, the historical/institutional contexts or arenas in which they occur, the outcomes of these actions for relevant participants and their longer run systems-maintaining or-transforming effects.

A. Actors

In situations involving threats to international peace and security, it is false to locate all responsible actions in the hands of the governments of nation states. Even traditionally, governments have been able on occasion to disown responsibility for actions from their territories or by their nationals when these actions were undertaken without governmental knowledge and approval. In the post-1945 era anti-colonial actions, new state-building conflicts and the existence of important transnational, trans-governmental, international and supranational actors all suggest broader definitions of both dispute participants and management agents. Thus our
own recent research practice has been to go beyond Kende, Zacher, Haas, Alker-Greenberg and Butterworth to include in our data gathering efforts a phase-specific list of both direct and indirect parties to international peace-threatening disputes. Briefly, conventional practices (and Kende-Zacher 'war' coding) look primarily at legal recognized parties to disputes, plus those taking sizeable military actions in them: these we call direct or primary parties, allowing as well that they may include non-state actors, if such actors have considerable influence and political autonomy. Secondary parties are those states or other actors significantly assisting primary parties -- beyond the mere giving of diplomatic support.

Also, in an effort to go beyond a state-centric empirical positivism, we extend our list of management agents beyond the lists of organizations constitutionally charged with collective security functions (according to either Haas-Butterworth-Nye or Zacher's interpretations) to get at the dynamic reality of both individual state and non-state actors, collective defense organizations and non-Security-Council UN agencies assuming such functions. Details of such distinctions are presented in the (Farris et al, 1979) codebook, which we are continually updating as new variables or cases are added.

B. Actions, Interpretive Perspectives and Conflict Phases

Typically the universe of studies we have been reviewing and reformulating has rather statically examined the collective actions of inter-state collective security organizations, only indirectly acknowledging that national, transnational, transgovernmental and alliance-linked supranational actions have often been the primary modes of security-seeking behavior. More realistically, but sometimes with an anti-collectivist bias, a much larger effort has been
made primarily in the United States, to collect data on serious conflict-events (like Kende has done) without special attention (or any attention) to the action of third party or collective management agents. Since the phases in which, and the extent to which, parties to a dispute get involved with conflict-managing practices varies considerably, with significant impacts on outcomes, we strongly believe both kinds of data are relevant to the study of more or less collective security-seeking practices.

At a considerable expenditure of effort, then, we have recoded all of the Butterworth-Scranton narrative conflict accounts for phase-specific information on the actions of the primary and secondary parties themselves, as well as those of the management agents. Following along lines suggested by the work of Azar and Sloan (1975), we have separately coded both initiation and cessation of conflictful and cooperative actions. Variables that characterize such actors unilaterally (e.g., subversion of a government; issuance of a diplomatic protest; expressing a willingness to talk; providing economic, technical assistance to an opposing party) are distinguished from variables (like existence of infrequent border skirmishes or military confrontations; the reduction of the level of hostilities and the coordination of policies) that refer simultaneously to the interactions of parties on both sides of a dispute. Although the data sources involved could be multiplied, and our two-sides only aggregations lose significant historical detail, they nonetheless move within the limits of our capacities in a desirable research-facilitating direction.

As for the historical sequencing of conflict episodes, we have further tried to reduce the arbitrariness of "statistically independent" events data collections by linking together separately described "phases" of particular conflicts and recoding more expansively Butterworth-Scranton information on
preceding or subsequent disputes deemed "relevant" for the understanding of party and agent actions. Our phase structuring (summarized in the Appended list of disputes) derives basically from Bloomfield and Leiss' earlier (1970) study: dispute phase I notes the beginning of a quarrel or disagreement claimed by at least one party to be an issue of substantive international political significance; conflict phase II indicates that at least one party has demonstrated willingness to use military force to resolve the dispute; hostilities phase III involves the systematic and objective-specific use of military force, causing casualties and/or property loss; etc. Although a dispute must reach phase II, the conflict phase, for it to be considered a crisis, knowledge of when it first was considered an international issue is very helpful in assessing the extent to which "preventive diplomacy" or relevance-denying agenda decisions have occurred. Hence our phase I dates, although often imprecise, are theoretically useful information.

As to the perspectives of conflict parties and management agents, their goals, demands, expectations, strategies and legitimating rationales, we have not gone much beyond previous studies, except for an intensive, related study of Chinese foreign policy operational codes conducted by Akihiko Tanaka (1980) on the basis of a modest recoding of Mahoney's DARPA-funded CACI studies. It is worth noting, however, that Zacher's suggestive study of changing aggression-related norms in the OAU, OAS, and Arab League fits quite compatibly with the Alker-Christensen-Greenberg series of papers on changing and alternative operational UN charters. The more intensive "reason analysis" of convergent rationales for UN Congo intervention (see our Table 3, below) remains an important model of what more hermeneutically/interpretively sensitive data analysis would look like in more historically detailed phase-specific
TABLE 3 An accounting scheme for UNOC Security Council votes
(Hypothetical positions of the United States, the USSR, France, and black African countries are on the left.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Veto weighted acceptability</th>
<th>Hypothetical positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Interests of the actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. General interests
- (++,-,+)
  1. Interest in solidarity with Free World bloc leader
- (-,+-+)
  2. Interest in solidarity with anti-imperialist cause
? (+,+,+)
  3. Interest in saving (white) lives, preventing bloodshed
? (+,+,+)
  4. Interest in Third World independence, self-determination
- (+,+-+)
  5. Interest in enhanced UN capabilities

B. Specific objectives
- (+,++,+)
  1. Interest in preventing Soviet foothold in the Congo
- (+,+-+)
  2. Interest in supporting colonial governments and settlers in Africa
- (+,+-+)
  3. Interest in transnational economic investments in Katanga
? (+,+,+)
  4. Concern for enlarging UN role in other decolonization postcolonial disputes
+ (+,+,+)
  5. Concern that Soviet-American conflict might destabilize the Congo and spread elsewhere
+ (+,+,+)
  6. Concern that a precedent for new boundaries not be created by successful Katangese succession

II. Nature of the conflict situation

A. Inside the Congo
- (-,++,+)
  1. The conflict is seen as basically anti-imperial.
? (+,+,+)
  2. The dispute is between Belgium and the Congo.
- (+,+,+)
  3. The primary conflicts are due to a breakdown in public order, as evidenced by mutinies.
+ (+,++,+)
  4. The government of the Congo wants UN help vis-à-vis the Belgian troops (and their support of the Katangese).
? (+,++,+)
  5. The Congolese request really involves an admission of civil incapacity to govern.

B. Outside of the Congo
  1. The conflict is pivotal in the emergence and maintenance of
     a) anti-imperialist coalitions.
     b) neutral states friendly to the West.
     c) independent Africa.
  2. The conflict is pivotally important for the definition of the UN's role in
     a) containing the Cold War.
     b) speeding decolonization.
     c) peacekeeping questions where veto powers may not all completely agree.

III. Expectations about UN actions and alternatives

A. Historical legal justifiability of UN peacekeeping role
  1. Willingness to see UN involvement as binding Security Council action
  2. Validity of Suez peacekeeping precedent
  3. Domestic interventions only valid when host state agrees.

B. The UN can mobilize sufficient
  1. troops
  2. logistics
  3. administrative personnel
  4. financing
to be quickly effective.

C. Considerations regarding alternate influence actions
  1. Awareness of vulnerabilities of their own large-scale direct intervention attempt
  2. Awareness of some options for continued
     a) United States influence
     b) Soviet influence
     c) European influence
     d) Afro-Asian influence
within the confines of a UN operation.

Source: Alker, 1975, p. 172f
disaggregations of relevant historical experience. We have, however, coded a modest amount of nation-specific actions within conflict-managing agents as a way of seeing which states try to shape discussions and outcomes on which disputes, in which arenas. Haas, Butterworth, Nye variables on the kind and extent of consensus mobilization efforts within their organizations are a different, also helpful way of disaggregating the ways organizations act on different disputes.

C. Historical Contexts, Dispute Outcomes and Systemic Effects

For large scale historical studies, detailed information on the perspectives of all major actors is either unavailable or prohibitively expensive to obtain. Disputes about the intentionality, the larger purposes, the unintended functions or planned consequences of particular action sequences go to the heart of many protracted conflicts. In such situations, like Kende, we have had to retreat to what relatively objective behavioral information is available. By collecting outcome judgments specific to the different sides of a dispute, we may inductively be able to sort out some of the more controversial arguments about collective security-seeking practices, going beyond the sizeable amount of judgmental assessments by Zacher, Haas and Butterworth in particular. But codings from various European, Asian, Latin and African judges are needed if a more universal scientific version of the "multiple reality assessments" in Table 3 is to be achieved. Like claims that certain acts are "aggressive" or that certain disputes are "threats to international peace and security," judgments that certain management actions serve "patching-up," "prophylactic" or "proselytizing" functions (James) or realize "hostility-stopping" or "dispute limiting" outcomes are essentially contested. Outside of the obvious divergent interpretations of Cold War crises, one need
only look at current UN or US or Egyptian Middle East moves. Rather than dictate "objective" codings of such disputes, it is better to see if comparative empirical assessments of outcomes and effects sustain one or another such assessments of a particular case. Less controversial, more interesting, system-relevant Haas-inspired codes of Third World "balancing" practices or "preventive diplomacy" designed to limit the spread and involvement of major parties might also be attempted in a similar fashion.

For such purposes, we have disaggregated and amplified the outcome and success variables of the earlier Haas-Butterworth-Nye and Butterworth-Scranton studies, basing them on objective behavioral evidence where possible. For management agent specific variables, we have coded, or are in the process of coding, judgments as to the likely intensity, continuance, spread or settlement of our disputes without management intervention. Our issue-relevant outcome judgments have also not been too holistic. Side-specific statements of satisfaction, when found, are coded (nation-specific judgements can be indirectly assessed using lists of parties on either side of a dispute.) We have added, more judgmentally, codes whether one, both or neither side was advantaged by management actions. Systemic effects -- such as new patterns of action in not referring new disputes to collective management agents, or referrals to, or out of, regional organizational arenas -- can help check the validity of such judgments.

In addition to Dwain Mefford's current efforts to study historical contexts of specific Great Power actions, perhaps the most interesting enrichening of an understanding of ways to represent the historical context of particular conflict episodes has come from Aki Tanaka's previously mentioned study (1980). He distinguishes precedental from narrative contexts of particular episodes.
**FIGURE 2:** Precedential Chains in Narrative Contexts behind Sino-Vietnamese Border Incident in late December, 1978

**Narrative Contexts**

- **341 (1974)** VN starts anti-PRC campaign
- **365 (1977)** India sends to intercede, aid Tibetan rebels
- **368 (1977)** USSR involved in invasion in Inner Mongolia
- **376 (1978)** VN accuses PRC of airspace violation
- **379 (1978)** VN troops violate PRC border
- **381 (1978)** VN troops ambush, fire on PRC troops
- **391 (1978)** VN ships attack PRC trawlers
- **392 (1978)** 3rd VN invasion-Cambodia: Phnom Penh taken
- **393 (1978)** More border incursion
- **385 (1978)** VN patrol enters PRC

**Precedents**

- **16 (1950)** UK commits border, airspace violation from Hong Kong (116003)
- **331 (1974)** SVN encroaches on Hongsha, other is. (116004)
- **349 (1978)** PRC rejects Indian claim of patrol ambush (116004)
- **385 (1978)** VN patrol enters PRC (116004)

* A ———— B means A is the precedent of B
A ——— B means A is the previous episode in the same story.
A ———— B means A is present when the current case occurs.

The numbers in the parentheses are the values of the six variables specified. For example, '116004' means PRC was an original party, substantially capable in a border dispute/incident in a nonambivalent friend/enemy situation, without the possibility of a strategic (nuclear) confrontation, involving larger vs. small powers.

*Source: Tomalea, 1980.*
Precedential contexts are defined in the same way that Alker, Christensen and Greenberg found "similar" conflicts in their practically oriented simulations of UN peace-making efforts. In Figure 2 on the right are a series of antecedent disputes exactly like or similar enough on key characteristics to be considered policy-relevant precedents to the Sino-Vietnamese border incident of December, 1970. On the left of the figure, a "narrative context" is constructed by looking for recent conflict episodes with at least one of the parties on each side the same as those on the current case being studied. An analogous presentation could be made for disputes in our modified and updated Butterworth data set. One can thus better see, and hopefully better analyze, specific events against the background of co-occurring as well as relevant past events.

IV Agenda Processes, Epigenetic Systems Change and Reflective Learning About War Avoidance

As a preliminary illustrative discussion of ways in which precedentially sensitive "reflective political learning about war avoidance" has had an effect on subsequent agenda processes and system change, we shall now discuss brief narrative accounts of UN involvement and noninvolvement in two different "breaches of peace:" the Chinese invasion of Tibet, 1950-51, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea, 1950-53, a war which also saw Chinese intervention, but at a later point. From a comparative perspective on the UN's effectiveness these two cases nicely contrast the extremes of the UN's relatively effective coercive involvement and its powerlessness. As noted by many observers in the advanced capitalist countries, a similar contrast fits the UN's unprecedentedly ambitious UNEF operation in the Suez crisis of 1956 and its inability to stop or even ameliorate the Soviet
invasion of Hungary at about the same time. After discussing these (and
some other related examples) we shall make some concluding, more systematic
remarks about research possibilities and reflective learning concerning
agenda processes and systems change in collective security seeking practices.

A. Tibet and Korea as Parallel Challenges to Collective Security

Seeking Practices

Recall that Tanaka's figure, reproduced above, contained cases other
than those connected by historical trees of either narrative-based or
precedentially-linked continuities. His reason for doing so was the
expectation that a careful examination of "parallel cases" (those that are
coccurring and strategically interdependent from the point of view of certain
actors) would sometimes reveal more about the generative principles or
operational codes of such actors.

The Tibet invasion and the Korean war are doubly interesting in this regard.
Not only do both cases involve nearly simultaneous invasions by Chinese
troops (into Tibet on 26 October 1950, and by Chinese volunteers into North
Korea at about the same time), they are both procedentially linked by the
role of India as a management agent, inside or outside of the United Nations.
Leaving to Tanaka the discussion of his own figure and the importance of
Chinese double involvement decision, we focus here on the later "parallelism."

Attempting to forestall the re-establishment of Chinese control over Tibet,
Tibetan authorities sought the aid of India (a local balancing operation)
to offset expected advances by the People's Republic of China (the PRC)
following the Communists' victory in the Chinese Civil War (a major "anti-
regime" conflict or "internal cold war" that the UN never had on its agenda).
Prior to the Chinese invasion, Tibetan-PRC talks were held in New Delhi under the auspices of Prime Minister Nehru. After the Chinese invasion caused an outcry in the West, India successfully blocked the inclusion of the Tibet question onto the UN agenda. Why, with what arguments? Referring to the nonmembership of the PRC in the UN (an issue fraught with significances for UN collective security practices for more than 20 years), India perhaps also appealed to the already heavy UN involvement in the Korean War. It's stated rationale involved the argument (which to many Westerners looked more like a fait accompli position than an advocacy of a truce and subsequent negotiations) that the situation could be resolved peacefully without resort to UN debate. India's position and Chinese moderation did facilitate the termination or resolution of this initial round of Tibet-PRC conflict, and the signing of the "Seventeen Article Agreement of 23 May 1951." (See Butterworth-Scranton, 1976, pp. 145-150 and James, 1969, p. 197f for relevant details) Consequently India's role as a "facilitator" of the PRC's interests in UN related matters was given a certain precedential validity on the part of both the PRC and the United Nations.

The story of UN involvement in Korea is better known. A UN commission had for sometime been in the country, trying to work for the peaceful reunification and post-war rehabilitation of Korea. It reported a massive, well planned North Korean invasion of South Korea, a move associated with Acheson's prior disavowal of US vital interests in Korea, the possibility of certain Southern provocations and considerable unrest in South Korea related to a domestic electoral process of dubious democratic validity. UN coercive involvement on the side of the South Koreans was helped decisively by US leadership on the provision of forces, and a from-this-case-perspective "accidental" absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council. After
the Soviet's return and successive vetoes attempting to delegitimate and stop UN coercive involvement, the US led a constitutionally significant effort (which in another form had earlier been unsuccessful) to bring such issues to the General Assembly. The Uniting for Peace resolution, a precedent now invoked at least tacitly by all parties, passed on the grounds that it was a procedural question not susceptible to Great Power veto, allowed the Assembly to take up and make recommendations concerning security questions on which the Council had reached a veto-based deadlock. In order to gain wide support outside of the Soviet Bloc (which it did), the resolution also contained language suggesting the desirability of increased Third World development aid in a subsequent period of diminished Cold War tensions.

After United Nations forces had reached the Yalu, China had intervened, and a military stalemate had occurred near the former North-South Korea demarcation line, dispute mediation efforts by the Indians and their non-aligned states were given more attention by the Chinese and United States allies. (Eisenhower's election and his secret threat to use atomic weapons against the PRC are given an important role in Realist commentaries on the subject as well). In any case, India had early expressed reluctance about the permissive engagement or proselytizing activities (to use Haas' and Jones' terms) of UN forces in an Asian context, on an issue where the Great Powers and their allies seriously disagreed. India was used to transmit "proposals" from the Chinese concerning an armistice and prisoner repatriation practices, proposals which eventually became a basis for the termination of hostilities. Given her exclusion from UN membership, surely Chinese willingness to use Indian "good offices" in UN related matters was furthered by her relatively satisfactory role as a management agent in the Tibetan dispute.
Stepping back from these brief narratives, one may draw some heuristically suggestive inferences. First note the importance of agenda processes, as they are affected by the relative power of different actors vis a vis particular arenas. Thus the PRC's nonmembership in the UN in 1950 encouraged a rare, explicit, negative agenda decision concerning the Tibetan case; similarly, the capturing of "collective security" symbols by a US-led "collective self-defense effort" against communist "aggressions," an anomalous result when compared with either the Tibetan or Hungarian cases, can be laid to the accidental absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council. Relatively decisive action, the Uniting for Peace resolution and Indian mediation efforts are associated with subtle but important endogenous change in UN security seeking practices.

In particular, the legitimating basis and functional character of UN collective security actions became less the Wilsonian Collective Security ideal (one unrealistic in a Cold War era anyway, and flawed from the point of the nonaligned countries) and more the "balancing" of Cold War antagonists by nonaligned parties playing newly legitimate universalistic roles directed toward the "peaceful settlement of disputes" rather than collective defense or collective security operations. Thus the beginnings of the nonalignment movement in the 50s (usually associated with the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the shift in World politics to a "loose bipolar system" with the UN playing a significant mediating role) are seen in our study as well. And the increasing role of both local or regional conflict managers and the UN system is prefigured, as is the post Bandung UN emphasis on "preventive diplomacy" directed against Third World Great Power involvement (turning, great Power Concert principles upside down until some later date).

A further suggestive inference is that agenda politics, the dynamics
of which disputes get addressed by which management agents (if any), holds a key to the better understanding of the evolution, decay and transformation of collective security seeking practices. Thus the very uneven involvement and success patterns of regional and universal collective security organizations can be seen realistically as part of a global political process in which neither "power politics" nor collective peaceful settlement practices are absent from the scene.

B. Collective Security-Seeking Agenda Processes

One of the serious mistakes of an unreflective logical empiricism studying collective security-seeking practices is a preoccupation only with the UN system and a taking for granted that only the issues discussed there are wanting of study (Alger has shown such tendencies to exist in the earlier American literature). Reducing the study of power politics to the study of participation of various actors in the making of decisions avoids recognition of what are now called "nondecisions" in American political science. Such a practice confuses 1) the overt power arena, where issues are actively and publically contested; 2) the veiled power arena, where rarely visible negative agenda decisions ("non decisions") take place; and 3) the realm of averted structural power which determines or limits actions even without overt agenda discussions or conscious recognition that choices are being made (see Lukes, 1974, for the best review of these distinctions, drawn originally from Dahl's work on community power).

We think it highly desirable to analyze collective security-seeking practices in these terms. Thus the recognition that a controversial issue is a peace and security dispute appropriately discussed in a multilateral way corresponds to the move from the averted structural power arena to the veiled
power arena. Agenda processes in the veiled power arena are typically associated with expectations of the "mobilization of bias" inherent in a particular institutional arena. This bias has a lot to do with the reluctance or enthusiasm of parties to a dispute to bring it into such an arena for management efforts (assuming unilateral self-help motives have begun to shift at least toward collective defense concerns). The jurisdictional scope, the normative consensus, the distribution of membership and divisional powers among friends and enemies in different management arenas all come into play at this stage. Agenda decisions that are positive lead to overt discussion and, possibly, action; negative decisions lead to non-managed conflicts, or management "non-decisions."

The communal nature of positive collective security-seeking actions (the avoidance of a veto, achieving 2/3 majorities, etc.) means that nondecisions on the merits of an issue are often the result of management efforts through collective security organizations. These nondecisions (in a different sense from above) are painfully obvious to various interested observers, who nonetheless frequently do not understand the reasons for nondecisions of either sort; dispute parties are likely to size up such prospects more accurately, relying on multiple security-promoting instruments, self-help and certain collective efforts in a calculated manner open to scientific investigation.

Does this general sketch conform to the views of Zacher, Kende, Butterworth, Haas and other students of our subject? Yes, at least partly, we believe. Haas, Butterworth and Zacher have all pioneered multi-arena comparative studies of collective security practices, although the agenda process has not been given sufficient attention in their studies. Zacher makes a further valuable contribution to our understanding of the frequent failures by internation collective security organizations to stop overt aggressions (e.g. the Chinese going into Tibet or U.S. assistance in the
overthrow of a Marxist government in Guatemala) by demonstrating the statistical unlikelihood of discussion and/or condemnatory actions in most disputes involving intra- or inter-bloc actions. He recognizes that attacks by bloc members on nonaligned states (like Egypt in 1956 or Tibet in 1950) are most likely to evoke positive deterrent action, if the additional requirement of membership of most relevant parties in a collective security organization can be met. Moreover, Zacher is quite suggestive in estimating the likelihood of bias (pro-West or not) in the different organizations he studies. We hope to extend his work, explicitly modeling the trajectory of issues into or out of management practices on similar grounds, thus making amends for previous studies, e.g. (Alker-Greenberg, 1976), which only mentioned agenda processes without empirically studying them.

As a first step in such activities, Figures 3 & 4 derived basically from a revised Butterworth-Scranton data set, give gross trends in agenda attention to the universe of disputes we are working with (listed in the Appendix). One can see that multiplication of management agents has indeed occurred. And a significant number of pure "nondecisions" vis a vis the stated charters of relevant organizations are also obvious. But what is surprising is the post-1965 decline in early UN (Security Council and general Assembly) involvement in serious disputes, although many more disputes than before are being managed, perhaps by the newer organizations. Surprisingly, the 1960s saw the Security Council busier with hostility dispute phases than in the 1950s!

Kende claim of post-65 detente is consistent with this perspective, but his articles deserve further comment. A weakness is his limited universe of wars. In our view he is right to focus on both "internal" and "foreign" wars (despite Charter provisions against UN intervention into "domestic" jurisdiction issues); he is right to look for breaches of the peace associated
Figure 3: Trends in the Number of Disputes (Conflict Phase I) handled by different types of management agents 1945-75. Revised Butterworth/Scranton data recoded into phases.
Figure 4: Trends in the number of hostilities (Conflict Phase 3) handled by different types of management agents, 1945-75. Revised Butterworth/Scranton data recoded into phases.
with regular, collectively organized military violence. But he is wrong to leave out military interventions that are nonmassively resisted (e.g., Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia) and he is limited in scope (as we all must be at times) in not focusing on the role of threats that coercively produce compliance (phase II actions) without an overt resort to force. The hegemonical role of both the U.S. and the USSR in their parts of the world has kept numerous disputes in the nondecisions category, e.g., the issue of U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico. Structurally averted power exercise according to the rule of anticipated reactions is real, even if difficult behaviorally to observe.

As a Marxist, Kende takes seriously the role of structural determination or the influence of systemic dispute contexts. Thus he argues:

> We do not believe that either of these [recent] important political phenomena — assertion of peaceful coexistence or the decrease of wars [post 1967] — was the consequence of some kind of suddenly arising personal good will, or of essential changes in any system. We are more inclined to the view that significant changes in the international balance of power ["the main line of development of international politics"] have led to these results, have compellingly brought about these new phenomena (Kende, 1978, note 6, p. 238).

It puzzles us that he attributes changes in war frequency and intensity to changes in a structural variable, the distribution ("balance") of power, but without seeing this distribution as an "essential change," as many Realists would have it.

Additionally, we feel, there is a need in the realm of averted issues to acknowledge and investigate the changing recognition of systemic determinants of at least some specific dispute management outcomes, such as arms races, unrecognized demographic-technological pressures for expansion, and asymmetric economic or political relationships. In the middle 1940s bloody
colonial riots and even explicit guerilla activity were sometimes not seen as threats to international peace and security by any major power; this has changed, resistance to genocide and other basic human rights have also slowly emerged. Classically, fights over overseas resource monopolies were causes of wars; now guaranteed market access complicates such issues. Arms race politics and the success or failure of arms limitation efforts cause previous nonissues (Soviet troops in Cuba) to become crises and help rationalize other interventions (e.g., the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). The study of collective security seeking practices cannot close its determinative loops until structural and political factors shaping security objectives are endogenously explained.

C. Genetic and Epigenetic Systems Change

Discussions about systems change are often rather unproductive. We started this paper, for example, with a summary of post 1945 developments in collective security seeking practices that to us indicates many such transformations, yet Haas and Zacher in some respects see few such changes within the United Nations, at least few that are not reflective of the external environment, world politics. Kende's remarks above also seem hard to interpret.

Without structurally reifying systems concepts, and without assuming the reproduction of such systems to be mechanically automatic, how can we study the systemic aspects of collective security-seeking practices? Our first response is to ground systems thinking in unilateral and collective practices (the Congo example of the Figure/Table above indicates how and organizational action can be rationalized as a collective political practice). Thus we may essentially or aggregatively find regularities in practices that deserve a "systems" label. Significant transformations in the number or distribution of major autonomous actors, in their action-
linked perspectives, in their support mobilization or security-seeking strategic action sequences, in the differently biased arenas characteristically appealed to for management practices, in issue-specific success or failure outcome patterns, and in the consequences of the above for future systemic patterning have all been used to describe system changes.

Additionally we may distinguish essentialist and aggregative systems views. The former looks for deep structuring, generative, organizing principles (contained within the perspectives of different practices). The later looks for statistical trends or aggregations, like Figures 3 and 4 above on trends in management/nonmanagement practices. Liberal or conservative positivists in the 20th century tend to take nominalist, aggregative positions on system issues, while Marxists like Kende's tend to make essentialist (i.e., capitalism-linked) interpretations. This polarization, however, is not complete. It is our view that the most productive approach is to look for indirectly observable, changing essences socio-political practices. If there are deep, generative structures within security seeking practices, we want to find them. Advanced techniques within the Artificial Intelligence tradition -- frames, scripts or schemas -- suggest ways of empirically modeling the charter norms, balancing or alignment rules, characteristic dispute management procedures or class conflicts that may be the constant or changing essence underlying such practices. (Alker, Bennett, Mefford, 1980)

One further distinction within an empirical essentialist way of thinking should be made: that between genetic and epigenetic processes of system reproduction and transformation. A geneticist views living systems as realizations of DNA-embedded, pre-formed genetic potential, possibly triggered off in different maturational stages. Analogously an epigenetic perspective emphasizes unprogramed, creative accretions in an organism's functioning.
Being careful with the limits of the analogy when applied to organized international systems, one can still meaningfully distinguish preformed and novel functional patterns. For example, we suspect the internalization of an insecurity-driven, power-balancing logic in the life experiences of most current political leaders makes the recurrence of such a systemic phenomenon highly likely, mistakenly giving the impression that this program of behavior had been "wired into" these statesmen and women at birth. Epigenetic accretions in function, like collective defense organizations that serve collective security functions also occur. The apparently temporary turning upside down of classical concert of power practices to give preventive diplomacy practices also strikes us as epigenetically describable. Combining these two kind of processes of systems change with adaptive, bias-sensitive security-seeking agenda processes helps explain our sense that lots of important systemic transformations have occurred in the 1945-1980 period, while at the same time allowing us and others like Zacher and Haas or Kende to account for the nearly "eternal return" of power balancing, bihegemonial systemic practices.

It is not our intention further to review here alternative systemic patterns possibly recognizeable within collective security seeking practices. But we do pause to provide a two dimensional alternative to the anarchy-collective security-world government continuum with which we opened this paper. From the writings of communitarian peace researchers like Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch, we recognize that a unipolar poser system may be legitimate or not, tyranny or world commonwealth; further we see the possibility of pluralistic security communities existing, systems of nominally sovereign states that manages the conflicts among them without recourse to threats of war. Figure 5 shows how many of the alternatives discussed in this paper can be characterized, (approximately to be sure) in terms of a power
Figure 5: An Approximate Classification of Collective Security-Seeking Systems

Scope and Depth of Insecurity Relevant Normative Integration

Hobbesian Anarchy

Multipolar Balance of Power

Pluralistic security community

Bihegemonial collective defense system

World confederation

Collective Security system

World government

Global Tyranny

Unified Hegemonial System
centralization and insecurity consensus axes. We wish the larger realm of transitions among such alternatives would more constantly be in the view of specialists on unilateral and collective security seeking practices.

D. Reflective Learning About War Avoidance

Ours has been, we hope, a sustained exercise of critical reason, undertaken in a realistic search for practical knowledge about how just peace may more readily be achieved. It has been a rational effort in the sense that all the views definable within such a framework of concern may be openly addressed and reasonably argued. It has been realistic in that we have tried to ground most discussions of alternative practices or systems in constraints and possibilities of the appropriate historical contexts. Not peace at any price, but peace likely to endure because of a sharable normative/legal basis has been our goal.

We have been critical both of our own work and that of others. We have tried to learn from the contributions of other scholars in our field and be reflective about the influence of paradigmatic differences in research training and national divergences in political loyalties on scientific arguments. This has meant an explicit attempt to recognize, transcend or side-step differences we associate with liberal or conservative positivist conceptions of scientific practice; at the same time, in an empathetic response to dialectical and socialist thought, we have illustratively supported, we hope, a reasonable commitment to mathematical and empirical work on security-seeking practices. Such norm-sensitive, but critical reflections we think to be characteristic of individual maturity, progressive science and sophisticated political practices. Having "collectivized" many relevant concepts, and dialectically overcome much of the static, ahistorical bias inherent in previous relevant empirical work,
we think it is now intellectually possible to continue a research program of empirical scientific studies of collective security seeking practices on a wider primary basis than North American peace research.
NOTES

1. Our brief summary on these points (including the Wilson quote taken from Ruggie's first page) derives basically from (Haas 1955), (Claude 1964), (Larus, 1965) and (Ruggie, 1974).

2. The first long quote is recalled by one of us from a talk by Stanley Hoffmann, the second comes from (Claude, 1964, p. 224); the remaining quoted phrases refer of course to Article 51, Chapter VII, and Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

3. In a study of the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for African Unity, the Arab League, and the Council of Europe, Haas, Butterworth and Nye (1972, p. 5f) estimated that of the 104 disputes between 1946 and 1970 involving fatalities (excluding purely civil wars and armed raids across borders not supported by governments) 69 (or 66%) were referred at some time to one of these organizations; the percentage of referrals is slightly higher (75%) for what they term high or very high intensity disputes.

4. A principle conclusion of the Haas, Butterworth, Nye study (1972, p. 60) is that "there has been no organizational learning in the past [1960-70] decade - although probably some 'unlearning'". Haas earlier (1962) described UN experience of the 50s as "Dynamic Environment and Static System", implying that if there was a real change taking place, it was not within the UN system. Given our own perception of rapid transformations in collective security seeking practices, we are trying to capture the real phenomena, wherever they occur.

In an important new study, Zacher (1979, p. 215) repeats the Haas, Butterworth, Nye view of collective security organizations as little more than standing diplomatic conferences with no power, personality or learning capacity beyond those of individual governments. His whole book gives a rather static, but detailed view of the efforts of inter-, intra- and cross-bloc alignments on prospects for collective conflict handling success. But he concludes, in a way that resonates with our concerns, that a future, multivariate theory of collective security efforts "will likely assign a central place to coalition configurations and the affiliation of conflicting parties with particular political - security groupings." (p. 207)

5. In our attempt to get serious further discussions going about empirical scientific work on collective security seeking practices we shall have to impute views to East European scholars that some or all of them, including Dr. Kende, may not hold. We do so, with apologies beforehand, in the hope of having our statements corrected through serious, empirically informed scientific discussions. The only other systematic, empirically oriented study of major post-war conflict episodes and conflict management practices of which we are aware is by Professor Gantman and
his associates in Moscow. A full English or French language account of these studies is not to our knowledge available.

6. We have not carefully reviewed the relevant histories, but see as relevant to present concerns Goldmann's depressing account of the great variety of rationalizations post-war states have used to justify (post-hoc?) war initiation decisions (Goldmann, 1970). Similarly Ferencez's (1975) recent study of eventual definitional success needs to be correlated with the political realities of its construction period. The interested operationally inclined research might further wish to read (Rivera, 1973).

7. So does the issue of what constitutes a genuine "threat to the peace." In the late 1940s and early 1950s, colonial allegiances clearly had an effect on whether certain individuals or states would recognize issues of decolonialization as more than "domestic," or "trusteeship" concerns. In arenas where disensus exists on whether human rights, cultural identities or oppressed classes are being suppressed, we agree with Mushakoji (1978) that there are many meanings to "peace" or its denial that all deserve further study.

8. A classic argument for the role of projective mechanisms in insecurity definition processes is Harold Lasswell's World Politics and Personal Insecurity (originally 1935). Brown's new book on Q Methodology allows introspective alternatives to be scientifically studied as well. Robert Harkey at Penn. State is helping to coordinate a relevant series of comparative studies of how national (in)security is actually defined.

9. When one of us tried to use the phrase the "jointness of production," he was told it referred technically to the fact that hamburger meat generation inevitably, i.e., jointly had associated with it the production of leather.

10. Taylor, 1974 has an interesting review of the mathematical arguments for state intervention for collective goods provision, one that tends to minimize its necessity. Although written from a rather anarchical perspective, it might have considerable appeal to state-centric realist thinkers who depend on the "terribleness" of international anarchy for their own legitimization, but do not want to give up national self-help strategies of security pursuit. See also Alker and Hurwitz, 1980, and Nurmi, 1977 for relevant literature reviews.

11. Together with inter-state focussed perspectives, these we call "cross-state" interactions building on work by Keohane and Nye.

12. Most similar to ours in format have been McClelland's WEIS project, Azar's COPDAB studies, Bleckmann and Kaplan's studies of the use of force, Singer-Bremer force confrontation studies and Mahoney's major efforts for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to study Chinese, American and Soviet Crisis Management behavior.
13. We like to think that the weakness of the UN is a virtue from the point of view of nondecisions research. Whereas conservative behavioral critics of the nondecisions argument have been known to say, "Show me a nondecision," which by their nature is difficult to do, the world of collective security seeking practices is full of nondecisions in either of the two textual senses used above. Perhaps, then, agenda process research has found here its Drosophila, a naturally occurring species whose "veiled" genetic codes are much easier to discover with microscopic investigation, than the veiled or averted power processes also thought to influence domestic politics.


Butterworth, Robert L. with Margaret E. Scranton, Managing Interstate Conflict 1945-74: Data with Synopses, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1976. An updated version of this book should be shortly forthcoming.


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<td>Gibraltar, 1964-</td>
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<td>Zaire Civil War, 1964-65</td>
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<td>Ifni, 1964-69</td>
<td>(I,II,VI)</td>
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<td>Stanleyville Air Rescue, 1964</td>
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<td>Rann of Kutch #2, 1965-69</td>
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<td>Chadian Insurgency, 1965-66</td>
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<td>Plots Against Toure, 1965-69</td>
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<td>Ghanian Refugees, 1966</td>
<td>(II,VI)</td>
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## Appendix: Case List

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<th>Event Description</th>
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<td>Eritrean Civil War, 1967-</td>
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<td>261</td>
<td>Battle of Hostages, 1967</td>
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<td>263</td>
<td>Bolivian Guerrilla Insurgency, 1967-1968</td>
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<td>264</td>
<td>June '67 War, 1967</td>
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<td>265</td>
<td>Biafran Secession, 1967-70</td>
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<td>269</td>
<td>Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1967-1973</td>
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<td>Pueblo Seizure, 1968</td>
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<td>Greek Tyranny, 1968-74</td>
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<td>Exiles in Haiti, 1968</td>
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<td>Czech Invasion, 1968</td>
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<td>276</td>
<td>Rio de la Plata Demarcation, 1969-73</td>
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<td>277</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinean Post-Independence Tensions, 1969-1978</td>
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<td>American Tuna Boats, 1969-74</td>
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<td>Southern Yemeni Borders, 1969-1973</td>
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<td>Iranian Borders, 1969-75</td>
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<td>282</td>
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<td>Northern Ireland, 1969-</td>
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<td>Bahraini Independence, 1970-71</td>
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<td>291</td>
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### Appendix: Case List

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<th>Case Description</th>
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<th>Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ugandan Coup, 1971-73</td>
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<td>Cod War, 1971-73</td>
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<td>Burundian Genocide, 1972-73</td>
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<td>Corisco Bay Islands, 1972-74</td>
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<td>Vietnamese Truce, 1973-76</td>
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<td>Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border, 1973-77</td>
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<td>Yom Kippur War, 1973-74</td>
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<td>Baluchistan, 1973-</td>
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<td>Kurdish War, 1974-75</td>
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<td>Cypriot Coup and Invasion, 1974-</td>
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<td>Angolan Independence, 1975-76</td>
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<td>Mizo Uprisings, 1964-77</td>
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*Note: The categories (I, II, III, IV, V, VI) likely refer to different classifications or stages of conflict.*
Phase Structure Definitions:*

*Phase* -- one of five levels of disagreement and conflict; a given dispute**may pass (repeatedly) through one or more of the phases.

*Phase I* -- (Dispute Phase) -- a quarrel or disagreement claimed by at least one party to be an issue of substantive international political significance.

*Phase II* -- (Conflict Phase) -- a dispute in which at least one of the parties has demonstrated willingness to use military force to resolve the dispute but as yet has not actually done so.

*Phase III* -- (Hostilities Phase) -- a dispute involving systematic use of military force, over a specific military objective(s), causing casualties and/or destruction of property.

*Phase IV* -- (Post-Hostilities Conflict Phase) -- fighting no longer occurs as in Phase III, but at least one party continues to view the quarrel in military terms. Sporadic violence may still occur, but evidence concerning the cessation of hostilities should suggest something more fundamental than just a temporary lull in intermittent hostilities.

*Phase V* -- (Post-Hostilities Dispute Phase) -- a dispute is no longer viewed in military terms. However, the issues in the dispute remain, although negotiations for resolution may be taking place.

*Phase VI* -- (Settlement Phase) -- the final phase, commencing with a settlement or agreement resolving the underlying dispute.
