Theorizing the Anti-Avant-Garde:
Invocations of Phenomenology in Architectural Discourse, 1945-1989

by

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ABSTRACT

My dissertation is an intellectual history of “phenomenology,” as it came to be understood within architectural discourse during the Cold War. The principal thesis is that contacts with phenomenology were at the crux of the 1970s shift from modernist to postmodernist thinking in architecture. I support this thesis through critical analyses of the work of Ernesto Rogers, Charles Moore, Christian Norberg-Schulz, and Kenneth Frampton, who are largely credited with introducing phenomenology to architecture, and with the expansion of the debates on Postmodern architecture to include issues of human-environment relations, such as the social function of traditional building practices, and place-bound identity politics.

At present their invocations of phenomenology are often charged with a naïve essentialism generally understood to be inconsistent with postmodern thought. This dissertation takes issue with that simplistic view by providing a more complete account of their contributions to architectural thinking. It situates each author in the context of the historical emergence of a new type of architectural avant-garde practice, that of the historian, which to this day has received little scholarly attention. I argue that they are important transitional figures, whose work is enframed by both the closing stages of a postwar modernist understanding of architecture and the opening stages of postmodernist epistemologies.

Around their interest in phenomenology cohered an intellectual formation that I call the anti-avant-garde, to situate it within the 1970s debates concerning the terms of architectural avant-gardism. The anti-avant-garde opposed the autonomy of practice or theory, charging equally against the formalism of neo-avant-garde architects such as Peter Eisenman, and against the self-sufficiency of theory proclaimed by critical historians like Manfredo Tafuri. Instead, the anti-avant-garde asserted a theory of “authentic” experience, in which theory and practice became indistinguishable. I argue that this put the anti-avant-garde in the contradictory position of having to efface its own theorizing. This dissertation critically evaluates the anti-avant-garde’s full impact in architectural thinking and pedagogy by laying bare its theoretical program.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation investigates the emergence and career of the idea of "phenomenology" as it came to be understood within architectural discourse. As a theory that privileges "experience" over theory, phenomenology’s rise to currency in the 1970s is as spectacular as its eclipse in the mid 1980s. The writings of Ernesto Rogers (1909 - 1969), Christian Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000), Charles Moore (1925-1993), and Kenneth Frampton (b. 1930) came to represent the backbone of the new forms of theorizing made available to architects through phenomenology. These authors were part of a singular generation of architects who reinvented themselves as historians in order to reflect upon ways of overcoming the various problems they perceived in postwar Modern architecture. Taken together, their work questioned modernism’s claims to autonomy from culture and history, and made non-modern architecture available to modern architects in entirely new ways. Phenomenology appeared to them as a potentially liberating re-framing of the age-old dyad of “man” and his environment. Through phenomenology, they emphasized the “unity” of individual and world, and called for a new architecture that would be sensitive to the “identity” of both. But by the nineteen eighties they were undercut from theory, accused of the very essentializing and totalizing principles they had once charged modernism of.

Phenomenology’s ramifications within architectural discourse are daunting in scope. It exists both inside and outside of the academy, somewhere between publications, academic genealogies, built projects, discursive practices, and personal friendships. In order to identify what gives coherence to this intellectual formation, this dissertation
moves between intellectual history and social academic history. It follows the principal lines of the architectural debates through which phenomenology made its appearances in academic reality, and discusses them as a function of the broader historical circumstances that drew the two disciplines into proximity against their multiple, and often a-synchronous internal revisions.

The architectural trajectory of phenomenology during the 1970s appears to be both the enabling element and the foundational rift between the worlds of theory and practice in architectural thought. But the architectural invocations of phenomenology were also part of a broader longstanding current that pitted the mind against feeling, on account of the belief that it was inconsistent with warm emotions necessary to bring “life” into architecture. During the 1970s, in the context of a renewed interest in scholarly rigor and accountability, the successful invocation of phenomenology in defense of this more general pre-existing anti-intellectualism gave rise to the architectural anti-avant-garde, as I will call it. Using phenomenology as a badge of academic credibility, this movement dumbed down architectural education in order to protect the discipline’s modernist ideology from the economic, political, and scholarly threats it came to face during the Cold War. Thus, modern architecture preserved both its myths of radical alterity to culture, and of an essential origin to aesthetic creation, through a new discourse of authenticity, which claimed the “purity” of feelings to be impervious to modernity’s alienating complexity. Posing as the antithesis of avant-garde attempts to elevate the understanding of modernity through reason, the modern anti-avant-garde walked hand in hand with the critics of modernism. The anti-avant-garde devised what we now call a “phenomenological approach” to architecture, a form of anti-
intellectualism premised on claims about the primacy and universality of corporeal experience that relegated the intellect to a secondary status in the process of understanding reality. This line of reasoning often degenerated into a simple demotion of intellectual work on the grounds that it was "relative," and into attempts to de-problematize the politics of practice by ridding it of theory. Paradoxically, out of these efforts to unbind reflection from practice came a literature that had to disguise its sophistication in order to remain credible. The aim of my dissertation is to give a historical account of this discourse that will reveal the deep impact of its shallowness, as well as the superficiality of its most profound arguments.

The architectural custom of identifying academicism with meaningless formalism, and sensualism with the \textit{élan vital} of engaged and creative practices, extends its roots well into the nineteenth century, and is correlative with the origin of modern architecture. As early as the 1880s, Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945), often credited as the father of modern architectural history, regarded academe as a mental abstraction that, like reason, impinged on "living reality." Thus, he expunged scholarly conventions from his essays in an effort to emulate the direct experience of art in writing. Between the world wars, Sir Herbert Read (1893-1968), the British art critic and historian largely responsible for introducing art in education as a form of psychological self-discovery, made the reaction against abstraction in architecture correlative with a "new humanism" that promised to "liberate" humankind from the cerebralism of functionalism. Indeed, what at first glance appears to be a force that aims to crack open the disciplinary limits of modern architecture, reveals itself under further scrutiny to act as a bonding agent that holds the
discipline together. The constant calls for experiential transgressions of the discipline can in fact be said to define the field of modern architecture according to the logic of various syntheses between aesthetics and psychology. Most recent among these unions was that created from the introduction of phenomenology within architectural discourse after World War II, which gave a new lease on life to the ideology of a liberalizing self-consciousness achieved through aesthetic experientialism. Yet, unlike previous syntheses, this one claimed to be “post-modern,” holding up certain works of architecture and philosophy as creations of “emancipated” individuals, who had allegedly transcended all the various crises of modernity. Contrary to this assertion, I will argue that the terms on which these works were celebrated, either as exemplifying pure creations of an essential Self (individual or collective), or as paradigms of radical otherness to modern culture, bespoke their modernist character and avant-gardist pretensions.

Method

In holding up immediate experience as a realm beyond discourse, Modern architectural discourse hides behind its own creation. This would seem to make the critical efforts of the intellectual historian almost worthless from the start. No matter how many layers one pulls away, there will always be another discursive mask claiming to make visible what is just beyond it. The ghost of pure experience is only perceivable when draped with the sheet of discourse. Can one ever be convinced that there are no ghosts? I have found Mark Jarzombek’s critical historiography to be a useful method to address this question. What I find special about it is that unlike the history of philosophy (or any other history that I am aware of for that matter), critical historiography does not

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1 See Sir Herbert Edward Read, "A New Humanism," in The Architectural Review, n. 78 (October 1935). In his Art and Society, (London: Farber and Farber, 1936), Read went as far as to define modern art as the
try to cover up the fact that it cannot answer the question from within or without the structure of the disciplinary knowledge it seeks to historicize. It does not try to read the contours of the bed sheet to see how accurately it conforms to the shape of a “normal” ghost, nor does it try to lift the blanket to see if there is “something” underneath it. Instead, it enters into the microscopic fibers of the cloth to understand how it is knitted together. In other words, as opposed to looking at discourse from the outside, through the window of disciplinary knowledge, it enters into the interlacing intellectual strands that make up discourse and traces the various ways in which they have been knotted together in history.

From this perspective, whether or not ghosts (or immediate experiences) exist is the less important question. My dissertation does not (indeed, cannot) judge the veracity of claims made about experience. Instead, following critical historiography, it considers another set of questions valuable to the writing of history, such as: Why, and at what points, did architecture and phenomenology require each other in order to uphold their claims about the liberating power of aesthetic experience? How did each discipline rearticulate its discourse to accommodate the other? What did architecture and philosophy stand to gain or loose by investing themselves in a common discourse? These questions can only be answered through a history that works within the intersections of architecture and philosophy. Therefore, I endeavor to engage the discourse in its hybridity, attempting to delve into it without disciplinary preconceptions about what constitutes the historical “evidence” of the idea in question. In doing so, I find that the articulation of ideas about liberating immediate experiences was not always limited to the letters printed on books. It was not only intellectual, but also aesthetic. At times, some

“sensuous correlative, equal and opposite, to intellectual abstraction” (pp 273-4).
believed it to be expressed directly through certain images, such as those found in
Christian Norberg-Schulz's carefully arranged photographic narratives, or those reveries
described by Gaston Bachelard as “poetic images.” Others considered it to be self-evident
in the material appearance of certain buildings, a view shared by Kenneth Frampton with
regards to structural expression in architecture, and by Enzo Paci in relation to
contemporary interpretations of traditional structures. Still others found evidence of
emancipating experiences in the practices of certain architects and philosophers deemed
to be enlightened, which, as it turns out, Charles Moore and Martin Heidegger believed
themselves to be. Failing to fully substantiate their claims about experience, they flooded
the discourse with expressions that asserted, but could never demonstrate, to have
surmounted modernity. In other words, what made these “things” (texts, images, people,
etc.) into “relevant evidence” was their persistent employment as such by many people
when attempting to convince others of the existence of experiences prior to reflection.
This dissertation is therefore part “sociology of ideas” part intellectual history. By
default, it is a history of the academy, for it is in universities that both architects and
philosophers alike form and disseminate their worldviews.

These postwar intersections between phenomenology and architecture were made
possible by the workings of psychology within both disciplines during the first half of the
twentieth century. Jarzombek’s *The Psychologizing of Modernity* (2000) has made
significant inroads in understanding how the discourse of liberating aesthetic experience
had become established by the 1930s as a foundational myth of modern architecture. To
expose this fabrication, Jarzombek had to go beyond a pure history of psychology, to
bring to light the repressed interdisciplinary nexus of texts, images, histories, theories,
personalities, and truisms that supported it. The power of that discourse, argued Jarzombek, came from the clarity of its promise (freedom through self-consciousness) and the ambiguity of its methods, which enabled the incorporation of psychology into multiple “host” disciplines. Contact with psychology had a double progressive/conservative effect on modern art, architecture, and their history. On the one hand, it allowed the avant-garde to challenge established disciplinary conventions by holding them against the criterion of emancipation. Yet, on the other hand, it failed to make explicit its own discursive protocols, producing instead a normalizing avant-gardism that worked only to identify those aesthetic expressions that fitted accepted standards of what “liberated egos” should produce. To support this, there emerged a new type of self-confident history writing, which equated the “primariness” of the historian’s experience of art and architecture to a sign of the alleged “authenticity” of the works themselves. Jarzombek critiqued that bond between historian, architecture, and architect by making explicit what it concealed, namely, a set of assumptions about the liberating potential of a psychologized self.

**Critical Position**

Also at stake in this dissertation, then, is the nature and fate of avant-gardism after World War II. After Renato Poggioli’s famous *Teoria dell’arte d’avanguardia* (*The Theory of the Avant-Garde*, 1962. English translation, 1968), and Peter Bürger’s important *Theorie der Avantgarde* (Theory of the Avant-Garde, 1974. English translation, 1984), a new interest in the historical avant-garde emerged among architects who looked to movements like Russian Constructivism as the last confirmation of an organic link between architects and progressive politics. Manfredo Tafuri pinpointed the
schizophrenic character of the 1970s avant-garde revivals, torn between a nostalgia for an essential culture and the anti-historical need to destroy it.² Here the role of historians cannot be overlooked, for it was the inner contradictions of modern historiography that eventually tripped modernism up, and that gave postmodern thinking its first triumphs. The difficulty is that the “postmodern” label is still in contention between those that wrote what is essentially a modern architectural history, and those that critiqued it. On the former camp, historian/architects like Christian Norberg-Schulz, Kenneth Frampton, and Charles Moore, attempted to cover over the fundamental ambiguity between experience and cognition that is at the heart of the modern crisis of authenticity, insisting that architecture was the path to wholesomeness. On the other side, critical historians like Manfredo Tafuri, put that ambiguity at the center of their questioning, arguing that attempts to cover it up were ideological, and that the task of history was to expose the constitutive function of inauthenticity in modernity.³

These two approaches to the writing of history disputed the territory forsaken by the modern avant-garde, namely that of raising the self-consciousness of society to prepare it for a possible resolution to the crisis of modernity. Each block reacted differently to their disenchantment with the failed promise of the avant-garde. The first group (Rogers, Moore, Norberg-Schulz, Frampton, et.al.) assumed a modernist position, which I will call the anti-avant-garde, claiming that they could fulfill the promise of

² Tafuri, Manfredo. "‘European Graffiti.’ Five x Five = Twenty-five." In Oppositions, n. 5 (Summer 1976), Translated by Victor Caliandro.
They mirrored the avant-garde's aesthetic of intellectual ascension above the cultural horizon\textsuperscript{4} with a new aesthetics of descent into the "roots" of culture. The second group (Tafuri, Jarzombek, Wigley, et. al.) was properly postmodern on account of its methods. It remained suspicious of any claims to unity, but nevertheless endeavored towards raising self-awareness, mixing historiographical rigor with political and philosophical watchfulness in attempts to discover new ways to achieve objective knowledge.

The "anti-avant-garde" demoted all intellectualist pretensions as signs of false avant-garde elitism, and chastised architects for dishonestly suggesting that they could in any way "elevate" their modern aesthetics above the norm of bourgeois mediocrity. For them, the duty of historians was to make people see that avant-garde subjectivity was a source of egoism and selfishness which led directly to the modern disbandment of community, the hypostatization of the lonely consumer as a paradigm of citizenry, and to the horrible tyranny of sameness ruling under industrial capitalism. To bypass what they regarded as the irreversibly "alienated" subject, the anti-avant-garde discovered a new anonymity in aesthetic creation, in which authenticity was coaxed out of "collectives," variously idealized as "participatory architecture," "traditional architecture," "rooted architecture," or what Christopher Alexander would call "ego-less and timeless architecture." The undergirding promise was that if architects could be "in touch" with the collective, then their buildings would provide "richer" experiences than "banal" modern structures. But the architect could not, by definition, assume complete

\textsuperscript{4} I borrow "aesthetics of ascension" from Adnan Morshed who's insightful dissertation "The Aviator's (Re)Vision of the World: An Aesthetic of Ascension in Norman Bel Geddes's Futurama" (Ph.D. Diss.:

authorship over the "communal" work. Having evacuated architects of responsibility for their works, it fell upon these historians to provide evidence of the healing power they projected upon buildings. But never able to find an individual that would attest to having being cured of alienation by a building, these historians had to offer their own subjectivity in example.

Anti-avant-garde historians had to devise ways to assert that the buildings they selected in their histories could make people "feel" connected to history, community, spirituality, and Self—i.e., they could in other words "cure" the splinterings of modernity. Thus, they had to produce, through their books, the same aesthetic of liberated experience that came to characterize the modern avant-garde's mystique of purity. Indeed, they assumed the role of modern avant-garde artists, engaging in phenomenology as one dips the brush in paint, to add color to the canvas of their existing discourse. But the fluid complexity of phenomenology dripped through architectural discourse in sometimes unintended ways. Phenomenologists, especially in the United States, began second guessing the aesthetics of architectural historians to gain control over architectural discourse. Some philosophers, like Karsten Harries, even became architectural historians of sorts, and others like Edward Casey attempted to re-align phenomenology with neo-avant-garde architects like Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi. And so, to trace the intellectual lines that make up the architectural illustrations of emancipating immediate experience, this dissertation enters into the history of phenomenology's unfolding ideas from within its intersections with architectural discourse.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001) identifies the reliance of the avant-garde on a discourse of aerial vision.
To write a history of these anti-avant-garde historians is to necessarily write against the grain of their work, for it was premised on their self-confident claim to see beyond history, and past the complexities of modernity. I endeavor to bring to light the contradictions they had to camouflage in order to project their modernist certainty in dealing with aesthetic matters. Perhaps the most important contradiction was that to express their liberation from modernity they had to abide by the canon of modern architectural discourse, which since Wölfflin had equated the historian’s ability to speak the Truth with his ability to exhibit sufficient self-confidence to dispense with the norms of academicism and “freely experience” architecture.

Beginning with Tafuri in the 1970s, postmodern architectural historians have attempted to critique these de-theorized histories and de-historicized theories of architecture. In the United States, critical historians from Stanford Anderson and Anthony Vidler, to Mark Wigley and Mark Jarzombek, have tried to satisfy the need for self-knowledge by shifting the emphasis away from utopian dreams of overcoming the complexities of modernity. Instead, they proposed a type of historiographical self-awareness that moved in concentric circles around the paradoxes of modern life. They tried to compensate for their inability to answer these contradictions by undertaking to answer second order questions about the origin and career of these unresolved “blind spots,” as Tafuri liked to call them. In my mind, these types of projects contributed to understanding by showing the relevance of certain “blind spots” to our contemporary situation and to our present commitments. Understanding their logic helps us deal with them, without trying to negate them. Just like when we come to accept our own mortality our life rather than loosing meaning gains it, critical historiography comes to live with the
incompleteness of modernity and post-modernity and can thus positively transform it. In that way, it works towards the promise of enlightened freedom made by the modern avant-garde, but remains weary of its own politics, assumptions, and objectivity.

My critique of the anti-avant-garde exposes the sites it constructed out of intersections between architecture and phenomenology around an object for which there is no documentation: experience prior to reflection. I work hermeneutically around this "blind spot" in order to understand the function of these constructions within postwar architectural discourse. I identify four such sites of intersection, each of which serves as the focus of a chapter. Yet, it would be misleading to think of them in isolation, given that they always appear interrelated in discourse, and that they help support each other.

My argument is that each of these constructions obscured its groundlessness in order to appear as a stable framework within which to accumulate political, social, economic, and aesthetic gains. In other words, they were ideological constructions used as means of advancement by people. But their effectiveness on the cultural field came at the price of a deadly weakness at their intellectual center. The Achilles' heel of the anti-avant-garde was its claim that it could defeat modernism with a chimera for which it could ultimately produce no evidence.

To see that weakness and to continue to ignore it, or even worst, to try to cover it up, is for me to operate in bad faith. But the cover-up was, and continues to be, enormously successful in architecture. The anti-avant-garde, in its multiple disguises and permutations within architectural culture, continues to act as a catch basin for all disillusionment with modernism, while serving to prolong and even accentuate the crises on which it feeds. In order to appear in the mantle of "resistance," it perpetuates the
modern myths of an essential origin to aesthetic creation and of a radical alterity to culture. To hide its complicity, the anti-avant-garde must resist all attempts either to historicize it or to theorize it. Its defense mechanism is historiographical vagueness, which remains hidden behind the cunning simplicity of its discourse. Although contacts with phenomenology initially aided in sustaining this elusiveness, they eventually exposed it, as the 1980s generation of scholars pushed the received understandings of phenomenology through deconstruction.

On the surface, anti-avant-garde architects and historians paid lip service to Husserl’s dictum to “search for ultimate foundations.” But unlike Husserl, who could never conclude his search, or Heidegger who’s questioning led him to the “groundless abyss” of ontological difference, the anti-avant-garde architect/historian always came out of his or her individual dig claiming to have “felt” the bedrock of existence. The problem was one of corroboration. Just as some have come to believe in the image of the backlight tunnel as proof of near death experiences, others believed in the image of the hut as proof of “rooted” existence. Phenomenologists often contributed to these myths by remaining at arms length of architectural discourse. They sometimes certified the “authenticity” of certain architects with a wink and a nod, expecting to be paid back in kind with a boost in popularity outside of philosophy. Other times however, phenomenologists made legitimate attempts to engage the discourse of architecture, where they left their indelible mark.

Content

In chapter 2, entitled “Ernesto N. Rogers and Enzo Paci: Tradition as Life-World,” I discuss the role of Enzo Paci, the noted Italian philosopher, in bringing
phenomenology to the heart of the postwar debates that took place during the 1950s in and around the *Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne* (CIAM). Paci helped lift the modernist ban on non-modern architecture, by openly interrogating what he saw as the self-imposed formal limits of modernism. By playing on the anxieties of postwar architects who could no longer ignore the failure of modern architecture to renew either society or itself, Paci persuaded architects that infusing its aesthetic forms with “the living flux of experience” could revitalize modernism. The touchstone of this promise was, of course, an always-inaccessible pre-reflexive experience. To cover this over, Paci actively promoted the work of the Milanese architects Antonio Banfi, Ludovico Belgiojoso, Enrico Peresutti, and Ernesto Rogers (whose firm was known as the BBPR), as examples of liberated egos in touch with the “life-world.” Paci encouraged architects to follow the example of the BBPR, and discouraged them from philosophical or theoretical speculation, arguing that too much thought would “abstract” them from “authentic” experience.

I argue that Paci’s sponsorship of partial engagements with his philosophy reveals not only a type of anti-intellectualism caught the folds of his thinking, but also the tendentious nature of his proposition. He encouraged the instrumentalization of phenomenology that would immediately take place under Rogers’s pen, first in his famous journal *Casabella Continuità*, then in the reports on education that circulated through CIAM around the world. Rogers aestheticized Paci’s “life-world” as “tradition,” and prescribed the introduction of traditional styles in design as a way to re-connect the avant-garde with the “collective.” So long as architects towed the line of tradition, the “authenticity” of their “feelings” was taken for granted. I contextualize the willingness of
both Paci and Rogers to aestheticize and conceal the negative core of their discourse within the context of the postwar reconstruction and its politics. For instance, I discuss how the significance of the building industry to the postwar national economies forced modern architects to have to compete with the mass appeal of popular architecture. Paci and Rogers rose to the top of architectural culture because they assisted in fitting the old modern ideology of progress to the new economic demands of the 1950s.

Chapter 3, entitled “Charles W. Moore: From Bachelard to the Poetic Image,” discusses the development of the anti-avant-garde in the United States first through the teachings of Rogers’s business partner, Enrico Peresutti, and then through Peresutti’s “the family,” an informal academic network established by his foremost student and leading Postmodern architect, Charles Moore. The anti-avant-garde flourished under McCarthyism, which was not just a communist witch-hunt but also a broader cultural censorship of discordant voices. “The family” dropped the modern avant-garde’s social revolutionary rhetoric, pledging instead that architecture, in caring for people’s body, could elevate their “soul.” In essence, the anti-avant-garde capitulated to the McCarthyite culture of consent, withdrawing architecture’s claims to the political sphere, so as to establish their hegemony in academia. McCarthyism had an inverse effect on Phenomenology. The demand that philosophers “speak the truth” cast phenomenologists to the margins of academe for their suspicions of objectivity. Phenomenologists like Karsten Harries, who needed interdisciplinary assistance to get established within the American academy, gave their support to the architectural anti-avant-garde, and
contributed enormously to the idea that architecture was spiritual nourishment “at least as likely to edify as philosophy.”

The architectural reception of Gaston Bachelard towers over the multiple interdisciplinary bridges made during the 1970s. Inspired by Bachelard’s writings on “poetic images” as “spontaneous commitments of the soul,” Charles Moore and others alleged that “images” were the spiritual fusion of people and architecture in “full body” pre-rational experiences. Moore’s enormously influential books defended the primacy of a sensualist epistemology, purporting that one could know architecture “directly,” “innocently,” and without intellectual effort. I argue that these beliefs about architecture’s ability to transmit knowledge a-linguistically and universally were equivalent to the formal universalism of earlier modernisms. It was an ideology that facilitated the work of postmodern architects, who by the early 1980s could claim to empathize with all “places,” and thus legitmate their emerging global practices.

I focus on the dissemination of this new cult of innocence through American architectural education. With the help of phenomenology, the anti-avant-garde turned architectural pedagogy into a journey of “returning” to “original” child-like experiences. One could turn to hundreds of educators who, like foot soldiers, carried that trope forward. Along with John Hejduk, Christopher Alexander, and Earl Morsund, Dalibor Vesley, professor of architecture at Cambridge University, invoked phenomenology as the “hygiene of the modern mind.” Anti-avant-gardists decried the 1970s intellectualization of architecture as “rootless” abstraction, arguing that semiotics and

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linguistics missed the a-rational and sensual way in which, they believed, buildings communicated. But, as critical historians began to emphasize scholarly accountability, the anti-avant-garde had to pass off its experientialism as a "study" of the "living past." I argue that the turn towards history ensnared the anti-avant-garde in a discursive tangle from which it could no longer free itself with appeals to the alleged liberating power of aesthetic experiences. By the 1980s poststructuralists could see that the anti-avant-garde's "freely exploratory" practice had come at the price of restricting a "freely exploratory" theory, which might have exposed its politics.

In chapter 4, entitled "Christian Norberg-Schulz: The Genesis of *Genius Loci* and its formulation as *Aletheic Image*," I concentrate on the career and work of Christian Norberg-Schulz, the famed Norwegian architect and historian who is widely, albeit erroneously, credited with first introducing phenomenology to architecture during the 1970s. Norberg-Schulz first came to architectural prominence with *Intentions in Architecture* (1965), a staunch critique of modern "theory-free" approaches to design. But by the 1980s, he had come to denounce theory as a "rootless abstraction" that severed the architect's attunement to local building traditions and to the region's nature. Therein lies the contradiction of his career. Indeed, I argue that Norberg-Schulz salvaged the demise of CIAM functionalist ideology by reformulating the claim that the "inner truth" of architectural shapes could be disclosed immediately in visual perception. He remained convinced that "authentic" buildings expressed their "inner function," but for him that expressive function was dictated by nature, not man. His famous theory of *Genius Loci* contended that nature itself called forth certain self-evident images of Truth, which he termed *aletheic* images in reference to Heidegger's nomenclature for pre-reflexive
experiences. For Norberg-Schulz, the *alétheic* image was so palpable in visual experience, that he unproblematically conflated it with his own photographs of landscapes and buildings, putting forth the illustrations of his books as evidence of its existence.

I contextualize Norberg-Schulz’s assertion that the authority of these images lies uniquely in their “truth content.” Because of the tendency of the *alétheic* image to foil all attempts at contesting its claims to Truth with its own totalizing immediacy, I have attempted to de-stabilize its self-referentiality by tracing its indebtedness to historical visual and textual discourses outside itself. Norberg-Schulz’s theory of the *alétheic* image, or *Genius Loci*, is said to have developed exclusively from his readings of Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutic ontology. Contrary to this belief, I demonstrate the centrality of postwar America’s architectural discourse for its conception. Norberg-Schulz’s thinking was shaped by his early involvement in CIAM under Siegfried Giedion, and then by his experiences as a visiting professor at MIT in 1973, where he worked closely with Kevin Lynch and Georgy Kepes, and where he began his serious study of Heidegger. Norberg-Schulz infused the American methods of urban and topographical analysis, with Heidegger’s notion that Truth could be immediately given in *alétheic* experiences. Thus, he turned an open-ended set of analytical tools into a taxonomy of visual diagrams, which he equated to transcendental essences. Norberg-Schulz’s images vastly influenced architectural education during the 1970s and 1980s. They were emulated in designs as symbols of authenticity. Yet, the discourse on perception that Norberg-Schulz deployed did not (and could not) provide evidence as to the *alétheic* images’s claims to Truth.
Ultimately, the Image itself stood as its own evidence, grounding itself in its own immediacy, and obscuring its discursive lineage.

Chapter 5, entitled “Kenneth Frampton: The Ideology of the Tectonic Aesthetic,” examines Frampton’s invocation of phenomenology in support of his theory of Critical Regionalism. Frampton’s influential theory premised the “critical” nature of an architect’s practice on his or her ability to aestheticize the collective pre-reflexive “will to make” of a “rooted” community (its morals, laws, social arrangements, and political institutions). Following the tradition of British exceptionalism, Frampton wrote the history of Modern architecture as an opposition between British and Continental ways of thinking about architecture. On the one hand he presented Augustus Welby Pugin’s as the origin of a British inspired architecture “rooted” in culture and Myth, and on the other hand he assigned the origin of avant-gardiste “alienating abstractions” in Jean Nicolas Louis Durand, whom Frampton made exemplary of a universalizing, French rational mind. Frampton extended the logic of this binary equation to encompass the struggle for local identity before what he saw as the equalizing pressures of global capitalism. Although he turned to Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology as an explanation of how two competing systems of legislating society could work towards reconciliation, he obviated Ricoeur’s fundamental description of communication as a reasoned process of “explanation and understanding” of otherness. For Frampton, what brought two people together was not the recognition of each other’s irreducible uniqueness, as in Ricoeur’s model, rather, he asserted that it was an ineffable reciprocity of feeling towards a particular aesthetics of “making.” What would otherwise be described as the affinity created by Bourgeois taste, was, for Frampton, the shared mythic roots of a common
culture. Hence, I argue that although Frampton demonized corporate and Fascist architecture for “distorting culture,” his thinking unreflexively advanced similar falsifications.

Although every chapter hinges upon a single phenomenological re-articulation of an architectural concept, there are some important distinctions between them. Different cultural, geographical, temporal, and disciplinary contexts divide the first chapter from the others. A full generation separates Ernesto Rogers and Enzo Paci from the architects, historians and philosophers discussed later. Their writings came in the immediate wake of World War II, as a reaction to the failure of the partisans to bring about the complete revolutionary transformation of society à la Marx. Rogers and Paci remained a reference for those who would later argue the need to open Modernism to non-modernist architecture, even by those who did not share their politics. Charles Moore claimed to be a-political (or sometimes an American Democrat), Christian Norberg-Schulz was a Norwegian conservative who loathed Marxists, and Kenneth Frampton is a British New Leftist proud of his Marxism. Regardless of their politics, they were all part of the same architectural discursive sphere, often meeting at conferences and round tables. Moreover, they shared a common disillusionment with postwar modernization, and collectively turned to phenomenology as the “cure” to that disenchantment. Although their work pretended to restore health to society it in fact only covered up the symptoms, and prolonged the life of modern essentialist myths.
CHAPTER 2

ERNESTO N. ROGERS AND ENZO PACI:
TRADITION AS LIFE-WORLD

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I. Introduction: Between Idealism and Realism

A. The relationship between Enzo Paci and Ernesto Rogers

At a time when Italy’s aesthetic and philosophical disciplines seemed completely under the spell of Benedetto Croce’s (1866-1952) Idealism, it seemed rather implausible that phenomenological thinking, although popular in France and Germany, would ever make inroads south of the Apennines. And yet, the multiple collaborations between Ernesto Rogers (1909-1969), a famed rationalist architect active from the 1930s to the 1960s, and Enzo Paci (1911-1976), a prominent phenomenological philosopher, were central in rearticulating the nature of architectural thinking away from Croce. Moreover, their radical formulations about the need to politicize, historize and socialize architecture posed a real challenge to more conventional Modernisms. Although the demise of Croce changed received understandings of the relationship between architecture’s aesthetics and its social function, the intellectual culture and major players that brought this change

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1 It is unclear when and where Enzo Paci met Ernesto Rogers, but what is certain is that, after World War II, the two men were already very close friends. In a personal interview with Francesca Paci, Enzo Paci’s daughter, held in Milan on June 1st, 2000, Rogers, fled to Switzerland from 1943 to 1945, and according to Francesca Paci (personal interview held in Milan on June 1st, 2000) Paci was sent to a concentration camp in Poland. Francesca Paci recalled that her father would spend long evenings at Rogers’s house and vice versa. The two men would show up together at each other’s house unexpectedly for either lunch or dinner. They would meet with other musicians and poets in Milan’s piazzas and hold long discussions until late at night. The debates were quite heated sometimes. One night, Mrs. Paci remembered, the police arrested them for public disturbance. They often met over meals at each other’s home, traveled together, and discussed the present state and possible future of Italian culture. Perhaps their common suffering and exile during the Fascist period brought them together initially, but the reasons for their prolonged relationship had clearly more to do with each of their common goal to help resolve the problems they identified in their respective disciplines and in their common culture. Rogers found the philosophical tiller in Paci that would help him finesse the direction of his intellectual research, and allow him to orient his international magazine, *Casabella Continuità*, with a precise criterion. Paci discovered in Rogers a high profile figure of Italian architecture with an international audience. *Casabella* was, for Paci, a welcomed opportunity to extend the cultural visibility of his phenomenology, to gain a strategic flanking position against the Idealist front of Benedetto Croce. From the exchanges between Paci and Rogers resulted an ambiguous interdisciplinary reality, where aesthetic practices came to the service of philosophy and vice-versa.
about have been largely overlooked. Ernesto Rogers, for instance, was instrumental in this paradigm shift. Nonetheless, his most important contributions to architectural culture have remained largely in the shadows, especially in Anglo-American circles, where critics from Reyner Banham to Kenneth Frampton have shaped his image into a reactionary apologist of populist kitsch, and made him into an outcast from the very Modernist canon he helped forge.

Rogers’s involvement in the Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM), and his parallel career in writing, deeply transformed Modernist architectural discourse, laying the groundwork in the 1950s for the 1970s emergence of a variety of Postmodernist aesthetics, such as Charles Moore ironic treatment of classical motifs, and Christian Norberg-Schulz’s methodical incorporation of natural landscapes as a source of formal inspiration in design. The intellectual path that led Rogers to question the modernist rejection of non-modern architecture is inseparable from Paci’s phenomenological project. Both Rogers and Paci were committed to interdisciplinarity and convinced that both mental and material labor were aspects of a more comprehensive life-project that suffused intellect and matter within an “original” experiential immediacy, and out of which allegedly sprung the progressive ethical tendencies of social and political commitment.

Rogers and Paci called upon architects to let their subjective egos and their objective works “emerge” out of a “primordial” realm of immediacy that Paci called “life-world” and Rogers described as “tradition.” For them, the belief that concepts were different from materials, or vice versa, accounted for the loss of meaning and direction that Modernism was experiencing in the postwar, as well as for architects’ inability to
control technology and to check the irrational dark side of enlightenment reason. The life-world, Rogers and Paci thought, was a structure structuring the core of both subjectivity and objectivity in history, a process of perpetual synthesis and disbandment upon which the being of all materials and concepts rested. They correlated the "crisis of reason" discussed by postwar intellectuals with a dismemberment of old forms in the life-world, and were earnestly convinced that a New Reason and a New Architecture would emerge in the next synthesis of the life-world.

The question of course was how the new synthesis would form itself in the present, and if the agency of people could encourage or delay it. This was not a self-evident process to most architects, so Rogers and Paci attempted to demonstrate it through their own practices presenting their own work as "liberated" from both the philosophical crisis of reason they identified with Croce, and the formal "mummification" of Modern shapes into architectural styles, which they believed was at work in functionalism.

B. The Phenomenological challenge to Idealism.

"Not since Goethe," stated Stuart Hughes speaking of Benedetto Croce, "had any single individual dominated so completely the culture of a major European country." From Antonio Gramsci's (1891-1937) political philosophy to Bruno Zevi's (1918-2000) architectural history, Italy began its post-war intellectual life under the aegis of Croce. He was editor of La Critica, an outspoken dissident against Fascism, a government Minister, and a Senator. He was one of the initiators of Latin Marxist studies --although he found Marx to be deterministic, and therefore at odds with his own commitment to
freedom. From his initial speculations on aesthetics, he would widen his scholarly work to produce a systematic philosophy, the philosophy of spirit, whose principal tenets on aesthetics were eventually embraced across cultural practices. His influence even extended to the English speaking world through the acceptance of many of his theories by R.G. Collingworth. By the late forties, however, it was clear that the experiences of the war, and the series of structural changes of the period immediately following the war, were beginning to break Croce’s hegemony. With the end of the war came a greater inter-dependence between European nations on all levels of culture, along with an internationalist spirit which would bring other continental intellectual trends to Italy.

The end of the war also brought with it a series of political accusations against Croce, including a series of shocking revelations about his previous allegiance to the Fascist régime, and about his later attempt to distance himself from Fascism by editing the content of his early essays so as to manipulate their meaning. Critics like Chester McArthur Destler depicted Croce as a nationalist that ridiculed pacifism, and that was openly against democracy, humanitarianism, and socialism. His philosophy was seen as a spring of proto-fascist ideology. For example, his *Filosofia della Pratica* (1908), where he assimilated thought to action in order to explore the philosophical aspects of will, action, and success, was read as a justification of the use of force in politics. In the same vein, his espousal of Giambattista Vico’s (1668-1744)\(^3\) theory of power and the state, and of the latter’s notion or recurrent barbarism, was now understood as granting philosophical dignity to the use of force to resolve public issues. Croce’s critics

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\(^3\) Giambattista Vico was an Italian philosopher who’s major work, *La Scienza Nuova* (1725, *The New Science*) attempted to bring together the systematic analytic methodology of the social sciences and history.
emphasized that between 1914 and 1919, he reasserted the amorality of politics and economics, and stressed that force alone was the basis of the state, of international law, and of all other types of law and right. Moreover, they argued, even after the Matteotti assassination by the Fascist régime, which Croce would later denounce, he gave Mussolini his vote as senator in the ensuing motion of confidence.  

In contrast to Croce, the spirit of commitment left over from the war experience boosted the popularity of “engaged” intellectuals, especially of those involved in the Resistance Movement. This was the case of Jean Paul Sartre for instance, who was at this time propelled to the level of cultural stardom. It was in this context that Robert Caponigri, a minor philosopher and Croce scholar, assessed the state of Italian post war philosophy to find the towering figure of Croce challenged by the rising presence of French Existentialism. According to Caponigri, existentialism first entered Italy through the attempts of Italian philosophers to “be fashionable” by joining the pan-European Paris-born intellectual fad. He argued that after this initial phase, Enzo Paci’s

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5 Sartre’s philosophy was central in shaping how many intellectuals of the postwar, including Enzo Paci and Ernesto Rogers, understood social commitment. World War II, and the subsequent liberation and the reconstruction of France, had occasioned a change in Sartre’s social philosophy. His previous conception of individual freedoms conflicting in the social field yielded to the existentialist notion of a “pact of freedoms.” In this latter articulation our choosing our own freedom meant choosing freedom for all our fellow beings. The liberation of human existence went from an escape into the world of beauty and art to a form of commitment to the social cause of revolution in the interest of the least free members of society.

6 Caponigri also notes the presence of a third movement Actualism, a dissolving formation out of which new trends are emerging such as Christian Spiritualism, and Neo-Scholasticism (a sort of Italian ‘New Criticism’). See A. Robert Caponigri, ”Italian Philosophy, 1943-50,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, n. 4, v. 11 (June 1951), pp 489-509.

7 As evidence of this, he argues that it is sufficient to note the fact that the existentialism of Kirkegaard, of Nietzsche, and of Heidegger, had its roots in spiritual crises which left Italian culture untouched. In addition, French existentialism was similarly rooted in a historical experience which Italy did not share. Moreover, one has to consider the fact that the new-idealistic movement governed Italian speculation for the first half of the twentieth century. See A. Robert Caponigri, ”Italian Philosophy, 1943-50,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, n. 4, v. 11 (June 1951)
hybridizing philosophical method could be counted as an “original” Italian development, given that Paci had placed phenomenology inside the larger construct of Crocean Idealism. Caponigri credited Paci with superlative “speculative power” for trying to establish a relationship between existentialism and the historicism of Italian Idealism. A goal that Caponigri found ironical, given Croce’s own criticisms of existentialism. “He [Paci] is convinced that the problems most intimate to historicism can be solved by the insights of existentialism, that historicism implies existentialistic premises, and that making these explicit destroys, not historicism, but only its panlogic façade.”

Despite Caponigri’s astonishment, Paci continued to assert his view of phenomenology as the necessary existential ground of idealism, and, by extension, of all aspects of Italian culture previously under the spell of Croce. He thus confronted idealism outside of philosophy proper, in other areas of study. Paci flooded the journals of other disciplines with his points of view, a tactic that afforded him a quick rise to cultural prominence. In particular, he became actively involved Casabella Continuita, the international architectural journal headed by Ernesto Rogers.

The fact that Rogers welcomed Paci to his editorial board can in part be explained in relation to the contemporary structural transformations of the Italian academy. The architectural profession was being “intellectualized” in part by the closing of the Beaux Arts academies and their integration with the university system. This brought about a shift in recruiting strategies for architecture professors, whose value was now estimated

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9 Ibid. p 507.
on the basis of their cultural production (i.e. books, articles). The members of the Architectural academe found themselves having to compete for a readership that would legitimize their institutional positions.

The new structure of architectural education in Italy would palpably change the scope and ambition of architectural projects and publications. The editorial staff that Rogers hired for Casabella Continuità soon succeeded in establishing the journal as Italy's standard-bearer of the modern movement and its heritage. Rogers' pre-war reputation as a socially responsible rationalist architect, or in the words of Reyner Banham as "the hero-figure of European architecture in the late Forties and early Fifties," gave the journal an almost instant credibility before a European audience eager to rebuild the continent according to a loosely defined modern humanism.

The very real problem of reconstruction centered these debates on the relation of Modern architecture to existing historical city centers. This put into question Modernism's claim to be a break with history, and required a new analysis of the formal language of Modernism, a new understanding of Modernism's dependence on the tradition of enlightenment reason, and for a clarification of the social and cultural responsibility of Modern architects. Paci and Rogers, met these challenges by attacking Croce's philosophy, which they identified as the source of all of Modernism's false

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11 "Without realizing what we were doing, we built up a mythical [Italian] architecture that we would like to see in our own countries, and architecture of social responsibility —stemming, we believed, from such political martyrs as Persico, Banfi, the younger Labo —and of formal architectonic purity—stemming from Lingeri, Figini, Terragni. This architecture, socially and aesthetically acceptable to men of goodwill, we saw embodied in the Milanese BBPR partnership, of which the first B was the martyred Banfi, the terminal R was Ernesto Rogers, the hero-figure of European architecture in the late Forties and early Fifties." Reyner Banham, "Neo-Liberty: The Italian Retreat from Modern Architecture," in *The Architectural Review*, n. 746 (March 1959), p 231.
claims. Instead, they introduced phenomenology as a new way of thinking about how Modern architecture involved history. They provided a compelling analysis architectural of form as the expression of Tradition, an empowering understanding of reason as emerging through practice, and a persuasive ethics for an engaged architectural practice that could give a sense of collective purpose to a war torn Europe.

II. Rogers and Pacl Politicize Postwar Architecture

A. The post war critique of Idealism’s lack of political commitment

Croce’s ascension to the pantheon of philosophy began with his work as a historian of the city of Naples. His dissatisfaction with this field lead him to a closer study of the nature of history, and in particular to the question of whether history was an art or a science. This research ultimately lead him to his first ruminations on aesthetics published as *The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General*, now considered his most influential early work.

The connection of *The Aesthetic* (as it would come to be known) to the tradition of Idealism, from Kant to Vico, is obvious. Croce began his systematic philosophy of the mind, or Philosophy of Spirit, by distinguishing between the intuitive knowledge of things in their particularity and the logical knowledge of general concepts. The functioning of the mind was thus divided in two stages: The first aesthetic (or theoretical) stage, and the second dependent logical (or practical) stage. In the first stage, Intuition, which is he regarded as the mind’s faculty of expression, grasped the otherwise inchoate jumble of sensorial stimuli, and expressed them as a particular form, making the world appear coherent to the perceiving subject. For Croce, this activity expressed the subject’s “categorical freedom.” Croce proceeded to make art and intuition identical to each other,
as forms of aesthetic world making. Aesthetic activity was thus limited to expressive acts, such as intuition and art, and was the pre-condition for any abstract conceptual process. Only after the particular elements of the world had been expressed into understandable forms could the subject use his or her conceptual or logical powers to extract general principles from the particulars.

Intuition and reason were 'theoretical' powers, on which a person's 'practical' powers were based. Croce divided this second practical stage into two more sub-stages: the economic and the moral. In the economic the subject tried to achieve what he or she had first intuited, and in the moral stage he or she distinguished between what ought and what ought not to be wanted. This is why, for Croce, aesthetic expression was, insofar as it was pre-practical, also a-moral.\textsuperscript{12} Morality was a choice between particular choices that existed, and this meant that morality could not be present until aesthetic intuition has done its work. Even though individuals could not help themselves from intuiting certain aesthetic visions, like killing someone, they could refrain from putting them into practice. That decision was, for Croce, a moral problem.

Although from 1925 to 1943 Croce had lead the intellectual resistance to Italian Fascism, after the war he retreated to a relatively conservative and static political position. The 1940s' and 1950s' demands for a greater degree of social responsibility

\textsuperscript{12} As a further corollary of his initial argument Croce concludes that there are no fundamental rules for the creation of art. The argument that art and expression are fundamentally the same, apparently commits Croce to the view that any expression is art, or that any object could be art. To prevent this, Croce emphasizes human agency as a basis of judgment: Since art involves freely creative human expression, then it is, first, different from nature. Second, if art is expression, then what makes an object art, is not its physicality, but its expressive content, or its ability to unify particulars into a coherent form. This last point would become the extraordinarily influential view that a work of art is an "organic unity" —it is the origin, for instance, of Bruno Zevi's "organic architecture," which stood less for an art that followed from a "natural" expression of architectural form and function (as in the American organic architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright and Louis Sullivan), and more from a conception of the mind's behavior.
made it difficult for intellectuals to accept a philosophy where morals were absent from aesthetic forms of expression. Paci and Rogers joined in the critique of Croce’s inability to incorporate the Fascist and Nazi experience into his historicist vision. Croce would defend himself by claiming that the political content of his work was often missed. He argued that because he aimed to affect the outcome of politics as a whole, he kept himself from addressing the obviously political:

Do [my critics] believe that I was not engaged in politics when writing, for example, my History of the Kingdom of Naples, [a work] which would never have been born without my political passion for the past and the present? Do they think I would have behaved more usefully if I had intruded among the politicians or [engaged in] the daily political chase? ... In fact my book penetrates minds and souls and I see it continually recalled... in the problems that concern Italian life and the conditions of Southern Italy. And that is... [the nature] of my best and most enduring “political work.”13

**B. Paci’s engaged life-world vs. Croce’s a-political aesthetics**

Paci’s critique of Croce’s ethical claims regarding aesthetic expression came first in the form of a corrective. In *Esistenzialismo e Storicismo* (*Existentialism and Historicism*, 1950), Paci argued that Croce’s theory of spirit could be accepted as more or less normative. However, its conception of the *origin* of spirit was flawed. It was true, as Croce claimed in relation to the second practical stage of the mind, that utility was at the moment of emergence of spirit, but for Paci, phenomenological description proved that spirit rested on an existentialist basis: the dawn of the spirit lied where there was no spirit, where there was only the *pure possibility of existence*. Paci went deeper into the concept of utility to prove his point. He charged that Croce’s notion of spirit was an attempt to absorb utility into the absolute principle of self-consciousness without
recognizing that utility lied beyond it. Utility, argued Paci, was an existential and a-rational element that had to stand at the basis of every construction, not just those of the mind. In this way, Paci inserted his phenomenology inside Idealism, not as a simple part of Croce's philosophy, but as its necessary foundation.

Paci would later work out his differences with Croce in the pages of *Casabella* presenting architects with a new possibility for a moral and ethical practice. As in his earlier critique of Croce's Spirit, Paci returned to the principle of utility to argue his case. The definition, in early Crocean aesthetics, of art as an autonomous, theoretical, disinterested and a-moral form of the spirit put into question whether architecture, with its necessarily utilitarian aspects, was an art or not. Later in life Croce had argued that there was not such a radical break between the aesthetic and the utilitarian, but that issues of function were actually contained in aesthetic forms. Paci however, found that both of Croce's positions sublimated function into the expressive form. For Paci, utility was a constitutive part of a pre-existing mondo della vita, which he defined as Husserl's Lebenswelt (life-world). Therefore, any authentically new creation, being by definition called forth by the life-world itself through life-projects, would necessarily have utility at its origin. Even though Croce created an antithesis where what was functionally utilitarian could not be art, and what was beautiful could not be functional, Paci argued that Croce's conception of the beautiful contained the utilitarian and the ethical in sublimated form, because utility was at the origin of any project. It was an existential pre-existence. Croce's misunderstanding of utility made him ignore the socio-historical relationships which structured and limited all aesthetic forms, and which gave art its

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moral content. Croce’s original sin, to continue with Paci’s objections, was to separate vital experience from aesthetic form. Form could only be born out of “authentic” lived engagements with the life-world:

If by experience that is historical, natural, social, and so on, one understands the contained [contenuto] and by style rhythm and measure, which give a spatial constructive architectural order to experience, one understands form, the result is that a new form, which has an authentic aesthetic value, can only be born if one returns to the contained and in that we are immersed making new and living experience. 15

Thus, Paci offered the possibility of a moral architectural practice at the price of each architect’s commitment to a new kind life project: immediacy in experience. Paci’s structure of lived experience described the relationship between nature and aesthetic forms, or between the life-world and architecture. To live authentically meant to engage in life projects, to create the new, according to the structure of the “life-world.” The problem, cautioned Paci, was that people were used to experiencing the world through concepts. They constructed a-priori abstractions, or pre-judices, that kept them from living on the plane of immediacy. They therefore failed to fully experience the life-world. Because they fell short of living “authentically,” they missed the world in its full complexity and inter-connectedness.

Paci encouraged architects to suspend abstract scientific prejudices and to fully experience the life-world as “the living flux of experience.” 16 He argued strongly against theorizing experience, and proposed instead that it should simply be “felt.” Theory, for

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15 “Se per esperienza storica, naturale, sociale, e così via, si intende il contenuto e se per stile ritmo e misura, che danno un ordine spaziale costruttivo architettonico alla esperienza, si intende la forma, ne risulta che una nuova foma, che abbia un valore estetico autentico, può nascere soltanto se si ritorna al contenuto e in esso cisi immerge facendone nuova e viva esperienza.” My translation. Enzo Paci, , “L’architettura e il mondo della vita,” in Casabella Continuità, n. 217 (December 1957), p 54.
16 Ibid. p 54.
Paci, was an abstraction that removed the architect from the life-world. This anti-theory position would become a central theme in the career of phenomenology within architectural discourse. In the 1970s, Charles Moore, Christian Norberg-Schulz, and Kenneth Frampton would return to the claim that theory “alienated” architects from reality in order to oppose the neo-avant-garde’s claims about architecture’s autonomy. The touchstone of all this opposition, of this anti-avant-gardism, was a belief in the emancipating power of immediate aesthetic experiences. For these anti-avant-garde architects and historians, “true” experiences of the world would reveal the avant-garde’s “deformation” of culture, and open people to an “authentic” knowledge of reality. By demoting theory, they empowered practice as the source of a much-desired new epistemology. The paradoxical downside of these interdisciplinary intellectual exchanges between architecture and philosophy was that this contributed to the de-intellectualization of architectural practice. Indeed, Paci discouraged architects from getting too involved in philosophy. Architects, he argued, didn’t need refined philosophical logic to objectively know how to live authentically. They required only their subjective experiences. The task of the architect, insisted Paci, was just to be experientially open to the life-world, for then the life-world itself would call the architect’s life-work in the direction of the new. For Paci, the life-world itself tended towards forms, not only spiritual forms as in Croce’s thinking, but also towards corporeal, natural forms.

The separation of the architect’s subjective experience from the analytic methods and academic rigor of philosophy encouraged, needless to say, the projection of Selfhood as the ultimate ground for validation, and the camouflaging of a wanting objectivity behind the veils of artistic confidence. The ideological nature of Paci’s notion of
experience became evident in his directives to architects. Valid new architectural styles, Paci declared, could only be born out of the architect’s union with the life-world, out of the moment where individuals could no longer distinguish themselves from the world:

It is nature itself, it is the materials themselves, the geographical and social environment of which we make lived experience, in which we identify ourselves, which move in us and which we move in that nature and that environment, until the point where we no longer know if it is nature and history that search for new forms in us, or if it is us who search the forms towards which nature and history seem to be directed. 17

C. The life-world as origin of Objectivity and Subjectivity

Paci’s understanding of the life-world was deeply indebted to the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). Paci often turned to the French phenomenologist to describe it as an ambiguous realm, where neither subject nor object was clearly identifiable, and where both were intimately fused. As early as 1933, Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of new developments in the empirical field of the behavioral sciences, and more particularly in the field of German Gestalt psychology, lead him to attempt an approach to the phenomena different from the strict division between subject and object. 18 He brought phenomenology to psychology with a tactic not dissimilar to Paci’s approach to architecture. He claimed that phenomenology did not invade psychology,

17 Ibid. p 54.
18 Merleau-Ponty was interested in liberating empirical psychology from the tradition of “critical” philosophy in the early stages of his career. In a short grant proposal submitted to the Caisse National des Sciences on April 8 1933, entitled “Study Project on the Nature of Perception (1933),” Merleau-Ponty makes a case for a new study of perception in light of the new findings of “Gestalt” psychology and neurology. The experiments conducted in these two different fields suggest for him that the body is indeed productive of sense-knowledges that are independent of intellectual elaborations. This puts into question the tradition of critical philosophy, which from Descartes to Kant conceived of sensations as an incoherent set of data which is mediated and structured by the mind. His essay from the following year, entitled “The Nature of Perception,” (1934) rejects psychology’s Kantian or neo-Kantian epistemology (and by extension also of Croce’s epistemology), whereby perceiving consists of applying intellectual interpretations to sensations or sensory signs. He objects to the description of perception either as a “brute given” or a “construction,” and argues that both empiricism and critical philosophy construct facts for which there is no tangible evidence in perception.
but revitalized it: "It is a matter of renewing psychology on its own terrain," he wrote, "of bringing to life the methods proper to it by analyses which fix the fundamental essences such as ‘representation,’ ‘memory,’ etc."\textsuperscript{19}

Merleau-Ponty was interested in \textit{Gestalt} psychology because it supposed a radical break with previous theories of perception and therefore implied a new theory of knowledge. He believed that the experiments of \textit{Gestalt} psychology invalidated the Kantian paradigm that perception depended on the intellectual capacity of memory, knowledge, and judgment to organize a chaotic ensemble of multiple sensorial inputs. Instead \textit{Gestalt} posited that the body spontaneously organized the perceptual field into wholes containing "supposed" elements, and which were contained within larger wholes. Influenced by Gestalt psychology, Merleau-Ponty argued that the recognition of form did not exclusively depend on the imposition of concepts themselves onto the material world; “there is no matter without form; there are only organizations, more or less stable, more or less articulated.”\textsuperscript{20} For him, objects did not stand out because of their “meaning,” but because they possessed special structures which made them identifiable as “figures” against a “ground.”\textsuperscript{21} By the same token, he maintained that space “is not the occasion of a judgment, but the cause of a neural process of which we know only the conscious

\textsuperscript{21} It is important to note two things at this point: first, Merleau-Ponty's structural mode of thinking does not refer to structures as first principles. Second, presence is not at the center of his theory of perception. Merleau-Ponty integrates the Gestalt structure vertically into non-causal superstructures, resulting in a vertical structural composition of specific strata of phenomena and behavior, which itself is based on a structural genesis. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the real appears as a description of structures. Structure itself is a fundamental reality because, for anything to appear, it must differentiate itself from its context. Structure is degree and direction of differentiation in experience. Thus, figure and ground embody a "primordial difference" which structures the experiential world. The formation of sense is a continual structuring, or transformation.
outcome, in the form of an impression of depth." All this suggested, for Merleau-Ponty, that the Kantian distinction between the world of things and an immanent consciousness needed to be revisited.

During the mid 1930s, Merleau-Ponty studied Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method in search for alternative models for understanding objectivity and subjectivity. In Husserl's intentionality of consciousness he found an entirely new philosophy of perception, "a theory of knowledge absolutely distinct from that of Critical thought," because it did not rely on a parallelism between internal and external worlds, between the conceptual and the material, as the basis for its epistemology. But reconciling Gestalt psychology with Husserl's phenomenology was not easy. Husserl had criticized Gestalt as a theory of pre-given wholes which repeats atomism on a higher level. To counter this claim, Merleau-Ponty argued that the formation of the Gestalt themselves concerned the organization of both internal and external worlds. As such, Merleau-Ponty though that it disclosed the functioning of Husserl's life-world [Lebenswelt].

A Gestalt, argued Merleau-Ponty, was a "structure of structures" that extended physiologically into the anatomical structures of the brain, creating an internal horizontal relation between specific milieus (or worlds) and corresponding (bodily) behaviors. Merleau-Ponty was interested in the Gestalt because he thought that it foiled attempts to make it into something either purely subjective or objective. Thus, the Gestalt provided an insight into a dimension of immediacy, that had structure and form, meaning and

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sense, but that was prior to either subjectivity or objectivity. Therefore, for Merleau-Ponty, structure and form were neither subjective nor objective, neither things nor ideas. They emerged in the life-world, which he viewed as a process of self-organization of experiential, linguistic and actional fields that was independent of preexisting principles, and was prior to individual events and separate elements.24

With *La Structure du Comportement* (1942) Merleau-Ponty subjected the concept of immediacy to a radical reinterpretation by claiming that the meaning, the structure, and the spontaneous arrangements of parts, all lied at the origin of experience. He established the identity of internal and external worlds in the experience of *Gestalten*. Because the *Gestalt* did not appeal to a-priori reason to explain itself (i.e. showing itself was identical with articulating itself), Merleau-Ponty concluded that rationality and subjectivity arose within experience itself. He identified the formation of the *Gestalt* with the spontaneous structuring of an experiential field where the “I” appeared, under certain conditions, and never in full control of the process.

If with his concept of the immediately experientiable life-world, Merleau-Ponty had put into question the existence of a centering consciousness so dear to the tradition of metaphysics, then, thought Paci, the life-world, radically understood in terms of structures and *Gestalts*, also undermined Croce’s idealism (where phenomena found their

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23 To construct this new understanding of the Life-world, Merleau-Ponty had to move away from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, whose work had initially turned Merleau-Ponty to phenomenology. Husserl never really gave credit to these new sciences. He only spoke of them to criticize them.

24 This idea of the Life-world has been criticized for not completely resolving Husserl’s description. It can be said that Merleau-Ponty concretizes Husserl’s “Logos of the aesthetic world” and shifts the transcendental dimension to a pre-egological region. See, for example Bernhard Waldenfels, “Perception and Structure in Merleau-Ponty,” in *Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure, Language*, ed. John Sallis, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), pp 21-38.
culmination in a pure presence for a consciousness which was present to itself.25 Thus, Paci used the notion of life-world to mount his attack of Croce in the pages of *Casabella Continuità*, and to offer the promise of a renewed architectural practice. If architects could only shed Idealism, and gain access to the structure of the life-world, then, he argued, a new architecture would emerge in “natural harmony” with both the environment and humanity. The problem for architects of course, was that access to the life-world came at the price of abandoning reasoned analysis, and suspending critical inquiry into the methods employed in the quest for authentic experience.

Paci’s writings picked up the language of contemporary architectural conversations about how to reconcile the pressing needs of expanding populations and the limited environmental resources of the world. Since the CIAM VIII on “The Core of The City” held in Hoddesdon (1951), modern architects had been debating ways to rethink functionalism in terms of a more complete understanding of the material and emotional needs of individuals. Paci’s understanding of the life-world allowed Ernesto Rogers to distinguish himself from other senior participants at the congress. Even the title of his address, “The Heart: Human Problems of Cities,” bespoke his belief in a realm of existence, prior to subjectivity and objectivity, within which the common forms of humanity and world disbanded and re-synthesized in the course of history. The task of the architect, he argued echoing Paci, was to give expression to the new synthesis of modernism, which he saw coalescing in the aftermath of the collapse of functionalism’s ideals. To feel the new synthesis, architects had to “take in” the full reality of the life-world, and this, he argued could be done by looking “inside” and “feeling” how the life -

25 By questioning subjective consciousness, Merleau-Ponty risked sacrificing individual agency. He tried to address this problem in his last, unfinished work, *Le Visible et L’invisible.*
world emerged within. Rogers thought that his experientialist “functional method” was at the “root of our creative process,” and could therefore be worked by any architect anywhere, regardless of culture and education. It resolved the contradictions faced by CIAM as it sought to preserve its ideology of universality in a world political context marked by the divisions of national wars of independence, and Cold War politics:

In CIAM, our responsibilities for town planning now extend from one extreme of the globe to the other, from cultural stratification to the historic present, each distinct and often contradictory. [...] In spite of differing cultural and economic conditions, everyone can profit to a certain extent by technical progress in order to embrace the widest horizon of experience; but the sources of artistic expression always remain to be found within the depths of each of us.  


Rogers was respected among the young generation of architects attending CIAM for willingness to engage in dialogue with junior members. His commitment to

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27 I learned this from Vittorio Gregotti, who belonged to the generation immediately following Rogers's, and who worked with Rogers as part of the editorial board of Casabella in the 1960s, during an interview I conducted in Milan, Italy, on June 30 2000. Parts of that interview were published as "Interview with Vittorio Gregotti: The Role of Phenomenology in the Formation of the Italian Neo-Avant-Garde," in Thresholds, n. 21 (Fall 2000), pp 40-46.
education led him to be a part of the Commission on education at CIAM VIII, where he successfully furthered his agenda to combine empirical research with "more unprejudiced adventures of fancy." Rogers believed that international architecture had to be "personified in the individuality of the artists and characterizes itself in local genius." These words would later echo in the writings on *Genius Loci* of Christian Norberg-Schulz, a young student of Siegfried Giedion who was present at the meetings as representative of the Norwegian CIAM youth group, and who would later turn to Heidegger's phenomenology in search for the key to achieving the type of "authentic" experience required by Rogers of good architects. The belief in the ability of local genius to give character to "universal" architecture made an impact in the younger generation, which began to split from the old modernist guard of Le Corbusier, and become concerned with issues of identity, scale, and meaning. Paci's writings about humanity and world in terms of the life-world, were aimed at encouraging this new generation to break away from the modernist canon and search for new kinds of architectural practices that would release the creative potential that he felt was locked in the structures of the life-world. By 1953, CIAM IX's attempted to widen its scope under the theme of "Habitat" to incorporate some of the youth groups's concerns about how to best design the environment for human society. But the seed of dissent had been planted.

After the congress, Alison and Peter Smithson, Jacob Bakema, Aldo van Eyck, and other

29 Ibid. p 71.
30 Norberg-Schulz published some of the proceedings from CIAM in his publication *TEAM*. He was particularly interested in the views of the commission on education at CIAM VIII, which he published as Walter Gropius, Ernesto N. Rogers, C. van Eesteren, S. Gideon, Serge Chermayeff, Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, "CIAM 8, Commission 3: Report on Architectural Education," in *TEAM: Collaboration of Young*
young members rejected the mechanized functionalism of CIAM’s Athens Charter and emphasized instead the primacy of human experience as the basis for urban planning.

These young CIAM groups rejected Rogers, who had done so much to further their position, as part of the old guard. His “betrayal” of the Modernist canon, as Reyner Banham would charge, also earned Rogers the denunciation of his own generation. Feeling akin to the revision of Modernism being carried out by emerging architects, Rogers attempted to continue the project of CIAM. He joined Jacob Bakema, Alfred Roth, John Voelcker, and André Wogensky in a committee to plan the next CIAM XI meeting at Otterlo in 1959. But Rogers was isolated in his belief that the synthesis of local and universal building methods was a modernist project, for which modern architects were responsible. Only 43 participants attended CIAM XI. Most of the leaders of the ‘old guard’, including Le Corbusier, Siegfried Giedion, Walter Gropius, José Luis Sert and J. Tyrwhitt, were conspicuously absent. And yet, their bedrock modernist belief that the avant-garde architect had to break free from the strictures of the present in order to move society forward, was sustained precisely in Rogers’s emancipating experientialism, which posited that architects could liberate themselves from the conventions of modernism by reaching into their innermost depths and “feeling” the life-world.

D. Paci’s life-world as Roger’s Tradition

Paci and Rogers understood culture as an expression of the life-world. Therefore, every moral engagement with cultural activities (such as architecture) required, first and foremost, a correct experience of the life-world. Rogers shared Paci’s conviction that an
architect’s ability to engage culture politically and morally rested on his or her capacity to fully grasp the life-world. The revision of Modernism required, for them, the ability of the young generations to understand the need to re-think subjectivity and objectivity in terms of the life-world. Having in a sense given up hope on their own generation, both men became deeply committed to the education of young architects. Rogers presided over CIAM’s commission for education, and Paci mentored young architects—such as Vittorio Gregotti (b. 1927)—at the university.

Rogers translated “life-world” into “tradition,” a word that fit more smoothly into the discourse of architecture. Rogers’s Casabella editorials (written between 1953 and 1964) are best described as a relentless attempt to redefine the architectural meaning of “tradition.” If the present world was the compounded result of accumulating interpretations of historical presents, he argued, the present material world in a sense “contained” history. For Rogers, tradition was the intersection of that material-history with human activity as tradition, a sphere that, like Paci’s life-world, preceded both subjectivity and objectivity. Thus, no object or person was simply a static thing. The identity of every-thing was de-stabilized by history, which revealed all entities as processes of change. Short of ascribing a progressivist telos to tradition, Rogers argued that it “tended” towards new expressions of itself. This argument led him to assert that the postwar reconstruction had to respond to the evolving demands of tradition, and not just to the subjective fantasies of Modern architecture.

For Rogers, then, the task ahead of the new generation of architects was clear: to give formal expression to the present tendencies of tradition in order to contribute to the
evolution of world history. Rogers thought that by attending to needs of tradition to resolve itself in ever-new formations, architects would be acting out their ethical commitment to both the material and the conceptual worlds. New architectural forms, Rogers insisted, were "responsible" only when they interpreted the past (as contained in the present) and projected it onto the future. This kind of responsibility required that the architect help create new forms by working from within tradition. To work within tradition meant that architects could not remain exclusively concerned with either materials or ideas. They had to reach deeper and discover the plane of experiential immediacy that was tradition. Rogers felt that architects could achieve this by limiting their design interpretations to place specific building forms, by literally "using" the materials that were already "there" and thinking "through them." In order to participate in tradition, Rogers concluded, architecture had to be built. By building, architects could participate in the continuous historical reshaping of the world. This, for Rogers, was "true" progress. To ignore history or building, the conceptual or the material, was to fall into the myth that the present existed outside of the past-present-future tradition-continuum:

By drawing the greatest possible energy from everything surrounding us, we favor the creative process of our works which, far from negatively conditioning those [works] already present, reinforce them, for we are building a bridge between the past and the future. The future partly depends on us, just as we partly depend on the past: tradition is this perpetual flow and to be modern means to feel oneself consciously a part, an active part, of this process. Those who do not feel in this way are not fully responsible "modern" artists and might simply be defined "contemporary", which means that it belongs to our age only in the
chronological sense, without having sensed and expressed its deepest content.31

E. Tradition as ethical cultural progress

To give expression to tradition was, following Rogers, to help move the wheels of progress. He understood traditional practices and modern technologies as the dialectical poles in the equation of "cultural" progress.32 The true emancipation of society, he argued, could not take place just through technological advance. Both poles had to move forth in history. Thus, the responsibility of architects to tradition, expressed their commitment to the progressive evolution, not just of Modernism, but of humanity.

Rogers extended his analysis of progress to deliver one of his strongest critical blows to the Modern movement. In his eyes, the "crisis" of rationalism was the result of a misguided conflation of architecture with science and technology that overlooked tradition. The crisis, he argued, was not a function of the collapse of the democratic conceptions that had allegedly stood as the ideological scaffolding of rationalism -- rationalism's success under fascism attested to this fact.33 Rather, Modernism's crisis was the result of its break with tradition.

Rogers considered that this break with tradition was not an ontological trait of Modernism. Rather, it was the result of a premature economic success that encouraged technological development over research into production and life. This tendency now threatened the very existence of Modernism. In the absence of history, Modernism had degenerated into a formalism and routine professionalism devoid of political content.

31 My translation from Ernesto Nathan Rogers, "Tradizione e actualità nel disegno," in Zodiac, n. 1 (1957), p 272. See also the general discussion of Tradition in pp 95-102, 247-251, 269-274.
Rogers argued that the possibility of progress resided in a historically aware architecture that moved forward together with society and culture. Architecture could not claim to free the people alone; to do so would be to idealistically sidestep tradition. Only when the people were delivered from oppression could they develop an architecture expressive of a free society.

With his phenomenological revision of the concept of tradition, Roger's offered an alternative to collective involvement in aesthetic expression. “Culture,” he affirmed, was the union of the historical, the social, and the technical. “Our European history, if it is to continue its evolution progressively, must aim to transform all policy into culture and to base its actions on the necessity of this culture.” Rogers thus premised the ethical responsibility of Modern architecture upon each architect’s commitment not to other individuals, but to culture and tradition.

Enzo Paci’s reinterpretation of Marx through phenomenology, added the critique of bourgeois culture to Roger’s notion of cultural progress. Paci returned to Husserl’s subjective concreteness of lived experience (as a force opposing the abstract objectivity and reified knowledge of the sciences) and combined it with Marx’s critique of the abstract and reified social exchanges resulting from capitalist forms of production. The result was an equation where the sum of science, technology, and the division of labor were equally destructive to the proper individuation of the subject. Paci argued for a return to a non-alienated subject, a subject that could “found” the scientific praxis destined to alienate him or her. The dominant theme in Paci’s union of Husserl and Marx

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33 For a defense of this position see Giulio Carlo Argan would have it in his article on Marcel Breuer.
was the refusal of the universe of science and technology, and the reaffirmation of
philosophy as capable of generating a univocal sense of the world.  

In contrast to Paci, Rogers did not discard science and technology wholesale, they
too had to be integrated into new form. Architecture could only give new meaningful
sense to the world by incorporating and transforming all aspects of reality. In one of his
later editorials entitled “Appunti sul Fenomeno Architettonico” [Notes on the
Architectural Phenomenon] Rogers attempted a more complete rendering of what he
meant by architecture’s ability to give sense to the world. Architecture, he wrote, was a
“tendency” towards historical unity of all the elements that constituted it, namely: the
designer’s intentions, the cultural and socio-political historical climate in which he or she
operated, the architectural object, and the society that used the object. Architecture
existed between subject and object as both and neither. For Rogers, this expanded field
of architecture had the capacity to synthesize the dialectically opposed forces of science
and technology, with their tendency towards specialization and individuation, and art,
with its tendency towards collectivity, creating “true cultural progress.” But this could
only be achieved if everyone lived self-consciously as “totally free” and “totally social”
individuals. Tacitly evoking Sartre’s notion of political commitment expressed through
action, Rogers described synthesis as the only “authentic” architectural action. By
expressing its own synthetic essence, architecture became the vehicle necessary for a
self-conscious, and therefore free society. It served as the interface uniting two opposing

35 Salvatore Veca, “Filosofia Italiana e Marxismi Eterodossi,” in Filosofia Italiana e Filosofie Straniere nel
36 Ernesto N. Rogers, “Appunti Sul Fenomeno Architettonico. II,” in Casabella Continuità, n. 266 (August
1962), pp 1-3.
forces "one centrifugal that will go from each individual to all the others, and the other centripetal that from all the others should go to the singular." 37

Rogers’ article struck against the founding myths of modernism’s social contract by shifting the possibility of immediate identification between subject and object from the social to the individual. In modern times, he argued, the immediate identity between architectural and social forms is no longer available, possible, or even desirable since it led too easily to totalitarian impositions. In clear reference to the later fascist life of Italian rationalism, Rogers earmarked the experience of the war as a turning point in tradition. Appealing to Sartre’s existentialism, he argued that the only alternative left was individual self-consciousness, and a commitment to the social expressed through action. If each individual developed himself as a member and a reflection of his or her collectivity, then he or she would at the same time open him or herself towards the collective ‘other’ and it would in turn be open to him.

Rogers believed that a new type of architectural design experience, one in which the architect surrendered to the demands of tradition, could provide the kind of social cohesion needed for cultural progress. Rogers shifted intentionality out of both subject and object and into the middle realm of tradition (or life-world). He turned architecture into the medium necessary for achieving a collective self-consciousness, a common identity. Thus, collective emancipation came at the price of a new impotence in critical interpretation. To be responsible, the architect had to withhold from imposing his own ego against the flow of tradition:

In architectural action, as in political and social instances, egocentric individualism can only lead to disintegration and it is therefore necessary that personal forces instead of closing themselves in, as self-exaltation or exhibitionism, flow into the personality of the work. [...] It is evident that the personality of the work and the personality of the artist are symmetrical definitions of a same reality, but I think it convenient to insist on the different accentuation, because the result is undoubtedly conditioned by the differing intentionality with which it is addressed from the start. \textsuperscript{38}

III. Spontaneous collectivity

A. Theorizing Tradition as the experiential union of individual and collective

Art, architecture and nature were for Rogers expressions of the same phenomenon: tradition. As such, the responsibility of the architect extended beyond mere buildings to the entire territory or landscape. Therefore, both architecture and the environment had to be cared for by humanity and made to serve the needs of tradition as they evolved in time. Roger's tradition as life-world gained impetus as a way to address the problems associated with postwar reconstruction. In light of the mass migrations of low-income workers, the Milanese architectural profession was called to achieve a new harmony between the rising population and the existing landscape. In the pages of \textit{Casabella}, Rogers beckoned Italian architects to open themselves up to tradition, and to let it guide the transformation of the real. Otherwise, he cautioned, Italians would fail to express the true dimensions of their present, and therefore would turn into a spiritually bankrupt nation. \textsuperscript{39}


By appending “Continuità” to the title of Casabella Rogers highlighted the philosophical problem of the new, and gave it a phenomenological twist. Historians to date have chosen to discuss the new title of the magazine as invoking the extension of the pre-war rationalist project, which Rogers and his business partners Antonio Banfi, Ludovico Belgiojoso, and Enrico Peresutti (who were known as the BBPR group) had helped forge. This is in part true, but what becomes clear from Rogers regular editorials,
and from his buildings, is that by “continuità” he meant something far more expansive and profound than mere allegiance to a stylistic movement. He was taking a philosophical stance on how architects should relate to the existing and to history, that was on the one hand, self-consciously at odds with Croce, and on the other hand, decisively privy to Paci’s conception of how history is “authentically lived” in the plane of the life-world.

The 1950s debate over the relation of architecture to history was in part a new formulation of an earlier conflict between Roman and Milanese architects over the lessons of vernacular or “spontaneous” architecture. The exhibition of photographs on rural Italian architecture that Giuseppe Pagano, Rogers’s antecessor as director of Casabella, put on view at the 1936 Milan Trienale set the initial positions of the debate. While the Milanese saw the photographs as a lesson in rationality, the Romans read them as a way to advance totally determinate formal techniques. After the war, Rogers rekindled the debate with new terminology, but his audience was no longer limited to Italy. The second half of the 20th century witnessed a veritable explosion of interest in the study of vernacular architecture, which would challenge the assumptions of a field dominated by Germany since the 1850s. The wholesale revision of dates through

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40 In 1929 and 1930 Eduardo Persico and Giuseppe Pagano assumed the positions of director and editor-in-chief of Casabella respectively. Their objective was to help advance a resolutely modern Italian architecture. To this end they kept a close look on every European progressive tendency. From the start Casabella was a forum open to both built projects and intellectual efforts. Architects such as Persico were published next to historians such as Giulio Carlo Argan and Lionello Venturi, or the writer Carlo Levi. Persico and Pagano’s stewardship also made the magazine into the main venue for the dissemination of Italian Rationalism, as initiated by the 1926 manifesto of the famous Gruppo 7—which was formed in 1926 by seven students from the Scuola Superiore di Architettura del Politecnico in Milan, including Giuseppe Terragni, Guido Frette, Ubaldo Castagnoli, Sebastiano Larco, Carlo Enrico Rava, Luigi Figini and Gino Pollini. In addition to Casabella, the international importance of rationalism was also due to the Gruppo 7’s exhibitions (Stuttgart, Werkbund exhibition of 1927, and Rome, M.I.A.R. 1928), competitions, and writings. See Vittorio Gregotti, New Directions in Italian Architecture, (New York: George Braziller, 1968), pp 13-16. When the BBPR group was founded in Milan in 1932, they presented a joint written introduction referring to their support of the Gruppo 7’s manifesto and of the Modern movement.

dendrochronology put into question the early work of Georg Landau, whose reading of Germanic house types as expressions of folk culture, set the pattern for his many successors in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Groups and societies sprung up. The German Arbeitskreis für Hausforschung (1950) and the British Vernacular Architecture Group (1954, publishing since 1970 the only international journal on the subject, Vernacular Architecture) were followed in the USA by the Vernacular Architecture Forum (1979). Rogers brought this new interest on the vernacular to bear on the Modern tradition, and challenged architects to take command of this more extensive field of building practice. By 1964 the relevance of the vernacular to the Modern tradition was so accepted that New York’s Museum of Modern Art, would finally give a green light to Bernard Rudofsky’s exhibition of photographs “Architecture Without Architects.”

Pagano’s “Spontaneous architecture” of the 1930s became a part of Rogers’ more expansive 1950s conceptual ensemble called tradition, which encompassed all the physical and conceptual materials present in the physical world, and was supposed to determine how people experienced them. Tradition was a sort of middle realm, this side of the subject object split, which gave temporal coherence to objective reality, and to subjective and collective experience. Rogers accused “national-popular” architects, who claimed to return to the roots of the vernacular, of being formalists and of mummifying tradition. They failed to grasp that tradition was not just a series of historical forms. Tradition, contended Rogers, had two components: The first was “vertical” and “static,” attached to places and to their internal coherence; the second was what he called “circular” and “dynamic,” connecting all phenomena through human exchange. Because

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new populists architects only copied the formal vocabulary of the vernacular, charged Rogers, they failed to renew it by integrating it into the evolving total history through the selective mediation of culture. Rogers argued for a Pacian “synthesis” of meanings and forms guided by tradition: a force-field with one vector emanating from the “people” and another returning to them.

Rogers proposed the synthesis of tradition in contradistinction to Croce’s a-moral aesthetics, which were defended at the time by architectural historians such as Bruno Zevi and others. Rogers made it clear that this kind of aesthetic practice was all about politics and ethics. The architect had a “moral” responsibility to tradition. Only through tradition could he or she be simultaneously committed to the collective subjectivity of “the people,” to objective reality, and to his or her own subjective interpretations. The task of the architect was to synthesize tradition, or the life-world, to capture the Truth of his or her lived history.43

B. Existentialist underpinnings to the notion of Tradition as collectivity

The appeal of Rogers’ theory of architectural experience as collective consciousness can be best understood against the background of Sartre’s popular existentialism, which emphasized the immediacy of bodily experience as the source of one’s consciousness of the collective.44 In the years immediately following World War

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44 Manfredo Tafuri, a member of the generation following Rogers', would later speculate that post-war architects too easily conflated knowledge with action in their search for alternative epistemologies that could help culture move beyond the crisis of reason. He contends that because of their self-imposed ethics of social responsibility they colluded theory and practice failing to see their dialectical relationship. Tafuri holds Heidegger accountable for what he views as an epistemological fallacy. Thus, Tafuri flattens the early dialogue of architectural discourse with phenomenology under the shadow of Heidegger, and casts it


II, Sartre’s philosophy was a breath of fresh air for those architects looking to transcend what appeared at the time as the bankrupt tradition of enlightenment reason. In L’Étre et le néant (1943) Sartre emphasized the activistic features of human existence based on the free nature of consciousness, which he also referred to as the “for-itself.” The “for-itself” was not an Idealist consciousness of pure presence, for which all of reality appears uniformly, it was a consciousness that was deeply bound up in the world, and which did not entirely define human beings. The absolute freedom and responsibility of consciousness was, according to Sartre, the foundation of human existence, and each individual’s being was ultimately derived from his or her bodily action. Unlike Martin Heidegger, Sartre’s reworking of Husserl’s phenomenology gave a great deal of attention to how bodily experience made an individual’s “for-itself” encounter its own self and that of others, thus entering into a conflict among incompatible freedoms. 45 Through this

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45 Although Heidegger and Sartre owe much to Husserl’s phenomenology, it is necessary to point out that both were original thinkers who contested Husserl’s philosophy and moved phenomenology in their own unique directions. In the case of Heidegger, differences with Husserl are worked out in various places, but most poignantly in his discussion of Realism and Idealism in section 43, Dasein, Worldhood, and Reality, in Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1962), pp 244-256. Heidegger studied Logische Untersuchungen independently since 1909, hoping for a chance to work directly with Husserl. By the time he met Husserl however, he had already completed his studies in Freiburg, had been admitted to the faculty as a Privatdozent, and was an accomplished scholar in his own right. Nonetheless, his attraction to Husserl was mutual. The older scholar, having just arrived at Freiburg, was looking for new students and colleagues to work with. Moreover, Husserl’s recent turn towards the more idealistic form of phenomenology expressed in his Ideen had left him practically isolated. In 1922 Husserl invited Heidegger to collaborate with him on an article on phenomenology for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. It is clear from the successive drafts that in the course of these years Heidegger moved away from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Their collaboration extended until 1927 when Husserl concluded (in a letter to Roman Ingarden dated December 26, 1927) that Heidegger had failed to grasp the meaning of the phenomenological reduction. Husserl remained erroneously convinced that he could educate Heidegger, and in fact submitted his name to the university of Freiburg as his only qualified successor. After 1960 Heidegger took a renewed interest in phenomenology, and went as far as to conclude his private seminar (conducted in his house in Freiburg-Zähringen in 1973) with the claim that his “tautological” thinking came closer to the original sense of phenomenology than Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.
drama of incompatibility, a new being emerged in Sartre’s philosophy: the “for-others,” whose being was a function of action.

Action, then, was the root of collectivity. Through action each individual could discover and experience otherness. But not every action was conducive to the opening of each human towards the other. Only committed action lead to forms of collective

Sartre put forth different objections to Husserl in the course of his career. Raymond Aron, fellow student at the école normale introduced Sartre to Husserl in 1932. Like Heidegger, Sartre was interested in transcending the opposition between idealism and realism, and to affirm, at the same time, the sovereignty of consciousness. Sartre credited Husserl’s idea of the intentionality of consciousness with the capacity of purging consciousness from the encroachment of the world. This, for Sartre, was not yet a full fledged reconciliation of subjective freedom and objective thingness but it opened the possibility of escape from the conflation of matter and consciousness. The encounter with Husserl marked a turning point for Sartre, and yielded works like La Nausée (1938), and L’Être et l’êant (1943). Specifically, Husserl’s transcendental reduction showed Sartre that the ego was constituted by the acts of free consciousness, that the imagination was irreducible to any kind of perception which might enmesh it in the world of causality, and that the magic of the emotions was not a fatal threat to subjective freedom, but rather the subject’s own willful doing, for which he or she was fully responsible.

Although Sartre embraced the above mentioned aspects of Husserl philosophy he was also critical of Husserl. For instance, Sartre’s disqualified phenomenology as foundation to existential ontology. In “La Transcendance de l’ego” (Recherches Philosophiques, 1936) Sartre critiqued Husserl’s conception of the pure ego in an attempt to improve Husserl’s fundamental conception of phenomenology, and to free it from “unnecessary encumbrances.” In L’Être et le ëant (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1943). Sartre claimed that Husserl failed to carry out his original conception of phenomenology because:

1) His Berkeleyan idealism interpreted Being and the transcendent objects of intentional consciousness as non-real (pp 24,28)
2) Husserl succumbed to “pure immanentism” by not escaping the “thing-illusion”
3) Husserl remained at the level of functional description which encased him in a mere account of appearances as such and makes him incapable of moving into “existential dialectics.”
4) Husserl was a “phenomenalist” (phenomeniste) rather than a phenomenologist.
5) Husserl gave a caricature of genuine transcendence, which according to Sartre should pass beyond consciousness into a world and beyond the immediate present into a past and future.
6) Like Kant, Husserl fell into solipsism by introducing the hypothesis of the transcendental subject.
7) Husserl did not take sufficient account of refractoriness (coefficient d’adversité) in our immediate experience.
8) Husserl mistakenly thought that an eidetic phenomenology of essences could lay hold of freedom. For Sartre on the other hand, freedom was identified with consciousness and with an existence that was at the root of all human essence.

In “Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi” (Société Francaise de philosophie, June 2, 1947) Sartre claimed that although Husserl provided an exhaustive description of consciousness, he never asked the question of the being of consciousness, nor of the being of the world. Husserl never returned from the époche to the world.

Sartre also critiqued Heidegger. He accused Heidegger of bad faith because, although he claimed to go beyond idealism, he ended up in a pseudo-idealism, and because he limited the ability to experience an other’s conscious act to the notion of death. Sartre also critiqued Heidegger for 1) having eliminated Descartes and Husserl’s consciousness from Dasein, 2) for grounding the concept of ‘nothing’ on the experience of anxiety rather than on the negative element in human spontaneity, 3) for the insufficiency of his hermeneutic descriptions which passed over the fact that man was not only a being with a
solidarity. In *Critique de la raison dialectique* (1969) Sartre described the transition from the individual to the collective through a non-empirical phenomenological analysis of praxis, which concluded that only a-priori and apodictic experience could lead to committed action. Because apodictic experience was tightly bound to the world of history Sartre argued that it contained the world’s necessity and universality. Therefore, it could not degenerate into a Husserlian pure consciousness. Through this form of immediate experience, explained Sartre, the dialectics of necessity entered the very structure of individuals, beginning with their material needs. Thus, it was at the level of this very special kind of experience, at the level of necessity and utility, that the bond between individual and collective was first made.\(^{46}\)

Sartre’s apodictic experience of the world of history had obvious echoes in Rogers’ emphasis on the authentic experience of tradition. For Rogers, tradition was a life-world that contained world history, that structured the existing, and that projected itself into the new as it re-structured itself. In light of Sartre, it is not difficult to see Rogers’ insistence that architecture be “connected” to tradition as a call for an “engaged” architectural practice. Rogers wanted to innervate architecture with world history in order to make architecture a vehicle for apodictic experience that would guide humanity, following Sartre’s logic, towards universality and collectivity.

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\(^{46}\) Sartre claimed that a new “critical dialectical reason” emerged out of apodictic experience and stood against Marx’s “dogmatic dialectics.” He rejected the metaphysics of dialectical materialism while accepting Marx’s conception of the class struggle.
C. Rogers’s Tradition in practice: social housing as collectivity

Understood from the perspective of the post war socio-economic climate it is easy to see how Rogers’ theories acquired such popularity. They appealed to the very real need to rebuild a sense of collectivity into a social fabric torn by war (especially in Italy where World War II exacerbated existing class differences), and to legitimate architectural practice politically. Rogers’ discussions of architecture as a condenser of collectivity were particularly popular in relation to social housing. It was through his pronouncements on this topic that Rogers first entered the heated European architectural and urban planning debates of the 1950s. Here, Rogers came head to head with the some of the young disillusioned members of CIAM, who after the eighth meeting at Hoddesdon (1951), had broken away with the “old guard” and founded the loose association of like minded emerging architects known as Team X. Some of the English members of this society were especially opposed to Rogers, in particular Alison and Peter Smithson, who were also members of the British Independent Group with architectural historian Reyner Banham.47 Like Rogers, the Smithsons were concerned with how the new could be inserted into the old. However, they did not share Roger’s understanding of architecture as being structured and structuring a historically unfolding tradition. In their eyes, people’s “patterns of use” and “networks of sings” made up the structure of the existing and they should not be disrupted by the new. Their reasoning was closer to the

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47 The Independent Group was founded in 1952 within the London Institute of Contemporary Art (ICA) and included architect Alison Smithson (1928-94), architect Peter Smithson (b. 1923), architectural historian Reyner Banham (1922-88), artist Eduardo Paolozzi (b. 1924), and the art critic Lawrence Alloway among others.
emerging structuralism of linguistics and the social sciences, than to Rogers' interpretation of phenomenology.⁴⁸

The Smithsons' read Rogers' emphasis on tradition as the very mummification of form that Rogers opposed. In turn, Rogers identified the Smithsons with the type of uncommitted relation with the real that they repudiated. For Rogers, the Independent Group stood for a type of arms length relation to the life-world, which translated into a regressive reluctance to engage and transform the existing aging fabric. Rogers believed that architecture's synthesis of tradition was the condition of possibility for the existence of collectivity. For the Smithsons on the other hand, collectivity preceded architecture, and stood threatened by new construction.

⁴⁸ In asserting that the Smithsons did not share Rogers's understanding of phenomenology, I am going against the claims of Sarah Williams Goldhagen that Sartre's existentialism was foundational to the Smithson's understanding of how people should become more self-conscious of reality. Her claim that Sartre's existentialism had suffused itself so much within the British cultural milieu that the Smithsons (even though they never read Sartre) had just learned it by osmosis from Dubuffet, is not tenable. The tradition of British empiricism, or even the contemporary theories of "Townscape" urban design promulgated by the Architectural Review in those days placed a similar emphasis on experiential awareness, and were far more current than Sartre in the architectural circles of the day. Goldhagen's analysis risks making everything under the sun appear as existentialist. See Sarah Williams Goldhagen, "Freedom's Domiciles: Three Projects by Alison and Peter Smithson," in Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, ed. Sarah Williams Golhagen and Réjean Legault, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) pp 75-96. For a more complete account of the Smithsons's intellectual debts see Anne Pedret's "The Collaborations of the Smithsons with the Independent Group and the Emergence of Team 10," in Tra guerra e pace: società, cultura e architettura nel secondo dopoguerra, ed. Patrizia Bonfazio, Sergio Pace, Michela Rosso and Paolo Scrivano (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1998), pp 242-250, and "CIAM and the Emergence of Team 10 Thinking, 1945-1959" (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001), pp 137-139.
The international controversy regarding Rogers' views on tradition only helped the success of Rogers' firm in the sector of social housing during the period immediately following the war. Between 1943 and 1963, the BBPR studio designed fourteen low-income housing districts in the periphery of major metropolitan centers to accommodate the massive numbers of poor workers fleeing the hardships of the rural areas, and give new homes to waves of immigrants from Eastern Europe. In the *Borgo San Sergio Quarter* (Trieste, 1955), which Rogers designed single handedly, we find a concrete

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49 These projects include: Project of houses in wood for war victims, 1943, unbuilt; workers’ housing quarter in Via Alcuino in Milan, for the Società Generale Immobiliare, 1945; urban planning of the INA-Casa quarter of Cesate in Milan, 1951 (the BBPR also designed some of the housing blocks and the school; Low income housing for INA-Casa in Albizzate, 1953; Low income housing for INA-Casa in the towns of Baggio, Casorate Sempione, Gambolò, Gazzada Schianno, Pinerolo Po, and Sedriano, 1953; Low income housing quarter in the Borgo San Sergio for the workers of EPIT industrial zone, 1955; Steel workers housing quarter in Sesto S. Giovanni, Milan, 1957; Steel workers housing quarter called “La loggetta,” Napoli, 1957; Workers housing quarter called “Moriggia” in Gallarate, 1957; Low -cost housing quarter called “Gratosoglio” for 20,000 inhabitants, Via Missaglia, Milan, 1963. For descriptions of each project, see Ezio Bonfanti and Marco Porta, *Città, Museo e Architettura: Il Gruppo BBPR nella cultura architettonica italiana 1932-1970*, (Firenze: Vallechi, 1973).
example how Rogers interpreted tradition in architecture. Rogers claimed the project gave ‘coherence’ to the collectivity of workers because it was a unitary synthesis of the Italian “civic, economic, and living traditions.” Although the buildings did not offer direct references to regional architectural elements of the past, Rogers argued that the relationship of all the elements in the composition to one another followed a traditional Italian settling pattern:

“The essential inspiration of this complex is founded on the contemporary interpretation of the Italian tradition that at the heart of cities has always given—and must continue to give—particular expression where the social, ethical, cultural, and spiritual contents of the community have their concrete manifestation in the aesthetic and practical terms of the buildings which represent them. [...] Thus are established three urban-architectural nuclei: The square of the church, the square of the cinema-theater (assembly hall) with café and bar, and the square of the administration and the market.”

The experience of tradition through architecture was opposed, for Rogers, to solutions that emphasized formal mimesis such as, for instance, the famous Tiburtino Quarter (Rome, 1950) of Ludovico Quaroni and Mario Ridolfi (executed with the help of Carlo Aymonino, Mario Fiorentino, and Carlo Melograni). The Tiburtino Quarter proposed a rational orthogonal disposition of dense blocks together with architectural references to the rural vernacular. Rogers considered the Tiburtino project to be an exemplary “mummification” of tradition.

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50 “L’ispirazione essenziale si questo insieme è fondata sull’interpretazione attuale della tradizione italiana che al cuore delle città ha sempre dato—e deve continuare a dare—particolare espressione onde i contenuti sociali, etici, culturali e spirituali della comunità abbiano la loro concreta manifestazione nei termini estetici e pratici degli edifici che li rappresentano. [...] Così si stabiliscono tre nuclei urbanistico-architettonici: la piazza della chiesa, la piazza del cinema-teatro (sala di riunioni) con caffè e botteghe, la piazza dell’amministrazione e del mercato.” My translation. Ernesto Rogers as quoted in: Ibid. p A72.
It must be noted that Rogers’s opinion has prevailed in architectural criticism to date, albeit as a result of different analyses. As early as 1964 Manfredo Tafuri, saw Quaroni’s attempt to create a new architectural language, recognizable by the displaced rural masses, as a derisive pandering to vernacular tradition. For Tafuri, Quaroni belonged to a series of bourgeois architects seeking to sugar coat the bitter pill of modernity. Later, Tafuri would extend his condemnation to all architect-intellectuals claiming commitment with the masses. In 1968, Vittorio Gregotti accused Quaroni and

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52 “Once these intellectuals had defined their positions, they became politically committed in the manner of Sartre; they chose to identify the destiny of their technique and language with that of classes that had
Ridolfi’s attempt to relate to the popular language of architecture of trying to “preserve the social structure and underdevelopment.” For Gregotti, only Rogers’s refusal to separate theory from practice, and his conception of history as an unfolding dialogue between the artist and the already, was a form of progressive protest against the narrow-mindedness of the profession. Closer to the present, Jean-Louis Cohen, writing in 1984, considered the Tiburtino Quarter a failed attempt to elaborate a new language that could be identifiable by its inhabitants. The result was, for Cohen, an “awful pastiche” of vernacular elements.

No one supported Rogers’ notion of architecture as collective consciousness in print as strongly as Paci. One year before Roger’s death, Paci wrote the first history of the BBPR. The architecture of Roger’s partnership was, for Paci, an exemplary individualization of the collective horizon. In the Quartiere di case operaie (Legnano, 1939) the collective was allegedly individualized through particular attention to the specific customs of the region. Paci saw collectivity arising from the individual, once he or she had been situated through architecture in the context of more general conditions. Collectivity was not as an abstract entity, but rather something that emerged out of the tangible and specific “ways of life” architecture enabled. For Paci, the architecture of the

suddenly come to the fore, and that were enriched by a “loser’s” past that enabled them to emerge as the bearers of new “purities.” It mattered little that this identification strongly resembled a cathartic bath, that the intellectuals’ exploration of these traditions hid a masochistic need to identify themselves with the losers, that their search for roots in the peasant hearth assuaged the anxiety of disorientation experienced through contact with mass society. They could not know that, even though they thought that they were acting like the Magi and were presenting their own engagement as a gift to the newly elected, their message was being dictated by the language of a plan whose docile tools they had become.” See Manfredo Tafuri, History of Italian Architecture: 1944-85, trans. Jessica Levine, (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1989), pp 10-11.

But Gregotti immediately adds that the failure of the group to propose a concise pedagogy meant that its effects were in the end damaging to the modern movement, “particularly in view of the frivolously pleasing nature of some examples.” See: Ibid, p 38.

BBPR expressed its synthetic and poetic power by making its function explicit—or by “tending” towards its function.


IV. Tradition Theorized as Concrete (non-abstract) Reason

A. Sartre: Reason originates in experience

The 1930s reception of Giuseppe Pagano’s “spontaneous architecture” in Milan had already established the inherent rationality of construction. However, after the war the tradition of enlightenment reason that had given philosophical foundations to modernism’s rationalist claims was showing signs of exhaustion. The irrationality of World War II made the wide public aware of the crisis of reason which philosophy had been proclaiming since the end of the nineteenth century. In the 1950s, then, the problem of building a new architecture became linked to the more general problem of the possibility for a new reason. Existential phenomenology made the emergence of that new reason rest on a new epistemology and a new theory of perception, which questioned the critical idealist tradition’s insistence on the mind-world split.

Both post-war architects and philosophers, found themselves searching for a new epistemology that would not be dependant on the enlightenment notion of disembodied, ever-present reason. Here, Sartre demonstrated the vitality of phenomenology when in Germany, principally because of Martin Heidegger’s early allegiance to the Nazi party, it “seemed to have become a matter of past record, to be left to the historians of philosophy.” In *Critique de la raison dialectique*, Sartre proposed a critical dialectical reason founded on direct and everyday experience, against the more “dogmatic dialectics” of Marx. Much like Merleau-Ponty, the experience Sartre described was a-priori and apodictic, and contained necessity and universality. Just as Paci found utility at the origin of spirit, Sartre discovered the dialectics of necessity in the very structure of
individuals (beginning with their material needs), and thus located the origin of reason in experience. The promise of these claims was that if people could experience immediacy, they would gain access to new forms of non-subjective, non-objective reason.

**B. Husserl: Reason is an “understanding Intuition”**

Phenomenology’s origin is tied to the crisis of reason. Edmund Husserl’s founding of phenomenology with his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 1913] came as a response to the perceived meaninglessness and irrationality of the sciences. Husserl’s reservations with regards to reason, as expressed in the *Ideen*, were not the result of the irrationality of World War I. The Great War occurred more than seven years after his original conception of the project. Rather, Husserl’s attempt to arrive at the foundations of science was motivated by a perception (broadly shared by the German intelligentsia of the period) that technology alone could not offer a guarantee for a meaningful existence, and that, on the contrary, it could very easily collapse into a regressive barbarism. Husserl saw his return to the roots of philosophy, his “radicalism”, as a way to prevent the further degeneration of the sciences. Herbert Spiegelberg boiled down Husserl’s critique of Modern science to two arguments:

1. The degeneration of science into an unphilosophical study of mere facts, as exemplified by positivistic science, which Husserl held responsible for the fact that science had lost its significance for man’s life as a whole, and for his life purposes in particular; (2) its ‘naturalism,’

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which had rendered science incapable of coping with the problems of absolute truth and validity.⁵⁸

Husserl, who was originally trained as a mathematician and a physicist, was first attracted to philosophy as a means to solve some of the deficiencies that he perceived in the foundations of mathematics. In his view the sciences had become un-scientific: They had degenerated into a study of mere facts that could no longer cope with problems of absolute truth or validity. Their reliance on “mere experimentation” as a foundation to their truth claims was lacking insofar as they presupposed an essence of phenomena that they did not call into question. He argued:

Individual existence of every sort is, quite universally speaking, ‘contingent.’ It is this; in respect of its essence it could be otherwise. Even though definite laws of Nature obtain according to which if such and such real circumstances exist in fact then such and such definitive consequences must exist in fact, such laws express only de facto rules which themselves could read quite otherwise.⁵⁹

This fundamental irrationality was at the root of both the sciences’ inability to deal with moral questions of right and wrong, and of their generalized lack of significance. The so-called exact sciences had failed to be rigorous insofar as they had neglected a clarification of their basic concepts and immediate phenomena. Philosophy was to undertake that task. Husserl was convinced that by treating philosophy in the manner of the deductive sciences he could provide a philosophical analysis of their foundations and rescue them from their fallen state of mere un-philosophical

experimentation. Measurements of the factual world needed to be “grounded” in an understanding of “essences”:

[The scientific investigator of Nature] observes and experiments; that is, he ascertains factual existence according to experience; for him experiencing is a grounding act which can never be substituted by a mere imagining. And this is precisely why science of matters of fact and experimental science are equivalent concepts. But for the geometer who explores not actualities but “ideal possibilities,” not predicatively formed actuality-complexes, but predicatively formed eidetic affair-complexes, the ultimately grounding act is not experience but rather the seeing of essences.60

This insight into the essence of phenomena was what, for Husserl, would differentiate Phenomenology as a “rigorous science” from all the other sciences. It was an insight that could only be gained through reason. But reason not in the anti-emotional intellect (Verstandt), but as understanding intuition and comprehensive wisdom (Vernunft). This more expansive sense of “ratio” held its indebtedness to Kant. But it must be clarified that Husserl, although convinced of the absolute primordiality of reason as the way by which we make judgments and asses our beliefs -- a conviction that pitted him against contemporary irrationalists --, refused to give up the world of immediate experience to sheer abstractions -- a refusal that clearly differentiated him from the eighteenth century’s rationalists.

Even though Husserl’s phenomenology had developed into a school of thought in its own right (mostly in Germany), it drew the attention of post-war European thinkers only as a result of Sartre popularity. For Sartre, Husserl’s refusal to relinquish the mind to immediate experience meant that he had not fully grasped the origin of reason. Reason, thought Sartre, could only come out of an apodictic, immediate experience of the

60 Ibid. p 16.
world, not out of a Husserlian pure consciousness. Therefore, Sartre’s search for authentic experience became that of reconciling the subjective (pour-soi) and the objective (en-soi). For him, this reconciliation was called for by our experiences of freedom and of the “Thing.” Freedom was the solitary experience of total responsibility that came with the unannounced presence of consciousness. The “Thing” impinged on that freedom by trying to convert the subject into a “thing-like” existence.

C. Paci: the new originates in “authentic” experience and is formed through technique

Paci brought Husserl’s Lebenswelt and Sartre’s search for the reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity directly into architectural discourse as the pre-condition for the emergence not only of a new reason, but also of a new architecture. In his Casabella article "L’architettura e il mondo della vita” he emphasized the need to reconcile man and nature. The fundamental hindrance holding back the new forms of reason was that human beings, as Husserl indicated, did not usually live authentically. They were, as Marxists

61 The process of Sartre’s disqualification of phenomenology as a foundation to existential ontology follows:
In “La Transcendance de l’ego” (Recherches Philosophiques, 1936) Sartre critiques Husserl’s conception of the pure ego in an attempt to improve Husserl’s fundamental conception of phenomenology and freeing it from unnecessary encumbrances.
In L’Etre et le néant he claims Husserl failed to carry out his original conception of phenomenology because: 1) His Berkeleyan idealism interpreted Being and the transcendent objects of intentional consciousness as non-real, 2) Husserl succumbed to “pure immancism” by not escaping the “thing-illusion”. 3) He remained at the level of functional description which encased him in a mere account of appearances as such and made him incapable of moving into “existential dialectics.” 4) Husserl was a “phenomenal” (phenomeniste) rather than a phenomenologist. 5) He gave a caricature of genuine transcendence “which should pass beyond consciousness into a world and beyond the immediate present into a past and future. 6) Like Kant, Husserl fell into solipsism by introducing the hypothesis of the transcendental subject. 7) He did not take sufficient account of refractoriness (coefficient d’adversité) in our immediate experience. 8) Husserl mistakenly thought that an eidetic phenomenology of essences could lay hold of freedom. In contradistinction to Husserl, Sartre identified freedom with consciousness and with an existence that is at the root of all human essence.
In “Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi” (Société Francaise de philosophie, June 2 1947) Sartre claimed that although Husserl provided an exhaustive description of consciousness, he never asked the
would say, alienated from the world. Paci blamed the human reliance on a-priori scientific abstractions (which Husserl referred to as the ‘natural attitude’) for people’s failure to experience the world in its full complexity and interconnectedness. Architects, according to Paci, had to suspend judgement to experience the life-world fully, in accordance to Husserl’s “bracketing.” Valid architectural styles could only be born out of an intense contact with the life-world in which “we no longer know if it is nature and history that search for new forms in us, or if it is us who search the forms towards which nature and history seem to be directed.” The life-world tended towards forms. These were not only conceptual forms, stated Paci in clear opposition to Croce’s thinking, the

question of the being of consciousness, nor of the being of the world. Husserl never returned from the epoche to the world. Husserl saw his “phenomenological reduction” as his great contribution to philosophy’s ability to break free of reification. Husserl was fighting against unverified and unverifiable “metaphysical nonsense,” which he liked to call “the spell of science” (i.e. reification). This spell was characteristic of the “natural attitude” in theory and praxis, which Husserl equated to the scientific interpretation of the world. On the one hand, the “natural attitude” was a pre-philosophical attitude inasmuch as it wasn’t concerned with reflecting on the conditions of existence on a rational basis. It was the common standpoint of existence when relating to matters of fact, processes, practical aspects, values, other persons, social institutions, and cultural creations. On the other hand, the “scientific attitude” narrowed the range of human experience by negating the subject in order to objectify nature as a field of study detached from human concerns. Considering neither attitude was concerned with a radical questioning of its own presuppositions, neither was deeply philosophical. The inability to see a third alternative beyond these two attitudes drove people to relinquish their cognitive potential to empirical science in search of meaning. But the latter’s un-philosophical grounds was inherently incapable of carrying out its assigned task. Thus, people were kept from a “correct” and “meaningful” experience of the life-world. The third alternative attitude could only be uncompromisingly philosophical. If philosophy insisted on limiting itself in any way by the irrational premises of either of the two pre-philosophical attitudes, then it would never grasp the full range of dimensions of experience. Only through “phenomenological reduction” -- through the suspension of the natural and scientific attitudes --could philosophical reflection break through this spell and achieve the true philosophical attitude. By reduction Husserl was referring to a kind of mathematical bracketing, which allowed the mathematician to put a particular expression in “suspension” while the rest of the equation was investigated. In the Ideen, Husserl described his reduction as a two step process. First, it entailed a reduction from particular facts to general essences (Eidetic reduction), that dropped all references to the individual and particular. Second, it involved the phenomenological reduction proper where consciousness: 1) suspended belief in existence (this, again, would be a bracketing, not a denial); 2) directed a glance through reflection at what was left of the phenomenon in all its aspects in order to “intuit” its essence (sosein), without attention to its existence (dasein). In this manner, Husserl could examine all areas of the world of things divested of their reality claims. He could thus reach back to the source of all knowledge, to the “wonder of all wonders,” to the hidden acts and achievements of consciousness.

62 Husserl saw his “phenomenological reduction” as his great contribution to philosophy’s ability to break free of reification. Husserl was fighting against unverified and unverifiable “metaphysical nonsense,” which he liked to call “the spell of science” (i.e. reification). This spell was characteristic of the “natural attitude” in theory and praxis, which Husserl equated to the scientific interpretation of the world. On the one hand, the “natural attitude” was a pre-philosophical attitude inasmuch as it wasn’t concerned with reflecting on the conditions of existence on a rational basis. It was the common standpoint of existence when relating to matters of fact, processes, practical aspects, values, other persons, social institutions, and cultural creations. On the other hand, the “scientific attitude” narrowed the range of human experience by negating the subject in order to objectify nature as a field of study detached from human concerns. Considering neither attitude was concerned with a radical questioning of its own presuppositions, neither was deeply philosophical. The inability to see a third alternative beyond these two attitudes drove people to relinquish their cognitive potential to empirical science in search of meaning. But the latter’s un-philosophical grounds was inherently incapable of carrying out its assigned task. Thus, people were kept from a “correct” and “meaningful” experience of the life-world. The third alternative attitude could only be uncompromisingly philosophical. If philosophy insisted on limiting itself in any way by the irrational premises of either of the two pre-philosophical attitudes, then it would never grasp the full range of dimensions of experience. Only through “phenomenological reduction” -- through the suspension of the natural and scientific attitudes --could philosophical reflection break through this spell and achieve the true philosophical attitude. By reduction Husserl was referring to a kind of mathematical bracketing, which allowed the mathematician to put a particular expression in “suspension” while the rest of the equation was investigated. In the Ideen, Husserl described his reduction as a two step process. First, it entailed a reduction from particular facts to general essences (Eidetic reduction), that dropped all references to the individual and particular. Second, it involved the phenomenological reduction proper where consciousness: 1) suspended belief in existence (this, again, would be a bracketing, not a denial); 2) directed a glance through reflection at what was left of the phenomenon in all its aspects in order to “intuit” its essence (sosein), without attention to its existence (dasein). In this manner, Husserl could examine all areas of the world of things divested of their reality claims. He could thus reach back to the source of all knowledge, to the “wonder of all wonders,” to the hidden acts and achievements of consciousness.

life-world also tended towards corporeal, natural forms. The immediate experience of the life-world was significant therefore both to philosophy and to architecture.

Croce of course also considered forms (whether material or conceptual) to be organic syntheses. The two philosophers disagreed in relation to exactly what was synthesized and how. For Croce, what was synthesized was a disjointed set of particular sensorial inputs, and what synthesized it was the mind’s intuitive or theoretical power. For Paci, what was synthesized was a life-world, but this synthesis occurred this side of subject and object divisions, beyond the power of the mind. Paci understood synthesis as the authentic relation between humans and their world, something that could only be immediately experienced in life projects. More precisely, the synthesis could only be experienced through authentic life projects.

Paci felt that architectural design and philosophical thinking shared the common problem of how to give birth to the new. The tension between permanence and emergence, between the existing and the possible, required that architects and philosophers synthesize the multiplicity of existing languages and needs. For Paci, this synthesis could only be achieved through the production of form, that is, through technique. Form was the mutation, production, and insertion of the possible in the real. As such, it continuously appealed to a pre-existing foundation: the life-world. The pressure of the novum, of the possible, was legitimated and called forth by the life-world, which was none other than the changing relationships between the lives of human subjects and their world, between social lives and their changing nature. In both

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64 See the article by Paci’s most eminent student Salvatore Veca, "Un Filosofo e l'Architettura: Enzo Paci," in Casabella, special issue "Casabella Cinquant'anni 1928-1978," n. 440-441 (October-November 1978), pp 73-74.
architectural and philosophical projects the new emerged in organic relation to the existing life-world of functions that constituted a social life. Because these functions renovated themselves over time, they disaggregated old forms and called forth new (architectural or philosophical) synthesis or forms. New architecture and new philosophy would be born, to follow Paci, out of the ambiguous and immediate zone between the subjective and the objective through technique, which was their living synthesis.

D. Function separates “inauthentic” technology from “authentic” technique

But Paci was careful to differentiate technique from the alienated and alienating sphere of technology. When he wrote the first history of the BBPR, he used his article as an opportunity to introduce architects to some of the themes in his recently published Funzione delle Scienze e Significato dell’Uomo (1963). Paci argued that functionalism, understood as the dynamic and organic synthesis of the problems that make up each project, was the “coherence” of the BBPR’s work. “Function,” Paci continued, if understood broadly, was not the type of abstract rationalistic formula that dominated science and technology. It was the field where reason met technique, collective objectives met particular goals, and invention met the existing.

Architecture, explained Paci, concretized function and rendered it poetic. It allowed people to experience the insertion of the individual in the collective drama of mankind, and made individuals feel life and death as part of nature and of the dialectic of history. Through Paci, function in architecture acquired moral overtones. It was the

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65 The book, which was published in English as The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man, trans. Paul Piccone. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972), undertakes a synthesis between Husserl’s philosophy of the life-world and Marxism.
"reason" of rationalism because it enabled the moral values of rationality and objectivity to be rendered concrete in construction. Because rationality and objectivity tended towards the truth of the life-world, architectural functionalism was a concrete, and therefore moral expression, of that tendency towards the truth. Paci’s definition of function allowed him to defend the BBPR’s neo-liberty as a coherent functionalism. Functionalism was so open and dialectical, that its concrete architectural expressions would by force be formally multiple, but, they would all coherently express the same moral tendency, the same idea: the authenticity of the life-world.

Paci ultimately argued that reason, function, and architecture all tended towards a common (Husserlian) telos: harmony. Reason, or the conceptual, met architecture, or the concrete, in the field of function. Function was the dynamic synthesis, which he called “coherence,” of the conceptual and the material synthesis performed again and again in history. As such, it brought things and reason into alignment with the needs of life. It
brought the past into the present and made it meaningful. Paci turned to the BBPR’s

*Tomba di Rocco Scotellaro* (Tomb of Rocco Scotellaro, 1957) to offer an example:

The memory of the dead, the ‘monument’, becomes the reason to live for the living, born anew from the past in the work of the present, which is present insofar as it is life of the past in us, life of tradition within the renewal of man according to clarity and truth, according to the teleological idea, not of an abstract reason, but of a living reason.⁶⁶

There was also an understanding of architectural “coherence” as synthesis in the thought of Rogers, but it was not limited to function. Rogers was in agreement about the fact that the coherence of the process of design lay neither in formal references nor in scientific rational principles, but he defined “coherence” more broadly as the recognition of an essential synthetic intention.⁶⁷

Rogers’s and Paci’s rethinking of functionalism in Modern architecture came at the time when it was being openly questioned in high profile architectural forums, such as CIAM. On the other side of the Atlantic for example, the conference held at Princeton University in 1947 entitled *The Social Basis For Architecture*, had identified technology with functionalism, and set a research agenda to incorporate notions of environment and human affective relations to the practice of architecture in order to ameliorate some of their negative effects.⁶⁸ But whereas the brunt of the critique there came from the

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⁶⁷ To illustrate his point Rogers looks to the work of Asplund:

> “The sequences of successive drawings from 1920 to 1937 for the expansion to the Town Hall of Göteborg by Asplund are a typical example of this work: born as a stylistic imitation of the pre-existing neoclassical building, it arrives at a goal unpredictable by means of an unpublished image. The harmony between the two parts is due only to their intimate expressive affinity, which is not of philological character by contrast or similarity or by whatever indebtedness to language, understood in the neo-positivist sense, but rather of phenomenological essence.”


emerging behavioral and social sciences, in Milan it came from phenomenology and focused on the recuperation of lived experience, and on the establishment of an architectural practice rooted in the immediacy of that experience.

We can now better understand Paci’s call to architects. When he demoted theoretical explanations of architecture in favor of building, he did not mean that “anything goes.” Reason would emerge within action, theory would appear within practice—or so he hoped. The architect would have to just let it happen, as it were. If he or she suspended abstract and scientific reasoning, the life-world would appear as it was. The architect would feel the pressure of the new within the life-world, in its full complexity, and would then enable it to gain form in the objective world through his or her technical intervention. Utility, reason, and morality would emerge simultaneously, bringing with them a new era of collective commitment and authentic living.

V. Tradition Theorized as History

A. Tradition Defined as the Progressive Tendency of History

Rogers and Paci forced the tremendous post-war search for newness against the forms of the old. Croce’s philosophy of spirit, as he developed it into a pure historiographical method, made History an obligatory reference in Italian intellectual speculation. It is therefore useful to understand Croce’s views on History, in order to grasp the full implications of Rogers and Paci’s critiques.

Croce rethought his idealism in terms of historiography in his later years, in light of the many criticisms his philosophy had suffered.69 He referred to this new version of

69 Most notably, the harshest criticisms came from Giovanni Gentile, his former protégé and later enemy. In the Philosophy of Art, Gentile strikes against the incoherent aspects of Croce’s idealism (which he
Idealism as "absolute historicism." Its objective was the complete resolution of philosophy into the methodology of historiography. Whereas Croce's early idealism presented the forms of spiritual activity independently from the history that they contained, the Croce of the post-war sought to close the fissure between this formal transcendentism and the central doctrines of historicism. He addressed the crisis of reason by attempting to purge his concept of method from all rationalistic and formalistic elements and to conceive historiography as indeed a totally immanent process, such that the shaping of its categories and canons would be controlled wholly by the concrete content. Croce's philosophy became nothing but the self-awareness of the synthesizing historiographical process, and involved nothing transcending that process.

As such, Croce's absolute historicism came close to the phenomenological insight that reason should emerge out of the Life-world through life-projects that engage concrete reality. But Croce denied the phenomenological dictum that there was no pure objective identity, that no object could exist in isolation. In The Aesthetic, Croce deduced a few corollaries about the nature of art, and history, from this initial description of the functioning of the mind: Because intuition, as he defined it, dealt only with particulars, he denied that any aesthetic work, such as history or painting, could be concerned with general principles. History could not deal with truths about, say, architects like Michelangelo, it had to always deal with this particular man Michelangelo. The same went for art. Each work of art had to be a unique expression of particulars. To grasp an object's artistic nature, meant to comprehend it in its uniqueness as an expression.
Therefore, for Croce, the notion of genres or styles was not essential to the determination of what art was. Stylistic categories were abstract logical concepts that could only be derived after having identified a series of unique pieces of art.

Croce opposed what he called “sociological historiography” because it tended to dissolve art in relationships to social institutions, politics, morals and to the economy. For him, the work of art had to be treated in strict relation to the artist. This meant that the monograph had to replace sociological history, or the general history of art.

“Sociological historiography” failed, according to Croce, because it focused on mediocre works to find the common denominator of the age, and had difficulty in discussing great works as something other than anomalies. Croce stressed the autonomous and individual value of the work of art. He denied that philosophy should be systematic and limited it to the solving of isolated historically specific problems. Thus, any union on the aesthetic level between art and other disciplines was, for Croce, absurd.

Not so, however, to the few Milanese intellectuals working alongside Rogers as members of the editorial board of *Casabella Continuità*. To them, the theme of “continuity,” that Rogers appended to the magazine’s title when he revived it after World War II, stood as a contesting theoretical position that argued the necessary conditioning of art by its cultural, political, economic, and physical contexts. Moreover, they firmly believed that innovation could happen within modernism precisely by linking it to tradition. They could not accept Croce’s conception of historical reality as a totally

an order. Furthermore, Gentile sees it essential to idealism that differences be overcome in the unity of mind. Croce fails to recognize this internal unity when he divides the mind into four different capacities.
immanent reality because it had lead him to deny the idea of progress. In doing so, Croce had deprived active life of its most relevant practical value. This made it difficult for them to assume the necessary personal responsibility in their everyday practical activity as builders. In contrast to Croce, Paci and Rogers proposed progress as a tendency of the life-world (or tradition) making architects commitment to it also an oath to progress, to the environment, and to the whole of humankind. With this act of faith, however, they also committed to surrendering their critical agency to the life-world.

In opposition to Croce’s historicism, Rogers circle shared a conviction that because innovation happened in a spatial and temporal context, any work of architecture was united, on the plane of tradition, with social, economic, physical, and cultural realities. A true work of art, or any new creative act for that matter, was part of a historical continuity, or tradition, which the new innovated by virtue of its appearance, and to which it was inextricably bound. A history of architecture had to therefore deal with these other disciplines as constitutive of architecture. Rogers’ circle would argue that even though they had to critique their society, they could not judge the work of other architects outside of the terms of the historical reality from which it was born, and in which it was inserted.

Such was the case of Giulio Carlo Argan, whose readings of Paci and Heidegger in *Walter Gropius e la Bauhaus* (1951) helped him expose the falsity of modernism’s mythic foundational claim of autonomy from larger historical currents. Argan emphasized the problematic link of modernity to the enlightenment tradition of

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70 For critics of Croce like Roberto Vivarelli, this denial stems logically from a flawed reduction of historical reality to an ideal process, which disregards day-by-day dimension in the range of empiric experience where improvements may be measured concretely, and where human life actually takes place.
transcendent reason. He contrasted this with the work of Walter Gropius (1883-1969), in whom he found a "limitless phenomenology of the built" bound to the sphere of the human, which refused all transcendence and all myth. Gropius had successfully kept the architectural project limited to an expression of the Life-world's own tendencies, and thus allowed its own reason to evolve in its contingency and historicity. Argan contextualized the avant-garde historically, ripping modernism out of the aura of absolute contemporaneity it once had.

**B. Tradition theorized as the progressive tendency of Modernism**

Modern architecture's relationship to history was also at the center of the controversy that would place Rogers and his editorial staff in the European spotlight. In 1959, Reyner Banham (1922-1988), the famed British architectural critic and historian, wrote a scathing review of Roger's recent work in the pages of the United Kingdom's most prominent journal *The Architectural Review*. Banham's motives in writing were clear: he wanted to eject Rogers (together with what he calls the Italian Neo-Liberty style) from modern architecture in order to call attention to his own definition of modernism. Banham, who had just completed a part time Ph.D. with Nikolaus Pevsner, was preparing his dissertation for publication as a history of modern architecture entitled *Theory and Design in the First Machine Age* (1960) –which would become his most influential text.

Unlike Rogers, Banham considered architecture to be a synthesis of technology and culture that happened only at the *symbolic* level. There was no middle realm between subject and object, no life-world that architects must immediately experience, no

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See Roberto Vivarelli, "Benedetto Croce and the Uses of Historicism by David D. Roberts" [book review].
tradition tending towards new forms. There was no experiential “single-valued criterion” as the source of authority for the socio-historical value of a building. A building’s quality and value was to be judged according to its ability to function as a sign within larger socio-historical symbolic patterns.

This premise let Banham theorize that “function” in architecture was a symbol, which could only be read if it resembled truly functional contemporary objects. Thus, the functionalist architecture of the twenties no longer seemed functional in the 1950s because it no longer resembled ships and aeroplanes.71 The advancement of civilization was dependent on technological progress, not on Roger’s dialectical “cultural progress.” The result was that Banham foreclosed on architecture’s utilitarian claims and reduced its relevance for the present to an expression of technology:

“It may well be that what we have hitherto understood as architecture, and what we are beginning to understand as architecture are incompatible disciplines. The architect who proposes to run with technology knows now that he will be in fast company, and that, in order to keep up, he may have to emulate the Futurists and discard his whole cultural load, including the professional garments by which he is recognized as an architect. If, on the other hand, he decides not to do this, he may find that a technological culture has decided to go on without him.”72


In picking on the Phileban solids and mathematics, the creators of the International Style took a convenient short cut to creating an ad hoc language of symbolic forms, but it was a language that could only communicate under the special conditions of the Twenties, when automobiles were visibly comparable to the Parthenon, when aircraft structure really did resemble Elementalist space cages, when ships’ superstructures really did appear to follow Beaux Arts rules of symmetry, and the additive method of design pursued in many branches of machine technology was surprisingly like Guadet’s elementary composition.

72 Ibid. p 329.
When Banham saw Rogers’ recently completed Velasca Tower in Milan (1958), with its medievalizing volumetry, he immediately identified it with an inability to shed the symbols of past technologies and embrace the new. Since, for Banham, what defined the yet unrealized future promised by the modern movement was the “[...] freedom from having to wear the discarded clothes of other cultures,”73 the turn to tradition was a turn away from modernism. In Banham’s modernity, freedom from tradition was the precondition to a life fully conscious of its present reality, to a truly modern life. The future coherence of modernism resided in its ability to have no past. With the urgency of the present, Banham foreclosed on possible revisions of his account of modernism’s past and future. “But even if the men of the nineteen-twenties were wrong, and the men of the thirties were stubborn in error, that is no reason for going back and re-puzzle its earlier problems.”74

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74 Ibid. p 235.
Banham grouped the circle of architects linked to *Casabella* (Gae Aulenti, Vittorio Gregotti, Meneghetti, Stoppino, Gabetti, Aldo Rossi, and Ernesto Rogers) as the leaders of a regressive turn away from modernism. He questioned whether these architects could be considered part of the international modern movement at all. Going even further, he held all of Italy responsible for the regression, but found the architectural press particularly at fault, for the excessively laudatory attention it gave to Art Nouveau. Only Bruno Zevi, who was one of the few to openly speak out against Neo-Liberty, and whose Crocean historicism was also devoid of a concept of life-world, was spared.

Rogers' response was categorical. He meet Reyner Banham's excommunication with a meditation on how he considered past and history to be defined. Rogers argued that Banham wanted to preserve the forms of classical modernism because his concept of the history of architecture was based on an a-priori notion of formal evolution. Rogers questioned the authority of the historian, defending the critical revision of academic history by artists who refused to mechanistically accept abstract lines of historical and stylistic demarcation. If modernism was to be the permanent revolution it promised to be, then it demanded the constant, physical revision of obsolete formal elements. Modernism was the revolution of History in the present, as the continuous transformation of tradition. Modern architecture could only achieve its promise of liberation from the past by internalizing it, by re-synthesizing its present forms within the life-world. To adjudicate modernism only to the architecture originating after the nineteen-twenties was to negate its liberating potential, by reducing it into forms. 75

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75 Ernesto N. Rogers, "L'evoluzione dell'architettura: Risposta al custode di frigidaires." in *Casabella Continuità*, n. 228 (June 1959), pp 2-4.
Paci had anticipated the arguments of the Banham-Rogers debate, in his 1956 *Casabella* article entitled “Problematica dell’architettura contemporanea.” Paci argued that architectural function was not merely symbolic, as Banham would later have it, rather, it was a necessarily link between symbolic expression and utility. Paci’s definition is not self evident, and requires elaboration in relation to the above description of Paci’s life-world.

Paci began his article by establishing that reality was both a process and a relationship. It was a process insofar as existence was governed by the principle of irreversibility embedded in spatiality and temporality. As spatial processes, forms emerged and endured, were either renovated or remained in equilibrium. To speak first of formal “emergence,” every such process was also conditioned by temporality. It arrived from the past as was structured in the present. Turning to formal “endurance,” Paci found it conditioned by the same temporal structure. The structure of the past in the present was therefore dynamically related to both forms of emergence and permanence. As new forms emerged, they changed the structure of the present and made old ones loose permanence. New forms are first expressed in symbolic language as possible new relationships within the structure of the existing (i.e. the Life-world). The harmonious relation of the new forms to the existing was their value, and determined whether they would ever achieve permanence or not. Put bluntly, Paci thought that only those creations that satisfied the needs of past and the present stood any chance of continuing to exist in the future. In the case of new architectural forms for instance, he believed that they

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would only endure if they were created in harmonious relation to the past and present structures of social and economic necessity.

Having defined reality as the life-world, Paci related the recent history of architecture and philosophy as the process of emergence of a new architecture and a new philosophy from the current crisis of rationalism—clearly, he was here speaking in reference to Rogers’ Neo-Liberty, and to his own phenomenology. Turning to the masters, he argued that although Gropius’ Bauhaus and Theo Van Doesburg’s De Stijl were correctly concerned with relating architecture to the rest of reality, their understanding of the relationship of emerging form to the life-world was still based on mechanistic rationalist concepts. Just as Husserl’s epoché incorrectly bracketed naturalism and psychology, Gropius suspended the relationship of his buildings to natural and psychological givens. Both were incorrectly concerned with achieving pure essences, or more precisely, with finding absolute relationships.

Paci also found consonance between Gropius’ and Van Doesburg’s search for a-temporal and elementary forms and Wittgenstein’s neo-positivism, which conceived of reality as composed of unrelated atomized givens. This same conception of reality resulted, for Paci, in the formulation of technical or material standards in architecture, and to the notion of Existenz-Minimum in urbanism. Ultimately, argued Paci, this philosophical and architectural idealism fixed reality and missed the fact that it was a historical and organic process.

To conclude his article, Paci joined the history of early twentieth century architecture and philosophy into a common tributary that lead directly to his phenomenology. He stated that in the United States Gropius discovered the specificity of
place in the New England region, and German positivism encountered a more expansive conception of experience in American pragmatism. For Paci, the combination of these discoveries opened both architecture and philosophy to his own understanding of reality as a historically contingent lived nature, where no given was absolutely autonomous. Thus, he depicted philosophy and architecture as discovering what he already knew: that every element was already a relationship. There was no foundational, essential element, which was always identical to itself. Permanence was flexible. Thus, Paci attempted to provide the historical evidence that his new form of philosophy was a new synthesis called forth by the historical tendencies of the life-world itself.

"With the existential a-priori of nature and history came Paci’s spatio-temporal conception of architecture as lived form. Here, function and form could not be understood as Banham’s mimetic repetition of symbols in the mechanistic sense. Rather, it had to be conceived in the integral and relational sense as “emergence.” Symbolism in architecture was not its mimetic function; rather it was the synthetic process through which the new emerges. Symbolism could not be mimetic because mimesis presupposed a stable identity of a priori, ideal, un-related elements that did not exist. Moreover, contrary to Banham’s separation of aesthetics and utility, the new always appeared together with utility, which was an existential characteristic of the life-world. Paci’s phenomenological conception of function viewed architecture both as a construction responding to specific needs, and as an expression of new forms and relations. Architecture’s symbolic aspect emerges together with utility. According to Paci, the new architecture, as well as the new philosophy, integrated partial points of view into an open-

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ended synthesis, a new open form. It contained technique, nature and history, reason and function, and conditioned processes that are open to new relations. 78

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VI. The reception of Rogers and Paci by their students.

Rogers brought the concerns of his students in particular, and of the first generation of young architects trained in the post-war in general, to bear on the direction of *Casabella*. He hoped that his new architecture would find perpetuation in their own practices. The careers of Giancarlo de Carlo, Vittorio Gregotti, Guido Canella, Aldo Rossi, Ezio Bonfanti, and Gae Aulenti would all be marked by their early involvement in *Casabella*. Rogers and Paci discussed the young generation’s contributions informally, and became increasingly aware of the differences that separated them.\(^79\) Paci was most vocal about his opposition to their interpretations of Marxism and their interest in Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurt School.\(^80\) For him, this intellectual current could lead too easily towards a regressive fall into irrationality, but for the new generation the Frankfurt School offered an invaluable critique of consumer culture and of the new leisure society. Ultimately, Rogers’ openness to the concerns of the new generation would cost him his editorship of *Casabella*. The degenerative brain disease, which eventually would take his life, made Rogers begin to lose his voice around 1964, at the same time as Italy fell into economic recession, and there were the first symptoms of student unrest --which his young editors supported. By the end of 1964, the publisher of *Casabella*, concerned that Rogers was losing his intellectual faculties as great mediator...

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\(^79\) In his personal diary, Paci notes many of his meetings with Rogers, and critiques the new generation of architects’ attempt to redefine the left from within as a projection of their own alienation. For instance, on the 4\(^{th}\) of April 1958 Paci writes:

_A colazione con Rogers. Discussione su un’articolo del poevo Aldo Rossi dedicato a Seldmayer, _La rivelazione_[?] dell’arte moderne, questi ragazzi proiettano sulla storia e sulla società le loro monadi[?] interne che applicano al comunismo e ad altre formule con virtù taumaturgiche. L’unica cosa che non vogliono fare e di riconoscere e che loro stesso estraniamento rientra nell’ordinario lo costituisce e lo esplica._

\(^80\) Vittorio Gregotti, conversation with the author, Milan, 30 June 2000.
of debates, and that he is no longer capable of moderating his young and restless editorial team, begun the process of selling Casabella, and replaced Rogers.81

Together with the differences that separated Rogers and Paci from their students, there are also many shared concerns that united them. First of all, there was the shared interest in phenomenology which resulted from Rogers’ mentoring role. He opened his protégés to international connections, and exposed them to his intellectual circle. Rogers favored his student Vittorio Gregotti in particular. The year after Gregotti finished his architecture degree, Rogers invited him to join in the founding of Casabella as editor, and encouraged him to take Paci’s philosophy classes. Gregotti soon found himself accompanying the philosopher to Paris to meet Merleau-Ponty -- later Gregotti returned alone to find Sartre. In Milan, Gregotti made the acquaintance of Paci’s own protégé, the philosopher Salvatore Veca, with whom he established a close friendship – the two would often lecture as guests in each other’s class. Later, both would join Gruppo ’63, which emerged under the influence of Paci and included members from various humanistic disciplines (Umberto Ecco would become the group’s most famous member).82

The new generation saw itself as continuing their elder’s critique of the modern movement’s emphasis on abstract rationality through the introduction of history and tradition. Gregotti’s first book Il Territorio dell’Architettura (1966) owed more to this previous generation than it willingly acknowledged. Like Paci, he described the field of architecture in an expansive and relational fashion. Following Rogers, he established a Merleau-Pontyan ambiguous zone between subject and object as the realm of the pre-

81 Miriam Tosoni, conversation with the author, Milan 29 June 2000. Tosoni was Rogers secretary at Casabella during his years as an editor.
82 Vittorio Gregotti, conversation with the author, Milan, 30 June 2000.
existing Life-world, which he then qualified through Paci as an open-ended and fluid structuring structure. Then, in the manner of Argan, he turned to Martin Heidegger to describe how architecture was an experiential “mode of Being” towards the life-world.\textsuperscript{83} Returning to Rogers, he explained the process of design as the emergence of new (conceptual or material) form within the existing.\textsuperscript{84}

Out of the many phenomenological sources of \textit{Il Territorio dell'Architettura} only Gregotti’s unapologetic embrace of Heidegger begot him criticism.\textsuperscript{85} Heidegger’s affiliation with the German Fascist régime made Heidegger \textit{persona non grata} of the Italian intellectual left. Moreover, Theodor Adorno’s critique of modern culture \textit{Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschadigten Leben} (\textit{Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life}, 1951), which had just appeared in Italian, fascinated Gregotti’s generation and exposes them to Adorno’s tireless critiques of Heidegger.\textsuperscript{86} Although the similarities between critical theory and Phenomenology have often been noted, Adorno stood in fundamental opposition to Paci and Rogers’ view of existence as grounded in the immediate experience of the Life-world.

The demotion of phenomenology by the new generation was perhaps strongest in the work of Manfredo Tafuri. Although his early work was deeply indebted to Paci,\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. pp 45-53, 128-134.
\textsuperscript{85} Vittorio Gregotti, conversation with the author, Milan, 30 June 2000.
\textsuperscript{86} Adorno himself would bring critical theory to architects with his widely circulated address at the inauguration of the Deutsche Werkbund in Berlin on October 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 1965, entitled “Functionalism Today.” The paper was first published in German in \textit{Neue Rundschau}, v. 77, n. 4, (1966). See also the English translation as Theodor Adorno, “Functionalism Today” in \textit{Oppositions}, n. 17, (Summer 1979).
\textsuperscript{87} Enzo Paci influences Tafuri’s notion of the historical dialectic, as rendered in his book \textit{Ludovico Quaroni e lo Sviluppo dell'Architettura Moderna in Italia} (1964). Tafuri’s description of the historical dialectic as a phenomenon in which it is just as impossible to inverse time as to proceed to an automatic repetition of events, was modelled on Paci’s opposition both to “pure traditionalism” and “pure avant-gardism.” For Paci each “pure” movement leads to equally sterile results, either to revivals or to the cult of the new for its
upon his move to the School of Venice in 1968, Tafuri encountered an intellectual milieu deeply engaged in the critique of Italian Marxism, and clearly dominated by Frankfurt School thinking. Tafuri’s exchanges with Francesco dal Co, Marco De Michelis and Massimo Cacciari are the origin of his philosophical reorientation from the phenomenology of Paci towards the teachings of Critical Theory.

Tafuri’s reorientation was strengthened by Rogers’s and Paci’s demotion of theory in favor of an experientialist practice. In 1968, Tafuri founded the Institute of architectural history in Venice, the first such institutions in Italy. The work inside the institute took two principal directions in the years immediately following 1968-69. First, Tafuri began the pursuit of historical studies on ancient architecture (such as Tafuri’s work on Palladio and Borromini, and his collaborations with Luigi Salerno and Luigi Spezzaferro on the Via Giulia). Second, the institute undertook research on Modern art and architecture. Methodologically, the institute emphasized contact of the historian with primary sources, a concern that was largely absent in the generation of Zevi and Benevolo. In 1976, the institute was reconstituted as a separate department of the School of Venice: The Department Of Critical And Historical Analysis Of Architecture, which offered degrees on the basis of strictly historical work. This shift supposed a new specialization that discharged architects of accountability on the level of historical and theoretical proficiency.

The task for Tafuri was to form specialist historians who, by virtue of their proximity to architects, should have a deeper understanding of the techniques with which their objects of study are constructed. Similar departments would follow this trend in the

own sake. see Enzo Paci, "La Crisi della Cultura e la Fenomenologia dell' Architettura Contemporanea," in
United States, beginning with MIT’s 1975 founding of the History Theory and Criticism of Architecture and Art section, making the separation of architectural theory and practice an international phenomenon. With the rise of professional historians came the demotion of architects from the center stage of intellectual life. More importantly, because Rogers and Paci’s claimed that the emergence of a new reason would come about through practice and action they had to remain silent before their own practice’s relegation to the background of a new intellectualism. Practice, came once more to be understood as theory’s ‘application’ or ‘test.’

When a new engagement with non-modernist architecture emerged in the late 1970s, Rogers and Paci’s understanding of tradition as an experience of original creativity that came prior to reflection resurfaced under various guises. Rogers business partner, Enrico Peresutti helped disseminate their understanding of tradition in the United States, where his student Charles Moore transformed it into “poetic images.” In essence, these appeals to an essential origin to aesthetic expression concealed and perpetuated the modernist myth that “authentic” creativity occurred in the sphere of radical alterity to culture, and that it could be achieved through the architect’s innocent avant -garde vision. Although there is no evidence to suggest the existence of such “pure” aesthetic experiences, self-assertion could elevate practice beyond convention. However, Rogers fell short of his own project to transform objective reality by insisting that subjectivity remain un-theorized. Without theory, the authorial Self served as and aesthetic veil to both the philosopher and the architect, who felt absolutely no need to provide objective evidence so that others could verify their assertions about emancipating aesthetic

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*La Casa*, n. 6 (1959), pp 357-58.
experience. Without an adequate critique that could ground the changing conceptions of subjectivity in history, their Self-assertions were condemned to become static and incapable of advancing Self-knowledge. The intersections with phenomenology that helped open up modern architects to non-modern architecture were obscured behind the veils of subjectivity. In the absence of self-critique, as modernist architects turned to the forms of the past, they were incapable of incorporating them into the language of the present. A case in point was the 1978 Palermo Declaration (which was an attempt by Leon Krier, Pier Luigi Nicolin, Angelo Villa, Maurice Culot and Antoine Grumbach to recuperate the link between architecture, urbanity, and politics), which was incapable of revising of heritage and modernity, choosing instead to attempt a return to the vocabulary of a pre-industrial era. Thus severed from its claims to the construction of a new reason (or of the new in general), Rogers’ tradition was rearticulated into a frozen life-world of unchanging essences. The architect’s immediate experience of that newly defined life-world can yield nothing but a discourse about timeless essences.

VII. Conclusion

In an interview I held with Vittorio Gregotti in August 2000, he described phenomenology and idealism as the main currents structuring the 1950s Italian architectural debate. The two positions were for him necessarily opposed, because

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they were by two conflicting intellectual traditions, on the one hand, Italian Idealism, and on the other French Phenomenology. Gregotti’s assessment must not be confused with the by now common view that architects “apply” an “original” philosophy, and that in doing so they perform some degree of violence to it by vulgarizing it. The life and work of the circle of architects and philosophers around Casabella from the mid 1950s to the 1960s offers a completely different reality. What we witness is a small but very influential group centered on the figures of Ernesto Rogers and Enzo Paci, who shared theoretical and ideological tenets, and who would go on to become major players in architectural culture of the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{90}

In turn, Paci and his students were convinced that philosophy had to affect culture, and they involved themselves directly in aesthetic practices like architecture, contributing articles to professional journals, and offering their (sometimes unsolicited) opinion on projects. Paci and Rogers even collaborated in the design for the History of Italian Science exhibition in Milan’s Palazzo Reale.\textsuperscript{91} Rogers and his circle believed architecture to be as much of an intellectual practice as it was aesthetic. In this unusual if not unique chapter in the history of dialogues between architecture and philosophy, architects not only welcomed the philosophers, but engaged them on equal footing, and challenge them. The result was a fertile joint project to redefine the intellectual claims of architecture as well as the practical role of philosophy.

\textsuperscript{90} Giulio Carlo Argan, would be the future mayor of Rome for the communist party; Giancarlo De Carlo, architect, would join Team X and be one of its principal spokesmen; Vittorio Gregotti, architect, after his membership in the shortlived Gruppo 63 he would go on to become one of the major figures of Italian architecture; Gae Aulenti, became one of Europe’s most renowned architects (and one of the few high profile women in practice) after she won the competition to remodel the 19th-century Gare d’Orsay into the present Musée d’Orsay (1980–86).

Their common work found its sources in French existentialism's emphasis on lived experience as the source of reason, and on action as an expression of commitment. Their common Marxist background strengthened their relationship to Sartre, whose thinking was particularly popular with the young European post-war generation because of its insistence on politics and because of its demand that people should reject 'bad faith' (leading lives according to the false conventions of society) and opt instead for 'authentic' existence. Sartre's existentialism contrasted sharply with the arms-length politics of Croce. Sartre contributed to youth sub-culture of the 50s by encouraging individuals to express themselves through their actions, to take responsibility for those actions, and to have a strong sense of political commitment. Italian architectural discourse would assimilate the Sartrean issue of commitment in two distinct ways: Architects (mostly of the higher echelons of society) would become committed to building for the lower classes, and would express their renewed responsibility to the environment—in more phenomenological circles, this would be more explicitly a responsibility towards the life-world.

Undoubtedly, Sartre's international reputation facilitated the acceptance of Paci's and Rogers' work, in Italy and the world. But the impact and breadth of their work cannot be reduced to a mere side effect of Sartre. Paci was the only existentialist of the 1950s to bring phenomenology directly to architects, proposing the re-foundation of architecture through Husserl's phenomenology, in the pre-categorical realms of

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92 Notwithstanding his objections to Marx (which were mostly directed towards Marx's "materialist metaphysics"), Sartre's existentialism is basically Marxist in its social implications. For instance, he accepts Marx's conception of the class struggle.


intentionality and lived experience. Paci made available a much-needed new conception of engaged architectural politics, whereby the every-day practice of architecture becomes, not just moral and political action, but the vehicle through which he believed the forms of a new reason could emerge. Moreover, Paci’s call for an authentic architectural praxis, where reason emerges through concrete life projects, provided a way out of the perceived exhaustion of rationalism. Paci claimed that the 1950s crisis of rationality was in fact a disaggregating of past forms of the life-world, and that the life-world was calling forth a new synthesis, a new form or thinking and of architecture. He saw his own philosophy as that new synthesis and Rogers architecture as its artistic equivalent. Rogers architectural synthesis rested on the foundation of the originality and authenticity of the life-world, and on the ability of architects to live authentically by heeding the call for new form of the life-world. For Paci, the contemporary constellation of the crisis invested the modes of the architectural project, inevitably, with the modes of reason of philosophy, and vice versa.95

The phenomenological re-articulation of modernism was furthered by the successful union of philosophy and architecture, in defiance of Croce’s objections. When, Paci and Rogers introduced immediacy in experience as the only true foundation for new architectural form, they shifted the emphasis of design from a scholastic adherence to shapes of the past to a more open ended subjective re-interpretation of the past as understood from the perspective of the present. Between 1953 and 1964, Milanese architects lay claim to history in the pages of Casabella in a rather articulate

95 This is, according to Salvatore Veca, one of Paci’s more significant contributions to architecture. See Salvatore Veca, "Un Filosofo e l’Architettura: Enzo Paci,” in Casabella, “Casabella Cinquant’anni 1928-1978,” n. 440-441 (October-November 1978), pp 73-74.
and coherent fashion, as the material with which they also worked. But, away from the highly intellectual architectural circles of Milan, the international community quickly dropped the nuances of phenomenological analysis.

In dealing with the major themes of post-war modernism, Paci and Rogers effectively re-defined the very notion of architectural practice as the potential source of collective self-consciousness and rationality. But their understanding of practice did not last, and the idea of authentic experience was soon be demoted to an excuse for architects to abandon intellectual aspirations and ignore historical reality. In all fairness, it must be noted that neither Paci nor Rogers ever really demonstrated the phenomenological method of achieving authentic experience systematically in their architectural essays. More often than not, instead of building up from an apodictic experience to the level of complexity and interdependency of architectural science, they asked architects to simply drop scientific speculation and opt instead to rely on poetic visions for their practice. This generated the by now common argument by architects that their subjective experience (usually presented through a few analytic sketches) grants them the necessary command of history, the vernacular, the territory, and the city to design appropriately. The repercussions of this position are still felt today, in the desperate attempts between architectural intellectuals (theorists, historians) and practitioners (architects proper), to operate independently of each other, while operating inside each other, and in the general disappearance of a discourse on social commitment from avant-garde practice.

The importance of Casabella Continuità in disseminating Paci’s and Roger’s thinking cannot be understated. It allowed them, as we have seen, to help infuse the international post-war discourse of architecture with a very particular understanding of
how the immediate lived experience of an authentic Life-world could help bring about a new architecture, out of the crisis of the old. The reception of their postulates, which often overlooked their epistemological model, opened modern architecture to new problems, which remain alive today: the nature of history and tradition, the non-transcendence of reason, the relationship of theory and practice, the spatial and temporal rigidity and fluidity of form, the fusion of culture and environment, the ethical responsibility of architects to both society and environment, and, perhaps most importantly, the diffusion of individual subjectivity into the world and into collective consciousness.

The persistence of the crisis of modernity in the present attests to the fact that Paci’s and Rogers’ contribution did not succeed in resolving it, but it did alter its structure fundamentally. The strategy of working phenomenology inside architecture, as its philosophical foundation, is its greatest strength and most vulnerable weakness. It allowed the concepts of life-world and experiential immediacy to “feed” on, or be introduced in the shadow of existing theories of architectural expression and perception. By shaping itself to the form of architectural problems its own accents became almost unrecognizable. But here again, the moment when phenomenology appeared to have surrendered to architecture was the instant when it had the greatest strength because it made everything under the sun appear in its image.
CHAPTER 3

CHARLES W. MOORE: FROM BACHELARD TO THE POETIC IMAGE

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We are living in a country which is the richest of all in availabilities, if we were to speak up. And I am glad we don’t, because as soon as we become conscious of it, it’ll be as ruinous as McCarthy, who spoiled our true consciousness, our sense of democracy. He tried to define it and called for sides to be held, to be counted, and therefore destroyed the beauty of what democracy could be. And we’re suffering to this day because of the attempt to isolate, you know, the qualities of democracy.

Louis I. Kahn

I. **Introduction: Anti-Avant-Garde, Neo-Avant-Garde and McCarthyism**

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed at Sing Sing prison in 1953, the first American civilians to be put to death during peacetime on charges of espionage. The evidence for their conviction, which alleged that they had passed atomic secrets to the USSR, was so scant that even Pope Pius XII had joined the international community in pleas for executive clemency, but President Harry S. Truman turned them down in 1952 (as did President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953). Truman could not afford to appear lax.

In 1949, while American supported factions were fighting Korean communists, China “fell” to Mao Zedong’s army. That same year, news arrived that the USSR had carried out an atomic explosion. The idea that the Soviets had “the bomb” terrified Americans, many of whom took to building nuclear fall-out shelters in their back yards. On March 22, 1947, Truman, under pressure from the republican controlled 80th Congress, issued Executive Order 9835, which put in effect a new loyalty-security program for federal employees meant to weed out communists and other dissidents. As a result, anti-Communism became the official policy of the United States. Federal employees had to undergo political background checks from the FBI, which were often based on specious

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reports from undisclosed informants, and which could result in their dismissal. The
Rosenbergs were mortal victims of what came to be known as the American “Red Scare.”

Inflamed by the execution, Jean Paul Sartre wrote an article in the French newspaper
*Liberation* accusing the American people of succumbing to fascism:

> You’ve allowed the United States to become the cradle of a new fascism [...] fascism is defined not by the number of its victims but its way of killing them [...] you have quite simply tried to stop the progress of science by a human sacrifice [...] your country is sick with fear. ²

The discriminatory practices of Truman’s Federal Employee Loyalty Program soon spread to state governments and to the private sector. Political tests became common to screen individuals for anything from a passport to a fishing license.

University jobs were no exception. After all, the Rosenbergs, like many other young Americans, had become members of the Communist Party while in college. The image of the college professor as a Left-wing demagogue acquired increased currency. Once perceived as a safe haven for liberal ideals and academic freedom, the university became suspect as the breeding ground of dissidents. But precisely because its legitimacy as an institution had been built around its intellectual autonomy, universities found themselves in a paradoxical position: They had to maintain the appearance of objectivity and fairness, while at the same time evincing a sense of political spotlessness before the community. That is, they had to “clean the house” of communists and “fellow travelers,” without appearing discriminatory.

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² Sartre’s article appeared in *Liberation* on June 22, 1953, as “Les Animaux malades de la rage.” In his biography of Sartre, Ronald Hayman noted Sartre’s Soviet bias. In order to chastise the United States, Sartre was willing to ignore the Stalinist purges in the USSR. Raymon Aron, Sartre’s college friend and colleague, commented that this text belonged to the literature of hyper-Stalinism. See Ronald Hayman, *Sartre: A Biography*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p 310.
The administrative procedures that ensued to silently carry out these purges have been widely documented. The cultural substrate of affirmation and consensus was as much a part of university life as of any other aspect of American life from the early 1940s to the early 1960s. Professors of architecture, who often doubled their academic careers with professional practices, were never far from the sensibilities of the communities they served. How did these pressures affect architectural education in general? I will argue that the conditions of the Cold War helped entrench a particularly American form of anti-intellectualism within architectural pedagogy, which pitted the mind against feeling, on account of the belief that it was inconsistent with warm emotion, against practicality, upholding theory to be the nemesis of practice, against character, on the grounds that the intellect was prone to wickedness, and against democracy, since to be an intellectual was deemed to be a type of gentlemanly distinction offensive to American egalitarianism.

The broad cultural acceptance of these stereotypes made the understanding of architecture as an intuitive practice, concerned mainly with the human emotions, to mushroom unchallenged. Its basic tenets constituted the fiber of what in the late 1970s would be referred to as a “phenomenological attitude” towards architecture. Indeed, many of the architects who resisted the late 20th century emergence of a theoretical consciousness in their schools, began invoking phenomenology (without necessarily

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carrying out a sustained study of the philosophy) as a means to quickly give the necessary credence and intellectual legitimacy against the challenges of young new scholars.

During the 1950s, significant sections of American architectural education became concerned with the systematic demotion of the intellect as a means to encourage the realignment of the profession with the reactionary sensibilities of the American post-war heartland. When seen in the light of McCarthyism and the Cold War, the emergence of Postmodernism in the United States reveals a soft underbelly of reactionary politics beneath the surface of a circumspect interest in the “vernacular” and the “popular.” It is impossible to divorce the attacks on Modern architecture, as introduced by European exiles teaching at elite universities, with the attempt to assert the supremacy of America’s white cultural folklore, religious values, and political traditions. The well-known lashings against the cosmopolitanism, social experimentalism, and skepticism of Modernism’s architectural intelligentsia drew much of their force from the anti-modern discourse from America’s small town Protestant culture, which since the early twentieth century had constructed its self-image as the bulwark of American values. Since its zenith in the anti-evolution crusade of the 1920s, this traditionalizing axis of American Protestantism had been on the slide on account of its inability to find moderate ways of putting its programs to action. The Cold War, however, offered this ideology a new lease on life. During the early years of the Cold War, the anti-modernist strands of Protestantism were channeled and secularized into a political machinery that suffused its anti-intellectual values within other economic, racist, and nationalist fundamentalisms.
What McCarthyism presented as the persecution of Communism was in reality the satisfaction of old-fashioned fundamentalist zeal on the political plane.4

The great 1950s shake down of the American university system is yet to be fully documented. Although some inroads have been made in the case of philosophy and history,5 its full impact on architectural education has thus far not been documented. Nor is it likely that a full accounting can be made for some time. Many universities keep personnel records closed for 75 years.

Architectural education “adjusted” to the McCarthyite repression of liberalism by in essence affirming architecture’s autonomy from culture and history, or so I will argue. An axis developed, within the Modernist avant-garde circles themselves that sought to salvage the practice of Modernism by emptying it of its socialist and reformist rhetoric, and replacing it with more circumspect discourses of either “quantification” or “spiritualization.” Those educators tugging in the direction of “quantification” attempted to modify the Modernist stress on “reform” into an emphasis on “research,” as they carried out narrowly defined “scientific” pursuits of truth. For instance, in 1952, Alexander Chermayeff, a professor at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design, began a search for “true statements about a house.” With the help of his assistant Christopher Alexander, he reduced the definition of design to permutations of logical types. By the early 1960s, both men had secured sufficient federal funds to buy time at MIT’s new IBM 704 computer and produce some of the first automated designs in the world. A different response to McCarthyism came from the professorate pulling towards

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5 Most relevant to the present work are John McCumber’s, Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), and Peter Novick, That Noble
“spiritualization.” They cloaked education in the mantle of a culture that smaked of monastic piety. Architectural training was to them the study of a quasi-divine mystery as revealed in earthly appearances, a “calling” which involved shedding the “baggage” of “lower” forms of socially or historically constructed knowledge. In 1953, while speaking about the need to elevate architectural education from its secular professionalism, Louis I. Kahn famously stated: “I studied at the University of Pennsylvania and, although I can still feel the spiritual aspects of that training, I have spent all my time since graduation unlearning what I learned.”

Although these two responses to the early years of the Cold War are clearly identifiable, they rarely appeared in pure form, so to speak. More often than not, proponents of the scientific pursuit of truth in architecture justified it in spiritualizing terms, and those advancing the “spiritualization” of architectural education developed complex methods for testing spiritual experiences that also gave the appearance of scientific research. Thus, Kenneth Rexroth could claim that Chermayeff’s goal was to scientifically produce houses for private family prayer, and Kahn could “objectively” assert that bricks wanted to be arches.

The critique that emerged in the mid 1960s of Modernism’s scientific claims is well documented in the canon of architectural textbooks. Those histories have correctly linked the specious claims of 1950s architectural scientism to the “rationalist” legacy of 1920s and 1930s avant-gardes, and criticized Modernism as a whole for being blinded by

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a naïve utopianism. However, the spiritualizing thrust of Cold War Modernism did not suffer the same fate. One reason for this was that, unlike architectural scientism, the spiritualizing impetus of Modernism emerged largely in opposition to agents of change such as reason, science, and technology. In essence, and to varying degrees of orthodoxy, it catered to middle-American constituencies which, since the New Deal, had expressed anxieties about the destruction of their traditional ways of life by those “experts” and “liberals” allegedly in control of decisions to modernize the nation.

Under the new banner of a Postmodern style, Modernism’s old spiritualism would walk hand in hand with 1960s and 1970s structuralist critiques of Modernism. This is in a sense not surprising since both opposed the “universalizing” tendencies of Modern rationalism. However, whereas academic critiques would try to de-center the totalizing claims of rationalism, Modern spiritualism would simply substitute “reason” for “the soul” as the essential source of the new, thus replacing one type of universalism with another. The challenge to this spiritual form of Modern essentialism came only in the 1980s with the arrival of deconstruction to architectural discourse.

The coexistence of structuralism and spiritualizing Modernism was also made possible by their common fascination with the early-twentieth century avant-garde. The neo-avant-garde pretensions of structuralists resulted in a series of rigorous intellectual examinations that historicized and relativized the claims of the early European avant-garde. These 1970s revisions (which were convergent with intellectual assaults on “modernity” and “objectivity” that swept across university departments, from literary studies to mathematics) were carried out by a new class of intellectuals who, although

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7 See Kenneth Rexroth’s introduction to Serge Chermayeff and Christopher Alexander, *Community and*
trained professionally as architects, had committed themselves completely to the academy. Groups such as the Conference of Architects for the Study of Environments (CASE) or the later Institute for Architecture and Urbanism (IAU) helped crystallize this growing theoretical, historical, and scholarly consciousness inside architectural pedagogy. In contradistinction to the structuralist attempt to revive a type of avant-garde intellectual architectural practice, the spiritualizing form of Modernism constructed its image in opposition to the avant-garde. This anti-avant-garde was thus boisterous, populist, anti-intellectual, spiritual, and hostile to all academic and scientific pretensions. Few of the architects who embraced it had an explicit theoretical or philosophical model of its precepts, but what the French call the vulgate anonyme was all the more powerful for not being systematically articulated.

With the arrival of the first batches of newly minted Ph.D.s in architectural theory, history, and criticism during the late 1970s, the face of architectural education took a turn towards scholarly rigor, and more competitive tenure requirements. Only then did the anti-avant-garde turn to phenomenology as a “theoretical” mask in order to acquire the necessary academic stature to be worthy of publication. The claim that phenomenology was a late 1960s nomenclature used to denote the ongoing life of a spiritualizing movement begun in the 1950s within Modernism itself raises a series of questions. Why did architects turn to phenomenology and not, say, analytic philosophy? Were there ideas in the philosophy itself that were given to anti-intellectualism? To answer these questions it is important to expand the limits of conventional intellectual history to also include the social histories of architecture and philosophy. Yes, these

architects were indeed drawn to the critique of rationalism and objectivity they found in phenomenology. They found echoes of the late Modernist attentiveness to human emotions in the phenomenological notion that the full ‘taking in’ of reality occurred as a function of both feeling and intellect. But similar notions can also be found in other philosophies, such as pragmatism.

The social history of phenomenology in the United States helps cast light on this matter. As a function of their inability to enter mainstream philosophy departments, American phenomenologists turned aggressively towards aesthetic disciplines, looking first to European literature departments, and then, as early as the 1970s, to architecture. The difficulties they experienced in securing jobs resulted in a sectarian and embattled mentality that resembled the derision architectural anti-intellectuals felt towards the university. As phenomenologists turned towards architecture, they were first welcomed by those architects furthest from the intellectual center of the discipline.

By the mid 1980s, the persistence of these contacts resulted in the first architectural critiques of phenomenology. These were, I will argue, not critiques of phenomenology at all, but rather attempts at excising from within postmodernism the by then quite visible spiritualized facet of Modernism. As such, they represented postmodernism’s push in the ongoing attempt to purge itself of the ghost of Modernism.

The invocation of phenomenology in the publications and pedagogical practices of the anti-avant-garde often involved the erroneous identification of their misgivings about the intellect with the critique of reason common to most phenomenological philosophers. 1970s contacts with phenomenology occurred at a consistently superficial level, leaving anti-intellectualism in architecture, with its stereotypical assumptions about
the mind, unchanged at its core. American architects rarely engaged in a careful study of phenomenology, but they did invite phenomenologists to participate in architectural discourse and pedagogy—some of these philosophers reached powerful academic positions in architecture, like Robert Mugerauer, current dean of the architecture school at the University of Washington. This systematic superficiality was not ameliorated by the philosophers who, in writing or speaking to architectural audiences, often presented phenomenology as the solution to the perceived crisis of Modern architecture. American phenomenologists, who perceived themselves as the marginalized victims of mainstream analytic philosophy (which to this day dominates philosophy departments), tried desperately to retain their new architectural audiences. More often than not, phenomenologists presented only the bare bones of their philosophy limiting its scope to a few bullet points about Heidegger’s critique of technology, or about how Merleau-Ponty’s embodied consciousness challenged the “disembodied Cartesian mind” of modernist architects. Although these philosophers can in no way be said to share the anti-intellectualism of the architects they ultimately joined forces with, the two groups shared a marked sectarianism, an embattled frustration with their respective disciplines, a devotional belief that their work was in the service of some higher truth (which remained hidden to the uninitiated), and a proselytizing pedagogy which promised salvation from the evils of modernity through conversion.

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It is worth noting that some philosophers, especially during the 1980s, did make an attempt to offer a more nuanced account of phenomenology. A good example is Edward Casey who not only contributed some early essays to architectural journals on the value of Husserl’s eidetic variation to design, but also attempted to re-orient phenomenology towards the more theory-friendly New York avant-garde at the time when architects such as Bernard Tschumi and Peter Eisenman became interested in Jacques Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction. See the concluding chapter of this dissertation in which I discuss the extensions into the present of phenomenology’s career within architectural discourse.
By the mid 1980s the word “phenomenology” had entered the common parlance of architects across the United States. In spite of its tongue-twister pronunciation, the term turned up frequently in student journals, conference proceedings, newsletters and professional magazines as the accepted nomenclature for a type of anti-intellectual low-brow design approach, which stressed piety towards the material world and the attunement of “interior” self with “outward” reality. The sudden popularity of a term with such philosophical (read intellectual) pedigree in architectural circles across the United States could be initially misread as a sudden nation-wide conversion to high thought. Much to the contrary, this chapter will argue that phenomenology served as a façade to give academic credibility to the architectural expression of America’s cultural misgivings towards intellectuals.

II. “Conventicules” and Little societies: a social history of phenomenology’s initial inroads into the anti-avant-garde.

A. Disciplinary Marginalization: architects and phenomenologists on the fringes of academe.

The early introduction of phenomenological thought in American architecture schools was caught in the framework of the internationalist “one-world” spirit of the post-war years, a time when American universities began regularly sponsoring European intellectuals on lecture tours and visiting teaching appointments. These efforts were encouraged and supported by government initiatives like the Fulbright Program, which was established in 1946 with the aim of “increasing mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries, through the exchange of persons,
knowledge, and skills.” Christian Norberg-Schulz, for instance, attended Harvard University between 1952 and 1953 on one such Fulbright grant. As scholars across disciplines expressed their fervent enthusiasm in cross-continental dialogues, so called “international” journals increased in circulation, and books emerged aimed at bridging intellectual divides. The Division of Humanities of the Rockefeller Foundation funded scholarship that promised to bridge intellectual divides, and financed its simultaneous publication in various European languages. Some of these books, such as Philosophic Thought in France and the United States (1950, published in French and English), helped raise awareness of Phenomenology in this country.

Ernesto N. Rogers and Enrico Peresutti, whose design philosophy as partners in the Milanese BBPR group had developed in dialogue with phenomenology, were among those European “stars” to become involved in American architectural education at this early stage. In 1952, Enrico Peresutti began his decade long teaching career in the United States with an appointment at MIT. Rogers’s 1955-1956 lecture tour included venues such as Harvard, Berkeley, University of Oregon at Eugene, Ann Arbour, Clemson, Blacksburg, Yale, and Minneapolis. At the end of the tour, he was named honorary member of the American Institute of Architects. Rogers’s reputation preceded him, for in 1951, Walter Gropius had proposed him as one of three candidates to inherit the head of the architecture school at Harvard. A few years earlier, Jean-Paul Sartre had made his

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11 Rogers returned to the United States in 1959 to spend the academic year teaching an Italian culture class at UCLA, Berkeley. In 1961 he returned to present a lecture at Columbia University on Le Corbusier, and in 1962 he lectured on Olivetti, again at Berkeley. During this period, on account of his worsening health, he declined offers to teach at MIT, Harvard, and Yale. Ernesto Rogers, Louis Kahn, Alvar Aalto,
first lecture tour of the United States. Between December 1945 and March 1946, Sartre spoke at Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, and Carnegie Hall. But there is no evidence that American architects took notice of Sartre. The fact that Sartre delivered his addresses in French and without translators did not help. More importantly, he had been invited on account of his popularity as an author of novels and plays, and his trip sponsored mostly by French literature professors (with the exception of the lecture at Carnegie Hall which was sponsored by Charles Henri Ford, editor of the avant-garde literary magazine View).  

The circumscription of Sartre’s audience to literary circles was not simply a function of the language barrier, nor of a perception among philosophers that his thinking was "soft," nor of a simple lack of worldliness of architects. There were important cultural and political issues that compromised his philosophy in the eyes of Americans, and worked against the more academic efforts to introduce it. Sartre was a staunch Marxist, a belief that made him more dangerous than a simple "egghead," as conservative Americans often called intellectuals. Sartre made no secret of his politics, openly

13 These reasons are summoned by Ann Fulton in Apostles of Sartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999). Otherwise a well researched and comprehensive piece of scholarship on Sartre in the United States, the book fails to take stock of how the charged political climate of the 1950s impacted Sartre’s appeal to American audiences.
14 Louis Bromfield, a popular right-wing novelist, issued a mockingly derisory definition of the term "egghead," which exemplified the more general cultural perception of intellectuals as pretentious, conceited, effeminate, snobbish, immoral, dangerous, and subversive:

Egghead: A person of spurious intellectual pretensions, often a professor of the protégé of a professor. Fundamentally superficial. Over-emotional and feminine in reactions to any problem. Supercilious and surfeited with conceit and contempt for the experience of more sound and able men. Essentially confused in thought and immersed in mixture of sentimentality and violent evangelism. A doctrinaire supporter of Middle-European socialism as opposed to Greco-French-American ideas of democracy and liberalism. Subject to the old-fashioned philosophical morality of Nietzsche which frequently leads

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criticizing France’s colonialism and protesting against the United States’ foreign policy, and “dividing himself,” as one of his biographers put it, “between political controversy and journeyman writing.” He often chose his literary work for its political content. A case in point was his 1955 decision to work on a screen version of Arthur Miller’s play *The Crucible*, which associated the McCarthyite persecutions with witch-hunting in seventeenth-century Salem.

By the same token, the political past of Ernesto Rogers and Enrico Peresutti, both former members of the Partito d’Azione, was a difficult hurdle for their work in American architecture schools. Before their arrival in the United States, Rogers and Peresutti had already curtailed their political views to discussions within a small group of friends gathered around the Marxist industrialist Adriano Olivetti. Their firm’s work during the 1950s was characterized by an “exalted abandonment to the immediacy of gesture without adequate conveyance on the plane of consciousness.” The critical evasion implicit in the surrender of design to the immediacy of experience was a response to the “crumbling of ideals” on the political and professional spheres. Italian intellectuals felt as thought they had failed to articulate their wartime experiences into a coherent program for political action. Rogers and Peresutti (along with many other Italian architects) attempted to sublimate this sentiment by constructing “culture” as an ethical and political battlefield where architecture “still mattered.” But this concern with culture, Rogers would later accept, was partly a frustrated attempt to make up for the

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collective failure of Italian partisans and of the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (Committee of National Liberation, or CLN) members to carry out the “renewal of society” they had both envisioned and promised. The retreat of the Rogers, Banfi, Belgiojoso, and Peresutti towards the stability of private conversations, and private commissions, was characteristic of the Milanese postwar cultural milieu, which was acutely aware not only of its own failures but of that of liberals and intellectuals in the United States and Russia. The world appeared to them condemned to become a consensual hell governed by “organizational men.” As architect Elio Vittorini recalled, by 1952 Italian architects were confronted with serious questions:

Was the Zdanov operation in Russia really finished? Was the McCarthy operation in America really succeeding? This was the darkness of the years around ’52. In conclusion, man seemed indeed destined to become the monstrous integral ‘functionary’ prefigured in Hegel’s romanticism.

The real failure of Italian politics, argued Vittorini, was that it stood perplexed before fascism’s appropriation of culture as the inalienable “thing,” as the rallying cry that gave strength to the murderous excesses of fundamentalism. The burden, then, was

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18 Ernesto N. Rogers, “Continuità,” in Esperienza dell’architettura, (Milan: Giulio Einaudi editore, 1958), pp 130-133. Rogers originally published this article in Casabella -Continuità, n. 199, (January 1954), his first editorial to inaugurate the new series. The comments on the CLN were added as a postscript for the book publication.
20 “Di chi è la sconfitta più grave in tutto questo che è accaduto?... E se ora milioni di bambini sono stati uccisi, se tanto che era sacro è stato lo stesso colpito e distrutto, la sconfitta è anzitutto di questa ‘cosa’ che ci insegnava l’inviolabilità loro... Questa ‘cosa’ voglio dire subito, non è altro che la cultura... non vi è delitto commesso dal fascismo che questa cultura aveva insegnato ad esecrare già da tempo, non dobbiamo chiedere proprio a questa cultura come e perché il fascismo a potuto commetteri!” See Elio Vittorini, “Una nuova cultura,” in Il Politecnico, n.1 (September 29, 1945), p 1. These remarks about culture, which Vittorini made in the first number of Il Politecnico (the journal he directed for the famous publisher Einaudi between September 1945 and December 1945) were to crystallize, according to Bonfanti and Porta, the aspirations of the Italian intelligentsia coming out of the struggle for liberation. See Ezio
on intellectuals of the postwar to understand culture, to appropriate it and define it so as to execrate its misconstrued (idealist) distortions. The attention given in Italy to “reality” across disciplines was commanded by this dictate to recapture culture. For the members of the BBPR, Husserl’s (and Paci’s) “return to things themselves” rung harmoniously with the new political necessity to return to culture.

By 1952, when Peresutti took up his first teaching appointment at MIT, the rising fundamentalism of conservative Protestantism was claiming sovereignty over American culture, and calling upon defenders of good old American values to join in the struggle against communists and liberals. Peresutti, whose alertness to the surreptitious nature of fascism had been sharpened by his years as a partisan, warned his students about the political importance of this (now American) struggle over culture. He called upon them


21 For more on this phenomenon, which Richard Hofstadter referred to as the rise of Protestant orthodoxy in America, see his Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New York: Knopf, 1963), p 124.
to hold on to "reality" and to keep a vigilant watch over culture. In the Italian context, Peresutti had attempted to solder postwar culture by appealing to both the "stable" past of "spontaneous architecture" and to the open-mindedness of Milanese late 19th century cosmopolitanism. But what past were American architects to hang on to? Folk architecture in the United States was associated precisely with the type of Protestant culture whose more orthodox factions were now clamoring against intellectuals.

Peresutti's pleas were answered (or so his students thought) by Lewis Mumford's Bay Region Style. Mumford had attempted to salvage the American vernacular by differentiating it from the "rural folk" and from Protestantism, and by linking it to a more cosmopolitan notion of the 19th century suburb. Striking back on defense of intellectuals, Mumford went as far as to blame the uneducated as well as Protestant ethics for reducing "reality" to a singular ideal. Their reductivism, he maintained, had seriously hampered the critical mechanisms of scientific theory, therefore eliminating resistances to Modern technology's degradation of the environment. The Bay Region Style, as Mumford

24 Mumford differentiated between science, with its emphasis on reason and understanding, and technics which aimed at manipulating and transforming the world. Science, he argued was positive and could in fact help discern between good and bad technical applications. Technics was in a sense blind to itself. For Mumford, the destructive advances in modern technics resulted from ignoring science, that is, from demoting the intellect. Some attacks against the intellect, such as the challenge to the theological understanding of the universe were good, argued Mumford, insofar as they gave way to an interest in nature. Mumford credits the common folk for this advance. "Their minds were less capable of forging their own shackles." The rational, common sense interest in nature was a shift from the erudite view of the world as an expression of a metaphysical beyond. Thanks to those who could not understand the allegorical significance of the mystic numbers three and four, seven and nine, and twelve, the world moved towards scientific mensuration. The second great obstacle to the advance of Modern technics was animism, which understood all entities in the world as containing a spirit, or an expression of a higher unattainable truth. This exorcism was the great achievement of the intellect. Animism was overcome by the imaginative capacity of dissociation. "The specific triumph of the technical imagination rested on the ability to dissociate work from the action of men and animals and create the water-mill: to dissociate light from the combustion of wood and oil and create the electric lamp." Scientific dissociation was perverted, continued Mumford, by Protestantism, which made particular facets of the real stand in for reality as a
defined it, was an attempt to widen the understanding of reality, to promote openness and heterogeneity, in sum, to resist all “purisms” – aesthetic, ethical, political, or otherwise. 25

Much like Peresutti, Mumford argued, against the political pressures of McCarthyism, for an inclusive definition of culture. This similarity allowed Charles W. Moore to claim Peresutti as one of his greatest influences (along with Louis I. Kahn and Jean Labatut) in shaping his self-image as a “Bay Region” architect. 26

In Protestantism he saw the double drive towards abstraction and quantification that came to characterize both capitalism and technological thinking. Protestantism rested on the abstraction of print and money, rejected pictorialism and allegorical symbolisms of communal life in order to emphasize individuality, and endorsed the quantification and accumulation of what it considered reality. “Life in all sensuous variety and warm delight, was drained out of the Protestant’s world of thought: the organic disappeared. Time was real: keep it! Labor was real: exert it! Money was real: save it! These were the realities and the imperatives of the middle class philosophy.” (p 43) This failure to take reality in as a whole, gave rise, according to Mumford, to the worst aspects of modern technology. See Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, (New York and Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963), pp 28-36, 43.

Mumford’s Bay Region Style has been mostly discussed as a reaction to the International Style, which it of course was. What I am arguing here is that the note of dissidence it sounded was not simply aimed at replacing an orthodox style with a more inclusive palette of formal references. It was “neotechnical,” as Mumford elaborated it in other works. It was also a program for a more inclusive civilization, one that could keep fundamentalisms at bay through intellectual rigor. This was the essence of his definition of (and call for) “neotechnics,” which was not a historical period (like the “eotechnic” and “paleotechnic”), but rather a form of social and physical organization. See: Ibid.

“I started out thinking of myself as a ‘Bay Region architect […] and then had been swept in turn by Europe and Japan. I had taught history at Utah, and I came to Princeton to do a degree in history. So Peresutti’s concern with the past was wonderful. The idea behind his sketching trips was for us to take something old and full of context, and then try to put new things in them—but new things that would not be like imposter, but like those congenial fellow travelers on the train.” Charles W. Moore as quoted in David Littlejohn, Architect: The Life and Work of Charles W. Moore, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984), pp 125-126. It is doubtful, though possible, that Moore invoked the term “fellow traveler” here in allusion to the term used by McCarthy to refer to communist collaborators.
Philosophers in the early 1950s, and phenomenologists in particular, also came under the sway of an ideology of purity. A sizable wave of phenomenologists had arrived in the United States as refugees during the 1940s, and slowly begun to draw interest to the philosophy. Among them were Aron Gurwitsch, Felix Kaufmann (1895-1949), Fritz Kaufmann (1891-1958), Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), Herbert Spiegelberg (1904-1990), Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965) and Moritz Geiger. Together with Americans Harmon Chapman and John Wild (1902-1972), and under the leadership of Dorion Cairns (1901-1973) and Marvin Farber (b. 1901), they founded the International

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27 An earlier origin to American phenomenology can be ascribed to Dorion Cairns and Marvin Farber, who were sent from Harvard by William Ernest Hocking (1873-1966) to study in Freiburg under Edmund Husserl during the 1920’s. Farber’s published dissertation, *Phenomenology as a Method and a Philosophical Discipline* (1928), was effectively the first American work on phenomenology. There had been phenomenologists teaching in the United States prior to that. Winthrop Bell, Husserl’s student, had taught phenomenological value theory at Harvard in the 1920s, where Moritz Geiger had spend had also taught, in 1907, before becoming a visiting professor at Stanford University in 1926 and 1935. An attempt to introduce phenomenology prior to these exchanges had been made, but effectively frustrated by William James, the famed American Pragmatist so praised by Husserl in the second edition of *Logische Untersuchungen*. James advised the would-be publishers of Husserl’s book against its publication, claiming that Americans would not be interested in another German work on Logic. See “Edmund Husserl,” in *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, ed. Lester Embree, et. al., (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p 363.
Phenomenological Society, along with its journal *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, which included prestigious phenomenologists from Europe in its editorial board, such as Antonio Banfi (1886-1957), Gaston Berger, Eugen Fink, Jean Hering, Gerhart Husserl (1893-?), and Ludwig Ladgrebe. The society had 231 members in 1942, but its ranks dwindled so much during McCarthyism that it had to cease convening.

Pragmatism, the quintessentially American philosophy with which some of the early phenomenologists had established a rapport, suffered the same fate. In their place, and to the practical exclusion of all other philosophical schools, Anglo-centered currents such as analytic philosophy, logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy established their hegemony over the academy. During the 1950s, only the New School for Social Research in New York offered Ph.D.s in phenomenology, under the tutelage of Schutz, Cairns, and Gurwitsch.

Why did phenomenology become so undesirable, so fast? Sartre’s acid criticism of America certainly did not help. But more importantly, phenomenologists were unable to “adjust” to the demands of the changing political climate. McCarthyite forces were turning the persecution of Communism’s alleged falsehood and mendacity into a generalized intolerance for professors who did not “speak the truth.” The mood of caution and self-censorship that presided over American life in the late 1940s and 1950s made this notion of “truth” congenial to a narrowly reduced, highly idealized, depoliticized and dehistoricized “objective” knowledge. As American philosopher John McCumber put it, the discourse of truth in McCarthyism relied on “a simple dichotomy:

intellectual life is either a scientific quest for truth or a mere propagandistic mission.”  

The success of Analytic philosophy in the United States was in part assisted by its claims to “objectivity,” which circumscribed truth to the production of statements any relinquished any connection to culture or politics. By the same token philosophies like phenomenology or pragmatism, which called into question objectivity, seemed intrinsically suspicious.

Phenomenologists did attempt to appear useful in the “battle of ideologies.” John Wild, a professor of philosophy at Harvard, was one of phenomenology’s most ardent promoters during the postwar. The Challenge of Existentialism (1955) was one of his early attempts to provide a comprehensive textbook for the study of phenomenology. Wild unapologetically argued that philosophy involved politics, and that if American

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31 McCumber singled out two philosophers, Raymond B. Allen and Rudolph Carnap, to illustrate the two primary modalities of circumscribing truth to the production of statements in American analytic philosophy. During the academic freedom cases of two University of Washington professors, Allen implied that his colleagues were communist propagandists by famously suggesting that philosophy was restricted to the objective, “timeless, selfless quest for truth” concerned with analytical truths and logical syntax in the manner of science. Although Carnap did separate scientific method from truth, McCumber critiqued him for not going far enough. In his 1936 article “Truth and Confirmation,” Carnap agreed that truth was timeless, but he argued that one could never achieve it because scientific inquiry unfolded in time. Science could therefore only “confirm” things in time. Yet, regardless of its shortcomings with regards to truth, science was our knowledge of the truth. This argument, for McCumber, naturalized philosophy into an empirical science. Both positions, summarized McCumber, relegated the philosophical search for truth to science, following the canon of logical positivism. John McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p41-42.
32 The disciplinary homogenization witnessed by philosophy as a function of cultural pressures in the McCarthy period was also common to other disciplines. The disappearance of dissident currents in history departments, for instance has been documented in Chapter 11. “A Convergent Culture,” in Peter Novik’s more extensive study of “objectivity” in That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession, (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
philosophers did not attend to this they were leaving their flanks open for a communist attack. His condemnation of the 1950s American academy was uncompromising:

Academic philosophy has become a barren wasteland with little relevance to actual life and with little appeal, except to careerists and technicians. It is not surprising that many of our own enquiring youth in times of chaos and depression have turned to the Marxist synthesis. No alternative has been offered. Our philosophy has fallen into evil days. It is no longer doing the work which men have expected of it in the past.33

Positivism, according to Wild, was chiefly responsible for this decay. He felt that its hold on the Anglo-Saxon world had contorted modern thought into a worrisome mix characterized by: “inattention to the immediate data of concrete experience; neglect of existence and first philosophy; a physicalist approach to the problem of human awareness, leading to subjectivism; and a radical separation of theory from practice, leading to the de-rationalization of ethics.”34 Further worsening this disparaging assessment, Wild presented dialectical materialism as a coherently articulated philosophy that was spreading unchallenged to all areas of human thought and activity. *The Challenge of Existentialism* was twofold: it attacked analytical philosophers and communists alike on the cultural battlefield.35 Wild was convinced that phenomenology could put an end to communist ideology through rational critique.36 But convincing his

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34 Ibid. p 26.
35 Analytic philosophy, also referred to as linguistic philosophy, is characterized by its method of philosophical inquiry, which concerns itself with sentential truth. The early picture theory of language characteristic of the work of early analytic philosophers, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein or Bertrand Russell, established a direct relationship between language and reality and posited the possibility of learning about the world through the philosophical study of language. In the course of the 20th century, analytic philosophers expressed misgivings about the “defectiveness” of everyday language in “hooking onto” the world. Some analytic philosophers thus resorted to a type of “ideal” language, known as symbolic logic, which could pass as scientific, truthful, and free of ambiguity. It was against this reduction of philosophy to the study of “perfect” statements that Wild objected.
36 This belief that was shared, or at least followed, by many of the young phenomenologists that Wild would publish in his *Northwestern Series on Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*. For instance, in line with Wild’s program to find value in phenomenology as an alternative to both positivism and
American readership proved more difficult. He was writing in the wake of a hotly contested European debate in which Merleau-Ponty famously defended the right of Sartre to integrate Marxism and Existentialism. Wild conceded that “Sartre has flirted with many political theories and movements, last of all Marxism. But,” he added, “the connection between existentialist thought and any definitive political philosophy, as it is now presented to us, is wholly arbitrary and unstable.”37 This ideological instability, unfortunately for Wild, was precisely what McCarthyism aimed to put an end to. Wild called for a philosophy that, involved in practical life, could serve as the wisdom guiding and ordering life. There was a need, he argued, to combat the cold-war of ideas with the bullet-proof criticism of a systematic philosophy that, like Phenomenology, could dismantle Marxism:

We find ourselves engaged in what is primarily an ideological war against a formidable enemy, well equipped not only with physical weapons but with ideological armament as well. These ideas are not a mere jumble. [...] We may believe that these conceptions are distorted and un-sound. But it is naive to think that we can effectively oppose them by non-rational means. These are not material objects that can be shot down or blown up by physical weapons. These are ideas; and the only adequate weapon against a false system of ideas is the truth, or at least a closer approximation of the truth.38

This was simply too risky a proposition for academics living through a period when universities had become inherently inhospitable to dissent. Like Wild, Sartre had unsuccessfully attempted to introduce the United States to a philosophy that mingled in

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the worlds of literature, psychiatry, psychology, and politics. Sartre’s American reception had suffered precisely from being too involved in culture, and (it is worth noting) too staunchly hostile to religion in a country where most philosophers, although not overtly religious, “were not far removed from the spiritual traditions of their families and communities, and they were averse to a philosophy that trampled too indelicately on remaining religious sensibilities.” Phenomenologists tried desperately to make themselves appear useful to the Cold War. Some like William Barrett (b. 1913), a professor at New York University, turned their anti-communism into an outspoken support for Senator McCarthy.

According to historian Ellen Schrecker, McCarthyism produced “one of the most severe episodes of political repression the United States ever experienced. It was a peculiarly American style of repression—nonviolent and consensual.” The efficacy of the repression rested on the system’s decentralized structure which eliminated accountability. McCarthyism’s machinery was divided between the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which identified and accused citizens of promoting communism or dissidence, and the private sector, which punished the individuals by firing them, often before the government agencies had made any formal accusations. Once an individual had been singled out as undesirable by government agencies, the private sector became the willing executioner of sanctions. Contrary to common wisdom, the American university system was not a bulwark for academic freedom. Its long history

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38 Ibid. p 5-6.
of accepting political orthodoxy over the scholarly ideals of freedom of speech did much to contribute to McCarthyism.42

Universities, as institutions whose business relied heavily on their reputation, could not afford to lose stature before the court of public opinion. Consequently, a silent and consensual system of repression ensued whereby administrators purged their departments of outspoken faculty members, as a preventive measure to protect the university of what they "might" do. Professors with a history of activism were quietly dismissed on fears that might become "unfriendly" witnesses before the HUAC by refusing to "name names." Administrators and professors alike worried about the bad press that inevitably followed when a professor made recourse to the Fifth Amendment before an investigation committee.43

The academic authorities that carried out these purges did so as secretly as they could. When they could not perfectly conceal what they were doing, they tried to disguise

42 According to Schrecker, the tendency of American universities to pay lip service to academic freedom helped define the mission of the university as an institution for research instead of reform. Schrecker determined that as early as the late 19th century, university administrations began quietly denying tenure to professors who were in outspoken opposition to the beliefs of the larger community. (p 15) By 1915, a series of highly publicized cases, such as the firing of economist E. A. Ross from Stanford for denouncing the industrial abuses of railroad companies, helped forge an academic culture that discouraged the political involvement of professors, and encouraged their circumscription to disciplinary matters. After the First World War, as after the second, "institutional loyalty was the overriding concern. In almost every situation, faculty members and administrators responded to outside pressures for the dismissal of dissenting faculty members in accord with what they believed would best protect or enhance their school's reputation." (p 23). See; Ibid.
43 In anticipation of several congressional committees aimed at searching for subversives in American campuses due to begin in 1953, university professors and administrators at all levels met to attempt to define academic freedom. On February 15, 1953 twenty five presidents of America's most prestigious universities met as members of the Association of American Universities (AAU) to discuss the issue. Unable to reach a satisfactory global definition, and scrambling to keep outsiders from interfering in their hiring and firing procedures, they established that personnel decisions were "technical" matters determined by each discipline's intellectual demands, and beyond the competence of anyone who lacked a Ph.D. This definition created a zone for political autonomy so limited that, as Schreker demonstrated, it excluded as unscholarly whatever political behavior the leading members of an academic community feared might trigger outside intervention." See: Ibid. p 12.
its political nature. 44 This was the case in the action brought against Enrico Peresutti at Princeton University. Since 1953, Peresutti had been offering a yearly “architectural composition” class at Princeton University, in which he had consistently encouraged students to break out of the “technical” limits imposed on their discipline and become actively engaged in social problems. His insistence that students take in “reality” in its entirety, was a carry over from the cultural battles he had been engaged in Italy immediately after the war. Teaching by example, Peresutti re-enacted his partisan resistance to the fascist leveling of culture by refusing to restrict his opinions to architectural audiences. It must be noted that he spoke only about architectural matters, but failed to separate technical expertise from socio-political pronouncements, as was the norm in the United States. Furthermore, he incited students to break out of their “bureaucratic learning” and sharpen their sense of criticism, 45 stirring their interest in phenomenology—a school of thought deemed “irrational” and “absurd” by analytic philosophers. 46 For Peresutti, the moral training of architects was the most important aspect of an architectural education:

44 Ibid. p 264.
46 The first, and most heated debate between analytic philosophy and existentialism in the United States took place between analytic philosopher Van Meter Ames, existentialist Maurice Natanson, with John Yolton, a Locke scholar teaching at Princeton in the 1950s, mediating the debate. Ames objected to Sartre’s rejection of empiricism and linguistic analysis. For Ames, the supposition that noun-substantives had actual existence violated the principal tenets of these methods. Existentialism for him resulted in irrationalism: insofar as it used “absurd words,” it made “absurd worlds.” Natanson, on the other hand, suggested that Ames’s contention reflected his ignorance of phenomenology, which maintained that human existence could not be fully explained in any language that would establish an empirical meaning criterion. Natanson asked that Sartre be considered on the merits of his arguments, and that he not be rejected simply because he ignored the largely unquestioned canons of the analytic and empiricist methods. The debate did not serve to change the opinions of the participants. For Ann Fulton, a Sartre scholar, the significance of the debate lied in the attempts at re-conciliation during a time when empirically and analytically oriented thinkers were given to outright dismiss philosophies such as existentialism, which contradicted “scientific” canons: “The debate was significant not only because of the attempted mediation it called forth. Yolto n’s
I don’t believe in emphasizing a technical training for an architect. I believe much more in a moral training. What is a moral training? It seems to me that if an architect is not perfectly trained in a technical way, this is not a very important fault, as it is for a doctor, for instance. If a doctor is not technically trained, he can kill a man, perhaps two or three; but if an architect is not morally trained, I think he can kill not one man but a whole society.47

In the mid 1950s, Peresutti began publicly denouncing Princeton University’s new $30 million building campaign. In his mind, the stripped-down Modernist designs selected by the Board of Trustees not only seriously compromised the moral structure of the University as a whole, but also reflected negatively on the pedagogical position of the entire architecture school, and on its social commitments.48 Peresutti’s request that the commissions be given to architects “of stature,” like Frank Lloyd Wright (who Casabella had strongly promoted), inflamed the administration, which did not want to alienate its private and governmental donors. Robert W. McLaughlin, Director of Princeton’s School of Architecture, attempted in vain to discipline Peresutti. The issue was such a source of tension that it became the object of debate during a symposium on architectural education held at Princeton in 1953 attended by some of the nation’s better known educators and practitioners.49

John Ely Burchard, Dean of Humanities and Social

failed mission was of a piece with similar efforts made in this period. Growing familiarity with Sartrean thought made it easier for critics to sort out its strengths and weaknesses and to suggest ways of increasing communication between different idioms and approaches.” Ann Fulton, Apostles of Sartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999), p 73


49 Conference participants included: Turpin C. Bannister, Head of the Department of Architecture at the University of Illinois; John Ely Burchard, Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Chairman of the Conference); Henry L. Kamphoefner, Dean of the School of Design, North Carolina State College; Robert W. McLaughlin, Director of the School of Architecture at Princeton University; José Luis Sert, Dean of the Graduate School of Design at Harvard University; William Wilson Wurster, Dean of the School of Architecture at the University of California (and former dean of MIT’s School of Architecture); Max Abramovitz, from Harrison and Abramovitz, New
Sciences at MIT, asked: “What effect should the architectural faculty be permitted or encouraged to have on the architecture of the university itself?” A conversation ensued in which McLaughlin felt pressed to again remind Peresutti of the kind of self-censorship expected from the Princeton faculty:

Kamphoefner: Who selects the architects for Princeton buildings now?
McLaughlin: Princeton is governed by a board of trustees.
Wurster: That’s the same as a state university.
Burchard: They are not self-perpetuating?
Wurster: No.

McLaughlin: There is a very definite line between the function of the trustees and the function of the faculty. At Princeton, building is the function of the trustees and it would be no more considered good practice for the faculty to interfere with the trustees, than for the trustees to tell us in the School of Architecture how we should teach.

Wurster: I wonder if the board of trustees knows any more about building than your faculty, who are going to live in these buildings. As Churchill says, “First we shape our buildings and then they shape us.”

McLaughlin: As a practical matter, the School of Architecture is frequently consulted about architecture but not necessarily followed. There is no question that if you have a serious divergence as to what is being taught in the School of Architecture and what is being executed on the campus, you can have a very unhealthy situation.

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51 Ibid. p 54.
Peresutti's deeply political intellectualism had become noxious to the well-being of the university's reputation. These confrontations were precisely the type of events that attracted the unwanted attention of the HUAC. Architects were expected to conduct "scientific" research about architecture, not make grand proclamations about the moral bankruptcy of the university. There was too much at stake. Driven by Cold War insecurities of Soviet preeminence, the Eisenhower administration, whose main concern with universities had been to purge them of Communist and disloyal professors, had begun to pour money into universities for construction and for improving curricula, a trend which continued for the greater part of the 1960s. Curriculum studies, commissioned by state governments and private institutions, had a direct effect on architectural practice and pedagogy. For instance, the Educational Facilities Laboratories

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52 The architectural press did not fail to note that Eisenhower's most important addresses to Congress in January of 1955 (the State-of-the Union, the Budget, and the Economic Report) emphasized his intention to boost construction activity as a means to buttress national prosperity. The editors of Architectural Forum expressed great excitement to see that lobbying groups on Capitol Hill were gaining the support of Congress for bills that would make $500 million dollars a year for educational buildings (almost the same as for roads, if we take into account that the Bureau of public roads received $559.3 million in federal aid in 1954). See "President's Economic Program Banks Heavily on Construction," in Architectural Forum, n. 2, v. 102 (February 1955), pp 9, 13, 17. The article "Building's Soaring Statistics," in Architectural Forum, n. 2, v. 112 (February 1960), pp 107-112, predicted that school building would play a major role in the continued explosive growth of the construction industry during the decade to follow. The graphs appearing in "A portfolio of charts tracing the industry's dimensions and its steadily growing importance in the U.S. economy" gave reason for optimism. "The post-war era," wrote the editors, "has been marked by the greatest capital spending boom in U.S. history." The construction industry in 1959 amounted to 11.3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, a rise of 400 percent since 1929. Although residential construction represented the largest percent of new building (43 percent), the Architectural Forum alerted architects to opening markets in non-residential buildings, especially industrial facilities and new schools. There was, they claimed, still an immediate need for 132,400 classrooms. Their predictions held true for the greater part of the 1960s as university campuses mushroomed across the nation. Yet, by the end of the Cold War in 1989, the construction industry had shrunk to only 4.5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, or 245.8 billion dollars. See US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Gross Domestic Product by Industry in Current Dollars As a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product: 1987-92 and 1993-99," (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/gposhr.htm), August 13, 2001.

(a branch of the Ford Foundation) paid one thousand dollars to ten “school architects” to develop “efficient” university buildings according to the Trump Report. 54

University professors and graduate students, and particularly those employed at prestigious universities, represented about twenty percent of the total number of witnesses called before state and congressional investigating committees during the McCarthy era. The majority of them lost their jobs. 55 By 1959, the activism and vigilance promoted by Peresutti among his students became intolerable for the administration. After seven years of service as visiting professor, Peresutti had to resign on matters of “conviction and principle.” In his resignation letter to the administration Peresutti insisted that the projects sponsored by the trustees were not conducive to the type of moral and ethical program proper to a university. 56 Instead of allowing a debate to take place where the decisions of the trustees could be put to the test of Peresutti’s better judgment, Princeton President Robert F. Goheen tried to keep the issue quiet. When Architectural Forum contacted Goheen to inquire about Princeton’s reasons for letting such a world-renowned figure go, he replied that “the committee does not propose to argue its views with those expressed by Professor Peresutti,” and the affair was quickly

54 Dr. Lloyd Trump's 1959 report on improving “efficiency and productivity” in universities was published by the Ford Foundation, and supported by the Commission on the Experimental Study of the Utilization of the Staff in the Secondary School. The Trump Report was discussed in “The productivity push in schools,” in Architectural Forum, (November, 1959). The architects invited to design campuses and buildings according to the report were: Donald Barthelme; Charles W. Brubaker of Perkins and Will; William W. Caudill of Caudill, Rowlett & Scott; Charles R. Colbert of Colbert, Lowrey, Hess, Boudreaux; Phillip J. Daniel of Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall; John C. Harkness of the Architect’s Collaborative; Samuel E. Homsey of Victorine & Samuel Homsey; John Mcleod of Mcleod & Ferrara; John Lyon Reid of Reid, Rockwell, Banwell & Tarics; and Eberle M. Smith. Their designs were presented at a symposium held at the University of Michigan in 1960, and were published in “Three Ace Schools for the Trump Plan,” in Architectural Forum, n. 3, v. 112 (March 1960), pp 118-128.


brushed aside.\textsuperscript{57} Peresutti’s international stature allowed him to immediately find a position at Yale.

As a result of its internal purges, the 1950s academic establishment effectively silenced an entire generation of radical intellectuals, until the civil rights movement sparked new waves of activism. Peresutti’s was not an isolated case. Only months after his mentor Peresutti “resigned” from Princeton, the administration turned to Moore, questioning his moral character and sexuality. In a “Strictly Confidential” letter to then Princeton President Robert F. Goheen, J. Douglas Brown, Dean of the Faculty, endorsed the decision of Robert McLaughlin, Dean of Architecture, to dismiss Charles Moore from the faculty:

The reasons for not holding Moore were sound, I feel, and are related to personality. Single at 35, Moore did not seem stable or mature in respect to his relationships with students, and while brilliant, was an uncertain quantity personally for the long pull. Bob [McLaughlin] has been anxious to avoid a climate too often associated with art centers. I am inclined to support Bob’s judgment.\textsuperscript{58}

In the Spring of 1955 Robert Bedell, an engineer who had been teaching at Cooper Union for two years, received a visit by FBI agents inquiring about his “friends in the international communist conspiracy.” His refusal to disclose any information to the FBI resulted in his dismissal from Cooper Union in April 1956, on reasons that were never made entirely clear. Bedell tried to fight what he considered was a case of political

\textsuperscript{57} President Goheen’s comments are quoted in “Princeton Critic Resigns,” in \textit{Architectural Forum}, n. 2, v. 112 (February 1960), pp 15-16. Goheen private response to Peresutti is in the Peresutti personnel file. Seely G. Mudd Manuscript Library. Princeton University. In it Goheen expressed his regrets concerning Peresutti’s departure, and defended his views on “tradition.”

discrimination, but to no avail. John Wild also shared Peresutti’s fate. In 1961 he became the first full professor ever to leave Harvard University’s philosophy department. Alienated from his colleagues, he took a position at Northwestern University.

The success of McCarthyism owed much to the collective failure of nerve of university professors who failed to mobilize in support of their persecuted colleagues. The Fund for the Republic, an offshoot of the Ford Foundation, was sufficiently alarmed by this fact that they gave sociologists Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens two hundred and fifty thousand dollars to research the response of university professors to McCarthyism. In the Spring of 1955 they published their survey of 2,451 social scientists under the title *The Academic Mind*. The results were not surprising; most “liberals” confessed that they were scared. Over 25 percent of interviewees reported having exercised self-censorship. Although 80 percent had unquestionably liberal opinions, only 40 percent of those polled were willing to act upon them. They would join a movement in defense of a colleague that was fired on political grounds, but they would not initiate it.

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59 The list of cases is long and growing as the personnel records of deceased faculty members become available. Ellen Schrecker has, to my knowledge, conducted the most extensive study to date. It exposes the various techniques employed by university administrations to satisfy public opinion and protect the institution from “bad press.” Apart from providing examples of the forced resignation technique used in Peresutti case, Schrecker shows that often junior faculty members were most vulnerable to attacks. To illustrate the function of seniority Schrecker presented the famous Countryman case at Yale. During the academic year 1953-54, Vern Countryman, an associate professor of Law at Yale University was voted for tenure unanimously by his department’s faculty. The administration, however, denied him tenure in what Schrecker speculates was a highly politicized decision to appease alumni who were unhappy to see the Law faculty defending communists in the courts. Countryman, a junior faculty member, had to be sacrificed to appease public furor although it was the senior faculty (more well reputed, tenured, and untouchable) who was most involved in the defense of communists. See Shrecker’s *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp 252-253. The Bedell case is reported on p 259.

In addition, the report found that 28 percent of professors felt they would not receive the support of their colleagues if they were to face political charges.61

B. Inter-disciplinary Symbiosis: Phenomenology and anti-avant-garde meet each other’s needs.

Peresutti’s and Wild’s response to McCarthyism was similar. They found new jobs at more welcoming universities, retrenched into the safety of personal friendships, established societies of like-minded individuals, and begun helping a younger generation to work and publish against the mainstream of their respective disciplines. With the exception of Peresutti’s circle of students, American architecture of the 1950s had yet to be exposed phenomenology. There were, however, structural similarities in the social and ideological makeup of these two groups. Both circles felt marginalized from a disciplinary mainstream they believed to be intellectually specious and subservient to a phony culture. They looked suspiciously upon claims to objectivity and scientism, as put forth by Analytic philosophers and “International Style” Modernists, identifying them with a capitulation to the appropriation of culture by reactionary politics. Dissatisfaction with the narrowing of their respective disciplines to the exclusion of broader cultural politics provoked different responses, which were both nonetheless based on a common hypostatization of the primacy of immediate experience.

Phenomenologists attacked the analysts’s reduction of philosophy to the production of true statements as sham scientism. In their effort to return philosophy to the role of “guiding wisdom” for lives and engagements, they gave equal importance to forms of inquiry that appealed to non-scientific criteria of validation for truth, such as

faith, tradition, or aesthetic insight. Architects in Peresutti’s circle objected to the circumscription of their discipline to a technical expertise governed by scientific methods. They shared the Modernist interest in the emotional and psychological effects of architecture, but they rejected the claim that scientific research could fully account for them. Emotions, they believed, could not be extrapolated from discrete empirical findings. The truth of feelings was in subjective bodily experiences not objective reason, in practice not theory.

Unlike phenomenologists, who continued to believe in the intellect as a complement to emotional disclosures of truth, these architects in general set the mind in opposition to the body. What ensued was a radical anti-intellectualism in architectural education that discarded what it saw as the high-brow theoretical avant-garde pretensions of Modernism. The American turn towards the vernacular was in this sense diametrically opposed to the European (mostly Italian) intellectualization of vernacular architecture as exemplary functionalism. The American variant was a negation of Modernism’s avant-garde rationalism, not its critique. In spite of this important difference, this small group of American architects grew close to phenomenologists who, although not averse to the mind, shared the same sectarian social network, a similar skepticism towards “pure” objective reason, and an equal passion for the body.

In the 1950s, the early days of the Cold War’s ideological strife, Analytic philosophers sought to protect themselves from the McCarthyite purges by excluding ethical and political considerations from their work, and emulating the manner of the sciences and linguistics. By the early 1960s, mainstream philosophy became increasingly aware that their discipline had become too narrow, constricting, and worried about
philosophical technique. Strict allegiance to the analytic canon had kept them from answering questions of human relevance and morality. In contrast, although phenomenology had yet been unable to make itself seem relevant to science, and to make an impact on American philosophy departments, it had been quite successful in attracting the attention of cosmopolitan youths. Sartre's existentialist plays and literary works were a popular reference in literature and other departments. Phenomenology benefited from the blossoming of Existentialism in European culture. Students who studied Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus in literature or theater classes were often drawn to the authors's philosophical sources, and asked for classes on existentialism, motivating professors to deal more closely with Sartre. But this popularity did not result in attempts to incorporate phenomenology into the dominant currents of empiricism and analysis. For the most part, this appeal of phenomenology in non-philosophical audiences kept analysts at a distance. Phenomenology, in their opinion, was too "soft" and ambiguous. It did not satisfy the requirements of McCarthyite scholarship, which demanded that each discipline be a scientific, timeless, and selfless quest for objective truth. Analytic philosophy rejected the possibility that truth could be attained through un-

62 American phenomenologists had to contend with the failure of their philosophy to find recognition among the scientific community. In his monumental intellectual history of phenomenology, the first of its kind in English, Herbert Spiegelberg felt compelled to point this problem out, but could offer no better answer to it than that of Husserl himself, a sigh of resigned frustration:

One of these [paradoxes] is the fact that a philosophy so determined to make itself scientific and to encourage cooperative and progressive enterprise as in the other sciences failed in this attempt almost from the very start; that, in fact, the founder [Husserl] of this new movement found himself toward the end of his career in an almost tragic isolation, which he himself, with a kind of wry humor, compared to that of a solipsist, and which he finally tried to interpret as a necessity and a virtue.


63 Such was the case with one of the first courses taught in the United States on subject by Barnes at the University of Toledo in 1950. Although popular in the late 1950s, classes on Sartre were rare in the late 1940s and early 1950s. John Wild offered a course at Harvard entitled "The Philosophy of Man" in 1951, and Paul Tillich discussed existentialism in the prestigious Terry Lectures at Yale in 1950. See Ann Fulton,
scientific or subjective means. Therefore, although they looked enviously upon the rising popular success of phenomenology, they remained convinced that there was no room for (their) philosophy in the spheres of religion, culture, art, and politics where the truth content of a statement could not be empirically verified. The claim of analytic philosophy that truth was the property of sentences or statements, allowed them to flourish under McCarthyism, to secure control of academic departments, the American Philosophical Association (APA), and the job market.64

Rejected by analytic philosophers, American phenomenology forged a self-image of “outsider movement.” It was further engrained by the fact that phenomenologists had to find jobs outside of traditional philosophy, in art, literature or language departments. For the most part, the teaching of phenomenology in philosophy departments during the 1950s remained restricted to Catholic universities. There were a number of reasons for this that should not be left undiscussed. Significantly, most of the early members of the American phenomenological community were Catholics. Some had been priests or seminarians, like Jim Edie, John Wild’s protégé at Northwestern. This fact motivated Reiner Schürrmann, of the New School for Social Research (himself a former Dominican) to famously state that: “continental philosophy came to America on the backs of priests.”65 Their “self-imposed ghetto mentality,” as Monsignor Ellis described the

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64 In Time in the Ditch John McCumber’s principal claim was that, even though the methods of analytic philosophy were not a direct product of McCarthyism, its hegemony was indeed an artifact of the 1950s American political establishment. See John McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001).
psyche of American Catholics, added to the sectarianism of phenomenologists in this
country.  

Many members of the North American Catholic community gave Senator
McCarthy their support. The fact that communist subversion was close to unimaginable
in Catholic institutions allowed them to escape McCarthyism, and to remain more open to
less conventional philosophical practices. Even though phenomenology found
somewhat of a safe-haven in Catholic universities, it nonetheless had to revise its earlier
politicized framing, as established under Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, towards a more de-
politicized German point of view. By the early 1960s, the postwar demographic surge
reached college age, and increased government spending on building new universities
increased employment opportunities. Thus, a slew of young professors, such as Edward
G. Ballard, John Compton, Hubert Dreyfus, James M. Edie, Eugene Kaelin, William

1955).
67 According to Hofstadter, McCarthy received much support of the Catholic community, although there
were small groups of Catholic intellectuals published in Commonweal and the Jesuits’ America that did
denounce McCarthy. Hofstadter argued that many Catholics were motivated by the desire to become first
rate American citizens, and to surmount the popular view that chastised Catholicism for being the religion
of poor immigrants. See Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New York: Knopf,
1963), pp 136-141.
68 Well into the 1960s, the American Catholicism struggled with its educational structure. The clergy itself
produced a number of studies that tried to suggest ways to promote intellectual excellence, including
Thomas F. O'Dea American Catholic Dilema: An Inquiry into Intellectual Life (New York, 1958), and
Father Walter J. Ong, S.J., Frontiers in American Catholicism, (New York, 1957). Part of the problem was
that the predominantly low-income Catholic constituencies had not been able to muster the funds to build
the necessary instutions of learning. Many Catholic universities did begin to spring up in the Post War
period, but they held little if no prestige. In his various surveys of American Universities, Robert H. Knapp
concluded that intellectual achievement in Catholic universities was remarkably low both in the humanities
and the sciences. See Robert H. Knapp and H.B. Goodrich, Origins of American Scientists, (Chicago,
1952), and Robert H. Knapp and Joseph J. Greenbaum, The Younger American Scholar: His Collegiate
69 In The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time of Crisis, (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1958), Paul
Lazarsfeld and Werner Thielens found that the vast majority of professors accused of “un-americanism”
during the 1950s came from Ivy League institutions and other “better” schools. In the South, where civil
rights posed a different set of social problems, McCarthyism was not as widespread. Lazarsfeld and
Thielens also argued that larger institutions had more sophisticated administrations capable of protecting its
professorate. This belief that professors in smaller parochial colleges were more at risk than those in large
Richardson, Calvin O Schrag, and Robert Sokolowski began offering courses on Heidegger, Husserl, and others.  

When John Wild moved from Harvard to Northwestern University in 1961, he founded the first continental philosophy (as phenomenology was then referred to) department outside of the Catholic university system. He immediately enlisted the help of James M. Edie in establishing the series entitled Northwestern University Studies on Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, which they aimed at a scholarly yet non-philosophical audience. In 1962 they founded the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP). During the 1960s, book series and journals devoted to phenomenology began to proliferate, such as Duquesne University Press's Research in Phenomenology, and the journal Phenomenological Inquiry. For some, the appearance of these venues for publication attested to both the vigor of their movement and to the resistance of other philosophical journals to publish them.

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The perceived mainstream resistance to phenomenology encouraged the proliferation of "small societies," which continued to operate as networking platforms even after phenomenological articles were common in regular philosophy journals. The fact that Phenomenologists worked mostly alone in non-philosophical schools, or in philosophy departments dominated by analysts, increased their need to meet face-to-face with like-minded people in separate groups such as SPEP. Like their journals, these societies proactively sought out non-philosophical constituencies. Phenomenologists fought the battle against the analysts outside of philosophy departments, in the larger university, and in culture. Against the sectarian domination of the American Philosophical Association by Analytic philosophers, James Edie claimed that openness was the driving ideology of SPEP:

What has distinguished the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy during this period [1965-69] from the various other quasi-closed (and sometimes secret) Husserl and Heidegger conventicles which have begun to meet in this country—with restricted membership and cut off from the criticism and debate which they would face in open confrontation with the major philosophical currents—is a firm decision to engage other schools of thought and other methodologies in discussion, to open the doors of membership to all, and to test the relevance of phenomenology in the open forum of American philosophy as it exists in the second half of the twentieth century. In all these collections of articles from the recent meetings of the Society, we have tried to avoid the stuffy atmosphere of the philosophical chapel in which an elite group of exegetes related to the European fathers either by certified discipleship or direct apostolic succession, expound achieved doctrine. Phenomenology in this country has already been accused of becoming a new form of dogmatism;

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75 McCumber accused SPEP members of meeting exclusively in the absence of outsiders, and of therefore falling prey to the same type of insularism as that of the analysts. According to McCumber, in the 1990s the dialogue between the analysts and phenomenologists was happening in Europe, not in the USA. John McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p 84, 87.
it is to be hoped that the contents of these volumes, and others like them, will show that such an accusation is unjustified. 76

American phenomenology had two distinct responses to McCarthyite orthodoxy. It tried to appeal to nationalist sentiment by seeking paternity in Pragmatism (the American philosophy par excellence), and it turned increasingly towards aesthetic disciplines. The strategy of assimilating continental philosophy into the framework of pragmatism served as an effective platform from which to question the legitimacy of (British) empiricism and decry analytic Euro-centrism in the United States. Why was this emerging world power letting Europeans stamp on its intellectual roots? True, phenomenology was also European, but because of Husserl’s admiration for James, it could easily be portrayed as American in inspiration. In 1967, James Edie went as far as to claim that American phenomenologists had achieved a veritable “renaissance” of William James. 77 This mid-century patriotism evolved into a generic late century reverence for the “primordially American,” as in Bruce Wilshire’s The Primal Roots of American Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native American Thought. 78

Some philosophers in the analytic and empiricist mainstream contributed to the association of phenomenology and pragmatism by discrediting both philosophies. 79 For

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78 Wilshire considered William James an existential phenomenologist “before the name” on account of his ability to describe our immediate involvements. James was for Wilshire the American key to re-discovering significance in all things, and his philosophy a precondition for establishing any and all values. Bruce Wilshire, The Primal Roots of American Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native American Thought, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p 21.
79 For instance, in 1951, Van Meter Ames, an aesthetician teaching at the University of Cincinnati, published “Existentialism and the Arts” in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, where he likened
the most part, however, analysts relegated them to the margin by ignoring them. By the mid 1950s Analytic philosophy was so institutionalized that it did not feel the need to reopen questions about its legitimacy. Phenomenology and existentialism were simply assumed to be extensions of metaphysics or soft subjectivism.80

Attempts to conciliate phenomenology and pragmatism often pointed to the primacy accorded to immediate experience in both philosophies. For instance, Richard McKeon (1900-?), a Spinoza scholar at the University of Chicago, argued that the criterion of experience, as the organic unity of the individual and “his” circumstances, gave both philosophies a common touchstone.81 Mary Coolidge, philosophy professor and former dean of Wellesley College, went as far as providing an analysis of Sartre fully contained within the framework of Jamesean thought.82 For Coolidge, analytic and empiricist thought, could not arrive at a satisfactory model of the individual because they

Sartre’s conviction that writing should be a commitment to social change to the pragmatic theory that people’s desires, fears, and needs propel them into action.

80 McCumber boiled down the objections of analytic philosophy to phenomenology and pragmatism as follows: “The pragmatists, pursuing not truth but confirmation, were in competition with empirical science. The metaphysicians [in which the phenomenologists were later included], pursuing truth but without benefit of logic, were as well. The latter group was illogical and hence unphilosophical; the former mistakenly took philosophy for a first-order enterprise.” See John McCumber, *Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era,* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p 81-82. Ann Fulton has argued that analysts had a more sustained engagement with phenomenology than McCumber would admit. For her, Sartre’s philosophy challenged analysts to consider issues of ethics and morality. On the whole, however, Fulton accepts that analysts remained impervious to phenomenology. “[..T] hey did not overlook its weak philosophical underpinnings, including the inability to derive universal freedom from individual freedom in a logical manner, and the failure to clarify the method by which a person might make an ethical choice. These shortcomings would continue to worry American philosophers in later years.” See Ann Fulton, *Apostles of Sartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963,* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999), p 76.

81 The differences, he argued, were that Americans looked for existence in “relations” instead of consciousness, situated experience in “events” and not in mental acts, analyzed experience in terms of “problems and solutions” not “immanence and transcendence,” and searched for the organic whole by moving from the particular event towards the society or universe, instead of from the ego towards the absolute or nothingness. Richard McKeon, “An American Reaction to the Present Situation in French Philosophy,” in Marvin Farber, *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States: Essays Representing Major Trends in French and American Philosophy* (Buffalo: State University of New York Press, 1950), p 359-360.

approached it “from the outside,” collecting data and establishing norms from the standpoint of “objectivity.” Phenomenology and Pragmatism on the other hand gave fuller account of the reality of human existence because they approached it from the “inside.” They described human experience as a totality from the standpoint of subjectivity. Coolidge believed that Phenomenologists and Pragmatists held a more future looking and optimistic perspective on life, in the sense that they stressed the freedom of individuals to act within a political and social world. According to Coolidge, the existentialist stress on individual uniqueness was a valuable insight in questioning the ability of scientific norms to fully account for human existence.

What made analysts averse to phenomenology made it welcoming for academics in aesthetic disciplines: the purported lack of philosophical rigor made it less daunting and available; and the rejection of the primacy of rationalistic structures seemed to give importance to other modes of explaining the universe, such as art, architecture, or religion. But what really caught the imagination of architects was the proposition that empiricism, broadly conceived, could be approached from the “inside.” And furthermore, that this “inside” had a direct relation to the “outside” through the fuzzy “in between” of experience.

The phenomenological interest in how individuals constructed their world through meaning and values gave rise to an intense architectural curiosity for how individuals built their world through experiences. When CIAM reconvened in the United States in 1947, it began professing a turn towards “humanism.” Modernism’s search for approaches to design that would incorporate the emotional and psychological effects on the built environment on individuals coincided with the 1948 English translation of
Sartre’s *The Emotions*. In this book, Sartre had tried to demonstrate the significance of feelings in the human apprehension of the world. He argued that phenomenological description offered a picture of the function of feelings as an essential structure of consciousness that was wholly absent from the analytic or Cartesian traditions. Methodologically, Sartre was attracted to phenomenology because he thought that it helped provide a holistic examination of feelings that accounted for the work of the examiner, whereas other perspectives falsely presumed thought to be independent of the subjectivity of the observer. Phenomenology for Sartre could help break out of the positivist belief that emotions were images that could be extrapolated from discrete empirical findings. The assertion that emotions played an integral role in our creative apprehension of the world suggested that emotions and world were either not entirely distinct, or inextricably bound (perhaps dialectically).

Sartre’s philosophy resonated with the attempts to establish emotional wellness as an ethical basis for the architectural production of environments. As the 1950s unfolded, two different responses to this turn towards the intimate and subjective world emerged—one Modernist and rational, the other anti-Modernist and spiritual—both of which “adjusted” architectural education to the pressures of McCarthyism by sublimating Modernism’s “reformist” rhetoric into one of “research.”

The first response was “scientific,” true to Modernism’s functionalist principles and standards of objectivity. Although some of these architects invoked phenomenology as “proof” of their work’s relevance, they remained for the most part oblivious to the critique of empiricism involved in the philosophy. They simply shifted attention from “outer” shapes to “inner” images, but the belief that these internal worlds could be
discreetly documented remained. To them, if emotions and feelings were “real,” then they had to be recordable objectively through scientific methods. The Modernist mastery of the inner world involved applying traditional methods for describing the environment, to describing the subject, and profiling users. It looked upon experience as a “performance specification” established through “representative samples” of the population in carefully staged “participatory planning” meetings. This design approach spoke directly to the interests of market researchers and industrial analysts, and received large sums of corporate sponsorship.

The second attempt to make emotional well-being into the ethical substrate of architecture was “spiritual” – by the 1970s, it would be commonly referred to as a “phenomenological” attitude in design, although it had as little to do with phenomenology as the first. The spiritualizing segment of Modernism answered the

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84 For instance, Philip Thiel (b. 1920), a student of Kepes at MIT who taught at Berkeley and the University of Washington, was hired by Arthur D. Little to study the optimum size for a highway billboard. He described the experience as follows: “MIT had a pavilion at the Expo ’60 exposition in Seattle and wanted to track the success of their building. They hired Serge Buttolene to do a study of the users experiences. In turn, he hired Gary Winkle, a University of Washington recent Ph.D. graduate, to help. Buttolene looked me up because he’d heard of me and because I got Gary appointed as a professor in environmental psychology. Later he got a job with Arthur D. Little to find out what the effect of billboards were on people on people driving on the highway. We did the work – which is available as a publication by Arthur D. Little. We took pictures of a strip every 100 feet and then had different subjects view them in sequence. We projected the original sequence first, then some doctored sequences where we would take out the billboards, or the telephone poles. The last sequence was just the buildings. The people would sit and bite into a thing that would keep their head still, and we had eye-tracking devices to see how they scanned the environment. We attempted to do two things. First we tried to characterize the person’s profile: their education, their background, etc. Second we tried to inventory what they looked at and what they felt. It was the first time that these multiple types of measures were used. We found that many times the billboards improved the experience of the highway! People liked billboards, and the University of Washington [architecture] faculty was in an uproar. They saw it as a lack of solidarity that I would do this. As a result, Gary left the university.” Philip Thiel, conversation with the author, 6 June 2000.
McCarthyite need to curtail Modernism’s socio-political program by channeling it into a more acceptable program of reform: the elevation of individual souls. By turning to the “inner” world of subjects, it suffused Modern commitments to social progress into the theological reaction to that very progress. Mouthing the Protestant Christian program of the distraught American middle class to strike against everything Modern, it fitted architectural pedagogy into the orthodox framework of the status quo.85 The long Protestant “revolt against modernity,” as Richard Hofstadter called it, appeared in architectural circles as an opposition to theory and rational criticism of any kind. The mantra of architects like Louis I. Kahn was that universities taught only to the mind, producing only half learned men without knowledge about the “higher power” of the soul.86 Pietro Belluschi, Dean of MIT’s School of Architecture, exhorted architects to shed their “aristocratic” airs, get in touch with their inner “spiritual content,” and with that of traditional forms cherished by “the people.”87 These architects played into the popular belief that intellectual sophistication was a sign of distinction inconsistent with

86 This was also the message of Evangelist Billy Graham, who was voted as the fourth “most admired man in the world” by the American public in a 1958 Gallup Poll (only after Eisenhower, Churchill, and Albert Schweitzer). He preached against the university and celebrated the McCarthy era as the time when “even the average university professor is willing to listen to the voice of the preacher.” For a good interpretation of the influence of Graham on American opinion see: Ibid. p 15.
87 The belief that architects had to become servants of the people (a sublimated call for the exercise of conformism) was common during the McCarthy period. Pietro Belluschi, dean of MIT’s School of Architecture and Planning, lectured the AIA’s New York Chapter on what the new change “from a profession serving aristocratic ends to one mainly devoted to democratic endeavors” implied for practitioners. The need to complete St. John’s Cathedral in New York was an exemplary challenge to modern architecture. Architects, he argued, needed to be more sensitive to the forms of the past and to their spiritual content. Although they might not seem like “hollow copies” to the highly educated, they remained “in the eyes of many people, the highest expression of religious faith when faith was at its highest.” Belluschi called upon modern architects to integrate historical forms of the past into a contemporary idiom, as a way for them to serve the common man. “Obviously,” said Belluschi, “what we need is a large supply of faith -- faith that the masses are really capable of growing in awareness and therefore that they are worth saving, faith also that our more creative people will succeed in producing the spiritual symbols which may
democratic egalitarianism. The heyday of consensus history and New Criticism had its architectural expression in "teaching by osmosis"—which John Hejduk would perfect into an art in the 1970s. For these architectural educators, research was tantamount to an introspective awareness that confounded "interior" life with "spiritual" life, and design was an "un-teachable" a-rational or so-called "poetic" act of transubstantiating "inner spirit" into "outer form."

Entwined in the politics of the 1950s academy, vital segments of architectural education fell into the hands of professors who joyfully and militantly proclaimed their hostility to theory, and who eagerly identified with students who showed the least intellectual promise.\(^88\) The "dumbing down" of Modernism in the United States answered the logic of an unfounded opposition between intellect and emotion. The less a student "thought out" a design, the more chances it had of being "fresh," of emerging immediately from the "inner self," as a "pure" expression of the soul.\(^89\) Stupidity was reassessed as the precondition to the expression of an aesthetic essence, which was treasured for its alleged innocence. "Intuitive" design was prized for being unfettered by culture and politics. A slew of 1950s texts likened architecture to a "calling," and design to the mystical way towards spiritual enlightenment. This devotional literature retained the emphasis on subjective experience and the voluntaristic impulse of American
Protestantism, thus contributing to its ongoing secularization.\textsuperscript{90} We shall see these 1950s segments of Modernist anti-intellectualism extend into the architectural pedagogy of the 1960s under the guise of an anti-avant-garde that revolved around the figure of Charles Moore. These strands must be differentiated from the postmodernist, structuralist, and deconstructivist critiques of rationalism that they came to coexist with in the 1970s. Their confusion with Postmodernism gave a new lease on life to these Modernist fantasies either of a pure origin or of an absolute alterity to culture—by obscuring their derivation.\textsuperscript{91}

By the early 1960s, attempts to discover the Rosetta stone to move between “inner” and “outer” worlds were commonplace in architecture. These efforts to find the connection between subjectivity and objectivity occurred as American phenomenology turned its attention to aesthetic disciplines. The translation of Sartre’s meditations on aesthetics \textit{The Psychology of Imagination} in 1948, and of \textit{What is Literature?} in 1949, documented the importance of inspirational literature in the secularization of American Protestantism, and in the broad diffusion of its voluntaristic and subjective impulses. Protestantism minimized Christian doctrine by getting rid of the bulk of religious ritual. The inspirational cults eliminated it all together, retaining only the emphasis on the subjective experience of the individual, and even this only narrowly conceived as the assertion of individual will. By the 1950s, these popular best-sellers had completely transformed the old self-help Protestant system, in which faith led to character and character to a successful manipulation of the world, and replaced it with a secularized system, where faith led directly to an individual will capable of self-manipulation. Inspirational literature promised that this ability to shape oneself at will was the key to financial success, health, and peace of mind. The success of this literature evidenced, according to Hofstadter, a problematic naturalization of spirituality. Whereas in protestantism spirit and world interacted, in inspirational cults they became ambiguously fused.

Within elite American architecture schools of the early 1960s, the inspirational myth of self-manipulation operated in the interest of promoting the will to conformity. Architectural students were taught to despise “élite professionalism,” to be suspicious of individuality as embodied in “star” architects, and to wary of the mind. These were expressions of selfishness, and the architect, they were taught, was a servant of the community. Withdrawal, self-examination, individuality, analysis, and reflection were bad. An architect of good character and personality was achieved by practice, not by introspection. Students were asked to manipulate their self and make it self-less, entirely at the service of others. The critical mind was seen as a liability for this purpose. It lead students down the path of self-analysis, and criticality, which could turn students dangerously loose from the traditions and concerns of the communities they were to serve.

\textsuperscript{90} In \textit{Anti-Intellectualism in American Life}, (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp 266-268, Richard Hofstadter documented the importance of inspirational literature in the secularization of American Protestantism, and in the broad diffusion of its voluntaristic and subjective impulses. Protestantism minimized Christian doctrine by getting rid of the bulk of religious ritual. The inspirational cults eliminated it all together, retaining only the emphasis on the subjective experience of the individual, and even this only narrowly conceived as the assertion of individual will. By the 1950s, these popular best-sellers had completely transformed the old self-help Protestant system, in which faith led to character and character to a successful manipulation of the world, and replaced it with a secularized system, where faith led directly to an individual will capable of self-manipulation. Inspirational literature promised that this ability to shape oneself at will was the key to financial success, health, and peace of mind. The success of this literature evidenced, according to Hofstadter, a problematic naturalization of spirituality. Whereas in protestantism spirit and world interacted, in inspirational cults they became ambiguously fused. Within élite American architecture schools of the early 1960s, the inspirational myth of self-manipulation operated in the interest of promoting the will to conformity. Architectural students were taught to despise “élite professionalism,” to be suspicious of individuality as embodied in “star” architects, and to wary of the mind. These were expressions of selfishness, and the architect, they were taught, was a servant of the community. Withdrawal, self-examination, individuality, analysis, and reflection were bad. An architect of good character and personality was achieved by practice, not by introspection. Students were asked to manipulate their self and make it self-less, entirely at the service of others. The critical mind was seen as a liability for this purpose. It lead students down the path of self-analysis, and criticality, which could turn students dangerously loose from the traditions and concerns of the communities they were to serve.
coincided with the burgeoning of the field of aesthetics in the United States, opening teaching opportunities for phenomenologists in that area.\textsuperscript{92} \textit{An Invitation to Phenomenology: Studies in the Philosophy of Experience} (1965), James Edie's compendium of essays, confirmed aesthetics as the area in which Americans had made their first valuable and original contributions to phenomenology. The strength of phenomenologists, argued Edie, was that unlike analysts they applied their philosophy to defined areas of human existence. For Edie, the turn towards aesthetics was bound together by a common interest in applying the descriptive methods of phenomenology to "intra-mundane structures," in order to understand how the experiencing body mediated between inner and outer worlds.\textsuperscript{93} This of course made their philosophy seem like a natural fit for Modern architects. But it was not until the early 1970s, when translations of original European works began to appear thanks to Edie's series \textit{Northwestern University Studies on Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy}, and phenomenological publications came into wide circulation that American architects to notice of phenomenology.

\textsuperscript{91} The pre-history of these fantasies can be found in the Modernist reception of primitivism and of the mentally ill. See Hal Foster, "Blinded Insights: On the Modernist Reception of the Art of the Mentally Ill," in \textit{October}, n. 97 (Summer 2001), pp 3-30.

\textsuperscript{92} In 1942, the \textit{Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism} was founded, along with the \textit{American Society for Aesthetics}, and by the late 1940s, there was a proliferation of university courses and books on the subject. See Ann Fulton, \textit{Apostles of Sartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963}, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999), p 54.

\textsuperscript{93} Edie spoke confidently of the success of phenomenology in America: "There is good reason to believe that in future surveys or histories of twentieth-century American philosophy the 1960's will be recognized as the period when the phenomenological movement finally took root in our philosophical soil and became an active and creative force in its own right." What remained unclear for him was the extent to which the American development of phenomenology was in fact a radical departure. Edie felt the need to put quotation marks around "phenomenologists" when referring to the authors compiled in the book. Their work, he thought, somewhat detached from the founding fathers of the movement. There was, for instance, a shared degree of suspicion towards Husserl's transcendental constituting consciousness. See James M. Edie's introduction to \textit{Phenomenology in America: Studies in the Philosophy of Experience}, ed. James M. Edie, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), pp 7-27. For his perspective on the turn of American phenomenologists towards aesthetics see his introduction to \textit{An Invitation to Phenomenology: Studies in the Philosophy of Experience}, ed. James M. Edie, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), pp 7-13.
By the late 1960s, phenomenology had expanded into psychology, communicology, and economics with sufficient force to warrant the foundation of a separate Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences. During this period, however, architects and phenomenologists remained largely oblivious to each other, save for Peresutti who had introduced his students to the relevance of phenomenology as a tool in understanding the fullness of "reality." Charles W. Moore, Peresutti’s assistant, wrote the first American dissertation citing the importance of Gaston Bachelard in establishing the correspondence of "inner" and "outer" worlds in immediate experiences of archetypal images.\(^{94}\) Peresutti’s circle of young architects identified the avant-garde Modernist circles of the 1950s with acquiescence to the "sham culture" produced under McCarthyism. They looked upon Gordon Bunschaft (a partner at SOM championed for his Americanization of the International Style in buildings like the Lever House) and corporate architecture in general as "evil."\(^{95}\)

Despite the growing animosity with the Princeton administration, Peresutti had managed to inspire a small group of students to remain faithful to his teachings, including Donlyn Lyndon (b 1936), William Turnbull (1935–97), Richard C. Peters, and Charles Moore (all of whom met at Princeton in 1956). Peresutti lectured them on the importance of vernacular architecture, on the importance of returning to real "things," and on the need to differentiate "the drawing of a building and a real building."\(^{96}\) To them, Peresutti’s teachings felt closer to Wurster’s and Mumford’s Bay Region Modernism,

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\(^{94}\) Moore utilized Bachelard’s work on water and dreams to posit the immediacy of water’s symbolic content in experience. The concept of immediacy also served Moore to posit water as a primordial element common to man and nature, and to relate the two. See Charles W. Moore, *Water and Architecture*, (Princeton: Dissertation, Princeton University, 1957).


more eager to incorporate the thick and contradictory “reality” of American culture.

Prompted by Peresutti, Moore saw the mainstream Modernists as people divorced from “reality” who dispensed empty rhetoric that was quickly and uncritically accepted by their academic acolytes:

Dean McLaughlin tried to run a countertext to people like Labatut and Peresutti. He brought down people from New York to lecture us, like Gordon Bunshaft. […] He was perhaps the most unpleasant creep I ever met. Really awful. All these sharp New Yorkers wheeled in to instruct the young of Princeton. […] When the heroes of the modern movement came, we usually though they were the prime idiots of all time. I remember Siegfried Giedion announcing (in a thick German accent, suitable only for Harvard) that the ideal size for a city was seven hundred thousand. And when questioned by us about that presumption—which, apparently, people at Harvard had simply accepted—he announced that Rotterdam was about seven hundred thousand, and Rotterdam was a nice city, and so seven hundred thousand was it.

No: the models that were so strong elsewhere in the fifties were just not very strong at Princeton. 97


Peresutti’s students began referring to themselves as “the family,” a small society of close friends with similar ideas which would later support each other in securing
academic posts and professional commissions. Richard Peters, who would become a lighting consultant to most members of “the family,” and a successful architect in his own right, recalled that when in 1962 Moore, Lyndon, Turnbull, and Whitaker came together to found the MLTW firm (later to be championed as the heir to Wurster’s Bay Region Style), the core members of Peresutti’s circle came together. 98

Although “the family’s” condemnation of the avant-garde gained strength from a wider cultural prejudice against intellectuals and experts, it must not be confused with these popular currents. This small anti-avant-garde was among the most highly educated architects at the time (very few architects, even to this day, hold a Ph.D. like Moore). Their anti-intellectualism was constructed as an anti-rationalism that invoked thinkers such as Diderot, Hume, the Earl of Shaftesbury, Gaston Bachelard, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. They pitted the mind against the body, arguing that thought was a reductive abstraction of the full “reality” of corporeal experience.

To this anti-avant-garde, rational planning and professional norms were analogous to the loss of individuality and over conformity spawned by corporate America, and denounced in books such as David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (1950) and William Whyte’s The Organization Man (1956). 99 Their understanding of the avant-garde as contaminated by “official” culture justified their search for a new “purity” in Modern aesthetic expression. They found it in the 1950s architectural discourse which likened design to an unmediated creation of the “spirit.” “The family” came under the spell of

people like Louis I. Kahn, and extended the Modernist myth of a pure origin to aesthetic expression well into the 1970s. The anti-avant-garde’s perception of avant-garde Modernism as a repressive force attracted it to the existentialist affirmation of the search for individual freedom. Its anti-intellectualism further opened it to the phenomenological critique of reason. But it was its interest in the “spiritual life” that finally enabled the anti-avant-garde to assimilate phenomenology as a “science” to pry open the “inner worlds” of individuals and things. The anti-avant-garde’s conflation of subjectivity and spirituality also involved confounding intellectual awareness with stream of consciousness, and the value of thought with psychological activity.

Despite being elitist, the anti-avant-garde played on the cultural power of populist sentiment. It camouflaged itself as a popular, anti-elitist movement, in order to displace the avant-garde elite it sought to replace. In the 1950s, the brooding discontent of small town Americans with the changes of modernization found an escape valve in professional experts, who were then rising to cultural prominence. This helped perpetuate cultural prejudices against intellectuals well beyond the height of McCarthyism. The 1957 launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite shocked American self-confidence into thinking that their derision for the intellect was hazardous to the nation’s survival. As attention turned to the United States’ dependence on expert skills in areas from defense to education and urban planning, a sense of helplessness intensified in American society, which saw itself as the powerless object of constant manipulation. Intellect, affirmed Richard Hofstadter, became widely resented as a form of power or privilege: “Once the intellectual was gently ridiculed because he was not needed; now he is fiercely resented because he is
needed too much. He has become all too practical, all to effective. He is the object of resentment because of an improvement, not a decline in his fortunes."100

After having resigned from Princeton in 1959, Peresutti moved to a position at Yale University.101 But it was not until the arrival of Charles Moore in 1965 that Yale became a center for Modern anti-avant-gardism. Moore succeeded Paul Rudolph as Yale’s Chairman of the department of architecture with the intention of propelling his reputation to a national level, and to challenge the New York based avant-garde. It was, as his partner William Turnbull remembered, an attempt to “roll the dice for the Big Time,” and “get your name known by the New York crowd.”102 Moore’s first grand gesture at Yale was to disappear for a semester with the first year class to New Zion, Kentucky, a rural town of two hundred inhabitants in the middle of the Appalachian Mountains with no electricity or phones. He hoped to pass on to his students the lessons learned from Peresutti about the vernacular and “reality.” Moore proposed a design-build project for a community center as the semester studio project. More importantly, Moore sent a strong message to the New York elite. Unlike them, his school was in touch with the American “heartland.” In New Haven, like in New Zion, to be an intellectual was considered a gentlemanly distinction offensive to American egalitarianism.

100 Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*. (New York: Knopf, 1963), p 34. According to Hofstadter, American intellectuals entered the public scene in one of two guises: as experts, who were perceived as manipulating the institutions that governed public and private life, or as ideologues, who were feared for their ability to manipulate the mind. Even though only a small fraction of intellectuals actually had a role in public life, they affected the prevailing cultural attitudes towards the rest. Americans of the early Cold War remained on the whole deeply suspicious of intellectuals. Their alleged power made them the object of McCarthyite accusations that they were manipulating government from the inside, and that they were stirring the minds of youth towards subversion.

101 Previous to his departure from Princeton, Peresutti had already been a visiting professor at Yale University in 1957.

At Yale, Moore found a hotbed of phenomenologists interested in art (and soon also in architecture). Philosopher Karsten Harries (b. 1937), who would later become deeply involved in architectural pedagogy, had been teaching there since 1961. In addition, John Wild had accepted a professorship at Yale’s department of philosophy in 1963, beginning an era that would be commonly referred to as the “Northwestern-Yale
Contacts between "the family" and American phenomenologists began during this period. In their sphere of influence, Moore’s anti-intellectualism was crafted into a carefully staged anti-rationalism that held theory to be inconsistent (and even dangerous) to practice.

Moore’s students were not encouraged to engage in the study of phenomenology. On the contrary, phenomenology was invoked only to give academic credence to the demotion of the intellect. As Moore’s pedagogy makes patently clear, Phenomenology’s critique of objectivity served only as a front obscuring the systematic negation of reason, and the hypostatization of feeling. Once summoned to legitimize the anti-avant-garde, the philosophy’s substance could be quickly discarded.

F. Andrus Burr began his architecture studies at Yale in 1966. He recalled that Moore and Kent Bloomer forged a strong “anti-theory” climate at Yale through their studio pedagogy, which emphasized the primacy of practice and of intuitive design responses instead of reasoned analysis: “It was an anti-intellectual approach to architecture, a no-nonsense seat of the pants attitude. The goal of architectural practice was the built form, and the architect participated in the building process. [...] One didn’t talk about architecture, one built it.” Moore famously told students that “the opposite of rational is real,” and that reality was bodily feelings. Burr considered that the objective of Moore and Bloomer’s pedagogical method was to make pupils discover their “inner feelings,” and to exteriorize them in built forms without the mediation of thought. Architecture was the transubstantiation of inner spirit into outer matter.

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To accomplish this impossible task, Moore and Bloomer created a veritable cult dynamic, attempting to "erase" the outside world in order to instill the new credo. "It was both an act of learning, and a process of deprogramming-- erasing the preconceptions." Books and drawings were deemed too intellectual. Plans and sections, students were told, gave a "false" representation of a building's totality. The building's "reality" could allegedly only be grasped through "feeling" as one "experienced" it. In an effort to reduce the intervention of the mind in design to a minimum, Moore and Bloomer encouraged the use of models as a means to bypass drawing altogether. "Students came to mistrust drawing as a biased representation of architecture, incapable of showing how one would really experience a building."
Moore and Bloomer's pedagogy had deep repercussions in the careers of Yale architecture students. With serious shortcomings in their drawing abilities, graduates had difficulty finding employment in established architecture firms. Marginalized from the mainstream of the profession, many Yale students stayed in academia and joined "the family," which grew to become a powerful informal networking platform for university positions. In continuing Moore's legacy, some welcomed contributions from phenomenologists in their departments, as in the case of Ron Filson, later Dean of Tulane's School of Architecture, with philosopher Michael Zimmerman. As a result of their inability to fit into traditional professional practices, some Yale graduates began to identify themselves with late 1960s countercultural movements. These Ivy leaguers felt themselves to be "non-elitist," and spoke of "revolutionizing" architecture by "working on their own rather than selling their souls to the devils of corporate architecture. [...] It

108 Ron Filson, for instance, studied under Moore at Yale during the late 1960s. He then moved to UCLA to help establish the Urban Design Workshop in 1970 (which was renamed the Urban Innovations Group in 1972). The workshop was initiated by economist Harvey Perloff, the dean of the school, as an outreach program modeled on the medical school's teaching hospital, which was to facilitate the involvement of faculty and students in "real world" in line with Moore's pedagogy. In 1973 Filson moved to UCLA to take charge of the UIG's architecture component, where Charles Moore joined him in 1974. For an account of this period see Ron Filson, "Charles Moore & Co. Evolution," in GA Houses, n. 7 (1980), pp 128-131.

Filson went on to become Dean of Tulane's architecture school, and offered Christian Norberg-Schulz the Luce Professorship at Tulane University. Filson had been taken by Norberg-Schulz's 1979 lecture at UCLA and had long used his volumes as textbooks. In a letter to Norberg-Schulz dated March 19, 1981, currently at the Norberg-Schulz archive in Oslo, Filson wrote:

"I was assistant professor at the School of Architecture and Urban Planning at UCLA a couple of years ago when you came and delivered a lecture which I found tremendously exciting and important. I have in addition relied heavily on your books and writings in my own courses and other work."

Norberg-Schulz continued to negotiate the possibility of accepting the job as is evidence by another letter by Filson dated September 1 1981. Filson invited phenomenologist Michael E. Zimmerman to write "Architecture and the Technological Culture," in Tulane Architectural View, (New Orleans, Louisiana: Tulane School of Architecture, 1978), pp 9-18. In 1984, Filson participated in the "Place Debate: Piazza d'Italia," which was sponsored by the magazine Places, and which reunited some of the members of "the family." In addition to Filson, the symposium was attended by David Littlejohn (Moore's biographer), George Baird, Robert S. Harries, Christian Norberg-Schulz, Jay Claiborne with Tom Aidala, Allen Eskew, Charles W. Moore, and Donlyn Lyndon.
was an easy step to take; condemning Nixon and Agnew one moment, Pevsner and Giedion the next.\textsuperscript{109}

So unwavering was their faith in Moore and Bloomer (and so scant their exposure to other views), that students failed to blame their marginalization with the fundamental inadequacies of their education. Instead, they held steadfast to their ignorance as a weapon in the battle against the Modern avant-garde. Moore and Bloomer succeeded in chiseling out an identity for the architecture students that was distinctly different from Yale’s larger Ivy League student body. To achieve this clique, Moore and Bloomer sacrificed standard academic administrative practices and obviated clear methods of evaluating students. In other words, objectivity disappeared, and a student’s advance within the system was subjected to his or her ideological proximity with Moore and Bloomer.

 [...T]he class also found some difficult and disturbing aspects to the new program. It tended to be vague. Problems were stated in a rather abstract manner and students were unsure what work should be done in response. In addition, the criticism was infuriatingly non-specific. There seemed to be no right or wrong answers. [...] The curriculum was very loose, and everyone was involved in making very real architecture. In this climate it was easy to overlook rules and regulations --they seemed so trivial. The enigmatic and talented George Hathorn joined the class of 1970 over a mountain of ignored entrance requirements.\textsuperscript{110}

The “the family” grew into a veritable nation-wide organization that disseminated “phenomenological” design (as it was beginning to be called by the mid 1970s), and which came to include a number of phenomenologists –philosopher Robert Mugerauer, for instance, became a protégé of Moore’s while at the University of Texas, Austin, and is currently Dean of the Architecture School at the University of Washington. Initially,

the core members of “the family” propagated this current of anti-avant-gardism: Lyndon as head the School of Architecture at Oregon and then at MIT, Whitaker as AIA Director of Architectural Education in Washington, and Turnbull as the principal architect of MLTW in San Francisco. But Moore’s impact on pedagogy towered over all of them. In the course of his career, he held appointments at six universities, and not only helped promote his former students, but sometimes even established new professional practices with them. In December 1979, *Progressive Architecture*’s survey named Moore one of the top 10 influences on others in the profession in recent years—Moore and his various offices also came in first in terms of number of pages devoted to a single architect by the magazine.\(^{111}\) His outstanding influence earned him the 1989 ACSA/AIA (American Collegiate Schools of Architecture/ American Institute of Architects) Topaz Medallion for Excellence in Architectural Education. The board conferring the award described him as “a brilliant and inspiring force who has transformed the character of architectural education in this country.”\(^{112}\)

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\(^{110}\) Ibid. p 173, 174.
To summarize, Moore helped confound an existing Modernist discourse on the “spiritual” essence of design with a broadly diffused low-brow American anti-intellectualism. Moore’s “family” turned the anti-avant-garde into a powerful movement at the very center of American intellectual and academic life. Its new hegemony was not, as some believe, a “Postmodernist” interregnum that can now be bridged over as architects seek to re-connect with Modernism. The anti-avant-garde infused itself in the way we teach and think about architecture to such an extent that the avant-gardist Modern canon can no longer be innocently put back together. For the anti-avant-garde was as “Modern” as its negative, but all the more enduring. Its demotion of the intellect allowed it to carry on un-theorized and de-historicized, a condition that obscures rather than reveals its true import.

Against the grain of its own project, the enormous success of the anti-avant-garde can be historicized as follows: 1) The anti-avant-garde “adjusted” architectural education
to the pressures of McCarthyism by turning the avant-garde spirit of dissent against itself, and putting it at the service of conservative fundamentalists. As avant-garde Modernism began to gain currency in the United States, and to spread with it the influence of "expert" cosmopolitan architects over small town America, anti-avant-gardism stepped up to represent the defense of popular values—even if its "guiding light" ideology remained fundamentally elitist. 2) The success of the anti-avant-garde entailed the camouflage of all outward expressions of privilege, such as intellectual sophistication and theory. Underneath the surface, anti-avant-gardism remained a high intellectual movement, promulgated by people who were deeply concerned with ideas. The McCarthyite curtailment of dissent also required the transformation of architecture from an engine of Modern social reform, to an instrument at the service of people’s emotional and experiential well-being. 3) The anti-avant-garde was able to maintain the Modernist ideology of reform alive by presenting architecture as a tool for achieving individual "spiritual" ecstasies, which were deemed "revolutionary" insofar as they stood beyond everyday experience. 4) The anti-avant-garde discourse of pedagogy followed suit with the view that architectural education taught students to tap into their "inner" spiritual core and transubstantiate it into a purely new creation. This attention to child-like primal spontaneity satisfied the Modernist myth of an essential origin by assimilating it into a widely accepted secularized Protestant ethic of voluntarism and individuality.
III. The Anti-avant-garde’s experientialism: anti-intellectualism posing as anti-rationalism

A. The anti-avant-garde’s “theoretical” mask

The architectural interest in Phenomenology did not emerge as a direct link to philosophy. Phenomenology’s role of in crafting the theory of the 1960s anti-avant-garde was minor. Through Peresutti, “the family” had been exposed to the philosophy, but their anti-intellectualism calls into question how much of his message they heeded. Their aversion to the avant-garde was indeed deduced from Peresutti’s concern with the falsification of culture by politics. They vilified American neo-avant-gardism (in its “master architect” and “corporate” forms) precisely for loosing the “purity” of European “originality,” and looked upon it as a bastardized copy at the service of the political establishment. But whereas Peresutti used phenomenology’s attention to the real as a guide in the reasoned critique of cultural mishandlings, “the family” crudely opposed reality to the intellect, mostly ignoring phenomenology. Like in the Hollywood remakes, Italian neo-realism lost a great deal of subtlety in translation. The anti-avant-garde would not engage phenomenology until the late 1960s, when new winds of tolerance began sweeping across American society and made overt anti-intellectualism into an untenable proposition. A new theoretical consciousness emerged within architectural discourse as part and parcel of the university-wide absorption of semiotics and structuralism, which put scholarly conventions on the foreground of tenure cases.113 Unable to carry on business as usual and in need of academic validation, the anti-avant-garde had to evince

113 The structuralist questioning of objectivity and universality also made the avant-garde less comfortable with its “scientific” taxonomies of emotion as a “performance specification.” Those who continued along this path, like Christopher Alexander, were relegated to the background. Instead of “catalogues,” the avant-garde began emphasizing what appeared to be more open ended “systems and processes” –even if some of these “systems” remained closed, as in Eisenman’s formal permutations.
its historiography, largely against its own will, in textbooks and class syllabi. To trace this shift, social history must therefore give way to intellectual history.

The anti-avant-garde, custodian of the Modernist myths of pure origin and of absolute alterity to culture, spread its cult of innocence and “pure spiritual expression” through pedagogy. Textbooks began using naïve illustration techniques and authors effaced their intellectual sources in an effort to appear “common” and “readable.” From the perspective of its discourse, the anti-avant-garde proved to be quintessentially Modern—not Postmodern, as those that have historicized only its stylistic preferences have argued. The non-disciplinary impetus present in 1950s and 1960s pedagogical discourse has a history within Modern architectural thought that dates back to the 19th century and to such figures as Heinrich Wölfflin.114 When the anti-avant-garde sought paternity in the founding authors of architectural history, it found a rich discourse that not only linked inner and outer worlds through corporeal analogies, but that had already effectively weeded out intellectual conventions from its discipline! Thus, the core teachings of anti-avant-gardism remained initially unaffected by the intellectualization of architecture—Modern architectural history “shored up” the anti-avant-garde against any claims of scholarly deficiency. Posing as anti-rationalism, its anti-intellectualism passed through the academic sift as another attempt to de-center the Modernism’s foundational claims to universal reason and objectivity. Modernism endured in the anti-avant-garde under the guise of Postmodernism.

Jarzombek has argued that the fusion of psychology into Modernist art and architectural discourse was possible largely because it went by un-theorized, and thus unrecognized, especially in the postwar years. The “Psychologizing of Modernity” was only workable through the (unspoken) Modernist theory which held that firstly, “there is a correlation between internal and external expressions, and that, secondly, this correlation is the product of free aesthetic contemplation.”115 Doing his part to expose it by naming it, Jarzombek coined this the theory of “subject-objectification.” The Psychologizing of Modernity (2000) traced its various incarnations from Max Stirner’s nineteenth century sensuous egoism and Theodor Lipps’s “science of immediate experience,” to Heinrich Wölfflin’s use of corporeal analogy as the basis of an empathic art history, and beyond into an ethos permeating Modernist thinking. Indeed, as Jarzombek pointed out, the secret to the self-rejuvenating currency of this theory was that it constructed itself as the stabilizing limit to Modernism’s perpetual crises. Posing as Modernism’s negative, the discourse of experientialism always appeared ex-nihilo, somehow floating beyond politics or history, and outside of theory. But upon Jarzombek’s closer scrutiny, this negation occurred only in appearance; Modernism created the illusion of its own incompleteness by manufacturing immediate experience as the domain beyond its theoretical grasp. In order to survive, Modernism required this “deterritorialization of the avant-garde”116—or what I am here referring to as the anti-avant-garde. Jarzombek was able to lay bare the anti-liberal and reactionary political substrate animating this anti-intellectual movement by theorizing and historicizing it. Just as a Wölfflin’s thought, properly historicized, shows itself to be intimately woven

115 Ibid. p 66.
116 Ibid. p 158.
into the German bourgeois reform, the history of experientialism in America cannot be separated from the tapestry of McCarthyism and its secularized forms of Protestant orthodoxy.\footnote{In The Psychologizing of Modernity, Jarzombek already gives ample evidence of the symbiotic relationship between the "determinatized" avant-garde, which I am discussing as the anti-avant-garde, and the consensual political climate of the 1940s and 1950s in the United States. I am trying to extend his work by looking closer at that political climate. Although the methods of the anti-avant-garde were not, as Jarzombek proves, properly American, I suggest that its success in the American university was indeed an artifact of McCarthyism. In the context of McCarthyism Modernism's "humanist social program" was not aimed at social reform (as Sarah Goldhagen has argued) but at social conformism.}  

The 1970s introduction of phenomenology into architectural discourse was concomitant with a larger attempt to give a "theoretical" face to the anti-avant-garde's experientialism. It was in great measure a reaction to the dawn of Ph.D. programs in architecture, which had by and large aimed to support the avant-garde, and which initiated a mode of intellectual accountability that Jarzombek calls "Critical Historiography."\footnote{Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p 205-207.} Given the scholarly attempts to define meaning in architecture as a function of socio-cultural historical events, the anti-avant-garde retorted with the claim that authentic knowledge of architecture could only be gained in immediate experiences. Numerous anti-avant-gardists refashioned themselves as "theorists" in order to protect Modernism from "false knowledge." Lars Lerup, for instance, argued that "Modern architecture [...] conceals and distorts the essence of architecture as type by giving preeminence to form."\footnote{As a post-script to his arguments, Lerup invoked the philosophies of Heidegger, Arendt, and Merleau-Ponty. He presented the front of specialized intellectual lineage without actually bringing its historicity to bear on his own thought. Lars Lerup, Building the Unfinished: Architecture and Human Action, (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1977), p 162.} His belief that architecture sprung from a social storehouse of housing archetypes available in "everyday" immediate experiences motivated the well intentioned involvement of communities in design build projects beginning in the 1970s.
But it was the success of Moore's and Bloomer's *Body, Memory, Architecture* (1977) that gave the greatest thrust to the theory of "subject-objectification," or of the "body-image," to speak in their own parlance. For Moore and Bloomer, people and buildings shared outward appearances (bodies) and inward spirit (image). According to them, the authentic meaning of Modern architecture could be restored if its outward forms were reconnected to the inner spirit of subjects. Moore and Bloomer proposed nothing short of a theory of sexual intercourse between people and buildings, which premised the flow of spirit between entities on intimacy of contact.

Since the mid 1960s, Moore had been arguing the case for an experientialism that could cure American society of the walls of interiority that, in his mind, were threatening to destroy it. In his famous article "You Have to Pay for the Public Life" (1965), Moore denounced California car culture for thriving on mobile privacy. The real cause for alarm, he argued, was that modern life hid people's body and thus fragmented the flow of interpersonal contact—i.e. modernity obstructed the spiritual oneness of America. Even public buildings such as Frank Lloyd Wright's "drive-in Civic Center" in Marin County, or John Carl Warnecke's Federal Building in San Francisco, were for Moore "monsters" of "rootlessness." Moore thought that the car destroyed place by flattening spatiality. What was needed, he argued, was "the excitement of a sensible framework" made up of experiences of spatial "depth" that would restore buildings and people to their "rootedness" in place. place, to follow Moore, originated in this bodily experience, not in

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121 Ibid. p 104.
the landscape, as Norberg-Schulz would later argue. In order to become coherent places buildings had to "embody" the "inner" spatial depth of humans. This was simply achieved, he argued, by buildings that provided different experiences of interior and exterior, that established a range of dimensional scales, and that "orchestrated" unusual ("rich," "complex," or "memorable") relations between spaces.

By the mid 1970s, Moore had developed a full-blown pedagogy of architectural eroticism, which argued for the liberation of sensualism from the "dogma" of the "rootless" and always too "theoretical" avant-garde. Moore and Bloomer called upon students and professionals (perhaps especially professionals) to incorporate the "whole body" in the design and experience of architecture, and to distance themselves from the banality of scholarship. For them, the body was the most "universal," "valued" and "immediately understandable" spatial organization. They capitalized on the popular perception of the body as the medium through which inner emotion was communicated – for instance, they discussed the "face" of buildings as expressive of "inner feelings." They analyzed the anatomy of buildings from various periods and styles in search of trans-historical emotional contents, somehow preserved and ready at hand on the surface "expressions" of buildings. Thus, they gave anthropomorphic descriptions of both buildings and sites, always pointing out the location of the face, the heart, the brain, etc.

Appealing to common sense, Moore and Bloomer quickly turned their assertions about the body’s ability to communicate alinguistically into a program for a new

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122 Following an argumentative line not unlike that of Moore, philosopher Edward Casey would speak experiences of "embodiment" as of the origin of place in The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997). In speaking about the various ways in which architects had made available these experiences through their buildings, Casey omitted the work of Moore –apart from two references in the notes that refered the reader to Body, Memory and Architecture “for the relationship between body and building.” (pp 459, 469).
universally understood architecture. It was not only dearly needed, but also “easy,” they exclaimed. To create it, they argued that it was sufficient to focus on one’s emotions. If one felt good somewhere, that meant the space was indeed good:

If feelings are social, so is the emotional spatiality of the human body, with all the meanings which find expression along its boundaries, centers, and psychophysical coordinates. Indeed it is impossible to imagine a spatial organization more universal, more valued, and more immediately understandable to everyone than the one provided by the human body.²³

Moore and Bloomer presented their *Body, Memory, and Architecture* as a pedagogical alternative to the “rational” theories that, they claimed, had led modernism astray by erroneously presupposing a mind-body split. They contended that the body was productive of conceptual categories, and that it was therefore necessary for students to first understand architecture as a “sensous art” with emotional and social effects, and not just as a technical system. Moore and Bloomer were among the first (and most successful) architects to conceal their anti-intellectual sensualism behind the face of a more “theoretical” anti-rationalism, which they peppered with phenomenology: They made recourse to Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Cartesian metaphysics in authenticating their belief in the meaningful pre-rational identity of viewer and world in immediate experiences; they invoked Bachelard’s understanding of “poetic images” as epistemological breaks in giving new life to the Modernist myth of an essential (a-historical) origin of artistic expression; and they used José Ortega y Gasset’s famous description of enclosure as the origin of communal civic life to put forth architecture as the spiritual storehouse of humanity, which could “recharge” individuals with “work!” energy” on mere contact.
The introduction of philosophical references in Moore and Bloomer’s book created a pre-requisite of intellectual competence that was antagonistic to the presumed spontaneity of their sensualist epistemology. This split was in a sense overcome (or overlooked) on the social level by the effectiveness of literary devices, such as bibliographies, in constructing the identity of “little societies” within the discipline of architecture that were attuned to what authors were “in” or “out.” On the intellectual plane, the gulf created by the rising standard of erudition in architecture was bridged over in part by the attempts of phenomenologists to expand their influence beyond philosophy. The escalation of the terms of extra-disciplinary engagement required that philosophers reposition their intellectual labor. In terms of the architectural problematic between ne-avant-gardism and anti-avant-gardism, this required that philosophy come to arbitrate on the mechanisms for surmounting the crisis of bourgeois banality. Phenomenology, perhaps more so than any other philosophy, attempted to resolve this crisis by premising the legitimacy and originality of aesthetic creation on the “authenticity” of the architect’s immediate experience. Through this extension of the psychological into the metaphysical, as Jarzomek has put it, phenomenology salvaged the demise of psychology in architectural history, giving a new lease on life to the idea that an allegedly autonomous and psychologically superior elite could continually rewrite history.124

124 For Jarzombek’s argument that philosophy came to replace psychology in postwar architectural history and theory see his The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, History. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp 185-207.
B. The mask of Bachelard: The “poetic image” as the Modern myth of pure origin and absolute alterlty to culture

1. The “poetic image” as pure creation of the soul

To pass off their “body-image” theory, not as a mere anti-intellectualism, but as more “academic” anti-rationalism, Moore and Bloomer made recourse to Western philosophical treatises on perception. They argued that since Descartes philosophers had demoted aesthetic sensations in order to posit the epistemological superLJTity of the mind over the body. For Moore and Bloomer, Theod or Lipps’ 1893 theory of empathy put this split into question by positing that the self could exist both in subjective and objective realms. In addition to empathy theories, they counted contributions ranging from volumes on Gestalt psychology to books such as that of environmental psychologist J.J. Gibson’s The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966), which emphasized the productive role of the body in perception, as further refutations of the classical philosophical paradigm of the senses as receptive mechanisms. Moore and Bloomer were interested in Gibson’s claim that the senses were not passive reception organs but aggressive information-seeking structures, which he divided into the visual system, the auditory system, the taste-smell system, the basic-orienting system, and the haptic system. For them, Gibson’s rethinking of the human sensorium was important to architectural thinking for two reasons: First, it was anti-intellectual. Gibson posited that the body obtained information about objects without the intervention of mental processes. Second, Moore and Bloomer argued that it was precisely the a-rational processes

126 Ibid. p 31-36.
involving the basic-orienting and haptic systems that were responsible for the human understanding of place and location.

This had serious implications for the theorization of place in architecture. Moore and Bloomer termed this comprehension of personal location the “body-image.” It was a type of personal, inward place, a primordial self-centered, a-rational and emotional structuring of the inner world. Moore and Bloomer concluded that the basic-orienting and haptic systems formed “the core of human identity,” and that this provided a new basis for understanding human feelings as three-dimensional architectural experiences. This search for a relation between inner emotional depth and outward spatial dimension would be a constant in Moore’s career as an architect. Gaston Bachelard’s work on “poetic images” was the philosophical tiller of his pursuit. The Bachelardian challenge to Cartesian and critical philosophy, Moore and Bloomer argued, called for a similar turn within architecture.

The “poetic image” was a central concept in Bachelard’s critique of Classical philosophy. In his *The Poetics of Space* (1958, English translation 1969), Bachelard discussed it as the key to understanding creation in non-causal, yet rational terms, and therefore as the opening towards a new philosophy free from causality and scientism. This much was quite suggestive to architects who, like Moore, were then engaged in critiquing their own discipline’s reliance on causality, as expressed in formalist truisms such as “form follows function.” But more importantly for Moore, the poetic image promised a direct link between the inner and outer worlds. According to Bachelard’s definition, it was a brief and fleeting union of subjectivity and objectivity. Neither an emulation of the outer world nor a mirror of pure inner consciousness, it was its own
specific reality: an irruption of pure immediacy within consciousness. The “poetic image” appeared in the absence of a past, as though motivated by its own “inner thrust.”

Because, according to Bachelard, no causality could explain the onset of “poetic images,” he regarded them as the open ended and primal sources of creativity, as moments in which inner consciousness and outer world were materialized into an “inner vision,” as spontaneous “commitments of the soul” which bypassed the “mind” and its knowledge. Poetic images passed from the soul to the mind as they went “from the original state of reverie to that of execution.” Therefore, continued Bachelard, the poetic image implied a bi-polar model of consciousness: on the one hand was the consciousness associated with the soul (inspiration and openness) while on the other hand was the consciousness associated with the mind (talent and reason). This of course played right into the American anti-avant-garde’s popular conception of the intellect as inconsistent with warm emotion, and into their belief that education deprived students of their “spontaneity” and “intuitive freshness” in design.

In Bachelard’s opinion, philosophy had concentrated on the mind and failed to recognize what he alleged were the more primordial origins of thought in the soul. Here was the crux of the philosophical task before him. If he could only prove that the poetic image was the source of all new creations in thought, if he could establish that reason was a function of catching and explaining these poetic bursts, then he could prove that science and reason were not sources of innovation, that the origin of creativity was detached from reason. If he could sustain this, it would be a fantastic blow those who claimed that science, not philosophy was the source of all truth. American phenomenologists,

cornered out of funding and jobs by the "scientism" of analytic philosophers took to Bachelard like flies to honey, following him into Jungian psychoanalysis as a means to prove the inadequacy of modern scientific explanations.\textsuperscript{128} American architects, who were been caught since the 1950s in the postwar search to move beyond rationalism and functionalism, were equally attracted to Bachelard insofar as he offered a means to rethink innovation outside of technologically determined models of progress.

Although Bachelard's most popular work in America was by far \textit{The Poetics of Space}, the book was only the last phase in his long search for a rationalism free from the methods of scientific knowledge, which had begun in 1938 with \textit{The Psychoanalysis of Fire} (English translation 1964), and had been followed in installments such as \textit{L'Eau et les rêves} [\textit{Water and Dreams}, 1942], \textit{L'Air et les songes} [\textit{Air and Revery}, 1943], \textit{La Terre et les rêveries de la volonté} [\textit{The Earth and the Reveries of the Will}, 1948], and \textit{La Terre et les rêveries du repos} [\textit{The Earth and the Reveries of Rest}, 1948]. In \textit{The Psychoanalysis of Fire}, Bachelard tried to prove the defectiveness of modern scientific explanations about how humans came to invent the first fire-making procedure. He claimed that ideas about primitive humans carrying out an empirical observation of ignition in nature and then trying to copy it were flawed. There was nothing in nature that resembled the rubbing of two dry pieces of wood. On the other hand, there were many "archetypal" human experiences relating warmth to rubbing, such as sexual intercourse. Hence, psychoanalysis could explain this invention very simply by focusing on poetic images occurring during reveries of fire. Bachelard thought that fantasies of sex

\textsuperscript{128} This is the case for instance of Edward Casey, who became a practicing psychoanalyst, and argued the importance of Bachelard's interiorization of the world (his "subject-objectification" to use Jarzombek's terminology) for the New York architectural Avant-Garde. See his Edward S. Casey, \textit{The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History}, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997).
involving bodies heating up in the course of vigorous rubbing that originally led humans to rub twigs together. For Bachelard, this was confirmed by the presence of similar Jungian archetypes of intercourse in various fire-creation myths. The point was that invention did not involve a causal string of events carefully arranged in time. The truly new resulted, according to Bachelard, from people reaching “inside,” getting to know themselves, and then projecting their interiority “outside.” As he put it:

The method of rubbing then appears as the natural method. Once again it is natural because man accedes to it through his own nature. In actual fact, fire was detected within ourselves before it was snatched from the gods.129

At the time of its English publication, this idea hit American architectural circles with incendiary force. Bachelard seemed to be suggesting that to get out of the crisis of functionalism, to invent a new architecture, people had to forget their professionalism, their academic training, and all their cultural “baggage” and “get in tune” with themselves. There were a few important dampers that might have kept the discipline from catching ablaze with this idea. On the one hand, architects of the McCarthy era were heavily involved in turning design into a science. Chennayeff and Alexander were buying time from precious MIT computers to crack the language of automated design. On the other hand, attempts to break the hold of functionalism through the recuperation of history were (at least initially) unmistakably linguistic if not semantic in approach – given the rising popularity of semiotics and the ground-breaking work of Noam Chomsky. But it was precisely against these avant-garde notions of architecture as rational language that Bachelard’s work was most powerful. The anti-avant-garde recognized this much: the problem of architectural language as a highly intellectualized
discourse governed by pedantic historians and newly minted Ph.D.s could be quickly 
“bypassed” through the Bachelardian model of creativity as epistemological break. 
Bachelard gave credence to the myth that the newness of Modernist expression was a 
function of its absolute marginality to culture, its negation of history. Moore and 
Bloomer’s ability to turn Bachelard’s philosophical concepts into a simple book, 
marketed to first year architecture students but geared to the entire professional 
community, and accompanied by Bloomer’s masterfully naïve drawings, helped them 
win over the profession. Their book Body, Memory, and Architecture sold like wildfire.

2. Contested disciplinary knowledge: Modernism as Postmodernism

The anti-avant-garde’s de-historization of creativity occurred in opposition to the 
heightened relevance given to the historicity of architectural forms during the 1970s. 
Bachelard’s claim that the origin of the “poetic image” was in the “depths of the soul” 
also bore upon language, giving the anti-avant-garde’s “Postmodernist” style a way to 
also “bypass” a learned study of classical architecture, and to argue that a meaningful 
“past” was already immediately available in each architect’s “soul.” According to 
Bachelard, the “poetic image” was a movement from the soul to the mind, or from logos 
to being. In his words, “it is at once a becoming of expression, and a becoming of our 
being.” Like Heidegger, Bachelard considered language and being to hold the same 
ontological structure. But, whereas Heidegger supposed an ontological difference 
between being and language that reduced knowledge of Being to a hermeneutics of 
language, Bachelard suggested that the immediacy of the “poetic image” filled that

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“abyss.” In this sense, whereas some authors have defended the work of Heidegger as being dialectical, Bachelard’s thought can be said to be uncompromisingly undialectical and affirmative. “Poetic images” were for him “pure sublimations” of the language of signification that reached back to their primordial origin (the soul).

Bachelard thought that the poetic image provided a way out of the realm of mere language and towards the experience of the original logos, that is, towards an unmediated experience of Being. For Bachelard, any and every thing possibly communicated through common language was only a rationalization of that prior “poetic image,” where neither subjects nor objects were yet differentiated. As a “pure sublimation” of language, Bachelard regarded the “poetic image” to be a break with the language of signification which capable of making the “soul” of language (its logos) emerge. According to Bachelard, the “poetic image” was “lived-language,” or the “original” language, which uncoupled words and meanings. In it, the ontologically unforeseeable nature of speech could be experienced first hand. The value of this experience, he argued, was that it opened people to freedom by returning them to the “original,” which was by definition always “new,” and therefore liberated from the shackles of past histories and experiences.

131 The literature regarding the dialectical nature of Heidegger’s thought is immense. A common point of reference is Theodor Adorno’s famous charges that Heidegger’s ontology was undialectical in The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will. (Evanston: Norwestern University Press, 1973). Fred Dallmayr (b. 1928), an American phenomenologist, attempted a reconciliation of Phenomenology and Critical Theory by drawing out similarities between the work of Heidegger and Adorno. He attempted a defense of Heidegger in light of Adorno’s critiques. In his view, it was Adorno’s Platonic insistence on the difference between nature and history (as a stand in for subject and object) that drove him to argue for the necessity of a dialectical reconciliation of the two terms. Dallmayr argued that considering Heidegger did not draw a distinction between the two terms, he was in no way obliged to attempt their reconciliation. See Fred Dallmayr, Between Freiburg and Frankfurt: Toward a Critical Ontology, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1991).
In brief, the experience of the “poetic image,” insofar as it was a bypassing of the mind and its rational language, constituted an epistemological break out of which emerged both a new being and a new knowledge. For Bachelard, “this new being is happy man.”133 For American architects like Moore, Bachelard’s pursuit of happiness and newness resonated not only with a broader cultural fixation with comfort and consumerism, but also with the avant-garde dictum to break with convention, which made the French author all the more appealing.

Inspired by Bachelard, Moore questioned the relevance of “academic” history to architects. In his mind, history was contained in “joyous experiences” of “reality.” The learned, he told students, considered Disneyland a populist simulacrum. But it was really the academics that were fakes who “repressed” their true emotions behind abstractions. Blinded by reason and academia, they could not “feel” the delight that every other “normal” person experienced there. He encouraged students to distance themselves from the “dangers” of scholarship and only look inside themselves for experiences of pleasure. “Joy,” in Moore’s parlance, was the only truth, the source of all eternally new creative expressions:

But the things that are eternal, like the quality of light, are just as real as they are in the nineteenth-century predecessors -- a delight in any time. And since this delightful stuff at a place like Disneyland is real, I see no reason why I can’t just as legitimately be inspired by a wonderful porch on one of their Victorian-era buildings as I might be by something done by Le Corbusier.134

133 Ibid. p xxv.
Although the theory that architects had to open themselves to their private and joyful "poetic images" to discover the new seemed simple enough, it was difficult to put in practice. How was a "poetic image" different from one's thoughts? Bachelard claimed that one had to be in a state of reverie to be open to them. Some architects tried drugs to get beyond their "controlled" thoughts, others practiced meditation, and others just lied and said "Oh yes, of course I can feel it, can't you?" This was a problem even for Bachelard, who resorted to the claim that "poetic images" were only those that "everyone" had. If it took too much thinking or explaining, that was a good sign that one was not dealing with a "poetic image." More importantly, Bachelard argued that poetry could induce that state of half trance, of being lost in thought, in which the rational mind could be bypassed and the margins of consciousness explored. This was not just aimless wandering or an anything goes, he warned. Poetry directed and opened the reader towards specific "poetic images." Thus, poetry was a method of non-rational yet specific communication. "And we should not forget," he wrote, "that these dream values communicate poetically from soul to soul. To read poetry is essentially to daydream."135

Poetry solved the problem of radical subjectivism. The social upshot was that it broke down the barriers (that the evils of Modernism had raised) between people. Bachelard considered "poetic images" to be trans-subjective because, he argued, they could appear in any one consciousness. He noted that the trans-subjective character of the poetic image also made it "variational," and therefore different from "constitutional" concepts. This meant that one's experience of an "original poetic image" was never entirely pure. It always appeared at the surface of consciousness burdened with some

personal baggage. Bachelard thought that through a type of phenomenological
description he called “topoanalysis” he could tease the “pure” image out, he could read
the surface of the psyche for clues about the “poetic image” that stirred it into existence
underneath, in the depths of the soul. As “a tool for the analysis of the human soul,”
Bachelard’s topoanalysis attempted to isolate characteristics of a poetic image that would
remain constant for any iteration of itself in anyone’s mind. In *The Poetics of Space* he
carried this out by comparing and contrasting his own experiences with those of other
“great men,” mostly poets: “These naïve daydreams, which I thought were my own, were
a source of astonishment to me when I found traces of them in my reading.”136 “Great
men” made “great images.” Their poetry turned their “inner visions” into outward forms
which, according to Bachelard, resonated as “poetic images” in the souls of other “men.”
This was a type of a-rational, pre-linguistic communication. Thus, “great poetry” opened
regular folk to what Bachelard considered to be the “truly original.”

Moore applied Bachelard’s thinking to “loosening up” the increasingly academic
1970s interest in classical Western architecture and in its “burdensome” rationalism.
Instead of discussing architecture in terms of rules, techniques, orders, and construction
systems, Moore described it as a “scene” where people and buildings “exchanged
feelings” and “energies” through bodily contact. For Moore, “great architecture,”
classical or otherwise, (like “great poets”) excited people’s bodies in such a way as to
make joyful “poetic images” fulgurate on the surface of their consciousness. The problem
of recuperating classical architecture, he argued, was really that of finding the

136 Ibid. p 49.
correspondence between “inner images” of well-being and outer “scenographies” – a program not unlike that of Christopher Alexander.

Moore’s argument gave secular expression to the Protestant emphasis on the primacy of personal judgment over institutionalized authority, asking architects to keep a safe “common sense” distance from the scholars. He decried the post modern intellectualization of architecture, arguing that semiotics and linguistics missed the a-rational way in which, he believed, buildings and people “exchanged” meanings sensually. Even a book as patently un-scholarly as Charles Jenks’s *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* (1977) was too academic for Moore. Professing a faith not unlike Wölfflin’s in the “fundamental corroborations of body, feeling, and

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137 According to sociologist Colin Campbell, American Protestantism was particularly given to questioning authority through a belief in the primacy of personal judgment. By the eighteenth century, however, the Protestant belief in personal autonomy had become secularized into a cult of self-gratification and self-fulfillment. He argued that since Western culture has always had a materialist bent (westerners believe there is a strong connection between the physical world and human values and behavior) the possession of goods appeared to promise self-fulfillment. To put it another way, consumption is a quest for identity through sensual means. This helps explain the power of Moore’s argument that identity could be acquired through the sensual consumption of images. The connection of Campbell’s theories to American architecture has been previously explored by Dell Upton in *Architecture in the United States*, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 33.

138 F. Andrus Burr, a former student of Moore and member of “the family,” recounted the acrimonious reception of academicism within the anti-avant-garde. Burr argued that Vincent Scully’s calls for a “true vernacular” led historical research and threatened the anti-avant-garde with “more conceptual than perceptual, more frontal than experiential” approaches to design. Burr erroneously depicted the rise of academicism in American architecture as a superficial “take-off” from Moore’s experiential “image gathering.” Although Burr attempted to maintain the primacy of sensualism as the “original” historicising movement in architecture, his explanation ignores a series of important factors, such as the institution of Ph.D. programs in architecture (which occurred quite apart from considerations of Moore’s theories). See F. Andrus Burr, “Learning Under Moore,” in *GA Houses*, n. 7 (1980), p. 178.

139 Following broadly accepted cultural stereotypes, Moore equated reason with the sense of sight, and emotion with touch. Thus, he could argue that Jencks was too “intellectual” because his formal analysis remained at the level of the visual (or symbolic). See Charles W. Moore, “Charles Moore On Post-Modernism,” in *Architectural Design*, n. 4, v. 47 (1977), p. 225. Charles Jenks position appeared in the same issue under the title “A Genealogy of Post-Modern Architecture,” pp 269-271.
architecture," Moore urged Postmodernists to learn the past through “images,” which he defined as the “full corporeal experience” of an immediately meaningful world:

And if we are to do it (whatever it ends up being called) right, then we’ll have to do more than clothe our buildings in the semantically appropriate Orders. We will have to bring comprehensible Order to them, to extend the order that we feel in our bodies to the built world.

Moore used the “poetic image” as a front to extend the Modernist myth of originality within architectural Postmodernism. Moore’s famous “image gathering” was a reaction to this 1970s “intellectualization” of architectural education. By the early 1980s, the idea that design was the arrangement of “images” in experiential “sequences” had taken over the design studio of most major U.S. universities. “Certainly at Yale,” exclaimed a student, “we talk about it [images] a lot.” But the student was not entirely clear about the trans-subjective and communal claims Moore was making about “images.” Moore answered that the “image” emerged in communities “spiritually,”

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140 See Mark Jarzombek’s discussion of Heinrich Wölfflin’s empathic art history, and its indebtedness to nineteenth century German anti-abstractionist movements. It would not be difficult to find paternity in Wölfflin for Moore’s belief that the past could be discovered in “corporeal experiences.” “The essential thrust of Wölfflin’s argument,” writes Jarzombek, “was that since architects invest their structures with animation, observers today can relive the past when looking at a building by studying their own breathing patterns and other empathetically induced bodily movements.” See Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p 42.


142 A good gauge of the popularity of Moore’s “image” design method is the slew of articles making reference to it in the series of published proceedings from the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture conferences from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s. One of the more informative articles in this regard is that of Frances E. Downing, a professor at the State University of New York, Buffalo, and Thomas C. Hubka, from the University of Oregon, which was entitled "Imagery and the Generation of Form in the Design Process,” in Proceedings of the 67th ACSA Annual Meeting, ed. Michael J. Bednar, (Washington, D.C.: Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, 1979), pp 187-191. This approach to design survived its more “Postmodernist” expressions in architects such as Steven Holl, who alleged that he began designing from a series of perspectives which he then arranged into sequences. He then tried to draw his plans so that one would experience the building as “a continuous deployment of changing perspectives.” What Moore called images, Holl called “anchorings” —an experiential and mythical bond between subject and object. From the perspective of discourse it becomes clear that architectural styles alone are not sufficient basis for differentiation between “schools.” I would therefore argue against the alleged novelty of Holl’s design method, as it has been discussed in articles such as David Leclerc’s
echoing the claims made by Enzo Paci and Ernesto Rogers before him about the identity of individual and collective in experiences of Tradition:

An attempt is made to add to that fund of images, to enter into some set of transactions that enrich the image bank, call it "educating" I guess. Then some imagery that comes out of the people present develops which is going to mean more to the people than some image laid on them. [...] So I press for a catholicity [sic.] of image collection. In the absence of any clear knowledge of where images ought not to come from, it's legitimate to have them come from anywhere that means anything to anybody. [...] Images get talked about too much nowadays as though there weren't anything else that was important, but you can't say we are not going to collect images because it isn't possible.143

Among Moore's many skills was the ability to recall a veritable storehouse of "images" on command, a mental collection he developed by combining professional practice with the teaching of architectural history. Yet, as Donlyn Lyndon (Moore's student and later partner in MLTW between 1962 and 1964) pointed out, his true talent was blending those historical images with more whimsical personal ones in hope of achieving "a lodging for innumerable fantasies of inhabitation... opportunities to imagine and enjoy being there."144 The objective of this fusion was everything except capricious. Moore's design method was an open challenge to the formalism of the modern masters. Against Mies' "I do not want to be interesting. I want to be good," Moore famously proclaimed being "interesting" as an ethical responsibility of architects. "It's hard today, I suppose." pondered Lyndon, "to recognize that this freely exploratory mode was once a

143 Charles W. Moore, "Charles Moore [Transcript of Talk with Students and Faculty]," in The Yale Seminars on Architecture, v. 2, (New Haven, Connecticut: School of Architecture, Yale University, 1982), p 45, 47.

radical position, hard to call forth the temper of the late fifties when dogma was the central concern of many architects.”

3. **The function of enclosure in the transubstantiation of “inner vision” into “outward form”**

Could architecture be like poetry? Could it induce a state of reverie in people that would allow them to think up the new? Bachelard seemed to suggest just that, and architects like Moore were quick to capitalize on it in their writings. In *The Poetics of Space* Bachelard dealt specifically with how a rationally constructed geometrical object such as a house could induce daydreaming. In his estimation, this happened in houses that “condensed” and “defended” intimacy. When people felt at the center of a protective and ordered environment, they could relax, stop worrying about reality, and let their imagination run free. Intimacy, he argued, occurred when people felt enclosed, shielded within “nests” or “chrysalis” like spaces. Bachelard called this image of the sheltering environment the “oneiric house,” which closed the universe off vertically (from cellar to garret) and horizontally (as an isolated hut). When such bodily confinement was achieved, and reverie began, Bachelard argued that something amazing happened: people experienced “concentrated wandering,” they felt to be “elsewhere,” inside the intimacy of the room immensity itself unfolded. The importance of these types of experiences for Bachelard was that, if taken at face value, they suggested that there was no such thing as subject and object, inside and outside. Rather, the two seemed intermingled in “intimate immensity.” “This is a conclusive formula,” he proclaimed, “for the demonstration I

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145 Ibid. p 29.
want to make on the correspondence between immensity of world space and the depth of ‘inner space’.”

It is surprising to see commentators of Bachelard claim that he took no interest in religious matters when there is no shortage of passages linking the divine with the notion of immensity. In addition, some in Bachelard’s circle of close friends were deeply concerned with theological questions, such as Gaston Roupnel, a physicist whose interest in the relationship between reason and faith is reflected in his 1927 book *Siloë*. Woven into Bachelard’s writing is a thread that ties reveries of immensity to the internal contemplation of divine mystery. It is worth noting that some of the architectural phenomena that interested Bachelard most have a long institutionalized history in Catholic thought. Take for instance the notion of confinement as the precondition for experiencing the “reversal of dimensions or inversion of the perspective of inside and outside.” This notion undergirds the entire monastic Catholic tradition, which, as Jeffrey Hamburger has pointed out, considered internment and enclosure as a prerequisite for the spiritual life. In medieval European convents, the rooms reserved for mystical experiences were occupied according to highly ritualized practices of meditation and prayer meant to induce the transcendence of the corporeal self, and the experience of the “elsewhere” or “otherworldly.”

Was Bachelard’s work read as a manual for how to inhabit intimate spaces so that they would yield mystical experiences? Certainly the work of mid century American

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148 One such attempt to “secularize” Bachelard is Roch C. Smith’s *Gaston Bachelard*, (Boston: Twaine Publishers, 1982). He makes explicit reference to his project in p 6.
architects interested in Bachelard seems to suggest precisely that. Fueled in part by McCarthyite anti-intellectualism, the view that architecture, as the art of controlling the body, could afford spiritual experiences in excess of any textually induced meditation (such as literary reverie) buoyed up to the mainstream of North American architectural discourse by the 1960s—where it lives on in the present. Yet, exposing the phenomenological roots of this belief is not without historiographical difficulties. First, phenomenology was only one strand in a more general attempt to give a “theoretical” face to the anti-intellectualism of the anti-avant-garde. Second, the power of the psychologized discourse of empathy that architects made recourse relied precisely on its de-theorized and de-historicized method, which by staying at arms length from academic formalities such as footnoting could claim to be closer to “real” life experience.

Architects often extended this technique, “saturating the discourse” as a means to prevent readers from straying from anti-avant-gardism. Third, and perhaps more importantly, the discourse of experientialism discouraged textuality and thus worked to efface its own discursive traces. It drew its legitimacy from its pervasiveness and from the cult of

151 The view that architecture can produce spiritual experiences by exciting the body finds contemporary expression in a variety of modalities. Most pervasive among these are the slew of projects likening architecture to a “prosthesis” for feeling the “other worldly” (be that cyber-space or ecstatic mysteries). In these projects objects restrict people’s bodies to force them to “see” things one way or another. Some claim that the union of body and machine in experience allows for extra-sensorial perception, as in, for instance, Doris Kim Sung’s recently published “Incorporations: Exploring the Space between Body, Mechanism, and Imagination,” in Journal of Architectural Education, v. 54, n. 4. (May 2001), p 260-263. Phenomenologists have played an important part in the subsistence of this belief. Take, for instance, the work of philosopher Bruce Wilshire, who insists that people can “heal” their inner selves from “the addiction of thought” by assuming unusual bodily postures. See Bruce Wilshire, The Primal Roots of American Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native American Thought, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p 109.

152 By the late 1970s many began practicing what Jarzombek has called the “quotation habit,” which sought out footnotes only as a means to validate existing beliefs. “The quotation habit,” argued Jarzombek, “responded not only to the lack of intellectual substance in the earlier psychologically oriented discourses, but also to the untheoretically informed disciplinary discourses of art history.” Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p 202.
personality, or more precisely put, of the “psychologized ego.”\textsuperscript{153} This cult, built largely through interpersonal exchanges such as “desk crits” in design studios, are verbal histories that remain largely hidden to historiography. Nonetheless, the bureaucracy of pedagogy required a minimum of textual documentation in the form of textbooks, class syllabi and handouts. These offer a window into how Bachelard’s work entered the design studio. In addition, there is the architectural work of these educators, through which they taught by example. As these buildings were published and discussed in print, a record remains of how professionals attempted to weave architectural form, bodily experience, and spiritual exaltation.

\textbf{Fig: The aedicula as the excitement of both virility and spirituality. The captions read: “Four columns and a roof create an aedicula, a shelter and a place suitable for renewing virility;” and “Medieval saints found similar aedicular homes.” Charles W. Moore and Kent C. Bloomer, \textit{Body, Memory, and Architecture}, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p 6.}

\textsuperscript{153} Jarzombek traces the origin of the psychologized ego to Max Stirner whose \textit{Der Einsige und sein Eigentum (The Individual and His Property}, 1844) argued that the ego was a natural and innately free aspect of existence that was forced to conform to social norms. Stirner vouched for the rights of the “egoist” to assert his innate historical consciousness. This theory was not without problems, and as Jarzombek pointed out, they became visible by the end of the twentieth century, as many artists and architects disguised their “anti-intellectualism behind an impenetrable wall of self-confidence and self promotion.” (p 204). See: Ibid. pp 44-46. Charles Moore has often been described as one such “wall of self-confidence.” The emphasis on self-promotion is perhaps most evident in David Littlejohn’s biography of Moore \textit{Architect: The Life and Work of Charles W. Moore}, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984).
This pseudo-theological reception of Bachelard is apparent the built work of Charles Moore, one of the principal disseminators of such a view. Moore attempted to resolve Bachelard’s call for chrysalis-like corporeal intimacy in the aedicula, or miniature temple used for ceremonial purposes. Following Bachelard, Moore believed that the aedicula reduced the infinite cosmos to the dimensions of the human body, and allowed for a “body-centered sense of space and place,” with walls to “stiffen a boundary just beyond the body itself.”¹⁵⁴ As Moore described and designed it, the aedicula

blended mystical experience with a highly charged eroticism. It was supposed to literally rub against the skin, to warm it up through friction to awaken the dream of "inner fire," which as Bachelard described it in *The Psychoanalysis of Fire* was the seed of man's fertility. Moore laced sexuality with religiosity effortlessly by printing two sketches side by side, one of a man in an *aedicula* described as "renewing virility," and the other of "medieval saints" who had "found similar aedicular homes."\(^{155}\) A closer look at the connection Moore made to the medieval *aedicula* clarifies its mystical dimensions. In medieval iconography, the *aedicula* often appeared as the visual allegory of a nun's physical confinement, which guaranteed the purity of her marriage to Christ, and granted the intimacy required for her spiritual union with Him.\(^{156}\) In his built work, Moore explored this conception of architecture as a stimulant of spiritual experience, often with openly homoerotic connotations.\(^{157}\) As one critic described the showers in the men's locker room of the second Athletic Club at Sea Ranch, California (1969): "There, yellow

\(^{155}\) Ibid. p 6.


\(^{157}\) To this day, Moore's sexuality remains ambiguous. Moore's mannerisms, his discussions of "joy" in design, and the homoerotic overtones of his rhetoric often inspired suspicions that he was a homosexual (Lee Cott, urban designer and collaborator of Robert Yudell, in conversation with the author, July, 2001). However, he is said to have lived a celibate (public) life, and was allegedly never seen in the company of neither man nor woman. Most of his followers played into this diversion of desire towards Moore professionally accepted forms. Take Eugene Johnson's discussion of Moore's working habits, which is not without homoerotic innuendo: "Moore is apparently unable to work on his own. [...] He needs a straight man to play against, but he also enjoys having someone else to look after the boring details." (see Eugene J. Johnson, "Performing Architecture: The Work of Charles Moore," in *Charles Moore: Buildings and Projects 1949-1986*, ed. Eugene J. Johnson, (New York: Rizzoli International Publications Inc., 1986), p 90.) Even David Littlejohn, Moore's first biographer skirted the issue. By the mid 1980s however, as feminist and queer studies began to take over the academy, this disciplinary silence began being called into question. Although the issue was never openly discussed, academics such as Richard Guy Wilson, professor at the University of Virginia, suggested that Moore's work could not be properly understood without addressing his sexuality. Wilson criticized Littlejohn for glossing over the issue: "Littlejohn probes gingerly into Moore's private life, but delicacy makes the excursion futile. Moore emerges as a charming and gregarious host who cultivates a somewhat disarming amiability and shambling gentility, and yet is fully in charge of his stage-managed façade." (See Richard Guy Wilson, "Charles Moore: The Bay Area Style and Beyond [Book Review of Architect: The Life and Work of Charles Moore, by David Littlejohn]." in *Architecture: The A.I.A. Journal*, n. 3, v. 74 (March 1985), p 163.

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aediculas are painted around openings in a wall that holds the shower heads on its opposite face. As one descends the stairs from the changing room to the showers, one sees the bathers as if they were classical nudes in niches.**158**

![Image](image_url)


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Moore pushed Bachelard’s idea that reveries of cosmic immensity could be achieved through small spaces for bodily pleasure. In the designs for his own homes (a total of eight!) the aedicula often enclosed the bath, as in his 1962 house in Orinda, California, or clasped around his bed, as in his 1966 house outside of Yale University. In the latter, the walls of the aedicula were painted with stars and its ceiling displayed a trompe-l’oeil dome, in a tongue-in-cheek reference to Bachelard’s idea that bodily intimacy was directly correlative with celestial immensity. Moore pushed the idea to the extreme. In an unprecedented move within the history of architectural monographs, he included fifteen Christmas cookies decorated with “fantastic drawings” of
dreamscapes. For those that ever doubted that the body could contain immensity, Moore presented the possibility of literally ingesting it.


159 The cookies were not meant to be literally eaten. They were designed as art objects and are not in the collection of Mrs. Saul Weingarten. See Charles Moore: Buildings and Projects 1949-1986, ed. Eugene J. Johnson, (New York: Rizzoli, 1986), pp 278-279.
What was masterful about the use of the cookies was that they served to illustrate a very complex intellectual problem about the relationship of intimate body to environmental or cosmic immensity in an immediate way. This technique was perfected in *Body, Memory, Architecture*, where images illustrated but also exceeded the assertions made in the text. The images functioned at the intersection of philosophy and architecture, of “high” intellectualism and “low” professionalism. The image, as a site of exchange, did not serve to introduce “common folk” to philosophical treatises. Rather, these images assumed a quasi-independent status. *Body, Memory, Architecture* could be “read” in the absence of the text, by just looking through the figures. In this sense, they blurred the academic and professional boundaries typically associated with philosophy and architecture. In these images, the barrier disappeared that had kept apart American popular culture (always mistrustful of intellectuals) from Western philosophy.

Although the images were meant to “educate the masses,” they also functioned as a two-way street allowing phenomenology to be soaked in the “reality” of everyday life, at a time when it needed it most. This reality included popular forms of eastern spirituality adapted for Christian audiences by corporate motivational speakers, grass roots and Gaia reverence for “mother earth,” and a rising belief in the power of traditional spiritual healing methods. In the course of the 1970s phenomenologists and architects alike attempted to incorporate these popular concerns into their work, as the two disciplines continued to turn towards each other. 160

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160 Hofstader documented the importance of inspirational literature in the secularization of American Protestantism, and in the broad diffusion of its voluntaristic and subjective impulses. Protestantism minimized Christian doctrine by getting rid of the bulk of religious ritual. The inspirational cults eliminated it all together, retaining only the emphasis on the subjective experience of the individual, and even this only narrowly conceived as the assertion of individual will. By the 1950s, these popular best-sellers had completely transformed the old self-help Protestant system, in which faith led to character and
character to a successful manipulation of the world, and replaced it with a secularized system, where faith led directly to an individual will capable of self-manipulation. Inspirational literature promised that this ability to shape oneself at will was the key to financial success, health, and peace of mind. The success of this literature evidenced, according to Hofstadter, a problematic naturalization of spirituality. Whereas in protestantism spirit and world interacted, in inspirational cults they became ambiguously fused. See Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp 266-268.

The inspirational myth of self-manipulation operated in the interest of promoting the will to conformity within elite American architecture schools since the early 1960s. Architectural students were taught to despise “elite professionalism,” to be suspicious of individuality as embodied in “star” architects, and to wary of the mind. These were expressions of selfishness, and the architect, they were taught, was a servant of the community. Withdrawal, self-examination, individuality, analysis, and reflection were bad. An architect of good character and personality was achieved by practice, not by introspection. Students were asked to manipulate their self and make it self-less, entirely at the service of others. The critical mind was seen as a liability for this purpose. It lead students down the path of self-analysis, and criticality, which could turn students dangerously loose from the traditions and concerns of the communities they were to serve.
Body, Memory, Architecture affords many a concrete example of how these complex popular concerns were given resolution in the immediacy of illustrations. To read against the grain of their alleged immediacy it is useful to consider these images as appropriations of historical icons that were used to serve similar functions. The medieval age, which Moore was so fond of, offers a wealth of such antecedents. Dominican friars of the 13th and 14th centuries used illustrations in manuscripts in pastoral applications, such as in teaching the preliminary stages of the mystical itinerary. These images were to be abandoned at the highest level of contemplation, when the pupil was to embrace both vision and mystical union. This hoped-for moment is illustrated in a 14th century manuscript about the life of the Rhenish Dominican mystic Henry Suso (ca. 1295-1366),
where he is depicted pulling his cloak apart to show Infinite Wisdom embracing his soul inside his chest. The image used in *Body, Memory, Architecture* to illustrate this union of the body and the “elsewhere” bears an uncanny resemblance to medieval iconography. Moore and Bloomer depicted an a-sexual baby (possibly the reader?) whose self (abstracted into a circle, the symbol of the soul) appears linked through a Chippendale opening to the cosmic immensity of the sun. Eternal Wisdom was thus replaced by the cosmos, and the God Head by Mother Earth. This re-naturalization of spirituality played into the cultural trends of the 1970s.

These interpretations of Bachelard’s thinking on the relation of intimacy and immensity gave new strength to the Modernist search for pure origins, this time disguised as the spiritualization of architectural pedagogy. If, as Moore’s illustration indicated, the spiritual fusion with the cosmos occurred during infancy, then the arduous mystical journey became that of “returning” to that “original” child-like experience. The belief that enlightenment awaited those who could shed their cultural and social “baggage,” and return to a child-like engagement with the world became institutionalized in American Architectural education through first year design studios which typically involved forcing students to break with the “preconceptions” of the society outside of the architectural discipline, and reaching “inside” themselves for true authenticity. Famous architectural educators such as Christopher Alexander, spoke of design pedagogy in skewed theological terms as a kind of anti-education. For him, professors were supposed to simply help students get on “the way” to the mystical release of “the fundamental order which is native to us. They do not teach us, they only remind us of what we know
already, and of what we shall discover time and time again, when we give up our ideas and opinions, and do exactly what emerges from ourselves.\textsuperscript{161}

John Hejduk (1929-2000), Dean of Cooper Union’s School of Architecture since 1976, was enormously influential in disseminating the belief that to grasp a work of architecture was a type of religious experience equated with authenticity -although he reserved the term “authentic” only for those works of architecture which induced such experiences in him. Hejduk argued that religious epiphanies involved immobilizing the body in order to help focus people’s attention on the mind. “Authentic” architecture, he argued, hindered people’s movement and was experienced as a series of “fixed conditions.” The bondage of the body yielded, to follow Hejduk, a mystical moment in which “inner vision” and “outer reality” synthesized into an experience of “totality.” When the body was properly enclosed, the mind became free to grasp the building in its entirety. Like Moore and the rest of the anti-avant-garde, he believed that architectural meaning was available pre-linguistically in immediate experience. Spirituality, understood as “absorbing that thing into ourselves and making something living and breathing from it --something personally meaningful,”\textsuperscript{162} became the most important lesson in an architectural education. To explain this idea to students, Hejduk used the simile of the body as food within the building’s digestive tract.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{161} Christopher Alexander, \textit{The Timeless Way of Building}, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p XV.
\textsuperscript{163} In the following lesson, Hejduk illustrated how architectural ingestion (i.e. the enclosure of people’s bodies), forced the mind to transcended its corporeal contingency:

It’s a singular reality maybe of no great significance, but the point is that the body is fixed, not in motion, and that means the mind can begin to operate and it does operate. Now, architecture is the only art form where I can be on a mountain, I can look at a house and I can see it in a distance like the model and I can also see it as a fixed condition. I’m not walking; it’s a fixed condition. I’m a fixed condition and then I can approach it. And
These examples emphasize the need to ask about the function of instruction in the dissemination of intimate space as a site for spiritual experiences if we are to better understand the architectural reception of Bachelard (and phenomenology in general) in the United States. Under the direction of Donlyn Lyndon in the 1970s, the University of Oregon became established as an important hub of architects interested in phenomenology. Oregon’s school of architecture was then perceived to be at the forefront of a national turn in architectural education that challenged the hegemony of the east-coast establishments with alternative grass-roots oriented practices. Christopher Alexander’s success in convincing the administration to rework their campus planning according to community driven principles of design put what would be called “The Oregon Experiment” on the architectural center-stage.\textsuperscript{164} Oregon’s reputation was also bolstered when, after the death of Louis I. Kahn in 1974, the school hired six of his employees: Richard Garfield, Thom Hacker, Galen Minah, Piccioni, Kleinsasser, and Gary Moye. The school’s rising importance was recognized across the Atlantic. European architects such as Ricardo Bofill encouraged prospective students to make

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I’m approaching a fixed condition [gestures] but what’s happening as I’m approaching the fixed condition is that the thing is beginning to change from total picture to not so total, because we can never see architecture in any way totally. We can physically not see it in the sense that we can see a painting or a drawing in a total condition at once. [...] And then what happens as you move in on it? [...] it hovers over you and there’s a crossing. The most incredible part about the crossing is that from the moment you go over into it you become eaten by it, digested. You now have become a physicality like a piece of food or another organ that’s in it! And you have to be in motion. And when you’re in motion the mind doesn’t work! It’s a fragmented condition; you go through it, but when you want to think about it, what happens is that you stop and fix your condition and then your mind begins to work.

See John Hejduk, "John Hejduk[Transcript of Talk with Students and Faculty]," in *The Yale Seminars on Architecture*, v. 2, (New Haven, Connecticut: School of Architecture, Yale University, 1982), pp 186-187.\textsuperscript{164} Christopher Alexander discussed the process of convincing Oregon University’s administration to adopt his principles of urban design in *The Oregon Experiment*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). Each chapter in the book expands on one of Alexander’s planning principles: organic order, participation, piecemeal growth, pattern language, diagnosis, and coordination.
Oregon their top choice instead of Ivy League institutions, the University of Virginia or Rice, which were seen as too caught up the formalist throngs of modernism.\textsuperscript{165}

As asked why Bachelard was such an important reference to his colleagues, Jerry Finrow, then a newly minted Assistant Professor at Oregon later to become dean of the school of architecture, replied that he helped elucidate problems about human-environment relations: "We viewed him as working to clarify fundamental experiences of space. [...] We thought he was doing what we were doing.\textsuperscript{166} Bachelard’s writing, argued Finrow, was easier to understand than that of other phenomenologists such as Heidegger or Husserl, which also made him more teachable.

One of the most popular classes during this period of Oregon University’s ascendancy was Earl Moursund’s “Spatial Composition and Dynamics.” His class objectives and assignments offer a window into the design ideology within which Bachelard’s writing was put to work. The Poetics of Space was introduced by Moursund as furthering an ongoing, and by then fully articulated, architectural discourse about people’s emotional, psychological, and spiritual responses to environments. The principal references in this discursive constellation, as reflected in the class reading list, included Moore and Bloomer’s Body, Memory, and Architecture, Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Existence, Space, and Architecture, Rudolph Arnheim’s The Dynamics of Architectural Form, and others. These texts constituted the primary vehicles for the contemplative ascent of students. Through them young pupils learned to regard architectural compositions as “thoughts,” that could be immediately experienced through

\textsuperscript{165} Sergio Palleroni, was one such students advised by Ricardo Bofill. Sergio Palleroni, conversation with the author, 5 June 2000.
\textsuperscript{166} Jerry Finrow, E-mail letter to the author, 20 September 2000.
the body, “bypassing” the mind as in Bachelard’s “poetic images.” To emphasize this phenomenological connection, Moursund referred to architectural composition as the induction of “image-responses” in people. He turned the objectives of the class towards teaching undergraduates how to feel “poetic images” that were “evoked from qualities and essences” of architectural experiences. Following Bachelard’s teachings, he encouraged students to consider these images as catalysts of reverie, and therefore as “primeval sources” of new design ideas. For Moursund, learning to experience poetic images was the prerequisite for a student “to discover, daydream, speculate, imagine, explore,” and “find orientation which connects him/her to the world (universe).”

167 Earl Moursund, “Discussion 1: Introduction and Assumptions,” handout given March 28, 1979 in “Spatial Composition and Dynamics” class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School or Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.
As both proof of competency and learning tool, Moursund asked students to design “A One Room House” that would cause occupants to experience a “poetic image.” Much like in Moore’s *aedicula*, the single cell nature of the project encouraged shrinking architectural enclosure to the closest proximity with the inhabitant’s body. The design process was divided into four stages and spaced out during the course of the semester. First, site analysis followed by an initial schematic synthesis of the student’s experiences into a “poetic image,” which Moursund referred to as a “critical image.” Second, students...
were asked to modulate the enclosure of their room according to the principles of “center, surround, proximity, which enhance the sense of being and enrich one’s mental perception.”

To reinforce the Bachelardian notion of correspondence between inner intimacy and outer immensity, as allegedly experienced in poetic images, Moursund used visual and textual examples. Frank Lloyd Wright’s Burlingham House, for instance, served to illustrate the coincidence of “three frames for viewing the world: finite, infinite, immediate.”

In the fashion of the corporate motivational speakers of his day, Moursund used decontextualized excerpts from literary sources, such as *The Book of Tea*, to stress the connection between bodily awareness and the immensity of spiritual wisdom.

Going beyond Moore’s pseudo-monastic emphasis on enclosure as an architectural prerequisite for the elevation of the soul, Moursund established a direct correlation between types of enclosure and the experience of different poetic images:

> Space cells are units of closure and consequently units of experience, -- images, lesser wholes. These units of experience are demarked by common characteristics of the element type -- repetitions and variations in shape, size, direction, location.

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168 Earl Moursund, “On-going study of a space: Project number two […] A One Room House,” handout given April 10th, 1979 in “Spatial Composition and Dynamics” class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School of Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.

169 Earl Moursund, “Week 2, Part 1, PATTERN-MESSAGE,” handout given in “Spatial Composition and Dynamics” class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School of Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.

170 Consider the following passage quoted by Moursund from *The Book of Tea* as an example of how to make the experience of a small room reverberate with Eternal Wisdom:

> “Rikyu, in his garden at Sakai, obstructed the open view of the sea by planting a grove of trees in such a way that only when the guest stopped at the stone basin to wash his hands and rinse his mouth preparatory to entering the tea house, he caught an unexpected glimpse of the shimmering sea through the trees -- a glimpse of Infinity -- thus suddenly revealing the relationship of the water in his cupped hands lifted from the basin to the vast expanse of sea and of himself to the universe.”

See Earl Moursund, “Week 2, Part 1, Pattern-Message,” handout given in “Spatial Composition and Dynamics” class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School of Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.

171 Earl Moursund, “Discussion 3: Closure, Spatial Elements, Human Response,” handout given April 5th, 1979 in “Spatial Composition and Dynamics” class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School of Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.
Following the introduction of students to the belief that enclosure produced “poetic images,” the third and fourth steps of the project required that each designer turn their project into a mechanism for elevating the user’s spiritual wisdom. Moursund insisted that each one room house “develop and elaborate the potentials for humans to relate themselves to the environment and stretch (if not expand) their levels of comprehension.”\textsuperscript{172} Luckily, to pass the class one was not (in fact could not be) required to confess whether or not one had experienced a “poetic image.” It sufficed to exhibit proficiency in formal manipulation itself. The prevailing assumption was that design dexterity demonstrated spiritual “connection.” Ultimately, the professor graded according to loose categories that were established a priori. Again following Moore, Moursund required the use of such design strategies as “aediculation,” “balance of energy,” “expansion/ contraction,” and others which were termed “thought frames.” These constituted a complete lexicon to describe design processes as the manipulation of “single units of experience” into full “images of the whole.”\textsuperscript{173}

To summarize, the anti-avant-garde used Bachelard as a mask to pass off its experientialism as a “study” of the “living” past. The fact that Bachelard situated the “origin” of creativity and invention in the subjective and transubjective “poetic image,” allowed the anti-avant-garde to posit the architect’s “soul” as the primordial repository of humanity’s creative history. The genius of this identification is that it relegated the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{172} Earl Moursund, “On-going study of a space: Project number three,” handout given April 24\textsuperscript{th}, 1979 in “Spatial Composition and Dynamics” class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School of Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.
\textsuperscript{173} Moursund recognized the similarity between making universal wholes out units of experience, and making sentences out of words. Therefore, he taught Peter Eisenman’s early applications of structural linguistics to architectural form as a useful “thought frames” in the process of transforming simple enclosure to yield complex types, and therefore more illuminated image-wholes. Earl Moursund, “Space: The Structure of Experience,” handout given April 24\textsuperscript{th}, 1979 in “Spatial Composition and Dynamics” class (Arch 416G, Spring 1979), School of Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon.
\end{footnotesize}
Modernism’s myth of origin to “spirituality,” to a realm of faith that was culturally exempt from the “shackles” of reason. The alleged historicism of the anti-avant-garde’s Postmodernism reveals itself precisely as its de-historization. Whereas Bachelard wanted to understand creativity in non-causal, yet rational terms, the anti-avant-garde dispensed with reason altogether. But if Bachelard’s work did not literally invite the aesthetic project of anti-intellectualism, it certainly tilted the philosophical balance in favor of sensualism by opposing creativity to conscious thought.\(^\text{174}\) The Bachelardian model located creativity in the “margin” of consciousness, outside of reflexivity in the “half-trance” of reverie (where he also located the origin of consciousness itself). Under Bachelard’s banner, the 1970s anti-avant-garde reacted to the rising standards of academic rigor by recasting itself as a “marginalized,” and therefore supposedly more “authentic,” form of “historical research.” By claiming its “marginality” to history and theory, the anti-avant-garde guaranteed its hegemony over the pedagogy of “practice” to remain largely unchallenged.

C. The mask of American phenomenologists: Architecture as philosophical training

As far as 1980s design pedagogy went, the general acceptance of the claim that the “poetic image” was both subjective and transubjective made Moore into a hero who had “cracked” the universal language of architecture. So widespread was the belief that an architecture based on “poetic images” could embody and perpetuate the ancestral

\(^{174}\) Mark Jarzombek has argued that in turning towards aesthetics, some twentieth century American phenomenologists, like William Barrett, have encouraged anti-intellectualism as a way to compensate for their belated attention to modern art. According to Jarzombek, the philosophical defense of Modernism came in the heels of an earlier defense by psychology from which it inherited many of its biases. See Mark Jarzombek, _The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, History_, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p 100. The case of Bachelard suggests this very principle. Bachelard’s quasi-opposition of intellect to emotion must be therefore read not just as philosophy, but as part of a larger infusion of psychological principles within philosophy itself.
"feelings" of society that it became accepted as vulgate anonyme. References to Bachelard or Moore disappeared in conferences and syllabi, and professors spoke as if ex nihilo. The more the theory remained un-articulated, the more powerful its hold on design pedagogy.

But even if the anti-avant-garde’s “theoretical” masks allowed it to smuggle its anti-intellectualism initially, its new face also made it identifiable. By the mid 1980s, more theoretically inclined architects were drawn to the philosophical sources of the anti-avant-garde. As they engaged phenomenology first hand they pointed out how the philosophy had been mishandled in the past, some with the intention of furthering the aims of the anti-avant-garde, others with the purpose of defeating it. The mid 1980s witnessed a confusing (and sometimes confused) double reception of phenomenology: On the one hand young architects proposed phenomenology as a way to critique metaphysical and spiritualizing referents in architectural education, while, on the other hand, phenomenology was invoked precisely by those who endeavored to spiritualize architecture as either the recovery of the “fullness of being,” or as the synthesizing “cure” to the fragmentation of modernity. As philosophers entered architectural discourse and took sides, they added to the confusion.

This double reception of phenomenology can be appreciated in the different appropriations of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodied consciousness. The anti-avant-garde invoked Merleau-Ponty to convey the alleged immediacy of transubstantiating the

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175 Even discussions of Charles Moore’s architecture in terms of poetic images failed to mention his role in developing the theory. For instance, Carnegie-Mellon University instructor Eleanor F. Weinel, discussed Moore’s Piazza D’Italia project (New Orleans, 1978) as a collection of “poetic images” where “each image achieves a distinct and timeless presence.” But she failed to discuss Moore’s ideas about “poetic images” completely! See Eleanor F. Weinel, , "Ars Poetica: Conversations in Latitudinarian Architecture," in
“inner” feelings of architects into tangible “outer” buildings. 176 Architects influenced by structuralism and deconstruction attacked this view, emphasizing that the “bodily” was not an experience of spiritual wisdom. They argued rather that it was a Foucaultian “site” where one could appreciate physical evidence of intersecting power relations. Merleau-Ponty did suggest that creation (artistic or philosophical) was an “exteriorization of interiority.” In his booklet *L’Œil et L’Esprit* (1964) he even called upon art as a means to clarify his philosophical claims about the existence of a life-world prior to subject and object distinctions. 177 *L’Œil et L’Esprit* was a philosophical performance of the aesthetic objects it described. Merleau-Ponty tried to make his philosophy do what came so naturally to painters: to give material expression to an “inner” vision.

In *L’Œil et L’Esprit* Merleau-Ponty wanted to describe painting and philosophy as projects in which making and knowing were one and the same. To do this, he first had

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176 1950s architects and planners, such as Kevin Lynch, interested in issues of environment-behavior relations were drawn to Gestalt psychology. The same issues also motivated the interested in Merleau-Ponty, given that he was credited with having made great contributions to Gestalt psychology. In “Merleau-Ponty's Examination of Gestalt Psychology,” in *Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure, Language*, ed. John Sallis, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), pp 89-121. Lester Embree, a philosopher at Florida Atlantic University, analyzed Merleau-Ponty's career-long interpretation, acceptance, and critique of Gestalt psychology. The article began with Merleau-Ponty's critique of the naturalistic attitude of Gestalists, and then moved to Merleau-Ponty attempt to extend Gestalt psychology by providing a more accurate description of “depth.” For Embree, Merleau-Ponty’s central contribution to Gestalt thought was his articulation of three species of behavioral structures: The syncretic, the amovable, and the symbolic forms. Embree argued that Merleau-Ponty’s more general importance stemmed from his notion that “there is one subject matter —‘active consciousness’ or ‘perceptual behavior’ (i.e. living)—approachable both from within and from without in oneself and in others, that in approaching such a matter one may have recourse to an analytic attitude, but that the ordinary perceptual comprehension is prior.”

177 Bernard Waldenfels argued that Merleau-Ponty achieves the “third dimension” (the field this side of subject and object) by weakening the principle of consciousness “the known is outweighed by the experienced, the intellectual by structure; this is certainly not a radical revision.” According to Waldenfels Merleau-Ponty failed to describe this third region in its own terms, and had to make recourse to a type of perpetual “double-view” that described consciousness always in terms of body and world. Waldenfels maintained that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology did not undercut the opposition of subject and object. It was a philosophy of concrete subjectivity, but it was still a philosophy of subjectivity. See Bernhard Waldenfels, “Perception and Structure in Merleau-Ponty,” in *Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure, Language*, ed. John Sallis, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), pp 21-38.
to prove that painting and philosophizing were not reproductions of the real, but processes of emergence of the real itself. In turn, this required evidence that thinking was not disconnected from the real, but that it could in fact “manipulate” matter. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty began by critiquing the Cartesian notion that consciousness could exist beyond the body. He argued that thinking was not the type of ever-present vision described by reflexive thought. Rather, thought was a type of “embodied vision,” an immediate, situational and corporeal experience that preceded any “transparent” idea or model about vision or about the visible ever put forward. In that sense Merleau-Ponty considered experience to be an “original” or “primordial” vision. As understood by Merleau-Ponty, vision was the experience of the life-world, which he alternatively described as lived-space.178

Merleau-Ponty argued that from the perspective of the experience of thought the material world erupted within pure ideality, contrary to what Descartes upheld.179 Particularly, in the experience of painting and philosophizing one felt that appearance was indivisible from reality, and that vision was inseparable from the visible.180 The

178 Merleau-Ponty differentiated his philosophy from the tradition of reflexive thought that originated with Descartes’ metaphysics. In contrast to Descartes’ notion of space as res extensa, in Merleau-Ponty’s “lived space” there was no difference between container and contained:

L’espace n’est plus celui dont parle la Dioptrique, réseau de relations entre objets, tel que le verrait un tiers témoin de ma vision, ou un géomètre qui la construit et la survole, c’est un espace compté à partir de moi comme point ou degré zéro de la spatialité. Je ne le vois pas selon son enveloppe extérieure, je le vis dedans, j’y suis englobé. (p 58)

Merleau-Ponty maintained that Descartes’s notion of space (and the space of disembodied thought) was only possible as an abstraction of lived-space. However, he believed that Descartes negated the very world which enabled his meditations and thus gave rise to the sort of abstract thought which was to take over science. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, L’Œil et l’Esprit, (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1964). 179 Ibid. p 54.

180 For Merleau-Ponty, embodied vision allowed one to “witness the fission of Being from within” (p 81) where and when “things” became differentiated from one another, while they remained encroaching upon each other. Embodied vision therefore let things acquire “presence” as the “visible” within a lived spatiality. According to Merleau-Ponty, this “lived-space,” which was opened up by embodied vision, was an englobing experiential reality which supported every cohesion and disbandment of things into and out of

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problem of course was that people had a tendency to view thinking as an abstraction. Modernity was to blame for this, thought Merleau-Ponty, because it had placed too much trust in the “abstract methods” of science. This, he argued, made the duty of philosophy, painting (and presumably of other aesthetic fields such as architecture) that of preserving the “mystery” of the “fullness” of immediate experience. Philosophers and artists were for him the guardians of “truthful” experience, until such time as science was ready to stop imposing its models upon thought. Painting and philosophizing, he thought, could turn “the skin of vision [i.e. thought] inside out,” change people’s perceptions about reality (and modernity). Cézane, he claimed for instance, “thought with paint.”

For Merleau-Ponty, the task of philosophy and of art was to maintain open the experience of lived-space, of “the body and the soul, of the existing world,” so that science would some day awaken to it and realize that not everything was a “construction.” This meant that philosophers and painters had to simply continue “making their vision,” to continue rendering it visible in the world so that others could heed the message –in other words, to flood the discourse with their “perspective.”

Architects were taken by the idea that they too, like painters and philosophers could “preserve the faith.” They began speaking of a new “ethical responsibility” of infusing matter with thought, of making their personal “inner vision” scintillate under the surface of architectural shapes. In 1984, Mark Schneider, a professor at the University of Houston’s School of Architecture, offered a graduate seminar on phenomenology that

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181 “Or, cette philosophie qui est à faire, c’est elle qui anime le peintre, non quand pas il exprime des opinions sur le monde, mais à l’instant où sa vision se fait geste, quand, dira Cézanne, il ‘pense en peinture.’” Ibid. p 60.
182 Ibid. p 58.
explored the architectural ramifications of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of making and knowing as one and the same. Since Merleau-Ponty established a relation of equivalence along the axis of an immediate corporeal-mental “experience” of reality, the seminar turned into a discussion of “everyday” experiences of reality, as too “mental,” “false,” or “abstract.” If, as phenomenologists argued, people were “blind” to the “real” boundaries of reality, then they only had a fragmentary view of where they were. Schneider drew the clichéd conclusion that Modern subjects could not “find themselves,” and that it was the task of the architect to employ his or her “superior” vision in making wholesome environments.

The anti-avant-garde’s claim on the “fullness” of experience played itself off against a schizophrenic conception of self-hood it helped fabricate. The supposedly fragmented, schizophrenic, modern subject required the phenomenological search for stable limits, or so argued the anti-avant-garde architects as they engaged in paranoid searches for the “purifying fullness of reality.” John Lobell, a professor of Architecture at Pratt Institute, lambasted “monumental architecture” for blocking “the flow of consciousness,” and breaking an experiential “umbilical union” between world and people. He urged architects to regain their place in the centering womb of reality, to “penetrate into phenomena, into the dialogue [of experience] itself.”

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throughout the late 1980s engaged in paranoiac attempts to put the self back together with prosthetic machines meant to enhance bodily perceptions.\(^{185}\)

Schneider asked Dalibor Vesley, professor of history, theory, and design at the University of Cambridge, England, “why should an architect study phenomenology?” Vesley replied that phenomenology was important because it was the way for architects to achieve authentic experiences of reality, to leave behind the “highly sublimated, intellectual, and abstract world” of science, and win back “the tendency to see things the way that people used to see them, as designers or painters.” He claimed that phenomenology’s *response* to modern culture was to provide a restorative “cleansing” of experience. The upshot for busy architects was that phenomenology was easy to learn; for Vesely, it was not even a philosophy!

Phenomenology is not a philosophy, as such, but a tendency to restore to the modern situation a global and consistent conceptual direction. One can think of it as an inevitable dimension or hygiene of the modern mind. It is a catharsis one must go through in order to restore one’s own experience. The word “phenomenology” is not important. One also does not have to worry about phenomenology as a discipline.\(^{186}\)

During the 1980s, the “know thyself” idea gained a wide following among North American architects who could easily reconcile it with their Judeo-Christian beliefs. Far from resisting this appropriation of phenomenology, many philosophers actually encouraged the view that it could serve as a spiritual path towards inner awareness. As early as 1965, Glenn Gray, a philosophy professor at Colorado College, who also explored the appeal of existentialism to countercultural university movements of the

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\(^{185}\) These types of student projects continue to appear at present. See for instance Omar Khan’s MIT project entitled “Body A(r)mour” in *Thresholds*, n. 21 (Fall 2000), pp 70-73.

1960s, thought that the concept of authenticity could provide the “spiritual nourishment” for those left drifting by the mid-century erosion of politics and religion. As these traditional systems of values lost currency, Gray felt that individuals could find the necessary guiding principles for life in existentialism’s emphasis on inner being, self-examination, and self-evaluation. In Gray’s estimation, Americans were not only philosophically ripe for existentialism, but also culturally inclined towards it. Americans favored the type of individualism, resoluteness, and self-reliance on offer in existentialism. If existentialism did not completely take over philosophy departments, Gray thought, it was because many American philosophers, while paying lip service to these ideals, in reality favored a much more socialized version of them. 187

By the mid 1980s, phenomenologists like Karsten Harries extended the idea of “spiritual nourishment” from philosophy to architecture. “The philosopher’s words,” he wrote, “are less likely to touch this inner nature than the built environment. Architecture is at least as likely to edify as philosophy.” 188 The “ethical function” of architecture, Harries argued, was to get society beyond Modernity’s “arbitrariness” (read schizoid fragmentation) by making people feel the “wholeness” of the “original” language of the senses and the imagination. 189 The ethical task for architecture, he insisted, was not so

189 “I cannot do more here,” stated Harries, “than provide a few hints as to how one might go about developing an understanding of the natural language of architecture. Perhaps the term ‘language’ is misleading, for if we can speak of a language at all, this is a language addressed, first, to sense and imagination. Before attempts are made to articulate words, it needs to be felt. The arts, and more especially architecture, are in a much better position to teach us to listen to this language than philosophy. I can imagine courses that would explore it, but such courses would have to rely on images.” Harries thus played right into the anti-avant-garde’s anti-intellectualist discourse, which was by then claiming that designing with “poetic images” led to the spiritual elevation of students. See Karsten Harries, “Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture,” in Perspecta: The Yale Architectural Journal, v. 20, p 18.
much the control of the physical environment, but the pastoral care and elevation of people's "spiritual control." For the philosopher, architecture was the best way to teach the process of spiritual self-discovery on which he premised the "discovery of meaning." Michael Zimmerman, a phenomenologist who became interested in architecture while teaching at Tulane University in the 1970s, identified "egoism" with a dismembered experience of reality. In his article "The Role of Spiritual Discipline in Learning to Dwell on Earth" (1985), Zimmerman argued for an "ego-less attunement to Logos." Contradicting his own theory, Zimmerman argued elsewhere that only those architects capable of imposing their egoistic visions on the world had been capable of creating places where people could still experience the "spiritual" and "emotional" dimensions of existence.

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190 "Meaning cannot finally be made or invented; it can only be discovered, where such discovery will also be a self-discovery." Karsten Harries, "Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture," in Perspecta: The Yale Architectural Journal, v. 20, p 14.


The idea of an “ego-less” architecture became extremely popular in theorizing the possibility of a new vernacular architecture arising immediately from the people.

Christopher Alexander, and other architects involved in self-help community projects, regarded the sacrifice of their ego as a “gift” to humanity’s spiritual awakening. In

For Alexander, “authentic” creation could only take place in the face of death. In recognizing their own mortality, humans also found their existential similarity with all things nature, and could thus “let-go” of
1981 Alexander built a café outside of the Forum Design Exhibition in Linz, Germany, that he hoped would shame modern (and post-modern) design for its superficiality, for creating what he saw as a “world of pretense and show which almost no one believes in, truly, deep in themselves [...].”\textsuperscript{194} Alexander constructed his building through his “feel” method, which allegedly brought him in touch with organizations of space emerging from “the kernel of the universe.”\textsuperscript{195} These patterns were for him so fundamental that he asserted their universal objective validity: “[...A]mazingly enough, they are the same for everyone. They are the same for different people, with different values: and they are even the same for people from entirely different cultures.”\textsuperscript{196} In his mind, he was taking his own ego out of architecture, “letting” images of the human soul emerge through him, as a sacrificial “gift” to God.\textsuperscript{197} The Linz Café, then, was to be a three dimensional photograph of the “inner universe” of human beings, a veritable \textit{ecorc hé }of the soul in which visitors could see themselves reflected as a part of God, and find contemplative peace. He saw the “sacrifice” of his own ego as a way to bring about a “new era” in society:

Even here, however, I believe that there is enough to challenge the present forms of architecture, and to show that, in our time, this could be possible... that it is not a hopeless dream, ... but a right and proper thing to do, which, as we learn to do it, will bring immense rewards ... and will

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid. p 90.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid. p 87.
\textsuperscript{197} “It is so easy to say this... and so hard to make it clear. But definitely, in a specific sense, the works of art, which touch us, which evoke great feeling... are works which have consciously, and deliberately been created as offerings to God, as pictures of the universe, of or something that lies behind the universe... as pictures of the human soul.” Ibid. p 69. Also, see his discussion of the “gift” in p 72.
bring us into a new state of our society, where the inner person will once again, be deeply present, in the outer things we build.  

Perhaps no American phenomenologist has made a stronger case for architecture's role in the "spiritual" education of the United States than Bruce Wilshire, a student of William Barrett at the New School for Social Research in the 1960s, and

\footnote{Ibid. p 76.}
currently professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. Wilshire proposed architecture as a pedagogical tool to awaken “primal habits” in which the harmonious relation of things could be immediately experienced. This was not entirely new to architectural theory, since postmodern authors had long endorsed the recuperation of craft understood as “involuntary habits” (as Kenneth Frampton described them in his theory of Tectonics). Wilshire believed that these “primal habits” could re-ground what he called the “experiencing body-self” in the “primal life-world.” They were the axis between two symmetrical worlds of “inner mystery” and “natural mystery.” Wilshire believed that in the course of evolution, the “body-self” had “given” “primal habits,” or actions which were perfectly in tune with Nature and thus helped humans live “authentically as one” with the world. The problem was (again) that modern science blocked the involuntary by placing all of its emphasis on Reason. Wilshire believed pretty much everyone but himself to be “drugged with thought.” To get out of this “addiction of thought,” Wilshire affirmed that humans had to return to ancient rituals preceding the

\[199\] Wilshire derived a notion similar to Merleau-Ponty’s body-consciousness from William James’ Pragmatism. Although James set out his *The Principles of Psychology* as a scientific study, Wilshire maintained that James’ realization that the psychologist could not exist outside of the world he studied, that he could not isolate his thinking and methods from the object thought about, led him to posit the identity of subject and object. Wilshire portrayed James as struggling with his “radical empiricism” to finally conclude that there were no independent existences, and that “relations of things are equiprimordial with the things related.”(p 54) In other words, thinker and thought were for James identical to the world thought about in a key way. This discovery, as Wilshire understood it, put an end to Cartesian dualism and helped James establish a “wholistic” and corporeal ontological framework for experience. Wilshire used this framework to depict James as the forerunner, not only of phenomenology, but of the Gaia hypothesis, which, as articulated by James Lovelock in the mid twentieth century, conceived of the earth as a self-regulating living organism. To this, Wilshire added the more theological thesis that the earth was also spiritual, insofar as, in accordance to James’s ontology, the soul was not some immaterial entity, but “just all that the body does.”(p 60) In essence, Wilshire argued that if, as James suggested, there were no independent existences, then the earth was the horizon of humanity’s common body and soul. Bruce Wilshire, *The Primal Roots of American Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native American Thought*, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).

\[200\] Ibid. p 111.
modern “blockage” of the involuntary. By straightening out the body, Wilshire hoped to re-orient the mind. “To reconnect and readjust the head and neck properly,” he wrote, “may be sufficient to release this archaic fixation and to free the self for mature behavior.”

Wilshire advocated using architecture to re-train the body according to ancient rituals like shamanism or Tai-Chi. This proposition was not new to philosophy, he claimed. John Dewey had already recognized that the purpose of architecture was to realign the “body-self” with the “mystery” of Nature. In his 1899 School and Society,

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201 “All we can do is locate ourselves practice-wise and ritualistically in the world that is experienced as whole, and trust that our anchorings and resonatings in proven namings will evoke responses from the ‘neutral’ body, responses that contribute to our integration and integrity and are beneficial to all over the long run.” Ibid. p 109.

202 Ibid. p 112.

203 Wilshire claimed that Dewey came to understand the importance of the body in re-aligning the spirit after he underwent sessions in 1916 with F.M. Alexander, a psycho -bio-therapist who claimed to alter “minding by altering bodily movements and postures.”( p 111) In writing the introduction to Alexander’s The Use of the Self, “Dewey writes that since there are central organic habits that condition every act we
Dewey presented diagrams of an ideal school adjacent to a garden with avenues leading back into the community. The concept generating the school was the integration of theory, which he housed in a central library, and practice, which he arranged in the perimeter of the structure. Bruce Wilshire believed the drawings to be “spatiospiritual” planning aimed at awakening in children the “prefigurations of space-time-and-culture coiled in the body, which guide our intercourse in every situation, our deepest habits that should be fostered, not paved over or managed in ham-handed way.”

Wilshire admired Dewey’s anti-academicism and his desire to unite poetry, morality, and science into an “art of life,” but he felt that his predecessor had not gone far enough in his architectural experiment. Dewey had not incorporated “ancient regenerative rituals” into his design, and this, for Wilshire, meant that architecture would not be able to bear the weight of making places in which humans could regain their orientation within the “mystery of Nature.” In the twentieth century, “a fragmented time” according to Wilshire, nature was so transformed as to be unrecognizable. Thus, he argued that Dewey’s education system needed to be extended to the manipulation of the body within the realm of the archaic, where, he believed, a connection with “primal Nature” could be re-awakened through “habits.” For Wilshire, architecture would have to re-train the body in ancient involuntary movements so as to re-center the mind.

perform, we can hope to locate these, bring them under conscious direction, and convert ‘the fact of conditioned reflexes from a principle of external enslavement into a means of vital freedom.’ ” Ibid. p 117.
204 Ibid. p 107.
205 “But are even Dewey’s achievements in integration as deep and comprehensive as we need? Is the central room, the museum, active and powerful enough? Or will they erupt randomly and demonically? Is Dewey adequately attuned to the archaic-ecstatic? Is performance allowed sometimes in the library? Is ritual? I think of the need for ritual in particular. Most significant it is that though he pictures the school adjacent to a garden, there is no suggestion of wilderness anywhere within his dia gram! This absence means occlusion of ancient forebears’ ritualized acknowledgements of the gifts of Nature.” Ibid. p 108.
“Education is the master art, another name for the art of life”206 and architecture would serve as the tool for integrating, and regulating, the sacred positions of the body.207

Although Wilshire did not write for an architectural audience, the degree to which his thinking resembled that of the architectural anti-avant-garde is an index of the assimilation of phenomenological themes in architectural discourse. Like Charles Moore, Wilshire considered that human wellness was dependent on a pre-reflexive “intimate communion” with the world. The capacity for total involvement in immediate experience, according to Wilshire, had helped William James surmount his debilitating depression, and Black Elk return from a near death experience. For Wilshire the complete engulfment in the world allowed both Black Elk and James to let “the world’s energies” augment their immunological and regenerative powers. Moore also believed that his buildings could help people surmount the crises of modernity on an individual level, by “recharging them” with immediate experiences. Architecture, for him radiated meaning and was amplified in its sphere of influence by its users. Moore believed he was helping people “take possession” of their world by transforming it into something as close to a “poetic image” of their inner psyche as possible. With characteristic humor and disarming frankness, Moore recognized that his ideas about how buildings received and dispensed human “energy” was bound up in a Christian ethics:

206 Ibid. p 103.
207 Consider the following passage in which Wilshire tries to recuperate a mystical origin for the Cartesian axis which generates descriptive geometry: “Dewey is suggesting, I think, that losing this basic orientation is like losing the primal person’s sense of the magic number seven—a talisman that orients and locates us in the world around us. Why seven? Notice how the four cardinal directions establish the horizontal axis; then point down and then up to establish the vertical axis—that’s six—then connect all the points at the center which is yourself, and you have the sacred number, seven. You have found yourself by finding your place in the world. Knowing, feeling, moving, and being are one. Black Elk, for example, finds himself and his people by locating them all relative to the Six Grandfathers and to the central Tree of the World that can boom in our lives.” Ibid. p 103.
It’s my belief that buildings become energized by human care, like casting bread on the water and having it come back club sandwiches or whatever the Christian precepts are. For a building to be satisfactory, it has to have a great deal of energy put into it. If a building gets enough attention to energize it, then it can repay the people who invested the energy: the designers, the users, the fund-raisers, all the people who were involved.208

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208 Charles W. Moore, "Charles Moore [Transcript of Talk with Students and Faculty]," in The Yale Seminars on Architecture, v. 2, (New Haven, Connecticut: School of Architecture, Yale University, 1982), p. 1. Moore expressed this same idea at numerous times in his career, sometimes with almost identical words. Compare the passage quoted to his description of buildings as "receptacles of human energy; if they receive enough of it, they can repay in satisfaction for the occupants, as in the biblical image of bread cast upon the waters." See Charles Moore, "The Yin, The Yang, and the Three Bears," in Charles Moore:
The "outsider movement" mentality of American phenomenologists made them seek inter-disciplinary assistance in asserting the value of their philosophical contributions. Thus, they willingly provided a philosophical mask to the anti-avant-garde's anti-intellectualism, defending the spiritualization of architecture as a "purification" of modern experience that reconstituted and "preserved" its abject fragments "holistically." What begun in the 1950s and 1960s as a turn towards literature, art, psychology, communicology, and economics advanced by the 1980s into human geography, behavioralism, environmentalism, planning, and architecture. In the early 1990s phenomenological publications devoted specifically to architecture and its philosophical exegesis begun to appear. Philosopher and geographer David Seamon, for instance, founded the "Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology Newsletter" (1990), and established the SUNY Series in Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology. Seamon became Associate Professor of Architecture at the University of Kansas, where he co-taught graduate courses that used Christopher Alexander's work to "transcribe" his philosophical ideals into practical design requirements. Simultaneously with these publishing efforts, associations such as EDRA (Environmental

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Design Research Association) appeared as umbrella societies for architects interested in phenomenology to network.²¹⁰

IV. Conclusion

Post-structuralism began to differentiate subtle nuances in the history of Postmodern architecture. The new class of architect/theorists correctly associated the primacy accorded to a “freely exploratory” practice in the 1970s with the capitulation of architects to cultural conventions about the limits of that practice. In essence, poststructuralists argued that 1970s architects had tried to retain their cultural status by restricting a “freely exploratory” theory, which might have undermined the definition of established roles assigned to architects in the broader social contract. Thus, these authors emphasized function of discourse in cultural reform. The promise of course was that

²¹⁰ The Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology group held a network meeting at the 21st annual Environmental Design Research Association conference, held in April 6-9, 1990 at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. The EDRA symposium was entitled “Phenomenological Approaches to Landscape and Place.” Ten people were present at the Networking lunch. Co-chairs Margaret Boschetti and David Seamon, with Robert Mugerauer led the meeting. They addressed what types of projects the EAP might sponsor and in regard to what organization or event. Some members proposed a conference session where participants would “go out into a place or environment and work to experience it directly and offer phenomenological observations.” See "EDRA Meetings 1990," in Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology Newsletter, n. 3, v. 1 (Fall 1990), p 2. Patrick Condon (Faculty of the School of Architecture, University of Minneapolis) chaired a session in which Robert Mugerauer and David Seamon participated. Many of the papers were concerned with describing or prescribing a “fullness of experience.” See for instance: M. Gee, Graduate School, City University of New York, “Art and the Non-Functional Object”; M. Boschetti, Kansas State University, “Continuity and Change in Century-Old Farm Homes”; J. Hammond, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, “Anatomy of the Taishan Village”; R. Bechtel, University of Arizona, Tucson, and I. Altman, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Variety of Religious and Important Places”; D. Seamon, Kansas State University, “Using pattern language to Identify Sense of Place: American Landscape Painter Frederic Church’s Olana as a Test Case”; R. Mugerauer, University of Texas at Austin, “Midwestern Suburban Landscapes and Resident’s Values”; P. Gobster, North Central Forest Experiment Station, Chicago, and R. Chenoweth, University of Wisconsin-Madison, “Peak Aesthetic Experiences and Natural Landscape.”; H. Schroeder, North Central Forest Experiment Station, Chicago, “The Felt Sense of Natural Environments”; W. Engler, Iowa State University, “Experience at View Places: An Inquiry into Emotional Ties between People and Places.”; Carolyn Norris-Baker and Rick J. Scheidt, Kansas State University, “Place Attachment Among Older Residents of a ‘Ghost Town’: A Transactional Approach.” The conference proceedings are published in Robert Selby ed. Coming of Age: Proceedings, Annual Meeting, 1990, Environmental Design Research Association (Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois, 1990).
architects could regain a type of avant-garde critical function by manipulating and
directing the ways that architecture was spoken about. Unfortunately, this re-theorization
of practice was partly de-historicized, it looked at the (non-) intellectual history of the
discipline in a social vacuum. As a result, architects appeared as perpetual lackeys of
power, congenitally predisposed to accept the status quo. But history is filled with
instances of architectural subversion, resistance, and even organized reformism. This is
all the more true in the twentieth century, when it is actually difficult to find instances
when the "reformist" rhetoric is not present. The question to ask then is how can
architectural discourse appear to be advocating cultural and social revolution and in fact
be cementing the status quo? A de-historicized theory is as dangerous as a de-theorized
practice.

But an intellectual history of theory is in a sense not sufficient. Without the
context of a social history it becomes impossible to understand the dimensions of an
idea's radicalism. By the same token it becomes difficult to assess if the distancing of
theory from practice at a particular historical moment benefits the interests of reactionary
or liberal politics. In this sense, the social history of McCarthyism in America upturns
received accounts of twentieth century American architectural intellectual life. The
hegemony of a "sloppy" and "inconsistent" theory of architecture in the 1960s and 1970s
cannot be thought of as part and parcel of being an architect. It is rather an artifact of a
consensual system of repression, which weeded dissenting architects out of the academy
and dissenting opinions out of discourse. The idea that Postwar American architects
"chose" to "dumb down" theory en masse presupposes that they had the choice, that there
was freedom of speech, when in fact there was not. In light of this reality, the
displacement of theory to the background appears as an “adjustment” to social and political conditions, which in many ways did “cave in” but in others also helped preserve a commitment to liberal ideals of freedom either in discursive form or in practice.\textsuperscript{211}

In the late 1940s and 1950s, European avant-gardism became suspect in America for its revolutionary rhetoric. Congressman George Dondero of Michigan, who made his career as a watchdog against Communism in American education, repeatedly lectured Congress on the dangers of imported avant-garde Modern art.\textsuperscript{212} American society also became increasingly impatient with “domestic” intellectuals, such as the New Deal experts that had helped modernize the country. Small town Americans looked upon their academic credentials as a sign of privilege inconsistent with American democracy. And it was precisely the defensibility to some of these values, such as democratic egalitarianism, that made the case for intellectuals so difficult. The pursuit of intellectual excellence became circumscribed to science (i.e. the improvement of the “art of war”), and spirituality (or the enhancement of the “art of life”). Architectural education split

\textsuperscript{211} Charles Moore and “the family” learned the lesson to “dumb down” theory after Peresutti’s forced “resignation” from Princeton. The question now remains whether Moore’s “loosening” of theory from practice was a careerist move, or if it was a way to carve out a space of discursive exemption in which to carry out social reforms from within, such as improving the living conditions for the disenfranchised. Judging from the kinds of projects he was involved in, I would tend to think of him more as a careerist. However, under a similar discursive mediocrity, aimed at securing the backing of reactionary political institutions, others carried out truly unconventional work, which in many ways challenged the social agenda of those very institutions of power backing them. I am thinking, for instance, of grass roots activists such as Sergio Palleroni, a professor from the University of Washington working to improve the slums of Cuernavaca with IMF funds, or even Christopher Alexander’s idealistic self-help projects in Mexico.

\textsuperscript{212} “The art of the isms, the weapon of the Russian Revolution, is the art which has been transplanted to America, and today, having infiltrated and saturated many of our art centers, threatens to overawe, override and overpower the fine art of our tradition and inheritance. So-called modern or contemporary art in our own beloved country contains all the isms of depravity, decadence, destruction [...] All these isms are foreign origin, and truly should have no place in American art. [...] All are instruments and weapons of destruction.” Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st session, (August 16, 1949), p 11584, as quoted in Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New York: Knopf, 1963), p 15. See also Dondero’s speeches on “Communism in Our Schools,” Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd session, (June 14, 1946), pp A. 3516-18, and “Communist Conspiracy in Art Threatens American Museums,” Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd. session, (March 17, 1952), pp 2423-7.
roughly along these lines, as did the rest of the academy. But both “adjustments” preserved the founding myths of Modernism untouched. Both maintained, for instance, the belief of a stable foundational origin to aesthetic expression, even if they thematized it differently: a belief in Objective truth became the basis for scientism and the CIAM avant-garde, whereas a faith in the radical individuality of the subjective soul became the basis of the anti-avant-garde’s spiritualism. The first expression came under scrutiny with the 1960s critiques of instrumental reason. The second endured until 1980s, when deconstruction put into question the notion of authorship. In this sense, what from the perspective of formal styles appeared to be Postmodernism, from the perspective of discourse can be better appreciated as the extension of Modernism.

In a sense, the separation of the study of objectivity from that of subjectivity prepared the ground for the post-structuralist critique of authorship. The anti-avant-garde gave the reformist discourse of Modernism an inward turn towards the “soul” and subjectivity, which satisfied Protestant orthodoxy on a more acceptable secular plane through promises of self-manipulation. But the idea that the soul could be reformed also implied that it could be subject to forces outside of itself. Contacts with the phenomenological tradition although admittedly superficial did have some profound effects. Bachelard’s critique of the idea of creativity as a willful act of reason encouraged the architectural search for “ego-less” design practices. The reform of the soul eventually became its negation in favor of a more trans-subjective source. Some, like Christopher Alexander believed this trans-subjective origin to be God. Others believed (and continue to believe) that an ego-less architecture could emerge immediately out of bodily experience if only it could be liberated from the workings of the willful and unruly mind.
This satisfied a middle-American cultural anxiety before an increasingly heterogeneous moral and religious landscape with a new type of stabilizing universalism: bodily experience. Still others, less pious indeed, became open to the post-structuralist “death of the author.”

Although the talk about autonomy (of practice from theory, body from mind, architecture from philosophy) appears hollow from the perspective of discourse, it did enable the distance between poles necessary to rearticulate ideas, and to change conventions of practice. This distancing is sometimes the result not so much of isolated intellectual pursuits, but also of extreme social conditions. It was precisely at one of these moments of greatest distancing, during the aftermath of the McCarthyite era, that phenomenology first entered into Anglo-American architectural discourse. Although post-structuralist critics were quick to accuse phenomenology for sanctioning the superficiality of architectural discourse, it in fact enabled them to identify and critique the ever-elusive remnants of modernism.
CHAPTER 4
CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ: THE GENESIS OF GENIUS LOCI AND ITS FORMULATION AS ALÉTHEIC IMAGE

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I. Introduction: postwar “humanism” as experientialism

By the late 1970s, Christian Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000) was a household name in architecture schools around the world as a principal proponent of architectural practices attuned to and expressive of local character. His early works entitled *Intentions in Architecture* (1963), and *Existence, Space and Architecture* (1971) had earned him wide recognition both in Europe and the Americas, and his later *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture* (1979) would extend that audience to Asia and Australia. The first and third book mark turning points in Norberg-Schulz’s career and thinking.

After *Intentions*, Norberg-Schulz abandoned his professional practice for a career as an architectural historian, convinced that the contradictions of contemporary life prevented avant-garde architects from effecting any progressive change in society. Given the waning image of the modernist architect as reformer, Norberg-Schulz thought that it now fell upon historians to take up the colors of avant-gardism and find ways for architecture to regain cultural and social relevance. Sixteen years later, *Genius Loci* presented the philosophy of Martin Heidegger as the key to a new way of experiencing architecture which promised to unify humanity and world, curing modern experience’s contradictions and multiple deceptions of artificiality. The book consecrated the image of phenomenology as a path towards experiential self-awareness, and eventually turned Norberg-Schulz’s theory into a catch basin for all disillusionment with modernity.

Norberg-Schulz is often credited as the “founding father” of phenomenological studies in architecture and landscape architecture by his North American followers. ¹ And

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¹ Norberg-Schulz’s followers in the United States included faculty members in most of the nation’s architecture schools. His influence was particularly strong at MIT, Yale University, University of Michigan, University of Oregon, University of Washington at Seattle, University of California at Berkeley,
yet, Norberg-Schulz’s turn towards Heidegger owed much to the postwar architectural culture of the United States, which he had been regularly exposed to from his early days as a Fulbright fellow at Harvard to his teaching appointment at MIT in 1974. This North American architectural discourse served as a filter through which Norberg-Schulz read Martin Heidegger and eventually developed his popular theory of *Genius Loci*. The success of his work rested on his ability to appropriate existing modernist conventions, such as Kevin Lynch’s understanding of cities in terms of subjective images and Georgy Kepes’s belief in the importance of visual competency in design, and to essentialize these design methods into universal truths. The process of de-historicizing these design approaches cannot be completely attributed to Norberg-Schulz. Historiographical erasure was in fact at the very core of modernist discourse, serving to conceal the multiple interdisciplinary borrowings that informed the construction of subjective experience into a touchstone of modern architectural design’s emancipating promises. The secret of Norberg-Schultz’s success was his ability to perpetuate modernist conventions by concealing them under the mask of Heidegger, such as the CIAM dream that architects could help advance society by finding new experiential ways to break free of conventions.

__Kansas State University, and the University of Texas at Austin. In a letter to Norberg-Schulz dated July 15, 1982, which is held at the Norberg-Schulz archive in Oslo, David Seamon, who together with Robert Mugerauer would become a leading member of the American phenomenological school, commented on the foundational importance of *Genius Loci* to the America academy: “I write now to describe a project that a philosopher, Robert Mugerauer, and I are working on: a collection of essays tentatively titled *Dwelling, Place, and Environment*, whose main thrust will be a phenomenological approach to environmental behavior and design, particularly the Heideggerian perspective. [...] We believe that the volume could stand as a seminal collection, and since you are a ‘founding father’ of the perspective, so to speak, it would be splendid if an essay by you could be included, perhaps something extending a theme or themes in *Genius Loci* (personally, I am very much taken with your notion of ‘creative participation’).”__
As a young architect, Norberg-Schulz was deeply involved in CIAM. Through Siegfried Giedion (1888-1968), his mentor and teacher at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH) in Zurich, he became familiar with CIAM’s postwar stress on subjective experience as the basis for disentangling modern architecture from the discursive snarl of functionalism, which had, according to some of the group’s members, reduced the practice of modern architecture to the bureaucratic implementation of rigid codes. The idea of rebuilding Europe according to the CIAM principles of functionalist planning provoked a considerable amount of anxiety. There was some disagreement as to whether Le Corbusier’s *La Charte d’Athènes* [The Athens Charter, 1943], which enshrined the well-known ideal of the CIAM city, neatly divided into four functional zones (dwelling, work, transportation and recreation), was sufficiently sensitive to

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2 Le Corbusier’s Athens Charter was written on the basis of the findings presented at CIAM IV (1933), perhaps the organizations most successful meeting, and the first to address the “chaotic” development of
principles of human proportion, scale, and beauty, which in the eyes of critics like Reyner Banham had been disregarded by Modernism’s functionalism.

Even Siegfried Giedion, who together with Hélène de Mandrot and Le Corbusier, had been one of the principal instigators in the formation of the legendary CIAM in 1928, and had even served as the group’s first secretary general, had misgivings about Le Corbusier’s doctrinaire approach to planning. At the ETH during the late 1940s, Giedion lectured students like Norberg-Schulz about the erosion of “humanist principles” in design. Giedion had developed these lessons about “humanism” in the United States, where he carried on the activities of CIAM with Walter Gropius, László Moholy-Nagy, José Luis Sert and others during the war years. The group operated under the name “Chapter for Relief and Post-War Planning,” which laid claim to the European reconstruction years before it had even begun. Like other members of the group, Giedion

the modern metropolis. Although the meeting was originally scheduled for Moscow, political tensions made this impossible. CIAM finally met aboard the SS Patris II, a cruise ship sailing from Marseille to Athens and back, thus the name of Le Corbusier’s book. José Luis Sert’s book Can Our Cities Survive? (1942) was also recapitulated the themes of CIAM IV, albeit in less dogmatic terms than Le Corbusier. 3 Norberg-Schulz studied at the ETH between 1943 and 1949, where he obtained his diploma of architecture. Giedion accepted a post as professor at the ETH in 1946. Norberg-Schulz kept his notes from
concentrated primarily on accumulating information about American industrialized building techniques that could be put to use after the war. The research led to Giedion’s famous book *Mechanization Takes Command* (1948). In it, he concluded that the separation of human thinking from feeling, which he had identified earlier in *Space, Time, and Architecture* (1941), was the result of the radical transformation of the everyday environment by industrialized means of production. The “outside” world had fallen out of synch with the “inside” world of individuals.

Giedion’s perception of a lack of correspondence between outer reality and inner emotion made him view the postwar era as a time of profound crisis. He described humanity’s lack of existential direction as resulting from the same “anonymous history” which had yielded the chaotic metropolitan centers of Europe and the Americas. This was the history of mechanization. Giedion thought that, from the perspective of the present, the objective of mechanization was clearly to control both man and world. However, this goal had not become explicitly apparent to humanity until the end of the 19th century. Giedion’s “anonymous” history was then a contribution to understanding the telos of technology since gothic times, when, he explained, a shift had occurred from craft making to mechanized production. Giedion remained optimistic about the present however, arguing that it was precisely within that moment of great uncertainty that a new epoch would come about.

Norberg-Schulz would later recall that Giedion and the American intellectual scene of the late 1940s was foundational to his own attempt to reformulate Modern design principles away from functionalism and towards a new and more holistic approach.
that would balance human emotions with the environment.  

In 1947, on the occasion of Princeton University's bi-centennial anniversary, a conference entitled "The social basis for architecture" was held to assess the achievements of the profession to date and propose new research agendas. The interdisciplinary event was attended by some of America's (and arguably the world's) most influential professionals, including Frank Lloyd Wright, Gyorgy Kepes, William Wilson Wurster, Walter Gropius, Richard Neutra, and Siegfried Giedion among over seventy others.

Judging from the participant's remarks, and from the structure of the conference itself, it becomes quickly apparent that Giedion's call for a return to "humanist" principles of design that would check the advances of technology was less than an original contribution to American architectural discourse during that period.

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6 William D. Wilson, an architecture student present at the conference, summarized some of the themes common to most presentations, the similarities with Giedion's thinking are readily apparent:

The most significant thing to me about the several sessions was the spontaneous recurrence at random of several themes. These themes insistently recurred in spite of a Conference program which attempted and largely succeeded in channeling the discussion quickly through the various aspects of planning man's physical environment. Obvious though some of these recurring themes may seem, I would attach a great deal of significance to them simply because they seemed to designate fields of general agreement upon which men of the architectural and allied professions might meet. Here is an incomplete list of these recurring themes:

1. Architectural education must reaffirm humanistic values. The proper study of architecture is man.
2. The machine must be humanized if its application or architectural techniques and esthetics is to be of valuable significance.
3. The architectural profession must make a greater effort to tell the public about the better physical environment within their reach if they want it.
4. The profession must take a more active role in bringing about the legislation which affects architectural planning.
5. The architect must be the coordinator of teams of specialists including not only designers and engineers but also city planners, sociologists, and political specialists as well.

In spite of the sporadic attempts of several delegates to introduce the issue of reaction vs. progress, I would not classify this as one of the dominant notes of the Conference. Nor was the old story of traditional vs. modern.

Princeton conference, an entire session was devoted to the need for architecture to attend
to the needs of society and community, with participants such as Richard Bennett
suggesting that architects should come off their “abstract” academic pedestals and
operate as engaged “common men.” Following the line of this argument, Henry
Churchill’s presentation “Space, Time, and People” made a derisory pun on the alleged
elitism of Giedion’s famous book. In another session Talbot Hamlin’s “Industrialization:
Servant or Master?” studied the limitations, possibilities, and potential dangers of
technology, as well as ways to curb possibilities for disasters by attending to “human
concerns.” Yet another forum stressed the importance of human perception, with Gyorgy
Kepes waxing eloquent about “The Importance of Order in Vision.”

In the shadow of the conference’s call for “humanism” the principal categories of
CIAM functionalism were being re-cast in terms that now emphasized the administration
of human feeling and emotion through architectural means. The unstated objective of the
conference was to set a new theory of practice into motion. This required the
rearticulating of the very definition of architecture. Henry Churchill argued that a new
architecture would require new scholarly investigations into the philosophical and
aesthetic foundations of architecture, which were “not barren exercises in words but a
sorely needed clarification.” Norberg-Schulz’s answered that call with *Intentions in
Architecture* (1965), which would earn him almost immediate world recognition.
Although his book came to be regarded as a seminal contribution the dawn of postmodern
architecture, his thinking emerged out of CIAM’s internal redefinition and extension of
the task of modern architecture.
CIAM VI was held in Bridgewater, Connecticut, 1947. It was the first official meeting to be held after the war—almost a decade after the previous congress. Giedion pleaded for a new architectural practice that would create environments attuned to what he perceived as the necessary equilibrium between people’s ways of thinking and their modes of feeling. Giedion’s program found echoes in the contributions of a young generation of architects, including Aldo van Eyck, Jacob Bakema and members of the English MARS Group, who shared his concern for the return to “humanistic” principles in avant-garde practices. The resulting *Declaration of Bridgewater* reformulated the aims of CIAM as the creation of a physical environment that “will satisfy man’s emotional and material needs and stimulate his spiritual growth.” The new “ethical task” of modern architects was to insure that “technical developments are controlled by a sense of human values.” With the publication of Le Corbusier’s famous *Le Modulor* (1948), CIAM’s new “humanist” dictum was often reduced to an increased attention to small scale structures, domesticity, and to “spontaneous” or vernacular architecture. Giedion himself contributed to the hypostasis of human dimensions with his Harvard seminars on “The Human Scale” during the late 1950s. In these classes, Giedion catered to the general emerging interest in non-institutionalized architecture. He often drew his examples from “anonymous” structures and primitive building traditions, which he discussed in terms of “regionalisms.”

During the early 1940s, architectural historians involved in CIAM like Alfred Roth made familiarity with vernacular architecture correlative with the progressive advancement of the modern movement. Siding with Ernesto Rogers, Roth’s *La Nouvelle*

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Architecture (1940) contrasted the attention given to the environment by second
generation modernists working in the periphery of Europe with the inhibition of idiomatic
variances characteristic in the work of central European masters (Gropius et al). Roth
declared the necessity to incorporate the contribution of regional cultures in order to
extend rationalist theory beyond the “dogmatism” of the avant-garde. Regional
traditions, he argued, could bring concreteness to the “abstract” principles of Modernism.
According to Roth, the mediation of culture in the application of rational design
principles would help modern architects attain comprehensive, empirical, and real
solutions. This, he thought, would make modern architecture be welcomed by the whole
of society, who would in turn give architects license to transform the world. For Roth
regional modernism had a latent educational mission. By moving beyond the closed
rhetoric of abstracted rationalism, architecture would teach the modern taste and sense of
quality “to all forms of the life of the spirit and of existence in general.”

The interest of CIAM members in regionalism had a history that went back to the
late 1930s. Even though one cannot discount the significance of Giuseppe Pagano’s 1936
photographic exhibition of Italian rural architecture at the 1936 Milan Triennale in calling
the attention of modern architects to local building types and construction techniques, it is
important to note that it was Siegfried Giedion who disseminated the understanding of
regional architecture as a primitive psychological “experience.” This experiential
approach to non-modern architecture, which Giedion learned from his doctor-father
\[8^{8}\] Alfred Roth, La nouvelle architecture, présentée en 20 examples [The New Architecture, Presented in 20
Examples], (Zürich: H. Girsberger, 1940) p 2.

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Heinrich Wölfflin, would also become Norberg-Schulz's principal tool for analyzing architecture, and establishing the correspondence of new and old buildings to a form of primary expression he would name *Genius Loci*. “Contemporary art,” wrote Giedion, “was born out of an urge to go back to elemental expression. The artist plunges in the depths of human experience, just like the psychologist.” Giedion’s architectural history entailed the projection of his own subjectivity as evidence of an experiential affinity between the architecture of “primeval man” and contemporary man.” Aesthetic experience liberated the historian from the canon, allowing him or her to equate modern architecture to the masterpieces of past by using emotion-response as the basis for equivalence. The validity of this history was contingent upon the “objectivity” of the historian’s experiences, which, in the case of Giedion, remained unquestioned behind the veils of his self-assured tenor. Giedion’s historicizing, insofar as it claimed to be rooted in “primeval” experiences, was the literary counterpart to the design practices of the modern avant-garde, which also attributed a subjective source to their aesthetic expressions that was allegedly outside of bourgeois culture and its history. Norberg-Schulz was formed professionally within this discursive culture and shared its faith in the unassailability of the architect’s and the historian’s “experience.” As protocols of architectural discourse became increasingly academicized in the late 1960s, Norberg-Schulz remained committed to the primacy of aesthetic experience over theoretical

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9 Sigfried Giedion competed his doctoral dissertation, entitled *Späbarocker und romantischer Klassizismus* [Late Baroque and Romanticist Neoclassicism], at the University of Munich in 1922, under the direction of Heinrich Wölfflin.


11 Giedion was so confident of the “objectivity” of his own experiences that in *Space, Time, and Architecture* he dispensed with the academic protocol of a general bibliography. He simply stated that it would “have swollen the volume by some fifty extra pages without at the same time affording scientific
discourse. This modernist framework would undergird his attempts to legitimate the “authenticity” of his experiences, and his eventual invocation of phenomenology as proof of their legitimacy.

It is significant that Giedion developed his experientialist historiography in the United States, “in stimulating association with young Americans,” as Charles Eliot Norton Professor at Harvard University between 1938 and 1939, the same year that the American art critic Clement Greenberg (1904-1994) published his influential essay “Avant-Garde and Kitsch.” Gideon’s sense that aesthetic value was the cornerstone of architectural modernism can also be appreciated in Greenberg’s insistence that it was painting’s formal properties, not its subject matter, which made it great. Both Giedion and Greenberg believed that if one disregarded “naturalistic features” and focused instead on the way lines, forms, and colors articulated a painting’s canvas or a building’s space, then a series of connections could be drawn between works that did not necessarily follow the conventions of “antiquarian” history. “History is not a compilation of facts, but an insight into a moving process of life,” emphasized Giedion with italics. Thus, Giedion claimed that cubist painters like Picasso, constructivist sculptors like Kasimir Malewitsch, and functionalist architects like Walter Gropius were united by a common attention to “advancing and retreating planes” that were “interpenetrating, hovering,

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often transparent, without anything to fix them in realistic position." This aesthetic made the works autonomous from political, moral, or socio-pedagogic matters. The task of architecture was not to persuade people in those senses, but to “elevate” their aesthetic experiences. Thus, Giedion signaled a turning point in the modernist understanding of avant-gardism. Modern architects were no longer charged with the responsibility of changing society, rather, they were to be custodians of aesthetic integrity. To be mired in politics became a sign of the architect’s capitulation to the mediocrity of bourgeois taste. The principal result of Giedion’s and Greenberg’s turning inwards was that the aesthetic experience of art and architecture came to be regarded as the secular equivalent of the spiritual and emotional purification associated with religious catharsis.

It was in this sense of a purifying aesthetic that Giedion spoke of a “new regionalism” to characterize how modern architects, operating in every corner of the globe, should give expression to the “emotional” and “spiritual attitude” of their building’s site. “This is not achieved by adopting the forms of the past,” cautioned Giedion, “but by developing a spiritual [read experiential] bond.” The continued interest of CIAM members in vernacular architecture during the 1950s responded to this aesthetic experientialism. Evidence of the pervasiveness of this modernist understanding of the architectural object can be found in Enzo Paci, who in 1956, was using Gideon’s “new regionalism” nomenclature to refer to the phenomenological search for an experiential aesthetic harmony between the new and the existing, between the modern and the traditional, the actual and the eternal, the human and the cosmic. Like Giedion,

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14 Ibid. p 433.
15 Ibid. p xxi.
Paci thought that this aesthetic purity characterized the emerging architecture of an "Americanized" Gropius, of F.L. Wright, and of other minor architects from Finland, to California, and Africa. In other words, regionalism was already being treated as the global project of humanity, commensurate with the international claims of Modernism.

This modernist understanding of regionalism would later reappear under a different guise in Norberg-Schulz’s concept of Genius Loci (as well as in Kenneth Frampton’s Critical Regionalism). The principal difference was that, against the directives of Giedion, Norberg-Schulz loosened the modernist ban on non-modernist vocabularies. So long as the building conveyed the “purity” of the “original” aesthetic experience, Norberg-Schulz accepted it as “authentic.” The question was, of course, what constituted such experiences. Norberg-Schulz would remain committed to the modernist notion that “aesthetic purity,” understood as a series of formal relationships, elevated architecture above political, economic, and social problems. Yet, he believed that by ignoring “naturalistic features” in favor of “abstract forms” modern architects had failed to grasp the most “original” of aesthetics, namely, the way lines, volumes, colors, and voids were disposed in natural topographies.
By the mid 1960s, Norberg-Schulz had made the process of re-naturalizing the “abstractions” of modernism into his life’s calling. In 1963, when he assumed the editorship of Byggekunst, Norway’s premier journal of modern architecture, Norberg-Schulz began introducing an insert leaf documenting traditional wooden buildings of the Norwegian countryside in every issue, alongside the most radical works of modernism. In this way, he introduced the Italian interest in “spontaneous architecture,” as it had been debated in the pages of Casabella Continuità, to a Scandinavian audience. In 1969,
he collected and published all the insets in his book *Byggekunst* as *Stav Og Laft i Norge* (Early Wooden Architecture in Norway). In the introduction, Norberg-Schulz stressed the need for modern architects to provide an aesthetic synthesis that would restore the gulf he saw between nature and humanity, a chasm he believed to be at the root of the various crises of modernity:

> Today it is no longer possible to tackle our problems by traditional means. Nevertheless we believe that the present book may have a purpose beyond the presentation of a national heritage. Perhaps it may inspire the architects of today to solve their problems with the same respect for nature, man and culture as the anonymous masters of the past. 17

Whereas CIAM discourse in general, and Gideon in particular, inspired Norberg-Schulz’s belief in the notion that aesthetic purity was at the source of all avant-gardism, it is important to note how his professional training in Norway influenced his naturalizing interpretation of that principle. As a result of his involvement in the Norwegian circles of 1950s functionalist architects, and of his exposure to their animist conception of nature, Norberg-Schulz would slowly transform CIAM’s aesthetic experientialism from a discourse on the “purity” of unadorned volumes to one where nature stood as the standard “primeval” form to which all modern architecture should aspire.

17 Christian Norberg-Schulz and Gunnar Bugge, *Stav Og Laft i Norge* [Early Wooden Architecture in Norway], (Oslo: Byggekunst and Norske Arkitekters Landsforbund, 1969) p 5. Norberg-Schulz assembled the documents included in this volume between 1963 and 1969, with the help of his friend the architect Gunnar Bugge, and students from the university of Trondheim. It is important to note, that this interest in vernacular architecture in a sense continued the long series of attempts to resolve the ongoing crisis of rationalism, now seen as too “abstract” by turning to regional building traditions. While teaching as a visiting critic at Yale in 1965, Norberg-Schulz visited Paul Rudolfsky’s “Architecture Without Architects” exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. In addition, during the 1960s Giedion insisted that the coming of a new humanist era in architecture would have to involve “continuity” with history and tradition. “Both above and below the surface of this century,” argued Giedion, “there is a new demand for continuity. It has again become apparent that human life is not limited to the period of a single life-span.” See Siegfried Giedion, *Constancy, Change, and Architecture*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1961), p 7.
A. CIAM-PAGON: from emotion to nature and language.


At the 1947 Bridgewater meeting, changes were made to the statutes to allow CIAM to expand as a federation of independent groups. Giedion took an active part in the promotion of new national groups. He called upon Norberg-Schulz, his ETH student now living back in his native Oslo, to find a suitable head for a Norwegian chapter of CIAM. In 1950, they agreed on Arne Korsmo, Norway’s leading functionalist architect, who readily accepted the invitation. Although Korsmo’s international style villas had earned him national recognition in the 1930s, he found himself as somewhat of an outcast after World War II. During the 1950s, Norwegian society was bent on rediscovering (or inventing) its traditional nationalist myths, and the internationalist spirit of Korsmo’s work kept him from securing many institutional commissions. Korsmo welcomed Giedion’s invitation to direct the Norwegian chapter of CIAM as an opportunity to regain a foothold in the profession. Under his leadership, Norberg-Schulz joined Sverre Fehn,
Erik Rolfsen, P.A.M. Mellbye, Geir Grung, Odd Østbye, Håkon Mjelva and Robert Esdaile to form PAGON (Progressive Arkitekters Gruppe Oslo Norge). With the members of PAGON, Norberg-Schulz began drafting speculative proposals for new Norwegian towns, civic centers, residential towers, and office buildings. Beginning in 1951, the group presented their projects to CIAM meetings.


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With the foundation of PAGON, Norberg-Schulz launched his short-lived but productive career as an architect, the development of which reflects his evolution from CIAM’s ideology of formal austerity as an index of aesthetic integrity, to his more personal belief that only the formal mimesis of nature could yield “authentic” aesthetic experiences. Arne Korsmo, with whom Norberg-Schulz established a common business practice in 1951, was instrumental in shepherding the intellectual development of his young colleague. According to Norberg-Schulz, Korsmo’s work was defined by the search for an “authentic” life, which originated in nature and brought humans together
into productive dialogues. It was a life understood in opposition to the “isolation” produced, in the eyes of Korsmo, by modern society. Korsmo believed the architect’s task to be that of providing working symbols that, through use, would help people fix themselves existentially in the world:

Each object, each house becomes not only an article of use, but a symbol, a compelling symbol with which man identifies through use. In the world of objects, man seeks, as in a mirror, an image of his ability to choose and to express himself, a proof of his existence.

Norberg-Schulz was drawn in particular to Korsmo’s treatment of architecture and nature as symbolic elements through which one could achieve an existential foothold in the world. Korsmo’s animist rhetoric was drawn from the discourse of national romanticism prevalent in Norway at the time. In accordance to Giedion’s theories, Korsmo translated his love of Norwegian nature and tradition into a search for aesthetic experiences of “Norwegianness” common to modern and traditional environments. Norberg-Schulz would later insist that Korsmo “did not conceive of creating as repeating familiar forms, but rather as discovering ever-new expressions for the thing itself. In this sense he was not only modern but alive in the true sense.”

19 Ibid. p 78.
20 Arne Korsmo as quoted in Ibid. p 30.
21 Ibid. p 26.
With so much emphasis on making architecture "deliver" specific subjective experiences, such as those of "Norwegianess," Korsmo and Norberg-Schulz were concerned that their architecture would become a formal code, and thus fall into the same trap as functionalism. The pressing design question was clear: could they achieve a consistent aesthetic experience without proscribing a fixed vocabulary to architecture? Each designer had different answers to this question. Korsmo argued that the integrity of
architectural experience was not so much in the shape of the building but rather in how people manipulated its parts. Norberg-Schulz maintained that nature was the original source code for all possible human experiences of the environment. Nature was in that sense an inexhaustible wellspring of formal combinations, different at every location. The young Norberg-Schulz believed that if his buildings allowed people to visually apprehend the surrounding topography, they would be “taking in” the most original and pure aesthetic experience.

Korsmo suggested the “erector-set method” where the architect provided the client with a number of moveable architectural “pieces,” such as walls and furniture, and the user assembled and erected them according to his or her specific needs. For Korsmo, the mutability of architecture and furniture enabled the home to be and ever-changing result of human life and interaction. A home, argued Korsmo, was a living organism that connected families to nature by allowing them to participate in the changing processes of the environment. People reshaped their house as the climate changed, lowering a shade here to keep the sun out, and opening a window there to let the breeze in. Korsmo’s “erector-set” method capitalized on these simple actions, ritualizing and mythologizing them as “authentic” experiences of nature. As a professor at the

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22 Korsmo’s “erector-set” method was contemporaneous with a number of other attempts by CIAM architects to create a “participatory” architecture. The references in Korsmo’s explanatory diagram for the “erector-set” method suggest that he was attempting to frame his work in relation to the more established members of CIAM, such as Le Corbusier, Mies, and Rogers. Korsmo had the opportunity to discuss his views with these figures in 1949 at CIAM VII. He had more extensive contacts with Rogers, with whom he participated in the Committee on Architectural and Urbanism Education. See the “Rapport de la IIIème Commission: Réforme de l’enseignement de l’Architecture et de l’Urbanisme” in Documents : 7 CIAM, Bergamo, 1949, (Nendeln: Kraus Reprint, 1979), unpaginated. Korsmo’s used the BBPR’s Monument to the Deceased in German Concentration Camps (Milan, 1946) in line 3, far right, of the “Erector-set-method” diagrams. See Christian Norberg-Schulz, Arne Korsmo, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, distributed by Oxford University Press, 1986) p 72.
National College of Arts and Crafts in Oslo, Korsmo schooled his students in his vitalist aesthetics:

The essential purpose of the summer course was to incorporate into the teaching the mobility and sense of space that *is innate in all people and which originates from the freedom embodied in nature*. It was a matter of consciously developing the possibilities inherent in the free unfolding of the rhythmic values of form, colour and materials. That freedom is rhythmic simply means that it is regular and constructive without loosing the *immediate, vital impulse*.23

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In 1952, Korsmo and Norberg-Schulz tested the “erector-set” method in the design of their own residences on the outskirts of Oslo, next to a nature preserve on Vetakollen hill. They built three adjacent prefabricated steel-framed houses arranged linearly, as “variations on a common theme.” A core of services lined the street defining a wall behind which three double height living spaces opened towards a back garden. The houses were reminiscent of Charles and Ray Eames’s Case study house in Los Angeles, which Korsmo had visited in 1949 while on a Fulbright scholarship in the United States. Norberg-Schulz stressed that the principal concept driving the design was to create a home where the family could work in harmony with an immediate experience of nature.

The idea is closely bound up with Korsmo’s conception of human life. For him the purpose of work was not simply to make a living; work was the very expression of living, seeing, recognizing, and choosing. In the house at Vetakollen this was manifested in an interplay between the natural surroundings and the life going on within the house, with people and with things.  

During his stay in North America, Korsmo had studied visual perception of form and color with Gyorgy Kepes and Josef Albers at MIT, later mixing their lessons with his own beliefs in the redemptive power of nature. Korsmo encouraged his young partner to follow his footsteps and to travel to the United States to develop his understanding of architectural form. In 1951, Norberg-Schulz joined Korsmo as member of the faculty of the National College of Arts and Crafts in Oslo, where he worked through the theoretical principles of Korsmo’s ideas on nature and symbolic form in his classes on the “Principles of Architectural Form.”

24 Ibid. p 74.
Norberg-Schulz began to distance himself from Korsmo as he expanded his intellectual horizons during a stay at Harvard University in 1952, in the capacity of Fulbright Scholar. In the United States, Norberg-Schulz widened the theoretical framework through which he had previously examined architectural form to include the philosophical and psychological analysis of perception. Although he was to have taken courses at Harvard, Norberg-Schulz, disillusioned by the fact that Walter Gropius’s classes were taught by his assistants, spent most of his time in Widener library pursuing independent research. Korsmo’s lessons on architectural form as synthesizing symbols, and the work of Georgy Kepes on visual perception, led him to the work of pragmatist philosopher Charles W. Morris on the *Foundations to the Theory of Signs* (1938), to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s positivist study of logic in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922), and to Jean Piaget’s *Gestalt* perceptual psychology in *The Child’s Conception of the World* (1929).

This research would comprise the philosophical and intellectual support for his first book entitled *Intentions in Architecture* (1965). Although phenomenology is notably absent from this work, the book (perhaps because of its Positivist and Pragmatist underpinnings) introduced many themes which would later become central to Norberg-Schulz’s appropriation of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Both in Norberg-Schulz’s early and late writings, one finds a similar emphasis on the emotional relationships established by individuals with their reality, and on language as the primal “opening” between humans and world. Because of his background as a teacher of architectural form, Norberg-Schulz would always remain interested in a specifically *visual* language.
Norberg-Schulz’s work was initially framed, by a dialogue (embodied in the figure of Arne Korsmo) between modernist architectural thinking and the pressures of post-war Norwegian national romanticism. There was on the one hand Siegfried Giedion’s call to bring human emotion and thought into balance with the environment. On the other hand, there was the local Norwegian emphasis on nature as a source of mystery and life. He found a happy medium between these two directions in Arne Korsmo’s holistic approach to design as a synthesis of human life and natural life. Norberg-Schulz’s initial theoretical formulations would be molded by these sources. They provided him with the basic framework out of which to later develop his more phenomenological writings. Norberg-Schulz’s development as an architect, was a key factor in this turn towards phenomenology. In his projects one can discern the evolution of his thinking, away from the principles of CIAM and towards a type of formal contextualism which would characterize his later pronouncements about the visual nature of architectural language.

II. Place: Grounding Synthesis of Humanity and Environment

A. Norberg-Schulz’s architecture: Symbolization of environment

Although the house Norberg-Schulz built for himself in Vetakollen, Oslo, was celebrated as an example of Korsmo’s “erector-set” method, a closer analysis makes it clear that the building represented Norberg-Schulz’s attempt to move beyond the teachings of his more experienced business partner. In Norberg-Schulz’s interior, there was no sign of the integrated moving furniture so central to Korsmo’s design theory. The young Norberg-Schulz designed a more conventional interior, where connections to
nature were principally visual. Double story windows framed views from the living room and bedrooms of the ravine in the back yard.


In the *Eget Hus*, as Norberg-Schulz called his residence, he began moving on from Korsmo to emulate the work of the modern masters, whose disciplinary status was by then being contested and redefined. His house reflected his academic interest in the teaching of form, and it played up the formal possibilities of prefabricated steel construction in the manner of Walter Gropius, and Charles and Ray Eames’s case study house in California. Upon returning from Massachusetts in 1953, with construction on his house nearly complete, he used the structure to test his studies on color theory and

25 One of Walter Gropius’s principal achievements at the Bauhaus was the introduction of unit construction as a simple method for combining standardized units into functionally complex wholes.

26 Arne Korsmo visited the Eames’s case study house in 1949, while traveling as a Fulbright scholar in the United States. Norberg Schulz credited the Eames as an influence in the design of the Planetveien houses.
gestalt perception. He painted the central beam and column of his living room a primary red, and installed blue curtains in the mezzanine. Against the white walls, the use of primary colors was evocative of the Hungarian architect Marcel Breuer’s (1902-1981) famous designs.27


27 Marcel Breuer studied with Gropius at the Bauhaus and began teaching there in 1925 as head of the carpentry workshop. At the Bauhaus, he was influenced by the Dutch DeStijl architect Theo Van Doesburg whose work was characterized by the use of discrete volumes painted in primary colors. Breuer joined Gropius as professor at Harvard in 1937, where he helped train the third generation of modern architects.

Norberg-Schulz took each new private residential commission as an opportunity to study the work of yet another modern master, in a sense situating himself as the heir to the whole of the modern legacy. In the Øhrn family House in Stabekk (1959), for instance, Norberg-Schulz explored Mies van der Rohe’s trademark spatiality. The walls and roof are treated as independent planes that frame a central service core and open the main living space towards a garden. Although the allusions to the materiality of Mies’s project for a brick country house (1923) are clear, Norberg-Schulz shied away from its centrifugal spatial arrangement, producing a rather compact and confined series of spaces by comparison.

Fig: Elevation and Section of Villa Weidemann, Oslo (1959). Designed by Norberg-Schulz. From Norberg-Schulz’s professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne Arbeider II, 1956-, (manuscript, c 1962).
The angular walls and cantilevered overhangs of Norberg-Schulz’s Villa Weidemann (Oslo, 1959), which is set on a steep slope, are reminiscent of Frank Lloyd Wright’s work of the late 1940s. Interest in Wright’s work had witnessed a resurgence in the late 1950s, especially through the pages of Casabella Continuità, where Enzo Paci and Ernesto N. Rogers praised Wright’s work as “spazio vissuto” (lived space). At the 1947 Princeton conference, Wright was emphatically calling for an architecture in opposition to technology as the promise of a new agrarian society, more in line with Thomas Jefferson’s 18th century views of the United States. As Manfredo Tafuri later commented, Wright’s “excessive complication of geometrical forms” expressed his desire to bring about a new age of humanism, by sublimating both geometry and

29 “No! -no assembly-line is the answer either for him, for you, or for me (and that means for our country) in education, building or living. Decentralization of our American cities and intelligent utilization of our own ground, making natural resources available to him for subsistence, is his road, yours and mine, to any proper future as a democracy for which we may reasonably hope. Essentially, we are a mob-ocracy now. Our present extreme centralization is a bid to slavery –all down the line, a bid by a shortsighted, all too plutocratic industrialism in control of government.” See Frank Lloyd Wright, “Education, Individualism,
technology in playful symbolism. "To play with geometry and techniques means indicating the possibility of transcending the civilization of labor: This presents itself as prophesy of a post-technological civilization." As Norberg-Schulz matured he became more convinced of the need for architecture to serve as an anticipatory realm where people could get an experiential foretaste of that promise of a world beyond the contradictions of modernity. For Norberg-Schulz modern alienation was basically the result of humanity's progressive distancing from pure aesthetic experiences of nature. If the "purism" of the modern avant-garde's aesthetics had dissociated it from nature, Norberg-Schulz thought that true avant-gardism would be to elevate modern aesthetics to the standard or nature, which was, he believed, the ultimate benchmark of all civilizations.

Fig: Project for a hotel in Holmenkollen, Oslo (1960). Designed by Norberg-Schulz. From Norberg-Schulz's professional portfolio Vol. 2, Egne Arbeider II, 1956, (manuscript, c. 1962)

Following the ideological underpinnings of Wright's naturalism, Norberg-Schulz's architecture emulated the salient features of the landscape surrounding it. His 1960 project for a hotel in Holmenkollen, again a hill site in the outskirts of Oslo, took the concept previously developed for the Villa Weidemann and developed it as a series of

repetitive, prefabricated units. The longitudinal sections reveal that the flanking walls are finished at an angle not for structural reasons, but to imitate the slope of the site, and to make *symbolic* reference to the landscape which surrounds the building. By the early 1960s it was clear just how far Norberg-Schulz had moved from Korsmo’s theory of design as a vitalist fusion of life processes and architectural elements. For Norberg-Schulz, design was the process of thematizing the essential formal characteristics of the local topography and translating them into an equivalent set of formal relationships within the architectural composition. Norberg-Schulz theorized this belief in his book *Intentions in Architecture*, where he applied Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) meditations on language to a discussion of how architecture could symbolize nature through "structural similarity":

Language is a symbol-system. A symbol system has to be constructed in such a way that it easily adapts itself to regions of the object world. This adaptation is possible by means of a common logical form. ‘Symbolization’ therefore means a representation of a state of affairs in another medium by means of *structural similarity*.31

Norberg-Schulz’s use of Wittgenstein, whom he read while at Harvard in the early 1950s, bespoke his *modernist* understanding of modern aesthetics. As historian Peter Galison has noted, Wittgenstein’s Viennese school of logical positivism was intimately related to the development of the Bauhaus’s theories of modern design.32 Hannes Meyer invited Rudolph Carnap, and other positivists to lecture on logic at the Bauhaus. Galison makes the claim that both architects and philosophers were privy to a common aesthetics of purity based on the myth of an “original” and “transparent” logic

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of construction. Logicians tried to restrict truth to sentential structure, ridding philosophy of "superfluous" metaphysical verbiage. In like fashion, Bauhaus architects tried to approximate the "truth" of aesthetic expression by ridding their buildings of ornamentation.

Wittgenstein's meditations on language in his book Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) were pivotal for Norberg-Schulz's theorization of nature as the ultimate ground of any architectural expression. Wittgenstein argued that only sentences that could be empirically verified could convey meaning. In order to say something, a proposition had to be a "picture of reality." The simple signs making up a sentence had to correspond to the basic elements of reality, or otherwise, the proposition was nonsensical. Because of its strict correlation with reality, argued Wittgenstein, every proposition had a single and definitive meaning, which could be ascertained through proper analysis (thus the term analytic philosophy). The basic correlative of Wittgenstein's thought was that there had to be common essence to language, to propositions, and to thought, which had to be the a priori order of the world. Wittgenstein described this essence as a common "logical form." This idea fascinated Norberg-Schulz, who began speculating that the fundamental problem of modern architecture was that it had lost touch with "reality." To make modern architecture meaningful, thought Norberg-Schulz, architects would have to ground their expressions in the "common essence" relating all languages and reality. The problem, as Wittgenstein made clear, was that the essential logical form common to language and reality could not itself be represented. Norberg-Schulz acknowledged this fact, speaking of this primary

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logical form as a “quasi-object,” or a “non-descriptive symbol-system” that preceded all knowledge of the world:

The perceptions of daily life are generally intermediate to the objects and quasi-objects mediated by the specialized symbol-systems. The non-descriptive symbol-systems, therefore, do not give us knowledge, but experiences and directions for our conduct. To this purpose they employ synthetical signs which mediate reality in its phenomenal totality.³³

In sum, Norberg-Schulz identified Wittgenstein’s essential logical form with aesthetic experience. Although at the time of Intentions in Architecture Norberg-Schulz, in line with analytic philosophy, believed that immediate experience could not convey meaning in itself, by the time his famous Genius Loci appeared in 1978, he was claiming that knowledge manifested itself immediately meaningful aesthetic experiences to the subject. Genius Loci introduced a broad audience to Norberg-Schulz’s “Spirit of Place” which posited that natural places self-manifested through the architectural work of humanity. Norberg-Schulz’s “Spirit” owed much to Heidegger’s understanding of the artist as a kind of instrument of being’s self-disclosure. As early as 1936 Heidegger had argued that should not be understood as a mimetic, representational, or symbolizing process. ‘Creativity,’ he argued, should not be defined in the terms of productivist metaphysics as “producing” and object. Instead, it should be regarded in ontological terms as the process of “letting” an entity become manifest.³⁴ Norberg-Schulz would eventually share Heidegger’s ontological understanding of art’s creative dimension as the process of Gestalt-grounding, or as the clearing and limiting which meets the surge of the “event of presencing” and “lets” entities become entities as such. But, in the 1960s,

Norberg-Schulz still conceived of the “language of architecture” as involving the architect’s willful imposition of form unto matter in familiar and therefore understandable shapes. More importantly, he still considered immediacy in experience to be a “naturalistic” epistemological model.


Norberg-Schulz’s pre-phenomenological understanding of architecture’s “symbolizing task” is most clearly apparent in the summer house he built in 1962 for his family in Porto Ercole, a small fortified seaport town in southern Tuscany. The house is
sited atop a hill that extends into the Mediterranean and flanks a small bay with a beach. Across the bay, the hill is mirrored by another mount on top of which one can discern the battlements of a sixteenth century Spanish fortress. Norberg-Schulz took the inclined planes of that structure to symbolize the mountainous geography upon which it stood. Following his theory of symbolization as “structural similarity” he designed a two-story house with a heavy masonry base the surfaces of which were appropriately inclined to resemble the fortress sitting across the bay. He hid the rooms inside the base, leaving the second story as a diaphanous space capped by a canopy-like concrete slab under which was the main living room and kitchen. Short of producing a literal copy, Norberg-Schulz responded “mimetically” to the site. He allegedly regarded the confusion of vacationing bathers who walked up the hill in search of the Spanish fortress only to find Norberg-Schulz’s house, as evidence of the design’s success.³⁵

Although Norberg-Schulz is thought to have “discovered” the more phenomenological notion of the “Spirit of Place” in 1976, he arrived at the idea through a long a tortuous struggle with the broader notion “environment” and its relationship to building form. Prior to understanding “place” as a Heideggerian “world” confronting humans, he regarded it in his writings as an environment to be technically mastered through the “building task,” and symbolized through building form. His own buildings were a product of the attempt to symbolize the environment through the mimesis of abstracted forms. This early dual interpretation of environment, as something to be both dominated and expressed, would facilitate the turn towards his later descriptions of

³⁵ Anna Maria Norberg-Schulz, conversation with the author. October 2000.
“place” as a world which “needs” humanity’s work in order to realize the “call” of its Spirit.

Whereas in his early theoretical work Norberg-Schulz had subsumed place under the notion of “building task,” as something to be “dominated” or “mastered” through technological means, his practice as an architect enabled him to consider place as a more autonomous aspect of the “architectural totality.”

Norberg-Schulz’s struggle with the relationship of place to building is illustrated in an exceptional, one page meditation in which he attempted to clarify his ideas. On upper left hand side of the page Norberg-Schulz described the “architectural totality” by drawing a square diagram with diagonals, and labeling each corner “Place”, “Task”, “Form”, “Technique.” This was a departure from his description of architecture in Intentions in Architecture, where he had described the architectural totality as “Task,” “Form,” and “Technique.” In short, the word “place” had not yet made its appearance as an independent term. At the time of Intentions, task, form and technique were expressions of “Semantics,” a general symbolic system “which manifests the most basic functional, social, and cultural structures of an epoch.” However, by 1966, after his experience of building in Italy, Norberg-Schulz substituted “semantics” with “place” to denote the study of how a particular location could signify meaning.

Norberg-Schulz made another important concept explicit in this manuscript. He viewed the “terrain” as a sentence made up of simple signs, which he identified with discrete topographic features, and was interested in “special research in syntax in relation to the types of terrain.” Thinking in the manner of a logical positivist, Norberg-Schulz
believed that the topography of the landscape literally “spoke,” and that through proper
analysis one could understand the meaning of its proposition. For Norberg-Schulz,
arbitecture was the best suited method for the exegesis of the meaning of the terrain,
because it was a human creation like language. But in order to convey meaning,
arbitecture had to express a “picture of reality,” to use Wittgenstein’s terminology, with
each of its elements corresponding precisely to each discrete feature of the terrain. The
underlying claim of Norberg-Schulz’s theory was that there was an a-priori essential
“logical form” common to reality, natural terrains, architecture, language, and thought.

It is not wrong to use such a diagram:

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Place          Task
  |           |
Form          Technique
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The question is if one should not divide the influence of the place over the other three dimensions. The place decides the building task. The building task comes in like (unity). The place can have influence on the form and on the technical instruments one uses (relationship to the ground, etc.). But what we are fighting with is to present a diagram that describes the architectonic unity. It is clear that the task-form and technique are three sides of that, but what about the place? It is probably better to let the place "drown" in the same way as the client "drowns" (he goes under the dimension of "task"). and to talk about the relationship of the building-task to the given conditions (which do not let themselves be separated), the level of the form depends on the environment (open-close form), and together with technical mastering of the given environment. If the place should come in as a separate main dimension than it should be differentiated. This is not easy because a place has various combinations of characteristics which are both practical formal and technical. But as we have divided the whole in three main dimensions that correspond with this it is illuminating that the terrain has to be then divided according to this. The theme landscape and human-work could also be experienced in three main and different ways. It is illuminating that in Trondheim they have wanted to start with the formal. There is also a special research in syntax in relation to the types of terrain. For no... we can hold on to the

![Diagram](https://via.placeholder.com/150)
even though the

![Diagram](https://via.placeholder.com/150)
can be used in special cases.

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[written vertically on the right margin]

The decisive is that when we describe the place we do not describe a portion of the architectural unity but something that comes out of it.

We can describe building formally technically in terms of task, but not in terms of place *

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37 Christian Norberg-Schulz's original pencil manuscript is written in Norwegian and bears the title, *Landskap og Menneskesverk; mitt Forsøk* [Landscape and the Work of Man; My Suggestion], it was translated verbally by Anna Maria Norberg-Schulz on October 4, 2000, and transcribed by me. I have dated the manuscript as prior to 1966 under the assumption that it was written in preparation for Norberg-Schulz's Christian Norberg-Schulz, "Il Paesaggio e L'Opera dell’Uomo (The Landscape is the Work of Man)," in *Edilizia Moderna*, n. 87-88 (1966), pp 63-70.
The published version of this meditation, entitled “Il paesaggio e l’opera dell’uomo” (1966) did not mention the word place. Instead, Norberg-Schulz referred to it as “landscape” and discussed its relationship to architecture in formal terms. The task of architecture was to “interpret” the natural environment into understandable and therefore meaningful forms. The landscape itself, although suggestive of order, did not possess a clear, continuous structure, partly because its immensity could not be grasped in perception. Norberg-Schulz applied the categories of formal analysis developed in *Intentions in Architecture* to the landscape, referring to its “diffuse” order as “topological,” that is, as constituted by relationships of proximity, similarity, and continuity. The task of “the work of man” was to analyze this “loose” order and convey its “meaningful” structure, a process which, to follow Norberg-Schulz, required establishing “difference.” Therefore, because the landscape was diffuse, architecture should be concrete. Architecture became meaningful as it entered into an oppositional relationship with the forms of the landscape. The paradox was, argued Norberg-Schulz, that by establishing its difference, architecture was actually inserting itself into a meaningful order greater than itself. The positivist idea of a common “logical form” to both architecture and terrain would be foundational to Norberg-Schulz’s later phenomenological phase, when he would call for a meaningful opposition of Humans and World, and would define architecture as a “setting into work” of the Place’s Spirit in order to midwife the self-realization of that Spirit.

Thus Norberg-Schulz began to explore the idea of “meaning” as not entirely constructed by the subject, but rather arising from the confrontation of subject and object. Thus he found himself pressed against the problem of culture, as the ever-changing
system of meaningful relationships between people and their object worlds. It was not
tenable to consider this new category of place as a static category like the others,
especially in light of the ongoing debate at the heart of CIAM about how to reconstruct
European urban centers, and how to deal with their transformation. What was a place,
then, if it was always changing? This was a real conceptual difficulty for Norberg-Schulz
who, we must recall, was a professor of building form, accustomed to theories of
perception premised on the stability of the object to be perceived.

B. Technology, Mobility, and Norberg-Schulz’s early formulations of Genius Loci

The small number of Norberg-Schulz’s commissions between 1950 and 1956
contrasted sharply with his ambitions. With the members of PAGON he produced master
plans for new urban centers across Norway, plans for the renewal of Oslo’s central
districts, high-rise office towers, concert halls, and town halls. To Norberg-Schulz’s
frustration, none of these projects came to fruition. Finally, in 1958, he won the first
prize for the new Norwegian Exhibition Hall Competition to be built in Oslo, even
though he shared the prize with another local architect by the name of Hovig. For a brief
time Norberg-Schulz thought his career was about to take off, as his name appeared in the
local professional and popular press as the young promise of Norwegian architecture.
The competition committee asked that both winners work out a final solution together,
and Norberg-Schulz soon saw his design compromised, and his voice drowned in
committee meetings. The jump in architectural scale involved a loosening of direct
personal control over the design that Norberg-Schulz found difficult to tolerate. The
building, as finally constructed, bore no resemblance to the competition entry. Norberg-
Schulz’s expressionistic roof hanging from two long-span arches was replaced with a flat slab and a grid of columns. The experience left him disillusioned with the profession.
Norberg-Schulz moved to Rome in 1960 to try to rebuild his practice. He befriended Prof. L'Orange, director of the recently founded Norwegian Academy in Rome, who had raised sufficient funds to give his institution a building. Norberg-Schulz secured the commission, and quickly drafted plans that L’Orange accepted. But L’Orange’s students mounted a front of opposition against Norberg-Schulz, who they regarded as too un-scholarly and Modern (i.e. against history, which was their lifeblood). Norberg-Schulz, who was then finishing the manuscript to *Intentions in Architecture* resisted the accusations, and began studying the history of Baroque Architecture. In spite of his efforts, L’Orange yielded to the pressures of his students and opted for purchasing an existing structure. The decision spelled the end of Norberg-Schulz’s career as an architect, and he would always recall it as “a stab in the back.” Disillusioned, Norberg-Schulz turned his efforts to publishing *Intentions*.

But his years in Rome were by no measure unproductive. His turn towards history would be crucial in changing his understanding of Wittgenstein’s formal logic as a fixed essence, to his later understanding of it as an entity in flux. In looking to prove his
competency as a historian, Norberg-Schulz took classes at the University of Rome with architectural historian Giulio Carlo Argan, whose own work covered a spectacular range of periods and figures. Argan moved with ease from the study of contemporary architecture to critical reflections on *Borromini* (1952), and *Baroque Architecture in Italy* (1957). His *Walter Gropius e la Bauhaus* (1951) had introduced Heidegger to an Italian audience more accustomed to French phenomenology via the writings of Enzo Paci’s and Ernesto Rogers.\(^{38}\) During this period in the mid 1960s, Norberg-Schulz began the serious study of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and of Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception*. The discovery of Existentialism would eventually lead him to writing *Existence, Space, and Architecture* (1971), where he would extend his 1965 definition of architecture to include, predictably, existence and space --these were, of course, popular terms in the Italian architectural debate of the 1960s, Bruno Zevi and Ernesto N. Rogers having had their strongest disagreements over the relation of space to human life.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{38}\) Argan agreed in principle with Heidegger’s assessment of the rise of technology as the source modernity’s crisis, and as a self-enhancing process leading to the total domination of society and nature. However, Argan did not read technology as a product of Western metaphysics. In contrast to Heidegger’s reluctance to speak on political and social issues, and more in line with the work of the Frankfurt School, Argan regarded technological as a socio-political process determined by bourgeois ideology. The architectural crisis of Modernism resulted from the confrontation of the architectural understanding of technology as a progressive humanist impulse, and the reality of a cultural situation where technology only helped further enhance the power of the bourgeois technocracy. See, for instance his *In his 1945 Manifesto per l’Architettura Organica*, Bruno Zevi contributed to the international CIAM centered call for a return to humanism. In his opinion, this meant returning to a human, non-monumental scale which could avoid state mythology. Zevi drew philosophically from Benedetto Croce, who Ernesto Rogers and Enzo Paci regarded as problematically indebted to Kantian idealism, and caught up in subject object paradigms that failed to recognize the existential life-world. Through organic architecture Zevi introduced the idea of architecture as the “art of space,” often describing space as space-time. Zevi would later attribute his understanding of space-time to “Jewish thought” which, in his mind conceived of being as movement, in opposition to Greek thought, which understood being as frozen presence. (see Bruno Zevi, “Ebraismo e concezione spazio-temporale nell’arte,” in *Zevi su Zevi*, (Milan: Editrice Magma, 1977) pp 120-131, originally published in *La Rassegna Mensile di Israel* (June 1974)). The notion of space time encouraged Enzo Paci to draft Zevi to the ranks of his phenomenology. He claimed that when Zevi spoke of space as “space-time” he shed his Crocean idealism. Space-Time was a type of lived space that was part of a coherent historicism which could not accept ideal processes. It recognized, according to Paci, the concrete spatial and temporal processes of work and invention through which the new might emerge. Paci argued that Zevi’s various interpretations of architecture (political, philosophical, religious, scientific, materialistic, etc.) all rested on the authenticity of this common lived space-time: the Life-world. See Enzo...
years in Rome, however, would see Norberg-Schulz timidly apply existentialist thinking to his new interest in the Baroque, and in particular to the work of Bernardo Vittone. 40

Through Argan, Norberg-Schulz began frequenting a circle of architects and historians who shared an interest in the Baroque, such as, among others, Rudolf Wittkower, Aldo Rossi, Manfredo Tafuri, Henry Millon, as well as Paolo Portoghesi and his partner Vittorio Gigliotti. It was Gigliotti who, on a walk through the Roman Forum, pointed out the altar to the *Genius Loci*, ancient deity of the place, to the amazement of Norberg-Schulz. 41


40 In Norberg-Schulz's work on Vittone we see, for instance, the projection of phenomenological concerns with achieving "primal" experiences unto the late Baroque. Having analyzed Vittone's churches in terms familiar to Kevin Lynch as vertical nodes which punctuate wider horizontal fields, Norberg-Schulz states:

[It is evident that the motive is a process of spiritualization and the very extension expressed in the diaphanous structures is not understood as a conquest of the exterior world. Vittone's churches are true sanctuaries, insofar as they are infinitely themselves. In Vittone, therefore, we can perceive the desire to return to more original existential conditions, which is something typical of the settecento.]


41 Anna Maria Norberg-Schulz, conversation with the author, October 2000.
As history would have it, L’Orange’s “stab in the back” coincided with the international success of *Intentions in Architecture*. Published originally in 1963 the book propelled Norberg-Schulz (almost instantly) into international architectural spotlight, drawing him away from architectural practice and pushing him more towards the academy. Norberg-Schulz returned to Oslo that same year, and was immediately offered the chief editorship of *Byggekunst*, Norway’s premier architectural journal. One year later, *Intentions* earned him the title of *Doctor Technicae* by the Norwegian State Polytechnic in Trondheim. Before he could think about re-starting his practice, he was spending most of his time lecturing across the United States and Europe.
Norberg-Schulz's lectures were targeted directly against the experiments on mobility and flexibility of contemporary projects such as Constant Nieuwenhuys's *New Babylon* (1957-1974) and Archigram's *Walking Cities* (1964). Norberg-Schulz made his attack explicit in coining "The Concept of Place" (1969). "What must we demand of the environment so that man may continue to call himself such?" Asked Norberg-Schulz. "A mobile situation without architecture, or a graspable place that is articulated architecturally?" He proclaimed that "mobile" projects destroyed the necessary balance between humans and place. In his view there could be no mobility unless there was fixity. Therefore, utopian projects claiming to set all of society in movement ran the risk of defeating their own goals. The design for mobility was premised on the assumption that total movement would give society "deeper human contact and a richer interaction," but without ordered places that humans could identify with, their world would turn into a disorienting chaos. Thus, continued Norberg-Schulz, "the current utopias of mobility are symptoms of escapism, since they evade the real and concrete problems of the present." What these projects manifested was a "lack of roots" characteristic of spiritual emptiness, which substituted true identification with the random consumption of meaningless stimuli. Norberg-Schulz argued for "rich articulation," which "due to its complex structure, may lead the subject to various interpretations. The 'various interpretations' permitted by chaotic form are on the contrary mere accidental projections of the ego, and burst like soap-bubbles."42 By turning to technology, the projects of Archigram and Constant would only perpetuate (not fix) human alienation, because, according to Norberg-Schulz, it was precisely technology that was responsible for the isolation of

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human beings. "Man" had not yet gained control of the forces unleashed by the machine, and as a result, mechanized life was transforming cities into chaotic environments.

Norberg-Schulz was convinced that this process was at the heart of the crisis of Modernism, and the loss of humanist principles. Without ordered environments humans would not be able to grasp meaningful relationships between primary architectural systems and secondary environmental topologies. The loss of visual order to technological mobility was therefore a process threatening to strike down the core of human identity: It was an existential problem. 43 Through an architectural leap of logic, Norberg-Schulz posited that by bringing back visual order architecture could help return social stability.

Norberg-Schulz’s first formulation of “place” was an attempt to critique the contemporary discourse on “space,” which he considered to be a continuation of “abstract” functionalist principles in design. The “mobility” espoused by Archigram and the Constant was made possible, to follow Norberg-Schulz, by an underlying abstract discourse about “space” which ignored the concrete ways in which humans actually lived and constructed meaning through interactions with fixed environments. Therefore,
Norberg-Schulz saw the struggle against space and mobility as a necessary first step towards the new era promised by Giedion and postwar CIAM. Norberg-Schulz was committed to helping bring about a new humanism to Modernism ever since he attended CIAM IIX (1951) as a young delegate, and had discussed the importance of returning to “man” with Rogers and Giedion. The late 1960s attention to mutable technological environments was, for Norberg-Schulz, a very real threat to the project of humanism. On both sides of the “space and mobility” divide, architects agreed on the need for deeper, more meaningful human interaction. Norberg-Schulz argued, together with Kevin Lynch, Charles Alexander, Colin St. John Wilson and others that that interaction could only take place against the background of a perceptibly structured world. Place, then, was the “origin” of human action and meaningful inter-action. It was, to follow Norberg-Schulz, the “immediate condition” of balance between our “inside” and the “outside” that was established when one felt “at home.” In other words, “place” was the satisfaction of Giedion’s call for a balance between human emotion and environmental reality.

The production and reception of Norberg-Schulz’s theory of place as meaningful environment was framed by a historical moment in which a new environmental consciousness was emerging in opposition to technology. Rachel Carson’s The Silent Spring (1962), the first book from within science to sound an alarm on the negative effects of high-tech agriculture on long-term health standards, was an overnight best seller, which led CBS to broadcast a documentary on Carson’s work in 1963. The book

44 Upon his return from CIAM IIX Norberg-Schulz founded TEAM, a magazine for young CIAM groups, in which he immediately published the documents he received from Rogers and Giedion. See Walter Gropius, Ernesto N. Rogers, C. van Eesteren, S. Gideon, Serge Chermayeff, Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, , “CIAM 8, Commission 3: Report on Architectural Education,” in TEAM: Collaboration of Young Architects and Artists, n. 2 (February 1952), ed. Christian Norberg-Schulz and E. Neuenschwander, (Oslo: Printed at Statens håndverks, and distributed by Christian Norberg-Schulz, 1952).
would eventually lead to Gaia theories, where the whole earth was taken as a biological/geological system. Melvin M. Webber’s Explorations Into Urban Structure (1964) brought forth the claim that the advancing techno culture of liberal capitalism was turning the once clear boundary between city and nature into a chaotic “non-place urban realm” where human interaction was no longer possible. Norberg-Schulz’s attack on technological mobility, as a means to return to humanist concerns, must also be read in relation to a growing body of literature which identified a growing distance between the humanities and the sciences. Charles Percy Snow’s The Two Cultures initiated the debate about the autonomy of these two branches of knowledge in 1959, and the controversy continued with Aldous Huxley’s 1963 Literature and Science, where he argued that the two fields had become completely independent. Lastly, Giedion’s and Norberg-Schulz’s belief that the coming of a new more authentic era rested on the ability to overcome the present state of technology was not an isolated architectural affair. On the contrary, it was an issue that, at the time, was receiving the attention of science, politics, philosophy, and the emerging social sciences. For instance, Herbert Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (1964) posited that social emancipation could only be conceived as a revolutionary transformation of science and technology itself, that is, through a New Science, or a New Technology, that would be liberating, not oppressive.

Norberg-Schulz’s first 1969 formulation of the theory of place in terms of Gestalt psychology was an attempt to draw from, and influence, these contemporary conversations. By that time, the understanding of perception in terms of Gestalten had also emerged as an important concept within phenomenology. In his quest to ground the
new architecture in the balance between human needs and environmental pressures, Norberg-Schulz defined place as the union of humanity and world, as the “existential space.” That definition re-directed his research towards the study of what he considered to be existentialist authors, namely Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. As a result of that encounter, his theory of place would be radically transformed, and, along with it, his conception of experience. Norberg-Schulz continued to consider place as the necessary ground of meaningful human life. However, in the span of a few years, place would cease to rest on the Gestalt perception of environmental order. Instead, place would become contingent on a more immediate and Heideggerian poetic self-disclosure of the environment.

III. The Turn Towards Heidegger

A. Place as the Poetic Self-Disclosure of truth through Alétheic images

Norberg-Schulz considered the concept of place to be such an important discovery that he felt compelled to amend *Intentions in Architecture* with *Existence, Space and Architecture* (1971). He set out to extend the laws of Gestalt perceptual psychology, which he felt had only yielded abstract organizational principles, with an understanding of “existential space,” a term he used interchangeably with “place” and with *genius loci*. Although Norberg-Schulz had given some attention to *Being and Time*, Norberg-Schulz did not understand Heidegger’s early work to be a challenge to his own work. He continued to explain experience according to a Kantian model where chaotic exterior stimuli are synthesized and rendered meaningful in the mind. He still conceived Place as a structured and hierarchical environment suited for human perception of order.
It was only after his careful study of Heidegger’s post 1935 texts (in which Heidegger himself had turned from Husserl’s model of phenomenology as “rigorous science” to a hermeneutic ontology premised on the poetic disclosure of Being) that he would begin to describe place as a poetic call for authentic human work at the service of the Spirit’s self-realization.

In *Existence, Space and Architecture* Norberg-Schulz continued to discuss the relation between place and architecture in terms of cause and effect. Beginning with the concrete and messy world, he established a linear model of increasing order and abstraction achieved through experience: First, there is the world of objects, in which humans act. Second, humans experience that world immediately. Third, they make a “stable” mental image symbolizing their experience (this is the “existential space” or “place”). Fourth, they gain knowledge of the world by making logical relations between mental images. Fifth, (if they are good architects) they transform the world, in accordance to their mental image, into meaningful environments, thus returning to the first step.45

The system owed as much to Kant as to current behavioral science. Although Norberg-Schulz had studied the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he apparently did not accept Wittgenstein’s later recognition that language was not a simple naming and reference structure, but rather a complex game of interrelated human praxis, a “form of life,” or a non-linear but nonetheless recognizable *Gestalt*. In contrast to Wittgenstein, Norberg-Schulz presented *Gestalten* as fixed mental images or archetypes of existential spaces. *Existence, Space and Architecture* can be read as a catalogue of existential spaces (or archetypal places), drawn as diagrams which follow the work of Kevin Lynch on *The
Image of the City (1960) almost directly. The value of the catalogue being, according to Norberg-Schulz, that it would help architects quickly understand how to order environments meaningfully. The more ordered an environment, the greater the quality of its genius loci, and the easier it would be for people to make mental images, to understand the world, and to live meaningful lives. Norberg-Schulz was convinced from the start that the task of architects was to help bring meaning to the world by ordering it. This work also implied attentiveness to differences in landscape from region to region, and a strong respect for the archetypes of order existing in environments (urban or otherwise). Norberg-Schulz’s emphasis on difference and regional specificity foreshadowed the reception (and reification) of his theory of place in the 1980s as foundational to identity politics. “Indeed, the truly ‘great’ city is characterized by a particularly pronounced genius loci.”46

Existence, Space and Architecture concluded that the objective reality was symbolized in mental images, which Norberg-Schulz called existential spaces (or archetypal genius loci). The book remained very much within the Kantian epistemological framework of Intentions in Architecture, and treated Heidegger’s work as though it was part and parcel of the very metaphysical tradition Heidegger sought to debunk. For instance, Norberg-Schulz equated Dasein with place (or existential space), and considered Dasein to be a symbolization of Being-in-the-world just like place was a symbolization of objective reality.47

46 Ibid. p 27.
47 Ibid. p 27.
In 1971, then, Norberg-Schulz had yet to recognize in Heidegger a completely new framework for thinking about the relation of architecture to the “event of presencing” of Being’s truth. But after 1974, Norberg-Schulz began using the terms *Genius Loci* and *alétheic* image interchangeably to refer to an immediate self-disclosure of architecture’s Truth in visual experience. At the height of his career in the 1980s, he would assert the absolute foundational “grounding” power of this *alétheic* Image.

Although his notion of *alétheic* experience can be traced directly to his reading of Heidegger, his understanding of it as a strictly visual phenomenon cannot. Rather, we must look to the work of Kevin Lynch (1918-1984) on urban Images, and of Georgy Kepes on vision, both of whom were central for Norberg-Schulz’s conceptualization of formal order as an immediately graspable image. Norberg-Schulz’s reading of Heidegger must be understood as a re-articulation of Lynch’s and Kepes’s ideas in light of a new theory of experience. This, of course, runs against the grain of Norberg-Schulz’s own theory, which maintains the universal validity of the *alétheic* image’s Truth content. The *alétheic* Image tends to foil all attempts at contesting its claims to Truth with its own totalizing immediacy. To destabilize its self-referentiality one must trace its indebtedness to historical discourses outside of itself. These various historical projects and dialogues intersect in Norberg-Schulz’s intellectual career providing a broader map of how a brutal immediacy could erupt within the more recalcitrant reflexive forms Modernism, namely functionalism and rationalism.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology invited Norberg-Schulz to teach classes on the theory of *Genius Loci* and on Baroque architecture during 1973 and 1974. He accepted this appointment (one among dozens of similar invitations from prestigious
institutions around the globe) with the hope of working with Kevin Lynch and Georgy Kepes who were then teaching at MIT, and with Rudolph Arnheim at Harvard. Upon his arrival in Cambridge, Norberg-Schulz still considered place to be a mental symbolic image of the formal order of the environment explainable in terms of traditional metaphysics. In a letter to his wife Anna Maria de Domenicis dated February 17, 1974 he wrote:

The course on Renaissance and Baroque runs easily, but the Genius Loci needs much preparation and brings about long and difficult discussions. It is certainly inspiring and useful for me. […] Significantly, my courses are especially popular among the girls; women need meanings and metaphysics, and my little book is the only one today, in this field, which offers something. The teachers at MIT also have lots of duties with administration and tutorials, and are always running around. But I hope to get in touch with everybody, such as Kevin Lynch and others.
Through his contact with Lynch and Kepes, Norberg-Schulz re-worked his understanding of architectural form in terms of *gestalt* psychology, as well as his conception of style in terms of semantical relations. He borrowed their usage of the word "image" to describe the effortless apprehension (or readability) of complex formal relations. Norberg-Schulz believed that Lynch had identified a new perceptual phenomenon where form and style coincided. For Lynch, the image was the intersection in time of objective order, subjective identification of that order, and the projection of
meaning unto the world. It was a process that was always in the making. “Since image development is a two-way process between observer and observed,” stated Lynch, “it is possible to strengthen the image either by symbolic devices, by the retraining of the perceiver, or the reshaping one’s environment.” 48 At the city scale, this last task was the domain of architects and planners. Lynch encouraged these professionals to craft orderly environments, to help others identify them and give them meaning. Architects and planners were an important part in making the image of the city, but they by no means controlled it. Lynch therefore ascribed a great deal of importance to the participation of people in the active transformation of the environment. 49 People had to put their five senses to “work” to perceive order, and could of course be trained to improve their skills. 50 Lynch’s *The Image of the City* (1960) was extremely popular in the 1960s and 1970s because it addressed the deep felt postwar concern for the “loss” of order in the face of the rapidly changing morphology of urban environments, which Norberg-Schulz shared. Lynch laid the groundwork for retraining the visual skills of designers, and his methods were put to work across the nation to help students identify new order-patterns and positively transform their environment. 51

The visual properties that Norberg-Schulz believed would produce a coherent *genius loci* corresponded to those making up Lynch’s “image.” Norberg-Schulz in fact

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49 “Environmental images are the result of a two-way process between the observer and his environment. The environment suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer—with great adaptability and in the light of his own purposes—selects, organizes, and endows with meaning what he sees. The image so developed now limits and emphasizes what is seen, while the image itself is being tested against the filtered perceptual input in a constant interacting process.” See: Ibid. p 6.
50 “Environmental images are the result of a two-way process between the observer and his environment. The environment suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer—with great adaptability and in the light of his own purposes—selects, organizes, and endows with meaning what he sees. The image so developed now limits and emphasizes what is seen, while the image itself is being tested against the filtered perceptual input in a constant interacting process.” See Ibid., p 6.
used the two terms interchangeably, and described them in terms of Lynch’s lexicon of “paths, edges, landmarks, nodes, and regions.” Unlike Lynch however, Norberg-Schulz did not understand the *Genius Loci* as a changing entity that people could transform, but rather as a type of Wittgensteinian “essential formal logic” which conditioned all possible transformations of the city’s image in time. Norberg-Schulz derived the notion that this logic was a “primordial” visual language from Kepes.

Kepes shared Lynch’s conviction that the “ret raining the eye” was an imperative, and insisted that only through visuality could humanity hope to control the industrialized systems of production that, in his (widely shared) view, were turning urban cores into “nodes” within immense sprawling metropolises. Kepes made nothing but the grandest of statements about visuality. He proclaimed that there was a need to rein in technology from its out-of-control state and into a coherent “new vital-structure” connecting all fields of knowledge. The *lingua franca* of this communication would be vision, since it could allegedly transmit more knowledge, more immediately than any other vehicle. More importantly, argued Kepes, intellectuals and idiots alike, all over the world, could speak it. “Visual communication is universal and international: it knows no limits of tongue vocabulary, or grammar, and it can be perceived by the illiterate as well as the literate.”

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51 Ibid. p 12, and especially the section on Jersey City on pp 25-32.
Arguing that verbal language structured human consciousness, Kepes concluded that it was mandatory to teach people how to see the structural order behind contemporary art, if humanity was ever to enter a new era of existential awareness. To teach people to see was to help them regain control of their technologically altered environments. It was to help them achieve “the mastery of nature.” Norberg-Schulz, who was also deeply concerned with how to control nature without using technological means, drew heavily from Kepes. In particular, he borrowed his notion of vision as a life-
structure through which humans engaged the world without "using it," that is, without turning it into a product for consumption.

Contrary to Norberg-Schulz's objectives for teaching at MIT, the two years he spent there would actually distance him from Lynch and Kepes as he re-oriented his thinking towards Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology. Far from his family and regular academic responsibilities, Norberg-Schulz found himself spending long hours alone in his dormitory room, and took to reading a recent edition of Heidegger's late essays entitled *Poetry, Language, Thought* (English translation 1971). The book spoke to him on many of the issues he had considered crucial since his days at CIAM with Giedion, and around which his conversations with Lynch and Kepes had revolved. It spoke of the alienating effects of modern technology, of the need to find a new relationship between humans and world that would not be premised on productionist metaphysics, of the need to return to a primordial experience of the world, and of the promise that this new encounter of humans with the world would bring about a new epoch in history. Norberg-Schulz began to recognize that Lynch's and Kepes's (as well as his own) conception of image as mental symbolization of place dealt only with "mere appearances" in the manner of metaphysics, and that in Heidegger's meditations on the poetic was the key to the more fundamental structuring structure of the world: Being. But the turn towards Heidegger came with great difficulty.

53 The copy of Martin Heidegger's *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, (New York and London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971) in Norberg-Schulz's library is signed "Boston 1974." The book is marked cover to cover and includes a number of inset leaves of paper, each with a word that would later become standard to Norberg-Schulz's writings: "Things" (p 15, the title page of "The origin of the Work of Art"), "Temple" (p 41), "What is" (p 53), "Technne" and "Aletheia" (p 59), "Science, Truth" (p 63), "Poetry, art" (p 73), "Poetry, founding, truth" (p 75), "Gestell" (p 84), "Science, Technology, Things" (p 112), "Threat of Technology" (p 116), "We are the bees..." (p 130), "Money, Measuring etc." (p 135), "Earth and Sky" (p 149), " Dwelling" (p 151), "Gathering (bridge)" (p 152), "Space Boundary" (p 154-155), "Building
Fig: Norberg-Schulz's MIT "genius loci" Class notes with a diagram of Prague that follows Kevin Lynch's representational technique for illustrating the image of cities.

Techne" (p 159), "Thing (persons object)" (p 173), "Gathering" (p 174), "Nearness" (p 177), "Thing, gathering" (p 199), "Poetry" (p 224-225).

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Inspired by his reading, Norberg-Schulz drafted an outline for his MIT class on the “Spirit of Place” which he would later use as a guide for the chapter on Prague in Genius Loci. Apart from the obvious indebtedness of the diagram of Prague to Kevin Lynch, the document reveals another discursive filter through which Norberg-Schulz was reading Heidegger: Giedion’s notion of “continuity and change.” Since 1938, Giedion had been calling for a “new tradition” in architecture to be built out of “constituent facts,” which allegedly remained constant in history. These stable elements were the backbone for “transitory facts,” which appeared and disappeared as history moved on. Giedion was interested in the urge for “elemental expression” which, in his mind, had served as the origin of both contemporary and ancient art. The rising interest in embracing the
“whole of men’s psychical existence” was evidence of a return to the origins of art. In this movement back towards the primal Giedion saw the titillating promise of the future. “We are standing today,” he famously stated, “on the threshold of a new tradition.”

Norberg-Schulz’s first sustained reading of Heidegger occurred as he searched for a way to reach beyond transitory facts and to resolve the problem of change as set out by his mentor. In his preparatory class notes, he made clear that his research into the Spirit of Place was really a quest for the eternal and immutable:

The Problem of Change:
To keep the main place-defining elements, and not to give them undue competition (skyscrapers!)
To respect the general character:
That is: to interpret anew the articulation and rhythm of the historic buildings (which through centuries have belonged to the same family).
That is: to show the same conscious or unconscious concern as other historic periods.

In a telling entry on “Architecture” for the Encyclopedia of Communication from the early 1980s, Norberg-Schulz, borrowing heavily from Heidegger, described his new understanding of the image. It was no longer a symbol that needed to be produced through the labor of the mind. Image and symbol still corresponded to moments in an experiential/epistemological process, but now image referred to that which was

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56 At the time, the question of change had been at the center stage of architectural debates for over two decades. The exchanges between Reyner Banham and Ernesto N. Rogers in the late 1950s had turned on how to rethink the formal vocabulary of Modernism through history. By the late 1960s, Robert Venturi had given a specifically linguistic turn to the same problem with Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture (1966). The preoccupation with change also extended to the urban dimension, as concern about the dissolution of urban centers rose.
57 This one page document, dated February 18, 1974, was written in Cambridge, but is now included in Norberg-Schulz’s manuscript for Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture, (c.1978) after the chapter on Prague.
immediately given in aesthetic experience, and symbol to the result of conceptual work. Norberg-Schulz divided the history of communication in architecture between two contending experiences of reality: the pre-Socratic image and the platonic symbol. The pre-socratic image was, for Norberg-Schulz, the original function of architecture. The Image, as alétheic experience, revealed an immanently meaningful world immediately to us. Interpreting Heidegger, Norberg-Schulz considered Platonic philosophy to have to have reduced the image to a symbol (thereby implicitly criticizing his own earlier definition), and to have divided subject from object. Norberg-Schulz assigned foundational primacy to the alétheic Image (as truth), and relegated symbols to pure abstractions of the mind (which could nonetheless offer valuable historically contingent insights). 58

As Norberg-Schulz developed his theory of genius loci in terms of Lynch’s notion of image, he became convinced that every transitory fact in architecture was ultimately grounded in a primal visual language, which, as defined by Kepes, was a structure that remained constant in history. Giedion’s “constancy” found expression in Norberg-Schulz’s genius loci as a static entity. Unlike Lynch, who argued that people had to put all five senses to work in order to construct an image, and more like Kepes, Norberg-Schulz claimed that the environment’s alétheic image communicated primordial meanings to humans visually. Participation in the image of an environment was reduced to seeing it. In Norberg-Schulz’s theory, the image continued to be the intersection of order, identity, and meaning, but these categories now stood beyond the realms of subject and object, in the pre-subjective and pre-objective realm of alétheic experience. Norberg-

Schulz thus excluded human agency from the creation of new meaning and limited their participation to the visual “use” of those existing. Free from the continuously changing appearances of subjects and objects, the alethégic Image became reflexive, evidence of a truth that floated beyond but that was given as the rule and measure of “authentic” existence.

This explains much of the mystic tendencies associated with the followers of Norberg-Schulz. The more they sought Truth in their experience of the natural, the more nature appeared foreign and contaminated by their own presence. True nature receded before their eyes towards a mystical beyond.

Fig: Members of a commune at Findhorn, Scotland, celebrate the autumn equinox with sacred dances and group meditation. Clare Cooper Marcus, a phenomenological cultural geographer teaching in the Department of Architecture at the University of California, Berkeley, advocated these practices as forms of “communion” with nature through which people could “feel a sense of togetherness.” From Clare Cooper Marcus, “Designing for a Commitment to Place,” In Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology, ed. David Seamon, (Albany : State University of New York Press, c1993), p 317.

The ruse of Norberg-Schulz is that he put his own theory to practice in ways no one else would have dared to. The structure of his books, which he always insisted on
laying out, conflated the Alétheic Image with the photographic image. His pictures did not just stand-in for the experience of landscapes and buildings, they were the Truth "given" in those objects as immediate meaning. The conventional photo-as-illustration-of-text model was reversed, and the text stood as a mere "training" accessory to the photographs. Once the pupil could "see," when he or she could experience the Images authentically, the text (as well as any verbal explanation) became completely superfluous (or inauthentic). Even though the Image, as a disembodied a-priori essence, could by definition never be willed into presence, Norberg-Schulz insisted that with proper schooling architects could tease it out of the photographs. It was there titillating on the surface of the page.

Fig: Image pair of tree lined path in Reims, and of the gothic cathedral, also in Reims, used by Norberg-Schulz to illustrate that "all places have a common denominator" (p 61). From Christian Norberg-Schulz, Architettura: presenza, linguaggio e luogo [Architecture: Presence, Language and Place], (Skira: Milano, 1996), p 64.
Mark Jarzombek has noted the function of the illustration in academic books as an alternative epistemological domain that premised itself on the ability to purify and transform the social through proper education. 

Georgy Kepes' *The Language of Vision* (1944) helped perpetuate that tradition in architectural theory, and introduced Norberg-Schulz a long history of claims about the "authenticity" of the Image. Kepes made nothing but the grandest of statements about visuality. He proclaimed that there was a need to rein in technology from its out-of-control state and into a coherent "new vital-structure" connecting all fields of knowledge. The *lingua franca* of this communication would be vision, since it could transmit more knowledge, more immediately than any other vehicle. More importantly, argued Kepes, intellectuals and idiots alike, all over the world, could speak it. "Visual communication is universal and international: it knows no limits of tongue vocabulary, or grammar, and it can be perceived by the illiterate as well as the literate." Arguing that verbal language structured human consciousness, Kepes concluded that it was mandatory to teach people how to see the structural order behind contemporary art, if humanity was ever to enter a new era of existential awareness. To teach people to see was to help them regain control of their technologically altered environments. It was to help them achieve "the mastery of nature."

A closer look at how Norberg-Schulz selected the illustrations of his books can give us a better sense of what he saw in them. Norberg-Schulz drew diagrams in the margins of his manuscripts that he later used to select photographs. Here, his conception of the *αλήθεια* image in terms of a-temporal archetypes becomes clear, since any number

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of photographs could have been “applied” as illustrations of the diagram, and since, in fact, he sometimes replaced a single diagram in two or more different pictures from different periods and locations. In the manuscript for Genius Loci, for instance, Norberg-Schulz drew two simple diagrams on the margin of the page: a rectangular solid with a triangular extrusion on top, and a solid drum with a cone. These two diagrams were supposed to demonstrate that the meaning of “earth” and “sky” was “given” in nature as “ridge,” and that the architectural equivalent (or concretization) was the gable roof. In the published version, over thirty photographs of natural terrains and buildings replace these two diagrams. Predictably we first see conical and linear mountains, then conical and linear settlements, and finally conical and linear gabled roofs. In case the reader did not understand the idea by simply looking at the series of photographs, the captions condensed the lesson and provided a first level of support: “On the ground under the sky. Temple of Heaven pagoda, Pekin.” For the really deficient student, the text spells it out: “The spatial structures developed during the history of architecture are always in one way or the other based on centralization and longitudinality and their combinations.”

Norberg-Schulz’s treatment of visual language as ontological first principle was a creative interpretation of Heidegger’s reflections on language in light of Lynch, Kepes and others, who (in the context of Norberg-Schulz’s thinking) were in turn contaminated by Heidegger. Norberg-Schulz became convinced that Heidegger’s thinking addressed many of the problems he was confronted with. For instance, Heidegger was also

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61 Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture*, (New York: Rizzoli, 1980) p 65. Siegfried Giedion was also famous for his use of photographs as a narrative structure in which to develop the main themes of the book. It is possible that Norberg-Schulz learned the importance of the image in architectural printed discourse from him.

concerned with how to get beyond the technological domination of man, which he argued had begun in ancient Greece with the advent of Western metaphysics. Norberg-Schulz, therefore felt compelled to answer Heidegger’s call to move beyond metaphysics, and return to a pre-socratic “original” or \( \text{alétheic} \) experience of the world. Giedion’s “change” could be surmounted by this Heideggerian “reaching back” to the origins of artistic experience, to the constant or “primordial ground.” Heidegger’s \( \text{alétheia} \) also resolved Lynch’s and Kepes’s formulation of the image as a “mere appearance” which had to be “assigned” meaning by subjects. In \( \text{alétheic} \) experience primordial meaning was “given” immediately. This, for Norberg-Schulz, eliminated the “problem” of multiple interpretations from different subjects. Norberg-Schulz believed that the aesthetic experience of \( \text{alétheic} \) images gave human beings immediate access to Wittgenstein’s essential “logical form.” Therefore, he thought, \( \text{alétheic} \) experiences had to be at the root of any and all “authentic” or meaningful creative expressions.

B. Excursus: From Giedion to Heidegger

Given Norberg-Schulz’s reading of Heidegger as a solution to surmounting Giedion’s understanding of modernity’s problems, it is important to compare and contrast the views of both authors. This analysis can only be done with full awareness that the intellectual and disciplinary foundations supporting Heidegger’s and Giedion’s individual perspectives were different, if not contradictory. However, some of the superficial similarities were what allowed Norberg-Schulz’s turn from architectural “functionalism” to phenomenology. Norberg-Schulz’s own awareness of some of these root differences would eventually lead him to try to provide new phenomenological foundations to architectural practice in the late 1970s.
This analysis can only proceed with the utmost caution. Even though some parallels may be drawn between Giedion’s and Heidegger’s writings, they used radically different logics and methods to arrive at their conclusions. Moreover, Giedion never discussed Heidegger in detail, and it is doubtful that he was even familiar with the philosopher’s thinking. The reverse is equally true. It is unlikely that Heidegger ever read a book by Giedion. In fact, had he given any consideration to Giedion, Heidegger would probably have concluded that the architectural historian was prey to the very productionist and foundational metaphysics Heidegger was trying to overcome.

Giedion and Heidegger were contemporaries. Giedion was born in 1888, and Heidegger in 1889, and being Germano-Swiss and German respectively, their mature life was marked by a central European cultural moment that, from the mid 1930s to the late 1940s, looked upon its present as the dusk of a great era of Western history --a feeling best described in Oswald Spengler famous The Decline of the West (1918-22). More importantly, even though their thinking evolved independently of each other, it would eventually be linked in the work of Norberg-Schulz, who considered Giedion and Heidegger to be his most profound influences.

Giedion and Heidegger began thinking in the mid 1930s that humanity was at a crucial point in its history, and that a new era was immanent in the present. Heidegger was convinced that the period coming to an end was a time dominated by technology and by a reductive human understanding of both people and world as “raw material” to be used up in the self-enhancing system of production. In 1946, Heidegger wrote “Letter on Humanism” amidst a post-war climate that was seriously questioning the very meaning of enlightenment humanism in light of its moral and political implications. The root cause of
the war was metaphysics, which he defined as the progressive subjugation of humanity into “raw material.” He considered this view to be coincident with the Will to Power which drove technological humanity to surrender itself nihilistically to the advancement of technology in and for itself. Modern ethics were concerned with “values” which, continued Heidegger, were nothing but a system of “positions” created by subjects as a way to intensify the control of the Will to Power over all aspects of human existence. What humanity needed, he insisted, was not yet another ethical system, but the end of metaphysics all together. Instead of ethics, he proposed a new ethos, or a new way of “dwelling on earth” that would help delimit the new basis for human behavior. This new ethos could not be imposed upon humanity in top down fashion. Rather, according to Heidegger, it would be bestowed upon humanity as a gift, presumably through his own philosophy, which claimed to open and delimiting the possibility of the arrival of that gift.

Whereas Giedion believed that the present epoch begun in the late gothic, Heidegger located its beginnings in ancient Greece. For Heidegger, Greece’s “original” confrontation with the world had initiated the long history of Western Metaphysics, which had since dominated human understanding. Confronted with the “primal” chaotic flux of being, ancient Greeks had focused on the non-variant aspects in which entities present themselves. That is, explained Heidegger, they had delimited the terror of the “original” surge of being by focusing on the foundational aspects that made entities

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63 These two different points of origin to the crises of modernity make evident how each thinker was limited by his disciplinary and cultural historical reality. Because of his art historical background, and familiarity with the work of Panofsky, Giedion regarded the passing from Gothic scholasticism to the Renaissance as the foundation of the modern era. Heidegger on the other hand, leaned towards ancient Greece, which was regarded by his discipline as the birthplace of Western philosophy, and by Germans in general as the origin of their culture and historical Spirit.
appear as things. Because the ancient Greeks had initiated this foundationalist
metaphysics, Western man, as a result, was compelled to understand the being of entities
in cause-and-effect terms. The West was “stamped” by metaphysical fixation with one
particular mode in which being disclosed itself, that is, with “beingness.”

Heidegger considered that in the present historical era, governed by productionist
metaphysics, being disclosed itself as “beingness.” This amounted to saying that being
“gave” itself in such a way that it concealed itself. As proof of this, thought Heidegger,
one needed only to realize that, since its invention in Greek times, metaphysics had failed
to notice the “event of presencing” itself, which was, for Heidegger, the condition of
possibility for things to become manifest. Metaphysics had been oblivious to the
primordial ontological character of presencing as synchronic event with fluid “motion,”
which “hardens” itself diachronically into specific historical modes of “beingness.”

The history of being in Western history was characterized by being “giving itself” as
“beingness.” In Heidegger’s own words, “The history of Being begins, and indeed
necessarily, with the forgetting of Being.” Heidegger argued that metaphysicians had
given various names to this same mode of being as “beingness,” including eidos, ousia,
energeia, actualitas, actus purus, etc. The present state of “beingness” was also a
hardening of being which had devolved, according to Heidegger, into modern
technology. Now being hid ever more resiliently behind “beingness,” forcing humanity to
look upon everything as “raw material.”

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Heidegger felt that in the modern technological era “to be” had been reduced to “to be produced.” Therefore, much of his work was devoted to proving that something could “be” without being the product of a cause. For Heidegger “to be” meant “to be manifest” through the primordial “event of presencing.” The “event of presencing,” then, was the “original movement” which “joined” together “beingness” as a coherent mode of being in the modern world. As such, it was prior to the entities disclosed through it. We cannot physically perceive the original event, since what we perceive are the entities disclosed by it. However, the disclosure cannot happen without us, on the one hand, and the world on the other. We must be present as a “temporal clearing” or horizon for the presencing of entities, and so too must the “self-manifesting” (presencing) of entities. Humanity delimited the powerful presencing of entities. It could apprehend entities as entities by bringing their presencing to a stand. For Heidegger both clearing and presencing, were necessary for things “to be manifest.” In other words, the confrontation of human existence and the world of entities was needed to articulate the ways in which things displayed themselves in particular epochs. For Heidegger precisely because the “event of presencing” itself does not appear, it remains primordial to that which appears.

Giedion shared with Heidegger an intuition about the lack of foundations, or the primal fluidity, of world-historical human existence. He also attributed the “stamping” of that existence to the confrontation of humanity and world. However, Giedion refused to give up the centrality and controlling agency of the individual, speaking of the world as the “outside” of the subject. Heidegger would have looked upon this insistence on subject/object divisions as a blindness to the ways in which the world not only constitutes
humanity but also appropriates it and discloses itself through humanity.\textsuperscript{67} For Giedion, then, epochs were “stamped” when humanity’s inner and outer worlds reached equilibrium. However, Giedion asserted, because these two spheres moved in history as two parallel curves with different periods, as soon as they began moving in harmony, they came quickly out of phase. “As soon as inner and outer reality agree, corresponding developments occur in the psyche of man. There is never a standstill. All is in a state of flux.”\textsuperscript{68} Moreover, Giedion emphasized, no closed circles and no repetitive pattern exist [sic.] to define the adjustments of inner and outer reality. They evolve in curves, never repeating themselves.\textsuperscript{69} According to Giedion, what followed after each stamping of a new epoch was the progressive distancing of humanity and world.

\textit{Mechanization Takes Command} was Giedion’s argument about how technology had so completely changed the world that humanity could no longer make sense of it. The coming of the new era was not only immanent in the present but also necessary if humanity was to take control of technology. Where Heidegger argued the need to move beyond metaphysics to let a new era come about, Gideon waxed about the need to proceed by shedding old systems of thought and their outdated certainties. “Just as steel bridges are built, springing from the ground and with one end freely poised in mid-air, renewed intellectual conceptions will arise piece by piece without the scaffolding of


\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. p 720.
The new “man” would have to achieve total self control, and learn to reconcile opposing forces, to find a balance between individual and collective, expert knowledge and universal outlook, methods of feeling and systems of thinking, the human body and its organic or cosmic environment. In other words, humanity would have to learn to understand the world holistically.

Although both Heidegger and Giedion remained elusive about suggesting specific forms of political, social, and economic reform, each made statements about how humanity would (or should) relate to the world in the coming era. It is clear to any reader of Heidegger that he longed for a new society where “authentic” modes of working and producing would replace what he saw as the alienating bondage of modernity. His analysis of productionist metaphysics led him to believe that work and workers would only regain their integrity through a new mode of producing which would emphasize the relationship between art (especially poetry) and production. If the decline of the West began with Greek metaphysics, because, according to Heidegger, it made technology possible, then returning to Greek art and culture could not challenge modernity. What was needed instead was a confrontation with the same ontological “primal” out of which sprung Greek metaphysics. Heidegger felt that his philosophy was particularly fit for the task because it was rooted on lived experience (Erlebnis), and thus permitted the inquiry into the authentic origin (Ursprung) and beginning (Anfang) of things. This

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70 Ibid. p 719.

71 Zimmerman contends that Heidegger’s treatment of Greek metaphysics as an all-encompassing narrative betrays his indebtedness to a series of ongoing Germanic intellectual and popular traditions. For instance, Heidegger responded to Hegel’s and Marx’s deterministic view of history. Heidegger’s use of the etymology of language, and his self-depictions as the spiritual Führer of the National Socialist Democratic Worker’s Party are, for Zimmerman, directly linked to Fichte’s views of the superiority of the German race and language, and of Germany’s “fateful mission to preserve the highest ideals of humankind.” See Division 1 of Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990).
original form of experience, he argued, was opposed to, and continuously threatened by, the "inauthentic" objectifying experience (*Erfahrung*), which was foundational to rational-scientific understanding.  

Heidegger often conflated inauthenticity with "everydayness," or spoke of inauthenticity as an aggravated case of everyday falleness. Inauthenticity, for Heidegger was the tendency towards depersonalization that arose, from the ontological condition of human "falleness," or of being always already thrown into a particular social and historical context. Heidegger extended Hegel's and Marx's intuition that human existence is social to the point of arguing that the existence of the self cannot by constituted by isolated egos. Instead, it arises through a relational, contextual, holistic, participatory event. For Heidegger the self did not exist as an autonomous, isolated subject, but rather as a 'crossing point' in a network of historically unfolding cultural systems, such as language, into which 'any man' (*Das Man*) is thrown at birth. According to Heidegger, people readily accept social norms because they gain self-definition only in relation to this pre-existing social whole.  

Heidegger believed that the historical reality into which modern man had been thrown was a bad lot, because it put "man" in the contradictory position of having to define himself as an isolated singularity in order to be part of his world. People were  

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forced to attempt individuation within a cultural system where “everyone is the other, and no one is himself.” This made for an “inauthentic” contradictory relation in which the “truth” of man’s existence concealed itself. As humans became more and more isolated in their attempt to be a meaningful part of the social reality, the system became, for Heidegger, more and more entrenched. Unlike Hegel and Marx, Heidegger saw alienation as the result of Dasein’s ontological condition of “falleness,” not as the result of economic-material causes. This “falleness” was the condition of possibility for a world dominated by economic and material concerns.

Prior to the war, Heidegger was already convinced that his work amounted to the “saving light” that would help humanity rise from its “falleness” and transcend the horror of its technological subjugation. But Heidegger believed this “liberation” had to occur in a revolutionary fashion involving all of society. He was convinced that authentic individuation could occur only within the context of an entire generation willing to submit to its common destiny. This conviction led him to disastrous decisions, such as joining the Nazi party. Convinced that the present state of German culture was inevitably drifting towards the same “productionist” metaphysics, destructive urban-industrialism, and meaninglessness gripping the Soviet Union and the United States, Heidegger himself drifted from his original goal to describe the present philosophically “without prophets and Führer-illusions.” By 1929 Heidegger was clamoring for a new powerful leader to steer Germany away from total social chaos or total technological totalitarianism. In

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75 As quoted in Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art, p33. (see Heidegger’s Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung die phänomenologische Forschung (Winter Semester, 1921/22) ed. Walter Bröker-Oltmanns, in Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985)
1933, when he was elected Rektor of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger declared his allegiance to Hitler, understanding the aims of the Third Reich to be in accordance with his own goals to change the whole course of German and Western history. He firmly believed the Führer to be a statesman of sufficient vision to carry out politically what Heidegger himself hoped to carry out spiritually, namely, to protect the German worker from the evils of both capitalistic materialism, and communistic collectivism.

Giedion also spoke of a coming era in terms of “universality,” and “humanity.” But in comparison with Heidegger, Giedion’s future seems less ambitiously drafted, if for no other reason that he did not foresee a turning away from technology, but only its “adjustment” to the needs of man. For Giedion, technology did not necessarily camouflage being and reduce entities to “raw material.” This was only the case when technological processes were out of synch with the essence of humanity. Giedion believed that although historical world was always in flux, the physical and emotional “core of man” remained constant. If humanity could be brought back into harmony with its environment it could regain control of the world and of technology. Humanity needed to bring “feeling” back into the things it produced, and to do involved a series of clear steps that Giedion claimed to have derived from the study of history: “We must establish a new balance between the individual and the collective spheres. [...] We must establish a new balance between the psychic spheres within the individual. [...] We must establish a new balance between spheres of knowledge. [...] We must establish a new balance between the human body and cosmic forces.”76 Heidegger and Giedion believed the coming of the new epoch to be immanently readable in their present. Both men also

shared a perhaps disproportionate self-image of their own role in the making of the coming new era. They both often wrote in a messianic tone laden with the urgency and self-assurance of the prophet who has seen beyond the veils of the present and into the future.

It is important to stress that despite the originality of Heidegger’s and Giedion’s thinking, their meditations appeared within, and were circumscribed by, different disciplinary realities. Their attempts to lay claim to the future, to present themselves as the “guides” of an era to come, must be understood as individual efforts to establish their avant-gardism within their respective disciplines. Without conflating these different disciplinary realities, it is nonetheless true that after world war II both men inhabited a common Western European cultural sphere. The anxiety about the relation of humanism to the political and social forms present at the end of World War II extended across continental Europe. This feeling was compounded by the fact that, by the end of the war, Western European nations, having been weakened by war, now shared Germany’s 1930s apprehension of falling prey to capitalism or communism. In France, where phenomenology had developed into its a school in its own right, philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre took seriously to thinking the problem through, attempting, unlike Heidegger, to provide concrete political and ethical solutions. In 1951, the same year of his famous “Building Dwelling Thinking” address

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77 In an attempt to influence the ambiguous political climate lived in Europe between 1945 and 1949 towards a “non-communist” left, Merleau-Ponty published *Humanisme et Terreur, Essai sur le Problème Communiste* (1947). Like those members of the Resistance who had expected revolutionary change to happen immediately after the war, Merleau-Ponty hoped for an independent Europe. The plausibility of his position was being thwarted by the inexorable drift of the West towards becoming a satellite of the United States. The institution of the Marshall plan in June 1947 was openly criticized by the USSR, and caused Molotov’s walkout from the Paris conference in July. French left wing intellectuals, suspicious of America’s intentions, hoped for a neutralist position for Europe but found it difficult to rally behind either the Communist Party (which was expected to follow Soviet directives), or the Socialist Party (which
to architects at the Darmstadt Conversation, Heidegger proclaimed that the Second World War had changed nothing. The statement inflamed critics who felt that he had not repented his Nazi past. For Heidegger however, the issue was clear. Because the war had been won by the USA and the USSR, which he considered to be metaphysically equivalent, humanity was doomed to continue down the path of alienation and enslavement to the Will to Power. The coming of the new era of working and producing authentically would have to wait, though Heidegger, perhaps a few hundred years more.

The modern avant-garde’s aesthetic of ascension was common to both Heidegger’s and Giedion’s writings, who took it upon themselves to elevate society above the banality of bourgeois culture. This is aesthetic comparison is, admittedly, superficial. And yet, it was precisely on this level that Norberg-Schulz constructed his collusion of hermeneutic ontology and architectural history. The powerful appeal of his theory was that it sold the myth of modern avant-gardism to the disillusioned architects of

the 1970s, who had lost faith in the ability of architecture to effect progressive social change.

C. The Alétheic Image as the source of the “authentic” avant-garde.

If avant-gardism was concerned with advancing human knowledge, then every form of “true” avant-gardism was, for Norberg-Schulz, contingent on experiencing the alétheic image. Those architects like Archigram and Constant who did not create in accordance with its essential “logical form” would only produce nonsensical statements. For Norberg-Schulz, then, his own practice as a historian was avant-gardist in the “true” sense of the word, given that he claimed to be attuned to the “original” language of the natural terrain, that he could “feel” its essential “logical form” in his experiences of the alétheic image. If sufficient architects learned to “feel” the “authentic” meaning of reality, then they would collectively engender a new era free from the contradictions of modernity. The belief that a historical turning point was just around the corner was not the isolated fantasy of Norberg-Schulz. In fact, it was the currency of this desire both within CIAM architectural discourse, as well as within the work of Heidegger and Giedion, that made it easy for Norberg-Schulz to bring these two thinkers together, and that accounted for the positive popular reception of his work.

Norberg-Schulz’s suggestion that, in order to become leaders in society, architects had to rediscover a more “authentic” world through Heidegger must be read in light of previous attempts within CIAM to bring phenomenology to bear on Modernism. Ernesto Rogers, for instance, attempted to rethink the role of history in Modernism through Enzo Paci’s phenomenology. His suggestion that “tradition” was a material like any other to be used and transformed by architects, was an extremely popular approach which opened
the way for Norberg-Schulz’s attention to the vernacular, as well as for Critical Regionalism later in the 1980s. In addition to Rogers, Jose Luis Sert’s inaugural address at CIAM IIX invoked the work of José Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish phenomenologist, to suggest that a debased mass society needed to be stewarded by a “natural élite” of leaders such as CIAM towards a more authentic civic life. Ortega y Gasset’s ideas, as expressed in *The Revolt of the Masses* (1930), were popular among postwar European intellectuals who were trying to steer a middle course between American capitalism and Soviet communism. 79 It has been suggested that Ortega y Gasset’s “natural élites” were an ideological undercurrent in CIAM discourse. 80 Although this claim might be true, the impact of Ortega y Gasset was so sublimated as to remain unrecognizable beyond a few of Sert’s postwar essays. The same is not true of Heidegger who, after Norberg-Schulz’s introduction into architecture, remains a staple reference in architectural writings about place.

Norberg-Schulz’s embrace of Heidegger’s late thinking marks an important node of contact between the intellectual tradition of Modernist architecture and phenomenology. Through Norberg-Schulz, the post-war CIAM discourse about retuning to a loosely defined “humanism” was extended and re-articulated in terms of Heidegger as a concern for “place.” However, Norberg-Schulz’s intellectual sources were not limited to Heidegger, although phenomenology eventually concealed the importance of Wittgenstein, Lynch, and Kepes. In the shadow of Heidegger, these influences were so

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80 In *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960*, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), p 207, Eric Mumford, claims that “Ortega’s concept of natural élites clearly had parallels to the Corbusier’s view of CIAM as an élite that could bring about social change by guiding physical interventions “for the common good,” and it could provide a continuing justification for CIAM as the avant-garde of modern urbanism.”
transformed by their "exposure" to one another, that Norberg-Schulz's concept of *Genius Loci* as *alétheic* image can almost be considered "original." Nevertheless, Norberg-Schulz's avant-gardist self-projection could not free itself entirely from the trappings of historiography. The various interdisciplinary supports behind his construction of the emancipating power of *alétheic* images reveal the ideological nature of his claims to aesthetic purity.

Norberg-Schulz understood avant-gardism within a modernist framework not unlike that of Clement Greenberg. By turning inwards to find the common "formal logic" of architecture, landscapes, and thought, he thought that he was guaranteeing the aesthetic integrity of modernism, keeping it safely autonomous from the "debased" mass culture he identified modernity with. But, in subscribing to a singular definition of modernity, Norberg-Schulz deceived even himself. He believed the "purity" of the *Alétheic* Image to be outside of modernity's contradictions and deceptions, and safely began calling himself a "post-modernist." Like all modernists, he subscribed to the myth that his brand of avant-gardism emerged from an "original" source that was purely outside of bourgeois culture.

By the time Norberg-Schulz was writing his books about the "essential" experience of *Genius Loci*, architectural discourse on avant-gardism had radically changed. Architects across Europe and America were trying to resuscitate other 19th and early 20th century notions of avant-gardism as a practice that engaged critically with the forms of capitalist culture in an effort to be a part of a wider movement of progressive social and political change. In different ways, architects like Renzo Piano, Richard

See also Mumford's comments on Sert's use of Ortega y Gasset as a defense of Gideon's "New
Rogers, Frank Gehry, Rem Koolhaas, and the Archigram group eagerly put their practices at the service of political agendas in an attempt to influence people’s life. For Norberg-Schulz, their architecture was a “meaningless exercise” in the fullest sense of the expression. Given that their buildings did not resemble “reality” (read the *Genius Loci*) they could not say anything intelligible about it.

Thus, Norberg-Schulz assumed an anti-avant-garde position, holding fast to his belief that only architecture that emulated the *Genius Loci*, could give meaning to contemporary life. For him, the 1970s neo-avant-gardes were only extensions other “rootless” practices such as architectural functionalism. In his opinion, the fascination with technology was responsible for the destruction of architects’ ability to recognize the elemental order of particular places. Functionalist architecture, thought Norberg-Schulz, resulted in the erosion of environmental order, and therefore in the progressive alienation of people slowly deprived of architectural ways to identify with the world.

By accusing the neo-avant-garde of “alienating” society, Norberg-Schultz made architects responsible for a great deal of humanity’s problems, from urban violence to the erosion of morals. The upshot was that “rooted” architects could also “save” humanity by helping to bring order back into the world. The architect’s attentiveness to the environment was an index of his or her ethical responsibility to humanity. For Norberg-Schulz this attentiveness was to be a sort of talmudic exegesis, a careful formal interpretation of the environment’s primordial structure. A “gathering,” to use Norberg-Schulz’s terminology, of the *genius loci* that could help bring about a new more “authentic” era of humanity.

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Monumentality” and a new American urbanism (pp 131, 206)
For Norberg-Schulz, the authentic fulfillment of human life required proper individuation, that is, the achievement of individual identity. Humans achieved identity when they felt “at home,” when they recognized the fundamental order of their environment, and by extrapolation, of their world.

**D. The practice of anti-avant-gardism**

Norberg-Schulz offered a new doctrine of “visual work” to architectural pedagogy. By the 1980s, an architecture student’s ability to “see” was regarded in many European and American schools as more valuable than his or her ability to read. Through
vision the student “participated” in the meaning of building, by grasping its immediately meaningful “essence.” “The building is not a sign,” he stated categorically, “it does not portray anything, but rather brings a world into view. The phenomenological approach to architectural meaning therefore implies a return to the image, in the original sense of the word.”\(^81\) This pronouncement was aimed at contemporaneous conversations about the language and meaning of architecture, which Norberg-Schulz deemed to have inappropriately identified the symbol (i.e. transitory styles) as the locus of meaning, and failed to recognize that meaning was “given” as Image. Norberg-Schulz charged against Postmodern architects who copied the forms of the past.\(^82\)

Norberg-Schulz’s theory of meaning was contingent on the literal conflation of a series of terms: the *genius loci* with the experience of the *aétheic* Image; the *aétheic* image with the visual perception of order; and visual order with meaning. Norberg-Schulz demonstrates this in his books, where the photograph lays claim to the status of self-evident truth (or *aétheic* Image). The landscape was for him more orderly, visually speaking, than the modern metropolis, and therefore more meaningful. In addition, it was “there” before humanity and therefore its meaning was more “primal.” In the city, one found only second order “interpretations” of the original meanings “given” in nature. As the primordial source of meaning, the landscape was for Norberg-Schulz the place where humanity should continuously return in order to 1) infuse the production of new architecture with meaning, and 2) to help understand the memories of meanings preserved in old buildings.


With the formulation of the *alethéc* Image, also came an intensification of Noberg-Schulz’s despise for the modern city. It was a feeling shared by popular sentiment in Europe and the United States where city centers were rapidly decaying, and crime statistics were rising. Since his early days as a teacher of architectural form, Norberg-Schulz had been horrified by the “visual chaos” of the modern city. By the late 1970s, he associated urban visual chaos with the destruction the Image of the city, and thus to the loss of meaningful life. If architecture did not reach back to the primordial spring of meaning, then it would become mere production for its own sake, at the service of the ever-expanding system of technology and consumer culture.

Alienation is in our opinion first of all due to man’s loss of identification with the natural and man-made things which constitute his environment. This loss also hinders the process of gathering, and is therefore at the root of our actual ‘loss of place.’ Things have become mere objects of consumption which are thrown away after use, and nature in general is treated as a ‘resource.’ Only if man regains his ability of identification and gathering, we may stop this destructive development. 83

Until his later years, Norberg-Schulz remained optimistically convinced that through his teachings he could help architect “see” the meaningful Images of nature. Every semester, Norberg-Schulz held his first lecture on the architectural history survey course at the National Folk Museum in Oslo, before a collection of historical farmhouses. Students were asked to shed their “intellectual baggage” and experience the essential meaning of those buildings. When the farms were built, argued Norberg-Schulz, they had “set-to-work” the rural landscape and “gathered” its primordial meaning. In their original locations they had been part of a larger Image, or *genius loci*. Having now been transported into the city each hut preserved the original meanings as a symbol, whose

83 Ibid. p 168.
presence referred to the absent landscape and kept its *alétheic* image alive. For Norberg-Schulz, this “setting-to-work” was the only “authentic” architectural practice, a type of anti-avant-garde resistance to the debased and meaning-starved modern cosmopolitan culture.

In *Genius Loci*, Norberg-Schulz developed an awkward system in which meaning is treated as a natural resource that can be extracted through architectural work and literally transported to areas in need. According to Norberg-Schulz, the Image is not equally distributed across the world. Certain areas of the world possess more of it because their particular topographical morphology has a clearer visual structure. In these areas an Image forms itself, and “it brings about an ‘increase in meaning’; that is, opens up a world by combining various and scattered elements into a unitary vision.”

When architecture is “correctly” inserted in this “natural” environment, it increases the visual coherence of the existing Image and thus ‘adds’ to the meaningful ‘content’ of the world. Norberg-Schulz considered rural vernacular architecture to be the sort of “correct” adaptation of architecture within the landscape. Thus, in this system, rural architecture, like the honest peasant, performs the primordial labor of extracting meaning from “nature” by adding to the Image. Norberg-Schulz recognized that as soon as a building was built it became part of a cultural historical reality. Therefore, a dimension of the building would be transitory, stylistic, or *symbolic*. This symbolic dimension of architecture embodied the cultural “form of life” of a particular epoch but did not produce any meaning, it simply “used” or “preserved” the meaning given in the primordial Image. In this sense the symbol was not a sign with a mere indicative function. The symbol had

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presence, and thus referred to the absent Image. Norberg-Schulz regarded the symbol as the architectural mechanism through which culture collected or “gathered” and “contained” the meanings of the Image, and literally moved them to another location.

In the city, for example, multifarious meanings are brought together, meanings that originally were discovered in other places. Thus the Greeks brought the temple from its holy place in nature into the polis. With translocation the Image loses its original function and becomes a symbol or monumentum, something that reminds. The Greeks regarded the goddess Mnemosyne (memory) as the mother of the muses. Mnemosyne was herself the daughter of the earth and the sky, which suggests that the memories giving rise to art center on our understanding of their relationship. Architecture keeps and visualizes the most basic properties of earth and sky and therefore becomes the “mother of the arts.”

In reading Genius Loci it is impossible to miss Norberg-Schulz’s treatment of the rural as the sphere of authentic production of meaning, and of the urban as the sphere of inauthentic consumption of meaning. For Norberg-Schulz, meaning was “gathered” in nature as architecture “set-into-work” the landscape. Then, it was trans-located to the meaning-starved city through symbols. There, meaning was cheapened in urban exchanges and eventually devalued into a mere memory:

The meanings are inherent in the world, and are in each case to a high extent derived from the locality as a particular manifestation of ‘world.’ The meanings may however be used by the economic, social, political and cultural forces. This use consists in a selection among possible meanings. The selection therefore tells us about the actual conditions, but the meanings have deeper roots.

In order to fully account for Norberg-Schulz’s appropriation of Heidegger in his visual pedagogy, it is important to stress their shared abhorrence of the city, and their common belief that “authentic” work happened in the countryside. Both Heidegger and

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85 Ibid. p 13.
Norberg-Schulz were part of broader social and cultural reactionary movements challenged modern society and its technologies. Heidegger’s horizon was Nazism. For Norberg-Schulz it was a secularized form of spiritualism that sought meaning in ancient obscurantist practices. Both men were profoundly convinced that traditional rural life was a bastion of resistance to the alienation lived in modern urban centers. Against academic traditions, each sought to “ground” their professions in the country, not in the city. Heidegger believed that true philosophical thinking participated in rural life through “honest” work—although in his more fanatical moments as a Nazi, he claimed that mental work had to be accompanied by physical labor. Norberg-Schulz was certain that architects belonged in the country. Thus, he elevated visual competency to the level of

87 The mystical element in Norberg-Schulz’s theory of genius loci cannot be separated from his deep religiosity. Norberg-Schulz converted to Catholicism in the 1950s, and would attempt to leave Norway for to join a Catholic academic community in Texas on several occasions. Norberg-Schulz was profoundly displeased with the policies of the Norway’s 1970s socialist government, which he felt was destroying all forms of traditional life, and promoting the expansion of chaotic urban development. While Norberg-Schulz was finishing Genius Loci he became convinced that Norway was existentially bankrupt. In 1978 he resolved to leave the country for either England or the United States. In a letter to James Patrick, Academic Dean of the University of Dallas, dated Oslo, June 9, 1978. (Christian Norberg-Schulz archive, Oslo) who would eventually offer him a position that same year, Norberg-Schulz described the causes of his discontent and his hopes for a new life in America:

Our visit to Dallas really meant a turning point in our lives. We came to understand more clearly our spiritual, human and professional isolation in this “socialist” country where cultural values hardly count any more, and where we experience how the environment and the schools tend to break down what we try to implant in our children.

In another letter dated Oslo, February 6, 1978 (now located in the Christian Norberg-Schulz archive, Oslo), and addressed to Mrs. Gail Thomas, Director of the Center for Civic Leadership of The University of Dallas, Norberg-Schulz added:

It was interesting to see that it [The University of Dallas] is a Catholic institution. Being myself a Roman Catholic, I have always hoped to have the occasion to work with people that share my values. In Europe that is not easy today; as you will know we experience a general disintegration of all traditional forms of life.

Norberg-Schulz’s plans to leave Norway never materialized. By the late 1980s he felt totally isolated and bitter. In a letter to his wife dated February 16, 1988 (now located in the Christian Norberg-Schulz archive, Oslo) he bemoaned:

I really start to feel that I am entering a “late” phase in life, and ever more that “my world” belongs to the past. (This feeling is also strengthened by the current tendencies in architecture, which seem to contradict everything I have been doing.) Now everything explodes and becomes a completely empty game. We have also experienced this lately in school during a long and somewhat unpleasant discussion on “information technology,” that is, data, which now seems to be the only thing. It is even supported by [Sverre] Fehn, who proves to be a kind of utopian modernist).
physical labor, considering it as honorable as a peasant’s tilling of the land, and necessary for the productive earth.

Both Norberg-Schulz and Heidegger shared a deep affinity for the rural folk life of their countries, and considered it the “home” of their people’s Spirit. During their mature years, both spent long months living in traditional huts in rural areas. Heidegger spent his free time in his Todtnauberg hut, in Germany’s Black Forest, from the mid 1930s onward. From 1988 to 1993 Norberg-Schulz and his family rented a traditional Norwegian Farm, or “Stabbur” at Minnesjord where they would spend the summers. They received guests in folkloric dress and engaged in minor peasant work, such as cutting the grass by hand. It is very possible that Norberg-Schulz’s decision to live in the country was in part driven by the desire to live or be like Heidegger. He was a member of the Heidegger society and was aware of the importance Heidegger ascribed to life in the country.

Out of Martin Heidegger’s commentators Michael Zimmerman has provided the clearest analysis of how Heidegger’s own scorn for the city is related to both his philosophy and to his historical socio-political reality. Although Heidegger’s criticism of technology and modernity is not made explicit until the early thirties, Zimmerman argues that his contempt for contemporary culture is already apparent in the account of “everydayness” that he provides in *Being and Time* (1927). There, Heidegger presented human existence as the “horizon” or “clearing” in which the being of entities could make themselves manifest. His ultimate goal was to explain the relationship between temporality and the human understanding of the being of entities. To achieve this,
Heidegger begun by attempting to describe the “essential” aspects of human existence. “Everydayness” referred to what Heidegger considered to be the “essential” condition of Dasein’s “falleness,” that is, of being always already thrown into a social and historical reality with which Dasein must deal in the process of individuation. For Zimmerman, however, Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s everyday falleness was circumscribed by the horizon of Heidegger’s own political and social contemporary culture, and was therefore more a commentary on industrial-urban society than an “essential” aspect of human existence. To drive his point home, Zimmerman relates Heidegger’s own yearning to overcome his experience of isolation in industrial-urban society to the major themes of völkisch authors --for instance, Heidegger’s desire to help the German Volk spirit find a “home” for itself.

It was in the urban metropolis, and in the civic life it harbored, that, for Heidegger, the process of loss of familiarity and meaning in human existence was most intense. “Publicness” appears in Being and Time as particularly undesirable aspect of Dasein’s “everydayness,” and is often connected to Dasein’s mode of being in “civil society.” For Heidegger, such a society constitutes itself through “idle talk” (Gerede) a form of “groundless” language where nothing is understood in an “original” way, and where understanding is consequently uprooted.90 Germans living in big cities were therefore always “distracted” by an insatiable thirst for the “new,” searching aimlessly for new places, people and goods.90 According to Heidegger, public transportation, newspapers, and other big city experiences forced Dasein to have to seek its own identity

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and understanding of reality in forms established by the "dictatorship" of the anyone self (Das Man). The metropolis was a "groundless" world where everyone became the same, where every man was indistinguishable, where Dasein lost its originality and became enslaved as "raw material" to be used up by the self-advancement of productionist metaphysics.91

Heidegger did not provide evidence to support his claims about urban life. He expected other "great minds" to agree with his own readings of reality. Zimmerman notes, that Heidegger excluded direct references to the bourgeois reality surrounding him, and to which the connotations of his descriptions seem to point, in order to maintain his claim that he was speaking about "essential" aspects of existence. For Zimmerman, Heidegger's commentaries on Spengler, which he formulated during his Freiburg lectures of 1929-30, are the first instance where Heidegger openly expresses his spurn for the modern metropolis, and his understanding urbanity as evidence of a life in decline. It was in the city, he claimed, that the enslavement of man by scientific reason was most intense and apparent. For Heidegger, the "essential" contribution of Spengler was that he drew attention to "The decline of life in and through spirit [Geist]. What spirit, primarily as reason (ratio), has formed and created in technology, economics and world-commerce, in the whole formation of Dasein, symbolized by the great city -- that turns against the soul, against life and smothers it and compels culture to decline and collapse."92

During the years of the Third Reich Heidegger became increasingly explicit about defining "authentic" work in relation to rural peasant work, and in opposition to the kind

90 Ibid. p 216.
91 Ibid. p 164.
of work carried out in cities. This definition was suspiciously similar to Nazi propaganda, which emphatically called for the need to restore peasant values rooted in the land.

Zimmermann notes, however, that in a radio address delivered on March 7, 1934 from his mountain hut near Todtnauberg, Heidegger differentiated his own view of rootedness from that of “incompetent, city-dwelling Nazi ideologues” who apparently did nothing but undermine the scholarly teaching about Volk-character and folklore. The address, entitled “Why Do We Stay in the Provinces?” was meant as an explanation of Heidegger’s decision to turn down the chair of philosophy at Berlin for a second time. He argued that his thought belonged in the Black-Forest along with that of the peasants, not in some isolated study in a city. Heidegger argued that his thinking drew its force and foundations from that environment: “It is intimately rooted in and related to the life of the peasants.” This aversion towards the city became a constant in Heidegger’s thought. In 1961 he lectured at the seven hundredth anniversary of his hometown, Messkirch, claiming that only in a small town could the sense of “homeland” be preserved before the alienating erosion of the modern world.

During his years as Rektor of Freiburg University, Heidegger insisted that students learn the value of manual labor so as to avoid the “dangers” of elitist intellectualism. Heidegger thought that the Nazi revolution had helped build a bridge between mind and hand by putting an end to the exploitation of workers in the name of science—a dubious claim in light of the then rampant industrial militarization of the country. In the late 1930s, Heidegger thought, it was high time the university itself rejected the claim that only the mind was the source of real work. Hand labor would

provide students with “the basic experience of the hardness, nearness to the soil and tools, the lawfulness and strictness of the most simple bodily an thereby essential work in the group.”

Norberg-Schulz raised vision to a status equitable to Heidegger’s manual labor. If Norberg-Schulz’s αλεθικός image contained the primal meanings of the rural, vision was how architects “tilled” the image. Through vision, argued Norberg-Schulz, people could immediately physically “feel” the land and understand its primordial meaning. As with Heidegger’s manual labor, Norberg-Schulz’s visual labor was a skill that required grueling training, and painful bodily exertion to be put into practice. The reward was a meaningful life:

Creative participation means to concretize the basic meanings under ever new historical circumstances. Participation, however, can only be obtained “by great labor.” The “threshold” which is the symbol of participation, is in fact “turned to stone” by “pain.” Participation presupposes sympathy with things, to repeat the word of Goethe, and sympathy necessarily implies suffering. In our context sympathy with things means that we learn to see.

Norberg-Schulz assigned emancipating power to the immediate experiences allegedly achieved through skilled visual labor. He believed that through this aesthetic experientialism architects could not only “set-to-work” places and extract their primordial meanings, but also distribute them to needy places through architecture. Thus, they could constitute a powerful elite capable of moving humanity into a better, more structured and

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93 Zimmerman points out the similarity between Heidegger’s thinking about the mind-hand union, and the Nazi party line. In Mein Kampf, Hitler stated “The blacksmith stands again at his anvil, the farmer walks behind his plough, and the scholar sits in his study, all with the same effort and the same devotion to their duty.” Heidegger echoed these thoughts in saying that “the knowing of pure science is absolutely not distinguished from the knowing of the peasant, the lumberjack, the earth- and mine-worker, the hand-worker.” See Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) pp 69-70.
meaningful world. To become leaders, architects would require training in the skill of vision. Since his youth Norberg-Schulz associated seeing with proficiency in the “language of forms”: “The experience of architecture has to be based upon training [...] this demand has nothing unnatural to it. ‘To learn to see,’ therefore, aims at understanding a formal language.”

IV. Conclusion

The success of *Genius Loci* turned Norberg-Schulz into a global household name in architectural circles. He received letters from admirers and translators from every continent (except Africa) on a weekly basis. At a moment when the globalization of economic market forces was threatening to undercut small architectural firms, and to limit large commissions to equally large corporate international firms, Norberg-Schulz helped architects regain a sense of empowerment. His *alétheic* Image returned a sense of purpose to practicing architects everywhere. As the primal source of all existential meaning, the very authenticity of life rested upon it. Norberg-Schulz called upon architects to help bestow upon humanity the “gift” of that fundamental meaning upon a world that had been allegedly voided of it by technology. The claim that the *alétheic* Image was disclosed immediately through formal order, gave visually competent architects a key advantage in perceiving it and providing it. Thus, Norberg-Schulz helped universalize the CIAM dream of an elite class of Modern architects guiding society forward. Every architect could now be a leader in bringing about the new age of existential plenitude, if he or she first learned the visual language of truth as carefully laid

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out by Norberg-Schulz. The ontogenetic character of the alétheic Image required, in theory, a complete surrender of the architect to its will. The task of the architect was to help bring imperfect nature to the primordial status of the Image, to “set-to-work” places towards the telos of the genius loci.

It is no coincidence that Genius Loci became popular at the same time when a visible return to the religious dimension on a world scale. From New Age spiritualism, to religious fundamentalisms, to occultism, to various forms of religious “sensitivity” in scholarly thought, the early 1980s saw the emergence of “Faith” out of its more secularized sublimated forms. Slavoj Žižek has helped analyze how these contemporary mysticisms, although apparently at the service of a new respect for otherness, in fact helped perpetuate and intensify racism and violence by weakening the project of critical philosophy, upon which liberal democracy and its values are built.96 The career of Norberg-Schulz epitomizes, at level of the architectural discipline, Žižek’s larger cultural claim that the necessary obverse of a society that assumes it has achieved universalized reflexivity is the “impotence of interpretation.” The functionalist project to produce a completely rationalized environment could prosper only to the degree that it rested on a minimal pre-rational support which evaded its apprehension. CIAM’s universalization of functionalism therefore required sustaining (if not producing) its own inefficiency, a domain which could permanently elude it and thus perpetuate the need for its advancement. Norberg-Schulz pushed the functionalist project to the limit where the attempt to achieve total reflexivity in the understanding of form resulted in the paradoxical re-naturalization of form. There is, in other words, an irruption of the brute

Real within the project of reason before which reason itself must remain silent. Thus, the violent appearance of immediacy, of the *alétheic* Image, foils all critical interpretation.

The discourse on perception that Norberg-Schulz deployed to describe the immediate apprehension of the *alétheic* Image did not (and could not) provide evidence as to the Image's claim to Truth. Ultimately, the Image itself stood as its own evidence, grounding itself in its own immediacy. I have attempted to de-center the totalitarian tendencies of Norberg-Schulz's *alétheic* Image by presenting its indebtedness to historical realities outside of itself. The *alétheic* Image conjoined aspects of post-war CIAM discourse, such as the desire to rethink the functionalist formal language of Modernism in terms of nature and history, and to introduce a loosely defined humanism into practice that would encourage attentiveness to the emotional and psychological needs of humanity. No less important in granting credibility to the Image's Truth claims was Norberg-Schulz's late 1970s re-interpretation of the 1960s architectural search for formal order as Heidegger's post 1935 project to transcend Western metaphysics and bring about a new epoch of authentic human existence. The *alétheic* Image's claim to immediately given Truth solved the aporias of Postmodernism's historical quotationism by displacing the origin of form onto nature as the primal given. Part of the success of *Genius Loci* is that it gave continuity and temporary resolution to a series of historical architectural anxieties about its diminishing role in society. More problematically, because the brutal immediacy of the *alétheic* Image foiled all critical projects, it functioned as a place of exception where the Postmodern architect, tolerant to all forms and histories, could act out his or her repressed Modernist prejudice against the
“superficial” game he or she felt forced to “play” by the markets, by theorists, or, more generally by the project of reason.
CHAPTER 5
KENNETH FRAMPTON: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE TECTONIC AESTHETIC

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I. Introduction

After graduating from the Architectural Association in London in 1956, Kenneth Frampton (b. 1930) joined the British Army’s Royal Engineers, experiencing first hand the trauma of the United Kingdom’s retreat from empire. Bankrupt, without the military strength or political will, the British Labour government begun conceding to pressure from the colonies at the end of World War II. Frampton would mature politically as an architect and critic in the context of a wider restructuring of the Labour party. His Marxism, which he would trumpet throughout his career as the basis for his critique of modern architecture, must be read in the context this British political reform and its intersections with architectural culture. In the course of his life-long project – to initiate an architectural practice that could cure the crises of Modernity –, Frampton interpreted the core values of New Left politics and the British Arts and Crafts according his own ends only (as expressive of a building practice irrespective of intention, and as “grounded” or “authentic” culture), when they were none of these things. His reading bespeaks a modernist fantasy about a practice innocently detached from the contradictions of modernity and its multiple falsifications of self. Frampton thought to have found evidence of this fantasy in the “tectonic” aesthetic. However, by placing on

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1 On August 15 1947, Britain officially left India, arguably its most treasured colony. Burma and Ceylon, later to become Sri Lanka, followed in 1948. At almost the same time, the mandate in Trans-Jordan was terminated, and Egypt was evacuated (except the Suez Canal territory). British troops left Palestine in 1948, coinciding with the proclamation of the state of Israel. In 1956 their black African colonies gained independence. Other European empires also dismantled during and after the 1950s. In July 1954, France and the Viet Minh signed the fragile Geneva Accords partitioning Vietnam into a communist Democratic Republic to the North, and a Franco-American backed Associated State to the South. However, France would remain engaged in wars for national liberation in Vietnam, as well as in Morocco, Tunisia, and
the tectonic aesthetic the burden of a community free from the complexities of the modern Self, Frampton abandoned the politics he claimed to uphold, and laid bare the ideological nature of his thought. Frampton's dream of pure alterity to culture preceded his engagement with phenomenology in 1983, and determined the terms on which he would read Paul Ricoeur's existentialism, or so I will argue.

In 1956, the year Frampton received his architecture degree, Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev's (1894-1971) secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party exposed some of the Stalinist atrocities of Soviet life, and set off a profound ethical and political crisis for communist intellectuals. The address also included reflections on foreign policy, in which Khruschev expressed the importance of decolonization to the outcome of the Cold War. In Britain, Left wing intellectuals read the rise of post-colonial nations as part and parcel of the pluralisation of identities evident in their modern cities—a collusion that would determine Frampton's advocacy of urban "enclaves" of identity. The British New Left emerged in the late 1950s as a re-

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Algeria well into the 1960s, the decade when Belgium, Portugal and The Netherlands were all divested of their overseas possessions.

2 Many of the nations emerging in the wake of World War II became theaters of antagonistic Cold War politics, with the United States and the Soviet Union trying to shape the nature of new states under duress, either towards Western style democracies or towards Soviet or Maoist models of communism. Nikita Khruschev believed that the global range of the U.S.S.R.'s nuclear arsenal had made "peaceful coexistence" with the USA a reality. The future opportunities for Socialism, argued Khruschev, would derive from the struggles of colonial peoples. He therefore committed his administration to the support of wars of "national liberation" across the world. In his 1958 state of the Union address US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, responded to the Soviet threats with rhetoric that expanded the missile race to all aspects of cultural life: "Trade, economic development, military power, arts, science, education, the whole world of ideas—all are harnessed to this same chariot of expansion. The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war." By the time Frampton left the British Army's Royal Engineers in 1958, the United States Congress had passed the "National Defense Education Act," accelerating weapons programs, and deploying intermediate-range missiles in his native England (as well as in Italy, and Turkey). See "International Relations: Total Cold War and the diffusion of power, 1957-72" in Encyclopædia Britannica, (www.britannica.com, 2001), http://www.search.eb.com/bei/topic?eu=108378&sctn=2&pm=1.

orientation of Marxist politics, away from the party line of the USSR, and towards a
greater sensitivity for the diverse interests of local constituencies.

In the hands of one of the New Left’s most prominent member, the social
historian and political activist Edward P. Thompson (1924-1993), this attentiveness to the
local developed into a celebration of grassroots mobilization within civil society. In his
the prevailing Marxist analyses of economic forces as directly productive of historical
change, and of 19th century class consciousness as a correlative of industrial systems of
production. Thompson argued that Marxists had turned the working class into a static
object of study, and missed the particular interests, experiences, and agency of
individuals who struggled to create a collective identity for themselves. The popularity
of Thompson’s book initiated a wide scholarly interest in a new type of history narrated
“form below.”

British architectural audiences had been attuned to the relevance of Thompson’s
writing to architecture since the mid 1950s. Thompson’s first book, entitled *William
Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary* (1955) explored how Morris, a 19th-century socialist
and leader of the Arts and Crafts Movement, had been able to juxtapose a creative
practice with engagement in political reality. It was precisely the perceived loss of this
organic relation between aesthetic practices and political engagement that led mid-
century British critics like Reyner Banham to argue that the architectural avant-garde, as
defined by CIAM, was in crisis, and to strike against modern historicist revivals such as
those of Ernesto Rogers and the Italian Neo-Liberty. Young British architects like Alison
and Peter Smithson argued for a “participatory” architecture more attuned to people’s
desires and permissive of the common folk’s expressions of “spontaneous” creativity. As technical editor of Architectural Design between 1962 and 1965, Frampton not only became exposed to this discourse, but also played a crucial role in its dissemination. Attention to the “participation” of the user in shaping the building was of course not a British invention. The concept was often invoked by CIAM architects, like Arne Korsmo and Christian Norberg-Schulz. The key difference was that when the British New Left architects spoke of “participation” they meant, in most cases, the involvement of the disenfranchised working class in making the building, not that of the elite bourgeoisie. This attention to how the working class made itself and participated in the creation of its environment reflected the broad cultural influence of Thompson in leftist thought.

Frampton would later reiterate the importance that Thompson ascribed to William Morris and the Arts and Crafts movement. The first chapter of Frampton’s influential Modern Architecture: A Critical History (1980) opened with a quote by William Morris, and proceeded with a narrative that linked Augustus W. N. Pugin (1812-1852) and William Richard Lethaby (1857-1931) to the origin of the heroic functionalist period of the modern architectural avant-garde. Frampton’s narrative reflected an exceptionally British view of architectural history, which had been previously crafted by the likes of Nikolaus Pevsner, and which went explicitly against the more canonical modernist architectural history of authors such as Siegfried Giedion. Unlike Frampton, Giedion

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5 Sigfried Giedion’s Space, Time and Architecture (1941) can be taken as one such example of how the avant-garde was written into the canonical history of modern architecture. The book is all the more relevant here since Frampton’s attribution of a British origin to the historical avant-garde went explicitly against the grain of Giedion’s better judgment. Giedion had cautioned against considering William Morris to be the
situated the origin of the architectural avant-garde in continental European, and identified it with such figures as the Belgian Victor Horta (1896-1947), the Dutch Hendrik P. Berlage (1856-1934), and the Viennese Otto Wagner (1841-1918). Even the canon of art history held the origin of the avant-garde to be French, not British—the Realism of Gustave Courbet (1819-1877) being accepted as the beginning of an art produced with a consciousness for social emancipation.

Although Frampton’s history would appear to radically revise conventional wisdom, the identification of Lethaby with the origin of modern functionalism was in fact the norm in 1950s Britain. The greater part of the architectural profession in the United Kingdom wanted nothing to do with “European” functionalism, opting instead to defend their “Englishness” by continuing the tradition of the picturesque and Victorian or Georgian architecture. By the 1950s, however, the London County Council (LCC), the city’s influential municipal authority, had come to embrace the architectural aesthetics, although not the planning methods, of functionalism. Moreover, the LCC’s long history, dating back to its auspicious beginnings in 1889, was closely associated not just with Labour politics (given that Progressives dominated the agency until 1907), but also with the towering figure of Lethaby, who had served in the agency as Art Inspector and been

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Does this parallel mean that van de Velde simply followed the example Morris had already set? We do not think so. The parallel springs from the fact that the disorder introduced into human life by industry made itself felt in England more than thirty years earlier than on the Continent. Identical conditions led to identical reactions. See Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), p 293.

The question of Englishness was inescapable in architectural circles of the 1950s and 1960s. When American architectural historian Vincent Scully visited the United Kingdom to study some new buildings by James Stirling, Alison and Peter Smithson, and the London County Council, he felt compelled to open his review with the following remark: “Even worse, I was struck, like all foreign art historians from Focillon and Frey to Pevsner and Boney, by the Englishness of the whole business, a topic already well
responsible for drastic changes to art and architectural education during the 1890s. As
Labour lost its hold on the LCC, there was an increase in attacks from the right on the
municipal authority's leftist ideological underpinnings, as well as on the functionalist
aesthetics associated with them. For instance, H.S. Goodhart-Rendel, an architectural
historian who was at one time president of the Royal Institute of British Architects
(RIBA), attacked both Lethaby and functionalism in the same page of his book *English
Architecture Since the Regency* (1955):

Functionalism may be regarded as a close architectural analogue of
Puritanism, with its insistence upon moral values, its distaste for aesthetic
values, its righteous slow-wittedness, and its abhorrence of gaiety. Like
Puritanism it offered the consolations of assured virtue to those whom a
naughty world might otherwise abash [...] It was first preached in England
by Professor W.R. Lethaby many years ago, but enjoyed no vogue until it
was restated more recently by M. Le Corbusier, and by him put into
practice [...] Although the theory of Functionalism was Lethaby's and
therefore English, it nevertheless seemed for many years as though the
country of its origin was the only part of Europe in which it never was to
be put into practice. If in Lethaby's own strange buildings all was done
for convenience and nothing for looks, the convenience must have been
that of the builder rather than that of the occupier.7

To properly understand Frampton's later career as an architectural historian and
critic, it is important to emphasize how during his early training as an architect he
identified closely with the LCC. Between 1960 and 1965, Frampton worked as associate
in the London architectural firm Douglas Stephen and Partners. During those years,
Frampton designed a housing block in Bayswater, London, which he published in
*Architectural Design* in 1964.8 In the project notes, Frampton underscored his design's

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8 Kenneth Frampton, "Maisonettes in Bayswater, London, by Douglas Stephen and Partners, with Kenneth
34 (September 1964), pp 442-448.
abidance to the LCC guidelines for housing, and made special note of how the apartments followed the preferred LCC "scissors section" in their staircase layout. Frampton’s enthusiasm with the LCC even led him to design the cover for the September 1964 issue of Architectural Design based on an axonometric of the "scissors section."

Many of the positions and themes developed by Lethaby about architecture and architectural education in and around the LCC would serve as a platform from which Frampton would later develop of his tectonic aesthetic. For instance, Lethaby opposed the view that architecture was the vehicle for aesthetic self-expression. Rather, he argued that it should be concerned with service to all classes of men. He defined service as common productive labor, the opposite of divided industrialized work tasks. Like Ruskin and Morris, Lethaby asserted that the best way to think about labor was as if it were "art." In turn, he thought that the best art was "sound ordinary work" in the service of utility. As the product of the people, this art-work was not only socialist, but also the most
elemental form of culture. Lethaby’s definition of art as common culture would become the backbone of Frampton’s assertion that “authentic” architecture was “essential” culture in built form. For Frampton, the importance of architects like Mario Botta was that they restrained their personal creative whims in order to emphasize that “essential” culture—which Frampton variously identified with local building types and with the building craft of local workers. By keeping their nose close to this “primary” culture, thought Frampton, architects could “evade the false naturalness of bourgeois ideology” so despised by Marxists:

Architecture, where it is not rooted in the community and cultivated equally by both the profession and the people, has little chance of emerging as a general culture, and the conditions under which the art of building may attain this stature are subtle in the extreme.  

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9 In “Ruskin: Defeat and Victory,” originally published in *Highway* (March, 1917) Lethaby discussed his understanding of Ruskin’s contribution to architecture:

Instead of turning over one of a score of volumes to find points to comment on I will quickly put down what I find in my mind as the general impression of his [Ruskin’s] teaching:

1. Art is not a luxury, it is an essential element in all right work. ‘Industry without art is brutality; life without industry is guilt.’ True work is the highest mode of life.

2. Science is not properly an endless heaping up of ‘facts,’ regardless of form and direction; choice is involved; it should be wisdom and service.

3. Economics called political need not be identified with a theory of bank balances regardless of who holds the cheque books, and what the cheques are drawn for. A reasonable system of economics would be a doctrine of wise production and beneficent distribution. ‘There is no wealth but life.’ The ‘orthodox’ economist who had forgotten life, who never heard of quality in workmanship, and neglected even to foresee war, nearly burst themselves with rage at such simple utterances.

4. Education need not necessarily be conceived as an introduction to the competitive scramble, it might be a tempering of the human spirit.

5. An artist, poet, or musician is not properly an acrobat engaged in showing off, his proper office is to teach and inspire.

6. The land is not a mine for exploitation and a dumping heap for refuse, but it is our garden home.

7. Property must observe propriety.

8. Quality of life is the end of all rational activity.


11 Ibid. p 2.
Frampton’s Marxism was enmeshed from the start with a particularly British architectural discourse, which identified modern functionalism with progressive New Left politics, and which maintained that good design was closely associated with the working of tools and materials. To say that Frampton was firmly committed to Marxism is to say that he was also committed to the functionalist aesthetic associated with Labour
politics in the United Kingdom. As he developed his appreciation of this aesthetic over
the course of his career, he would never cease to associate it with a type of grass-roots
New Left politics, even though the architects, clients, financiers, and builders of the
buildings Frampton admired often wanted nothing to do with socialism.

During his years as technical editor of *Architectural Design*, Frampton established
personal contacts with a number of emerging American architects, most notably Peter
Eisenman, a recent graduate of Cornell University. At the time, both men felt they shared
a common understanding that architectural form preceded style, and that functionalism
thus implied research into the formal language of architecture. In 1964, Eisenman,
founded CASE (Conference of Architects for the Study of Environments), an association
that attempted to establish a rapport among young academics and established New York
policy makers, such as Jack Robertson, Rich Weinstein, and Geo Passineli, who were
part of Mayor Lindsey’s administration and were said to “run” Lower Manhattan.
Eisenman invited Frampton to participate in the group’s first meeting at Princeton
University along with Michael Graves, Robert Venturi, Donlyn Lyndon (Charles Moore’s
business partner), Stanford Anderson, and Henry Millon.

The conference would change Frampton’s life. He moved to the United States in
1965 to take a position as Hodder Fellow and visiting professor at Princeton University.
As a result of the lobbying efforts of the CASE members, an exhibition was held at the
“*The New City: Architecture and Urban Renewal,*” which marked the high water mark of

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the group. The disbandment of CASE after the exhibition did not prevent the members from maintaining a close social network. Eventually, some of them regrouped as IAU (Institute for Architecture and Urbanism) again under the leadership of Peter Eisenman. The debates that ensued there led Kenneth Frampton, Peter Eisenman, and Mario Gandelsonas to found the journal *Oppositions* in 1973.

![Fig: Kenneth Frampton. (Web Image)](image)

Frampton’s commitment to rethinking Modernist practice in terms of a Marxist responsibility towards culture, politics, and ethics, found its clearest expression in his important theory of Critical Regionalism, which eventually earned him a wide, and in many ways well deserved, international following. Critical Regionalism posited the singular importance of architecture in helping human beings establish a common essential culture and maintain wholesome communal lives. With the idea that architecture was particularly well suited to synthesizing “universal” industrial processes and “unique” building cultures, Frampton gave new momentum to the Modernist model of architects as leaders and stewards of society. The immense popularity of this proposition with architects of the 1980s propelled Frampton to a position of international distinction unmatched by any other Anglo-American theorist or historian of the late 20th
century. In turn, Frampton diligently used his access to scholarly journals and presses around the world to saturate architectural intellectual life with his singular point of view.

II. Frampton identifies the crisis of modernity with “instrumental reason”

A. Critical Regionalism opposes “instrumental reason”

Fig: Illustration of Ernesto Rogers’s and the BBPR’s Velasca tower in Milan on the cover of the proceedings from Critical Regionalism: The Pomona Meeting, ed. Spyros Amourgis, (Pomona: College of Environmental Design, California State Polytechnic University, 1991).
The *First International Seminar on Critical Regionalism*, held in 1989 at the California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, attested to Frampton’s success in disseminating his New Left inspired theory around the globe. Architects from various countries eagerly subscribed to it, like Ricardo Legorreta (Mexico), Glenn Murcutt (Australia), Erich Schneider-Wessling (Germany), Tadao Ando (Japan), Harry Wolf (USA), and many others. In his introduction to the proceedings, Spyros Amourgis, Professor of Architecture at the university hosting the event, unwittingly discussed Critical Regionalism in terms that echoed the teachings of E.P. Thompson. One of the points of departure for the conference, stated Amourgis, was to strive towards architectural practices that could help in “preserving grass-roots participation in the process.” Amourgis’s definition of Critical Regionalism accepted Frampton’s Lethabian identification of grass-roots work with elemental or “rooted” culture, as well as his German post-romantic differentiation between *Zivilization*, signifying materialism and superficiality, and the less brilliant but more profound *Kultur*. “By the opposition between Civilization and Culture,” stated Frampton, “I intend, after Paul Ricoeur in his essay ‘universal Civilization and National Culture,’ the resistance to locally grounded cultural form as opposed to the phenomenon of universal technology.”

I will return in brief to the symposium, and later to Frampton’s invocation of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur in his articulation of Critical Regionalism. But prior to discussing this intersection with phenomenology, I would like to point out the historicity of the oppositional equation “culture vs. civilization” that activates Frampton’s theory, as

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well as some of its problematic presuppositions, which precede his turn to philosophy. Although enormously popular among architects, Frampton’s Critical Regionalism was not without its critics in the academy. Alan Colquhoun (b. 1921), the British architect, critic, and Professor of Architectural History and Theory at Princeton University, objected (without naming names) to Frampton’s hypostatization of culture as essential origin. According to Colquhoun, the old German term *Zivilization* acquired the connotation of “technological society” during the late 19th century, in opposition to pre-industrial social values which became identified with *Kultur*. “But both in the earlier and the later senses, *Zivilization* represented rational and universal as against the instinctual, autochthonous, and particular.” Colquhoun found echoes of this opposition in the work of critics (i.e. Frampton) who read modernity as constituted in a split between the intellectual (understood as a collusion of the projects of reason and technology) and the emotional (believed to be the project of “intuitive” culture). For Colquhoun, the historical uses of the term “regionalism” exhibited an essentialist logic that attributed an elemental "core" to all cultures. According to this argument, Frampton’s assertion that culture was “there,” available to be discovered and put to good use in “resisting” civilization, appears as an ideological assertion.

In an obvious way, Frampton replaced the old dyad by substituting “critical” for *Zivilization* and “regional” for *Kultur*. The aim of Critical Regionalism was to seriously limit or even break up the perceived autonomy of *Zivilization*-related phenomena (such as reason, capitalism or even modernity) and to “reconnect” them with life and elemental

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culture. Frampton argued that these poles "should be seen not so much as categorical opposites between which we must chose, but rather as the points of dialectic interaction."^{16} But this scheme only seems simple. For what is civilization and what is culture? By merely setting up this opposition one seems to concede to civilization the autonomy that is in question, and to situate living culture at a point beyond reach. The project of civilization, which Frampton identifies with modernity itself, is doomed to failure from the start since, by definition, it cannot be a part of living culture—it is seen as always alien to people's "life." Frampton conceived of "life" paradoxically: it was at once distant and immediate. On the one hand, it was inaccessible to modern subjects who, in order to exist in contemporary society, had to invest themselves in multiple, overlapping and often contradictory identities. On the other hand, Frampton described life as immediately "there," waiting to rush in as soon as society adopted a common identity. In his own words:

\[...T\]he development of culture is by no means the simple consequence of acquiring power and accumulating capital. [...] Knowledge is critical and refinement essential, but these attributes are impotent without the passionate adoption of a common cultural cause, without the use of architecture as agent for both the realization and the representation of the society and its identity.\^{17}

In this sentence Frampton smuggled in his Lethabian socialism. Living culture was, for him, the construction of a "common culture" or identity through the erection of architecture. But why does Frampton assign such a prominent position to architecture in the realization of "common culture"? The answer is that he valued building because it inescapably involves collective work. For Frampton, as for Lethaby, life was service.

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understood as common productive labor. The great “invention” of the British tradition of socialist architects like Ruskin, Morris, Lethaby, and later Frampton, was to insist that labor be thought of as “art.” Their claim was that this made the drudgery of work bearable. To be precise about it, work became “slavery” for them when it was divided up into discrete procedures and regulated by industrial labor. Lethaby, for instance, felt that modern industry, by forcing everyone to work “the cranks and wheels” of machinery, had sucked the life and spirit out of “honest” work. The British Arts and Crafts movement sought to regain a sense of integrity for individual labor, but it succeeded only on the ideological plane, by projecting the aesthetic unity associated with finished works of architecture to the work of each person involved in the building’s production. The upshot was that architecture’s aesthetic unity could also be easily and ideologically construed as the wholesomeness of “communal labor.”

The sub-theme of so much of Frampton’s talk about “unity” was an anxiety about the alienating effects capitalism’s division of labor. Frampton’s critique of architecture was essentially Western Marxist. He was primarily concerned with how the supposedly “wholesome” communal work of making buildings was being replaced by standardized procedures of assembly: “Are we not again confronted,” he asked rhetorically, “with capitalism’s subtle appropriation of a cultural and technical capacity that legitimately belongs to the society as a whole?” Here again, Frampton painted a picture of an innocent, living Kultur being sapped of its lifeblood by Zivilization’s rapacious angel of

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17 Kenneth Frampton, “Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino,” in *Oppositions*, n. 14 (Fall 1978), p 2.
19 Kenneth Frampton, “Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino,” in *Oppositions*, n. 14 (Fall 1978), p 25.
death. Frampton wrote these comments in 1978, five years prior to his first mention of Paul Ricoeur in his article “Towards a Critical Regionalism.” (1983). It is therefore unlikely that Ricoeur was as foundational to Frampton’s theorization of culture in opposition to civilization as he would later claim. The English Arts and Crafts tradition, with its condemnation of technological society and its reverence for culture, is the more obvious underpinning of Frampton’s critique of modern architecture. Frampton turn to phenomenology came as an afterthought, as he searched for a cure to salvage the project of modernism from the implications of his own historical critique.

Coming back to the “Pomona Meeting” for the moment, I want to emphasize the aesthetic dimension of Frampton’s Marxist critique of architecture. The centerpiece of the symposium was an exhibition of the work of the Italian architects Antonio Banfi, Ludovico Belgiojoso, Enrico Peresutti, Ernesto Rogers and their BBPR group. Their famous Velasca Tower graced the cover of the proceedings. This celebration of the BBPR as a historical precursor to the work of the symposium’s participants was anathema to Frampton, who consistently omitted Neo-Liberty from his survey book Modern Architecture: A Critical History (1980), and from its subsequent editions (1985, 1992). Frampton’s attitude towards the BBPR set him against Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, the other keynote speakers at the conference, who regarded Ernesto Rogers as a pivotal figure in opening postwar Modern architecture to the importance of “regionalism.”

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In the shadow of this disagreement about the historical status of the BBPR was a contentious dispute between Frampton on the one side, and Tzonis and Lefaivre on the other, over the sense in which “Critical Regionalism” could become a theory of practice.21 Both camps shared the basic view that contemporary social life was technologically determined, and both criticized it for repressing other forms of communal identity construction. Both also agreed that buildings could be used as an effective tool to assert “other” types of identity formations. They differed, however, in their view of the architect’s role with regards to building. Tzonis and Lefaivre asserted the architect’s ability to break free from convention through critical reflection on the nature of forms. Put crudely, they believed that it was possible to think one’s way out of bourgeois banality by asking the right questions about the present conditions of life. Furthermore, and here is the crux of their discrepancy with Frampton, they upheld that ambitious architecture could change society: architects could help initiate other people in the intellectual exercise of questioning by producing unconventional buildings where people could experience “defamiliarized” spaces, which would (hopefully) encourage individuals to become more “self-aware” of the “superficiality” of their lives and surroundings.22 By espousing the notion that architecture could be an agent of revolutionary social change, Tzonis and Lefaivre continued the ideological tradition

21 Although Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre coined “Critical Regionalism” their conception of the term had been overshadowed by the success of Frampton’s adaptation. The symposium proceedings attempted in various ways to emphasize Tzonis’s and Lefaivre’s definition of Critical Regionalism over that of Frampton. Their contribution is published first, and Frampton’s fourth. The first sentence of Tzonis’s and Lefaivre’s essay makes reference to the fact that they introduced the term first in “The Grid and the Pathway,” in Architecture in Greece, n. 5, (1981), and that Frampton later “adopted” it. The presentation of the BBPR must also be read as an attempt to Tzonis’s and Lefaivre’s genealogy of Critical Regionalist architects (Ernesto Rogers, Alvar Aalto, William Wurster, Lewis Mumford, James Stirling, and so on) over that of Frampton (Joar; Antonio Coderech, Luis Barragan, Alvaro Siza, Gino Valle, Mario Botta, Tadao Ando, etc.).
running from the historical avant-garde to the many 1960s neo-avant-gardes. In their estimation, Regionalism had been the most successful among postwar neo-avant-garde technique for “defamiliarizing” modern architecture from its commercial, clichéd variants. Therein lay the singular importance of Ernesto Rogers, who, in their opinion, had spearheaded the regionalist protest against the “neoformalist and technocratic architecture of the International Style of the nineteen fifties”23 along with Team Ten.

Whereas Tzonis and Lefaivre defined the critical element in regionalism as the architect’s avant-gardiste effort to change culture and society, Frampton conceived the critical as a resistance to that type of change. For Frampton, architects could not intellectually will the change of cultural and social norms into being—this was, for him, a neo-avant-gardiste delusion. They could only help continue existing “authentic” cultures precisely by surrendering their intellectualist pretensions to local materials, traditions of craftsmanship, customary building types, and resulting aesthetic—which Frampton identified with “socialist” politics. “Where these cultural and political conditions are absent, the formulation of a creative cultural strategy becomes more difficult. The universal Megalopolis is patently antipathetic to a dense differentiation of culture.”24 To be clear, Frampton, in line with Tzonis and Lefaivre, also conceived of an organic bond between aesthetic practices and socio-cultural conditions, but he thought that union was broken the minute avant-garde architects tried to think themselves outside of their cultural and historical context. Frampton understood culture to be “intuitive,” not “rational,”

23 Ibid. p 18.
following the tradition of British architectural historians epitomized by Nikolaus Pevsner. The thinking, rational architect promoted by Tzonis and Lefaivre was, for Frampton, inconsistent with participation in the organic development of culture. Furthermore, Frampton believed that any attempt to make architecture into an intellectual project was detrimental to "rooted" culture:

The discovery of the Vitruvian text introduced the notion of architecture as a conceptual projection; a project which embodied both ideology and instrumentality as a composite civilizing force. [...] the Renaissance was the epoque in which an opposition between these modes [of architecture and building] first became evident, as one medieval city after another [...] began to radiate a rational world view alien to the city of Christendom. [...] From its initiation in the 15th century, classicism never ceased to project a unitary vision and method which sought to displace and eventually supersede the continuity of building as rooted culture and to establish in its stead the normative condition of a universal civilization.

This passage is from "Avant-Garde and Continuity" (1980), one of Frampton’s most important essays. In it, he noted his objections to Ernesto Rogers and rehearsed the theory that he would later call Critical Regionalism. Again, he returned to the old dyad of Zivilation and Kultur, this time depicted as an opposition between "autonomous" avant-gardiste aesthetics that fed on the division of lebor, and "rooted" building practices arising from "wholesome" communal work. The title of the essay echoed Clement Greenberg’s “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” (1939). Indeed, Frampton maintained Greenberg’s definition of avant-gardism as the practice of detaching aesthetics from political and social content, and of focusing inwardly on technique and formal


26 Ibid. pp 21.
relationships. But whereas Greenberg had advocated aesthetic autonomy as a way to keep advancing culture within a sphere free from the contradictions of political ideologies (he denounced Stalin's Soviet Realism and Fascistic “Imperial” styles), Frampton condemned aesthetic detachment, arguing that culture was not distinct from aesthetic, political or social categories.


The history of avant-gardism began, for Frampton, with Jean Nicolas Louis Durand, who codified Classical Architecture into a “combinatorial construction system” in Précis des leçons données à l'école polytechnique (1802-1805). In his view, Durand's code turned design into a formal game of substitution and combination that was segmented off from what was previously a locally integrated building practice. Frampton argued that this split from the “living culture” of building marked the origin of the disciplinary formations later know as the Avant-Gardes of the 20th century: modalities of
“cartesian” ideology and instrumentality, premised on the autonomy of forms from local values, and upholding the utopian promise of universal civilization. Frampton associated the more general “crisis of modernity” with this “affirmative” movement because, in his eyes, it had turned architectural form into a “game” of possible substitutions, and thus reduced its meaning to a pure matter of difference.

Fig: Illustration of a modern jail from A. W. N. Pugin's *Contrasts* (1841).


Luckily, intimated Frampton, a more authentic “critical practice” of building had lived on unscathed in England. Frampton drew the lineage of what we can here call an anti-avant-garde from the British architect Augustus Welby Northmore Pugin (1812-1852), to Lethaby, the Arts and Crafts, implicitly to himself, and later in his career to Critical Regionalism. Frampton regarded Pugin as a resistance hero in the pre-history of

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“the intrinsic opposition of rooted culture to the universal rationality of Classicism.”

His significance, according to Frampton, rested on the fact that he continued to think of architectural forms, moral values, and faith as interdependent. Thus Frampton saw Pugin as the “continuity” of an architectural practice that claimed to infuse matter with the inner, pre-conscious meanings of society, and that stood defiant against the rise of the Avant-Garde:

As far as he [Pugin] was concerned, the degeneracy of modern Catholicism was signaled by its equal indulgence in Classicism, utility, and industrialization. Durand’s detached manipulation of ‘empty’ classical elements in order to accommodate and represent the new institutions of the rationalized and universal state was countered by Pugin’s conviction that the authenticity of rooted culture could only be grounded in faith.

The manner in which Frampton pitted Durand against Pugin unveiled not just his disciplinary commitments to Lethaby and the Arts and Crafts Movement, but also a repressed map of his New Left politics. Beginning with Durand and Pugin, Frampton extended this history into the present in terms of an opposition between the state and “rooted culture,” of a conflict between reason and faith, and of a strict division between the ‘empty’ inauthenticity of surface and a ‘meaningful’ inner Truth of buildings, between two sorts of 20th century architects: those belonging to a “rootless” Avant-Garde, and those continuing to work within the limits of “rooted common sense.” While accepting the impossibility of a pure architecture of continuity, Frampton consistently vindicated work in which he could identify a dissymmetry in favor of a rooted faith in a hidden Truth (i.e. Louis I. Kahn, Mario Botta, et al).

29 Ibid. p 22.
Frampton’s identification of Durand’s 1804 treatise as initiating the history of “rootless” practices, was inspired by the conservative neo-Hegelian German Art historian Hans Sedlmayr, who also deemed that date to be the beginning of the West’s decline. In his famous Art in Crisis, The Lost Center [Verlust der Mitte—Die bildende Kunst des 19 und 20. Jahrhunderts als Symptom und Symbol der Zeit, 1948], Sedlemayr claimed that the French Revolution had de-humanized architecture through the “alien domination” of geometry, and eliminating all non-rational components such as myth from building. “The end of the architecture revolution,” Sedlmayr stated, “synchronizes with the end of the political one. Napoleon, who detested ideologues, was crowned in 1804.”30 In statements which bear an uncanny resemblance to those of Frampton, Sedlmayr denounced Avant-Garde architects for feeding the “abstraction-loving mind” with formalism, for “attacks on the tectonic” such as “cloaking” buildings with ornaments derived from a “fake vitalism,” and for denying “man’s earth bound state.”31 Sedlmayr, a staunch Catholic, identified the Avant-Garde with the sacrilegious attempt of humans stand in for God. He made their work responsible for the loss of faith and mythic meaning:

As the world becomes more and more objective and reduces all things to its own pedestrian level, so whatever was exalted in mythology is brought down to a petty scale, and is in the end demoted to the nursery; the myth lives on as a fairy tale pure and simple, the saga of heroes becomes a bedtime story—and the God-man becomes the ‘Christkind.’ 32

Sedlmayr understood pluralism in architecture as a loss of center resulting from the eclipse of the image of God from modern building. Without the guiding light of the Lord, styles succeeded one another in equally empty attempts to master raw materials. In

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31 Ibid. p 102-108.
32 Ibid. p 37.
the past, thought Sedlmayr, strong cultures had integrated building trades that had given cohesion and order to architectural form. By way of contrast, Modernity had splintered the unity of the arts within the architectural Gesamtkunstwerk (total work of art) and segmented architecture off as a purely functional problem. Only certain architects, such as Gottfried Semper had been able to cling on to some “sacramental pretensions” by insisting on craftsmanship as a synthesis of all the arts.33

Frampton shared this view of the ultimate futility of all styles, of architecture’s succumbing to instrumental reason, of the need for unity through culture-bound craftsmanship, and even of Semper as an example of “resistance.” Frampton’s depiction of Critical Regionalism as the only practice capable of reestablishing a form-inspiring order mystified Lethaby’s notion of culture (as the art of ordinary people) by drawing on Sedlmayr’s Catholic assumptions about the divine roots of formal order. Frampton agreed with Sedlmayr that “rooted culture,” as the unassailable dominion of inner collective values, faith and Spirit, was the only hope for a meaningful life. He used these two poles to sift the good from the bad. Establishing diffuse analogies between the “chaos” of contemporary life and buildings that appeared “chaotic,” Frampton judged those architects attempting to assert their individualism through flights of creative fancy, or those thinkers that insisted on the primacy of reason, to be privy to the “degeneracy” of modernity’s substitution of Truth for reason. Moreover, he suggested that these architects posed a greater threat to society than reason itself. The claims of reason were at least total, but architecture operated in more surreptitious and localized ways, thus posing

33 “Semper’s account of an antique temple reads like a description of some gorgeous building of the new era, for it is a cardinal characteristic of this last that it should show this fusion of all the arts, and that in particular the applied arts and the arts of the decorator, the handicraftsmen and even of the scene-painter and stage manager, should play an increasing part in the ultimate effect.” Ibid. p 40.
an even greater and darker danger. Thus, Frampton presented a long genealogy, stretching from Durand to Albert Speer and Archigram, which he charged with secretly driving the progressive alienation and "chaos" of the modern world. Their turn towards artistic individual expression was the true cause of the final "decline" of the West:

No account of recent developments in architecture can fail to mention the ambivalent role that the profession has played since the mid-1960s – ambivalent not only in the sense that while professing to act in the public interest it has sometimes assisted uncritically in furthering the domain of an optimized technology, but also in the sense that its more intelligent members have abandoned traditional practice, either to resort to direct social action or to indulge in the projection of architecture as a form of art. 34

As historian Beat Wyss has noted, Sedlmayr’s own attempts to demote nomadic culture in favor of traditional earth-bound ideals of construction were undergirded by a conception of culture as a vertical model of rule and obedience. 35 Sedlmayr equated the

35 In Hegel's Art History and The Critique of Modernity, trans. Caroline Dobson Saltzwedel, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999) Beat Wyss noted the Hegelian roots of Sedlmayr’s emphasis on the tectonic as a saving synthesis of art an culture, and of his demotion of the avant-garde for being whimsical and unethical. Hegel had criticized Romanticism for failing to suffuse form by content. Art had to find inspiration in its culture and times, so that all could understand it. When artists allowed themselves to indulge in subjective whims, they severed themselves from the common sense of society. Reason, for Hegel, was this unifying synthesis of individual artist and collectivity. Wyss claims that in the course of the 19th century, architects such as Carl Friedrich Schinkel developed the synthesizing nature of Hegelian Reason into a construction-oriented argument about architecture’s ability to hold together the arts and culture within the framework of the building: “Tectonic functionality and metaphysical meaning came together to form an original phenomenon—on this basis and on none other could German Idealism erect its museum.” (p 108) Wyss also identified these Hegelian dictums in the work of 20th century authors:

True art [for Hegel] strove for a synthesis of the particular and the general, such as the Greeks had uniquely achieved. The harmony of classical art thus remained paradigmatic. In modern art this wonderful balance had lost its equilibrium – a message that many of Hegel’s disciples passed on with singular success. They called it ‘the loss of center,’ ‘degenerate art’ or ‘bourgeois decadence’: what was always meant was this malady diagnosed by Hegel, that the artist had allowed his own ideas to grow beyond the measure of beauty. Only what appeared in the harmonious company of Reason deserved to be called beautiful. (p 87-88)

Wyss singled out Sedlmayr as an example of how the commitment to Absolute Reason could easily turn into an uncritical abidance to totalitarian politics, such as those of Nazism.
loss of a clear top and bottom in building to a loss of "obedience" to social laws as "given" by God in nature:

Sedlmayr's political credo coalesces with Nazi propaganda in that he simultaneously and in equal measure rejects both bourgeois liberalism and socialist collectivism. But he would ideally like to see a third way: an organic patriarchal state. This differs from the Third Reich in that dictatorship is here seen as being the will of God, something that Hitler never asserted. 36

Fig: Page from Frampton's "A Synoptic View of the Architecture of the Third Reich," In Oppositions, n. 12 (Spring 1978), p 66.

In writing about totalitarianism, Frampton depicted the political mechanisms typically associated with the violence of, say, fascism, as surface effects of a more profound mishandling of culture by architects. For instance, Frampton criticized the

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arbitrary use of symbols in Nazi architecture as a fake attempt to create culture. He found that Benno von Arendt’s use of hammer-shaped pylons for the entry hall of the German Labor Front Pavillion (Berlin, 1934) was an “arbitrary” invention of “symbolic codes” aimed at producing an “instant culture.” The ‘degenerate’ aspect of Nazi architecture was, therefore, that it passed empty symbolic play for true, “rooted,” non-discursive culture—the same crime perpetrated by Durand, and more recently by Postmodernist architects such as Venturi.

Frampton adopted many of the aesthetic biases Sedlmayr’s, such as the affinity towards an architecture expressive of “tectonic production.” “[…] In our evident need to determine the future of a sequestered culture,” stated Frampton, “the ‘how’ must surely be accorded a status of equal import [to the form]. There is, as Hans Sedlmayr has pointed out, and inescapable moment when place and production are fused together to yield that quality of character from which we eventually receive our sense of identity.”

37 To prove that fascist “instant culture” was in fact “rootless,” Frampton argued that Nazi symbols were part of a global economy of superficial deformations of a building’s structure. Arendt’s pylons, he wrote, derived from other rhetorical creations of totalitarian regimes: Adalberto Libera’s façade for the Italian Fascist Exhibition (Rome, 1932), and Konstantin Melnikov’s Bolshevik Dom Narkomtjazprom (1934-36). See Kenneth Frampton, “A Synoptic View of the Architecture of the Third Reich,” in Oppositions, n. 12 (Spring 1978) p 66.

38 “Venturi is determined to present Las Vegas as an authentic outburst of popular fantasy. But, as Maldonado has argued in his book La Speranza Progettuale (Design, Nature, and Revolution) of 1970, the reality would indicate the contrary, that Las Vegas is the pseudo-communicative culmination of ‘more than half a century of masked manipulatory violence directed towards the formation of an apparently free and playful urban environment in which men are completely devoid of innovative will’.” Kenneth Frampton, Modern Architecture: A Critical History, 3rd edition, (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 1992), p 291.

39 Kenneth Frampton, “Place, Production and Architecture: Towards a Critical Theory of Building,” in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 (1982) p 45. When Frampton revised the article in which these sentences were written for its inclusion in his best seller Modern Architecture: A Critical History (1980), he also enlarged the weave of Sedlmayr’s thinking in his arguments. Frampton’s attacks on the nomad culture of Archigram and on the geometric formalism of Eisenman (p 312) as “apocalyptic” and “quasi-Dada” followed directly from Sedlmayr, who had identified the Dadaists (and the Avant-Garde in general) as an inhuman degradation of rooted cultural values responsible for the West’s accelerating course towards the end of the world. In Art in Crisis, The Lost Center, (H. Regnery Co.: Chicago, 1958) p160, Sedlmayr wrote: ‘Surrealism,’ says Champignuelle, ‘corresponds to a condition of inner revolt, of doubt, of denial. Artists deny art and painters painting.’ One might add that architects also deny
What would otherwise be described as the affinity created by Bourgeois taste, was, for Frampton, the shared mythic roots of a common culture. Although Frampton demonized corporate and Fascist architecture for “distorting culture,” his thinking unreflexively advanced similar falsifications.

Frampton upheld the historical avant-garde’s participation in the Russian Revolution as evidence that avant-gardism could be organically tied to the furthering of “rooted culture.” And yet, in the final analysis, Frampton saw the historical avant-garde as a failure because it had not peacefully transformed existing social structures, but rather attempted to completely replace the old with the new. Between the lines of his derision for radical breaks one may read Frampton as a British exceptionalist with a preference for a type of “peaceful revolution” in the manner of Cromwell. Frampton viewed the history of the 20th century as the progressive degeneration of a well-intentioned avant-gardism into an obscene “Kitsch” which mindlessly imitated the aesthetic techniques of the historical avant-garde but was incapable of subscribing to any progressive social program. Yet, Frampton’s critique of the Neo-Avant-Gardes disguised the fact that it was a clichéd imitation of the countless 1970s diatribes against contemporary revivals of the techniques of the historical avant-garde, which followed Peter Bürger’s *Theorie der*
Avantgarde [Theory of the Avant-Garde, 1974. English translation 1984]. Hal Foster has pointed out how the critics who condemned the 1970s neo-avant-garde revivals for failing to be historically relevant were themselves speaking from a position that was outside of history. In light of Foster’s critique, Frampton’s writing appears blind to its own modernist pretensions to view history from a position of absolute objectivity. For Foster, this modernist theoretical model:

[...] pervades attitudes towards contemporary art and culture, where it first constructs the contemporary as posthistorical, a simulacral world of failed repetitions and pathetic pastiches, and then condemns it as such from a mythical point of critical escape beyond it all. Ultimately this point is posthistorical, and its perspective is most mythical where it purports to be most critical.41

For Frampton, architecture’s aesthetic detachment from culture originated in the separation of architects from “rooted building culture,” by way of their intellectual pretensions and fascination with the instrumentality of technology. According to his account, neo-avant-gardiste “rootless” autonomy from culture took two forms in the last quarter of the 20th century: formalism, and postmodernism. He pitted Swiss and Italian Neo-Rationalism against Postmodernism as two extremes defining the limits within which “critical architecture” was to work. Neo-Rationalism’s claim of autonomy, for Frampton, ran the risk of being “divorced from the reality of the life world,” and of degenerating into a formalist game emptied of cultural value.42 Postmodernism, on the other hand, was a false Realism which passed on the private fantasies of architects as a “reconciliatory historicism” comparable to Heimatstil. Both poles, for Frampton, allowed the subjective creative will of the architect to distort culture. There was a need.

argued Frampton, for an architecture that allowed local cultures to speak truthfully and for themselves. Critical Regionalism would become, for him, this hoped for architectural practice devoid of subjective intention. It was the architectural equivalent to E.P. Thomson's history "told from below."

Fig: Frampton used these illustrations under the title of "Tessenow and the Image of Helmat" to illustrate the pre-history of the Postmodern falsification of culture, which he deemed to be prevalent in Neo-Liberty. Page from Frampton's "A Synoptic View of the Architecture of the Third Reich," in Oppositions, n. 12 (Spring 1978), p 57.

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Frampton portrayed Neo-Liberty as an early formulation of Postmodernism, indicting Ernesto Rogers by association for falsifying culture. Frampton’s critique followed the by then canonical portrayal (established by critics from Reyner Banham to Manfredo Tafuri) of Neo-Liberty as a regressive populism that championed bourgeois taste. Although “Avant-Garde and Continuity” left the disciplinary status of Rogers intact (i.e. as a pseudo Nazi who had retreated from the freeing potential of “true” modernity), upon closer analysis Frampton’s charge against Neo-Liberty was inconsistent with his conclusion. After having chastised the neo-avant-garde for only partially engaging culture, Frampton went on to advance precisely what he had opposed: a “relative autonomy of architecture” that would balance formal self-sufficiency with cultural integration.

How was this possible? This contradiction in Frampton’s argumentation lays bare his inability to accept the implications of his own historical critique of the avant-garde: namely, that architectural practice, in its most advanced form, was unable to contribute to the development of “rooted culture.” The view that the neo-avant-garde was incapable of inhabiting the territory forsaken by the historical avant-garde had led 1970s critical historians such as Manfredo Tafuri to claim that it had become the task of the historian to replace the avant-garde, and to prepare the ground for the transformation of society. But Frampton could not openly accept this newfound importance of the historian, even as he took on the role of avant-garde designer through his writings. Frampton insisted on the primacy of practice as he envisioned it. Unable to live up to his critique of the partial (and

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therefore allegedly instrumental) cultural engagements of the neo-avant-garde, Frampton came to advocate them. To do so, Frampton upturned his German Romantic opposition of Zivilization and Kultur in an identity thesis, whereby both were now said to be contained in “type-form”:

Architectural autonomy indubitably means a rappel à l’ordre—that is to say, a return to normative rules and procedures which are close to the precepts of Western classicism. Such a return, however, does not necessarily imply a reduction to the extreme polarities of either pure art or instrumental reason. [...] Against this tendency of artistic autonomy to regress into hermeticism, the relative autonomy of architecture implies a re-dedication to the urban fragment [...] In this ‘space of public appearance’ (Arendt) the monument comes to signify not only continuity of the type form and the built fabric, but also the continuity of a culture; a culture which stands to be ‘rooted’ to the degree that it is attached to a specific and identifiable monument, set in a particular place.

In this passage, Frampton took on the role of the designer, proposing a particular built arrangement as a synthetic solution to the division between Kultur and Zivilization. In essence, he claimed that buildings built according to “type-forms” could help cure the various crises of modernity which he saw stemming from that division. Yet, it is important to recall that Frampton, first “constructed” that opposition in his critique, only to then declare to have resolved it. The triumphs Frampton assigned to Critical Regionalists fed on the clichéd critiques of modernity’s alleged failures which he uncritically perpetuated. It is not difficult to see how Frampton’s prescriptions for what can be described as an anti-avant-garde practice soon became a catch basin for all disillusionment with modernity.

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44 It is worth noting that Frampton’s notion of relative autonomy rehashed the core of Rogers’s thinking, even as Frampton condemned it, for Rogers premised “true cultural progress” on the evolving transformation of “regional” architecture through the mediation of advances in technology.
By 1983, Frampton had developed the principal theoretical lines of his “Avant-Garde and Continuity” article into the theory of Critical Regionalism. His 1989 address at the Pomona symposium reflected a number of revisions and clarifications that Frampton made to his thinking. Most significantly for our purposes, by the late 1980s, Frampton was consistently invoking Paul Ricoeur in relation to Critical Regionalism as a way of expanding the opposition between Zivilization and Kultur into a meta-discourse on the conflict between abstract Reason and concrete culture.

III. Frampton’s theory of “authentic” practice prescribes an aesthetic: to give outward expression to the building’s inward construction.

A. 1970s and 80s models of signification

The journal Oppositions, which Frampton co-founded with Mario Gandelsonas and Peter Eisenman in 1973, can be largely credited with the introduction of structuralism into architectural thinking. In many ways, it familiarized the United States with the notion, shocking to many, that architecture was not just a discipline but also a discourse. Oppositions was part of a larger restructuring of the discipline which also took place in Europe through other journals founded during the mid 1970s with similar critical aims, such as Arquitecturas Bis (Barcelona), Architese (Zurich), and Lotus (Milan). Structuralism rejected the historicist model for understanding how architecture (or any other cultural product, for that matter) generated meaning, which upheld that architecture was meaningful only in relation to certain trans-historical entities (such as the field of architecture itself). In more concrete terms, a historicist would have argued that a new building, say Le Corbusier’s church at Ronchamp, was meaningful because it developed
an existing traditional form, that of the "monument" for instance. Thus, Ronchamp
signified monument. Inversely, the life of that trans-historical form known as
"monument," was premised on its constant renewal by new particular buildings (like a
living organism whose life depended on the continuous regeneration of its cells). The
historicist model of signification was premised on the assumption that these trans-
historical forms were at once timeless and in constant flux. If one reads the Casabella
Continuitá editorials of Ernesto Rogers, where he defended Ronchamp as giving new life
to Tradition in modernism, it becomes quickly apparent that, like most of his generation,
he conceived of signification in historicist terms. Likewise, Frampton’s definition of
"making," as a historically constant yet ever changing "constructive poetic" that
generated meaning, relied on the methodological assumptions of historicism. Frampton’s
writings for Opposiciones introduced a type of historicism into the folds of the structuralist
project. His contribution blurred the reception of structuralism as a model of
signification, encouraging instead the understanding of "type-form" in historicist terms as
a changing continuity.

Structuralism’s model of signification, as it was developed in the semiology of
Roland Barthes and Ferdinand de Sassure, led to a re-evaluation of historicist claims
about Modernism. If in the historicist model meaning depended on the strict correlation
between (trans-historical) word and (contingent) object (in the language of Frampton
between logos and techne), structuralism questioned any permanent or "original"
connection between signifier and signified, arguing that the constitution of meaning in
language was a function of pure difference. In other words, the meaning of a word like

45 Peter Eisenman, Kenneth Frampton, Mario Gandelsonas, Anthony Vidler assessed the relation of
Oppositions to like minded European journals in their joint editorial "On Arquitecturas Bis," in
“church” was not dependent on the appearance of churches in the world. Instead, differentiation occurred within a “structure.” Indeed, the word “church” could be substituted by an almost infinite number of words that could refer to same object, i.e. basilica, cathedral, building, institution, edifice, etc. However, the selection of the word was not random. It responded to a series of assumptions associated with different vocabularies (of scale, of function, of constructive sophistication, etc.), so that the difference between two words responded in turn to the difference between the systems of assumptions they each were associated to. Therefore, structuralists argued that words were not uniquely tied to certain objects, but that they gained meaning as a result of a system of reference and difference.

The implications of Structuralism for the methodology of architectural history, as it was practiced in the 1970s, were enormous. The idea that meaning was the result of a series of possible substitutions allowed critics to ask questions about previous choices. Why, in the case of 1920s functionalism for instance, were certain architectural shapes associated with particular functions of use? The notions of stylistic coherence or formal consistency which had so preoccupied post-war critics such as Reyner Banham came loose, as did the entire history (and meaning) of modern architecture. The critical project

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Oppositions, n. 4 (October 1974), pp 158-159.

46 This issue was debated between Mario Gandelsonas and Peter Eisenman in 1976. Gandelsonas argued that a neo-functionalism had assumed the dialectical contradictions of 1920s functionalism in a progressive way, which emphasized the development of the symbolic dimension. According to Gandelsonas, this Neo-Functionalism mediated between neo-realist and neo-rationalism, the two contradictory “spinoffs” of functionalism which had foregrounded the importance of language and meaning in architecture. See Mario Gandelsonas, “Editorial: Neo-Functionalism,” in Oppositions, n. 5 (Summer 1976) pp 1-2. Peter Eisenman reacted to Gandelsonas arguing that “the form/function opposition was not necessarily inherent to any architectural theory.” Eisenman argued instead for a Post-Functionalism from the standpoint of Foucault’s view of modernity as a “new Episteme” which broke with the precepts of classical humanism. He claimed, polemically, that modernism had therefore not yet been elaborated in architecture, and that his post-functionalism was a “term of absence.” See Peter Eisenman, “Editorial: Post-Functionalism,” in Oppositions, n. 6 (Fall 1976), pp 1-3.
of *Oppositions* was in this sense cut out from the start: First, they would aim at coming to terms with the legacy of Modernism by exposing its myths and regressive tendencies, as well as its progressive components. Second, they would endeavor to make sense of contemporary production, exposing the assumptions about meaning and language that prevailed in the historicism of the Postmodern style.47

Contemporaneous with similar re-evaluations of Modernism being carried out in art and literature, *Oppositions* helped establish the value of criticism and discourse in architectural culture. Although Frampton was not swayed by Structuralism’s theory of meaning, he did partake in the general rewriting of the Modern movement’s history. As Structuralism’s emphasis on language became associated with Postmodernism’s re-introduction of historical forms into architecture, Frampton’s project turned to re-claiming Modernism for historicism, as an architecture where the aesthetics of “making,” not symbols, generated meaning.

Structuralism, as it was received in the United States, made the question of methodology into the keystone of criticality.48 Armed with a new awareness of method as a set of choices constituting the object of criticism, historians and critics began thinking about those choices as preceding and determining any consequent judgment about that object. This had two implications for the discipline of architecture. First, the

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47 These two directions can be already discerned in *Oppositions*’s founding mission statement. In their first editorial the editors situate the journal as a critical forum for the debate of ideas about the past and present of architecture. In addition they emphasized the notion of architecture as a discursive reality that overlapped and connected with other formal, socio-cultural, and political discourses. See Peter Eisenman, Kenneth Frampton, Mario Gandelsonas, “Editorial Statement,” in *Oppositions*, n. 1 (September 1973) unpaginated.

48 In many ways the American assimilation of structuralism simply as “method” turned it into a system for yielding “truth” that was often as positivistic as the historicism it replaced. Nonetheless, it opened the possibility of contestation in once hermetic academic circles. *Oppositions*’s emphasis on method was in a very real sense productive of a new kind of pedagogy reflected most strongly in new Ph.D. programs founded in the mid 1970s, where the only core curriculum class was usually “Methods.”
methodology of past (and present) historians and architects could be examined as a way of laying bare the set of assumptions and values that guided their work. This work resulted in valuable studies exposing the foundational myths of the discipline. It also helped draw attention to “minor” architects and styles that had been previously ignored. Hence, for instance, the renewed 1970s interest in the theretofore neglected Baroque. Second, it brought the burden of self-consciousness upon writers, who now had to consider how and why they were choosing a particular subject matter, and what kind of ideology they were perpetuating by doing so.

The upshot was that once writers made the case that “what” and “how” they studied expressed their commitments to the discipline, society, politics, etc. they were also able to lay claim to “engagement” in ways previously reserved for architects in practice. Thus, Frampton’s *Oppositions* essays on Modern masters (such as Le Corbusier, Kahn, and Alvar Aalto) are to be recognized as expressions of his own commitment to “resisting” Structuralism’s “play” in signification. For Frampton, the insistence of Postmodern architects like Robert Venturi on distinguishing surface from construction blocked the “almost seamless” connection of the “user” and the “collective unconscious” which Frampton believed to be preserved in the building’s structure. Frampton read Postmodernism’s deviance from an aesthetic of “making” as an “arbitrary” invention of “symbolic codes,” a charge he also brought against Nazi architecture. Only modernism’s more “restrained” surface treatments could come close to bridging between subject and object, and communicating the constant *logos* in

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49 Most notably, these studies tackled the myths of an enlightened Avant-Garde, of architecture’s ability to bring about utopias, of the relation of rationality to functionalism, and of the affirmation or negation of historical models in design.
buildings: their “making.” The importance Frampton gave to strict adherence of outer surface to inner logos was under-girded by contemporary theories of communication, such as those of Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas, which posited the need for all communication to strive towards Absolute communication. It is therefore necessary that we compare his thinking on non-verbal communication to that of his avowed influences.

B. Reading Arendt: Frampton identifies inward construction with the “people’s” silenced mythic culture

Frampton deployed the aesthetics of “making” as a precious form intersubjective, a-rational experience, which established a community of feeling subjects, linked by their shared sense of agreement about the “beauty” of this (and not that) particular building. Ideologically, this perpetuated the tradition of bourgeois thought whereby the fragmentation of social order was compensated with a sense of communal unity at the level of the aesthetic. As the British Marxist philosopher Terry Eagleton has noted, this construction of aesthetic experience, which has its pre-history in Kant, carried with it a theory of privacy and publicity, interiority and exteriority that was crucial in constructing the universal subjectivity which the ruling class required for its ideological solidarity:

At the level of theoretical discourse, we know one another only as objects; at the level of morality, we know and respect each other as autonomous subjects, but can have no concept of what this means, and a sensuous feeling for others is no essential element of such knowledge. In the sphere of aesthetic culture, however, we can experience our shared humanity with all the immediacy of our response to a fine painting or magnificent symphony. Paradoxically, it is in the apparently most private, frail and intangible aspects of our lives that we blend most harmoniously with one another. [...] If the aesthetic must bear the burden of human community,

then a political society, one might suspect, must leave a good deal to be desired.51

Frampton's attempt at constructing community through aesthetic experience explains his identification of buildings with society as a whole, as well as his careful construction of "making" (read Critical Regionalism, Critical Practice, or Tectonic) as that shared yet intimate aesthetic experience. Before we analyze the relation of what Frampton deemed to be the "correct" formal expression for the aesthetic of "making," let us look at how he came to hypostatize "interior" a-rational feeling over "exterior" rational discourse, and at the political implications of this model.

In "The Status of Man and the Status of his Objects: A Reading of The Human Condition" Frampton focused on the direct relationship that German philosopher Hannah Arendt established between individual alienation and the atrophy of what she called the "space of appearance."52 Frampton interpreted Arendt's term to have a type of architectural equivalent in the public square, or more precisely, in the medieval piazza. The political importance of the square was that its "public" nature was constructed and delimited by a "gathering" of "private" dwellings. Frampton termed this "community" of private buildings a "place." Following Arendt, Frampton portrayed the private house as the "essential 'darker' ground that not only nourished the public realm but also establishes its experiential depth."53 Inversely, he established the public realm as the "shallow" surface masking of the "profound" authenticity of private life experience.

52 The article appears reprinted in Kenneth Frampton, "The Status of Man and the Status of His Objects: A Reading of the Human Condition," in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 (1982) pp 6-19. Frampton states that the article was previously published in a critical anthology edited by Melvin Hill titled Hannah Arendt and the Life of the Mind. I have not been able to locate this original source in the United States, in either university libraries or the Library of Congress.
53 Ibid. p 8.
Frampton’s definition of “public” bundled a series of concepts together that give a political twist to his derision for both theory and architectural ornament (as in the hiding of a building’s structure with historical motifs). Indeed, the public sphere was where the
private realm acquired presence for others, but according to Frampton, only at the cost of inward profundity. Arendt’s definition of labor as processal and private, and work as (potentially) reifying and public found an echo in Frampton who also thought that the transition from private to public entailed the threat of alienation, or of a loss of meaning.

Frampton had cultivated this sense that “authentic” experience resided in intimate feelings since his early 1970s readings of Heidegger. In *Being and Time* Heidegger differentiated between language, as an authentic (and private) disclosure of Being, and “idle talk,” as an inauthentic (and public) “closing-off” of Being: “The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its becoming public; instead it encourages this. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own.” 54 This public kind of communication alienated humans from “genuine understanding,” which of course for Heidegger required a renewed experience of Being. Frampton’s anti-intellectualism, as manifested in his derision of theory (whose very nature was to be “public” in “publications”), expressed his anxiety at the covering up private “authentic” life behind the mask of public “idle talk,” to use Heidegger’s terminology.

Apart from his more philosophical sources, Frampton’s understanding of the public was also contingent on the architectural discipline itself, where an elaborate discourse about “inside” and “outside,” “structure” and “ornament” had been at work since the 19th century. More precisely, Frampton always returned to the writings of Gottfried Semper and Eugène-Emmanuel Violet-le-Duc in search of how a building’s internal structure can receive “authentic” outward expression. Frampton derived the
notion that social structure (and values) may be “deposited” in construction techniques from Semper, and he extracted the idea that a building’s structure may itself “contain” a spirit from Violet-le-Duc.

Frampton deployed these political, philosophical, and architectural sources in relation to an ongoing 1970s and 1980s cultural debates about the nature of public and private. In architectural circles, the discussion was centered on the effect of suburbanization in the disappearance of public space, the status of the monument as symbol of public values, and the function of ideology in the distortion of the meaning of public and private. In “On Reading Heidegger” (1974) Frampton lashed against the “abstract language” (read discourse) of the “apologists of sprawl.” In opposition to their theoretical “idle talk,” Frampton called for a return to the “concrete function” of communication which he felt was at root in the “making” of architecture. He argued that the use of words such as “space” violated architecture by abstracting it beyond the point where it could serve as a meaningful communicative link between nature (including human nature) and man. Instead, he called for a return to “concrete place.” He urged architects to “make” the public realm, not by appealing of an abstract sphere of communication, but rather by creating environments where individuals could “feel” united in common experiences.

C. Frampton Identifies type and craft with Inward construction

The emphasis in Frampton’s Critical Regionalism on craft and typology as determinants, not only of architecture, but also of all culture can be better understood in light of Ricoeur’s understanding of culture as the embodiment of the involuntary. In his

Philosophie de la volonté (1950), Ricoeur argued that the “broken” nature of our existence could be ascertained in the relations between the “voluntary” and “involuntary” parts of human nature. The former could be described through reasoned thought, but the latter comprised not just the subjective, but rather the entire lived body. In Ricoeur’s estimation, the body could not be explained away as an instrument of willed action. The voluntary aspect of action was enmeshed in involuntary aspects, such as instincts, emotions, and habits, which he termed the “performed know-how.” This led Ricoeur to contest the notion of freedom as “absolute creation,” defining it instead as dependent independence, or the conciliation of voluntary and involuntary dimensions.

Frampton extracted an architectural correlative to Ricoeur’s description of human nature: like humans, buildings were also “broken” between the voluntary and the involuntary. Frampton regarded craft and type as involuntary aspects of architecture that could not be explained away by theory or reason. In his mind, these co-existed in buildings with more “rational” or voluntary aspects. Thus, Frampton gave a quasi-existentialist turn to the post-war rethinking of Modernism, which had critiqued rationalism for reducing the unconscious and psychological aspects of human experience to mere function. The prefix “quasi” is used here with caution, since Frampton did indeed treat the individual existence of buildings as though they incarnated the collective existence of a society. In Frampton’s model, craft and type embodied the “collective” unconscious, which in his mind had also been overlooked by Modernism’s emphasis on absolute a-historical creation. Against this “utopianism” of reason, Frampton stressed craft and type as the mythic kernel of material culture.

Fig: Frampton used this image of a ritual bonfire in Japan in support of his claim that communal structures should embody collective cultural myths. From Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995). p 13.

Much like Ricoeur had thought in terms of individual freedom, Frampton understood Modern culture’s “dependent independence” on craft and type as the key to collective freedom. This had significant implications for his understanding of the relationship of theory and practice. Frampton refused Ricoeur’s emphasis that each generation re-interpret Myth through critical discourse as a means to keep it from being “perverted.” Demoting written or spoken public debates, Frampton regarded the “rational” building act as the only way to re-interpret the collective Myths of craft and type. This was the basis of what he termed dialectics. He thought that architecture’s involuntary myths would be brought to reason through “rational” construction techniques. Inversely, the Modern assemblage of buildings would be turned meaningful when limited to the craft and type-forms of the past.

Ricoeur would have deemed Frampton’s model for resolving the “broken” nature of human existence to be a “premature” claim to unity. Most significantly, he would have resisted the characterization of making as a synthesis of matter and thought because it would presume the displacement of theory and history from the domain of interpretation, and their reduction to silent witnesses of practice. In this sense, it can be said that Frampton eliminated criticality from the equation of architectural practice.

Ricoeur resisted both the identity and the complete separation of theory and practice. He skillfully argued the mutually constitutive status of the “contemplative” and the “active.” He identified the necessity for a “relative autonomy” of theory from praxis,

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56 “Myths are not unchanging and unchanged antiques which are simply delivered out of the past in some naked, original state. Their specific identity depends on the way in which each generation receives or interprets them according to their needs, conventions, and ideological motivations. Hence the necessity of critical discrimination between liberating and destructive modes of reinterpretation.” See Paul Ricoeur, “Myth as Bearer of Possible Worlds,” in *A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination*, ed. Mario J. Valdés, (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1991) p 486.
needed in order to maintain a degree of “openness” in both thought and action, without
which either would spiral into totalitarianism and violence. Without “relative
autonomy,” theory and praxis would be either identical, or completely different. In the
first case, Ricoeur argued, we would be powerless before the “fanatical” proclamation of
Truth—this then would have been his charge against Frampton, who by reducing theory
to practice left no room for contesting views. In the second, we would stand disarmed
before the “skepticism” which abolishes all Truth and proclaims the meaninglessness of
life. Ricoeur considered theory and practice to be “dialectically” related. Although he
cautions his readers from conflating the two, he often came close to doing it himself.

Consider the following passage:

I believe in the efficacy of reflection because I believe that man’s
greatness lies in the dialectic of work and the spoken word. Saying and
doing, signifying and making are intermingled to such an extent that it is
impossible to set up a lasting and deep opposition between ‘theoria’ and
‘praxis.’  

“Relative autonomy” meant, according to Ricoeur, that thinking and acting were
not the same, but that they were comparable existential structures, which could be related
as opposite poles of a dialectical equation. In his view, at the origin of both lied an
existential “affirmative” function, that of human life and its uniqueness. Here again,
Ricoeur’s existentialism showed through: In order to think one had to first overcome
contingency and radical nonsense in “hope” of finding meaning. That is, reflection for
Ricoeur was a movement beyond the very thing one hoped to understand, or an
“affirmation” of a “vเฮemence to exist.” Similarly, in order to act one had to first
overcome the imminence of death. Thus, action was also an “affirmation” of a “will to
live,” which trusted in a “hidden meaning” of life in the absence of any logical explanation or evidence of such meaning. 58

Whereas Ricoeur invoked “hope” to foil any premature synthesis of theory and practice, Frampton used the notion precisely to fuse the conceptual and the material in an ontologized act of making, which was to serve as the foundation stone for his “critical practice.” Frampton’s descriptions of “making” invested it with a hidden meaning which trusted in the identity of “craft” and “type” with a society’s “collective unconscious” despite the absence of all reasoned evidence. This led Frampton into a series of important contradictions, such as premising his advocacy of practice in the denouncement of the very discursive reality from which he derived his authority.

Ricoeur considered his description of the “primary affirmation” to be the central contribution of History and Truth, because it offered the possibility of being critical. 59 Without an awareness of it, one would have no way of relating thinking and doing without conflating them, and one would fall prey of totalitarianisms and violence. In arguing for a “relative autonomy” between theory and praxis Ricoeur was trying to address the problem of achieving “free” thoughts and actions. The paradox of freedom

58 Ibid. p 13-14.
59 As Herbert Spiegelberg has noted, “affirmation” was also what separated Ricoeur from Sartre’s philosophy of freedom as essentially negation. Consider the following passage from Ricoeur’s Philosophie de la volonté, as quoted by Spiegelberg:

“The philosophical faith which inspires us is the will to restore on a higher plane of lucidity and happiness that unity of being which negation has killed more radically than reflection. For us philosophy is the meditation on the “yes” and by no means the quarrelsome dwelling (renchérissement hargneux) on the “no.” Freedom does not want to be a leper but the very accomplishment of nature, as far as that is possible in this world. Where we pass through as wayfarers. This is why we meditate on the negation only with the ardent hope of going beyond it (surpasser).”

was that it had to resist any single “unity” while allowing for multiple (often contradictory) meanings. How then not to fall into utter relativism? The key for Ricoeur was to remain attentive to the presence of the “primary affirmation” in all thought and action so as to maintain openness without foregoing meaning. The way towards this freedom was to continuously move dialectically between reflection and action, a process he called “rational feeling,” without loosing sight of one’s existential “hope.”60 Thus, one could check one’s ideas against one’s actions, and one’s reflexive methodology against the political ethics of one’s actions.

Ricoeur wanted to combine clarity of understanding with the sense of mystery, as a way of suggesting that no understanding was ever “total,” and that no mystery was ever completely beyond exegesis. Phenomenology was for him “The crestline which divides romantic effusion and intellectualism without depth.”61 Here again, we must draw distinctions with one of the principal tenors in Frampton’s writing, where reasoned descriptions and deductions are cast into the world of occult meanings, but reasoned explanation is not sought. Thus Frampton tuned the myths allegedly perpetuated through “making” into realms completely impenetrable to reason and critical thought. Consider for instance the following passage in which Frampton described Carlo Scarpa’s process of achieving “truth through making”:

While Scarpa’s obsession with this motif [the double circle] has been attributed to many different sources, one of the more likely origins is the mystical ideogram known as vesica piscis (from vesica, bladder, and piscis, fish). While the interlocking version of this icon is reminiscent of the oriental ying-yang symbol, it also represents the oppositions between solar universality and lunar empiricism. Even if, as legend has it, Scarpa

first encountered this symbol on a packet of Chinese cigarettes, he would surely have become aware of its place in the European tradition and of its latent cosmological attributes.  


The illustrations accompanying this passage traced the “sacred” genealogy of Scarpa’s double circle. Frampton intimated that under these forms teetered a world of Myth that was preserved by them. The occultist *vesica piscis* embodied the union of the archetypal and the empirical realms into a “balancing consciousness.” Under this diagram Frampton placed the plans for Gianlorenzo Bernini’s Baroque church of Sant’Andrea al Quirinale, with the same double circle inscribed in them. Further down, a diagram indicating the “geometric progression” implied by the two circles, annotated with the mystifying relationships: “axis 1/axis 2: axis 2/axis 3: axis 3/ axis 4=1/√3: √3/3: 3/(3√3).”\(^63\) Lastly, in the caption for the bottom double diagram Frampton tells his readers that: “The circle and the square, in the art of self-division, give rise to the 3 ‘sacred’ proportional relationships of √2, √3, and √5.”\(^64\) Thus, the captions and illustrations framed the text in such a way as to encourage the reader to “believe” in the

\(^{63}\) Ibid. p 315.

\(^{64}\) Ibid. p 315.
persistence of Myth embodied in form. The reader was given a “feeling” of the deep meanings that lied beyond, but was never quite initiated into the secret rites of architecture. For Frampton, those rites remained always outside of discourse and reason, in the realm of an ontologized act of making.

D. Reading Habermas: Frampton Identifies the outward expression of buildings with the public sphere

Why, we might ask, did Frampton displace the possibility of collectivity to the level of aesthetic experience? Is it not rather in the sphere of politics that collectivity should be negotiated and resolved? Frampton regarded formal politics as function of instrumental reason and the State. His views of contemporary society were decisively bleak from the outset of his career. In his early 1970s reflections on Heidegger, Frampton was already arguing that the “unity” of man could not be regained through “abstract discourse,” and that only a return to a primordial experience of architecture’s “thingness” could help save society. 65

The primacy of practice over theory, and the suspension of reflexivity that it entailed, was Frampton’s prerequisite for experiencing of humanity as a unity. This was the “hope” that Frampton offered in the aesthetic of “making”: the meaningful experience of the synthesis of individual and collective, of particular and universal. Thus, Frampton delivered the synthesis that Ricoeur so vehemently postponed out of the conviction that to pronounce it before the Last Judgement could only do service to violence.

To follow Ricoeur’s reasoning, a theoretical pronouncement of the synthesis between “system” and “uniqueness” such as Frampton’s ultimately led to violence (read

64 Ibid. p 315.
revolutions) on the social and political spheres. And yet, in “Avant -Garde and Continuity,” Frampton had mounted his case against the avant-garde precisely in opposition to the ideological structuring of architectural practice around violent or radical breaks. Instead, Frampton advocated the “continuity” of peaceful revolutions in the British tradition, as did many mid-century New Left thinkers. In his article “On Reading Heidegger” (1974), Frampton tried to clarify how architecture could serve as a foil for the irruption of violence within society. Even though the article’s title referred to Heidegger, the body of the text dealt mainly with the work of Jürgen Habermas. In Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics (1971), Habermas argued that the strict separation of theory and practice could only lead to a loss of accountability and therefore to irrational violent conduct. Only a dialectical relation between theory and practice, he maintained, could result in a model for political decision making that would allow for accountability and for the setting of informed and rational goals for technological production. Although Frampton’s “On Reading Heidegger” claimed to follow Habermas’s model, the article in fact remained within the “pragmatic model” that Habermas wished to transcend. For Habermas, the dialectics of theory and practice followed immanently from the confrontation of “technical knowledge and capacity” with “tradition-bound self-understanding,” as society strove for ideal conditions of general communication, free from domination, for the entire public.66 Frampton, on the other hand, insisted that “place-form,” as the physical and immediate manifestation of the experience of “common sense”, mediated between theory and practice at the level of pre-understanding. Frampton believed that as humans interacted with each other in “place-

forms,” their decisions would immediately follow historically determined pre-understanding, governed by social norms, of what was practically necessary. For Frampton, Habermas’s “public sphere” was constituted in “place” because place was, he argued, the physical embodiment of socius. Thus, Frampton ignored Habermas’s principal argument, which stated precisely, that the structural transformation of bourgeois public sphere made the presupposition that mediation would happen at the level of pre-understanding untenable.

The political ideology making up Frampton’s concept of the “public” now appears clearer. It would be a real physical “place,” the surfaces of which would express the interiority of the structure through an aesthetic of “making.” Those select few, capable of recognizing, in the most private and intimate depths of their experience, the beauty of these surfaces, would constitute a community. Their common private experiences would attest to their shared moral values. This “common sense” would serve as a foil for the advances of “other” values. When Frampton equated “house-building” to a Heideggerian “rooting,” a “clearing the ground” to make a “place of dwelling,” he was suggesting a politics of belonging based on this aesthetic experientialism. Frampton sought to resolve the problem of the “broken” nature of subjectivity by repressing the

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67 Therefore, concluded Frampton, the test of validity for design goals was their capacity to positively affect “place.” Only in this way would society be capable of guiding technological production towards the creation of “receptive places”. Ultimately, Frampton wanted to achieve a “homeostatic plateau” between place, production, and nature. In effect, Frampton longed for a synthesis which was not reconcilable with the dynamism inherent in dialectics. See Kenneth Frampton, “On Reading Heidegger,” in Oppositions, n. 4 (October 1974), unpaginated.
issue of individual communication in the public sphere, and replacing it with a
“communal feeling” in the pre-conscious private sphere. More problematic than the
impoverished nature of the resulting subject, is totalitarian nature of this model, where
one’s ability to be a part of society depends on one’s compliance to an established norm,
which is itself beyond the limits of reasoned criticism. “In the last analysis,” concluded
Frampton, “everything turns as much on exactly how something is realized as on an overt
manifestation of its form.”70 His conception of signification as immediately given at the
pre-reflexive level of experience contrasted with the reception of Arendt’s work by his
contemporary structuralist architectural historians such as George Baird.71

IV. Frampton formulates the Tectonic aesthetic as a “cure” to modernity

A. Frampton believes the Tectonic Aesthetic precedes discourse.

The consistency with which the intellectual history of modernism was mishandled
by Frampton is perhaps less surprising in light of his avowed derision for discourse in
general, a position which became increasingly explicit in the latter part of his career. In
his immensely popular 1995 treatise Studies in Tectonic Culture, Frampton attempted to

70 Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth
71 George Baird, a contemporary of Frampton, was also deeply influenced by Hanna Arendt, and was
deply critical of the post-structuralism of the early 1990s. However, he cautioned against the architectural
fetishization of Arendt’s emphasis on the “things of the world,” which he saw at work both in
“contemporary phenomenologies” and deconstruction. Consider the following passage by Baird on the
status of both object and subject in modernity, which can be read as a criticism of the unmediated
“phenomenological” fetishization of both categories at work in Frampton’s “The Status of Man and the
Status of His Objects: A Reading of the Human Condition”:
“If her conclusion has been a sound one, our acutely ambiguous current attitude to the
“object” in the modern world might well benefit from a careful reconsideration of it. This
would point to the possibility of our once again assuming a stance vis-à-vis the “things of
the world” that would acknowledge their “brittle” status (to use Adorno’s word), but
would not go so far as to fetishize them. Should we assume such a reconsidered stance,
the it will also follow that contemporary phenomenologies that seek to underscore the
liberatory potential of “subjectivity,” and the architectural praxes that follow them, will
need to make their case with caution.”
formulate the autonomy of architecture from discourse and especially from “other,” presumably non-architectural, legitimizing discourses (a goal that was contradicted by his own arguments’s reliance on abstract concepts derived from the history of architecture and modern philosophy). He defined the tectonic as a “poetics of construction,” which by virtue of its “artistic dimension” was neither figurative nor abstract. Rather, the tectonic was the “thingness” of construction, the “concrete” and “real” that would suffer the post-facto “abstraction” of mediation.

In this sense, Tectonics revived Critical Regionalism under a different name: it continued to hypostatize the “making” of “real things” according to traditions of local craft. Undergirding Tectonics, once more, was the notion of a “critical practice” promulgating a Heideggerian “return to things” where “primordial” encounters with “thingness” allegedly disclosed non-discursive, non-intellectualized knowledge. According to Frampton, the tectonic was the fusion of knowing and making, social interaction and construction, concept and material, body and world.

With this aesthetic of tectonics, Frampton attempted to depict the intellectual validation of discourse as a second order mental analysis—the pale reflection of a more “foundational” existential knowledge, which was stable, “rooted,” and not affected by “superficial” afterthoughts. This of course ran counter to the work of Tafuri, whose descriptions of the dialectical relationship of ideology and practice, had been enormously influential in Western academic thought during the 1970s and 1980s, and had inspired a wealth of new studies in the early 1990s relating the discourse of architects to the

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structural changes in the capitalist modes of production. The anti-discursive position evident in Studies in Tectonic Culture was a frontal attack on the now mature baby-boomer group of scholars (including Beatriz Colomina, Mark Wigley, Mark Jarzombek, and K. Michael Hays) whose theoretical work, influenced by post-structuralism, opened to historical analysis and placement those very categories (such as the tectonic and other timeless vessels wherein aesthetic development was said to take place and become meaningful) that Frampton viewed as indestructible. Frampton argued that architectural making and thinking not only coexisted in the act of building, but that the possibility for a truly “critical” architecture, autonomous and resistant to “other” cultural phenomena (such as capitalism), rested on this union. He made his outrage at theory public:


75 The argument in pro of separating architectural thinking from practice, which also drew its strength from the work of the Italian historian and critic Manfredo Tafuri, took an enormous joint effort on the part of young scholars working primarily in the North East of the United states during the late 1980s. Their published work raised the standard of competency significantly enough to become in many ways inaccessible to practicing architects (who often complained that theory was no longer “useful” to them). The role of social relations must also be considered when accounting for the progressive splintering of theory and practice. When the baby-boomer generation began mentoring their own students, it became common practice to discourage Ph.D. students from returning to practice. In addition scholars publicly inscribed themselves (and each other) within a common project of architectural thought. Consider, by way of example, the following remarks written by K. Michael Hays (Associate Professor of Architecture at Harvard University, and editor of the influential journal Assemblage) in praise of Mark Wigley’s The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida’s Haunt, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), and printed on the dust jacket of the book:

“Among the theorists who have recently found architecture a vantage point from which to open up new questions about the logic of space, structure and ornament, surface, materiality, media, gender, and politics, Wigley may well be the best. [....] His book will stand as a mark of a moment in the history of architectural thought when architecture reasserted itself as a mode of thought in its own right.”

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Among those who are familiar with the professional and academic architectural scene, it may well be thought that the last thing we need is another book on architectural theory. [...] This book however has a good chance of breaking through this barrier of deadening indifference, often displayed today by many members of the profession and even by a large number of students, for this is a refreshing direct and unpretentious compendium of the elements of architecture as these can be reasonably derived from architectural practice.76

The anti-intellectualism of Studies in Tectonic Culture made explicit what had been a constant in Frampton’s career. His position preceded his contacts with phenomenology, and is therefore perhaps better understood as an extreme radicalization of the 1960s Anglo-American views on education.77 Frampton’s move to the United States in 1965, occurred in the midst of a widespread American fascination with what was beginning to be called the British “open education” system. During the early 1960s, the Labour government made significant changes to the British education system. They encouraged notions of team teaching and individual learning, and promoted a shift in pedagogy from a “didactic” model of “teacher instruction” to an “exploratory” model of “student discovery.”

A.S. Neill, Britain’s noted educational progressive, had been a forerunner to these attitudes earlier in the century. The curriculum of his famous Summerhill experimental school gave children complete freedom to do and learn what they pleased. The 1960 edition of Neill’s book Summerhill sparked the educational controversy in North America. By 1964, a number of important books appeared that criticized the

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Note that although Wigley was trained as an architect in his native New Zealand, he is here identified as a “theorist” who has “found” architecture. 

77 For an in-depth study of Anglo-American education during the postwar see Arthur Marwick who deals with the subject extensively in the section “British and American ‘Progressives’ and ‘Do-Gooders’,” in
authoritarian and unimaginative nature of United States education, such as *Compulsory Mis-Education*, by Paul Goodman, and *How Children Fail*, by John Holt. In the early 1960s, North American educational researchers were already studying the British system, visiting schools and universities in the United Kingdom, and by 1969, study teams from twenty North American cities had conducted research in England. Arthur Marwik suggests that the North American perception of British progressiveness in teaching was “slightly exaggerated, but perhaps in part because of the good work already put in on behalf of Britain by the Beatles, it had a great impact.” Frampton was one of the many British academics who were offered teaching positions in the United States during this period of fascination with the progressiveness of British pedagogy.

In 1974, *The Teacher’s Guide to Open Education* appeared in the United States and popularized the notion of “a classroom environment in which there is a minimum teaching to the class as a whole, in which provision is made for children to pursue individual interests and to be actively involved with materials, and in which children are entrusted to direct many aspects of their own experience.” By this time, there were already numerous critics of open education, especially among university professors who had seen their authority undermined during the student revolts of 1968. In light of these debates defenders of “progressive” education radicalized their positions. Most notable among these “radicals” was Ivan Illich, whose *Deschooling Society* (1971) and *Disabling Professions* (1976) depicted schools and disciplines as pillars of bourgeois society, and

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79 Ibid. p 503.
intimated that by speaking and writing correctly and grammatically one conformed to bourgeois values.  

The opposition to academicism was at one with Frampton’s Marxist opposition to the division of labor. He inherited this understanding of scholarship from Lethaby and the LCC. Essentially, the Arts and Crafts Movement was anti-academic. It argued that good design was not the result of university schooling, cultivated taste, or even drawing skill. Rather, Arts and Crafts proponents like Lethaby argued that it was the result of an intimate knowledge of tools and materials. That knowledge was transmitted through common productive work. The Arts and Crafts movement was therefore understood as an opposition to industrial systems of building production.

Frampton’s radical devaluation of academic discourse as concomitant with bourgeois “instrumental” reason began in the mid 1970s. By the mid 1990s, his Tectonics attempted to separate “critical practice” from all matters of human expression that might be historically contingent. Giving up the hope that modern society might ever reach a sense of community, Frampton sought to compensate for this lack at the level of a unifying collective unconscious. Tectonics was neither a visual style, nor a verbal symbol. It was a pre-symbolic and pre-reflexive process of “making.” Through craftsmanship, a tradition-bound way of dealing with matter, one was to gain access to the involuntary, pre-conscious level of culture and collectivity. Although expressions of the tectonic could ‘look’ different (depending on the region or time in which they were

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80 Ivan Illich’s influential writings continue to influence thinking of architectural pedagogy. See, for instance, Duncan Philip, “De-Schooling Architecture,” in Journal of Architectural Education, n. 1, v. 42 (Fall 1988), pp 58-59. In this article, Philip challenges the idea that architectural education should take five or six years of study.
produced) for Frampton they all remained affirmations (in the positive sense) of the deeper existential dimension of “making.” In Frampton’s own words:

It is undeniable that over the course of this past century the tectonic has assumed many different forms, and it is equally clear that its significance has varied greatly from one situation to the next. Yet one thing persists throughout this entire trajectory, namely, that the presentation and representation of the built as a constructed thing has invariably proved essential to the phenomenological presence of an architectural work and its literal embodiment in form. It is this perhaps more than anything else that grounds architecture in a cultural tradition that is collective rather than individual; that anchors it, so to speak, in a way of building and place-making that is inseparable from our material history.81

Frampton’s invocation of phenomenology in this passage to denote the fusion of “making,” “material,” and “history” helps explain his differences with postmodern scholars such as Mark Wigley. In fact, the synthesis he proposed here denounced not just post-structuralism, but also the basic tenets of Structuralism and Critical Theory with which he himself had come to be identified during his co-editorship of *Oppositions* with Alain Colquhoun, Mario Gandelsonas, Peter Eisenman, and Anthony Vidler in the 1970s. Frampton’s reduction of epistemology to matter ran counter to the 1970s neo-Marxist and structuralist ideas about the transmission of knowledge, values, and about the constitution of social collectives. Critical Theory was only one of the many intellectual interests of Frampton. Arguably, judging from the undialectical nature of his thinking, it was the less dominant.

In the aftermath of the 1983 “Heidegger Affair”82 a series of younger critics schooled in Critical Theory began critiquing Frampton, as well as Norberg-Schulz and

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82 Heidegger’s “The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts,” although allegedly written in 1945, was published in 1983, in accordance with his request to his son Herrmann that it be released at a “propitious
other established historians, for their sustained interest in phenomenology. Hilde Heynen summed up the new generation’s distaste for phenomenology by arguing that Frampton’s and Norberg-Schulz’s “uncritical” readings of Heidegger’s notions of "gathering" and "essence" were to blame for the architectural popularity of the philosopher in the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast to this, Heynen argued that a second more “critical” understanding of Heidegger had been carried out by her generation of scholars, including Mark Wigley and Francesco dal Co, who had stressed Heidegger's description of the impossibility of dwelling in the Modern era, and compared them to similar diagnosis by Theodor Adorno. Heynen therefore questioned the value of Heidegger to architects concerned with “rooted” dwelling, and associated phenomenology with Nazi ideology. In response to these critiques Frampton became all the more emphatic about the ability of phenomenology to help ground thinking in building, to unite theory and practice. Moreover, he dismissed the new post-structuralist challenges to this union as testaments to their “rootless” Avant-Garde alienation from culture.

The essay was received as an attempt by Heidegger to defend his involvement in the Nazi party. Inadvertently, it sparked a series of historical investigations which effectively exposed the mendacious character of his remarks. The “Heidegger affair,” as it came to be known in academic circles, was unleashed first in France in 1987 with the publication of Victor Farias’s *Heidegger et le nazisme* (Paris: Verdier, 1987), and then in Germany with Hugo Ott’s *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu Seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1988). By 1998 the “affair” also received attention in the Anglo-American academy through the work of philosophers such as Richard Rorty, Richard Wolin, Thomas J. Sheehan and Michael E. Zimmerman.


B. The Tectonic aesthetic is a Christian ethics of practice

Ricoeur depicted Christianity as in a sense pre-figuring the battle of existential phenomenology against idealism. Phenomenology’s “return to things” was in his mind foretokened by the satisfaction of “the wrath of God” on the cross. With Christ’s crucifixion, two forms of ethics appeared: on the one hand the “ethics of coercion” as Reason “in the flesh” leading to its institutionalization first in Roman Law and now in the nation-state, and on the other hand the “ethics of love” materialized as “embodied” Myth and giving culture its “unique life.” Human existence was for him limited and torn between these two poles, essentially “broken” between the need to build “systems” and the mystery of life, whose singularity defied all systematic thought. At the level of collective existence, this meant that unlike the state, understood as “a set of tools which accumulates, sediments, and becomes deposited, a cultural tradition stays alive only if it constantly creates itself anew.” Ricoeur regarded the re-unification of Reason and Myth as the limit of human existence, an absolute horizon from which human life received its meaning.

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87 In his attempt to describe both the finite and infinite aspects of human existence, Ricoeur was setting himself apart from contemporary existentialists, who emphasized finitude as the universal characteristic of existence. Ricoeur’s philosophy might seem to be a counterpart to that of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945). Ricoeur cast doubt on Merleau-Ponty’s identification of “man” with his insertion into the perceptual field, arguing instead that there could be no philosophy without any absolute. Against Merleau-Ponty’s description of human existence as pure embodiment that is then transcended in reflection, Ricoeur argued that the act of existence simultaneously became embodied and transcended its embodiment. In other words, the experience of finitude was non-identical to finitude, since it presented itself only as a contrasted experience between limitation and “transgression.” Ricoeur used a similar line of reasoning to critique Sartre’s “philosophy of negation.” He blamed Sartre for taking nihilating acts to be a “nothingness” which would stand for the ontological essence of human reality. The infinitude of “nothingness” missed, according to Ricoeur, the “primary affirmation” of limitation inherent in any reflexive act. See Paul Ricoeur, “Phénoménologie existentielle,” in Encyclopédie Française, v. 19, (1957) pp 6-12.
According to Ricoeur, only myth, as the opposite of reason, could resist the pressure of reason to subsume everything in its path. But where was one to find myth in the increasingly secular European 20th century? Ricoeur asserted that myth could be found in culture. For him all cultures originated in myths, which could subsequently die or change in time. The value of a “living culture” was its ability to preserve the “ethical and mythical nucleus of mankind.”88 A “living culture” kept the “negative” of Reason alive in the form of a unique “singularity” that prevented Reason from closing upon itself as a finished “system.” It was for him important that philosophy not try to de-mythologize it through reason.89 Inversely, Ricoeur argued that the task of Reason was to keep Myth from closing upon itself. Only the dialectical relation of Reason and myth could keep both systems “alive,” and move history forward by permitting the emergence of new (and contesting) myths (or truths) within the unattainable horizon of Truth:

It seems to me that we can distinguish certain conditions which are sine qua non. Only a culture capable of assimilating scientific rationality will be able to survive and revive; only a faith which calls upon the understanding of intelligence can ‘espouse’ its time.90

Ricoeur read the meaning of nation-state and culture as arising from more essential human experiences of absolute and finitude. Taken individually, these opposite poles were meaningless. However, taken together and in “hope” for their reconciliation, they acquired profound meaning. Thus, Ricoeur termed his thinking “eschatological” to denote its circumscription to the horizon of hope for the re-unification of absolute “system” and unique “finitude” into a single Truth, as promised in Christ’s apocalyptic

second coming. Until that final day, Ricoeur thought human existence would find meaning in a life led in hopeful anticipation:

This limiting situation, by which ethics splits into two ethics of distress, is undoubtedly not a constant situation, nor even a lasting or frequent one. But like all extreme things, it throws light on the average normal situations. It attests that until the last day, love and coercion will walk along side by side as the two pedagogies, sometimes converging, sometimes diverging, of mankind.

The end of this duality would the total “reconciliation” of man with man. But this would also be the end of the State, because this would be the end of history.  

Politically, Ricoeur’s eschatological thought meant that both the rational nation-state and the mythic cultures had to advance together. The decolonization movements of the 1950s “awakened”, according to Ricoeur, the “margins” to their existential rationality. “We are witnessing the advance onto the world scene of great human masses who were heretofore silent and downtrodden. It can be said that a growing number of men have the awareness of making their history, of making history; in this sense, one can say that these men are really joining the majority.”

The danger of decolonization, as Ricoeur saw it, was that it failed to also encourage the advancement of mythic culture. The nation-states (new and old) were replacing Truth with their specious and incomplete rationality. In a notably existentialist

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gesture, Ricoeur called upon every individual to limit this perversion by reaching into their cultural myths and asserting them. 93

Frampton translated Ricoeur’s call for an architectural audience, encouraging architects to assert to their mythic culture as a sign of their ethical commitment. But whereas Ricoeur had argued for nation and culture to “walk hand in hand,” Frampton took traditional culture to be the source of all authenticity, and identified any deviance from it as evidence of a demoniacal instrumental reason. Thus, avant-garde countercultural practices, or theoretical questioning of the validity of culture were to be strictly resisted. In the epilogue to “The Isms of Contemporary Architecture,” Frampton introduced “Regionalism” as a type of marginal architectural practice that by hypostatizing “the culture of the region” above any other interest served as the foundation helping to ground all architectural styles.94 Thus he turned Regionalism into a universal “ethics of love,” comparable to that of Christianity, whereby a Regionalist architect could welcome and check all extraneous forces. By reaching back towards architecture’s mythic origin in craft and “regional” types, architects could help their community preserve its unique identity before the “system.” For Frampton, an architect’s

93 For Christians like himself, the task was to assert the “revolutionary” demand of Love, which required one’s sacrifice for a greater universal good. Individual disobedience in the name of fraternal love would be punished by the state, yet this personal sacrifice would serve humanity by limiting the state:

I must act with the idea that the maxim of my action might become a universal law. The meaning of my act of disobedience, when extended to all, is therefore a threat to my State whose chances of survival I lessen. This is the “meaning” which I must accept and even assume if I disobey: in the limiting situation of war, the testimony that I bear to the absolute quality of the commandment which forbids murder puts my State in danger and, along with it, my fellow citizens. I do not have the right to bear this testimony if I do not assume, besides the risk involved, the meaning of my action, that is to say the threat to and, in the extreme, the sacrifice of my State.


“Regionalism” was the measure of his or her critical stance (or “resistance”) towards outside influences.

Frampton’s discussions of culture as a “balance” to technology would seem to indicate that he shared Ricoeur’s concern for keeping Truth and History “open.” Ricoeur’s notion of human freedom as dependent independence, a dialectical movement between the willful creation of systems and the involuntary uniqueness of existence, can be read as a blue print for Frampton’s discussions of the “relative autonomy of architecture,” as the dialectical relation between “rational” building systems and “mythical” or unexplainable types. However, there are also marked differences separating the two models. Whereas Ricoeur saw the mutually limiting relation between Reason and Myth as occurring through the dialectics of theory and practice, Frampton considered that the two poles could be “reconciled” in practice alone. Frampton established a strict separation of theory from practice, arguing that particular traditions of “making” yielded buildings that could hold together “mythic culture” and “universal reason” within their framework. Theory, in his mind was only an abstraction of this more fundamental union.

Frampton considered that one need not to wait for Judgment Day to experience the synthesis of the individual and the collective. It was “there” in those special buildings which he selected. Frampton made various attempts to construct the semblance of an anti-avant-garde movement. In a special issue of Architectural Design devoted to Kenneth Frampton, he put forth Gwathmey Siegel & Associates, Henri E. Ciriani, Josef P. Kleihues, Jørn Utzon, and Cesar Pelli to
demonstrate, in different ways, the vestigial potential for architecture to resist. To evoke the notion of resistance is to challenge the progressive myth of the avant-garde and to turn, if not to the antithesis, the *arrière garde*, then certainly to the strategy of revealing ‘differences,’ as practiced by Adolf Loos throughout his career [...].

Frampton carefully assembled buildings from around the world as exemplary of an aesthetic that, according to his own taste, expressed the union of the individual architect and the collective for which he or she worked. Critical Regionalism must thus be viewed less as a practice and more as an anti-avant-gardiste aesthetic supposedly shared among architects such as Mario Botta, Tadao Ando, Alvaro Siza, Jørn Utzon, and others. To the uninitiated, this aesthetic by no means conveys the union of architect and collective. Hence Frampton’s life-long efforts at educating architects.

C. Frampton anoints architects who produce the Tectonic aesthetic

For Frampton, this feeling of human unity, of “community” and “region,” arose out of the recognition of by a group of individuals that they shared a common aesthetic taste. It was in this experiential sense that Frampton characterized the “region” of his Critical Regionalism. Hence, the importance he ascribed to cultivating, and teaching, a shared way of valuing aesthetic experiences. Consider the following clarification, which he offered in 1986, after he called on university journals to focus their content “exclusively around the work and concerns of a particular architecture school,” and to stop publishing “star” architects:

This example enables me to define more clearly that which I have attempted to elaborate elsewhere under the rubric of “critical regionalism.” By appropriate extension, an architectural school can certainly be

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conceived of today as a cultural “region”; and it is precisely the self-
cultivation of this region which will enable it to resist without falling
either into reactionary hermeticism on the one hand or into the media
juggernaut of universal civilization.96

Frampton’s own community project involved the teaching and dissemination of
the Tectonic aesthetic. Frampton made the claim that this aesthetic of “making” was the
only one that could yield an “authentic” experience of public collectivity, because only it
wove the fabric of that experience with the thread of interiority and privacy. A building’s
ability to turn its most inward constructional logic into an outward public experience was
the measure of its social content. Frampton’s ability to introduce these somewhat
abstract and highly theoretical concepts as the telos of mainstream architectural history
partly attests to the desire of certain architects to be a part of a wider disciplinary
community. As it turned out, Frampton claimed the aesthetics of “making” to descend
directly from some of the canonical French and German forefathers of the Modern
movement. Thus, the appeal of his community is that it offered membership in the
Western canon to those outside of it at the price of speaking the aesthetic language of the
center.

To speak briefly of how Frampton re-articulated the history of the canon in terms
of the aesthetic of “making,” we must look to the lineage he sought for his “tectonic
tradition.” He located the origin of the movement in Semper’s founding of the Zurich
Polytechnikum (now the ETH) in 1855, and ascribed its popularization to the structural
rationalism of Viollet-le-duc.97 The next touchstone in the lineage was Hendrik Petrus

96 Kenneth Frampton, “Architecture in Print: A Dialogue with Kenneth Frampton,” in Design Book
97 See Kenneth Frampton’s “Introduction: Reflections on the Scope of the Tectonic” in Studies in Tectonic
Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture, (Cambridge MA:
Berlage, the Dutch master and precursor of Modern architecture, who achieved, according to Frampton, a synthesis of Semper and Violet-le Duc by understanding the identity between building structure and social structure and fusing them in architectural forms:

Like Louis Kahn after him, Berlage was to envision the walls of the environment as literally embodying the space of society; as being the matrix within which and by which the society is formed. In this regard his Stock Exchange building assumed the existence of a social community or Gemeinschaft, both within and without its volume. 98


Frampton went on to state that the articulation of the building’s masonry provided the immediate aesthetic experience of the burgher values of the middle ages, suggesting...
that the vestiges of “rooted communal ideals” belonging to a pre-industrial society were somehow embodied in the “high-quality craftsmanship” of the Dutch. Berlage, being Dutch, had somehow connected to this traditional mindset and given it unitary expression by exposing the high craftsmanship of the building to view. Thus, through a leap of logic, Frampton argued that Berlage had been able to realize socialism in ways that no Marxist discourse ever could. This type of argument can be traced back to similar assertions made by the members of the British Arts and Crafts movement, such as William Morris and Augustus W. Lethaby, to whom Frampton owes a great intellectual debt.

In like fashion, Frampton argued that Louis Kahn had been able to give us access to the communal “spirit” “alive” in the aesthetic experience of “making” by exposing the inner structure of traditional type forms. This was the same argument that Frampton would also make in relation to Mario Botta. These architects, insisted Frampton, had a “deep” or pre-reflexive understanding of their culture, which set them apart from “superficial” discourses, from the “vulgar historicizing and monumental rhetoric,” of Postmodernists like Philip Johnson and others:

For Kahn, ‘historicist’ monumentality meant an orientation toward the underlying structure of traditional forms. Thus he remained committed to transforming these forms rather than reducing them to the status of being mere references which made rather obvious allusions to historical precedents, and it may well be that it is this subtle distinction which accounts for his eclipse from current discourse.

The “underlying structure” to which Frampton was referring here was of course meaning, which for him was “given” immediately in forms. Frampton’s theory of

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99 Ibid. p 338.
100 Kenneth Frampton, “Louis Kahn and the French Connection,” in *Oppositions*, n. 22 (Fall 1980) p 41.
meaning circumvented the rising hold of allusive historicism upon architectural practice between the 1970s and 1980s, and the surrounding problematization of meaning and language by postmodern scholars. The notion that buildings contained a “deep” meaning in their structure clearly undermined the treatment of architectural surfaces with historical shapes. Through his endorsement of a loosely defined typology Frampton was able to “salvage” not only the language of modernism, but also its ideology. He made the classical Modernist depiction of the avant-garde architect as the guiding light of society available to all architects. So long as architects held fast to traditional building methods and forms, the “common sense” and values of society would be preserved, and a good ethically sound future. The architect’s safeguarding of tradition guaranteed the continued presence of a pre-reflexive physical “foundation” upon which all new theoretical, moral, or ethical discursive constructions would have to be grounded.

Frampton’s fetishization of the experience of the “interior” of a building’s structure as the “authentic” locus of meaning, relegated the building’s “exterior” surfaces to the realm of “superficial” discourse, to the “public” realm of “idle talk.” Within architecture, this separation was easily assimilated as part of the centuries-old debate over the primacy of structure or ornament, a question that had been problematized by Robert Venturi’s *Learning From Las Vegas* (1972), and which dominated architectural thinking during the 1970s and 1980s. Frampton touched the nerve of this debate by asking the question in moral and political terms: was it *ethical* to completely separate structure and ornament, as did Venturi? In Frampton’s model of meaning, although the surface was by default an inauthentic public expression of the true structure, it was important that it
remained close to the "inner structure" of the building because, for better or for worse, once the construction process was over, the interior "essence" was only approachable from the outside. Therefore, Frampton equated the subduing of non-structural expressions with an ethical commitment to society.\textsuperscript{102} This motto came awfully close to Modernism's founding myth of dispensing with superfluous non-functional ornament, a connection that Frampton encouraged by depicting Critical Regionalism as the recuperation of Modernism.

By insisting on the reduction of the "public" surface of architectural objects, Frampton could more easily make the claim that non-ornamental architecture was more "authentic" and "honest" because it came closer to the inner essence of the building. The popularity of Frampton's condemnation of Postmodernism's separation of "public" surface from "private" structure was aided by a long standing post-war discourse in the social sciences which also equated the "public" as a source of alienation. Habermas's work on the difficulties of communicating in the public sphere without ideological distortions found echoes in 1970s reflections about the relation of ideology to cultural production; for instance, in Alvin Gouldner's famous book, \textit{The Dialectic of Ideology and}...

\textsuperscript{101} For a historical account of this separation of "essential" and "superficial" interior within the Modern movement see Mark Wigley, \textit{White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture}, (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1995).

\textsuperscript{102} Consider, for example, Frampton's discussion of Swiss architect Mario Botta:

[...] Botta is able to pass from the vernacular referent of the exterior to the stoic and astringent order of his rationalist interiors; to the black slate, white-washed bloc, radiant wall panels, and to Escher-like staircases by which his modernist space is structured. It is by means such as these that Botta is able to evade the false naturalness of bourgeois ideology [...]

See Kenneth Frampton, "Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino," in \textit{Oppositions}, n. 14 (Fall 1978) p 17.
Technology (1976), which located the origin of ideology itself with the emergence of a mass "public."\textsuperscript{103}

\section*{D. The Tectonic aesthetic subsumes the architect's intentionality}

The existential status of "hope" also assumed theological status in Ricoeur's thought, in his case as a Kantian limiting concept. Hope, for Ricoeur, helped one refuse to say "the last word" (to refuse any "unity" or "totality"), and simultaneously gave one faith in the meaningfulness of the pursuit of truth. Ricoeur insisted that this hope for an ultimate resolution of things in a final moment in history, for the "eschatological moment," was existentially foundational to philosophy (or to any discipline). In his view, it provided the necessary openness and freedom for philosophy to determine its own problems, methods, and statements. In other words, "hope" allowed one to accept the

\textsuperscript{103} One of the most comprehensive 1970s studies of the historical relation of ideology to the public is Alvin W. Gouldner's, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976). In Chapter 4, "The Communications Revolution: News, Public, and Ideology," Gouldner argues that the onset of the "age of ideology" rests on a series of technology related factors which enabled the creation of a new mass public. The increase in population that ensued the post-industrial revolution increase in available food, coupled with the secularization of the masses, their increased levels of literacy, and the availability of printed materials, compounded into an erosive force which disintegrated the core of traditional social systems. In response to the augmented market for secular meaning, symbol systems proliferated that attempted to synthesize the recent revolutionary events. This was fertile soil for ideology. The growth of journals and newspapers from 1780 to 1830 brought into being a new social phenomenon: the (news reading) public. This new social formation stood in sharp contrast to traditional forms. It no longer drew its sense of constituency from persistent interaction with one another, but rather from exposure to the same social stimuli, which foster among them shared interests and understandings. But the very formal content of newspapers prepares the way for a rationalization of society, through a rationalized categorization of the information about the social to which individuals are exposed. News grounded conversation in public cafes became the vehicle of public rationality, dependent of course on the "free" time make available to bourgeois society through professionalism and industry. Appealing to the very rationality of the media, ideologies served to mobilize "social movements," creating common interests and goals among the population. Ideologies can thus be further defined as symbol systems produced and consumed by a (news-reading) public accustomed to a mediated experience of the real, where events are experienced de-contextualized from life. (p 105) This removal of context occurs in two principal levels: on the one hand, the systems are free from the "affect" structure of face-to-face interaction; on the other, these (news) systems are always "interpretations" of life events, texts on texts. The separation of news-communication from everyday life potentiates ideologies by enabling the claim to self-groundedness imposed by rationality, and by widening the disparity between facts and values, theory and practice (p 106).
independent (and often unreconcilable) truths of different disciplines (like theology and science). The disquieting premise was that disciplines like philosophy could only achieve autonomy to the extent that they remained open to their own foundation upon an originary eschatological myth. Philosophy could only exist, so long as it resisted its own totalitarian tendency to “violently rationalize” or de-mythologize everything, including itself. “Here philosophy seems to be well guarded against itself by non-philosophy. […] It seems that in order to be independent in the elaborations of its problems, methods, and statements, philosophy must be dependent with respect to its sources and its profound motivation.”104

Inspired by Ricoeur’s attentiveness to the non-rational, Frampton sketched out a definition of “critical practice” as docta ignorantia in "Avant-Garde and Continuity” (1980), which he would later rename Critical Regionalism.105 Criticality, as Frampton described it here, was not a mode of reflexive judgment in the tradition of critical philosophy, but precisely the resistance to thought. It was imperative, he insisted, that architects return to traditional building methods, and to traditional culture understood as a craft. This was “critical practice,” a “rooted” making that could in his mind attack the degeneracy and corruption of “affirmative practices” such as “rootless” “avant-garde” architecture, and theoretical speculation.106 For him, all “affirmative practices” embodied enlightenment reason, industrial production, and consumer culture.

Frampton recognized the impossibility of eliminating industrial production, reflexive thought, and reason from the equation of progress. Hence, he argued for a

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middle course between “affirmative” and “critical” practices. He accepted that architecture had to embody both voluntary and involuntary aspects of life. However, unlike Ricoeur, he maintained the ethical primacy of Myth over Reason. His middle course was therefore a strategy for “grounding” a-moral universal reason in local ethics. But how was architecture to support the enormous burden of containing reason? Here, Frampton spun his theory of “making” into an entire socio-political program for achieving collective authenticity. This required a series of conceptual steps aimed at turning “making” into Myth, which are nowhere stated but always implicit in Frampton’s thinking. First, Frampton regarded “making” buildings according to historical typologies as the “habitual” practice of putting buildings together according to “know-how.” This he considered tantamount to the immediate embodiment of the involuntary into the architectural form. Second, since by definition buildings were made by many people, they embodied the involuntary “know-how” of many. This made Frampton understand buildings as the material incarnation of collective mythical values, or in other words, culturally bound ethics. Third, since people used these buildings, they would immediately experience the values “hidden” in the building at a pre-reflexive level.

Frampton’s identification of making with the process of infusing matter with “spirit,” meant that, unless local craftsmanship “checked” industrial production, soon only the ethics of coercion (to use Ricoeur’s term) would govern our experiences of the world. Without craft, he argued, the “value-less” instrumental reason allegedly governing industrial production would be injected into every physical artifact, it would conquer the world, control of humanity, and eventually destroy it. Frampton held “avant-garde”

105 “Avant-Garde and Continuity” was prepared for a conference with the same title held in Valencia, Spain, in 1980. The essay was later printed in Architectural Design, n. 7-8, v. 52 (1982) pp 20-27.
architects and theorists responsible for fueling the “utopian promise” of life devoid of physical (and therefore moral) constraints. They had produced “rootless” or “autonomous” architectural forms, which responded only to vacuous mental exercises, and were therefore undercutting the “common sense” embodied in traditional environments. Frampton’s apocalyptic rhetoric, and his lashings against discourse and “star-architects,” have only intensified in his later years:

The United States loses some 50 acres of virgin-cum-agricultural land per day to suburbanization, while at the same diurnal rate, the world loses an area of the rain forest the size of Manhattan, together with some 100 species of flora and fauna. This apocalyptic state of affairs can barely be justified opportunistically in terms of gratifying some popular consumerist desire, for nothing is more artificial than our admass manipulation of taste.107

E. Architects must surrender their intentionality to the local community of builders.

Frampton rested the very possibility of progress upon the limiting function of “rooted making” before “rootless production.” As a model for progress, Frampton’s theory had to address the problem of “correct action.” In other words, even if one accepts the model that community value-systems enter architectural objects through pre-reflexive acts of making, the question remains: how can one judge that the “right” values had been built? Frampton addressed this question with a naturalist or organicist theoretical framework. For him, “critical practice” arose organically out of a “connection between

the political consciousness of a society and the profession." As such, it would always be *de facto* ethically grounded in the set of moral values of that society.

This assertion in turn raises the problem of how the connection between the architect and his or her community’s “set of underlying ethical and spiritual values.” How was it to be effected? Frampton asserted that in certain locations in the “margin” politics were undifferentiated from “rooted culture.” In those privileged locations, every cultural practice was identical to a political expression of the community’s values. Even accepting this unlikely premise as possible, then how could one be certain of the connection’s “authenticity” if, as Frampton asserted, the architect-community bond occurred at the unconscious level? Was there room for deceitful, ironic, or duplicitous manipulations on the part of architects? Frampton suggested that one’s embrace of “marginal” or “regional” ways of “making” was an index of the authenticity of one’s connection to a community and its values. Thus, an architect’s “regionalism” became the measure against which to judge, not only “outside” influences, but also his or her level of political and ethical commitment. By extension, Frampton established “regionalism” as the “authentic ground,” the *limiting concept*, of all ethical (and even possible) architectural practices:

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111 Frampton defined a "regional architect" as a "marginal" but "talented individual working with profound commitment to a particular culture." An important pre-requisite to marginality was to have remained outside of the international "star rating." This unlikely category included household names such as Louis Kahn, Carlo Scarpa, and Jørn Utzon. See Kenneth Frampton, "The Isms of Contemporary Architecture," in *Architectural Design*, n. 7-8, v. 52 (1982) pp 81-82.
Clearly Regionalism intersects with all the other *isms* of this ‘taxonomy’ [Neo-Productivism, Neo-Rationalism, Structuralism, and Populism] so as to remain potentially open to all of them, but only on the condition that they are subordinate to the culture of the region itself. Regionalism is thus enabled to interpret universal culture (of which it is also a part) in terms of its own intrinsic base.  

The politics of Regionalism stemmed from its claim to a more “authentic” model of production than that on offer in late-capitalism. Frampton understood the presence of fine craft to be evidence of a society’s strong cultural and moral unity. This theory of identity between the physical, social, and ethical domains allowed him to establish political differences between ethno-cultural groups on the basis of craft. For instance, Frampton compared Germano-Swiss “rooted” culture to Anglo-American “rootlessness.”

As examples of “grounded” politics, he identified architects such as Mario Botta, Luigi Snozzi, Mario Campi and Franco Pessina. These “marginal architects,” Frampton wrote, operated in a “cantonal” cultural context where the architect’s practice and the building trade were “undifferentiated.” This allegedly harmonious and unitary culture of making had been able to “revitalize the language of modern architecture” thanks to the “filter of a severe constructive poetic.” “I am alluding,” continued Frampton, “to the exceptional Swiss ability to transform ordinary engineering form into works of everyday art. This ability is as much present in Ticino as it is in German Switzerland where it may be said to have had its origin. This is a quality that contemporary Anglo-American architecture is almost incapable of achieving.”

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112 Ibid. p 82.
113 See Kenneth Frampton’s “In the Lugano Landscape: Five Architectures,” in *Casabella*, n. 534 (April 1987) pp 4-11, and “Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino,” in *Oppositions*, n. 14 (Fall 1978) pp 1-25.
114 Ibid. p 4.
115 Ibid. p 5.
Fig: In this page, Frampton makes a visual argument about the equivalence of three buildings, which he claims are part of the same mythic culture of northern Italy: Gino Valle's house at Sutrio, near Udine; a house for a painter in Tuscany by Leon Krier (1974); and a single family house at Ligornetto (1975-1976) by Mario Botta. See Kenneth Frampton, "Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino," in Oppositions, n. 14 (Fall 1978), p 17.

Frampton's nostalgic view of the Swiss "culture of making," as one that remained impervious to the division of labor, was undermined by the reality of the Swiss building trade, which relied on underpaid migrant masons and unskilled labor from Spain and Turkey. What Frampton called "local craft," then, was really a product of the very same globalizing world markets that he so criticized. Turning his eyes from this diverse socio-economic reality, Frampton suggested that the Swiss had achieved a "tectonic synthesis" of industrial construction methods and local craftsmanship. As a physical embodiment of
the fusion of industrial and human labor, Frampton regarded Swiss architecture as “an agent of both the realization and the representation of the society and its identity.” Here is the crux of Frampton’s understanding of “making”: it was the pre-reflexive creation, conservation, and representation of the “sacred” core of culture, which, to go back to Ricoeur, was none other than Myth. Frampton’s defense of the “constructive poetic” (from the Greek poiesis meaning creation) as the “filter” of “authentic culture” summoned making as mythopoesis.

The importance of “proper” making to the collective identity of a society can now be better ascertained. According to Frampton’s model “critical practice” reproduced, maintained and transmitted the pre-conscious myths bounding individuals into a synthetic collective. This strong emphasis on the identity of individual and collective undercuts Frampton’s claim that his “critical practice” was in fact a dialectical mediation of universal and particular. Indeed, Frampton’s so-called dialectical model was also frozen and undialectical to the degree that it presupposed the fusion of abstract concepts with material processes within the category of “making.” As further evidence of Frampton’s identity thesis it is important to note that he rarely differentiated between the architect’s intention, the hands-on process of building, and the final work itself. All of these aspects of the building process were united in “making,” as in the following passage:

This observation stresses two essential aspects of Scarpa’s method, first the gestural impulse passing almost without a break from the act of drafting to the act of making, and second a reciprocity obtaining between what Frascari characterizes as the techne of logos and the logos of techne; that is to say, between construing a particular form and constructing its

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116 Kenneth Frampton, “Mario Botta and the School of the Ticino,” in Oppositi ons, n. 14 (Fall 1978) p 2.
realization (and then later in the cycle, the moment in which the user construes the significance of the construction). 117

So far, we have been focusing on Frampton’s understanding of “making” as the mythopoetic kernel of ethics and culture. This passage, however, points to Frampton’s theory of “making” as meaning creation, and requires that we look closer at the relation he established between myth and meaning. There is an implied symmetry in this citation between the early stage of the cycle, when Scarpa passes from drawing to making “almost without a break,” and the “later moment” of the cycle, when the user grasps the meaning infused in the structure by “making.” Frampton suggests a continuity in meaning (logos) between architect and user is that bound together and stabilized by “making” (techne). This passage by Frampton is a thumbnail of his theory of non-discursive communication. From its insistence on the immanence of meaning in matter we can begin to get a sense of just how far his theory was from 1970s and 1980s theories of signification. To understand the precise differences it is important that we analyze Frampton’s theories of signification and communication, as well as those of his contemporaries, in closer detail.

V. Conclusion

Frampton re-articulated the central issues of 1970’s and 1980s debates into an extraordinary persuasive theory through which architects could reclaim their status as “builders of society.” His treatment of meaning helps us gauge just how far Frampton’s theory of meaning was from the structuralism he associated himself with—and just how much further away he was from feminist and post-structuralist displacements of the

117 Kenneth Frampton, *Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and*
public/private opposition. Contrary to Frampton’s conception of the aesthetic of “making,” structuralist authors, following Michel Foucault, would have argued that such non-reflexive immediacy between the laboring body and the values of a community did not exist. For them the body itself was constructed and understood through discourse. Furthermore, they would have opposed the underlying assumption in Frampton’s argument that the “origin” of meaning could be “located” in culture, contained within architecture, and separated from language. In the words of the American philosopher John Rajchman, one of Foucault’s main theses about the relationship of modern culture to language was that:

The culture in which art is free to take itself as an object in the sublime transgression of the limits of experience is the culture whose “fundamental problems” are “intimately linked” with the “question of the being of language.”

Unlike Foucault, who saw structures of knowledge (i.e. epistemology) to be opposed to the phenomenological understanding of human existence, Frampton insisted on the possibility of a type of making indistinguishable from knowledge and

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118 For Gayatri Spivak, there was “a certain program at least implicit in all feminist activity: the deconstruction of the opposition between the private and the public.” She was referring to the deconstructive structure of reversal and displacement. “The shifting limit prevents this feminist reversal of the public-private hierarchy from freezing into a dogma or, indeed, from succeeding fully is the displacement of the opposition itself. For if the fabric of the so-called public sector is woven of the so-called private, the definition of the private is marked by a public potential, since it is the weave, or texture of public activity. […] Displacing the opposition that it [deconstructive practice] initially questions, it is always different from itself, always defers itself. […] Deconstructive practice teaches one to question all transcendental idealisms. It is in terms of this peculiarity of deconstruction then that the displacement of male-female, public-private marks a shifting limit rather than the desire for a complete reversal.” See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Explanation and Culture: Marginalia,” in In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics, (New York and London: Routledge, 1988) p 103.

corporeality. Not only did Frampton posit epistemology as a non-reflexive embodied reality, he premised the very possibility of "resistance" and "criticality" on the exclusion of language from knowledge.

By establishing the aesthetic of "making" as the only possible experience of human unity in a "broken" existence, Frampton equated it with the "ontological attributes" and political values of the whole society. In the identity of meaning, morals, and building, Frampton (wittingly or unwittingly) misrepresented the Heideggerian notion that language constitutes humanity's understanding of Being, to mean that the non-verbal language of architecture constituted a community's ontological traits.

Contrary to the logic of multiplicity that an attentiveness to marginal practices would imply, Frampton issued dogmatic statements about what kinds of architectural forms would qualify as belonging to the aesthetic of "making." To gain access to the community of Critical Regionalists an architect should design according to the following principles: First, he or she would design urban "enclaves"—i.e. clearly identifiable forms with well defined inside and outside boundaries. Second, the form of the "enclave" would be derived from the local traditional (preferably 19th century) urban morphology, the topography of the local landscape ("the oneiric essence of the site," as Frampton described it), or the typology of traditional local buildings. Third, this form would be erected preferably by local labor, whose culture, by virtue of being marginal, would immediately infuse the structure with the local "political consciousness." Fourth, it would

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121 See Kenneth Frampton, "On Reading Heidegger," in Oppositions, n. 4 (October 1974), unpaginated.
be built out of local building materials. Fifth, the “enclave” would express the “tactile and materialist” interior constructive logic of the structure through rich detailing and craftsmanship that could be appreciated at close range.¹²²

On the surface, it might appear as though Frampton was really not proposing anything new. Since CIAM VIII (Hoddesdon, 1951) on ‘The Heart of the City,’ it had been common to identify the dense urban fabric of the 19th century core with the human scale and with civic values, and to associate the urban periphery with either hasty unplanned development for the sake of economic profit, or with the rational industrialized erection of “inhuman” mass housing. Frampton was consciously continuing this convention with his constant calls for a return to dense “enclaves” and his famous scorn for sprawl as a “non-place urban realm”:

The universal Megalopolis is patently antipathetic to such a dense differentiation of culture. It intends, in fact, the reduction of the environment to nothing but pure commodity. As an abacus of development it consists of little more than a hallucinatory landscape in which nature fuses into instrument and vice versa. Regionalism would seem to offer the sole possibility of resisting the rapacity of this tendency. Its salient cultural precept is ‘place’ creation; its general model is the ‘enclave’ --that is, the bounded urban fragment against which the inundation of the place-less, consumerist environment will find itself momentarily checked.¹²³

Similar arguments in pro of dense urban environments had been put forth in the late 1970s and 1980s by architects such as O.M. Ungers and Leon Krier. Like Frampton, they appealed to Heidegger’s notion of raum, understood as place, to oppose the more Modernist and abstract notion of architecture as the art of shaping “universal space.”

However, under the semblance of displacing the notions typically associated with “center” towards various dimensions of marginality, Frampton put into practice a complex discursive mechanism of “tokenism,” to use Gayatri Spivak’s term: “The putative center welcomes selective inhabitants of the margin in order better to exclude the margin. And it is the center that offers the official explanation; or, the center is defined and reproduced by the explanation that it can express.”

Frampton asserted “critical practice” (be it under the guise of Critical Regionalism or Tectonics) as the putative center of architectural exegesis and meaning precisely by negating marginality. If, as Spivak pointed out, “what inhabits the prohibited margin of a particular explanation specifies its particular politics,” then Frampton’s demotion of theory and surface as marginal and irrelevant to “critical practice” had three objectives: first, it tacitly affirmed his own intellectual practice as neutral and universal; second, it repressed the possibility of other public “expressions” of architecture, be they built or printed; and third, it invited the repressed margins into the center at the price of exacting from them the language of centrality.

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125 Ibid. p 106.
Unlike art history, architectural history has not achieved sufficient distance from itself and its subject matter to critically assess its changing conceptions of avant-gardism during the second half of the twentieth century. Too often architectural historians have borrowed basic assumptions about the avant-garde from modernist art discourse. In the 1970s it was common to find echoes in architectural discourse of Clement Greenberg’s 1939 definition of avant-garde art as a type of formalist autonomy from politics and culture that was opposed to ‘kitsch’ art, which was in turn seen as subservient to commodified forms of popular culture, politics, or academicism. The problem of course was that architecture could never claim this type of aesthetic autonomy from “reality” as neatly as art, and thus seemed to always fall short of pure avant-gardism. Some so-called “paper architects,” like John Hejduk, sought refuge in the academy from the vicissitudes of client relationships. Others, like Christian Norberg-Schulz and Kenneth Frampton, found independence from building in newfound careers as historians. Coexistent with Greenberg’s notion was a competing view of the architectural avant-garde, also borrowed from art, which defined it as concomitant with the radical and progressive transformation of society. This was the view espoused by Ernesto Rogers, Enrico Peresutti, and Charles Moore who regarded their building practice as inextricably bound up in a continuous revolution of society and culture.

Yet, it would be mistaken to portray the architectural scene of the second half of the 20th century as two monoliths. The aim of this dissertation was to argue that these
unsullied definitions do an injustice to the fluidity and impurity of architectural discourse during the Cold War. Each chapter described an important renegotiation between the poles of aesthetic purity and social engagement, through which the terms of architectural avant-gardism were redefined into what I have been calling the anti-avant-garde. What distinguished this group was that they believed they had found the origin of both aesthetic “authenticity” and social cohesion in experiences prior to reflection. For them, the architectural avant-garde had found architecture’s value to reside only in one pole to the detriment of the other, say emphasizing formal language at the expense of social utility or vice versa. Thus, the accusation that the avant-garde was “uprooted” from “true” progress runs as a common thread from the writings of Rogers to those of Moore, and from Norberg-Schulz to Frampton.

It is important to emphasize that the anti-avant-garde was not alone in its attempt to reconcile the bipolar model of avant-gardism. Critics and historians of the 1970s recognized that behind every effort to claim the autonomy or dependence of architecture, there was an attempt to establish the parity of contemporary practice to the high water marks of either classical or modern architecture. Dominance over architectural discourse became premised upon discovering (or inventing) the terms of trans-historical equivalence. Hence the emergent centrality of historians in this period, and of their competing claims to avant-gardism. In other words, this was a period of renegotiation and redefinition of the avant-garde, in which it was by no means clear what types of practices fell under the aegis of the term.

Take Mario Gandelsonas for instance, one of the editors of the American critical journal of architecture *Oppositions*, who’s principal claim to avant-gardism was his
writing practice. Although he did not share the anti-avant-garde’s belief in the liberating power of immediate aesthetic experience, he also searched for a key to compare the value of contemporary architecture to the standards of the past. Gandelsonas described the architectural scene of the late 1960s and early 1970s as split between “neo-rationalism” and “neo-realism,” which he defined each respectively as claims either for the “autonomy” or “dependence” of architecture from history and culture. Gandelsonas used these categories to sift through the architects who were deemed avant-gardists in 1976, situating the young Eisenman, Hejduk, and Rossi on the side of “neo-rationalism,” and Venturi on the side of “neo-realism.” But no sooner did Gandelsonas divide contemporary practice, he tried to re-synthesize it by claiming that both tendencies were poles of a more “fundamental dimension of meaning,” which he called “neo-functionalism.” Not unlike Gandelsonas, Kenneth Frampton also argued that although contemporary production was divided between “autonomous” avant-garde and “dependent” populist architects, there was a common root of all architecture, which he called “Regionalism.”

What then makes an architect or author part of the anti-avant-garde? The anti-avant-garde distinguished itself through its theorization of pre-reflexive experience as a touchstone of universality and trans-historicity. My thesis is that this was, in effect, an extension of a modern intellectual position, and that therefore the anti-avant-garde was

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not "Postmodern" as it claimed to be. Indeed, modern historians from Heinrich Wölfflin to Siegfried Giedion and Christian Norberg-Schultz used the criterion of immediate experience to evaluate the relative worth of old and new buildings. Aesthetic experience of this sort was for them the key to breaking away with "dead" academicism and infusing "life" into the world of architecture. This ethos of liberation was contingent on the belief that aesthetic experience was already meaningful prior to reflection. Only then could it constitute a type of "pure" knowledge, untainted by history, politics, or culture. Only then could those experiences carry the "revolutionary" creed of Modernism, by forwarding its myths that aesthetic creation had an essential origin, and that by tapping into that source architects could create works that would be radically outside of culture.

If aesthetic experiences uninhibited by thought were pivotal for theorizing the historical emancipating programs of modernism, then it could be argued that the intellectual formation described in this dissertation was indeed simply the avant-garde, and not its nemesis. But this would miss the fact that avant-gardism was, and continues to be, a term in dispute. I argue that by the 1970s the dominant definition of the architectural avant-garde (in Western intellectual academic circles) was no longer modern, but properly post-modern. Thus, extensions of modernist ideology assumed an antagonistic posture with regards to neo-avant-garde formations. By the 1970s, journals like *Oppositions* (New York), *Arquitecturas Bis* (Barcelona), *Architeze* (Zurich), and *Lotus* (Milan) propounded a structuralist methodology in historical analysis. They cast doubt on the modernist understanding that the meaning of modernism was rooted in either a radical break with history, an aesthetic alterity to bourgeois cultural forms, or a pure expression of the architect's innocent vision. In conflict with these essentialisms,
the early writings of Aldo Rossi, Vittorio Gregotti, Mario Gandelsonas, Alan Colquhoun, and others put forth a structuralist model of signification which denied any permanent or "original" connection between signifier and signified, arguing instead that meaning was generated as a function of difference within an established system of relations or "context"—cultural, social, aesthetic, political, etc.

The architects and historians that I have studied, and grouped together under the appellation of the anti-avant-garde, remained committed to reading architecture within a modernist conceptual framework, which required them to continuously evince an essential source of meaning for buildings. Ernesto Rogers trusted that architectural forms were called forth by an "original" life-world, which he called tradition. These forms were supposedly experienced immediately by architects who were "in touch" with tradition as new and meaningful syntheses of traditional forms and new construction techniques. Charles Moore ascribed a similar synthesizing power to "poetic images," which he believed to be pre-reflexive experiences of humanity’s collective creative history that flashed within the architect's "soul." Christian Norberg-Schulz thought the "alétheic image" to be an immediate visual disclosure of Truth, which sprung forth from natural topographies and "gave" architects "authentic" forms to use in buildings. For Kenneth Frampton, the Tectonic was a realm of the aesthetic that functioned as the secular collective equivalent to individual experiences of spiritual purification. Frampton’s promise was that the Tectonic could be experienced immediately, and that it could therefore re-unite individuals at a pre-reflexive level with their cultural "mythic roots," thus bringing together communities which shared a taste for certain "poetics of construction."
Like most of their forward thinking contemporaries, anti-avant-gardists believed themselves to have broken free of Modernism. One must acknowledge that they were instrumental in bringing down the formal restrictions on the use of non-modern vocabularies and spatial distributions. However, from the perspective of the claims they made about the liberating power of pre-reflexive aesthetic experiences, they in fact extended the universalizing ideology of modernism into the late twentieth century. Moreover, this ideology continues to exercise its sway in the present, under guises no longer identified with phenomenology, in efforts to mask the unwieldy lack of clarity of history and theory with various images of closure.

Taking into account the coexistence of modernist and postmodernist positions during the 1970s, the received understanding of that period’s intellectual formations splinters and is re-arranged into new groupings. Kenneth Frampton shared much more with Charles Moore and Ernesto Rogers than he did with Alan Colquhoun, and John Hejduk had more in common with Christian Norberg-Schulz than he ever did with Peter Eisenman. I have focused on tracing the intellectual academic history of only one such modernist group, which cohered around an intellectual debt to phenomenology.

I have given special attention to the particular circumstances that drew individual authors to phenomenology in order to demonstrate that they did not turn to philosophy to question their assumptions about architecture, but rather to add credibility to their modernist preconceptions. Ernesto Rogers’s early rationalist belief that utility was the source of architectural form would have seemed uncritical after World War II, when other Left wing European intellectuals were criticizing the emergent Western consumer societies for fostering only those aspects of human life that were “useful” to furthering
the capitalist system. Therefore, Rogers gave utility a greater sense of social and political engagement by availing himself of Enzo Paci’s phenomenology. Rogers argued that utility was at the source of every authentic “tradition,” a term he substituted for Paci’s *mondo della vita* (life-world). Charles Moore was schooled in the 1950s, the period when the “crumbling of ideals” in the political and professional spheres replaced modernist utopian desires to bring about revolutionary social change. In the United States, McCarthyism placed heavy limitations on the political aspirations of architecture. Moore salvaged his modernist revolutionary fantasies by turning them inward and claiming that architecture could serve to reform and elevate the soul. In the 1970s, when the changing protocols of the academy required greater intellectual accountability Moore embraced Gaston Bachelard’s notion of “poetic images,” understood as epistemological breaks, to give greater credibility to his claims. Christian Norberg-Schulz began seriously reading Martin Heidegger only in 1974, while teaching at MIT, where phenomenology was on the lips of mathematicians and cognitive scientists. From his early student years, Norberg-Schulz shared his mentor Siegfried Giedion’s belief that a new architectural practice would occur hand in hand with the advent of a new historical epoch. Later at MIT, he identified Giedion’s conviction with Heidegger’s similar pronouncements, and began trying to teach architects about how immediate or *alētheic* experiences of the world would eventually usher in a new era of innocence. Kenneth Frampton was part of a postwar generation of disaffected European Marxists, influenced by social historian E.P. Thompson and the British New Left, that wanted to create a space for grassroots moral dissidence against the exploitation of workers by both the capitalist and communist Cold War blocs. Throughout his academic life, Frampton believed
architectural practice should give a voice of those “below” by allowing room for workers to express their habitual construction techniques. Frampton found later confirmation for his project in the work of phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur, through which he construed local building practices in universalizing existential terms the “mythic origin” and unique source of cultural meaning.

Even though each of these authors eventually attained international recognition, it is important to emphasize that the discursive dynamics that led each of them to phenomenology were not the same. Ernesto Rogers produced his most influential theoretical work in Italy during the 1950s, whereas the other protagonists of this study made their mark first in the United States during the 1970s. Rogers came in contact with phenomenology through the serendipity of personal relationships. His collaborations with Paci grew out of their shared Marxist and liberal values. They sublimated in the aesthetic dimension the revolutionary aspirations of other Italian partisans, satisfying with a new architecture their frustrated desire to see the birth of a new socialist society after the war. The bridges Rogers and Paci built between their respective disciplines were extraordinary in their time. By the 1970s, however, interdisciplinary connections were common in the humanities and social sciences, especially in North Atlantic cultures. Architectural history and theory, as well as literary theory, cultural studies, and art theory found it essential to their progress to establish a dialogue with philosophy. As postmodernist thought moved each of these disciplines to challenge the hierarchies of the Western tradition, intellectuals had to confront the philosophical roots of their disciplines. In architecture, Hegel and Kant were unavoidable, and so were their major interpreters, such as Marx, Heidegger and Habermas. The absence of philosophical schooling resulted
in the prevalence of autodidacticism, for better or worse. Although one must recognize the importance of these "theory" approaches to philosophy, they often focused only on aspects of the philosophy in a manner that de-historicized the works. The compartmentalized approach to philosophy undermined the project that theory portended; namely, establishing a common meaningful language with which to discuss issues across disciplines, and thus engage in a pursuit of enlightened freedom that remained accountable. 

The type of de-historicized approach to phenomenology of 1970s architects and historians was not entirely accidental. I have suggested that the extraordinary success of phenomenology in North American architectural circles can be considered an artifact of McCarthyism. In academic circles of the late 1950s and early 1960s, McCarthyism

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4 Many contemporary critics have pointed out the problems of a de-theorized history and a de-historicized theory, but only few have ventured to answer them with new methodologies. In architecture, Mark Jarzombek's Critical Historiography, which I discuss in the introduction to this dissertation, is to my knowledge among the rare exceptions. In the tradition of phenomenology, American philosopher John McCumber has suggested a method to get "Philosophy out of the Ditch," as he entitled his account of it in chapter 5 of Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001). McCumber's proposal is of interest in relation to Jarzombek's. To summarize, McCumber proposed that philosophizing be a project of disassembling and re-assembling the history of thought into new and ever-more comprehensive, or universal, narratives, in order to "open up" possibilities for the future. In essence he proposed a reconciliation of Hegel's method of attempting rational transparency, or "a single explanation of many things," such as cultural memory, (p 147) and Heidegger's hermeneutics, where interpretation moves forward precisely when description fails. McCumber called "Nobility" the double Hegelian quality required of "narrative links": first, that they place our description into the intrinsic temporality of narration; and second, that they exhibit rational transparency. He used the term "Diakenicity" to refer to the Heideggerian method of "demarcating" narrative links in the present. "Diakenicity," in other words, was a way of deconstructing present narratives by recognizing the irreducibility of entities gathered by the narrative to the narrative itself. In McCumber's language, a set of beings is "diakonically" gathered, and therefore open to new interpretations when: "1) none of them is adequately understood apart from the others; 2) none grounds or explains the others; 3) no yet more basic phenomenon can ground, or explain, all of them together." (p 158) McCumber thus suggested a rather enticing method for recovering ethics without making standard truth claims, a way to value the past in relation to the present. His method was to keep us from repeating or closing the past. Maintaining the past open also meant keeping the task of present geared towards opening new possibilities for the future. As McCumber synthesized it:

In sum, when we recount a historical development not from a timeless, selfless standpoint but guided by the knowledge that we ourselves are among its results, we see it not as a set of ethically neutral events but as a set of gains and losses. The standard with reference to
discouraged interdisciplinarity, and encouraged strands of scholarship that posited their disciplinary isolation as evidence of their claim to objective truth. In philosophy this propelled Analytic philosophy to the mainstream, where it safely claimed to be autonomous from culture and history in its pursuit for eternal truths. Architectural education “adjusted” to McCarthyism with two different yet equivalent sublimations of the modernist emphasis on social revolution: one emphasized change through outer “quantification,” as in objective research, and the other stressed architecture’s ability to reform the individual’s inner “spiritual” self. In essence, both of these strands affirmed architecture’s autonomy from culture and history in order to maintain a modernist conception of the architectural object. Cultural pressures coming from outside the ivory tower also buttressed the academic demotion of architectural inquiries into other intellectual disciplines. During the booming 1950s building market, the popular press as well as cultural institutions worked to equate modernist forms with the American “good life,” and with the new international supremacy of US corporate organizations, while carefully repressing theoretical speculations that might alienate the middle class consumer.

which we identify a historical development as either a gain or a loss for us is what I call ‘narrative link.’ (p144)


6 For a study of the function of the popular press and cultural institutions in disseminating a de-theorized grass-roots version of modern architecture in the United States see Mark Jarzombek, “Good-Life Modernism and Beyond: The American House in the 1950s and 1960s,” in *The Cornell Journal of Architecture*, n. 4 (Fall 1990), pp 76-93. Jarzombek’s article must be read in relation to William H. Jordy’s 1972 study of the dissemination of Modern architecture in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s. Jordy placed less emphasis than Jarzombek on mass culture as a determining factor in this process of dissemination. Jordy argued that the international style became domesticated, vernacularized, diversified, and adapted to popular taste on account of: 1) the establishment and popularization the avant-garde architecture, which lead to the loosening of canonical tenets, and to attempts to incorporate images of “home” into architecture. As examples of this trend Jordy presented the work of Le Corbusier in Chile and the Riviera, where he attempted to subordinate the machine to the “traditional,” and the work of Alvar Aalto who adapted modernism to Finnish nationalist imagery. 2) The domestic problems in America, which
The restraint of dissenting moral and socio-political dimensions within architectural education began to alienate many students during the 1960s. The events of May 1968 brought to the foreground the general inadequacy of discourse in American architecture schools. The new generations of students, avid for specific knowledge, rejected the formulaic claims about the autonomy of architecture. They sought to fill the theoretical vacuum by looking to the social sciences, and other expanding disciplines like philosophy, in search of a consciousness of the nature of forces of change, and of the breadth of the cultural field that architects needed to appropriate if they wanted to take part in any significant cultural debate. Phenomenology, which had remained peripheral to philosophy departments through the 1950s and 1960s on account of its mingling in the worlds of literature, psychiatry, psychology, and politics, became popular in the late lead to a turning inwards in the 30s. 3) The rise of theorists like Lewis Mumford, who advocated the indigenous. 4) The geography of the US, which is widespread and lead to diversity, according to Jordy. 5) The influence of F.L. Wright and his antagonism towards the modern movement. 6) The activity of the building industry. 7) The increased circulation of consumer magazines. 8) Finally, European architects, argued Jordy, were interested in assimilating American modernity because of its technological advances. See William H. Jordy, "The Domestication of the Modern: Marcel Breuer's Ferry Cooperative Dormitory at Vassar College," chap. 3 in American Buildings and their Architects, Volume 5: The Impact of European Modernism in the Mid-Twentieth Century, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).

For an examination of the role of corporate culture and business procedures in the formulation of claims about the ability of modern architecture to provide identity to both corporations and their subjects see Reinhold Martin, "Computer Architectures: Saarinen's Patterns, IBM's Brains," in Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, ed. Sarah Williams Golhagen and Réjean Legault, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp 141-163.


In Apostles of Sartre: Existentialism in America, 1945-1963, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999), Anne Fulton argued that the openness with which Sartre engaged non-philosophical disciplines (say, in his Marxist literary and journalistic work in Europe) accounted for his reception as “soft” by mainstream American philosophers, who were then mainly concerned with producing logical statements about “objective” truths in the manner of the sciences and linguistics. Phenomenologists in this country internalized the ethos of incompetence ascribed to them by the dominant philosophical culture of the 1950s. The social and academic history of phenomenology in the United States is marked by its self-image as an “outsider” movement. Of this view can be found ranging from institutional to personal histories. In The Primal Roots of American Philosophy: Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Native American Thought, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p 159, Bruce
1960s precisely for its inter-disciplinary openness. The academic legitimacy of phenomenology benefited enormously from the endorsement of architecture and other disciplines. They actively sought to participate in architectural culture, often contributing to the historiographical erasure of their discipline by presenting only discrete aspects of phenomenology, and tending towards the prescriptive instead of the descriptive when publishing in architectural journals—a tendency which continues to this day in the work of Edward Casey and others.

Coetaneous with these 1970s inter-disciplinary openings, the question of the architect’s responsibility to society became a central issue of debate in architectural discourse. This presented a serious problem in the ongoing redefinition of avant-gardism. What social service did the avant-garde architects really provide? The claim of architects such as the Smithsons, that they saw above the crowd and could “elevate” the self-awareness of people, seemed awfully elitist. It was too “top down” for the 1970s. And

Wilshire, a member of the first generation to complete Ph.D.s in phenomenology within the American university system, recounted that as a young academic he felt that he had no place in the mainstream of philosophy:

After the defense of my dissertation at New York University in 1966, I was walking with William Barrett in Washington Square. His voice shifted to another level, and I sensed that something that had been left unsaid for years was about to be said. Within this aura, it surfaced—as if out of a rising globular skin of smooth and shining ocean water a great back would appear. ‘You know, Bruce, one can lose one’s job for being a phenomenologist.’ Phenomenology, of course, I knew. The history of the New School for Social Research is also enmeshed in the second rate complex of American phenomenologists, given that it was one of the few institutions outside of the Catholic university system that was hospitable to phenomenology. When in 1978, an accrediting committee of the State of New York voted to rescind the New School for Social Research’s accreditation, the phenomenological community decried it as an instance of intellectual discrimination. Although the committee apparently pointed out deficiencies in the curriculum and in the administration, phenomenologists were convinced the real grounds for the rescission was that the school was too far removed from the interests of mainstream American philosophy. See John McCumber, Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p 51.

Sarah Williams Goldhagen gives a good account of the Smithson’s claim to be raising the self-awareness of people through their architecture in “Freedom’s Domiciles: Three Projects by Alison and Peter Smithson,” in Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, ed. Sarah Williams Golhagen and Réjean Legault, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp 75-96. In this article Goldhagen holds that the Smithson’s were indirectly influenced by Sartre’s existentialism through the work of Jean Dubuffet, although they never actually read Sartre or new much about his work. Borrowing from Martin
yet, modern avant-gardism had been historically premised precisely on the myth of the architect’s sharpened sense of society’s relation to the future. He or she was said to live literally outside or “before his or her time.” The anti-historicism of the modern avant-garde architects was the basis for claims about the aesthetic integrity of their work. Architects like Mies van der Rohe identified their freedom from history with the pursuit of an aesthetic “purity” impermeable to mass culture. This apparent turning inwards, together with an ideology of self-assured superiority, allowed them to establish their work as the very benchmark of culture. The upshot during the McCarthy period was that this inwardness also allowed architects to keep the arms length relationship to politics necessary to get public commissions during the 1950s and 1960s in the United States.

The ideology of aesthetic purity, so perfected by Clement Greenberg in art, remained a pillar of architectural history during the 1970s. As late as 1976, renowned American historians like William H. Jordy were praising Mies’s “minimalism” as a search for the “objective truth” of the times.  

Jay, Goldhagen claims that Sartre’s notion of authenticity put into question ocularcentrism and emphasized the haptic. This is somewhat of a contentious claim, given that it is a highly interpretative extrapolation from Sartre’s philosophy which came only in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Goldhagen claims that it was this understanding of Sartre as a haptic-oriented thinker that led the Smithsons to believe that the rough treatment of materials could force people to see their environments in new and more “authentic” ways.  

See William H. Jordy, "The Laconic Splendor of the Metal Frame: Ludwig Mies Van der Rohe’s 860 Lake Shore Apartments and His Seagram Building," Chapter 4 in American Buildings and their Architects, Volume 5: The Impact of European Modernism in the Mid-Twentieth Century, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). In this essay, William H. Jordy defended Mies’s philosophy of “less is more” and “almost nothing” on the grounds that it was a way of confronting the “facts of technology” and to derive from them “truth” in architecture. Jordy argued that in a period dominated by technology, modern architecture could only be of consequence if it faced up to the “truth of its time” (p 252). The “objectivity” of Mies’s architecture came, according to Jordy, from his ability to make simple elements speak or perform functionally, aesthetically, and symbolically (Jordy gave the example of the I beam, pp 242-244). Jordy also argued that there was a transcendent or timeless element in Mies’s ability to reduce architecture to “minima,” which “although constantly in change, are so elemental as to be perceived by the intellect as immutable” (p 241). The argument put forth by Jordy about transcendence moved from a discussion of elements (i.e. I beams) to a description of all of Mies’ buildings as being “essentially” prototypes of a single mental construction, or “expressions of the same Building” (p228 & 251). Jordy saw Mies as emblematic of a modern synthesis between a Baukunst of Hellenic origin, and a Formkunst of Renaissance origin (p276)
historians like Manfredo Tafuri, who argued that the anti-historicism so central to the modern definition of avant-garde had its own historicity. The avant-garde, claimed Tafuri, was in crisis because, on the one hand, it could no longer sustain the claim that it was outside of history, and on the other hand, it could not retain an absolute aesthetic autonomy for its object. Rising doubts about the insularity of the object were intensified by structuralist theories of signification, which placed importance of the role of the observer (or reader) in the creation of meanings. The accusation that modernism was ossified and “academic,” leveled by critics like Reyner Banham, became commonplace by the 1970s. Architectural historian James Ackerman later recalled that period as a time when it was no longer possible to believe that the avant-garde could be “progressive,” or that it could in any way advance “knowledge of the unknown.” The feeling that the avant-garde had abdicated all social and ethical responsibility led to nostalgic revivals of so-called “historical avant-gardes,” such as the Soviet constructivists, as evidence of a last “organic” union between architecture and progressive politics.

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14 See, for instance, issue number 10 of *Oppositions* (Fall 1977) which included translations of 1920s reviews of Tatlin’s Monument to the Third International by Soviet avant-gardists like Nikolai Punin and A.A. Sidorov. In addition, and expiatory introduction by Kestutis Paul Zygas was included. There was also a review by Eric Dluhosch of Hungarian architectural historians Jiří Kroha’s and Jiří Hruška’s 1973 book about the Soviet architectural avant-garde entitled *Sovětská Architektonická Avantgarda*. The nostalgic revival of the Soviet Avant-Garde was also present in the work of architects such as Bernard Tschumi, who tried to revive its aesthetics, and Rem Koolhaas, who attempted to borrow concepts such as “social condenser” from the early Soviets. See Rem Koolhaas, *Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), and compare it to the description of “social condensers” in Anatole Kopp, *Constructivist Architecture in the USSR*, (London: Academy Editions, New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), pp 70-123. In both cases, revolutionary architecture is premised on its ability to provide place of exemption from the normalcy of the present where the “radicality” of the future can be “freely experienced.”
One of the principal arguments of this dissertation was that anti-avant-garde authors gave new life to the modernist myth of an organic unity between the architect and the "progressive" forces of society, without sacrificing aesthetic purity. In fact, they pushed the notion of an uncorrupted aesthetic to the extreme, deeming that even "thought" could contaminate it. Their cunning genius resided in identifying social progress with the collective pursuit of such "clean" experiences, and in holding out the possibility that architects could create anticipatory environments where people could get a foretaste of "unencumbered" experiences. In that sense, the architectural audiences of Norberg-Schulz, for instance, believed that to the degree that their buildings achieved the aesthetics of the Alethieic Image, they were helping prepare society, by "bestowing" the "gift" of immediate experience upon people one by one, for the coming of a new era when everyone would be "free." The problem, of course, was that free from the continuously changing appearances of subjects and objects, the Alethieic Image became reflexive, evidence of an aesthetic purity that floated beyond anyone's grasp, but that was given as the rule and measure of authentic existence. The more architects sought Truth in their own experiences, the more these appeared foreign and contaminated by their own "conscious" presence. The liberating power of immediate aesthetic experiences withdrew before their eyes behind an ever-receding mystical horizon, which I like to call a "blind spot," borrowing from Tafuri.

The purpose of this dissertation was to show how that "blind spot," for which there is no documentation, is the foundation of Norberg-Schulz's Alethieic Images, Moore's "Poetic Images," Frampton's Tectonics, and Rogers's Tradition. In other words, I attempted to demonstrate that they bear the hallmark of ideological concepts. Their
broad acceptance made them seem transparent, innocuous, and natural, when they are everything but. They were re-articulations of an unfolding modernist discourse on architecture, which carried with it a powerful set of assumptions about the stability of both subject and object. In general, the anti-avant-garde projected the myth of a unifying identity onto the plane of an idealized aesthetic experience that it equated with Truth. The strong momentum of modernist discourse allowed anti-avant-garde historians and architects to persevere without ever having to fully account for the intellectual positions on which their arguments about architecture were premised.

Even though the invocation of phenomenology by the anti-avant-garde gave the semblance of an intellectual inquiry, analysis was always directed outward, so to speak, towards the accepted closure of the architectural object or subject, and never inward, towards its own muddy discursive code. This permitted, if not encouraged, partial engagements with phenomenology that instrumentalized the philosophy into an operative theory of practice. Modernist historians and architects read phenomenology according to their own ends, as evidence that their aesthetic creations sprung from an essential origin beyond the problems and contradictions of modern life. It is in this sense that I spoke of phenomenology as a “theoretical mask” for the anti-avant-garde.

By the mid 1980s, a rift was apparent within architectural discourse concerning the function and character of phenomenology. The influence of Jacques Derrida’s reflections on phenomenology moved a new generation of architects and theorists to engage the philosophy in a more comprehensive manner. As they delved deeper into the complexities of phenomenology, they found it difficult to reconcile it with the “theoretical” mask of the anti-avant-garde, which insisted “essences,” understood as a
unified and unifying identities. Some architects reacted by “dropping” phenomenology and “theory” altogether to claim that they were “just practitioners.” But, it was in a sense too late. No longer buttressed by the social and political acquiescence to McCarthyism that characterized the mid-century American life, the anti-avant-garde could no longer hide behind its cult of innocence. “While identifying Heidegger’s thought with such figures as Norberg-Schulz is easy, “ argued architectural theorist Stephen Perella, “the [architectural] practitioners of phenomenological positions would never identify themselves as such.” More learned in the basic readings of Enlightenment philosophy, the 1980s generation of newly minted Ph.D.s in architectural history, theory, and criticism turned phenomenology against its architectural “mask.”

The debate was framed by the question of meaning in architecture, which had been at the center of architectural theory since the 1970s. Especially in the pedagogy of design, architects had generally associated “words” with variously defined architectural “images,” which were taken to possess some “stable” cultural meaning. 16 By the mid 1980s, architects began to question the ability of culture, history, nature, or immediate experience to stabilize meaning. They took issue with attempts to “fix” any context, arguing that to insist on definitive boundaries (such as an “essential” cultural identity) was to perpetuate what they thought was the foundational myth of Modernism: namely,

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16 I am using “image” here to refer to the various 1970s definitions of the relationship between architectural form and meaningful language. For instance: Moore’s “poetic image,” which founded meaning in communal bodily experiences; Alexander’s “pattern language,” which based it on the “archetypal environmental needs” of societies; or Rossi’s “typology,” which rested it on the fungibility of form as mnemonic referent. During the late 1970s, these different definitions were variously applied to the pedagogy of the design studio, as can be appreciated for instance in Language in Architecture: Proceedings of the 68th ACSA Annual Meeting, ed. John Meunier, (Washington, D.C.: Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, 1980).
the existence of a single controlling principle of the universe—be that truth, reason, or God. Two correlative arguments followed from this modernist myth, which were in turn opposed by post-structuralist architects: 1) the existence of an “essential origin” or logos to aesthetic expression (such as the architect’s “spirit”), and 2) the ability of any entity to exist outside of a context (such as a radical architect working completely outside his or her culture and time). Against these Modernist principles, post-structuralist architects emphasized the impossibility of either radical difference or radical sameness, and begun searching for “non-foundational” ways to think about architecture.

The 1980s thus witnessed a second reception of phenomenology. Stephen Perella and Hilde Heynen, for instance, argued that earlier readings of phenomenology, such as that of Frampton and Norberg-Schulz, had failed to grasp the complexity of the philosophy and confused pars pro toto. Perella crafted the Pratt Journal of Architecture into a forum for displacing these earlier “foundational/conservative” readings, and instituting a “non-foundational” approach to phenomenology and deconstruction. In order to make clear the dividing lines of the debate, Perella divided the journal’s second

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17 In his editorial to Form, Being, Absence: Architecture and Philosophy, Perella argued for a “non-foundational,” progressive and “phenomenological” revision of the 1970s “foundational/conservative” appropriation of phenomenology in architecture: “A body of architectural thought has been affected by an historicized account of Heidegger held largely in academia. The foundational/conservative Heideggerian influences in architectural theory which this journal seeks to displace, may be found in the work of such theorists as Christian Norberg-Schulz, Kenneth Frampton, and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, who are influenced by Heidegger. Each maintains that Heidegger offers an account of a return to an origin, and each argues for architectural practices informed by natural context, regionality, or personal authenticity. In each case the manifold of a context becomes reified as a fixed concept which is then employed in the service of arguments for harmoniousness, semi-autarchical resistance, or poetic dwelling. The question to be put to these writings is whether or not Heidegger’s “later” thinking is allowed to inform the “earlier” in such a way that reification becomes problematic.” See Form, Being, Absence: Architecture and Philosophy ed. Stephen Perella, (Brooklyn, N.Y.: School of Architecture, Pratt Institute; New York, N.Y.: Distributed by Rizzoli International Publications, 1988), p. 85. Hilde Heynen made the same differentiation between an early and late reception of phenomenology in “Worthy of Question: Heidegger’s Role in Architectural Theory,” in Archis, n. 12 (December 1993), pp 42-49. See also her critique of “early” architectural appropriations of phenomenology, which follows the lines of Adorno’s objections to Heidegger, entitled “Architecture Between Modernity and Dwelling: Reflections on Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory,” in Assemblage, n. 17 (1992), pp 79-91. 

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volume in two parts, with the proponents of phenomenology on one side, and the challenging advocates of deconstruction on the other, including John Knesl, Peter Eisenman, and Mark Wigley.

Inspired by Derrida, Wigley suggested that the superficiality with which Postmodern architects had engaged phenomenology was an index of their subservience to cultural conventions about hierarchy, structure, and solidity. More importantly, Wigley questioned the authority of philosophical discourse over architectural discourse, arguing that the acceptance of the primacy of philosophy over the object served to preserve received ideas about the stability of meaning. Given the cultural contract on which discourses were premised, Wigley intimated that avant-garde architects could regain a critical function with regards to culture by exposing the inconsistencies and "disquieting aspects" within their own discourse.¹⁸ Wigley dispensed (or rather 'displaced' and 'deferred') the notion that any "foundational" meaning of the architectural object could be attained outside of discourse, in say, immediate experiences such as those revered by the anti-avant-garde.

The emphasis on discourse as a critical tool also drew some architects to Michel Foucault. For instance John Knesl, professor of architectural design and theory at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, denounced the "spiritualization" of architecture by the anti-avant-garde as an attempt to resurrect the classical ideal of unity. There was no truth, he argued, in the promises that postmodern architecture could embody meanings that would "ground" human spirituality and result in individual fulfillment. These arguments were for him founded on a specious notion of identity as closure, a correlate of
which was the equally erroneous idea that meanings were ideal entities. Following Foucault, Knesl argued that meanings were artifacts of power relations “and the corresponding signifying systems, to organize the practices by which it [power] must work to maintain itself.”\(^{19}\) For Knesl, the possibility of resisting power was contingent upon one’s capacity to critique both identity and its systems of signification precisely as institutionalizations of power. If one ignored this fact, if one operated under the delusion that identity was an a-historical constant, then one was operating in complicitous agreement with the power establishment. Knesl accused postmodern architects of this very thing. He believed that by spiritualizing architecture they were trying "to restore to the powers and conditions of today, the legitimation provided by the great classical metaphysical referents: man, nature, and history."\(^{20}\)

Whereas Wigley attempted to rethink the discursive relation between phenomenology and architecture, Knesl clung to the primacy of philosophy, arguing that a better understanding of phenomenology would yield a more critical attitude with regards to experience –i.e. an understanding of experience as a mediated phenomenon. Knesl believed that the spiritual (alternatively referred to as the metaphysical) could not be entirely ignored. Modernism had already attempted the “subjugation” of spirit by matter, and had consequently been unable to account for it when it irrupted as “irrationality” and “violence.” Overlooking the fact that Foucault understood his genealogical epistemology to be opposed to the phenomenological understanding of the

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\(^{20}\) Ibid. p 17.
immediacy of knowledge, Knesl tried to reconcile the two schools. Even though his attempt was unsuccessful, it is important as an index of the continued strength of phenomenology in architecture. In theorizing a new agenda for the avant-garde in the mid 1980s, architects simply could not ignore phenomenology.

As phenomenology came under the closer scrutiny of architectural theorists and historians, some phenomenologists (many of them teaching at the State University of New York, Stonybrook) also shifted allegiances, and began, in one way or another, to withdraw their support of the anti-avant-garde. Thus, Don Ihde, Dean of the School of Humanities and Fine Arts, and professor of Philosophy at SUNY Stonybrook, spoke to architects about a “new” phenomenology, which he tried to differentiate from the popular architectural understanding of it as an increased attention to materials and methods of construction. Ihde argued that traditional phenomenology’s “variation theory” (as in Husserl’s thematizing of essential structures through idetic variation) prefigured postmodernism insofar as it also elevated “imaginative praxis” above mere perception.

When the anti-avant-garde lost its hegemony within architectural discourse in the late 1980s, phenomenologists sought to maintain their architectural standing by actively promoting the neo-avant-garde. For instance, philosopher Edward Casey, also a professor at SUNY Stonybrook, was among the most vocal sponsors of the American

21 Knesl described Merleau-Ponty’s “body-consciousness” as Foucault’s “body.” The “bodily,” argued Knesl, was at once the realm of subjective experience (where distinctions between material and conceptual categories occurred), and the locus where Power materialized. But in assimilating Foucault to Merleau-Ponty, Knesl unwittingly cast power outside of the realm of relations and into a type of metaphysical otherness. To be critical of power, architects had to challenge the known environments, reach deep into the “bodily” change its current structures from within. “Critical design has to develop the special relation that architecture has to the body which it surrounds and to which it speaks imperceptibly.” (p 22) See: Ibid. p 17.

22 Ihde claimed that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty premised their philosophies on “material variations” or bodily searches for “multi-stable” structures of existence. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for him extended Husserl’s “imaginative” eidetic variation method. See Don Ihde, “Phenomenology and
neo-avant-garde. In his book *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* Casey argued that place, was not a fixed thing with a steadfast essence (as Norberg-Schulz might have argued). Rather, Casey argued that place emerged out of, or became “implaced,” as part of an unfolding, dynamic processes of “embodiment,” a phenomenon he identified with the architecture of Peter Eisenman, and Bernard Tschumi. Casey claimed this “non-foundational” understanding of place was present in Bachelard’s writings on the “poetic imagination.” Although Casey felt compelled to footnote Charles Moore’s and Kent C.


23 Casey traced the modern understanding of implacement as embodiment to Immanuel Kant. Although Kant’s most significant contribution to the history of philosophy is considered to be his formulation of the transcendental subject, Casey argued that in an early essay entitled the “Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Regions in Space” (1786), Kant had treated human subject as a distinctively bodily subject. Kant arrived at an awareness of how the human body was productive of orienting relations by demonstrating the existence of a set of phenomena that could not be explained through Leibniz’s mathematical analysis of space in terms of magnitude and shape. To give a concrete example of Kant’s reasoning, Casey enumerated the series of factors that make our hands appear to be images of one another, although they are entirely different. Even though our left and right hands are equal in terms of magnitude and shape, they cannot be substituted for one another—a fact that can be quickly ascertained by trying to fit a left-hand glove in your right hand. (p 205)

The fact that the body is structured in two distinct sides granted it a singular power of orientation for both Kant and Casey. Kant further clarified the body’s bilaterality by pointing out its non-symmetrical nature, such as in the frequent dominance of one hand of the other in terms of dexterity and strength. In this essay, according to Casey, Kant radically extended an earlier claim that only material substances, sensible bodies, existed “somewhere.” He was now making the implacement of material substances contingent upon the human body, since only insofar as a human body was experienced as bifurcated a-priori, could it perceive sensible bodies as placed and oriented. Casey derived the implicit series Position—Place—Body—Region—Space from Kant’s argument, whereby making the human body assume a mediating position between how and where things were. Casey thus made the immediate experience not of the world, but of the body, into the touchstone modern conceptions of place:

Without the body’s lopsided two-sided ingressions into particular regions and places, space would be merely a neutral, absolute block of else a tangled skein of pure relations built up from pure positions. But as we in fact experience the spatial world, this world is composed of oriented places nested in diversely directed regions. For this, we have the body to thank. And for bringing all this to our attention, we have Kant himself to thank. In his tiny text of 1786 he demonstrates—for the first time in Western thought— that the most intimate as well as the most consequential inroad to place is through the body. (p 210)


24 Casey read Bachelard’s poetic image as a reconceptualization of the nature of place. Bachelard’s description of how and where poetic images appeared (as reverberations in the soul) called into question, according to Casey, the Aristotelian conception of place as containment. For Bachelard, the poetic image was not contained by an enveloping psyche, it appeared at the surface of the psyche. In this model, argued Casey, the psychic surface gave place by fulgurating with the image it at once received and sent forth. As Casey explored the corollaries of this new idea of implacement, he found it to differ from Aristotle’s on
Bloomer's, *Body, Memory, and Architecture* (1977) on the analogy between body and architecture, he did not credit Moore's professional practice for having heralded the translation of Bachelard's thinking into a coherent set of architectural propositions.

Casey drew an intellectual genealogy that gave historical credence to the notion that the immediate experience of one's body was the source of place. Beginning with Bachelard, Case's intellectual lineage passed through Foucault's "heterotopic sites," included the 1980s work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on "smooth and nomad space," tied in Jacques Derrida's late 1980s collaborations with architects Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi, and ended with Luce Irigaray's 1990s critique of Aristotle through the sexed female body.

Casey's stitching of architectural discourse into his history of place was no less instrumentalizing than the use of phenomenology as a "theoretical mask" by the anti-avant-garde. He ignored the long history of intersections between phenomenology and architecture, in order to identify his own philosophical project with those architects deemed "avant-gardists" in the late 1990s, namely Eisenman and Tschumi. In other words, Casey appropriated the "avant-garde" aura of those architects to give a sense of his own project's progressiveness. But this came at the price of erasing philosophy's own historiographic self-awareness.

From the perspective of architectural discourse, Casey's selective account of the intersections between architecture and phenomenology obscures more than it reveals, given that the various claims made about the "liberating" potential of architecture by other, more profound counts. Most importantly for Casey's argument, Bachelard was not concerned with a place that perdured, but rather with one that unfolded with, and was fundamentally transformed by the kinds of things it implaced. This, Casey insisted, was an insight that could only be gained through the immediacy of bodily experience. See: Ibid.
architects of the neo-avant-garde are not unlike those made by the anti-avant-garde twenty years earlier. In the vein of Moore, Frampton, Rogers, and Norberg-Schulz, neo-avant-garde architects like Bernard Tschumi and Rem Koolhaas continue to uphold a “purifying” experientialism. Tschumi’s “event-space” and Rem Koolhaas’s “social condensers” follow in the tradition of Moore’s “places” for community interaction, insofar as they also premise their “progressiveness” on creating anticipatory spaces where people may achieve experiences “un-co-opted” by contemporary conceptual frameworks. The touchstone of these contemporary speculations remains the modernist assumption that experiences prior to reflection are immediately meaningful.

Casey’s suggestion that the emergence of place in Tshumi’s architecture is best understood as a type of Bachelardian embodiment of “intimate immensity” would have been more convincing in relation to the work of Charles Moore. After all, Moore

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25 In pursuing his argument about the body, Casey pressed Bachelard on the origin of poetic images. For Bachelard, poetic images originated as a stirring in the depths of the soul that then fulgurated at the surface of the psyche. One of the goals of his “topoanalysis” was to get at the depths of the psyche, at the soul, by carefully describing these images as they appeared at the surface. Casey quickly pointed out that Bachelard’s model attributed a type of non-spatial extension to the soul with “a special kind of insideness and its own modalities of surface and depth” (p 288).

If images are originally “im-placed” in the soul, argued Casey, then images should themselves be charged with the “placial” attributes of the soul. Casey explained Bachelard’s topoanalysis of poetic images as a description of the soul’s placeness. But (and here is the crux of how Casey’s narrative pushes Bachelard towards the body) alongside this description of the soul as the place where images originated, Casey presented a parallel account where poetic images sprung forth from the body’s habits. Thus, the poetic image of house “is based on bodily habits inherited from one’s original home.” (p 291) Casey presented a double origin for poetic images, although he never discussed as such, which suggests that he either considered soul and body to be one and the same, or that he (wittingly or unwittingly) left it up to the reader to conflate the two.

Whether Casey thought that body and soul were the same is perhaps not as important as the fact that he was fascinated with how they could be made to bleed into one another. Casey concluded that what was at stake in Bachelard was a new understanding of interiority that cracked open the (Aristotelian) notion of continuous boundary inherent in the preposition “in.” He was drawn to Bachelard’s topoanalysis because he found it to be a concrete description of how the most intimate aspects of experience, such as poetic reverie, folded the outer world in themselves and leaked out into it. For Casey, following Bachelard, to dwell “in” a place was to be “implaced.” This meant that one simultaneously found oneself “out” in that undetermined ambience, and recognized that (unde)limited expanse “concentrated” within. These aspects of being in a place came together in the phenomenon of what Bachelard called “intimate immensity.” The importance of this phenomenon, for Casey, was that it served as the key to surmount the modern “tyranny” of infinite space. The immensity of space could now be absorbed into place through a greater attunement.
played a bigger role in disseminating Bachelard in architectural circles. In addition, Moore’s conception of the unfolding nature of place was as “dynamic” or more than any put to date by Bernard Tschumi or even Rem Koolhaas. Moore, Koolhaas and Tschumi spoke of place in highly eroticized terms as an instrument for setting in motion the “operations of seduction and the unconscious.” Indeed, even though their discourse shared fundamental features, each architect produced artifacts that sought aesthetic paternity in different moments of the past. During the 1970s, Tschumi and Koolhaas remained caught in a fetishistic adulation of constructivist forms, exploiting the nostalgic belief in an organic union between the Soviet avant-garde and the Russian revolution.

Moore encouraged licentious distortions of classical forms, often reflecting upon the

to the experiencing body. As he boiled it down: “implacement entails embodiment, and vice versa.” (p 340). See: Ibid. 


27 The fundamental discursive similarities between contemporary neo-avant-garde and anti-avant-garde, in terms of their unsubstantiated claims about the emancipating function of aesthetic experience, are obscured by the belief of certain philosophers, architects and historians that formal differences between buildings must signify ideological discrepancies. They don’t. The evidence weighs against those who insist on a transparent correspondence between matter and concepts. Again and again, academic discourse proves to be semi-autonomous from the artifacts it portends to interpret. This is one of the principal lessons of Mark Jarzombek’s Critical Historiography. A similar position, although far less nuanced, has also been put forth by historians of postwar architecture like Sarah Williams Goldhagen. See her “Coda: Reconceptualizing the Modern” in Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, ed. Sarah Williams Golhagen and Réjean Legault, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), especially p 319.

28 This connection has been entirely internalized and taken for granted by Koolhaas’s apologists. Arie Graafland’s Architectural Bodies, ed. Michael Speaks, (Rotterdam: OIO Publishers, 1996), for instance, is a pseudo-Deleuzian attempt to link Koolhaas, Eisenman, and Libeskind to Le Corbusier and Soviet constructivism. Koolhaas’s reading of the New York Downtown Athletic Club (Starret, Van Vleck and Hunter, 1931) in Delirious New York is, for Graafland, evocative of the Soviet notion of “social condensers.” For Graafland, Koolhaas’s understanding of architecture as a “social-condenser” was an accurate diagnosis of the needs of modern metropolitan culture. Graafland believed that to bypass the conventions of society it sufficed to turn architecture into an enveloping reality concentrating bodily interaction. Graafland’s found confirmation for this belief in postmodern authors such as Deleuze and Guattari, Jameson, Virilio, and Baudrillard. The fact that Graafland submitted his own criticality to the post-modern canon, serves as illustration of the persistent call for communal corporeal experience within architectural discourse to this day. Predictably, Graafland claimed that what was most valuable in Koolhaas’s reconstruction of a program for the DAC was that it illustrated how architecture could “connect” and “intensify” corporeal experiences. For Graafland, this principle of connectivity was a promise of new freedoms, an opinion about Koolhaas’ work that has been repeated ad nauseam. For example, see Alejandro Zaera Polo, "Finding Freedoms: Conversations with Rem Koolhaas," in El Croquis, v. 53, (Madrid: El Croquis Editorial, 1992), p14.

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conventions of practice with cutting criticism and humorous irony. But each of them used aesthetics as an instrument to pursue the same goals, namely, to validate themselves in relation to the changing politics of academic discourse, of what was “in” and “out,” and to influence (if not control) the direction of advanced practice. The operation of eliminating unwanted realities from their work in the name of clarity is not unlike what Casey did to the history of contacts between architecture and phenomenology. They are both procedures of historiographical erasure which give in to the historical momentum of disciplinary discourses.

Judging from these recent attempts to re-write the history of multiple intersections between phenomenology and architecture, it would seem that concealment of is the price of academic standing. Discourse speaks through the author, dragging him or her towards its conventions, and therefore also towards its accepted distortions of truth, its ideology. In the absence of a proper critique of its aesthetic practices in the interstices of other disciplines, phenomenology continues to help perpetuate the various crises it claims to cure.

If this dissertation has taught me anything, is that any attempt to advance knowledge must remain accountable to itself and verifiable by others. A self-reflexive

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29 It must be noted that Moore’s architecture was also valued for “intensifying” communal corporeal experiences. Architectural critic James Steele, insisted that Moore’s 1960s reasoning about how to create public life in the United States, continued to be relevant lessons in the 1990s. he argued that Charles Moore’s career had been a long search for ways of combating “placelessness” by creating communities. One of Moore’s characteristic design strategy was to create large rooms within enclosed compounds where communal interaction (or “social spontaneity” as Steele called it) could safely take place. In the case of commercial projects these rooms turned into internal open air streets, such as in Plaza las Fuentes (Pasadena, CA, 1985), or enclosed arcades. In Steele’s estimation, these projects were not entirely successful because Americans preferred air conditioning to walking in the heat. Moore’s more successful communities, argued Steele, were his religious “walled compounds” such as the Nativity Catholic Church (Rancho Santa Fe, CA, 1985) and the St. Matthews Episcopal Church (1979-1983). See James Steele, “Charles Moore: Place, Placelessness and the Res Publica,” in AD: Architectural Design, Profile 98, n. 7-8, v. 62 (1992), pp 93-95.
critique of latent ideologies cannot move forward if it remains blind to its own investigative biases. This means that new knowledge cannot be established on purely empirical grounds, through critiques of ideology on the basis that it makes claims about cognition that are independent from material justifications. This is especially true in the case of architectural discourse which, being partly autonomous from the artifacts it portends to interpret, is always making claims about cognition that overshoot reality.\(^\text{30}\)

For me, any attempt to ground cognition (be it in disciplinary, political, or class consciousness) is dependent on a self-reflexive critical practice which must necessarily stand watch over reifying its own thinking into ideology.

I have tried to expose how social and academic thinking is distorted by discourse. Precisely for that reason, I cannot safely claim to be outside of that distortion. Instead, I have tried to keep my work in check through self-critique. In this regard, this dissertation resembles Marxist critique. However, Marxism's preoccupation with the ideological contingency of cognition kept it from addressing the empirical as an epistemological problem, and from internal debates on proper method.\(^\text{31}\) I have tried to remain attentive to the psychological refractions of the Self involved in the production of knowledge, and suspicious of its own methods of writing history. Thus, I've tried to both distance and

\(^{30}\) Mark Wigley has argued that architectural discourse is characterized by its transcendence of empirical reality, and that it is this conceptual "overshooting" of matter that turns buildings into architecture. In his exhibition catalogue entitled \textit{Constant's New Babylon: The Hyper-Architecture of Desire}. (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 1998), p 55. Wigley wrote:

Architects are theorists. Being fundamentally speculative, architecture is inseparable from theoretical discourse. It is even theoretical when built. Architectural projects never appear without polemic. Polemic transforms a building into 'architecture,' not a set of formal characteristics. It is anyway the theory that highlights the characteristics.

Architects necessarily leave a trail of manifestoes, journals, articles, and books.

superimpose the author who tries to drive out ideology to make a clearing for meaning, and the author who cannot escape being caught in the artifices of discourse.

The mechanism that enables this simultaneous distancing and overlapping is interdisciplinarity, which allows one to problematize one’s own claims to subjectivity and objectivity by comparing them to those made by different specialized discourses in time. In essence, this dissertation does not concern itself with answering whether “pure” subjectivity or objectivity exists. Instead it considers “purity” as one among many “aesthetics” of subjectivity or objectivity, and provides an aesthetic critique based on a comparative analysis of how this and other “aesthetics” are put into practice within different disciplines, over time, in relation to various contexts (the market, intellectual fashion, social relations, the academy, political climate, and others).

I believe this dissertation differs from traditional architectural history in that it aspires to both authorial and disciplinary homelessness, although by definition it cannot achieve either. The crux of its self-critique is that by inhabiting multiple disciplines it can keep itself from having to protect the vested interests in “objectivity” of any one discipline, and it can proscribe its own tendency to disappear behind the “subjective” veil of the authorial Self. Yet, I recognize that knowledge cannot be advanced in the absence of these two poles. “Objective” scholarship can elevate “subjective” understanding beyond mere avant-garde style projections of Self-hood as the ground for truth. In turn, “subjective” Self-assertion can elevate “objective” scholarship from fossilized convention. This dialectical movement serves to advance self-knowledge because both “subjectivity” and “objectivity” are transformed in the process.
I have tried to trace a number of these transformations by examining how notions of subjectivity or objectivity were put into practice within the academic history of architecture, architectural history and phenomenology. I found that all three disciplines often worked within each other as “aesthetic masks” of “objectivity” and “subjectivity” respectively, but they seldom were pressed into confrontation with one another. Thus, established models were perpetuated within each disciplines which gave the semblance of progress when in fact there was no real advancement of knowledge. To break free from this stasis, I have tried to put the often de-theorized “objective” claims of architectural history into dialogue with the regularly de-historicized “subjective” claims of phenomenology and architecture. By demonstrating the historicity of phenomenology and laying bare the psychologizing of architectural history, I have attempted to work against the historiographical camouflages they enabled in architectural history and practice. For me, the value of this type of critique is that it is not performed from above but rather from within the discursive and aesthetic practices it addresses. One cannot pretend to operate from a ‘stable’ theoretical or methodological framework. On the contrary, critical method has to adjust to the terrain it moves in.


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——. Interview with the author. Seattle, WA, 6, June, 2000.

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APPENDIX A:

CHRONOLOGY TABLE
<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>1900</th>
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<td>Husserl, <em>Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusst-seins</em></td>
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<td>Husserl lectures on &quot;Dies Idee des Phanomeno-logie&quot;</td>
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<td>P. Frankl: <em>Die Entwicklungsphase der neueren Baukunst</em></td>
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<td>Heidegger <em>Duns Scotus</em></td>
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<td>SOCIAL HISTORY</td>
<td>Founding of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, ACSA</td>
<td>Heidegger habilitation in Freiburg</td>
<td>Husserl takes professorship at Freiburg.</td>
<td>Birth of Bruno Zevi</td>
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<td>Heidegger becomes assistant to Husserl at Freiburg. Founding of National Council of Architectural Registration Boards (NCARB)</td>
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<td>1920</td>
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<td>William Richard Lethaby, <em>Form in Civilization: Collected Papers on Art and Labour</em></td>
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<td>Heidegger <em>Zeit</em> und <em>Zei</em></td>
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<td>Heidegger lectures in London. Cornell University establishes first USA five year Bachelor of Architecture program.</td>
<td>Heidegger Professor at Marburg</td>
<td>Birth of Charles Moore</td>
<td>Birth of Christian Norberg-Schultz</td>
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<td>Hussert retires. Heidegger transfers to Freiburg. Founding of CIAM</td>
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<td>1929</td>
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<td>Sedlmayr, Zu einer strengen Kunstwissenschaft posits the need of theory to achieve a correct experience of architecture.</td>
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<td>Sartre's La Nausée and La structure intentionelle de l'image. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs. (Chicago)</td>
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<td>Series Philosophy and Phenomenological Research begins</td>
<td>Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportement</td>
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<td>Sartre, L'etre et le Neant</td>
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<td>*Symposium &quot;Phenomenology&quot; organized by the American Philosophical Association in Philadelphia. *Founding of the National Architectural Accrediting Board (NAAB)</td>
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<td>Sartre resigns as teacher of philosophy at the Lycee Concordet de Paris</td>
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<td>Sartre tours the USA, and lectures at Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, and Carnegie Hall.</td>
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<td>1946</td>
<td>Greenberg, Mayano. &quot;Review of an Exhibition of School of Paris Painters,&quot; Read, The Practice of Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Sartre, &quot;Existentialist on Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History</td>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>Goldfinger, &quot;The Sensation of Space.&quot; Neutra, &quot;The sound and smell of architecture.&quot;</td>
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<td>1949</td>
<td>*T. Creighton, Building for Modern Man, proceedings of 1947 &quot;The social basis for architecture&quot; conference.</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>Argan, Walter Gropius e la Bauhaus.</td>
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<td>1951</td>
<td>Rogers editor of Domus</td>
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**AESTHETIC HISTORY**

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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Sartre's &quot;Existentialism is a Humanism&quot; lecture (Wide circulation).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Levinas, De l'existence a l'existant</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Merleau-Ponty, Sens et Non-sens</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>*Heidegger's Existence and Being is translated into English.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Paul Ricoeur, Philosophie de la Volonte I; Husserliana series begins. Paci, Esistenzialismo e Storicismo</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Heidegger, &quot;Building Dwelling Thinking&quot;. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (english translation)</td>
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**INTELLECTUAL HISTORY**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>CIAM VI. Moore graduates B.Arch from U. of Michigan. Conference held at Princeton University entitled &quot;The social basis for architecture.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Norberg-Schultz diplome in Architecture from ETH, Zurich, under Giedion. Sartre attempts non-communist revolutionary democratic alliance (Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionaire) it failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>CIAM VII. Riesman, The Lonely Crowd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Moore professor at University of Utah until 1952.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>CIAM VIII &quot;Darmstadt Conversation&quot; Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, Rudolf Schwarz, O. E. Schweizer, O. Barting, P. Bonatz, W. Kreis, R. Riemenschneider, E. Neufert</td>
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<td>1952</td>
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<td><strong>SOCIAL HISTORY</strong></td>
<td>Place debate Piazza d'ltalia: with Littlejohn, Baird, RS. Harries, Norberg-Schulz, Claiborne, Aidala, Filson, Eskew, Moore, Lyndon</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<td>Casey, Remembering: A Phenomenological Study.</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>Anderton, &quot;Architecture for All Senses.&quot;</td>
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<td>Stefanovic, &quot;The Experience of Place: Housing Quality From a Phenomenological Perspective.&quot;</td>
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<td>Lefebvre, The Production of Space(trans).</td>
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<td>Lyotard, Phenomenology.</td>
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<td>Norwegian television makes film about Norberg-Schulz.</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Hillier, &quot;Specifically Architectural Theory: A Partial Account...&quot;</td>
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<td>Norberg-Schulz, &quot;Une Vision Poetique.&quot; Snyder, &quot;Building, Thinking, and</td>
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<td>Politics: Mies, Heidegger. and. the Nazis.&quot; Heynen, &quot;Worthy of Question:</td>
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<td>Heidegger's Role in Architectural Theory&quot;. Mugerauer, Overcoming Barriers</td>
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<td>to Understanding in Research and Practice: Place and the Politics of</td>
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<td>Identity, Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological</td>
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<td>Ecology. Crowther, Art and Embodiment: From Aesthetics to Self-Conscious</td>
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<td>ness. Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction. Guattari, &quot;Space and</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>Stefanovic, &quot;Temporality and Architecture: A Phenomenological Reading of</td>
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<td>Built Form.&quot; Mugerauer, Interpretations on Behalf of Place. Holl, &quot;</td>
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<td>Questions of Perception: Phenomenology of Architecture.&quot; and &quot;Archetypal</td>
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<td>Technolog. Pallazman, &quot;Architecture of the Seven Senses.&quot; Second volume</td>
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<td>of SUNY series on Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Norberg-Schulz, &quot;Jorn Utzon and the Importance of the Primitive.&quot;</td>
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<td>Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture. Holl, &quot;Pre-Theoretical Ground.&quot;</td>
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<td>Baird, The Space of Appearance. Mugerauer, Interpreting Environments:</td>
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<td>Death of Charles Moore. Norberg-Schulz consultant for remodelling of</td>
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<td>Death of Tafuri (1935-1994). Norberg-Schulz named Grand Officer of</td>
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<td>the Order of the Italian Republic; Lectures in Rome, Berlin.</td>
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<td>Norberg-Schulz gold medal of the French Academie d'Architecture;</td>
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<td>Intellectual History</td>
<td>Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, Derrida, Adieu à Emmanuel Levinas, and Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!</td>
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