



# **Dynamics of Enterprise and Technical System Architectures: Early insights from Combat Air Operations**

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March, 2006**

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# Motivation



- **Changing nature of competition**
- **Increased uncertainty**
- **Increased interdependence between users, partners, suppliers, other stakeholders**
- **Increased technical complexity and interdependence between enterprises and technical systems**
- **Commercial *and* military contexts**

***Goal: flexible and adaptable enterprises***





# **Concept: Network-Centric Warfare**




***... in operations and  
acquisition***



# The Basic Idea

- **Classic hierarchical tree structure as the foundation**
  - **Two basic modifications to create all varieties of structures**
    - vertical connections
    - lateral connections (within layers)
- **Hypothesis: enterprises with more lateral vs. vertical connections will perform better in complex, dynamic and uncertain environments, both operational and acquisition**





# Approach




- **If we examine architectures of operational military enterprises, we may be able to identify features that**
  - **correspond to desired attributes**
  - **provide insights into mechanisms that drive enterprise architectures, such as:**
    - **Key stakeholder dynamics**
    - **Doctrines**
    - **Cultures**
    - **Other external factors**
  - **impact and are impacted by technical system architectures and social architectures**





# Combat Air Operations



**1991-2003**





# 2003: Iraqi Freedom




OIF: ~2003

CONL  
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NCA/SECDEF/CENTCOM



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# Measuring the Architecture



- **Ratio of lateral to vertical connections**
- **Number of paths through the system expresses as a ratio to the number of nodes (paths/node)**
- **Spectral and other network theoretic measures (*in progress*)**
- ***n.b.: numbers that follow are preliminary***







# Initial Attempt at Measurement



| CAMPAIGN     | (V) | (L) | (LV) | L/V  | <b>LV/V</b> | $(L+LV)/V$ | $(L+1/2LV)/(V+1.2LV)$ | <b>LN(PATHS/ NODE)</b> |
|--------------|-----|-----|------|------|-------------|------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| DESERT STORM | 62  | 21  | 24   | 0.34 | <b>0.39</b> | 0.73       | 0.45                  | <b>11.59</b>           |
| KOSOVO       | 37  | 17  | 35   | 0.46 | <b>0.95</b> | 1.41       | 0.63                  | <b>10.51</b>           |
| AFGHANISTAN  | 71  | 40  | 19   | 0.56 | <b>0.27</b> | 0.83       | 0.61                  | <b>13.56</b>           |
| IRAQ-II      | 74  | 30  | 43   | 0.41 | <b>0.58</b> | 0.99       | 0.54                  | <b>11.30</b>           |

Note: preliminary data





# Insights/Observations



- **Doctrinal organization was never used**
  - Different organization in each case
  - IT enables more choices, more options
- **No significant structural change in air operations C2 enterprise since Desert Storm**
  - No transformation yet--at the operational level of enterprise
- **Possible reasons**
  - Externally imposed constraints (risk management)
  - Doctrinal assumptions about proper use and effectiveness of coercive force--inter-service tussle
  - Other forces driving acquisition programs





# Insights/Observations



- **Architectural measures:**
  - V/L ratio may prove a good proxy measure for flexibility of an enterprise architecture, more work is necessary
- **Possible that transformational change (and effects) are concentrated at the tactical level**
  - The core proposition of NCW
  - Enabled by changed tactical rules (not operational level architecture)
- **Potential emergence of a formal coordinating (integrating) layer between service components and Joint Force Commander**
- **Underappreciated:**
  - Role of key actors/leaders
  - *Potential for manipulation of enterprise architecture and the strategic agenda of the enterprise--even in a military context*





# Methodological and Analytical Challenges



- **Abstraction and modeling may be a more effective than detailed, microscopic, analysis**
- **Modeling at a larger scale**
  - Examination of architecture may be more informative than micro-level analysis
  - Properties of interest to senior leadership are here
  - Architecture places ‘boundaries’ or ‘constraints’ on potential enterprise dynamics, properties, actions at the micro-level
- **Catch-22: macro-level modeling and analysis must be supported by a robust micro-level theory**



# Potential Benefits



- **A tool to ‘measure’ progress toward transformation**
- **Deeper understanding of fundamental dynamics, mechanisms and driving forces in enterprise transformation**
  - **Highlight areas where management, senior executive attention have most impact**
- **Concepts and tools to enable design of flexible and adaptable enterprise-technical systems**
  - **Impact of organizational modularity on performance (Army)**
  - **Flexibility of programs to changing user requirements (spiral development)**
  - **Coordination boards**





# Operationalization

(a larger agenda)



- **Design:**
  - Bi-directional causality between capability and structure
  - What are the limitations of lateral vs. vertical architectures?
  - When, where, do different architectures perform ‘better’?
  - How do/can we design enterprises to preferentially grow lateral connections?
- **Management:**
  - Understanding conscious and unconscious forces that drive evolution of enterprise capabilities
    - For the specific case of combat air operations:
      - Is there an upper limit on what the CAOC can ‘command’?
- **For military operations in general: What architectures enable truly effective capability generation--not just maximization of air power’s effectiveness and efficiency?**





# Questions



# Methodological and Analytical Challenge



***“While on the Gulf War Air Power Survey, I started trying to count the informal and lateral links between people and organizations in theater and between theater and CONUS. I gave up because it was very difficult to count and the number was very high...very difficult to trace...these connections saved the formal organization ... from collapse by providing timely information, analysis, and instructions.”***

***--Dr. Mark D. Mandeles***

***C2 Analyst, Gulf War Air Power Survey***

