

***Lean  
Aerospace  
Initiative***



***Enterprise Value:  
The New Lean Horizon***

**Managing Intellectual Capital  
for the Long Haul**  
March 27, 2002

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MIT

Research Sponsored By SDM program sponsor

- **Intellectual capital (IC) defined**
- **LAI-related research on IC**
- **Evolution of IC in design projects**
- **Observations from IC research**
- **Some ways of framing IC investment decisions**
- **Conclusions**


## *Intellectual Capital Defined*

- **IC is intellectual material -- knowledge, information, intellectual property (IP), and experience -- that can be put to use to create wealth and value**
- **Includes:**
  - employees' skills
  - patents & trade secrets
  - an organization's technologies, processes, and experience
  - info about customers and suppliers

**Assertion: IC, like other forms of capital, can be made more productive through proper management**

- **The Link Between Design Problems and Intellectual Capital Loss in Aircraft Development**
  - Investigate examples of increased problems in design for possible links to intellectual capital degradation (Andrew)
- **Intellectual Capital Management in the Multi-project Environment**
  - Model and identify key factors affecting development and sustainment of intellectual capital associated with project assignments in a multi-project environment (Herweg & Pilon)
- **Assessing and Measuring Intellectual Capital**
  - Develop an assessment tool to support management of and investment in intellectual capital (Seigel)

# 1992 RAND Study: Maintaining Aircraft Design Team Capability



Conclusion: Need \$100M annually (research and technology funding), 1,000 technical staff to maintain adequate aircraft design team capability

Study conclusions based on historical experience unlikely to be repeated; What are the realistic solutions to IC challenges potentially occurring in a significantly different future context?

# ***Digging Deeper Into “Design Team Capability”***

- **Recent LAI study on role of IC in aircraft design:**
- **Setting: new commercial aircraft designs over a generation of change in the industry**
  - **Same target markets**
  - **Company-funded development**
  - **Same FARs, certification requirements**
  - **Mature multi-product firms (with significant military business)**
- **Data based on interviews and extensive archival document search**

<b>Year</b>	<b>70s Era</b>	<b>90s Era</b>
<b>Case Studies</b>	<b>“A70”</b>	<b>“A90”</b>
	<b>“B70”</b>	<b>“C90”</b>



# Data Used to Assess Design Team Capability

- Examined detailed aircraft and program performance metrics and their stability over the life of the development program:
  - Design effectiveness:  $W_e$ ; Useful load; payload; MTOGW; Range; Altitude
  - Design quality: Spec changes, flight test hours
  - Program milestones: First flight, Type certification (VFR & IFR), Initial delivery
- IC metrics (including):
  - New aircraft designs in past 10, 20 years
  - Design team staffing stability
  - Individual engineering and managerial experience
  - Type of experience (demonstrator vs. production a/c)
  - Use of modern design tools and knowledge capture


## ***Comparing the Programs***

- **70s programs had the following in common:**
  - **Same period of execution, competing head to head in the same market**
  - **Workforce new design aircraft experience base is high**
  - **Predominantly Paper & Mylar design tools**
  - **Physical representations (e.g., prototypes, powered wind tunnel models) for design validation**
  - **Functional Organization with "heavy weight" project managers**
- **90s programs had the following in common:**
  - **Overlapping periods of execution, overlapping market segments**
  - **Extensive use of computer aided design tools and information technologies**
  - **Increased reliance on simulation for design validation**
  - **Use of IPTs**





# Frequency of New Design Aircraft Introductions in Study Firms



**Trends in each firm were similar and mirrored the rest of this industry sector**

## *Illustrative Findings: A70 Performance at type certification*

<u>Metric</u>	<u>Deviation</u>
We (lb)	+7%
MTOGW (lb)	+3.1%
We/MTOGW	+3.6%
Useful Load (lb)	+2%
Range (nm)	+4 %
First Flight	+9 mo.
Type Certification	+6 mo.
Initial Delivery	+8 mo.
Major Specification Changes	3

**Some deviation from plan observed, but overall  
the best-performing program**

## *Comparing the 4 Programs*


- **Ranked performance across all 4 programs:**
  - **Design effectiveness (i.e., weight, range, etc.)**
  - **Design quality (i.e., ECPs, etc.)**
  - **Program performance (i.e., milestones)**
  - **Intellectual capital (e.g., # new designs in prior 10, 20 years, management depth, skills)**
- **Sum scores and check for correlation**

**Depth of IC is positively correlated with design and program performance**

- **Strong Linkage between IC metrics and Program Performance Metrics**
- **70s-era design efforts outperformed the 90s-era efforts in meeting program/ performance objectives**
  - **Better weight, payload margins; closer to delivery milestones**
- **Performance extremes were in the same company—allowing convenient comparison**
  - **Can address evolution of in-depth through interviews with “graybeards” and documents**
- **Test phase an important downstream indicator of design performance and IC**
  - **Test personnel positioned to understand design system weaknesses through exposure to recurring problems**


# A Story About the Shelf Life of Explicit Knowledge

Weight Plan Profile (WPP) Illustration



**WPP resulted from attempt to codify lessons learned from a close military competition**

# 70s Era Aircraft (A70) Design Experience




**Aggressive use of WPP (and other lessons learned) by those who helped create it kept program on track**

- **Evolutionary derivative program 7 years later experienced greater difficulties**
  - **Delayed type certification**
  - **Reduced performance (poor weight control)**
- **WPP tool still existed, but originating team had moved on to new assignments**
  - **Discipline to use WPP methodology was not as strong as in original A70 program**
  - **Other codified lessons learned were circumvented**

**Perceived relevance of captured knowledge (WPP and others) was apparently affected by passage of time and turnover in workforce**

# 90s Era Aircraft (A90) Design Experience



**“Evolutionary” design strategy de-emphasized role of experienced air vehicle team members, with problems appearing in and corrected during developmental test**





# ***Contrasting the A70 and A90 Design Experiences***

- **A70:**
  - **Management team built on senior engineering leadership emerging from a key military program competition victory**
  - **Hand-picked team of senior engineers with experience on multiple programs—“fully staffed” program**
  - **Aggressive use of lessons-learned and risk reduction strategies (employing familiar, common tools and concepts)**
- **A90:**
  - **1 prior major program from which to draw experiences (but housed in a separate facility)**
  - **Program leadership experience primarily with legacy/derivative program; few key players (1-deep at times) from flight sciences**
  - **Manufacturing quality higher as a result of advanced design tools**
  - **Simulation tools graphically compelling, but underlying data deficiencies (in part due to reduced reliance on wind tunnel testing) lead to late design changes**

## Summary Observations From This Research

- Knowledge capture and/or knowledge codification methods may be only partially effective if not backed up with experience in practice
- Prototype and experimental aircraft experience alone is inadequate to bring a new aircraft design through certification and rate production
- There must be adequate "critical mass" of intellectual capital—a few stars can't carry the entire team
- Use of modern design tools:
  - Modern computational tools did not fully offset impact of intellectual capital declines on program performance
  - Failure to refresh/support knowledge systems resulted in misprediction/rework that caused major delays
  - Modern computational tools can inhibit development of user tacit knowledge compared with predecessor analysis methods.

## ***Implications: Thinking About Investment in IC/KM Tools***

**NPVIC= discounted value of future net IC contributions to enterprise performance**

$$= \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{\text{Productivity gains resulting from IC/KM projects}}{(1 + r)^i}$$

**Investment in people and tools may increase net IC productivity and yield a return to the enterprise, but:**

- **Organizational return from knowledge creation decays with time**
  - **Employee turnover, new requirements, forgetfulness, etc.**
- **Current productivity metrics make economic justification of IC/KM investment difficult**

# *IC/KM Investment Aided by Development of Better Metrics?*


## Two areas for development of practice/metrics:

- **Efficiency:**
  - IC/KM reduces transaction costs by streamlining, improving knowledge flows
  - Enhances cycle time and cost outcomes
  - Need metrics and tools that can assess IC/KM impact on transaction costs (e.g., ABC/ABM)
- **Effectiveness:**
  - IC/KM allows creation/combination of the right of knowledge to create competitive advantage and superior products
  - Enhances competitive position for future business
  - Need metrics that can assess IC/KM impact on:
    - Relevance of captured/stored knowledge to tasks at hand
    - Ability to combine “network” knowledge into new forms to address new requirements

## Learning Curves

$$C_n = K N^s$$

Unit cost (C) declines with each additional unit produced by a rate (S)



- “Production breaks” make the next unit more expensive because of “lost learning”
- IC analogy: years between exercise of design skills results in higher costs due to relearning or mistakes not avoided
  - Case studies showed that programs with broken or disrupted IC continuity with prior programs suffered in performance and programmatics

# ***Strategic Choices Around Knowledge Creation***

## **Illustrative knowledge creation and capture investment strategies:**

- **Short-term (periodic and predictable customer pull for new products):**
  - **Firm bridges gaps in knowledge creation activities through own investments in development of derivatives, IRAD, productivity enhancements**
- **Long-term (many years until next new design):**
  - **Externalize cost of knowledge creation by allowing customer to fund technology demonstrations, concept studies, and prototypes**
  - **Customer or firm adopts “spiral” or adaptive development process to “load level” design experience over several years**
  - **BUT—customer acknowledges and accepts potentially significant relearning penalties to develop follow-on new products if the break in knowledge creation activity stretches on too long**

- **Research on IC continuing**
  - **LAI: Development of model, framework, and tools to help assess IC vitality (June 2002)**
  - **LARA: current primary research thrust**
  - **Focus of LAI/LARA white paper to Presidential Commission on Future of Aerospace Industry (April 2002)**
- **Research scope and activity associated with KM expected to expand in LAI follow-on phase**