China's Policy Towards US Adversaries

by

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ABSTRACT

If the Chinese government is trying to reassure the US that China’s rise is not threatening, why does China diplomatically support adversaries of the US such as Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Syria? This thesis shows that soft balancing against the US in concert with Russia best explains China’s foreign policy towards these states. Economic interest and a number of other alternative theories, in contrast, do not explain the observed variation in China’s policy. Critics of soft balancing have overstated their case; concrete instances of soft-balancing behavior are present in the international system.

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# Table of Contents

**CHAPTER 1: THE PUZZLE OF CHINA’S SUPPORT FOR ADVERSARIES OF THE US** .......................... 5  
  INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 5  
  PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON CHINA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH US ADVERSARIES .................. 9  
  THE ACADEMIC AND PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH US ADVERSARIES .. 11  
  CHINA AS A UNITARY ACTOR .................................................................................................. 14  
  SUMMARY OF APPROACH AND FINDINGS ............................................................................. 15  

**CHAPTER 2: SOFT BALANCING AGAINST THE US: MOTIVATION AND TACTICS** .................. 19  
  THE DEFINITION OF SOFT BALANCING .................................................................................. 19  
  CHINA’S MOTIVATIONS TO SOFT BALANCE ........................................................................ 24  
  SOFT-BALANCING TACTICS AT THE UNSC ............................................................................ 27  
  CHINA AND RUSSIA’S JOINT SOFT-BALANCING AT THE UNSC ........................................... 32  
  TESTABLE PREDICTIONS ......................................................................................................... 36  

**CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC INTEREST AS AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY** ................................. 37  
  THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS .................................................................................................. 37  
  TESTABLE PREDICTIONS ......................................................................................................... 39  

**CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES OF CHINA’S POLICY TOWARDS US ADVERSARIES** ................. 44  
  CASE STUDY SELECTION ......................................................................................................... 44  
  CLASSIFYING CHINA’S LEVEL OF OPPOSITION ..................................................................... 47  
  PREDICTIONS OF CHINA’S BEHAVIOR IN THE FOUR CASE STUDIES .................................. 48  
  SUDAN, 2004-2008: DARFUR .................................................................................................... 51  
  IRAN 2006-2013: THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ............................................................................... 72  
  LIBYA 2011: ARAB SPRING .................................................................................................... 86  
  SYRIA, 2011-2012: ARAB SPRING ......................................................................................... 95  

**CHAPTER 5: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS** ....................................................................... 109  
  REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS ............................................................................................ 109  
  SINCERE DIPLOMATIC/TACTICAL DISPUTES .................................................................... 110  
  DOMESTIC POLITICAL INCENTIVES ...................................................................................... 111  
  ISSUE LINKAGE ....................................................................................................................... 112  

**CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION** .................................................................................................. 114  

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ..................................................................................................................... 119  

**APPENDIX 1: SUDAN UNSC RESOLUTIONS SUMMARY** .................................................. 135  

**APPENDIX 2: IRAN UNSC RESOLUTIONS SUMMARY** ....................................................... 138  

**APPENDIX 3: LIBYA UNSC RESOLUTIONS SUMMARY** .................................................... 140  

**APPENDIX 4: SYRIA UNSC RESOLUTIONS SUMMARY** .................................................... 142
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Chapter 1: The Puzzle of China’s Support for Adversaries of the US

Introduction

What leads China to diplomatically support adversaries of the US? What limits the extent of this support? Both within and beyond East Asia, China’s ‘rise’ has inspired fears of a broader realignment of the international system. In this context, China’s support for authoritarian states with adversarial relations with the US is seen, by some, as either a nascent anti-liberal movement or, potentially, a future anti-US alliance system. Moreover, China’s support for these states has theoretical significance; the motivation behind China’s policy speaks to debates on the importance of economic interests and soft balancing in contemporary international politics.

Indeed, China often diplomatically supports nations with tense relations with the current international order and the most powerful state in this order, the US. The US has in the past referred to such states as ‘rogue’ or ‘of concern,’ ‘backlash’ or ‘outlaw’. This thesis uses:


the term 'US adversaries' for these nations. Such states are distinguished not only by internal
domestic repression, but also by a history of externally-directed behavior that the US views as
"aggressive and defiant." This historical external behavior includes development of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMDs) as well as promotion of radicalism and terrorism beyond their
national borders. Although the relations of the US with particular adversaries often warms and
cools over time, these states are marked, in the US' view, by a "chronic inability to engage
constructively with the outside world." In other words, these states interact antagonistically
with the international system constructed and led, in large part, by the US. During the Hu
Jintao administration, China played a leading role in delaying and watering down US-backed
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) action on issues including the Iranian nuclear program,
the genocide in Darfur, and the Libyan and Syrian revolts. China’s opposition to US initiatives
toward such states is not, however, constant. In contrast to its policy on Syria, for example,
Beijing put up relatively little initial resistance to the US-sponsored Libyan no-fly zone.

China’s support for US adversaries is puzzling because the top organizations and leaders
within China’s foreign policy system explicitly recognize the critical importance of China’s
relationship with the US. Hu Jintao has stressed that "China attaches great importance to
developing relations with the US and the development of healthy and stable China-US

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4 Other works on this subject have used the term "pariah state." Joel Wuthnow, "Beyond the Veto: Chinese
Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council (Phd Thesis)" (Columbia University, 2011), 18. However, "pariah"
implies a level of international isolation that is not always accurate; "US adversary" is preferable.
5 As described by Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs under Clinton. Lake,
"Confronting Backlash States," 45.
6 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," 46.
7 Harvey Morris, "Gaddafi's UN Envoy Joins Rebels," Financial Times, February 26 2011; Times of India, "UN
8 Lieberthal and Wang, "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust."
relations," while China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi has described the Sino-US relationship as “one of the most important bilateral relations in the world.” Xi Jinping’s goal of “a new type of great power relationship” similarly recognizes the importance of and dangers inherent in US-China relations.

If Sino-US relations were to deteriorate, there would be serious economic and security consequences for China. The “peaceful international environment” valued by China’s Ministry of National Defense as so useful to China’s development would be severely impaired. Moreover, China’s leaders and top officials have historically wished to avoid creating the perception, both in the US and in the world at large, that China is a future rival pole to the US.

The Chinese government’s repeated statements, from before Mao’s death to the present, that China will “never seek hegemony” is now explicitly used to address foreign

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13 Deng Xiaoping famously emphasized that China should “hide its capacities and bide its time” (韬光养晦). Although this statement was not initially directed as a guide to China’s US policy, this philosophy of restraint holds currency to the present and is directly relevant to China’s current US policy. Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” 6-7, 9. China continues to produce reports and statements designed to allay concerns about China’s rise and China’s diplomats make the case for restraint. For example: Information Office, “White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development,” ed. State Council (Beijing: 2011); Traub, “The World According to China “.
concerns about China’s rise. As Wang Guangya, China’s Ambassador to the UN from 2003-2008, has said, China “likes to punch underweight... We don’t want to make anyone feel uncomfortable.” While China has become more assertive after the 2008 financial crisis, China’s leaders nevertheless continue to see the Sino-US relationship as extremely important. However, despite the importance of the Sino-US relationship and international perceptions of China, China pursues policies that have clear costs for its international image and its foreign relations with the US. China’s Sudan policy created a discomfiting international backlash leading up to the Olympics, resulting in anti-China protests, the high-profile departure of Steven Spielberg as artistic adviser to the games, and generally very bad publicity in the US. Similarly, Chinese academics and analysts are well aware that China’s support for Iran is an important source of friction in Sino-US relations. On Syria, US State Department officials were deeply and publicly frustrated by China’s veto of an Arab-league backed peace plan. US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice pronounced the US “disgusted” with China and Russia’s

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15 People’s Daily, “Respect China’s Peaceful Sincerity (尊重中国的和平诚意); People’s Daily, “Cooperate in Jointly Creating a Beautiful Future in Sino-German Trade Cooperation - Speech at the Conference on Sino-German Industry Cooperation (携手共创中德经贸合作的美好生活-在中德企业合作论坛上的演讲).”
17 Lieberthal and Wang, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust.”
vetoes, while US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the vote a “travesty.” These statements and events do not meet Ambassador Wang’s goal of avoiding making “anyone feel uncomfortable.” Instead, they invite warnings from high-ranking US officials that China’s relations with US adversaries are “going to have repercussions elsewhere.”

Previous Literature on China’s Relationship with US Adversaries

This thesis looks at a particularly interesting and curious set of China US-adversary foreign relations, specifically, China’s relations with US adversaries in which Beijing has no clear security interest or ties. This group includes states such as Iran and Syria but excludes states such as North Korea. Why does China support these distant states in the absence of direct security motives? What limits the extent of this support? Houser and Levy’s 2008 work on “Energy Security and China’s UN Diplomacy” has been the most direct study comparing several hypotheses for China’s UNSC policy. They find that sovereignty norms drive China’s policy and that, in contrast, economic-interest explanations for China’s UNSC policy do not explain variation in China’s voting record. Their valuable work does not, however, focus upon US adversaries or the trade-offs inherent in China’s policy, nor draw out the full implications of

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China's behavior for both international politics and international relations theory. Their relatively short piece, moreover, makes a convincing case that economic interests do not account for variation in China's UNSC policy but does not show how sovereignty norms can explain the observed variation.

Wuthnow (2009) and (2013) finds that a mix of traditional and non-traditional security incentives, interest in promoting a strict interpretation of sovereignty, and economic interests are the motivations for China's policy towards US adversaries, while Wuthnow (2011) notes the additional motivation of maintaining a strong Sino-Russian relationship. Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small propose that a mix of growing economic interests and a focus upon promoting sovereignty norms account for China's policy. Similarly, earlier works on China's behavior at the UN is also relevant to China US-adversary relations. Papers by Kim, Thalakada, and Morphet touch upon China-US adversary relations but do not rigorously test competing hypotheses for this behavior. Kim notes that China's policy at the UN is driven by a mix of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, focus upon sovereignty norms, and pragmatism. Thalakada

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31 Wuthnow's literature review was very helpful on this subject. Wuthnow, "Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council (Phd Thesis)", 17.
finds that China balances economic interests, security incentives, and an interest in strict sovereignty norms, and Morphet highlights China’s interest in sovereignty norms. Studies of China’s general policy towards international intervention, such as those by Fravel, Reilly and Gill, and Chen relate to China’s US-adversary policy, as international intervention may involve US adversaries, but generally do not focus upon US adversaries nor compare possible explanations for China’s policy. Fravel’s work finds that China’s policy on international interventions stems from China’s interests in strict sovereignty norms, while Reilly and Gill cite a trade-off between norms and economic and security interests. Chen explains China’s increased involvement in and support of international peacekeeping through change in Chinese officials’ normative frameworks.

The Academic and Practical Importance of China’s Relations with US Adversaries

Different theories of international relations (IR) offer a number of plausible competing explanations for China’s behavior. Commercial-liberal theories of IR, most clearly articulated in the works of Lenin and Gilpin, predict that China’s foreign policy towards US adversaries is

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38 Fravel, "China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989," 1109.
40 Chen, "Explaining the Change in China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping: A Norm Change Perspective," 157-158.
driven by economic interests, especially interests in raw materials. Realist theories, on the other hand, predict that China's policy will be driven by the desire to counterbalance the US in response to US power or intentions. If, due to US primacy, hard balancing through alliances is too costly, then soft balancing — defined in this thesis as non-military action, motivated by the threat of US power, to restrict US power — will be the strategy of choice for countries such as China. Constructivist theories predict that China's US-adversary policy will arise from norms dictated by historical experience. In other words, China's past US-adversary policy will be driven by anti-imperialism based upon the “century of humiliation,” and, more recent changes will be driven by a process of socialization resulting from increased involvement with the international community. As Brooks and Wohlforth suggest, China's policy might be the result of regional-security concerns, sincere US-China diplomatic disputes unrelated to US power, China's domestic political incentives. Alternatively, as the International Crisis Group suggests might be the case, the policy could be an attempt by China to gain payoffs by initially opposing US policy. Beijing’s motivation for support of US adversaries thus has direct theoretical

importance, as the explanation for Beijing’s support will address basic debates on foreign policy formation in a unipolar international system. Moreover, the significance of soft-balancing explanations for China’s US-adversary policy directly addresses realist debates on the incidence and importance of soft balancing after the Cold War.⁴⁸

Understanding China’s policy towards US adversaries also has significant relevance for US policymakers. For example, if economic-interest explanations of China’s foreign policy are correct, then increased Saudi-Arabian oil exports to China should reduce China’s support for Iran. If soft-balancing or constructivist explanations are correct, obtaining China’s full support may be more difficult. On the Syrian issue, the strength of soft-balancing or constructivist preferences will dictate whether there are any meaningful UNSC resolutions that China would favor without significant concessions from the US. Moreover, the relevance of this thesis extends beyond China. India, Russia, and Brazil’s policies towards US adversaries have also noticeably diverged from the US position.⁴⁹ Understanding the China case may cast light upon the foreign policies of a number of nations.


⁴⁹ For example, see the joint opposition of these nations with China and Russia to US unilateral sanctions on Iran. Matthew Williams, "Brics Agree Not Bound by "Unilateral" Sanctions on Iran," Reuters, March 28 2012.
China as a Unitary Actor

This thesis treats China as a unitary actor, an assumption that provides substantial insights in the study of China's policy towards US adversaries. Thus, when this thesis refers to 'China' or 'Beijing,' it is referring to the Chinese government. Within the government, the ultimate responsibility for foreign policy rests with the 9-member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), led during the 2004-2012 period by Hu Jintao. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also plays a role in formulating policy and implements this policy at the UN Security Council (UNSC) through China's permanent mission to the UN. Other influential actors in the foreign policy system include the state councilor in charge of foreign affairs, the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group, the People's Liberation Army, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the International Liaison Group. 'China's' views as articulated in this thesis are thus results of deliberative processes between these actors, with the PBSC having the final say and the MFA carrying out the implementation.50

When describing China's views, I generally reference the public statements of Hu Jintao, MFA officials, and Chinese official state media, including the People's Daily (人民日报), Xinhua (新华) and the MFA's magazine World Knowledge (世界知识). I also use the published views of Chinese academics and analysts in order to provide a sense of foreign-policy views within China, some of which may be too sensitive to express in official government discourse. Although different Chinese policy actors have diverging opinions upon the merits of, for example,

peacekeeping when the host country has given consent, there is not strong evidence of Chinese intergovernmental disagreement on a policy opposing coercive US policies towards US adversaries.\footnote{International Crisis Group, "China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping," in Asia Report (2009), 19-22, 26.} Statements issued by Hu Jintao, the MFA, and official media were consistent with each other over 2003-2013. The unitary actor perspective, for the purposes of this thesis, is thus an acceptable assumption that lends tractability to the analysis.

**Summary of Approach and Findings**

In order to study the origin of China's US-adversary policy, this thesis adopts a small-N approach grounded in China's official pronouncements as well as the Chinese IR literature. My dependent variable is the difference between US policy preferences and China's negotiating position on individual UNSC resolutions concerning US adversaries. Based on this unit of analysis, I examine China's stance on UNSC action towards Sudan's human-rights abuses in Darfur, Iran's nuclear program, Libya's attempted suppression of its 2011 rebellion, and Syria's suppression of its own 2011-2013 revolt. These four states are selected based upon their history of deep antagonism with the US; these countries have been described by US officials as 'rogue,' 'of concern,' 'backlash,' or 'outlaw.'\footnote{Marquis, "U.S. Declares 'Rogue Nations' Are Now 'States of Concern'; Lake, "Confronting Backlash States; Litwak, "Rogue States - a Handy Label, but a Lousy Policy; de Lama, "Reagan Condemns 5 'Outlaw' Nations."} Their membership on the US State Department's "State Sponsors of Terrorism" list at some point during the 2004-2012 period is symptomatic of this antagonistic history. Out of the six countries on this list, these are the four that are non-
contiguously to China and were discussed at the UNSC discussion during this period. This research design critically improves upon the IR literature on soft balancing, which almost exclusively relies on anecdotal research designs. In other words, previous literature has no clear criteria for case selection or for determining what sort of states will balance and when. By selecting a state, China, with real motivation to balance, and by looking at China’s policy across a clearly defined sample of US adversaries, I, in contrast, examine empirical regularities in China’s behavior that test a variety of IR theories more satisfactorily than these previous pieces.

I find that soft balancing, based upon China’s desire for a strict interpretation of sovereignty that restricts the influence of US primacy, best explains China’s policy towards US adversaries. However, China does not soft-balance against the US in alliance with these adversarial countries. China does not currently, for example, collude with and aid in a meaningful way Iran’s nuclear program in order to promote a US rival in the Middle East. Rather, I propose that China soft-balances against the US in coordination with other major powers. China’s stance at the UNSC consistently opposes US policy at the maximum level of resistance by other UNSC permanent members, with Russia as China’s constant partner due to

53 Being outside of China’s region, they are not directly relevant to China’s regional security.
54 US Department of State, "State Sponsors of Terrorism Webpage," (2012). North Korea and Cuba were also on this list at some point during 2004-2012, but, as discussed below, these two states are excluded from the analysis. North Korea is excluded due to its contiguity and history of alliance with China; security and historical factors unique to North Korea influence the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship. The US-Cuba relationship over 2004-2012 had no tensions that required China to make substantial foreign policy choices.
56 Often referred to pejoratively in Chinese sources as hegemony (霸权).
similar opposition to US ideology and security concerns. As I discuss below, constructivist theories of China’s foreign policy are subsumed within this soft-balancing explanation, as China’s sovereignty norms are deeply related to concerns about US power. The economic-interest explanation of China’s international behavior fails to explain China’s US-adversary policy, and regional security concerns, sincere diplomatic disputes unrelated to US power, domestic political incentives, and issue linkage are similarly unsuccessful. My findings are thus broadly similar to Houser and Levy and Fravel but advance a soft-balancing interpretation of China’s behavior. Moreover, I propose a new explanation of Chinese tactics that can explain the observed variation in Chinese UNSC policy.

China, thus, manages the tradeoffs inherent in maintaining its relationship with the US while soft balancing against the US by opposing US policies towards US adversaries up to the same level as the other most-opposed permanent member of the UNSC. By doing so, Beijing reacts to the constraints of unipolarity, avoiding isolation that could provoke a strong and targeted US reaction. Critics of soft-balancing theories of international relations should reassess their findings that there “is no empirical basis for concluding that US power, and the security threat that potentially inheres in it, has influenced recent constraint actions undertaken by the other major powers.” The threat of US power is a clear factor in China’s foreign policy towards US adversaries. Beijing may have a more nuanced foreign policy now than it did in the 20th century, but promotion of sovereignty norms, as a restriction on

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57 Houser and Levy, “Energy Security and China’s UN Diplomacy; Fravel, “China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989.”
exercise of US power, remains an important component of this policy. Furthermore, this finding is consistent with a broader theory of middle-power foreign policy under unipolarity, described below, in which middle powers, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa, react to threats inherent to US primacy by soft balancing up to the level of the other most opposed middle powers. Although unipolarity may not necessarily result in a rebalancing of the international system, US primacy does worry these middle powers. China and Russia's soft balancing is most pronounced and most effective due to the threat that US ideology poses to their authoritarian systems and to their veto power on the UNSC.

In the following chapters, I lay out a general theory of soft balancing and its implementation under unipolarity that can explain China's policy towards US adversaries. I then describe the economic-interest theory, which is the most popular alternative explanation for China's policy. After stating the predictions implied by the two theories, I show that soft balancing can satisfactorily explain variation in China's policy towards US adversaries, while economic interest cannot. Next, I consider briefly the remaining alternative explanations for China's behavior. I conclude with a discussion of my results and their theoretical and policy implications.
Chapter 2: Soft Balancing Against the US: Motivation and Tactics

The Definition of Soft Balancing

How do states respond to international concentrations of power? Before the end of the Cold War, realists saw ample evidence of hard balancing, the use of internal strengthening or external alliance structures with a focus on accumulating military might, in response to systemic concentrations of power or threat. However, hard balancing against the US, the international system’s sole remaining pole or ‘unipole,’ has been notably absent following the end of the Cold War. This absence is generally attributed to overwhelming US military and economic power, described in this thesis as ‘US primacy’ or ‘unipolarity,’ as well as the US’ non-threatening (for most states) foreign policy.61

The dearth of hard balancing against the US has provoked a debate between realists who see a more subtle form of balancing against US power and those who deny such a phenomenon. Art, Pape, Paul, and Walt lead the group in favor of this “soft balancing,” while Brooks and Wohlforth and Lieber and Alexander lead those opposed. The debate is

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60 For example: Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
62 Walt, Taming American Power; Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States; Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy; Art et al., "Striking the Balance."
complicated by conflicting definitions of basic terms, including the term "soft balancing" itself,\textsuperscript{64} and anecdotal research designs.\textsuperscript{65}

In this thesis, in order to address the criticisms often made of the soft-balancing concept, I use a restrictive definition of soft balancing:

\textbf{Soft balancing against the unipole is non-military action by sovereign states, motivated by the threat of the unipole's power, to restrict the unipole's power.}

I use the term "power" in the sense of both military and economic material capabilities. Like Walt,\textsuperscript{66} I focus on threat – the threat from the unipole is a function both of the power itself \textit{and} the unipole's intentions. Soft balancing is motivated by both capabilities and intentions, as there can be no threat without both power and the possibility of its use. Thus, states with a strong alliance relationship with the US, such as France and Britain, will generally be less concerned by US power than other middle powers. Nations such as India and Brazil, although democratic, lack as strong a relationship with the US, and thus will feel unease at overwhelming US power and possibly changeable US intentions.

Soft balancing is a rational reaction to a systemic concentration of military power because it shifts competition and contention from an arena where the military arena where the unipole dominates the field to arenas where power is more evenly distributed. In addition to

\textsuperscript{64} Nexon, "The Balance of Power."

\textsuperscript{65} There is no clear criteria for case selection in the above papers by Art, Pape, Paul, and Walt, nor in the work by Brooks and Wohlforth or Lieber and Alexander (although case selection in these criticisms of soft balancing is shaped by the case selection of the proponents of soft balancing). Examples of commonly cited cases are international opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, opposition to US intervention in Kosovo, general increased European military cooperation, and Russian arms sales to China and Iran.

\textsuperscript{66} Walt, \textit{The Origins of Alliances}, Chapter 2.
the military arena, balancing can also take place in economic and diplomatic arenas. Economic competition is characterized by actions such as the formation of trade pacts that exclude the unipole, depriving the unipole of economic-growth opportunities, or consistent alliance in joint suits against the unipole at the World Trade Organization. Economic soft balancing can also have significant costs for the balancing parties, due to the unipole’s substantial economic power and the benefits of trade with the unipole. The focus of this thesis is not economic soft balancing, and I have not found concrete examples of this type of balancing. Nevertheless, the economic arena is a clear area in which opposition to the unipole could occur.

Diplomatic soft balancing is characterized by attempts to restrain the unipole’s use of its military and economic power through restriction and delegitimization of these capabilities in international forums. For example, a soft-balancing tactic could be the exclusion of the unipole from discussion of regional issues through, for example, the formation of regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Association. If diplomatic opposition to US and NATO intervention in Kosovo was motivated by the threat inherent in US power and was designed to restrict US power by refusing international legitimation of its use, this diplomatic opposition would be soft balancing. The UNSC is a particularly fruitful area for diplomatic soft balancing for middle powers with vetoes, such as China and Russia. There are only five permanent members of the Council, each has exactly the same prerogatives, and each can unilaterally prevent UNSC authorization of sanctions or military force. In comparison to the military arena, the UNSC arena is thus distinctly more favorable for states with vetoes who oppose the unipole.
The magnitude of soft balancing by a given country can be measured by the severity of that country’s opposition to the unipole. Diplomatic opposition, for example, could range from enabling the unipole’s actions in international forums to completely blocking any international legitimatization of these actions. In my description of China’s relations with the four US adversaries below, I discuss the specifics of measuring China’s diplomatic opposition to US policies at the UNSC.

This definition refines previous definitions of soft balancing. Walt defines soft balancing as the “conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to US preferences – outcomes that could not be obtained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support.” Paul defines it as “the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the United Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if the United States goes beyond its stated goals” and Pape finds that soft balancing is “actions that do not directly challenge US military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral US military policies.” My definition is closest to Pape’s in that my focus is non-military balancing behavior. However, I have no requirement that soft balancing be directed at “US military policies,” non-military action by sovereign states that restricts the unipole’s (US’) power in areas such as, for example, international markets, are also included in my definition. My definition, moreover, catches much of the spirit of Walt and Paul’s definitions, even if it differs in specifics. In other

words, my definition captures the nature of soft balancing as balancing against the unipole when military opposition and alliance is prohibitively costly.

Art prefers a much more expansive definition of soft balancing that includes any state behavior intended to augment that state's power. The advantage of my more restricted definition, however, is that it answers the objections of many of soft-balancing's critics. The reference to US power in the definition addresses the criticism of Brooks and Wohlforth that soft balancing must be motivated by US power or policies to be an analytically useful concept. It would rule out, for example, a genuine dispute among US allies over how best to intervene in a foreign civil war. Moreover, this focus on restricting unipolar power sets a minimum threshold for soft balancing. The goal, if not the effect, of soft balancing must be restriction upon US power. Diplomatic rhetoric that opposes the unipole's position but that is accompanied by actions that in fact aid the unipole is not soft balancing. Rather, such behavior should properly be described as, at a minimum, tactical cooperation with the unipole, and, at a maximum, discrete 'bandwagoning.' The precision of the definition meets Lieber and Alexander's critique that "defining and operationalizing the concept is difficult." Finally, my definition concerns a state's behavior rather than the results of this behavior. I do not address the realist debate on the presence or absence of an international systemic tendency towards multipolarity.

72 See, for example, Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 108-111.
China’s Motivations to Soft Balance

Why would China soft balance against the US? Following the end of the Cold War, existential threats to China’s national survival seem more or less absent.75 China’s 2010 Defense White Paper notes that: “the overall security environment... remains favorable,”76 and, despite varying somewhat during high tensions on the Taiwan Strait,77 this assessment has been more or less consistent in past White Papers. Given the importance of the Sino-US relationship for China’s economic growth, even soft balancing would thus seem curious as it could damage this relationship. However, US power and policies directly endanger two of the four “goals and tasks of China’s national defense.” Specifically, the US threatens the first goal of “Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development” and the second goal of “Maintaining social harmony and stability.”78 US policy and military support prevents any forceful reunification of Taiwan with mainland China79 and prominent US politicians, including the US president, continue to meet with and support Tibetan advocates.80 China defines both issues as “core interests (核心利益).”81 With regards to China’s goal of “social stability,” the US promotes international norms antithetical to the CCP’s rule. The Eastern-European color

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77 For example, the 1996 White Paper, written in the shadow of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, is more pessimistic, discussing a future World War that “can be delayed, and may possibly also be avoided (新的世界大战不仅可以推迟，而且有可能避免)." Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, "White Paper: China’s National Defense in 1996," (Beijing: 2005), Chapter 1: Advancing Human Peace and Development.
revolutions and Arab Spring, as well as the US role in these events and possible implications for China, have deeply troubled Beijing.\textsuperscript{82} Finally, US power threatens China in a general sense, continued US primacy is seen by some Chinese analysts and scholars as a constraint on China’s growing power.\textsuperscript{83} Beijing would distinctly prefer ‘multipolarity’ to US primacy.\textsuperscript{84} China thus has strong motivation to soft balance against the US.

Promotion of strict sovereignty norms is one manner by which China can delegitimize and restrict unilateral use of US power that may, in the future, be applied against China. As a result, China has adopted the maintenance of international norms of strict inviolable sovereignty as a component of its national defense.\textsuperscript{85} China’s promotion of the norm of strict Westphalian sovereignty and non-interference developed from the 1960s onwards as a reaction to the dual threats of US ‘imperialism’ and Soviet ‘social imperialism’.\textsuperscript{86} With the passing of the USSR, promotion of sovereignty has become intimately tied to concerns regarding US primacy.\textsuperscript{87} China wishes to avoid legitimation of “power politics (强权政治),”\textsuperscript{88} in

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\textsuperscript{83} Goldstein, \textit{Rising to the Challenge}, 112; Lieberthal and Wang, "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust," 7-19.

\textsuperscript{84} For example: Shucheng Liu (刘树成), "The International and Domestic Environment Faced by China’s Development in the Next 15 Years (我国‘十二五’时期发展面临的国内外环境)," \textit{People's Daily}, March 25 2011; Yong Deng, \textit{China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 145-151.

\textsuperscript{85} Fravel, "China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989," 1115-1119.

\textsuperscript{86} Kim, \textit{China, the United Nations, and World Order}, 90-93, 410-415.

\textsuperscript{87} For example: Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power," 14-15. Although a number of authors suggest that China’s focus on this norm has loosened, at least slightly, in recent years, these authors still note the high
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other words international sanctions and intervention, as a response to the domestic crises or territorial disputes of sovereign nations. The analogy of such international actions to China's own experience following the Tiananmen massacre, as well as China's colonial experience, is clear. Official media articles that attack the idea that “human rights are more important than sovereignty” are somewhat less virulent than in the 1990s, but this discourse nevertheless continues. Moreover, there is a clear conceptual link between promoting sovereignty and opposing US primacy, which is often referred to, pejoratively, as “hegemony (霸权)” in current Chinese scholarly discourse and, obliquely, in current official discourse. Chinese analysts and academics commonly discuss a strict interpretation of sovereignty and the abuses of US primacy in the same piece, and China is, up to the present, distinctly opposed to any remaining importance of the norm. Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge*, 76-77; Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, "China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?".


international precedent that could impact China. The Chinese Foreign Ministry similarly stated in 2005 that the US government: “uses human rights as a tool to promote hegemony and power politics (把人权作为推行霸权主义和强权政治的工具),” and, as China’s Premier has stated, “China opposes hegemonism and power politics.” Thus, opposing the use of US power to coerce US adversaries both prevents the legitimation of international norms that might be used by the US against China and restricts the general power of US “hegemony” to dictate international and domestic affairs. China “does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, nor does it allow others to interfere in its internal affairs.”

**Soft-Balancing Tactics at the UNSC**

China is distinctly aware that the UNSC is an ideal arena in which to restrain US power. As Premier Wen Jiabao stated in 2007:

*China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a member in other important international organizations. We should make full use of this favorable condition to uphold China's fundamental interests.*

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95 Wen (温家宝), “Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning China’s Foreign Policy.”
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
As laid out in the theoretical foundations of soft balancing above, China should be expected to choose arenas for balancing where the playing field is less one-sided. Although the UNSC seat is valuable to China for a number of reasons, Chinese officials are certainly clearly aware that the UNSC is such an arena for diplomatic balancing. The UNSC is not the only arena in which China soft balances, Evan Medeiros of RAND has noted similar behavior in non-proliferation forums, where China uses "such forums to register its opposition to U.S. security policies (such as US missile defense programs), to limit US influence on key issues and to promote the Chinese position on nonproliferation and arms control." 

There is a limit to how far China can be expected to support a US adversary, however. While domestic human-rights abuse, even if grievous, does not threaten China’s security, economy, or system of government, some US-adversary policies could possibly directly impact critical Chinese interests. Iran’s threats to, for example, close the Strait of Hormuz, a step that would disrupt world oil markets and thus China’s economy, prompted Premier Wen Jiabao to state China’s opposition to "any extreme acts across the Strait of Hormuz." Similarly, although China is currently not overly concerned by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon, China should not be expected to support Iran’s sovereign rights if they begin to drastically destabilize the Middle East and the world economy. The International Crisis Group

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98 International Crisis Group, "China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping," 11-12. Although some of the International Crisis Group’s interviews with Chinese officials as well as some academics such as Johnston suggest that an interest in safeguarding the current UN and economic system has become increasingly important to China, this view of the UNSC as an ideal forum for balancing US power is still alive and well in China, as my paper shows. Ibid; Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), Chapter 4.

99 Medeiros, China’s International Behavior, 188-191.


101 International Crisis Group, "The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing."
has noted a pattern in which China reflexively supports states, including US adversaries, against interference in their internal affairs, only afterwards to have to modify its stance due to the trouble these states cause in their regional environment. However, as will be shown below, even when the actions of US adversaries do affect their world region to a moderate extent, China still promotes global norms of sovereignty and non-interference while avoiding international isolation.

Constructivists may criticize the linkage of China’s promotion of strict sovereignty with opposition to US power. Specifically, a constructivist might hold that China’s preference for a strict interpretation of sovereignty is rooted in a historical colonial experience and is a deeply held norm unrelated to US primacy. However, as shown in the preceding paragraphs, the preference is intimately linked, in Chinese discourse and conceptually, to concerns about US power. A constructivist interpretation of China’s foreign policy that takes this linkage into account is subsumed by the soft-balancing definition provided above.

Having provided a general overview of soft balancing and China’s motivation to soft balance, I now turn to the specifics of soft-balancing tactics. Opposing a pole in the international system, for whatever reason, can carry substantial costs for a less powerful state. Moreover, under unipolarity, the unipole’s unmatched economic, diplomatic, and military power will make isolated opposition particularly dangerous. As Pape, Paul, and Walt note, states thus generally prefer to coordinate their opposition. Even if their opposition was for reasons unrelated to soft balancing, Russia, France, and Germany notably cooperated in

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opposing UNSC legitimation of US invasion of Iraq. 104 US officials found that each member of this group was willing to oppose the US as long as the others did. 105 Similarly, Russia and China coordinated in their opposition to US and NATO action in Kosovo, 106 and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have jointly stated their opposition to US unilaterally imposed sanctions on Iran. 107 The change in the USSR/Russia’s UNSC voting behavior leading up to and after the Cold War is a further illustration of this point. While up to the 1970s Russia was willing to adopt extremely adversarial positions at the UNSC, often vetoing resolutions and openly opposing the US, Russian behavior has noticeably moderated as its power has decreased. 108 Following the Cold-War, Russia is still willing to oppose the US, but generally coordinates this opposition with states such as France and China.

In general, then, a given state can be expected, under unipolarity, to avoid isolation in opposition to the unipole on issues that are not critical to that given state. In other words:

**A state soft balancing against the unipole will oppose the unipole on non-critical issues only up to the level at which the state still has substantial international support.**

Non-critical issues are those that do not immediately and directly threaten a state’s security, economy, or its system of government. The unipole’s treatment of its distant adversaries will generally be non-critical. Substantial international support is defined as international support

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107 Williams, "Brics Agree Not Bound by "Unilateral" Sanctions on Iran."
that leads other states to make efforts equal to China's own contribution. China's level of support is particularly well-defined at the UNSC, where there are only three voting options, and the level of support can be seen in the similarity of other permanent members' votes to China's own.

China's US-adversary policy is a clear example of these soft-balancing tactics. The country has a long history of maintaining a low profile at the United Nations and, except on issues critical to Chinese security such as Taiwan and North Korea, will not oppose the US unilaterally. Kim, Thalakada, Wuthnow, and Garver, Leverett, and Leverett, as well as US negotiators, all note China's avoidance of international isolation and attempt to balance interests at the UNSC. Johnston similarly notes China's aversion to isolation at the UN General Assembly, and the International Crisis Group notes China's common references to the support of regional organizations when discussing China's position at the UNSC. This aversion to isolation stems from two key concerns. First, China does not want to take an overly aggressive role in world affairs, as Chinese leaders, from Deng Xiaoping onwards, have a clear policy of preventing an international reaction to China's rise. This concern is reflected in Deng Xiaoping's admonition to: "observe developments soberly, maintain our position, meet challenges calmly, hide our capacities, bide our time, remain free of ambitions and never claim

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109 Vote affirmatively, negatively, or abstain.
112 He also notes a Chinese interest in maintaining a good image overseas. Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 131-136.
leadership.” It is further manifested in China’s more recent rebranding in the 2000s of its “peaceful rise (和平崛起)” to the more reassuring “peaceful development (和平发展).”\textsuperscript{114}

With regards to the UNSC, this desire to avoid standing out was so pronounced in the 1980s that China often would not even vote on UNSC resolutions, preferring to not declare even a decision to abstain. This desire to avoid isolation and aggressive behavior has been tempered as China has increased in power, but it is still a key driver in China’s UNSC behavior.\textsuperscript{115}

\textbf{China and Russia’s Joint Soft-Balancing at the UNSC}

Thus, although China’s US-adversary policy balances diplomatically against the US in order to prevent the erosion of sovereignty norms and in order to restrict US international freedom of action, China trades-off its opposition to US power and the importance of the Sino-US relationship by avoiding international isolation, and the UN is an ideal forum for finding partners opposed to US intervention and US propagation of liberal values. People’s Daily in 2006 noted this climate of opposition and the multitude of countries opposed to US policy in an article called “America’s UN General Assembly Nightmare (美国的联大‘梦魇’)”.\textsuperscript{116} Thus, at the UNSC:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} International Crisis Group, "China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping," 11; Orville Schell, "China Reluctant to Lead," \textit{Yale Global} (2009).
\item \textsuperscript{115} International Crisis Group, "China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping," 3-5; Schell, "China Reluctant to Lead."
\item \textsuperscript{116} Xuejiang Li (李学江), "America’s UN General Assembly Nightmare (美国的联大‘梦魇’)," \textit{People’s Daily}, September 29 2006.
\end{itemize}
China consistently opposes aggressive US policy on non-contiguous US adversaries up to the level of the most opposed other permanent member of the UNSC.

In practice, this country is Russia; China's "largest neighbor (最大的邻国)," whom Chinese official media discusses terms of a "Strategic Partnership (伙伴合作)." Russia is the country on the UNSC with the most similar concerns regarding US power, international propagation of liberal norms, the maintenance of a traditional concept of sovereignty, and opposition to the use of sanctions and military force to influence foreign countries' domestic affairs. Russia's most recent foreign policy whitepaper speaks directly to this last concern multiple times, stating that:

It is unacceptable that military interventions and other forms of interference from without which undermine the foundations of international law based on the principle of sovereign equality of states, be carried out on the pretext of implementing the concept of 'responsibility to protect.'

The same document decries that: "some concepts... [of international law] are being implemented [that] are aimed at overthrowing legitimate authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting civilian population." China has very similar concerns, and

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117 Yihuang Zhou (周溢潢), "China's Foreign Policy Achievements Gain People's Attention (中国外交成就令人瞩目)," PLA Daily, June 24 2002.
interviews with US diplomats and overall analysis of UNSC voting patterns suggest clear coordination between Russian and Chinese positions. Although China’s official media may state that China and Russia’s strategic partnership does not target any third country,\textsuperscript{120} the obstruction of US policy on US adversaries is, in reality, distinctly related to security concerns regarding US power.\textsuperscript{121} China and Russia have not formed a hostile alliance system against the US, but at the UNSC they are well-matched partners.

On some issues Russia takes the lead, on others China takes the lead, but there is consistent correlation of positions.\textsuperscript{122} The following stylized game can be imagined:

1. The US adversary acts, taking an action contrary to US interests. In the four cases discussed below, this action is either violation of humanitarian norms or suspected violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

2. The US, possibly in coordination with allies such as Britain and France who have similar concerns, formulates a policy of UNSC pressure on the US adversary.

3. Russia and China respond in opposition to the components of the policy that infringe upon sovereignty and propagate liberal ideals. Due to what seems to be a greater aversion to international isolation on China’s part, Russia in the cases below often appears to take the lead when states non-contiguous to

\textsuperscript{120} See, for example, World Knowledge, affiliated with the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Guangcheng Geng (邢广程), "How to Get Along with Russia (与俄罗斯怎样相处)," World Knowledge (世界知识), March 2012.

\textsuperscript{121} Medeiros, China’s International Behavior, 187-188.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
China are discussed at the UNSC. China takes a position as, but no more extreme, than Russia’s. Chinese and Russian opposition can range from delay and weakening of resolutions to outright vetoes.

4. The US adversary decides whether or not to cease the behavior motivating US displeasure. In all four cases discussed below, the US adversary does not acquiesce to pressure exerted through the UNSC.

5. Assuming the issue is not resolved following step (3), the US, with Britain and France, often pushes for increased UNSC pressure through new resolutions. Steps (3) and (4) repeat.

6. This cycle continues either until the US adversary ceases the behavior objectionable to the US or until it becomes clear that the US and its allies will not achieve further UNSC pressure due to Chinese and Russian opposition.

By these steps, Chinese opposition to the US at the UNSC promotes a sovereignty norm that both protects China’s sovereignty and impedes the exercise of US power overseas, while avoiding a situation in which China bears sole responsibility for opposing the US.

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123 Russia seems to take the lead more often than China. A likely reason for Russia’s more aggressive anti-US position is the difference in Russia and China’s power trajectory. While China is a rising power, Russia is instead a stable or declining power with less economic dependence upon the US. Russia thus has less reason to maintain a good relationship with the US – Russia neither expects to be substantially stronger militarily or economically in the future, nor is Russian-US trade as important as Sino-US trade.

124 However, the exact details of this collaboration are somewhat opaque, due to the lack of good primary sources, at the time of the writing of this thesis, on diplomatic communication between Russia and China.
Testable Predictions

This theory of China’s soft balancing makes two concrete testable predictions. First, China will always be opposed, in principle, to aggressive US policy towards US adversaries (or, for that matter, any state). Aggressive actions such as sanctions or military action threaten to set a precedent for intervention in China’s own domestic affairs and territorial disputes, while also possibly increasing the US’ international influence. This opposition will be evident in speeches, writings, and initial negotiating positions taken by Chinese official sources. Second, China will always engage in the same level of diplomatic opposition as the other maximally-opposed permanent members of the UNSC. China will never move to an isolated oppositional position, as China is unwilling to bear the cost to the Sino-US relationship. China may, if possible, attempt to coordinate its actions with other states and encourage them to support the Chinese position. However, China will not be isolated; if the position of the other maximally opposed UNSC member shifts, China’s position will also shift.
Chapter 3: Economic Interest as an Alternative Theory

Theoretical Foundations

The most popular alternative explanation of China’s US-adversary policy is economic interest, especially interest in foreign raw materials. I thus review the economic interest theory before examining closely China’s relations with these four US adversaries. The theory is grounded in “commercial-liberal” theories of IR, “liberal” in the sense that the theory finds that state preferences shape national foreign policy and “commercial” in that it postulate that these preferences are shaped by economic interest. Lenin and Gilpin have been the most notable advocates of such a theory. Lenin notes the inevitable drive of capitalist states, motivated by domestic commercial interests, to secure natural resources and markets overseas, as well as the inevitable conflict that this impulse causes between major powers. China is now sufficiently capitalist to be covered by Lenin’s theory. Gilpin similarly finds a tendency for states to respond to growth in national “power and wealth” by a search for control of international markets and resources. He also notes the international tension caused by limits on resource availability. In recent years, both Chinese and Western authors have used the economic-interest theory to explain China’s foreign policy towards US adversaries. In the case of Iran, for example, China’s Former Ambassador to Iran Hua Liming (华黎明) and Fudan University Professor Shen Dingli (沈丁立), as well as Western analysts, apply an economic-

128 For example: Zweig and Bi, "China’s Global Hunt for Energy; Gang Yin (殷罡), "Four Doubts Concerning Syria (关于叙利亚的四个疑问)," World Knowledge (世界知识) 2011 44; Shen (沈丁立), "2007: Anti-Proliferation and Sino-US Relations (防扩散与中美关系)."
interest theory to explain China’s position. Shen Dingli states, for example, “Whatever Iran does, we need oil... Oil is more important than international law”. Similar interpretations of China’s policy are often used to explain China’s position on Sudan.

In broad terms, based upon Lenin and Gilpin’s discussions of spheres of influence and resultant international conflict, the implications of the economic-interest theory can be stated as the following:

Increased economic interest by a given country in a US adversary will result in increased support by that given country for that US adversary, even on issues not directly impacting that given country’s economic interest.

Increased economic interest by a given country in a US adversary will draw that US adversary into the given country’s sphere of influence. The trading relationship thus created will make this country reluctant to see other nations influence and coerce this US adversary. The economic-interest theory, in other words, posits the development of a semi-mercantilist or colonial relationship between major powers and their lesser trading powers. Economic-interest explanations of China’s foreign policy, for example, often cite a desire by China to increase its energy security through the development of preferential relationships with exporting nations.

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129 Garver, Leverett, and Leverett, “Moving (Slightly) Closer to Iran; M.D. Swaine, “Beijing’s Tightrope Walk on Iran,” China Leadership Monitor 33 (2010); Hua (华黎明), "The Iran Nuclear Issue and China’s Foreign Policy Choices (伊朗核问题与中国外交的选择); Shen (沈丁立), "2007: Anti-Proliferation and Sino-US Relations (防扩散与中美关系).” See also pieces such as: Zhu (注力平), "The Iran Problem under the Influence of Nuclear Security and China’s Foreign-Policy Strategy Choice (核安全背景下的伊朗核问题与中国外交战略选择)," 60.
132 A narrow theory that stated that China will oppose UNSC policies that directly and immediately impact its interest, ceteris paribus, is self-evident. The broader theory presented here is more in line with that proposed by Lenin and Gilpin.
These relationships cause tension with the US as they conflict with US international influence.\textsuperscript{133}

Testable Predictions

In the Chinese context, then, this theory predicts that China’s overall support for US adversaries will vary as a function of China’s economic interests in these states. If Chinese companies invest in and trade substantially with a given country, China will support this country internationally even on issues that do not directly impact China’s trade and investments. For example, a strong economic relationship with a US adversary would lead China to shield that US adversary from international censure for its nuclear program, even if China’s economic interests in the country are not threatened directly by the censure. As China’s security interests in the four US adversaries considered in this thesis are minimal, the economic interest theory predicts that this support will be proportional to China’s economic relationship with these states. This support will continue until a US adversary threatens to massively disrupt the world economy or world stability, forcing a tradeoff between China’s interests in the US adversary and China’s broader interests.

\textit{The economic-interest theory thus predicts that China’s support for these four US adversaries will vary proportional to their economic importance.} China’s economic interest can be measured along four axes: total trade, energy trade, Chinese investment and contracts, and

\textsuperscript{133} See, for example: Zweig and Bi, "China’s Global Hunt for Energy."
arms trade. As a percentage of China’s total trade in all goods, however, none of the four adversarial countries are particularly important. Chinese imports from and exports to Iran, China’s largest trading partner among the four, have only ever reached 1.1% of China’s trade with the world. The maximum that China’s combined trade with Syria, Sudan, and Libya has ever reached is 0.62% of China’s trade with the world. As a reference, China’s trade with the US in goods was 13% of China’s trade with the world in 2010, without including services, which are a substantial portion of the US exports to China. Total trade is not a credible explanation for China’s interest in these states.

Energy products, investment, and arms would seem more likely explanations for China’s interest in US adversaries. In particular, both Lenin and Gilpin highlight the importance of natural resources. Moreover, with regard to energy, Beijing is keenly aware of the dependence of the Chinese economy upon foreign energy imports. China’s powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and China’s gigantic state-owned oil-and-gas companies form an important constituency in the Chinese government with an interest in promoting trade with and investment in energy-rich states. In particular, elements of the NDRC are strong advocates for a non-market-based approach to energy security, an approach which necessitates increased involvement with resource-rich foreign governments. Figure 1 presents China’s

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135 Nevertheless, including total trade in the following analysis as a measure of the relative importance of these US adversaries to China will not change the analysis, the order of importance would still be Iran, Sudan, Libya, Syria.
136 In 2011, Sinopec Group and China National Petroleum were, respectively, the world’s 5th and 6th largest companies in the world by revenue CNN Money, "Global 500," ed. CNN (2011).
total imports of mineral-fuels, oils, and products of their distillation\textsuperscript{138} from the four US adversaries as a percentage of China’s total imports of these goods. For reference, in 2010, out of all suppliers, Iran was China’s 3\textsuperscript{rd} largest foreign source of these goods (3\textsuperscript{rd} also in crude oil), Sudan was 9\textsuperscript{th} (6\textsuperscript{th} for just crude oil) and Libya was 16\textsuperscript{th} (10\textsuperscript{th} for crude oil). Syria’s energy importance was negligible.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{China’s imports of mineral-fuels, oils, and products of their distillation from the four US adversaries as a percentage of China’s total imports of these goods. As reported by China.\textsuperscript{139} Out of the four, Iran is the most important source of these products by far. Sudan, then Libya, are of medium importance. China does not import these resources in any important quantity from Syria.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{138} This classification includes crude oil as well as natural gas and related energy goods. This measure thus looks beyond just crude oil.

\textsuperscript{139} I use China’s reported figures as the importing party generally keeps better statistics than the exporting country. UN Comtrade, "UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database."
Chinese investment and contracts, in energy and otherwise, might also be thought to constitute economic interest.\footnote{China is certainly aware of the possible impact of unrest in US adversaries upon Chinese investments. See, for example: Guimei Yao (姚桂梅), "Deriving Lessons from Losses in Libyan Investments (汲取在利比亚投资受损的教训)," \textit{World Knowledge (世界知识)}, September 2011.} A complete and reliable list of Chinese investment overseas is not available; I use Derek Scissors’ list of publicly reported investments over $100 million.\footnote{All prices are in US dollars. Scissors focuses upon accurately characterizing the destination of investment, avoiding problems with China’s official data. This official data tends to show that much of Chinese investment goes to Hong Kong. However, Hong Kong is a routing destination and China’s official data does not record the ultimate destination after Hong Kong. Derek Scissors, \textit{China’s Investment Overseas in 2010} (The Heritage Foundation, 2011 [cited May, 2012]; available from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/02/chinas-investment-overseas-in-2010.)} Iran is the most important investment destination out of the US adversaries. According to Scissors’ conservative estimate, over the 2005 to 2012 period Chinese companies invested more than $10 billion in Iran and secured contracts worth $1.5 billion or more.\footnote{Derek Scissors, \textit{China Global Investment Tracker: 2012} (2012 [cited May 2012]); available from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/china-global-investment-tracker-2012.} The actual sum invested is likely higher, with some sources citing sums as high as $100 to $120 billion and the truth lying somewhere between these upper bounds and Scissor’s lower bounds.\footnote{Erica Downs and Suzanne Maloney, "Getting China to Sanction Iran: The Chinese Iranian-Oil Connection," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 90, no. 2 (2011).} Sudan is probably the second most important investment destination. Scissors reports relatively low credibly-reported investment, but other sources discuss investment of more than $6 to 8 billion by 2008.\footnote{Human Rights First, "Investing in Tragedy: China’s Money, Arms, and Politics in Sudan; Scissors, \textit{China Global Investment Tracker: 2012} ([cited]; Qingfen Ding and Jiabao Li, "Investing in Sudan a ‘Win-Win’ Situation," \textit{China Daily}, August 29 2011; Wuthnow, "Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council (Phd Thesis)", 223; International Crisis Group, "China’s Thirst for Oil," in \textit{Asia Report} (2008), 23.} Chinese investment was substantial enough to give China a strong voice with the Sudanese government when China finally decided to ask the country to accept a UN force in Darfur.\footnote{Cooper, "Darfur Collides with Olympics, and China Yields; Wuthnow, "Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council (Phd Thesis)", Chapter 5; International Crisis Group, "China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping," 20.} Finally, Scissors reports that Chinese companies had secured approximately $3 billion
in Libyan contracts as of the 2011 revolts (no investment data available), and that Chinese investment in Syria totaled approximately $3 billion as of 2012 (no contract data available).\footnote{Scissors, \textit{China Global Investment Tracker: 2012} ([cited]).}

Defense companies associated with China’s military might be thought to lobby effectively for arms sales, lending arms exports a disproportionate weight in China’s policy.\footnote{Although another possible interpretation is that China’s arms trade is an instrument, rather than motivator, of China’s foreign policy. Daniel Byman and Roger Cliff, \textit{China’s Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications} (RAND, 1999).} According to publicly available data, Iran was China’s second largest arms export destination over the 2004-2012 period, while Sudan was 15\textsuperscript{th}. There is no reliable public record of substantial Chinese arms exports to Libya and Syria over this period.\footnote{Exports to Pakistan, however, dwarfed all other arms exports. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Sipri Arms Transfers Database,” (2012).}

In summary, across energy, investment, and arms, the order of importance of the four countries to China would be: Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Syria. \textit{The economic-interest theory would expect China’s support for these states to vary proportionally}. I discuss the specifics of measuring this support at the UNSC in the next section.
Chapter 4: Case Studies of China’s Policy towards US Adversaries

Case Study Selection

Having described the two competing theories above, in this section I show that soft balancing, not economic interest, best explains China’s UNSC support of US adversaries. Specifically, I consider China’s support of Sudan, Iran, Libya, and Syria at the UNSC over 2004-2013, the period of time from Hu Jintao’s full assumption of China’s leadership to Xi Jinping’s full assumption of leadership. My unit of analysis is China’s overall position on UNSC resolutions concerning these countries. There is thus one observation per US adversary. While soft balancing is sufficient to explain China’s support for these states, economic interest is not.

These four states have a history of tension with the US and are often described in the US as ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw.’ Their membership on the US State Department’s “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list at some point during the 2004-2012 period is symptomatic of this antagonistic history. Out of the six countries on this list, these are the four that are non-contiguous to


151 The Secretary of State places countries on this list for having “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” Placement on the list results in “restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.” The bite of these sanctions and restrictions are substantial. US Department of State, "State Sponsors of Terrorism Webpage." Terrorism is not the immediate cause of US tensions with these states during the 2004-2012 period, but the list nevertheless proxies well for underlying antagonism. Walt mentions a similar list of US adversaries with a good deal of overlap. Walt, Taming American Power, 123.

152 The US removed Libya from the list in 2007, but the list still proxies well for an underlying level of distrust that resulted in relatively quick US support for the Libyan opposition. The analysis that follows is, in any case, robust to removal of the analysis of the 2011 events in Libya. Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler, "As U.N. Backs Military Action
China and which are discussed at the UNSC during this period. Their geographical situation is comparable; they are all in the North Africa and Western Asia, a region of the world where “hegemony and counter-hegemony struggle against each other (霸权与挑战霸权的争斗)” according to People’s Daily. 153

North Korea and Cuba are also adversaries of the US and appeared on this list over the 2004-2013 period. However, North Korea is excluded as China has a historical and security relationship with North Korea that makes China-North Korea relations fundamentally different from Beijing’s relations with other US adversaries. 154 China has few security ties with the remaining states on this list. Cuba is excluded due to an absence of international incidents over this period requiring China’s input at the UNSC.

This research design improves upon the IR literature on soft balancing 155 which, as mentioned above, tests soft-balancing theories using an anecdotal sample of countries with widely varying motivations and security concerns. This literature considers soft balancing in diverse cases such as international opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, opposition to US intervention in Kosovo, increased intra-European military cooperation, and Russian arms sales to China and Iran. The implicit assumption is that countries such as China, Germany, France, and Russia will react similarly to US primacy. However, as Li Chao (李超) notes, nations may


adopt the same policy for different reasons. China and the BRICS have very different attitudes than Germany towards the US' policy towards its adversaries, even if Germany occasionally votes with the BRICS in opposing intervention. Furthermore, not all major powers must engage in soft balancing for soft balancing to be an important phenomenon.

Thus, rather than rely on this strong assumption of equivalence, my design focuses on the foreign policy of one country with motivation to soft balance, China, towards a set of countries selected systematically based on their history of antagonism with the US. By looking at China's policy towards these four US adversaries, rather than the policies of a variety of states across a range of issues, I examine empirical regularities in China's behavior that test various IR theories more satisfactorily than these previous pieces. Moreover, endogeneity concerns regarding China-US-adversary coordination are minimized by my case selection; the initiation of international tensions between these four US adversaries and the US are, for China's purposes, effectively exogenous to China's policy. China's policy, for example, had very little direct connection with the outbreak of violence in Syria. Because this design focuses upon China, an illiberal country with real concerns about US power, it is an easy test for the existence of soft balancing. If soft balancing is a real phenomenon, we would indeed expect a country such as China to engage in soft balancing.

156 Li (李超), Chao, "Why Did Germany Refuse to Participate in Military Action on Libya? (德国缘何拒绝参与对利比亚军事行动)," International Data Information (国际资料信息) 4 (2011): 43.

157 In a very broad sense, one might find that China's general support for a norm of strict sovereignty encourages these US adversaries to engage in behavior that the US finds objectionable. However, China has not been the primary cause of the actions of these US adversaries in the 2004-2012 period.
Classifying China’s Level of Opposition

Over the 2004-2012 period, Sudan, Iran, Libya, and Syria each pursued one policy that provoked serious US interest in UNSC action. These policies were, respectively, Sudan’s counter-insurgency campaign and human-rights abuses in Darfur, Iran’s nuclear program, Libya’s attempted suppression of the 2011 rebellion, and Syrian suppression of its own 2011-2013 revolt. In each case, the US supported multiple UNSC resolutions against the governments of these countries. The difference between US policy preferences and China’s position on these possible UNSC actions is my dependent variable. The measurement is taken for China’s position during negotiations, rather than just for China’s final vote on the issue. I use a qualitative scale with four levels to measure this opposition. “High” opposition is defined as complete rejection by China of US requests for UNSC action. Vetoes by China of relatively mild US-supported resolutions that censure a US adversary without threatening any physical international action would be an example. “Medium” opposition is defined as China permitting UNSC action after a significant shift from the ideal US position. A significant shift would involve, for example, a removal of reference to possible sanctions in a resolution censuring a given country. “Low” opposition occurs when China makes principled objections to a resolution but does not force significant changes to the resolution. No significant modifications to the

\[158\] UN Resolution 1680 in 2006, encouraging “Syria to respond to Lebanon’s request to delineate border, establish diplomatic relations,” technically is a resolution involving Syria over a separate issue. However, I do not consider Resolution 1680 here as it is a relatively minor event in which Russia and China, as predicted by soft-balancing theory, cooperated in opposition to more serious UNSC action on the issue. UNSC, “Security Council Strongly Encourages Syria to Respond to Lebanon’s Request to Delineate Border, Establish Diplomatic Relations,” (Department of Public Information, 2006); John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2007), 390. The protests following Iran’s 2009 election were not considered at the UNSC.
resolution are made at China’s request. “No” opposition, not observed in this thesis, occurs when China initially agrees with the US position.

This focus upon China’s position during the UNSC negotiation represents an improvement upon Houser and Levy’s examination of correlation between Chinese trade and China’s voting on coercive diplomacy at the UN. Often, the strength of a successful UNSC resolution will be diluted based upon threat of a veto or (in some cases) abstention during negotiation. Thus, a weakness of literature that focuses upon the result of UN voting is that UNSC resolutions can be extremely distinct in their severity and import. Qualitatively examining China’s negotiating position before the vote, rather than just the vote itself, accounts for China’s (or other nations’) role in modifying the strength of a resolution.

Predictions of China’s Behavior in the Four Case Studies

The soft-balancing theory predicts that China’s preferences will always be in opposition to aggressive US policy towards these US adversaries. There will be clear speech evidence of this preference. China, however, will not adopt an isolated position in actual negotiations; China’s position will be at the maximum level of opposition by other permanent veto-holding members of the UNSC (US, France, UK, Russia, and China). The economic-interest theory predicts that China will oppose US policy proportional to its trade and investment connection to the US adversary. Based on China’s energy imports and investments as well as the numerous

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159 Houser and Levy, "Energy Security and China’s UN Diplomacy.”
160 For reference, Sudan, Iran, Libya, and Syria have all vociferously opposed UNSC action on their countries.
sources that cite Iran as an example of the economic-interest theory, I assume that Iran is high in economic importance to China; the other US adversaries are coded relative to Iran.

China’s policy has been generally consistent over time towards each of these four nations. Table 1 presents the predictions of these two theories as well as the reality of China’s position on UNSC action towards the four US adversaries. Consistent with the soft-balancing theory, Table 1 shows that China’s opposition has always been equal to that of the most opposed non-China UNSC permanent member, Russia. With the exception of Sudan, Russia has often seemed to clearly take the lead in negotiations, moving first, with China backing up Russia’s position. Russia’s leading position is to be expected, given the geographic proximity of these states to Russia and Russia’s own interests in promoting strict sovereignty norms. The economic-interest explanation, on the other hand, fails to explain variation in China’s support for these US adversaries.
Table 1: Summary of China’s observed support for US adversaries and the predictions of the soft balancing and economic interest theories. The observed behavior is best explained by a soft-balancing theory in which China opposes the US position up to the maximum level of opposition by Russia. The economic-interest theory does not predict the observed variation.
Having discussed the general variation in China’s policy towards these four states, I now turn to the specifics of China’s support for these states at the UNSC. In each case, I show speech evidence that China’s support for the US adversary is motivated by China’s promotion of sovereignty norms and that this promotion of sovereignty norms is linked to China’s concerns regarding US primacy. I then provide a history of the case and show that China’s opposition at the UNSC matched, but never exceeded, that of Russia, the other most opposed UNSC member. Finally, I discuss the success of the economic-interest theory in explaining each instance of China’s support and show that this theory fails to explain China’s support for these states. While China may oppose specific sanctions targeted at energy exports to China from these US adversaries, China’s overall opposition to US policy on these states cannot be explained by the economic-interest theory. Due to these fairly isolated states’ dearth of available trading partners, China’s economic interest in these states does not give them substantial leverage upon China.

Sudan, 2004-2008: Darfur

China’s Sudan and Darfur policy is best explained by soft balancing. Over the 2004-2008 period, human rights abuses by the Sudanese government were the motivation for US, British, and French pressure at the UNSC for sanctions on Sudan and for UN assistance to the

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161 The British position was generally in line with the Americans, while the French also tried to promote regional stability and protect their interests in Chad and the Central African Republic. The positions of Britain and France were much closer to the US position than those of China and Russia. Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: A 21st Century*
African-Union force deployed in Darfur. Over 2004-2006, the US with British and French support primarily pushed for UNSC sanctions on Sudan’s arms imports and oil exports, as well as targeted UNSC individual financial and criminal sanctions directed at Sudan’s leaders. Both contemporary press reports and the texts of negotiations indicate that UNSC resolutions in this vein, such as Resolutions 1556, 1564, 1591, and 1672,\(^\text{162}\) were weakened at China’s insistence. Threats of coercive sanctions were made less explicit; sanctions that were actually implemented were made less stringent.\(^\text{163}\) From 2006-2008, China, with Russia, prevented further UNSC pressure on Sudan, while nevertheless working to moderate the Sudanese government’s behavior through non-coercive persuasion. Over the course of negotiations on Sudan, China, with two minor exceptions, maintained the same negotiating position and voting pattern as Russia.\(^\text{164}\) China’s opposition to the US is coded as medium on the issue of Sudan, as China forced modification of resolutions but nevertheless permitted their eventual passage in watered-down form. While China in the 2006-2008 period opposed further UNSC resolutions, it did convince the Sudanese government to cease some of its abuses in Darfur, in line the with

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\(^{162}\) The US did not support Resolution 1593, but I also discuss it below.


\(^{164}\) China’s voting position differed from the Russian position only on Resolution 1556 and Resolution 1593. On Resolution 1556, demanding that Sudan disarm the Janjaweed militias China abstained (with Pakistan), while Russia did not, but the two countries maintained fairly similar stances supporting a political solution. UNSC, “Security Council Demands Sudan Disarm Militias in Darfur, Adopting Resolution 1556 (2004) by Vote of 13-0-2.” Resolution 1593 was not backed by the US, due to its reference to the International Criminal Court; China abstained with the US on this resolution. I discuss these events in detail below.
the spirit of the resolutions but while maintaining the precedent of Sudan’s sovereignty. A
summary overview of the UNSC resolutions on Sudan is provided in the Appendix.

*China’s Position: Speech Evidence*

Speech evidence on Darfur supports the soft-balancing interpretation of events. China’s
officials, up to the level of Hu Jintao himself, consistently emphasized opposition to foreign
intervention and the primary importance of “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity” on the issue of Darfur as well as the crucial importance of securing the Sudanese
government’s consent for any UNSC action on the matter. In a direct reference to
hegemony, and thus US policy, Hu Jintao, before assuming China’s presidency, noted in 2001
meeting with Sudanese officials that:

> Although the international situation is improving, hegemonic ideology and power
politics continue to exist (当前国际形势总体上趋向缓和，但霸权主义和强权政治依然存在)

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达尔富尔和平协议，联合国和非盟评估小组抵达苏丹),” *People’s Daily*, June 12 2006. See also: Embassy of the
http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/sudandarfurissue/t416945.htm; Shao (邵杰), “UN Supports Darfur Peace
Agreement, UN and the African Union Evaluation Teams Arrive in Sudan (联合国支持
达尔富尔和平协议，联合国和非盟评估小组抵达苏丹); Qimmin Wu (吴绮敏), “Hu Jintao Meets with Sudan President Bashir, the Two Sides
Agree to Jointly Implement Their Common Agreement, Diligently Advance China-Sudan Friendship and
Cooperation to a New Level (胡锦涛同苏丹总统巴希尔会谈，双方一致同意要抓紧落实有关共识。努力把中苏
166 Shijia Li (李诗佳), “Hu Jintao Meets with Sudan’s Number One Vice President (胡锦涛与苏丹第一副总统会
Although such statements are common in Chinese foreign policy speeches, they nevertheless speak to a real concern, expressed in Sudan, concerning US primacy. Moreover, a number of Chinese academics and analysts draw a connection between the US' Darfur policy and a US desire to ensure continued US primacy. Wang Meng (王猛) of Xi’an Northwestern University’s Middle East Department provides a typical example of this sentiment when he states that the US’ Darfur policy springs from a simultaneous desire to dominate the Middle East region and to obstruct China’s rise. He Wenping (贺文萍), director of the African section of China’s Academy of Social Sciences makes a similar point when he states that the US’ goal in Sudan is “regime change and extension of American hegemony to this region (‘政权更迭’并维特美国在该地的霸权).” Furthermore, as predicted by the soft balancing theory, China’s actual opposition during negotiations matched Russia’s position and was, as a result, at a medium level. US-backed UNSC resolutions were passed, but negotiations dragged and final resolutions often were significantly weaker than the US had originally desired. China did support UN peacekeeping assistance for the African Union force in Darfur but consistently opposed any imposition of a force without the Sudanese government’s explicit consent. The result was a severely delayed and weakened force.

Background to the Case

167 Wang (王猛), Meng, "Western Motives and Limits for Dealing with the Darfur Crisis (西方应对达尔富尔危机的动力和限度)," West Asia and Africa (西亚非洲) 1 (2010): 48.
Sudan has a history of unrest, rebellion, and extremely poor relations with the US. These poor relations have their basis in Sudan’s strong support for international terrorism before 2001 and severe human-rights abuses before and after 2001.\textsuperscript{169} In response to a 2003 revolt in the restive Darfur region, to the West of the country, the Sudanese central government in 2004 began backing pro-government Arab-identified militias (Janjaweed) and Arab-identified nomads in a brutal counter-insurgency campaign against African-identified farmers in Darfur. This conflict came in addition to a long-running conflict between the Muslim North and Christian and Animist\textsuperscript{170} south of the country (the South Sudan conflict, although having bearing upon Darfur, should be kept conceptually distinct).\textsuperscript{171} By February 2004, the UN estimated that thousands of civilians had been killed and over 800,000 civilians had been displaced in Darfur.\textsuperscript{172} By 2005, the conflict had killed 180,000 to 300,000 and displaced 2.4 million people.\textsuperscript{173}

\textit{The UNSC Negotiations}

UN and NGO officials stationed in Sudan began warning of a humanitarian disaster in Darfur 2003 and early 2004, and following some preliminary statements of concern by the


\textsuperscript{170} All parties in the Darfur conflict were, in contrast, Muslim.

\textsuperscript{171} All sides in the Darfur conflict were Muslim, unlike in the North-South conflict.


\textsuperscript{173} Hoge, "UN Council Approves Penalties in Darfur."
UNSC in early 2004, matters began to come to a head in the summer of that year. Resolution 1547, which established a UN advance team to begin planning for peacekeeping assistance to South Sudan after a hoped-for peace-treaty, included a reference to violence in Darfur over China, Pakistan, and Algeria’s objections. Following this resolution, the US initiated contentious UN Security Council negotiations on the subject in June 2004 by proposing a resolution threatening the Sudanese government with arms and financial sanctions if the Arab militias were not reigned in. As Secretary of State Colin Powell prepared to travel to Sudan, other US officials were already noting “indicators of genocide.” On June 23, the US presented satellite imagery of destruction of black-African villages to the members of the UNSC, and a July 3 joint communique between Sudan and the UN Secretary General failed to resolve the conflict or US concerns. However, China, Russia, and Pakistan forced removal of any mention of sanctions from the draft resolution, leaving only oblique references to possible sanctions through expressing the UNSC’s intention “to consider further actions, including measures under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, in the even to non-compliance.”

Even after these concessions, China and Pakistan eventually abstained during the successful passage of what became Resolution 1556 on July 30, 2004. The final resolution placed arms embargos on the Arab militias and African rebels, embargos which were effectively

178 The resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN charter, which deals with threats to peace, but referenced Article 41, which deals with economic sanctions, severance of transportation and communication links, and removal of diplomatic relations but specifically excludes use of force. UNSC, "Security Council Demands Sudan Disarm Militias in Darfur, Adopting Resolution 1556 (2004) by Vote of 13–0–2."
toothless in their impact on the combatants and did not directly impact Sudan's government, and demanded that Khartoum disarm and hold accountable the Janjaweed within 30 days.

Speaking for China before abstaining on the draft, Chinese deputy UN ambassador Zhang Yishan noted the importance of respect for the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country [Sudan]", that "the Government of Sudan [i.e., not an external body] bore the primary responsibility to resolve the situation in Darfur", and that China would abstain as the resolution "included references to measures that were not helpful and would further complicate the situation." He later noted that "Our desire to solve this problem is no less than any other country on the council but we have our principled stand."179 This abstention is one of only two votes on Sudan for which China's final position did not align with Russia's (in the second vote, the Chinese and the US position coincided in abstention), however, the Chinese and Russian stances on the issue were very similar leading up to the vote.

Resolution 1556 set a deadline of 30 days for Sudanese government compliance and asked the UN Secretary General to report on this compliance at the end of the deadline. On September 2, 2004, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Sudan, Jan Pronk, reported that despite some progress,

Attacks against civilians are continuing and the vast majority of armed militias have not been disarmed. Similarly, no concrete steps have been taken to bring to justice or even identify any of the militia leaders or the perpetrators of the attacks, allowing the

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violations of human rights and the basic laws of war to continue in a climate of impunity. After 18 months of conflict and 30 days after the adoption of resolution 1556 (2004), the Government of the Sudan has not been able to resolve the crisis in Darfur, and has not met some of the core commitments it has made.\textsuperscript{180}

A week later, US Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility.”\textsuperscript{181} The US draft of a new resolution, in response to Pronk’s report, was again revised to address the objections of China, Russia, Pakistan, and Algeria. Kong Quan (孔泉), Director of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted before the vote the positive steps taken by the Sudanese government and the need to revise the resolution to remove threatening language and discussion of sanctions.\textsuperscript{182} In the event, sanctions, including on Sudan’s oil industry, were still mentioned in the final draft, but at the insistence of these four countries, who held the position that sanctions would complicate the situation, were not immediately triggered by non-compliance, as they had been in the initial draft.\textsuperscript{183} The final text of resolution 1564, passed in September 2004, read that in the case of continued non-compliance with resolution 1556 and an expansion of the African Union force already in Darfur, the UNSC:

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\textsuperscript{180} Jan Plonk, "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraphs 6 and 13 to 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) " (UNSC, 2004), 14.  \\
\textsuperscript{182} PLA Daily, "China Hopes the US Will Revise the New Draft Resolution on Darfur (中国希望美国修改达尔富尔问题新决议草案)," September 15 2004.  \\
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shall consider [emphasis in original document] taking additional measures as contemplated in Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, such as actions to affect Sudan's petroleum sector and the Government of Sudan or individual members of the Government of Sudan, in order to take effective action to obtain such full compliance or full cooperation. ¹⁸⁴

Key changes made to initial drafts were clear reference to “consideration” of sanctions rather than automatic implementation, inclusion of language that the African Union would be consulted on Sudan’s behavior (previously no consultation was mentioned, implying the UNSC would act without such consultation), and the substitution of the demand that the Sudanese government “cease” military flights for a more subdued request that “urges the Government of Sudan to refrain from conducting military flights in and over the Darfur region.”¹⁸⁵

Nevertheless, China, Russia, Pakistan, and Algeria all abstained from the final resolution. The representatives of all four of these countries mentioned their opposition to sanctions as playing a key role in their decision to abstain. Chinese statements after the resolution, as well as contemporary commentary, emphasize the “positive efforts (积极努力)” and “sincerity” of the Sudanese Government. Focus was often directed at the importance of the African Union (regional, as opposed to Western) effort in resolving the conflict.¹⁸⁶ In the same vein of emphasizing opposition to “hegemonic” US behavior, shortly after the passage of resolution

1564 the People’s Liberation Army Daily (PLA Daily) carried commentary explaining US interest in Sudan as a result of US interest in Sudanese oil and natural gas, particularly in the light of rising gas prices:

America is the world’s largest consumer of energy resources; its demand for oil and other resources is always increasing. However, the persistence and worsening of the Israeli-Palestinian and Iraq conflicts has made the Middle East unstable and threatened the US’ interest in these traditional oil exporting regions. At the same time, a variety of factors have caused oil prices to rise in recent months, increasing US uneasiness. As a reaction to this situation, the US has been forced to shift its gaze to Africa, and look for new reliable and stable sources of oil production. (美国作为世界上最大的能源消耗国，对石油等战略性资源的需求日益增加。然而，持续升级的巴以冲突和伊拉克不断恶化的安全局势给中东地区带来不稳定，直接威胁美国在这个传统石油输出地区的利益。同时，近几个月来各种因素交织导致世界石油价格暴涨，更引起美国的不安。鉴于这些情况，美国不得不将视线转移到非洲大陆，寻求新的稳定可靠的能源供应基地。) 

This theory of US interest in Sudan’s oil matched general concerns regarding US dominance of the Middle East region and would reappear in later official writings.

November 2004 saw the passage of the mostly uncontroversial resolution 1574, which followed a North-South peace conference in Nairobi, reaffirmed Sudan’s sovereignty, and, going off topic from the North-South conflict, encouraged all parties in the Darfur conflict to sign a comprehensive peace agreement by the end of the year. People’s Daily, in its reporting on the subject, emphasized that resolution 1574 reaffirmed Sudan’s “sovereignty, unity,

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187 Xin Jianqiang (辛俭强) and Others, “The International Activity Behind the Darfur Crisis (达尔富尔危机背后的国际举动),” PLA Daily, October 18 2004.
independence and territorial integrity." Following resolution 1574, the brief resolutions 1585 and 1588 both passed unanimously. The result of these two resolutions extended the mandate of the small UN advance mission in Sudan until March and then December of 2005. Following conclusion of a January peace-agreement in the separate long-running conflict in South Sudan (not Darfur), the UNSC passed resolution 1590 unanimously. The resolution, which established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) force of 10,000 military personnel, did not focus on the Darfur conflict, although it did direct the UN secretary general to report with “options for how UNMIS can reinforce the effort to foster peace in Darfur through appropriate assistance to the African Union Mission” in Darfur. The resolution was passed unanimously and without opposition from the government of Sudan. The Chinese representative made no statement.

The aforementioned African Union Mission in Darfur (distinct from forces in South Sudan) had by mid-2005 had reached approximately 7000 persons. However, the force was hampered by deficiencies in logistics, transportation, and expertise, as well as the fact that even the most well-equipped and trained force would have struggled to police an area the size of France. In March of 2005, the African Union, together with the EU and the US, determined the mission to Darfur suffered from important deficiencies in protecting civilians. This conclusion coincided with the US and the UK proposing the implementation of more pressure through the UNSC.

The US and UK proposal culminated in the March 29 passage of Resolution 1591. This resolution, in its final form, noted the failure of the Sudanese government and rebel groups to abide by previous resolutions, reaffirmed previous arms embargos, and set up a committee to both assess compliance with UNSC resolutions and designate individuals “impeding the peace process” for targeted travel and financial sanctions. The US had hoped to extend the arms embargos already in place to include the Sudanese government itself, but this extension was not included in the final draft at the insistence of China, Russia, and Algeria. Despite this omission, the Chinese, Russians, and Algerians again abstained due to opposition to sanctions.

Chinese UN Ambassador Wang Guangya at the UNSC and in official Chinese media emphasized China’s problem with the “whole concept of sanctions”192 and their deleterious effect on peace talks.193 Two months after this resolution, the People’s Daily would explain that: “This year, following the discovery of more and more oil in Sudan, Darfur has become an excuse for Western countries to encroach on Sudan (近年来，随着苏丹国内发现越来越多的石油，达尔富尔问题又成为西方大国伺机染指苏丹的借口)”.194

March 2005 was a busy month for UNSC action on Darfur, and the final resolution passed that month, resolution 1593, referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The US supported the establishment of a separate tribunal to

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193 Dehao Zou (邹德浩), "UNSC Decides to Sanction Individuals Violating Human Rights in Darfur, Our Representative Explains Sanctions Will Not Help the Situation (安理会决定制裁达尔富尔违反国际人道主义法的个人 我代表强调制裁无助于解决问题)," March 31 2005.
handle the cases, but France and other UNSC members eventually presented a draft that used
the International Criminal Court (ICC) to carry out any prosecutions. The US opposes
legitimization of the ICC due to concerns that the court will be used by foreign countries to
prosecute US citizens. Thus, for a unique moment, both US and Chinese concerns on
sovereignty coincided, and both the US and China abstained on the vote. The US emphasized
its opposition to the resolution because:

The United States continued to fundamentally object to the view that the Court should
be able to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials, of
States not party to the Rome Statute [the agreement establishing the ICC]... The United
States would continue to discipline its own people when appropriate.

Similarly, China stated that:

China did not favour the referral to the International Criminal Court without the consent
of the Sudanese Government. In addition, China, which was not a party to the Rome
Statute, had major reservations regarding some of its provisions and had found it
difficult to endorse the Council authorization of that referral.

Brazil and Algeria also abstained. Brazil objected to the “exclusivity” of the ICC’s jurisdiction put
forward in the resolution, while the Algerian representative stated that the African Union
should be given further leeway to solve the problem.195 Thus, US and Chinese concerns over

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195 UNSC, "Security Council Endorses African Union Decision on Need for Concrete Steps in Transition to United
Nations Operation in Darfur," (Department of Public Information, 2006).
their own sovereignty being infringed converged, for a brief moment, in a joint position on Resolution 1593.

The next resolution of consequence focusing on Darfur was Resolution 1672, in April of 2006, which named four Sudanese (two government leaders and two rebel leaders) for targeted financial and travel sanctions as per Resolution 1591. These four persons were recommended to the UNSC by the committee established by Resolution 1591. Originally 17 persons were named by the committee, but only four were eventually included in the final measure. China, Russia, and Qatar abstained, with the Chinese representative expressing the usual objection to sanctions.

Resolution 1679, which followed the “Darfur Peace Agreement” between the Sudanese government and one rebel faction, established a joint African-Union UN mission to assess the requirements of a joint deployment to Darfur. The Resolution was passed unanimously in May of 2006, but the Chinese and Russian representatives both expressed concerns about the Resolutions reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and noted that Sudanese government approval was a precondition for deployment of any peacekeeping force. Quoting the Chinese representative Zhang Yishan:

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196 Resolution 1627 also concerned Sudan, but was focused on extending the mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan assisting the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, rather than Darfur. Resolution 1651 unanimously extended the mandate of the panel of experts monitoring the individually-targeted financial and travel sanctions instituted by Resolution 1591. UNSC, "Security Council Extends UN Mission in Sudan until 24 March 2006, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1627 (2005)," (Department of Public Information, 2005); UNSC, "Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1651 (2005), Security Council Extends Mandate of Expert Monitoring Panel Concerning Violations in Darfur," (Department of Public Information, 2005).

China had not pressed its objection, but that should not be construed as constituting a premise for the Security Council’s future discussions or adoption of its future resolutions on Sudan. Regarding the United Nations presence, China’s Foreign Minister had already made clear the country’s position: deploying a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Darfur would require the agreement and cooperation of the Sudanese Government. That was a basic condition and precondition for all peacekeeping operations.

In other words, China’s acquiescence to the Resolution would not set a precedent for forced intervention; Sudan’s sovereignty would be maintained during any peacekeeping operation.198

As a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson announced a month before the passage of this resolution, while discussing Darfur, “China will not walk the same path as Western colonialists’ past uncivilized plundering and human rights violations (中国不会走西方殖民者当年那种野蛮掠夺、侵犯人权的道路).”199 The conviction evidenced by these statements would become clear in the coming year.

Violence continued after the Darfur Peace Agreement, as the remaining rebel factions continued their resistance to the government. Resolution 1706, supported by the US and passed in August 31 of 2006, was intended to extend the mandate of the UN Force (UNMIS) already in South Sudan to include a joint peacekeeping operation with the African Union in Darfur. Rather than require Sudanese governmental consent, the Resolution only “invited” the consent of the Sudanese government. China and Russia abstained; their UN representatives both noted their support of the concept of a UN Peacekeeping Operation, but only with the

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consent of the Sudanese government. Although the resolution passed with only an invitation to consent, it became clear over the months following the August resolution that, due to Chinese and Russian resistance, Sudanese government approval would be necessary for any actual deployment of forces. As Khartoum continued to refuse to give such consent, stating concerns both on the “colonial” nature of such a force and on possible use of the UN force to bring President Bashir before the ICC, Chinese and Russian opposition led to continued delay in any real deployment of forces.

A full 10 months would pass before Sudan’s consent to deployment of UN forces in Darfur. Over these 10 months, no UNSC resolution of importance was passed on the Darfur issue, although the US and Britain proposed sanctions four times over this period and attempted to exert pressure through unilateral mechanisms. Violence continued to increase dramatically. A March 2007 UN report concluded that:

Even after the signing of the DPA [the Darfur Peace Agreement referenced in Resolution 1769], war continues and the human rights situation has further deteriorated. Today, millions are displaced, at least 200,000 are dead, and conflict and abuse are spilling over the border into Chad. Making matters worse, humanitarian space continues to shrink, and humanitarian and human rights actors are increasingly targeted. Killing of civilians remains widespread, including in large-scale attacks. Rape and sexual violence are widespread and systematic. Torture continues. Arbitrary arrest and detention are

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202 Resolution 1709 concerned Sudan but focused on the North-South peace agreement. 1713 extended the duration of the council of experts assessing individuals for targeted sanctions. 1714 and 1755 called for peace in Darfur and extended the duration of the UN Mission to Sudan (almost completely deployed in the South) without extending its scope in Darfur. All were passed unanimously.

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common, as is repression of political dissent, and arbitrary restrictions on political freedoms... meaningful disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed, other militia and rebel movements is yet to occur.203

Despite the spiraling violence, US threats that sanctions would be brought before the UNSC were repeatedly rebuffed by Chinese officials. In mid and late March 2007, as Bashir asked for diminution of the capabilities of the proposed force, US and British proposals for draft resolutions on sanctions were met by both public and off the record comments by Chinese officials that China “never ever believes in sanctions.” Instead, Chinese diplomats expressed confidence that Sudan would accept, through persuasion, a UN force. A mid April push for sanctions following reports that the Sudanese government was flying arms to Darfur in planes painted with UN colors was derailed by identical Chinese objections. Similarly for the US’ April push for UNSC strengthening of the arms embargo, individually targeted sanctions, and restrictions on flights to Darfur.204 Russia was with China in these positions. Russia’s ambassador to the UN consistently expressed Russia’s opposition to sanctions and stated a similar justification: opposition to human rights employed as a “pretext for interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.”205 The UN deployment envisioned by Resolution 1706 would not be formally arranged until July 31, 2007, with the passage of Resolution 1769 after Sudan’s consent was given. This resolution passed unanimously. However, China made sure that the resolution was passed under its presidency so that a number of threats of sanctions


205 Interfax Moscow as quoted in Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council, 105.
and coercive measures could be easily removed. Peacekeeping forces were deployed only slowly after the passage of this resolution.  

China, during these 10 months of delay at the UNSC, through bilateral methods, encouraged Sudan to accept a peacekeeping force formally. This Chinese policy appears to have been motivated by the desire to prevent instability from spreading further in Sudan and Chad. Concerns of a humanitarian disaster certainly do not appear to have been paramount. Special Representative to Darfur Liu Guijin, when asked in 2008 about the impact of Chinese arms transfers to Sudan, stated that: “If I am selling a knife, I cannot ensure that my client will not use the knife for murder, even though this is not my intention.” Similarly, when asked about the situation he had personally seen in Darfur, he remarked “I didn't see a desperate scenario of people dying of hunger.” The Chinese position on sanctions and pressure revealed a similar lack of urgency. Nevertheless, during these 10 months, Premier Wen Jiabao, Assistant Foreign Minister for African Affairs Zhai Jun, Special Representative to Darfur Liu Guijin, and State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan all brought up the subject while meeting with Sudanese officials (in the case of Hu, meeting with Bashir). While the US had few contacts in Sudan, China had many. Concerning Darfur, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte stated that “the Chinese have helped us and the international community generally.” US Special

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Representative to Darfur Andrew Natsios similarly stated that the Chinese have "been much more helpful than may be apparent publicly." 209

Summary of China’s Position at the UNSC

However, it is important to remain focused on the fact that, with Russia’s support, China maintained the position that if the UNSC was to act on the Sudan issue, it would do so in a way that did not erode Westphalian norms, 210 and, moreover, would ensure that Sudanese government consent would not be extracted through obvious international pressure. 211 The result was 10 months of delay, a delay consistent with China’s medium level of opposition to US policy. Although Sudanese consent for the peacekeeping force was, eventually, given, 212 China insisted upon a formula for UN intervention that clearly respected Sudan’s sovereignty. Moreover, China and Russia’s opposition to coercive measures had a clear deleterious impact on the final UN mission. According to the International Crisis Group in its assessment of UNAMID, the UN’s force in Darfur, “Nearly twenty months after its creation, UNAMID… [was] barely at two thirds of its deployment target and… had a minimal impact on improving the

211 This focus upon host consent for UNSC operations is consistent with that observed during the 1990s and 2000s. Fravel, "China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989," 19-22; International Crisis Group, "China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping."
security situation." This slow-rolling deployment of UNAMID brought to a close the key debates on coercive measures on Sudan and Darfur at the UNSC. Over the entire period of 2004-2008, China, with Russia, had consistently engaged in a medium level of opposition to US policy. Resolutions on Sudan were passed, but only after substantial delay and revision.

**Evidence for the Economic Interest Theory**

Sudan is, in fact, the strongest case out of the four for the economic-interest theory, as it is the sole case out of the four where the economic-interest theory’s predictions are born out. China had a medium economic interest in the country and did support the Sudanese government at a medium level. There is ample evidence of China’s interest in Sudan’s energy resources, as reported by both Chinese official, Chinese academic, and Western sources. In fact, a number of academic articles from Chinese journals, in line with the PLA Daily’s commentary above, explain the US’ interest in Sudan as also being driven by US interest in Sudan’s oil resources. In other words, some Chinese sources see interest in Sudan’s oil on both sides.

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214 See for example: Wuthnow, *Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council, 95-101*; CNN, "CNN Student News Transcript: September 18, 2007; Xiaoguang Tong (童晓光), "We’re Looking for Oil in Sudan (我们在苏丹找石油)," *People’s Daily* 2004; Hoge, "UN Council Approves Penalties in Darfur."
215 Tong (童晓光), "We’re Looking for Oil in Sudan (我们在苏丹找石油)," 58; Danni Jin (金丹妮), "Study of the Experience of Chinese Oil Companies in Sudan (中国石油公司在苏丹的发展历史研究)," *Academic Journal of Xi’an Oil University (西安石油大学学报)* (2012): 67.
Moreover, China did act to protect its trade with Sudan; China opposed blockading Sudan’s ports or sanctioning Sudan’s oil exports.\textsuperscript{216} However, there is little evidence that China’s protection of its trade with Sudan caused China to be responsive to the Sudanese government’s wishes. Rather, influence ran in the other direction, the Sudanese government was pressured, successfully, by China to consent to non-African UN troops on Sudanese soil, frustrating Sudan’s goals to defeat the rebellion militarily.\textsuperscript{217} While Sudan’s concession and request for UN support for the African Union force met China’s goals of upholding the appearance of sovereignty norms, it did not meet Sudanese government preferences of minimization of international influence in the country.\textsuperscript{218} This directional influence is as one would expect; China’s importance to Sudan far dwarfs Sudan’s importance to China. While China in 2007 bought 40\% of Sudan’s oil production, a crucial source of the Sudanese government’s revenue, this purchase accounted for only 6\% of Chinese oil imports.\textsuperscript{219} There is little evidence that China feared the Sudanese government would hurt China’s economic interest,\textsuperscript{220} while there is ample evidence that China was motivated by promotion of a norm of strict international sovereignty.

\textsuperscript{216} International Crisis Group, "Getting the UN into Darfur," 8-9.
\textsuperscript{218} International Crisis Group, "Getting the UN into Darfur," 4.
\textsuperscript{219} Herbst, "Oil for China, Guns for Darfur; Reuters, "Oil Will Bring Downfall of Sudan Government: Turabi," May 10 2012.
\textsuperscript{220} Although, of course, these events are fairly recent and evidence may emerge in the future.
Conclusion

In conclusion, China from 2004-2008, on the Darfur issue, pursued a policy of medium opposition to US demands. As the soft-balancing theory predicts, China opposed in principal all aggressive US-backed UNSC action on Sudan. In the actual negotiations, China never went beyond the Russian position.

Iran 2006-2013: The nuclear issue

China’s Iran policy is similarly explained by soft balancing. During both the Bush (2006-2008) and Obama (2009-2013) pushes for UNSC action on Iran, China’s opposition has been consistently medium, delaying and weakening UNSC resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program. China’s opposition to US policy is, however, moderated by a desire not to move beyond Russia’s stance; China has calibrated its opposition in negotiations to never advance beyond that of Russia. China and Russia’s opposition has been in contrast with France and the UK, who are much more supportive of US policy on Iran. This medium level of opposition stands in contrast to the high level of opposition to US policy that the economic-interest theory would predict. A summary overview of the UNSC resolutions on Iran is provided in the Appendix.

221 A fact noted by US officials involved in the international negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran, 48, 120.
China’s Position: Speech Evidence

China opposes, in principle, the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon, but is not nearly as concerned by the prospect as the US. In particular, China is unconvinced that Iran is as close to weaponization as the US claims and sees the issue as inflamed by US policy. Although Chinese analysts in general oppose an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon, they do not feel it is an immediate worry.\(^2\) Even if Iran were to acquire such a weapon, the impact on China’s interests in the Middle East would be much less than upon the US’s.\(^2\) Moreover, China’s concerns regarding US erosion of international norms of sovereignty and US power are particularly obvious in the Iran case. Chinese officials and academics note Iran’s national right to a peaceful nuclear program\(^2\) and are often of the view that the US’ policy towards Iran is motivated less by genuine anti-proliferation concerns than by US desires for regime change in Iran and US dominance in the Middle East. China’s former ambassador to Iran Hua Liming’s statement on Iran typifies this view: “the so-called Iranian nuclear issue actually is a US tactic by which to pressure Iran ... [Because] Iran is the country that the US hates the most in the Middle East, due to Iran’s important location, plentiful oil resources, and strong anti-Americanism. The US cannot permit this type of anti-American regime to exist in the Middle East.”\(^2\)

\(^2\) International Crisis Group, “The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing,” 1, 3-5.
\(^2\) International Crisis Group, "The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing," 1, 3, 4; Dingli Shen (沈丁立), "Nuclear Sovereignty and Nuclear Trust (核主权和核信任)," People’s Daily, March 11 2006; UNSC, "Security Council Toughens Sanctions against Iran, Adds Arms Embargo, with Unanimous Adoption of Resolution 1747 " (Department of Public Information, 2007).
the Iran issue as fundamentally driven by US hegemonic policy in the Middle East is pervasive in Chinese analysis of Iran-US tension.\textsuperscript{227}

\textit{Background to the Case}

Adversarial US-Iran relations date to Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution against the US-backed Pahlavi Shah. Tensions between the two countries concern Iran’s role as “the most active state sponsor of terrorism,”\textsuperscript{228} Iran’s regional ambitions, and the possibility of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. This last point, specifically Iranian uranium enrichment, has been the focus of repeated UNSC negotiations. Iran, pre-Islamic revolution, signed the National Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and did not renounce its treaty commitments to solely peaceful atomic research post-revolution. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which plays a central role in investigating NPT violations, in 2002 began an investigation into possible Iranian research into nuclear weapon production.\textsuperscript{229} Strong US pressure on this issue dates to the Iranian government’s August 2005 decision to restart uranium processing at the Isfahan nuclear plant, shortly following President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in June elections of that

\textsuperscript{227} International Crisis Group, "The Iran Nuclear issue: The View from Beijing," 9-10; Lushi Yue (岳麓), "Media Wars That Make People Nervous (令人质疑的新闻宣传战)," \textit{People’s Daily}, February 20 2006; Liming Hua (华黎明), "The Influence of the Iranian Nuclear Issue on Big-Power Relations (伊朗核问题及其对大国关系的影响)," \textit{Peace and Development (和平与发展)} 2, no. 114 (2010); Li (李淑珍), "Double Standards on Armed Force and International Intervention in the Middle East and North Africa (对中东北非的武力干预与国际干预的双重标准); Guofu Li (李国富), "The Crux of the Iranian Nuclear Problem and China’s Stance (伊朗核问题的症结与中国的立场)," \textit{Seeing through the focus (焦点透视)} 10 (2007): 23, 25.

\textsuperscript{228} US Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2010: Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism " (2011).

year. In January of 2006, the Iranian government restarted its nuclear research facility at Natanz, removing the International Atomic Energy Agencies seals on the facility.\footnote{Britain, France, and Germany led the initial negotiations with Iran until 2005. Paul K. Kerr, "Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations," (Congressional Research Service, 2013), 4-5.} In February of 2006, Iran ceased to implement the “Additional Protocol” signed with the IAEA in 2003. The Additional Protocol had allowed more exhaustive inspections than originally provided for by the NPT.\footnote{BBC, Iran Profile (March 2 2012 [cited 2012]); available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14542438.} The removal of these seals marked the beginning of serious US pressure at the UNSC council, supported by Britain and France.\footnote{Kerr, "Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations," 3; IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Gov/2006/15)," (Board of Governors, 2006), 6-7.}

The UNSC Negotiations

Resolution 1696, passed with 14 positive votes and Qatar’s abstention on July 31 of 2006, was the first product of US and Western pressure at the UNSC. Noting that the “International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was still unable to provide assurances about Iran’s undeclared nuclear material and activities after more than three years,” the Resolution “demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.” The UN press release made explicit the “possibility of economic and diplomatic sanctions,” but the actual resolution itself omitted the word “sanctions” at the

\footnote{Britain and France (with Germany) up to 2005 attempted to push for a negotiated settlement with Iran in which Iran would restrict its nuclear program in exchange for economic and political ‘carrots.’ By 2006 this approach had failed and both countries moved to a hardline position generally close to the US’. France in particular favored a sanctions based approach. Farrar-Wellman, France-Iran Foreign Relations ([cited]; Farrar-Wellman, United Kingdom-Iran Foreign Relations ([cited]; Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran, 12-13. Bolton discusses and roundly abuses the pre-2006 European strategy in: Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option, Chapter 12: Iran in the Security Council: The EU-13 Find New Ways to Give In.}
insistence of Russia and China. Nevertheless, the resolution and the Chinese and Russian representative’s statements mentioned possible action under Articles 40 and 41 of the UN charter, a not so oblique reference to sanctions. The Chinese representative expressed the desire to “safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism,” while emphasizing that “dialogue and negotiations were the only way out. IAEA should always be the main mechanism for dealing with the issue.” Chinese officials made similar statements to the People’s Daily. These dual concerns of preventing proliferation while maintaining the view that dialogue, rather than sanctions, was the correct way forward would characterize China’s positions in the UNSC debates that followed.

The demands and deadlines of Resolution 1696 were not met, and Resolution 1737, sponsored by Britain, France, and the UK, and supported by the US, passed unanimously on December 23. The Resolution imposed sanctions “blocking the import or export of sensitive nuclear materiel and equipment,” and financially targeted Iranian organizations and individuals involved in possible nuclear weaponization. Although China and Russia eventually voted affirmatively on the resolution, they delayed the vote on Resolution 1737 for five months. Moreover, Russia, supported by China, achieved removal of a number of more punitive sanctions. Russia had a number of contracts with Iran that it wished to safeguard, including

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235 Xuejiang Li (李学江) et al., "Resolution 1696 – the Iran Problem (第 1696 号决议——伊朗核问题)," People's Daily, August 2 2006.

construction of a civilian nuclear reactor. Reference to this reactor was removed from the resolution, and a number of the sanctions were made optional for countries dealing with Iran. The Russian representative, moreover, emphasized Russia’s opposition to “the use of force.” China mainly played a supporting role for the Russians. The Chinese representative emphasized, again, the importance of the NPT, the “limited and reversible” nature of the sanctions, the role of the IAEA as the “main mechanism for dealing with the issue,” and China’s desired for “a peaceful solution through political and diplomatic efforts and negotiations.”

The IAEA in February 2007 reported that Iran still was not in compliance with the IAEA’s requirements and was continuing to enrich uranium. This lack of compliance motivated the US, Britain, and France to pursue further sanctions. The final resolution, passed unanimously on March 24 as Resolution 1747, increased the scope of individually targeted sanctions established with Resolution 1737, while also banning Iranian arms exports. At China and Russia’s insistence, however, the US, Britain, France, and Germany’s modified their draft proposal. The initial proposal had also implemented a travel ban on a number of Iranian leaders, prohibited sales of arms to Iran, and eliminated export credits for companies dealing with Iran. The final proposal eliminated these aggressive measures. The Chinese representative at the time of the passage of the resolution again emphasized the reversible nature of the sanctions, stating that,

239 Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council, 79.
if Iran “complied with the relevant resolutions of IAEA and the Council, the Council should suspend and even terminate the sanction measures.” He further emphasized the limited nature of even the expanded sanctions, stating that “the relevant sanction measures should neither harm the Iranian people nor affect normal economic, trade and financial exchanges between Iran and other countries.” Finally, he again noted the importance of the NPT, as well as the importance of peaceful dialogue.  

Shortly following the resolution, a March 2007 People’s Daily article called “Russia-US: Strong Country [Russia] Vs. Hegemonic Desires [of the US]” would state that Russia was asserting themselves on the Iranian, as well as a number of issues, due to constant American provocations in Russia’s sphere of influence. In other words, the disputes over Iran were being driven by great power politics and Russia, rather than China, was the leader in opposition to the US. This article matched with the impression from the above negotiations that China was taking a passive supporting role to Russia, rather than leading opposition to the US on Iran.

Following resolution 1747, the IAEA found in May of 2007 that Iran continued to be uncooperative on key inspection issues. Due to this lack of cooperation, the IAEA was unable “to fully reconstruct the history of Iran’s nuclear programme and provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful

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242 UNSC, “Security Council Toughens Sanctions against Iran, Adds Arms Embargo, with Unanimous Adoption of Resolution 1747 ”.

243 The first part of the title was actually taken from a contemporary speech by Putin in which he had roundly criticized the US at a Munich Peace Conference. Hongjian Yu (于宏建), "Russia-USA: Strong Country Vs. Hegemonic Desires. Facing More Pressure Than It Can Bear, Russia Counter-Attacks with 100% of Its Strength. Russia Says 'No!' To America. (俄美：强国志 vs 霸图心 面对挤压忍无可忍 奋力反击底气十足 俄罗斯向美国说"不")," People’s Daily, March 2 2007; Qing Huang (黄晴), "Eruption after Patient Forebearance (隐忍后的爆发)," People’s Daily, March 2 2007.
nature of that programme.” 

Nevertheless, Iran in July concluded an agreement with the IAEA for inspection of the suspicious Arak heavy water reactor, as well as potentially more cooperation. This agreement forestalled further attempts by the US to put increased sanctions before the UNSC. While the US clearly wanted to continue to increase the severity of sanctions, Russia, with China’s support, opposed any further sanctions following the IAEA agreement. The US’ chief negotiator on Iran told reporters that “the alchemy of this group [the five permanent UNSC members and Germany] is such that anything is going to be a compromise,” and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice exchanged tough words with the Russian Foreign Minister over the issue.

Through the fall of 2007 and into 2008, the US continued to push for UNSC sanctions in line with its “two track” approach of negotiations and sanctions on the Iranian nuclear issue. This US initiative was damaged by the December 2007 release of the US intelligence communities consensus assessment that Iran had, in 2003, abandoned its nuclear program. However, the initiative was given a boost in January 2008, when Iran test-fired a rocket. While Iran claimed the rocket launch was intended to test Iran’s satellite capabilities, the US discounted this explanation. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister similarly noted concern, stating that the launch “adds to general suspicions of Iran regarding its potential desire to build nuclear

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246 Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council, 79-80, footnote 53.
247 Germany also expressed opposition to sanctions, but Russia and China were the key proponents of delay in considering any further sanctions. Helen Cooper, "Split in Group Delays Vote on Sanctions against Iran," New York Times, September 29 2007.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
weapons... Long-range missiles are one of the components of such weapons.”251 Over the following months, a draft resolution imposing increased sanctions was hammered out. The final resolution, passed on March 3, 2008, as Resolution 1803, “called upon all States” to scrutinize Iranian institutions, shipments, and individuals in their territories. The resolution was passed with the support of all UNSC members save Indonesia. The resolution also expanded the scope of targeted financial sanctions against nuclear-activity-affiliated Iranian individuals and institutions.252 However, China and Russia’s opposition forced the removal of measures targeting Iran’s military and two large Iranian banks.253 The Chinese representative’s statement focused on the same points as before: the minimal and reversible nature of the sanctions, the importance of the NPT, and the importance of dialogue. The Russian representative emphasized points similar to China’s, as well as that the resolution had no reference to “use of force.”254

The Bush administration would not achieve further sanctions of note on Iran. Resolution 1835, adopted unanimously on September 2008 following an IAEA report that Iran continued to enrich uranium, merely reaffirmed previous resolutions on the issue.255 Consistently delaying and weakening sanctions, while still allowing their passage, China’s opposition to the US position over the course of the Bush administration was medium. This position was consistently in line with that of Russia, with Russia usually taking the lead role in

252 UNSC, "Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran’s Proliferation-Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance over Iranian Banks, Has States Inspect Cargo," (Department of Public Information, 2008).
253 Wright and Lynch, "UN Imposes New Sanctions on Iran."
254 UNSC, "Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran’s Proliferation-Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance over Iranian Banks, Has States Inspect Cargo."
255 UNSC, "Security Council Reaffirms Earlier Resolutions on Iran’s Uranium Enrichment, Calls on Country to Comply with Obligations ‘Fully and without Delay’," (Department of Public Information, 2008); Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council.
opposing punitive resolutions. UNSC resolutions on Iran, over the Bush administration, in the end, were, as China’s UNSC representative had repeatedly emphasized, “limited.”

Although the Obama administration entered office with plans to repair US-Iranian relations, these plans faltered following Iran’s 2009 disputed election and subsequent violence. Following the Obama administration’s failure to engage Iran in substantive negotiations on normalization of relations, the US by July 2009 began again pushing for UNSC action to pressure Iran to cease uranium enrichment. In September of 2009, the US, British, and French officials publicly revealed that Iran was covertly building a small uranium-enrichment plant near the city of Qom. With this revelation, the US intended to persuade the UNSC to threaten Iran with “crippling sanctions.” The Qom reveal did have some effect; Russia shifted its stance to favor criticism of Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Isolated, China did not oppose this measure and shifted positions in step with Russia, voting affirmatively for IAEA criticism of Iran. However, this IAEA criticism had no coercive element.

When the US, Britain, and France pushed for increased UNSC sanctions on Iran, however, China and Russia slowed negotiations and opposed the severest elements of the sanctions. Resolution 1929 was passed on June 9, 2010, nine months after the IAEA statement, with all permanent members of the UNSC voting affirmatively. Brazil and Turkey voted no, while

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256 Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran, 178; Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council, 81-82.
Lebanon abstained. The final resolution expanded sanctions against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, imposed restrictions on transfer of more advanced weaponry to Iran, and allowed nations to unilaterally pursue sanctions against Iranian businesses, including energy businesses, and banks. At China and Russia's insistence, however, strong mandatory economic and oil-trade sanctions were removed from the resolution. The Chinese representative again emphasized that the resolution sprung from the "desire of all parties to resolve the matter through dialogue and negotiations" and that sanctions, both at the time and in the future, "must not affect the daily lives of the Iranian people." The Russian representative made similar points. The result was far from "crippling," and Resolution 1929 was the last UNSC resolution on Iran. In sum, UNSC sanctions over the 2006-2010 period had imposed bans on Iranian imports of certain dual-use items, Iranian imports of certain types of advanced weaponry, and Iranian exports of arms. Additionally, a number of Iranian institutions and individuals associated with the nuclear program were targeted with financial sanctions, and individual states were given the right to scrutinize and sanction Iran in a unilateral manner. These measures were not the strong sanctions that US negotiators had hoped for over this period.

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260 UNSC, "Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 in Favour to 2 against, with 1 Abstention," (Department of Public Information, 2010).
263 UNSC, "Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 in Favour to 2 against, with 1 Abstention."
From 2010 to the present, China, with Russia, has opposed US attempts to unilaterally sanction Iran and tried to redirect such efforts to the UNSC, where China would be more able to constrain US policy. The US has threatened to sanction foreign financial institutions dealing with Iranian financial institutions, but has issued waivers for the major importers of Iranian oil, China, Japan, India, Italy, and South Korea. China continues to buy large volumes of Iranian oil. China’s opposition to UNSC action on Iran was, thus, medium over the 2009-2013 period, slowing and delaying sanctions without vetoing or preventing any action. This stance was in line with Russia’s.

Summary of China’s Position at the UNSC

Thus, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, China’s level of opposition to US policy was consistently medium. At China and Russia’s insistence, formerly punitive draft resolutions were both delayed and made much less severe. As the soft-balancing theory predicts, China never moved beyond Russia’s position on the issue, and available evidence suggests that US negotiators believed that any shift in Russia’s position would lead to a similar shift by China.


Evidence for the Economic Interest Theory

With regards to the economic-interest explanation, China did act to safeguard its energy trade with Iran. China opposed UNSC and unilateral-US sanctions on Iran's oil industry over the 2006-2013 period, and writings by academics and China's state publications acknowledge the importance of Iranian oil exports to China's oil industry. China's representative to the UNSC repeatedly expressed concerns that sanctions should not "affect normal economic, trade and financial exchanges between Iran and other countries." Similarly, US officials noted and were worried by China's interest in, investment in, and purchase of Iranian oil. Specifically, they felt that China's actions contravened the "spirit of the UN sanctions." However, an economic-interest explanation that proposes that China supports Iran across the board because of Iran's high economic interest to China does not match the observed reality. China's support for Iran was only medium, rather than the high level that such a theory would predict. Moreover, China seems conscious and wary of Iranian attempts to influence China through economic interest. In particular, some Chinese analysts note that Iran has attempted to pursue a "binding strategy," in which Iran attracts Chinese investments in order to gain China's support at the UNSC. For the moment, moreover, given Iran's increasingly limited

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266 Garver, Leverett, and Leverett, "Moving (Slightly) Closer to Iran; Swaine, "Beijing's Tightrope Walk on Iran; Hua (华黎明), "The Iran Nuclear Issue and China's Foreign Policy Choices (伊朗核问题与中国外交的选择); Shen (沈丁立), "2007: Anti-Proliferation and Sino-US Relations (防扩散与中美关系)." See also pieces such as: Zhu (注力平), "The Iran Problem under the Influence of Nuclear Security and China's Foreign-Policy Strategy Choice (核安全背景下的伊朗核问题与中国外交战略选择)." 60.

267 UNSC, "Security Council Toughens Sanctions against Iran, Adds Arms Embargo, with Unanimous Adoption of Resolution 1747 "; UNSC, "Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran's Proliferation-Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance over Iranian Banks, Has States Inspect Cargo."

268 Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council, 80.

269 The International Crisis Group finds this sentiment in interviews conducted in 2009. International Crisis Group, "The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing," 7. Without making explicit reference to attempts to "bind" China specifically, Tian Wenlin of China's Contemporary International Affairs Institute makes a similar point. Tian (天文,...
opportunities for oil sales due to US unilateral sanctions,\textsuperscript{270} Iranian dependency on China is much higher than China’s dependency on Iran.

\textit{Conclusion}

In summary, the soft-balancing explanation for China’s policy better matches the observed data. Over the 2006-2013 period, China significantly weakened the text of UNSC resolutions, but still permitted substantive action against Iran. China’s support for Iran was not high as the economic-interest explanation would have predicted or Iran would have liked; Iran was surprised and angered, for example, by China’s willingness to support Resolution 1929.\textsuperscript{271} Instead, China never moved beyond the Russian position in its support of Iran, and, in 2008-2010 when the Russian position shifted following the Qom revelations, China modified its stance to match that of the Russians.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{270} Iranian dependency on its remaining trading partners has become particularly high in recent years, as US and Western sanctions have become increasingly severe. Myers, "US Exempts Japan and 10 Other Countries from Sanctions over Iran Oil; BBC, "Iran 'to Accept Payment in Gold for Oil'," February 29 2012; Rick Gladstone, "In Reversal, Iran Allows Interest Rates to Increase," The New York Times, January 25 2012; Landler, "China Is Excluded from Waivers for Oil Trade with Iran."
\textsuperscript{271} Wuthnow, "Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council (Phd Thesis)", 190-192; Parsi, \textit{A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran}, 196.}
Libya 2011: Arab spring

China opposed in principle the UNSC authorization of NATO intervention in Libya, but, due to the support of both the Arab League and Russia for UNSC action on Libya, had very little actual restraining effect on UNSC authorization of this intervention. As the soft-balancing theory would predict, over the relatively short course of this crisis, China’s actual opposition at the UNSC matched Russia’s and thus was low. A summary overview of the UNSC resolutions on Libya is provided in the Appendix.

China’s Position: Speech Evidence

Chinese diplomats and academics, in speech, strongly opposed US and Western policy towards Libya as an infringement upon Libya’s sovereignty. This principled opposition went all the way to the top; Hu Jintao stressed respect for Libya’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as primary. Consistent with the soft-balancing hypothesis, a number of Chinese IR articles directly tied the Western intervention in Libya to US “hegemonic” plans. China’s official sources decried NATO intervention, authorized by UNSC Resolution 1973, in Libya as

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272 People’s Daily, "Hu Jintao Telephones President Zuma of South Africa (胡锦涛同南非总统祖马通电话)," July 22 2011.

273 Hongyu Lin (林宏宇) and Xiaosan Li (李小三), "Analysis of the Political Economy of North Africa and Middle East Unrest (北非中东动荡之国际政治经济学分析)," Journal of the University of International Relations (国际关系学院学报) 4 (2011); Qian (钱文荣), "The UN Has Created Two Dangerous Precedents (联合国开创了两个危险先例); Baiyi Wu (吴白乙), "In the Midst of the Libyan Crisis, Constancy and Change in China’s Foreign Policy (利比亚危机中，中国外交的‘变’与‘守’)," Social Outlook (社会观察) (2011).
“indiscriminate bombing (狂轰滥炸)” that worsened Libya’s humanitarian situation\textsuperscript{274} and as encouraging nuclear proliferation among other isolated states in the international system.\textsuperscript{275} Western intervention in Libya was “an assault on the UN Charter and the basic principles of international relations (对《联合国宪章》和国际关系准则的冲击),”\textsuperscript{276} a point echoed by Chinese academics.\textsuperscript{277}

\textit{Background to the Case}

US-Libya diplomatic ties had improved over the 2000s following Libya’s abandonment of its WMD program and as Libya and the US increasingly cooperated on counter-terrorism. International sanctions were lifted in 2003 and 2004,\textsuperscript{278} and Libya was removed from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism in 2007. As a result, US business had begun to engage with Libya by 2008.\textsuperscript{279} Nevertheless, Qaddafi was still viewed as dictatorial and erratic by many US officials, and US policy turned sharply against the Libyan government following the Arab Spring.

\textsuperscript{274} For example: Liu (刘永明), Shuiming, "Pay Attention to Changes and Increase Our Study - Summary of Seminar on Middle East Changes and Their Influence (关注变化,加强研究-中东形势的变化及其影响学术研讨会综述)," \textit{People’s Daily}, May 24 2011.
\textsuperscript{275} As Qaddafi gave up his nuclear program in order to secure better relations with the US, leaving him unable to resist foreign aerial intervention, these Chinese articles posit that his fall will encourage other US adversaries to actively search for such a deterrent. Huang (黄培昭), Peizhao, "The Price of Striking Libya (打利比亚的代价)," \textit{World Knowledge (世界知识)}, September 2011, 43; Xiang (项慕), Xi, "The Libya Reset (利比亚的启示)," \textit{World Knowledge (世界知识)}, September 2011.
\textsuperscript{276} Sheng Zhong (钟声), "Don’t Give up on Efforts for Peaceful Methods for Resolving Crisis (不要放弃用和平手段解决危机的努力)," \textit{People’s Daily}, March 21 2011.
\textsuperscript{277} Xing Qu (曲星), "The UN Charter, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Syrian Problem (联合国宪章、保护的责任与叙利亚问题)," \textit{International Studies (国际问题研究)} 2 (2012): 13-14.
The Arab Spring began in December 2010 in Tunisia. Following unemployed fruit-vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation, domestic protests fuelled by youth unemployment and the corruption of Tunisia's ruling family quickly spread beyond the Tunisian government's control. By January 14, 2011, Tunisia's President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali had fled to Saudi Arabia, and Arab regimes that previously had seemed unshakeable suddenly seemed vulnerable.

Libya, like Tunisia, was a hotbed of anger at pervasive government mismanagement, with, additionally, tensions between the western and eastern parts of the country. Protests were reported in Libya as early as January 16, and following President Mubarak's exit in Egypt on February 11, events began to spiral out of control. Serious protests and violent clashes beginning on February 15 in the eastern city of Benghazi, spreading quickly to major cities and towns across the country. Prime Minister Muammar al-Qaddafi, unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, however, would not leave office without a serious fight. His son, speaking for the regime on February 21, vowed that: "We will keep fighting until the last man standing, even to the last woman standing ... If everybody is armed, it is civil war, we will kill each other." Such a

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conflict soon materialized, as armed opposition groups began arming and brutal struggle with unleashed government forces.\(^{283}\)

The **UNSC Negotiations**

France, the US, and Britain quickly moved to activist positions on Libya. All three had called on Qaddafi to step down by the end of February 2011. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, who may have wanted to rebut domestic and international criticism of France’s recent close relations with Ben Ali and Mubarak, relations which continued right until the two leaders’ loss of power,\(^{284}\) on February 25 called for Qaddafi to step down.\(^{285}\) President Barack Obama of the United States imposed unilateral sanctions on Libya on February 25,\(^{286}\) and, after having evacuated all US citizens from Libya, called for Qaddafi to step down on February 26.\(^{287}\) Prime Minister David Cameron on February 28 called on Qaddafi to "go now."\(^{288}\)

Britain and France, with US backing, in the last week of February, quickly put forward a UNSC draft resolution imposing personal, financial, and arms sanctions on Libya and Libyan...

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\(^{283}\) International Crisis Group, "Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges after Qadhafi," 1-5.


leaders. The draft that became Resolution 1970 also referred the conflict to the International Criminal Court.289

China, Russia, and India had initially opposed the referral to the Court. Russia and India relented following impassioned testimony from Libya’s UN envoy, who had defected to the Libyan rebels.290 Russia additionally obtained the removal of a clause in Britain’s original draft that humanitarian assistance would be delivered by “all measures necessary.” He emphasized in his statements the resolutions commitment to Libya’s “territorial integrity.” China was the last to agree to the resolution, finally referencing African and Arab support for the resolution, as well as the exceptional circumstances, in its decision to vote affirmatively on a resolution it would not normally have supported.291 Resolution 1970, thus modified, passed unanimously on February 26.

Britain and France initially led the UNSC push for military action in Libya, but the US would soon become a key component in this drive.292 British Prime Minister David Cameron was the first to adopt an aggressive position in speech on military intervention, stating on March 1 2011 that:

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289 Resolution 1970 thus became the first UNSC resolution referencing the ICC that the US supported affirmatively. Lynch, "UN Votes to Impose Sanctions on Gaddafi; UNSC, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria That Would Have Threatened Sanctions, Due to Negative Votes of China, Russian Federation."
290 Lynch, "UN Votes to Impose Sanctions on Gaddafi."
We do not in any way rule out the use of military assets... We must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own people.

France on March 10 was the first country to recognize the Libyan opposition in Benghazi as “the legitimate representative of the Libyan people,” and March 11 began proposing air strikes as a possible response to Qaddafi’s fight against the Libyan opposition. The US, however, was initially hesitant to become involved in military action in another Muslim country, especially because the conflict had no real security implications for the United States. Nevertheless, by mid March the US, with Britain, France, and Lebanon, was a supporter of a draft resolution instituting a no-fly zone in Libya and authorizing “all necessary measures [including military measures] to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country.” Chinese official sources saw the US as a key player in the events of Libya, rather than as a secondary actor.

The draft was adopted on March 17 as Resolution 1973 with this aggressive language intact, but China abstained from the vote, along with the governments of Russia, Germany, India, and Brazil. All other UN Security Council members voted affirmatively. China and Russian UN representatives explained these abstentions with reference to prioritizing “peaceful means

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295 Iraq and Afghanistan being still ongoing.
297 Al Jazeera, "UN Authorises No-Fly Zone over Libya," March 18 2011.
298 UNSC, "Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing All 'Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions," (Department of Public Information, 2011).
of resolving the conflict” and respect for the UN Charter (and thus Libya’s sovereignty).

Specifically, Chinese officials mentioned three points justifying their choice of an abstention.

First, China was concerned by the “continuing worsening of the situation in Libya.” Second, however, the UN Charter, and China’s own policy, is clear on the importance of sovereignty:

> China has always emphasized that in its relevant actions, the Security Council should follow the UN Charter and norms governing international law and respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and resolve through peaceful means the current crisis in Libya... China is always against the use of force in international relations.

Third, consistent with China’s aversion to international isolation, China did not vote “no” due to the weight of international and regional opinion:

> China attaches great importance to the relevant decision by the 22-member Arab league on the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya... We also attach great importance to the position of African countries and the African Union.

China thus opposed intervention on sovereignty grounds, but abstained due to the positions of other countries. The lack of stronger Russian support for Libya was disappointing for China, who it seems wished to support Libya more. Official media and at least one Chinese academic decried the absence of Russian support for Libya as due to Russian pragmatism and focus upon

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300 Wu (吴白乙), “In the Midst of the Libyan Crisis, Constancy and Change in China’s Foreign Policy (利比亚危机中，中国外交的‘变’与‘守’),” 67; Zhong (钟声), “Don’t Give up on Efforts for Peaceful Methods for Resolving Crisis (不要放弃用和平手段解决危机的努力); People’s Daily, “China Has Serious Difficulty with Part of the Resolution,’ Envoy Says.”
material interests, implicitly distinguishing Moscow’s position from a principled stand on the part of Beijing.\(^{301}\)

Resolution 1973 was the last resolution on Libya at the UNSC before Qaddafi’s fall. Rebel forces, aided by NATO bombing, slowly moved over the entire country, taking Tripoli in August 2011. Qaddafi himself was killed by rebel forces on October 20.\(^{302}\) The rebel victory was followed by a number of unanimous UNSC resolutions confirming the rebel victory. Resolution 2009 on September 16 established a UN support mission in Libya to “support a nationally led process aimed at building a democratic, independent and united Libya” and lifted some of the arms and financial sanctions put in place by Resolution 1970. China’s representative again emphasized the importance of respect for Libya’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in his comments on the resolution, while Russia’s representative called for lifting of the no-fly zone and deplored NATO’s “targeting of civilian facilities.”\(^{303}\) Resolution 2016 on October 27 unanimously ended the UNSC authorization by which NATO acted,\(^{304}\) Resolution 2017, also passed unanimously, dealt with controlling the flow of advanced weaponry from Libya to external groups,\(^{305}\) and resolutions 2022 (2011), 2040 (2012), and 2095


\(^{305}\) UNSC, “Security Council Acts to Stem Arms Proliferation from Libya,” (Department of Public Information, 2011).
(2013) unanimously extended and somewhat expanded the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya.\textsuperscript{306}

*Summary of China’s Position at the UNSC*

Thus, while in principle being distinctly opposed to US and Western policy in Libya, China in practice took only minor actions to delay, hinder, or change the terms of this action and intervention. Opposition to US and Western policy was coded as “low,” matching Russia’s at all times. Moreover, the Sino-Russian dynamics predicted by the soft balancing theory were clearly on display: a shift in Russia’s position brought about a clear undesired shift in China’s position; China wished to oppose Western intervention in Libya but was unwilling to be isolated in this opposition.

*Evidence for the Economic Interest Theory*

The very low level of China’s support for Libya does not match the predictions of the economic-interest theory. While China’s economic interest in Libya is smaller than China’s interest in Sudan, it is not so low that the economic-interest theory would predict the observed extremely low level of Chinese support for Libya. Contemporary Chinese sources and experts stressed a possible loss of twenty billion USD in contracts and investment due the Libyan

conflict, with authorities such as China’s former ambassador to Iran emphasizing the painfulness of this lesson in political risk for Chinese enterprises. Chinese acquiescence on Libya contrasts markedly with their high opposition in the Syrian case, where Chinese economic-interests were almost non-existent. The Libya case is a clear mark against the economic interest theory.

Conclusion

Thus, consistent with the soft-balancing hypotheses, China opposed, in speech, UNSC action towards Libya out of a concern for sovereignty norms and US dominance in the Middle East. However, China was unwilling to take an isolated stance on this issue, and, absent Russian support for a stronger stance, China only abstained on the no-fly-zone resolution. The absence of any major powers or even regional organizations with which China could balance against the US distinguishes the Libya case from the Sudan and Iran cases as well as the Syria case, to which I now turn.

Syria, 2011-2012: Arab Spring

The Syria case, finally, provides the most striking and recent evidence of China’s strong preference for a strict interpretation of sovereignty and concomitant restriction upon US power,

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as well as how far China will go when Russia leads the way. Despite an absence of any real Chinese security or economic interest in Syria, China, in cooperation with Russia, has systematically blocked any substantial UNSC action in response to Syria’s 2011-2013 revolt and civil conflict. China and Russia’s support has persisted through the partial or total destruction of more than “one third of the total housing stock in Syria” and the death of almost 100 thousand and the displacement of over six million Syrians. The conflict has taken on some aspects of a proxy war with Russia and Iran on one side and the US, some European states, and a number of Arab Gulf States on the other. The positions of both internal and external actors involved in the conflict has become increasingly hardened as the conflict drags on into its third year. A summary overview of the UNSC resolutions and attempted resolutions on Syria is provided in the Appendix.

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308 Shown above, but also noted by Chinese authors. Qu (曲), "The UN Charter, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Syrian Problem (联合国宪章、保护的责任与叙利亚问题)," 6-7.
309 Geng (邢), "How to Get Along with Russia (与俄罗斯怎样相处)," 52.
311 Mark Tran, "Millions of Syrians in Need of Food Aid as War Devastates Food Production," The Guardian, July 5 2013.
313 Iran has a historical alliance with Syria’s ruling Alawite minority.
China's Position: Speech Evidence

As predicted by the soft-balancing theory, China at the UNSC is firmly on Russia's side due to a principled stand of anti-hegemonism, rather than any real economic interest. Chinese officials such as China's current Ambassador to the UN Li Baodong (李保东) have repeatedly stressed that China’s motivation is the preservation of “the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Syria.” Similarly, Chinese official media and academics have noted that China’s stance aims to “defend the spirit of the UN Charter and principles of non-interference” and to avoid giving any legitimacy to further violation of this charter and principles. UNSC action on Syria has the potential to reinforce a dangerous precedent set by Libya, a precedent in which NATO countries “abused the UNSC resolution authorizing the no-fly zone.” Moreover, Chinese academics commonly note that the underlying motive of the US is increased dominance of and expansion of interests in the Middle East region, a view also reported in some official media. While China did not

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318 As laid out by the head of the Chinese Institute of International Studies: Qu (曲星), "The UN Charter, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Syrian Problem (联合国宪章、保护的责任与叙利亚问题)," 7. See also: Liu (刘中民), "Middle East Changes and the Policy Adjustment of Major Powers," 14.
319 Qian (钱文荣), "The UN Has Created Two Dangerous Precedents (联合国开创了两个危险先例),"
321 Qu (曲星), "The UN Charter, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Syrian Problem (联合国宪章、保护的责任与叙利亚问题)," 14-15; Liming Hua (华黎明), "American Urging of Assad’s Resignation Is in Order to Counter Iran (美国坚持阿萨德下台是为了对付伊朗)," *China Daily (中国日报)*, February 20 2012.
strongly support Libya due to general international antipathy towards the regime, Syria, according to Chinese sources, is different, as Syria has more international (read, Russian) support.\textsuperscript{323} China has little economic reason to be interested in Syria.

\textit{Background to the Case}

The Syrian conflict is, like Libya's, a product of the Arab Spring. Many Syrian elites and foreign commentators believed, initially, that Syria might be immune to the winds of change sweeping the region. Syria's leader, President Bashar al-Assad (commonly referred to as Bashar to distinguish him from his father), had a number of reasons for such confidence. Since taking power in 2000, following the death of his father, Bashar had implemented a number of economic and political reforms that had made him relatively popular, compared to many regional leaders. Unlike other leaders in the region, he had continued his father's foreign policy of overt opposition to Israel and the West, a foreign policy popular in Syria. Thirdly, his security services had an earned reputation for extreme brutality that many believed would have a deterrent effect. Finally, these same security services had ensured that civil society in the

\textsuperscript{322} Peizhao Huang (黄培昭) and Yangjun Yang (杨俊), "Syria Pushed into the Eye of the Storm (叙利亚被推上‘风口浪尖’)," \textit{People's Daily}, August 30 2011.

\textsuperscript{323} Shuangqing Chen (陈双庆), "Why Syria Is Not Libya (叙利亚为何不是利比亚)," \textit{World Knowledge (世界知识)} 2011.
region was divided and weak. All these factors led both internal and external analysts to believe Syria would be different from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.324

Deep underlying socio-economic and sectarian tensions, however, lay beneath the surface. The 1990s and 2000s had seen increasingly visible economic stratification and elite corruption, and, like Tunisia, Syria was primed to explode.325 When protests began to spread across the country in March of 2011, the regime’s ham-handed, regressive, and at times amazingly incompetent response accelerated rather than restrained the resulting result.326

*The UNSC Negotiations*

By the end of April 2011, approximately 350 people had been killed in Syria’s resulting violence. The United States ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, characterized the violence as “abhorrent and deplorable,” and the major Western powers on the council supported discussion of a draft statement censuring Syria for attacks on protesters.327 China, together with Russia and Lebanon, was however reluctant to support such a statement. China’s representative to the UNSC noted the importance of “political dialogue” and hoped that “the international community will offer constructive help in line with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter [emphasis added].” This focus on Syria’s sovereignty, combined

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with Russia’s strong support for Assad, would be critical in shaping China’s position going forward. Russia was explicit in the April 2011 discussions, noting that “Syria is a cornerstone of the Middle East security architecture” and “the current situation in Syria... does not present a threat to international peace and security,” rather “a real threat to regional security... could arise from outside interference in Syria’s domestic situation.” China’s principled position on Syria and Russia’s security position on their regional ally would critically shape the events to follow.

By the early May 2011, Western diplomats and Syrian opposition organizations reported that 7000 persons had been arrested and 800 killed. Violence intensified when the Syrian regime in May 2011 reacted to national unrest by sending soldiers tanks to a number of cities in the south, Homs in the middle of the country, Banias in the northwest, and the suburbs of Damascus. The May 10 UNSC meeting saw the US, British, and French again express concern over Syrian violence, while China emphasized that:

The international community and external organizations can provide constructive assistance [to protect civilians], but they must observe the principles of objectivity and neutrality and fully respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country concerned. There must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war by any party under the guise of protecting civilians.

Russia made explicit reference to displeasure over the implementation of Resolution 1973 on Libya, implicit criticism of civilian casualties resulting from US, British, and French actions in Libya, Afghanistan, and Cote d’Ivoire, and noted that:

it is unacceptable for United Nations peacekeepers to be drawn into armed conflict and, in effect, to take the side of one of the parties when implementing their mandate. This last point being a clear expression of both unhappiness over NATO actions in Libya and of unwillingness to allow similar action in Syria. 330

Violence intensified in June 2011, as the Syrian government continued to lay siege to opposition cities. Over 10 thousand refugees had fled to Turkey by the end of the month. 331 However, an early June draft resolution by Britain and France, weakened to meet Chinese and Russian objections but still condemning the Syrian government, was never brought to a vote due to Russian and Chinese opposition. Out of non-veto holding members, Brazil, South Africa, and India also opposed action on Syria’s internal affairs. 332

The increase in mass violence continued through the summer and into the fall of 2011, but the positions of the Western powers and Russia, China, as well as other members of the BRICS, remained deadlocked. The only UNSC action over the summer was a July 12 press statement condemning the attacks on the Damascus embassies of France and the US and an August 3 non-binding presidential statement 333 condemning the ongoing violence and the Syrian regime’s use of force, while reaffirming respect for Syria’s sovereignty. An August British

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draft resolution that would have resulted in targeted sanctions on Syria was never brought to a vote.\textsuperscript{334}

On October 4, China and Russia together vetoed a draft resolution that made demands upon the Syrian government and contained an oblique reference to possible sanctions through a mention of Chapter 41 of the UN Charter. The primary parties responsible for this draft were the US, Britain, France, Germany, and Portugal. The first draft of this resolution had contained explicit threat of sanctions, a demand that a UN investigation team be allowed to enter the country, and a truncated timetable for Syria’s compliance, but these measures were diluted in an attempt to avoid a veto.\textsuperscript{335} This dilution failed to achieve its objective however; China and Russia both cited their objection to infringement of Syria’s sovereignty. Russia made explicit reference to its displeasure over NATO’s actions in Libya. Brazil, India, South Africa, and Lebanon abstained over similar concerns.\textsuperscript{336}

October 2011 to February 2012 saw, again, increasing violence. The Arab League suspended and sanctioned Syria in November of 2012, with the UNSC condemning attacks on foreign embassies in Damascus, but otherwise taking little action. With Russia on China’s side, the change in stance of the Arab League had no discernable impact on China’s position. In Syria, atrocities on both sides multiplied, the UN as of February 2012 estimated that approximately


7500 people had died. A number of draft resolutions were discussed, both by Western countries and by China and Russia, but none were brought to a vote until February. On February 4, 2012, the US, European, and Arab League backed draft resolution was vetoed by China and Russia. The resolution “would have demanded that all parties in Syria – both Government forces and armed opposition groups – stop all violence and reprisals” and made a number of demands upon the Syrian government. The final draft resolution was, however, heavily diluted in its severity compared to the original draft, which had demanded Assad’s resignation and democratic elections. China and Russia were alone in voting against the resolution; India and South Africa this time voted affirmatively. The Arab League was likewise supportive of the draft. Both China and Russia opposed the draft resolution as being unbalanced in its focus on the Syrian government instead of rebels. Additionally, China cited, as usual, the importance of Syria’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity,” while Russia again opposed “a change of regime.” This veto took place the day after the Syrian government began its assault on the city of Homs, a siege in which 200 people were reported killed in the first day.

Showing the true isolation of China and Russia’s position, a similar resolution would pass the UN General Assembly on February 16, with 137 UN members voting in favor, 17 abstaining.

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338 UNSC, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan."
340 Lebanon was no longer on the UNSC.
341 UNSC, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China."
and 12 voting negatively. The 12 negative votes were by Russia, Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. This group is characterized by its members’ generally hostile relations with the US government. Matching the predictions of the soft balancing theory here, it seems that Beijing is comfortable in general opposition to the US as long as Russia matches this position.343

US anger at China and Russia’s vetoes was palpable. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the veto a “travesty,”344 while the US Ambassador to the UN stated angrily that the people of Syria would now:

be able to see clearly which nations had stood for their legitimate rights and which had chosen to “prop up desperate dictators”. Indeed, any further bloodshed in Syria would be on their hands

British and French officials had similarly harsh words. Britain’s foreign secretary stated that China and Russia “sided with the Syrian regime and its brutal suppression of the Syrian people in support of their own national interests,” while the French foreign minister said that “those who block the adoption of such a resolution are taking a grave historical responsibility.”345

These speeches, however, had little substantive impact on China and Russia’s position. On March 1, the council issued a press statement condemning violence in Syria and calling upon the Syrian government to grant entrance to a UN Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief

343 UN General Assembly, "General Assembly Adopts Resolution Strongly Condemning ‘Widespread and Systematic’ Human Rights Violations by Syrian Authorities.” (Department of Public Information, 2012).
344 Mohammed, "Clinton Calls UN Syria Vote a ‘Travesty’.”
Coordinator. However, China continued to emphasize the importance of Syria’s sovereignty and opposition to “regime change” at UN debates; a position completely in line with Russia’s. At the end of March, Morocco proposed a draft resolution censuring the ongoing violence to the five permanent members of the UNSC (the P5), but continuing disagreement within the P5 quickly caused the resolution to be withdrawn. In April 2012, the Chinese and Russian governments supported former UN Secretary Kofi Annan’s non-coercive six-point ceasefire plan. In line with this support, Resolutions 2042 and 2043, which had no coercive measures, were passed unanimously in April of 2012. Resolution 2042, sponsored by the US, France, Britain, Germany, Morocco, Northern Ireland, Columbia, and Portugal, deployed “30 unarmed military observers” to Syria and expressed the willingness of the UNSC to assist in a peace process, while Resolution 2043, sponsored by Russia, expanded this force to 300 unarmed observers. The Annan six-point plan and these resolutions had little long-term impact on the violence; danger to the observers necessitated their withdrawal, and Annan himself would resign as Joint Special Envoy for Syria at the end of August 2012 deploring UNSC inaction and the lack of a desire for peace by either the Syrian government or Syrian rebels.

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348 Security Council Report, Chronology of Events: Syria ([cited]).
As the Annan plan foundered, the US, France, Britain, Germany, and Portugal in July proposed a draft resolution that extended the mandate of the UN observers in Syria and threatened sanctions if violence continued. This resolution, like the others before it, was vetoed by China and Russia on July 19. Pakistan and South Africa abstained, while all other UNSC members voted affirmatively. The Chinese representative stated that China’s veto had the goal of “safeguarding the interests of the Syrian people, as well as the basic norms covering international relations,” and deplored that “a few countries had been eager to interfere in the internal affairs of Syria.” The Russian representative similarly stated his opposition to “military intervention and sanctions.” The non-coercive Resolution 2059 passed unanimously on July 20. However, the resolution was limited to extending the UN observers’ mandate by 30 days. The brief resolution neither censured the Syrian government nor contained any coercive measures. The UN observers’ mandate would end in August 2012, as its continuation had been predicated upon “the cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction in the level of violence by all sides.” This condition was manifestly not fulfilled.

Since Resolution 2059, a year has passed since any UNSC action on Syria. The conflict threatens to destabilize the entire region, particularly vulnerable Lebanon, and chemical weapons have reportedly been used, although both the government and rebels deny

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352 UNSC, “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria That Would Have Threatened Sanctions, Due to Negative Votes of China, Russian Federation; Gladstone, “Friction at the UN as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions.”
responsibility. Positions of external supporters of both the Syrian government and Syrian rebels have hardened, the well-known International Crisis Group in June of 2013 assessed that "the optimal solution – a negotiated, diplomatic one – at this stage belongs pretty much in the world of make-believe." 

Summary of China’s Position at the UNSC

The Syrian case is thus a clear example of high opposition. China has vetoed three resolutions on Syria, rejecting any coercive UNSC action, including sanctions, and even mild censure of the Syrian government. As predicted by the soft-balancing theory, China’s actions on the UNSC have mirrored Russia’s. When Russia is willing to stand firm on an issue at the UNSC, China is willing to veto US-backed resolutions, translating speech into action.

Evidence for the Economic Interest Theory

In contrast, the Syrian case is a clear mark against the economic-interest theory and for the soft-balancing theory. Despite an almost complete lack of Chinese economic interest in the Syrian government, China has supported Syria at the UNSC, explicitly referencing promotion of sovereignty norms and protesting US and Western violation of those norms in Libya.

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Conclusion

Out of the four cases, the predictions of the soft-balancing and economic interest theories are the most disparate in the case of Syria. China’s observed high level of opposition is thus a clear mark in favor of the soft-balancing theory and against the economic interest theory. China is willing to oppose the US when it believes norms of strict sovereignty are at stake and Russia similarly blocks US action at the UNSC. Economic interest is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain China’s opposition to US policy; China’s Syria policy is intimately tied to concerns regarding US power and its use.
Chapter 5: Alternative explanations

I have shown above a soft-balancing explanation can explain China's policy towards these four US adversaries, while economic interest fails to explain the observed variation. In addition to the economic explanation for China's behavior, however, there are a number of other possible theories. Brooks and Wohlforth highlight a number of alternatives – regional security concerns, sincere tactical/policy disputes, and domestic political incentives. A fourth alternative would be issue linkage; China adopts an adversarial position in order to gain concessions on issues such as Taiwan. None of these alternatives, however, can satisfactorily explain China's policy towards US adversaries.

Regional Security Concerns

By design, my sample of US adversaries does not include countries that touch upon China's regional security concerns. Chinese analysts note China's relative freedom from security considerations in the North Africa and Western Asian region where these four US adversaries are situated. Iran, the most capable of the four, would be the most likely candidate for such cooperation, but, despite Iran's significant interest in a strengthened Sino-Iranian relationship, China has consistently refrained from any hint of alliance. China's 2010 Defense White Paper, although it mentions military cooperation with a number of states

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disliked by the US, such as North Korea and Burma, omits any mention of Iran.\textsuperscript{360} China's actual military activity in the Middle East has been minimal; the first visit by China's naval vessels to the region did not occur until 2010 and was related to counter-piracy.\textsuperscript{361} Moreover, since 1997 China has greatly reduced conventional arms sales to Iran and has more or less ceased civilian nuclear cooperation.\textsuperscript{362} With regards to international organizations, China and Russia have rebuffed the Iranian application to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a full member, possibly to avoid giving the impression that the organization is an anti-US alliance.\textsuperscript{363} Similar arguments apply for the other three US adversaries.

\textbf{Sincere Diplomatic/Tactical Disputes}

Brooks and Wohlforth suggest that sincere diplomatic disputes unrelated to opposition to US power could result in activity easily misconstrued as soft balancing. For example, French opposition to the war in Iraq can be explained as a sincere dispute over the best manner in which to handle international terrorism.\textsuperscript{364} Similarly, Chinese government officials, academics, and media commonly justify China's positions on US adversaries as based upon the concern

that US policy will "complicate the situation" and increase the suffering of common people.\textsuperscript{365}

However, this concern for civilian suffering is inconsistent with China’s overriding interest in sovereignty, in preference to human rights, described above. Chinese statements on promoting humanitarian welfare in Sudan, Iran, Syria, and Libya are more rhetoric than explanation for China’s policy; these statements are difficult to square logically with Chinese officials’ pronouncements that, for example, Syrian violence is within the range of normal social contradictions seen in many countries around the world,\textsuperscript{366} or that the Darfur humanitarian crisis does not appear to be very urgent.\textsuperscript{367}

**Domestic Political Incentives**

There is little evidence for a serious theory of domestic political incentives based upon stoking Chinese patriotism. Although opposition to US “hegemony” is certainly a characteristic of Chinese nationalism,\textsuperscript{368} China’s policy towards US adversaries is often downplayed, rather than played up, in China’s state-controlled media. In particular, with regards to the Arab Spring, China’s government is more concerned with avoiding a similar event in China than with scoring

\textsuperscript{365} For example, Zhongmin Liu (刘中民), "The Syrian Resolution: Why Did China Say No? (叙利亚决议案：中国为何说‘不’？)," *Social Outlook*(社会观察) 2 (2012); Hongze He (何洪泽) and Dehao Zou (邹德浩), "China Opposes Sanctions (中国反对制裁)," *People’s Daily* 2004; International Crisis Group, "The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing."

\textsuperscript{366} Chinese Special Representative to Syria Li Huaxin (李华新) as interviewed in Xiaofang Wu (吴晓芳), "China’s Special Representative Constantly Travelling around the Middle East (穿梭在中东的中国特使)," *World Knowledge* (世界知识) 2012, 23.

\textsuperscript{367} Silva and Salopek, "U.S. Adds to Sudan Sanctions; CNN, "CNN Student News Transcript: September 18, 2007."

\textsuperscript{368} Peter H. Gries, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
domestic political points from the events. Relations with US adversaries do not touch upon Japan, by far the most virulent and common object of Chinese nationalism, and, in general, there is little reason to believe that public opinion is a substantial motive for China’s government policy on US adversaries.

### Issue Linkage

Finally, China might pursue a US-adversary policy based upon issue linkage. By initially obstructing US policy on US adversaries, China would seek to gain diplomatic payoffs from the US as a reward for changing its position. China’s official media has linked US arms sales to Taiwan and “cooperation on key international matters such as those related to Iran, Afghanistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” and there is some evidence that China has attempted to leverage its relations with US adversaries in order to gain concessions on this issue. However, there is no strong evidence that a theory of deliberate

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369 Jacobs and Ansfield, "Catching Scent of Revolution, China Moves to Snip Jasmine; Michael Wines, "China Sentences Another Prominent Activist to Prison," New York Times, January 19 2012; "In Beijing, Regional Experts Discuss the State of the Middle East and North Africa Unrest and Its Influence on China (在京部分专家学者谈 ‘中东北非局势动荡及对我影响’) ."

370 Peter H. Gries, "China’s ‘New Thinking’ on Japan," The China Quarterly 184 (2005); Peter H. Gries, China’s New Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

371 Xiaokun Li, "Beijing Furious at Arms Sales to Taiwan," China Daily, February 1 2010.

372 In 1997, China tried to tie increase US public support for China’s Taiwan position to cessation of missile and nuclear relations with Iran. China may have secured concessions from the US on Taiwan in 2002 and 2003 during the lead up to the Iraq War. International Crisis Group, "The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing," 4, 10; Alterman and Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East, 16, 48; John Pomfret, “Beijing Is Cool to Powell’s Pleas; Secretary Sought More Support for U.S. On N. Korea, Iraq,” Washington Post, February 25 2003.
issue linkage consistently explains or drives China’s policy towards US adversaries. China does not take more extreme positions than Russia in order to be rewarded for changing its position, as such a theory would suggest. Moreover, China’s reluctance to veto UN resolutions and general desire to keep a low international profile are inconsistent with a desire to gain political payoffs through forceful bargaining.

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373 In fact, China has, at other times, angrily denied that it is even amenable to linking issues. Xinhua, "China Not to Trade Its Sovereignty, Principle," November 27 2007.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis finds that soft balancing against the US best explains China’s policy towards US adversaries, a finding in line with the predictions of authors such as Art, Pape, Paul, and Walt.\textsuperscript{374} A new, stronger, definition of soft balancing that answers the objections of Brooks and Wohlfarth and Lieber and Alexander\textsuperscript{375} is proposed and applied; this new definition will be useful for study of soft-balancing behavior by countries other than China.

Furthermore, this thesis proposes a possible general theory of middle-power foreign policy when opposing the unipole and applies this theory to China. My work finds that China manages the tradeoff between, on the one hand, resistance to liberal norms of intervention and US primacy, and, on the other, the importance of the Sino-US relationship by taking positions on US adversaries that are as extreme, but never more extreme, than other major powers. Russia is China’s UNSC partner in this endeavor. At least on the US-adversary issue, the Sino-Russian relationship is therefore more important than authors such as Johnston suggest.\textsuperscript{376} These findings are broadly consistent with those of Houser and Levy and Fravel,\textsuperscript{377} and likely shed light upon general trends in the foreign policies of other medium powers without strong alliance relations with the US. Other members of the BRICS such as India, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa also support restrictions on exercise of US power and were particularly concerned by the precedent of Libya. Moreover, these nations are similarly inclined to take

\textsuperscript{374} Walt, \textit{Taming American Power}; Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States; Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy; Art et al., "Striking the Balance."


\textsuperscript{376} Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power," 39.

\textsuperscript{377} Houser and Levy, "Energy Security and China’s UN Diplomacy; Fravel, "China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989."
unified positions and avoid isolation when opposing the US.\textsuperscript{378} Further work on middle-power foreign policy, using the framework laid out in this thesis, will likely be profitable. The relationship of regime type (liberal vs. illiberal) and middle-power opposition to the US is of particular interest.

Economic-interest theories such as those proposed by Lenin and Gilpin,\textsuperscript{379} in contrast, fail to account for the observed variation in China’s support for US adversaries. Although China, like most countries, opposes direct harm to its trade and investments, its support for US adversaries is motivated across the board by a desire to restrict US power through promotion of an international norm of strict sovereignty. This finding is consistent with the International Crisis Groups interview-based assessment that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not engage in comprehensive strategic planning with China’s economic actors.\textsuperscript{380} Alternative theories of regional security concerns, sincere diplomatic disputes, domestic political incentives, and issue linkage are similarly unsatisfactory as explanations for China’s policy. Critics of soft balancing such as Brooks and Wohlforth and Lieber and Alexander should reassess their objections to the concept.\textsuperscript{381} Furthermore, although China’s attitudes towards peacekeeping have changed substantially\textsuperscript{382} and China’s foreign policy has become more sophisticated,\textsuperscript{383} China’s support for sovereignty norms as a check to US power remains an important

\textsuperscript{378} Bilefsky, "New Move to Condemn Syria in UN; MacFarquhar, "UN Resolution on Syria Blocked by Russia and China; Williams, "Brics Agree Not Bound by "Unilateral" Sanctions on Iran."

\textsuperscript{379} Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline.

\textsuperscript{380} International Crisis Group, "China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping," i.

\textsuperscript{381} Even if China is part of a small subset of states (Lieber and Alexander, p. 139) engaging in balancing, China’s current and growing power means that China’s behavior is, on its own, important. Lieber and Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back; Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing."

\textsuperscript{382} For example: Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, "China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?; Reilly and Gill, "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing; International Crisis Group, "China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping."

\textsuperscript{383} Medeiros and Fravel, "China’s New Diplomacy."
component of China’s strategy. China’s anger over Western intervention in Libya is strong evidence of this fact.

A possible criticism of my work is that Russian preferences are, effectively, taken as exogenous. My results would be weakened if there was an omitted variable driving both China and Russia’s UNSC votes that was unrelated to soft balancing. Nevertheless, the Chinese speech evidence presented in this thesis suggests a clear conceptual link between promoting sovereignty and restricting US power. The recent events in Syria, for example, are difficult to explain as anything other than a soft-balancing response to US power.

China’s soft-balancing behavior at the UNSC likely extends beyond supporting only adversaries of the US. The US adversaries presented in this thesis represent a well-defined sample that is particularly interesting due to the strain that China’s support for these states places upon Sino-US relations. I find, however, that China is not aligning with these adversaries of the US, but rather is balancing with Russia against the US. This coalitional balancing suggests that the ‘rogue’ nature of the state targeted by the US may not be critical and that the soft-balancing theory can be extended to explain China’s general support for sovereign entities threatened with coercive diplomacy. Israel is, for example, a special case that nevertheless fits the theory. China’s support for Palestinian statehood has its roots in promotion of norms of strict sovereignty and China’s long-standing views of the Palestinian territories as occupied

\[384\] Houser and Levy similarly find that China’s preferences for sovereignty extend beyond just US adversaries. Houser and Levy, "Energy Security and China’s UN Diplomacy."
territory rather than land subject to Israeli sovereignty. From this perspective, China’s support for Palestinian statehood, although moderated by China’s trade relationship with Israel, promotes sovereignty norms that restrict exercise of power by militarily strong states such as Israel and the US.

Extension of the soft-balancing explanation for China’s UNSC policy to the economic arena is, however, more difficult. The difficulty stems, first, from the fact that from China’s perspective the Sino-US economic relationship is, in general, a positive in Sino-US relations. The theory of middle-power and Chinese tactics laid out here suggests that China would be very cautious in jeopardizing this important element of its relationship with the US. Secondly, there are analytical difficulties. Alternative explanations of Chinese policy based upon pure economic interest or diplomatic disagreements unrelated to US power are more difficult to disprove given the market-driven nature of the field. And with regards to willingness to bear international isolation, China’s resistance to US pressure on rare-earth exports suggests that China, on market issues, is willing to bear substantial criticism without the support of other nations.

More research is necessary before any claims are made regarding economic soft balancing and tactics.

In conclusion, the root causes of China’s support for US adversaries will critically shape Sino-US relations as China’s power increases. Shen Dingli predicts that US-China frictions will

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continue to grow on the issue of US adversaries.\textsuperscript{387} My findings suggests that he may be correct; an increase in China’s power may result in a situation where China is not as concerned about damaging the US-China relationship but still wishes to promote sovereignty norms in order to restrict US power. As a result of China’s increasing power and distinct unease over the recent increase in “hegemonic and power-politics ideology as well as the new interventionist [meddling] ideology (霸权主义、强权政治和新干涉主义有所上升),”\textsuperscript{388} China may, in the future, be more willing to unilaterally oppose the US on issues such as sanctions on Iran. Cooperation with Russia will certainly be a constant. Xi Jinping, as China’s new President, made Russia his first foreign visit after taking office, and while in Russia stated that:

\begin{quote}
  We must respect the right of each country in the world to independently choose its path of development and oppose interference in the internal affairs of other countries...
  Strong Chinese-Russian relations ... not only answer to our interests but also serve as an important, reliable guarantee of an international strategic balance and peace.\textsuperscript{389}
\end{quote}

However, this finding does not necessarily suggest that China is a revisionist power. Indeed, China’s focus on strict sovereignty norms and desire to restrict US influence overseas is actually a conservative impulse.\textsuperscript{390} I leave discussion of China’s ‘status-quo’ or ‘revisionist’ nature to other authors.

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\textsuperscript{387} Shen (沈丁立), "2007: Anti-Proliferation and Sino-US Relations (防扩散与中美关系)," 6.
\textsuperscript{388} PLA Daily, "The Diverse Uses of China's Military Forces (中国武装力量的多样化运用)," April 17 2013.
\textsuperscript{389} Vladimir Soldatkin, "In Moscow, New Chinese Leader Xi Warns against Meddling," Reuters, March 23 2013.
\textsuperscript{390} Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power," 15.
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### APPENDIX 1: SUDAN UNSC RESOLUTIONS SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Resolution Content</th>
<th>China’s Position and Influence</th>
<th>UNSC members with similar positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1547</td>
<td>2004, June 11</td>
<td>Establishes UN advance team to South Sudan, includes reference to Darfur.</td>
<td>With others, opposes reference to Darfur, but eventually votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>Pakistan, Algeria also oppose reference, but also eventually vote affirmatively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1556</td>
<td>2004, July 30</td>
<td>Places light sanctions on Darfur combatants. Demands that Sudan hold Janjaweed accountable, oblique reference to sanctions of Sudan in case of non compliance.</td>
<td>With Russia, forces removal of direct mention of sanctions from initial draft. Abstains from final vote.</td>
<td>Russia and Pakistan also oppose mention of sanctions. After their removal. Pakistan abstains, Russia votes affirmatively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1564</td>
<td>2004, Sept 18</td>
<td>In the event of continued Sudanese non-compliance in Darfur, UNSC will consider sanctions.</td>
<td>With Russia, opposes threats and sanctions. With others, forces removal of automatic triggering of sanctions by non-compliance and demands that Sudanese government cease military flights in Darfur. Abstains from final vote.</td>
<td>Russia, Pakistan, and Algeria hold the same positions. They, with China, abstain in final vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Resolution Content</td>
<td>China's Position and Influence</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1574</td>
<td>2004, Nov 19</td>
<td>Urges Darfur parties to come to peace agreement.</td>
<td>Supports, votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1585</td>
<td>2005, Mar 10</td>
<td>Extends mandate dates of UN advance mission to Darfur.</td>
<td>Supports, votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>2005, Mar 17</td>
<td>Extends mandate dates again.</td>
<td>Supports, votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>2005, Mar 24</td>
<td>Focuses on South Sudan.</td>
<td>Supports, votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>2005, Mar 29</td>
<td>Sets up committee to designate individuals for targeted sanctions.</td>
<td>With Russia, opposes. With others, forces removal of extension of arms embargos. Abstains from final vote.</td>
<td>Russia and Algeria have same position and also abstain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>2005, Mar 31</td>
<td>Refers Darfur situation to the ICC.</td>
<td>With others, opposes and abstains.</td>
<td>US, Brazil, and Algeria have similar positions and also abstain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1672</td>
<td>2006, April 26</td>
<td>Names four Sudanese for targeted sanctions.</td>
<td>With Russia, opposes and abstains.</td>
<td>Russia and Qatar also oppose and abstain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1679</td>
<td>2006, May 16</td>
<td>Establishes UN advance mission to assess possibility of peacekeeping in Darfur.</td>
<td>With Russia, opposes reference to Chapter VII. Emphasizes need for Sudan's ascent. Votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>Russia has same position, also votes affirmatively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Resolution Content</td>
<td>China’s Position and Influence</td>
<td>UNSC members with similar positions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>2006, Aug 31</td>
<td>Extends mandate of UN force in South Sudan to include Darfur.</td>
<td>With Russia, opposes, notes necessity of Sudanese government consent. Abstains.</td>
<td>Russia has same position, also abstains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1769</td>
<td>2007, July 31</td>
<td>Establishes joint UN-AU mission to Darfur.</td>
<td>With Russia, delays passage for 10 months until Sudan gives consent. Then supports and votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>Russia has same position, voting affirmatively only after consent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 2: IRAN UNSC RESOLUTIONS SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>UNSC members with similar positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1696</td>
<td>2006, July 31</td>
<td>Demands Iran suspend enrichment and reprocessing.</td>
<td>With Russia, forces removal of explicit reference to sanctions in final resolution. Votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>Russia has the same position, also votes affirmatively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737</td>
<td>2006, Dec 23</td>
<td>Blocks import or export of nuclear-related items.</td>
<td>With Russia, delays votes on resolution for five months and secures removal of the more punitive sanctions proposed. Finally votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>Russia has the same position and is leader of resistance to US, finally votes affirmatively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>2007, Mar 24</td>
<td>Slightly increases scope of sanctions from Resolution 1737.</td>
<td>With Russia, secures removal of more aggressive individual sanctions, prohibition of arms sales to Iran and elimination of export credits for trade with Iran. Finally votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>Russia has the same position, finally votes affirmatively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Resolution Content</td>
<td>China’s Position and Influence</td>
<td>UNSC members with similar positions</td>
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<tr>
<td>1803</td>
<td>2008, Mar 3</td>
<td>Called on all states to “scrutinize” Iranian trade, citizens, and organizations. Expands targeted financial sanctions.</td>
<td>With Russia, delays discussion at UNSC for year from Resolution 1747. Forces removal of measures targeting Iran’s military and large banks. Votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>Russia has the same position, finally votes affirmatively. Indonesia abstains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>2008, Sep 27</td>
<td>Reaffirms previous resolutions.</td>
<td>Supports.</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>2010, June 9</td>
<td>Expands sanctions against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Imposes sanctions on Iran’s import of advanced weaponry. Allows states to unilaterally sanction Iran.</td>
<td>With Russia, forces removal of mandatory economic- and energy-trade sanctions. Finally votes affirmatively.</td>
<td>Russia has the same position, finally votes affirmatively. Brazil and Turkey vote no.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 3: LIBYA UNSC RESOLUTIONS SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Resolution Content</th>
<th>China’s Position and Influence</th>
<th>UNSC members with similar positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2011, Feb 26</td>
<td>Imposes personal, financial, and arms sanctions on Libya and Libyan leaders. Refers Libya to ICC.</td>
<td>With Russia and India, opposes referral to the court and delivery of humanitarian assistance by “all means necessary.” Secures removal of this passage on humanitarian assistance. Finally votes affirmatively on modified resolution after Russia and India change position.</td>
<td>Russia and India also initially oppose resolution. Finally also vote affirmatively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2011, Mar 17</td>
<td>No fly zone, authorization to protect civilians by all means necessary, including military means.</td>
<td>With Russia, China opposes use of military force. Abstains from resolution.</td>
<td>Russia, Germany, India, and Brazil also oppose and abstain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Resolution Content</td>
<td>China’s Position and Influence</td>
<td>UNSC members with similar positions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2011, Oct 31</td>
<td>Measures to counter heavy arms proliferation from Libya.</td>
<td>Supports.</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 4: SYRIA UNSC RESOLUTIONS SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Resolution Content</th>
<th>China’s Position and Influence</th>
<th>UNSC members with similar positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft</td>
<td>2011, April</td>
<td>Draft statement censuring Syria for attacks on protestors.</td>
<td>With Russia, opposes and blocks.</td>
<td>Lebanon also opposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft</td>
<td>2011, June</td>
<td>Draft resolution condemning Syrian government.</td>
<td>With Russia, opposes and blocks any vote on draft.</td>
<td>Russia, Brazil, South Africa, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft</td>
<td>2011, Aug</td>
<td>Draft resolution with targeted sanctions.</td>
<td>With Russia, opposes and blocks any vote on draft.</td>
<td>Russia, Brazil, South Africa, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft</td>
<td>2012, Feb 4</td>
<td>Weak draft demanding all parties stop violence, with slightly more demands on the Syrian government.</td>
<td>China and Russia oppose and veto.</td>
<td>Only Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2042</td>
<td>2012, April 14</td>
<td>Sends unarmed observers to Syria.</td>
<td>Supports.</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2043</td>
<td>2012, April 21</td>
<td>Expands force of unarmed observers.</td>
<td>Supports.</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Resolution Content</td>
<td>China’s Position and Influence</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft</td>
<td>2012, July 19</td>
<td>Extended mandate of UN observers, threatened sanctions if violence continued.</td>
<td>With Russia, China vetoes.</td>
<td>Russia vetoes. Pakistan and South Africa abstain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2059</td>
<td>2012, July 20</td>
<td>Extends mandate of UN observers by 30 days.</td>
<td>Supports.</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>