June 30, 1967

THE CONTROL OF LOCAL CONFLICT

A Design Study on Arms Control and Limited War in the Developing Areas

ACDA/WEC-98 II

Prepared for

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Prepared by

Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss

with

Col. Laurence J. Legere, U.S.A. (Ret.)

Richard E. Barringer
John H. Hoagland
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C O N T E N T S

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Case studies prepared in connection with this Design Study are bound separately as Studies of Conflict (WEC-98 III).

F O R E W O R D

Once again, as in the past, the interests of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in a particular aspect of arms control have converged with the concern of the M. I. T. Center for International Studies about certain continuing issues relating U. S. national security policy, arms and arms control, and the developing countries. Under a contract assignment to make a Design Study of the relationship between arms control and limited war, a group of researchers at the Center has, generally speaking, carried one step further the work begun here in recent years (also on contract for USACDA) on regional arms control problems and prospects for the developing regions.*

As in the previous study, my closest collaborator in this Design Study at all stages of research design, analysis, and execution was Miss Amelia C. Leiss. If the Center's Arms Control Project were so constructed as to have a co-director, Miss Leiss surely so served. Not only did she give direct supervision to a substantial part of the total group research, but her own personal intellectual contribution was outstanding --including inventive and farsighted formulations that went into our central model of local conflict, notably her identification of the phases of conflict; uncompromising critical standards in her guidance to the review of the work of the research team; and her unique conception and direction of what we have called the Historic-Analytic Case Method, which stands alongside

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*See Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas, Report for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Center for International Studies, September 1964).

the dynamic conflict structure model as one of the Design Study's principal methodological products.

Col. Laurence J. Legere, USA (Ret.), also served throughout as an extraordinarily versatile, energetic, and imaginative collaborator. In addition to his preparation of the classified annex to this report, and to his assistance on virtually every point, whether substantive or editorial, he created a new dimension of analysis on the foundations of my own crude preliminary efforts to work out some meaningful typologies. The chapter on typologies that Col. Legere substantially drafted, in my opinion, carries the process of classifying and categorizing local conflicts well beyond into a new mode of policy analysis.

Mr. Richard E. Barringer, one of our graduate students in the M. I. T. Political Science program, was asked to undertake the special task of transforming the disorderly data of historical local conflict cases into a formal model, in order to see if it were indeed possible, within the framework of our central hypotheses, to manipulate these materials with mathematical rigor and elegance. We were interested to know if such analysis could usefully employ high-speed computers. With the splendid and unstinting collaboration of another M. I. T. student, Mr. Robert K. Ramers, Mr. Barringer succeeded in developing a configuration analysis technique that shows real promise, not only for further research on conflict control, but perhaps in other fields as well. In addition, during our most perplexing early stages, Dick Barringer made significant contributions to the general concepts that provided us with a framework to follow. If the central structural-dynamic model of conflict control is recognized as having any enduring merit or value, I would hope it would be referred to as the Bloomfield-Leiss-Barringer Model.

Several others made up the continuing research team, and their contributions in each case went beyond their special assignments. Miss Janet Fraser prepared the original drafts of the Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya and Cyprus case studies, and subsequently took full responsibility for the onerous and demanding task of technical editor, which she fulfilled with distinction. Mr. R. Lucas Fischer, who is also working toward a Ph.D. in Political Science at M. I. T., did the historical research for the Indonesia, China-India, Malaya, and Malaysia-Indonesia cases, worked out all the requirements for maps for the cases, and in addition offered helpful substantive and methodological ideas for the research as a whole.

Mr. John H. Hoagland, Executive Vice-President of Browne and Shaw Research Corporation, proved once again to be an invaluable colleague (as he had in our previous ACDA-sponsored study of Soviet interests in arms control) both personally and through the unique resources of his staff in the collection and analysis of military-type data. Through a subcontract relationship we benefited as well from the special services of Miss Priscilla A. Clapp in drafting the Bay of Pigs case. Miss Clapp, together with Mrs. Judith H. Young and Mr. Lewis A. Frank, collected data on weapons acquired and used in local conflicts.

Other Ph.D. candidates in the M. I. T. Political Science graduate program took responsibility for the first drafts of other cases: Messrs. Philip M. Raup, Robert H. Bates, Stanley J. Heginbotham, and Edward W. Gude. Mrs. Jane K. Holland developed the draft of the Iran case.

We also appreciate the contribution made by the Bendix Corporation on a subcontract basis. Dr. Joseph I. Coffey, Lt. Col. Bernard L. Tauber, USA (Ret.), and Dr. Donald H. Armsby were the responsible contributors.

The Design Study benefited inestimably from the advice from time to time of six distinguished consultants: Dr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Hon. Alastair Buchan, Dean Edmund S. Gullion, Dr. Robert E. Osgood, Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau, and Prof. Thomas C. Schelling.

Mr. Thomas C. O'Sullivan drafted a paper on the relevance of factor analysis to the study of the control of local conflict, and in addition offered helpful advice regarding both our central model and the Configuration Analysis.

Additional codebooks in connection with the Configuration Analysis were generously filled out by the staff of CINFAC, courtesy of Col. Richard H. Moore, and by Mr. Barton S. Whaley. Mrs. Irirangi C. Bloomfield served as historical editor in connection with the narrative sections of the Historic-Analytic Case Studies.

Among my colleagues at the Center who were especially generous with their time and interest were Professors Max F. Millikan, Fred C. Iklé, and Lucian S. Pye, and Col. Thomas L. Fisher, II, USAF.

I am personally grateful for the splendid support throughout the Design Study of the project officers of ACDA, Messrs. Edmund S. Finegold and Thomas C. Irwin.

Miss Barbara H. Abramson as Project Secretary and Miss Ulrike H. Hochreiter provided the indispensable office assistance and atmosphere without which the Design Study could not have functioned. This main report was typed by Mrs. Eileen Smith with her customary competence and good nature.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Director, Arms Control Project

D E F I N I N G T H E P R O B L E M

CHAPTER I

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

THE AGE OF LOCAL CONFLICT

The world since the end of World War II has lived in the shadow of a cataclysmic nuclear war. The driving ambitions of first the Soviet Union and then Communist China, and the determined opposition of the West, gave such a war every apparent reason for happening. But a general thermonuclear exchange could be regarded only by a madman as a rational means of achieving political ends. This transforming fact has forced into prominence a number of other elements of prime concern to the present study.

One implication of that change is that local quarrels and disorders, although taking place far from the capitals of the great powers, have become aspects of a worldwide competition, posing potential threats of major intensification* to wider areas and more destructive weapons.

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*We have chosen to use the words "intensification" and "moderation" rather than the more common "escalation" and "de-escalation." These latter are so ambiguously defined in common usage that any but the most egregious steps are subject to quarrel as to whether they qualify or not. "Intensification" and "moderation," while equally imprecise, do not currently carry the same semantic freight.

Another implication involves the reverse of the first. Some local conflicts have been more free to take place to the extent that a fear of intensification has inhibited superpower intervention. And a third implication is that, as the result of the other factors, the most powerful nations on earth have found themselves concerned with small-scale conflicts to a degree that is unique in political history. The trend and the basic reason for it was summed up by the late President Kennedy in 1962: "As nuclear weapons get more and more powerful there will be less and less occasion to use them and more and more emphasis on this kind of struggle [lower-spectrum war]."*

Post-World War II conflicts of the local variety have thus emerged into unanticipated prominence. They have contributed significantly to the general problem of the developing nations in the regions outside Europe, over 90 per cent of them having taken place in the great southern, underdeveloped half of the world. Some of them represent the more traditional type of warfare between states. All recent wars have been "limited," and most have taken place within the frontiers of a single state. Even the largest in scale, such as Korea, have been confined to restricted, if shifting, objectives. There have been virtually no formal declarations of war throughout the period. The very nature of armed conflict has undergone a radical change since the war. As one contemporary student of the problem, Evan Luard, writes:

> Aggression, in the classical sense . . . of assault by one state against another with the object of total war, unconditional surrender, or the wholesale annexation of that state . . . is an almost extinct form of international activity.**

The growing number of internal insurrections, insurgencies,

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*President John F. Kennedy to State Department Seminar, July 3, 1962, as reported in the New York Times, July 4, 1962.

**Peace and Opinion (unpublished manuscript), pp. 93-94.

civil wars, and guerrilla warfare-type conflicts, is equally striking. Accompanying the increase in numbers and decrease in scale of wars, along with the general decline in external wars, there has been a substantial decline in wars of conquest and colonization, and an increase in the proportion of wars for psychologically coercive purposes.* Luard concludes that, all in all, it is a rather bloody time in history:

> The illusion that we live in a relatively peaceful world is largely ethnocentric, based on the fact that fairly peaceful conditions have prevailed in Europe. The number of separate armed conflicts that have taken place during this time is probably as large as during any comparable period in history.**

One cannot predict with any assurance how the picture will continue to unfold. But the incidence of local conflict is a function both of revolutionary economic, social, and political change, and of the superpower relations that provide its global backdrop.

The first does not require elaboration here. As to the second, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be undergoing a shift of possibly more than tactical dimensions toward improved understanding and recognition of limited common interests. They nevertheless can produce continued strategic dangers of the type Stanley Hoffmann recently analyzed:

> [The danger does not lie] in the imbroglios that may result from the super-powers' taking opposite sides in disputes among third parties, for in most of the areas of potential maelstrom the super-powers have been moving in such a way as not to be too openly on opposite sides. . . .The danger lies in the "gray areas" at the fringes of each alliance

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*Ibid., p. 121a.

**Ibid., p. 92.

> system, in which each super-power is involved with a state which its rival may have become reluctant to protect but whose destruction it may not be able to afford.*

In the developing areas, the Sino-Soviet split may generate conflicts stemming from competition for the allegiance of local Communist parties (exacerbated, in Marshall Shulman's view, by probable Chinese nuclear diplomacy).** These will also be in competition with leftist non-Communist revolutionary groups in Latin America and elsewhere.

Whatever the color of a given revolution, conflict also arises from the very nature of revolutionary change itself. Danton's apothegm that "revolution devours its children" is no less true of an Nkrumah or Sukarno than of a Trotsky, Zinoviev, Peng Teng-Hua, or Liu Shao-Shi. And, finally, a familiar historic process of geopolitical consolidation is taking place:

> Insurgency really springs out of the fact that Asia is entering, shall we say, the nineteenth century. Stronger central governments imbued with nationalist concepts have arisen since World War II. They are in the process of extending their authority to areas hitherto only claimed on maps. . . .It's like the rise of national European powers in the nineteenth century. It's always the hill people who are last to be brought under control.#

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*"Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics," in Alastair Buchan, ed., A World of Nuclear Powers (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 103.

**See Beyond the Cold War (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1966), p. 98.

#A Chinese-born diplomat in Bangkok, quoted by Harrison E. Salisbury, "Unrest in the Hills Besets South Asia," New York Times, June 26, 1966.

Another recent writer is even bold enough to predict the numbers:

> It is more likely there will be ten to fifteen revolutions a year for the foreseeable future in the less developed societies, in addition to the many forms of domestic strife in the societies that are more developed.*

Future conflict between states should, however, not be written off either. There remain several predictably explosive colonial situations in the southern half of Africa, along with equally volatile potential racial conflagrations. In the same continent, as well as in such areas as the Himalayan foothills and the Arabian peninsula, the absence of clearly demarcated boundaries looms as a fruitful source of local conflicts. Rivalries in the Arab world remain prime sources, and the same may become true in South and Southeast Asia when efforts to organize the nations on a regional basis are seriously pursued. And it hardly needs pointing out that hardy perennials such as Kashmir, Palestine, and Cyprus remain dangerously unresolved.

One of the leading students of counterinsurgency operations has tied together internal and interstate conflict in a prediction that future "limited wars" are likely to occur when the following conditions prevail: proximity of the conflict area to Communist powers, relative inaccessibility of that area to the United States, and lack of internal stability in the area.** Many a candidate meets these requirements.

While it may be true that territorial conquest has lost its historic paramountcy, it is possible, as Klaus Knorr writes,

> that the desire for economic gain, or for relief from economic misery and distress, will direct the

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*C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York, Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 165-166.

**Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy (Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 58 ff.

> eyes of leaders in these less fortunate countries to the conquest of farmlands and other economic assets abroad. . .More important . . . may be the appeal to incorporate territories and populations in Asia and Africa where present political boundaries--often drawn arbitrarily by former imperialist powers--pay scant attention to ethnic groupings and historical connections.*

Nothing seems safer than the prediction that, whatever else may happen, the decade of the 1970s, because it will be one of revolution, modernization, and change, will be one of local conflict. The Soviet Union and China will function, in unpredictable competition or combination, as the "scavengers of the modernization process," in Walt Rostow's vivid phrase, and the United States will regard each such episode as a potential threat or opportunity. It can readily be demonstrated that even with significant arms-control and disarmament measures, many of these prospects would remain basically unaffected.**

In sum, the ingredients will exist in the future, as they do now, for local conflicts to flourish, to draw in the great powers, and to intensify. But the conditions may also exist for a purposeful strategy of conflict control that would aim to moderate such conflicts and make them less threatening to regional and world peace.

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*On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 28.

**See the lists of potential situations of instability fundamentally unrelated to arms control catalogued in Chapter Three ("International Force in a Disarming--But Revolutionary--World") by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, in Lincoln P. Bloomfield, ed., International Military Forces: The Problem of Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World (Boston, Mass., Little, Brown, 1954).

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

If we define "control" as purposeful efforts to minimize violence, to imply that all local conflicts are equally controllable would be of course highly misleading. In a world where, at a minimum, responsible nations and international organizations strove harmoniously and with unremitting dedication to prevent, moderate, and terminate violence, there would still be enormous differences in the ease with which conflict-control measures could be imposed on individual situations. There is a tremendous difference between a conflict that represents an accidental and inadvertent stumbling into an unwanted grapple, and a conflict that is deliberately planned, purposefully initiated, and singlemindedly persisted in until death or victory. "Control" of a conflict can be achieved by a quick victory of one side over the other. But the larger goal of international peace and security would hardly be served by encouraging conflicts that, in the words of a leading French student of conflict, "will definitely end only with the crushing of one of the two armies on the battlefield, or by capitulation of one side to the war aims of the opponents."*

Contemporary French experience would certainly support this last image of warfare <u>à outrance</u>, with no quarter given and none received, whether in the ultimately degrading struggle for Algeria, or the destruction of French forces at the hands of Communist-led nationalists at Dien Bien Phu. Neither conflict was truly negotiable except in the sense that Grant negotiated with Lee at Appomattox. Both complied perfectly with Kenneth Boulding's somewhat bloodless definition of conflict:

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*Roger Trinquier's definition of "modern warfare," whether in the form of Communist insurgencies or colonial wars. See <u>Modern Warfare</u> (New York, Praeger, 1964), p. 53.

> A situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatability of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other.*

In any scale of controllability, there is no doubt that this kind of purposeful warmaking with unlimited ideological objectives--the classic definition of "imperialism "--belongs at the "least controllable" end of the scale. But in practice, even Communists modulate Marxist-Leninist objectives to conform to realities of power, of timing, and, in the case of the Soviet Union, of the fatal drain of messianic energy that comes with growing embourgeoisement. Communist nations practice a form of conflict control that itself vividly illustrates the semantic difficulty of the concept.

In the English language, control means, among other things, "manipulation." Control of conflicts thus does not necessarily mean or imply "peace at any price." Certainly the operational meaning of conflict control in the Communist lexicon stems in the first instance from Marxist-Leninist (and, in the case of China, Maoist) definitions of ends and means, strategy and tactics. An authentic statement of the Soviet version is doubtless still to be found in former Chairman Khrushchev's January 6, 1961, speech sanctifying "wars of national liberation" but discouraging general--and limited--wars because of the danger of "escalation."

Controlling a conflict that is defined by Communists as a "war of liberation" (or "people's war," in Peking's phraseology) frequently turns out to mean, both to Communists and to those who counter their efforts, the manipulation of a fight in order to "win" without running unacceptable risks. Both the differences and the similarities

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*Conflict and Defense (New York, Harper & Row, 1962), p. 5.

between control in this sense of conflict management, and control in the sense we are using here of minimizing violence, are illustrated by the way Mao Tse-tung has used what are in effect arms-control and other conflict-control doctrines and tactics as instruments of "safe victory":

> Mao consistently practiced what is now known in the West as a policy of unilateral arms control. In doctrine, the defensive nature of the limited arms struggle was stressed. The concept of "justifiability" imposed a restraint on the frequency of armed clashes. The requirement of gaining an advantage in every engagement restricted the scale of the armed conflict, since the Communist troops could not fight a large Kuomintang force with assurance of victory. The aim of picking out the "most reactionary section" of the "die-hards" to strike at first, limited the targets of attack. The injunction to seek the "truce" after the achievement of victory in a limited armed clash controlled the duration of each specific engagement. The policy of taking the initiative to seek unity and conclude a peace agreement with the opponent sometimes punctuated the intermittent armed conflicts with periodic negotiations and sometimes made talks at the conference table a form of political struggle paralleling the armed struggle on the dispersed battlefields.*

The related semantic issue is that of "arms control." The most sophisticated arms-control doctrine aims at reducing the likelihood that armed hostilities will occur, reducing their duration, destructiveness, and other costs if they do occur, and reducing the likelihood that others, particularly the superpowers, will be drawn into them. This is all highly relevant to the question of how the local conflicts of our age can be controlled, and what policy activity--including measures commonly called arms control--might fruitfully be applied to

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*Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," American Political Science Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1 (March 1965), p. 94.

what types of conflict, at what point in time and space, and by whom.

But to describe the panoply of policy activity aimed at controlling local conflict as "arms control" is obviously inadequate. Arms control as commonly understood simply does not cover the ground, particularly the difference between voluntary reciprocal understandings and arrangements, à la Schelling and Halperin,* and the prime role played by others in imposing constraints on the smaller breed of adversaries. By "control" we mean the prevention, moderation, or termination of organized violence at the intranational and international level. By "local" we mean the small interstate wars, the bitter civil wars, the proxy conflicts behind which the superpowers hide, and the insurgencies and guerrilla warfare in the backwaters of the developing world--in short, the wars that do get fought in this era, rather than the big one most planned for and feared, but mercifully not fought. Our focus is on the continents and regions outside of Europe--Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. What we mean by "conflict" is a dispute that is being or is likely to be dealt with by predominantly military means.

Our analysis concerns itself with conflicts up to and including wars of any size outside Europe not directly involving both Soviet and U.S. forces in open hostilities. On the downward side of the scale it descends to include the kind of low-level insurgency that is, in the words of Roger Trinquier, "rooted in terrorism."** The range of

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*Evidently thinking in terms of superpower military relationships, arms control is: " . . . all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it." Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 2.

**Op. cit., p. 16.

conflicts in the regions in question could go as high as a possible Asian nuclear war, and as low as guerrilla warfare in one province of a Latin American country. Both internal and interstate conflicts are of concern to us, in an age of increasing international intervention in internal struggles. These and all between we lump under the label of "local conflict."

It can be seen that the problem we are describing is larger in scope than any single category, discipline, or method of diplomacy or military policy. Diplomacy in all its aspects bears on the problem, particularly when it comes to such "control" mechanisms as peacekeeping and peacemaking procedures, as well as facilities of international organizations, whether global or regional. But military hardware and supplies, their availability, flow, and use, are central since they are what make the conflict military instead of purely political, economic, social, or psychological.

The operational purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, it aims to organize an unstructured set of questions in such a way as to serve as a basis for further research. Second, it seeks to produce tentative findings about the applicability of arms control and other policy measures to the turbulent world outside the central superpower confrontation.

Our focus here is on measures bearing directly on the waging of conflict--measures that tend to produce or influence inhibitions, constraints, or limits with regard to conflicts--or conversely tend to expand conflicts. We are seriously concerned with measures primarily affecting military capabilities, but such measures will not be limited to those previously called "arms control." They will be limited only by being operationally relevant to reducing the risk, limiting the intensity, or facilitating the cessation of local conflicts.

LIMITED WAR AND LOCAL CONFLICT

Many partial approaches have been made to the problem of conflict and its control. But there is a dearth of theoretical knowledge tying together the various pieces and yielding a body of analysis and doctrine on the controllability of less-than-general conflicts. The present Design Study seeks in a preliminary way to bring together the critical masses, so to speak, of knowledge of local conflict with the growing understanding of arms control (and other policy measures relevant to conflict control) to see what kind of doctrinal detonation they make, and what avenues might fruitfully be pursued leading to improved national and international policies.

Any such study must start from a surprisingly thin base of organized knowledge. For a generation, a major part of the scholarly and policy intellect, wealth, and energy of the United States has been devoted to understanding, calculating, and deterring the prospect of general war between the superpowers. We now know a great deal about the theory of superpower wars, happily still in the realm of theory. As mutual thermonuclear deterrence has created a built-in strategy of caution in Moscow, Washington, and probably Peking as well, strategic theory has lowered its gaze to the subject of "limited war" in the sense of less-than-general nuclear clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe and elsewhere.

Virtually all the "limited war" literature deals with this less-than-all-out nuclear exchange between the superpowers. It is primarily because this is the common meaning of the words that we elected to use the words "local conflict" rather than "limited war." But while the nuclear preoccupation of most "limited war" analysts makes the knowledge they have developed of only restricted utility in

the study of local conflicts, there is one sense in which their insights are of value.

Just as the chief distinction between "general" and "limited" nuclear war lies in the degree to which states exercise restraint over the amount of force they use--by contrast to the amount available--local conflicts too can be waged in a "limited" or "unlimited" manner. As Thomas Schelling recently wrote:

> Most of us, in discussing limited war during the past ten years, have had in mind a war in which <u>both</u> sides were somewhat deterred during war itself by unused force and violence on the other side.*

Henry Kissinger, in his pioneering work on nuclear warfare, established the characteristics of such a conflict: specific rather than unlimited objectives, and the intention of affecting rather than crushing the will of one's opponent:

> A limited war . . . is fought for specific political objectives which, by their very existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to <u>affect</u> the opponent's will, not to <u>crush</u> it, to make the conditions to be imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for complete annihilation.**

These treatments of "limited war" emphasize the fact of not using all one's power, and not fighting a "general war" on the model of World Wars I and II (and presumably III).# The historical tradition

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*<u>Arms and Influence</u> (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1966), p. 173.

**<u>Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy</u> (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 140.

#The official U.S. Defense Department definition of limited war is "armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents,

in which this contrast is embedded is European, post-Renaissance, and traditional. But now new definitions, and new policies to suit them, are needed to cope with the wars that, unlike the much planned-for Soviet-U.S. confrontation over Berlin, do occur. The "cats and dogs" of contemporary conflict turn out to be sometimes far from Soviet or U.S. military power, and usually far from Berlin. In developing "limited war" doctrine, writes Schelling:

> We were not thinking about wars that were limited because one side was just not interested enough, or one side was so small that an all-out war looked small, or even because one side was restrained or both were by humanitarian considerations.*

What turns out to make the difference is the point of view from which one regards a conflict as "limited." Deitchman defines "limited war" as not a war for U.S., Soviet, or Chinese survival, characterized by limited and precisely defined superpower objectives, and stoppable at any level of what he calls escalation.** Yet from the standpoint of the combatants, what looks to Washington like a brush-fire may look total and feel total. To those involved, unlimited annihilation can seem an accurate description for an Alamo, a Little Big Horn, a Carthage--or an Asian village that is leveled, its crops destroyed, and its population decimated. That such conflict stands low on the scale of thermonuclear casualties is irrelevant to the local perspective.#

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involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations." (JCS Publ. I and Army Dictionary)

*Arms and Influence, p. 173.

**Op. cit., p. 29.

#Even in Europe, a theater nuclear or battlefield nuclear war that appears "limited" to the United States may obviously not appear at all as limited to the nations located in the theater or near the battlefield. The use of the term "limited" in categorizing conflicts

Robert E. Osgood's definition is more applicable to some of what we call local conflicts without introducing excessive great-power distortion, since he uses the point of view of the parties to the conflict, whoever they may be:

> A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement.

In addition to limited objectives and negotiability (to which we shall return), Osgood suggests that a limited war involves only a few rather than many parties, is confined to a given geographical area, and is directed against a selected number of targets. Finally, it involves only a fractional commitment of the human and physical resources that are potentially available to it, and normal life tends to continue while it takes place.*

In our lower-level conflicts, unlike, for example, the Korean War, the discrepancy between the actual and potential force exerted by one or more of the belligerents is much less, and therefore the limitation of war depends less on deliberate self-denial. However, strictly speaking, many local wars could have been waged more intensively and extensively. What kept them limited, and sometimes what kept them local, was not always a lack of physical capabilities as such but rather a relationship (as the belligerents saw it) between the nature and value of war aims, the costs of the war, and the prospects of achieving the

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in recent years has begun to fade in official international discourse, to be replaced or at least supplemented by a basic distinction between nuclear war or weapons and conventional war or weapons.

*Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 1-2.

aims at a particular level of effort--a relationship that is affected by but not determined by available capabilities.

Some of the insights of superpower limited war doctrines, particularly those involving the bargaining quality of limited use of force, apply in the non-European, non-superpower local conflict context:

1. Fear of reciprocal enlargement, i.e., two-sided intensification, or the "positive-feed-back" problem;

2. The requirement for successful coercion, which may mean apportioning violence over time and can induce apparent limitations even in the absence of any danger of reciprocal enlargement;

3. Fear of spoiling what is being fought over, whether people, economic assets, social stability, etc.;

4. Lack of domestic enthusiasm; this is somewhat like lack of "resources," but implies no lack of interest at the top level of government;

5. Interest in the war itself rather than victory, e.g., the need to express hostility or disapproval, to meet obligations, to satisfy internal demands, or to create external excuses for domestic policies;

6. Fear of outside censure or intervention.*

One should not, however conclude that just because conflicts outside Europe tend to remain confined and rather low-level from a superpower standpoint, it follows that the passions involved, the intensity of commitment, or the ideological component are necessarily less. Some are of a low order of intensity or aim even by local standards. But in some cases that is only because they lack the capacity to be intercontinental, rather than because they are all purposefully modest in aim or scope.

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*We are indebted to Thomas C. Schelling for this list.

China, for example, claims to see itself in a world-wide conflict in which stimulated "wars of national liberation" are to be viewed as battles in a revolutionary war of global sweep. On a somewhat lower order, Nasser's Egypt and Ben Bella's Algeria (when the latter ruled) shared aims that at times appeared to embrace all of the African continent. Just so, Castro holds unlimited aims with regard to the whole of Latin America, and in recent years Sukarno's ambitions extended to wherever the Malay race was to be found in Southeast Asia. Certainly some African states would, if they could, draw all of Europe and North America into a war to the death against white-ruled governments in such places as Rhodesia and South Africa. The lack of deliberate self-denial as a reason for the limitation of at least some small-bore non-European wars is also underscored by the occasional tendency of local leaders rhetorically to invoke World War III, thermonuclear exchanges, and all the other apocalyptic extravagances they evidently wish they had available.

Another meaning of "limited" to be found in the literature is the suggestion that, because the parties are prepared to conduct such conflicts with what are even to them limited means in accordance with limited objectives, the conflicts may be presumed to be susceptible to accommodation.* According to this equation, if the great powers make only a modest commitment and are not prepared to involve all of their resources, it follows that they are content at some stage to negotiate a settlement, however provisional or temporary.

But if we accept that local conflicts not involving the great powers are in some instances limited because the belligerents have no choice rather than because they have necessarily decided to conduct a conflict on a low level, we cannot automatically adopt as a general principle from this equation the crucial element of

*See, for example, Osgood, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

susceptibility to accommodation.

It is clear that the inability of the smaller countries to carry their struggles to the point of exhaustion or annihilation does not necessarily carry with it a willingness on their part to reach any kind of settlement, other than perhaps an armed truce (for example, Palestine, South Africa, and Rhodesia). By this reasoning, one may even conclude that the Nasserite Arabs, the African states vis à vis South Africa and the white Rhodesian regime, and Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnam, even if deprived of sophisticated means, can with will and organization conduct a war without end. As Osgood says, "Even the most rudimentary means can lead to unlimited war when the ends of war are not limited." Rome, as he points out, did not need nuclear bombs to annihilate Carthage.

Thus limited war even outside Europe is not always so in the sense of a limited aim on the part of the parties: It is sometimes limited--and therefore local--because of a lack of resources, or of the capacity to spread the conflict to other areas. In short, there is no natural law that limits wars outside of Europe, except as we may define "limited" ourselves.

When geographical scope is a measure of "limitedness," of course most local conflicts are just that--local. The hardest conflicts to control turn out to be the most local of all--the ones that occur within the boundaries of one state in which the issue is control over the machinery of internal rule. Given the potency and the universality of internal instability in the developing regions, it is clear that this sort of conflict, however local, may range very high on a scale of intensity and commitment. And the reason for the great powers and the United Nations to care is that external involvement in that struggle may be extensive, as it was in the Spanish Civil War, the

Greek Insurgency, Cuba, the Congo, and now Vietnam. In such a case one danger of intensification, as in Vietnam today, is that there will be a spread of the internal war to the general neighborhood. The other danger is that the involved outside powers will wind up fighting each other. In this sense the indivisibility of security in the world of the last third of the 20th century means a built-in potential for what is commonly called "escalation," as well as for peacekeeping and peacemaking.

The same preoccupation with the superpower arms competition and the need to manage it in the interests of greater safety and security that characterizes "limited war" literature also is true of most existing studies of arms-control theory, in many ways the most inventive strategic literature of our generation. But it has turned out that the actual postwar conflicts have involved firefights, brushfires, revolutions, and assaults of one kind or another, virtually all outside Europe, and virtually all involving the "underdeveloped world."

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF CONFLICT CONTROL

As the true shape of the political world has become apparent, these lesser conflicts have become increasingly a concern for the U.S. government. The nation even now is in the process of trying to educate itself about insurgency situations, good and bad, Communist and other. But the lack of coherent policy doctrines with which to approach the problem results in two failures of policy. One is failure to take advantage of such patterns and uniformities as may exist. The other is failure to deal with many conflicts preventively. In the absence of better analysis, interstate conflicts are considered to be random and

individually unique phenomena, calling only for traditional diplomatic treatment, and that only if they become sufficiently menacing. As for insurgencies, some contemporary analyses seem limited to assuming the existence of a series of contests in which the primary object in the period ahead is to "win." Given that objective, the questions of interest would of course be: how to interdict the area in question from those hostile to the United States, and how best to apply friendly resources and power to produce an outcome favorable to the United States. The Vietnam war has generated widespread concern at the prospect of many more such commitments. But it has also stimulated new thinking about how to handle a potentially unending stream of U.S. interventions.

The research question underlying this Design Study is: If you want to bring a given conflict under control, in the sense of minimizing violence, what would you probably have to do? Whether one wants to carry out such a policy is a different question. We recognize that there may well be local conflicts that the United States is legitimately more interested in winning than in controlling. We grant that on occasion the United States may choose even to foment a local conflict rather than to pay the human or strategic price of not doing so. We recognize that other values are frequently preferred in war--one side winning, justice being served, Communism defeated, oppressors slain, colonial rulers ousted, etc. There will of course be times when the latter ends are, by any but doctrinaire pacifist standards, more to be valued than the exclusive end of minimizing violence.

Our analysis aims at generating a set of prescriptions for those times when minimizing violence is--or should be--the determinant of policy. Such a perspective runs the risk of being misunderstood. In his introduction to The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli made it clear that he was simply stating factually, on the basis of "long experience

of modern events and a constant study of the past," what a ruler had to do to gain and hold power. His prescriptions included tactics few rulers would publicly admit to using. But to gain and hold power, many such tactics were--and are--in fact employed. Whether he intended it to be the case or not, Machiavelli has gone through history charged with advocating the actions he merely described. Von Clausewitz has suffered a similar undeserved fate.

With appropriate humility at the comparison, we have sought to be faithful to an equally pointed research purpose here: how to deal, with a minimum of violence, with conflicts among and within states. Such a quest may serve a practical need to the extent that the desire exists to learn what recent history seems to teach about policy measures likely to control rather than to propagate conflict. U.S. policy, as it looks out on the somber prospects of virtually endless local conflicts the world over in the decades ahead, might well consider a strategy of conflict control with the same seriousness with which it studies a strategy of "victory."

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN CONFLICT CONTROL

CONFLICTING INTERESTS

The point of view from which we approach the task of understanding local conflicts and their "controllability" is an American one. We are interested not only in the anatomy and etiology of local conflict from the standpoint of how it can be prevented, moderated, or terminated. We are equally interested in considering the U.S. interest in that process in general and in particular instances, and the ways in which that interest can be effectively achieved.

Does the United States have a general interest with regard to conflicts in the developing regions of the world? It might be thought that the answer to that question is self-evident. But in reality the answers have been quite contradictory, at least insofar as one can deduce them from U.S. actions. Perhaps the most common American view of U.S. interests assumes that, as an extraordinarily rich and strong power with a great concern for international stability, the United States ought to favor any reasonable means to stop conflict wherever it takes place and whatever might be thought to be gained by violence. The status quo probably suits this country as well as or

better than any other nation in the world. In material and perhaps in political terms as well, the United States has more to lose and less to gain from chaos, instability, and, generally speaking, unpredictability, than virtually any other nation.

By this reasoning it would clearly be more consonant with U.S. interests to secure U.S. objectives by peaceful rather than by violent means. Logically, it is desirable that the numbers and effectiveness of non-violent means of achieving national objectives be increased and strengthened. The United States would be expected to be found in the forefront of advocating such policies aimed at stabilizing local situations and minimizing outbreaks of violence.

In fact, the United States has most often acted in harmony with this general interest. It has consistently spoken in favor of arrangements of international law and order aimed at implementing and making general this conflict-control preference. The United States has vigorously supported the formulation of rules that condemn conflict-provoking and conflict-producing policies. In specific terms, it has pronounced in favor of prohibitions on the violent crossing of political boundaries. As to insurgency situations, it has vigorously espoused measures aimed at countering Communist take-over attempts. It has consequently supported U.N. resolutions condemning intervention; of which the following is typical:

> 1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently armed intervention as well as all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned;
>
> 2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the

> subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed to the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State. . . .*

The United States has frequently--far more than its critics give it credit for--engaged in various forms of quiet (or not so quiet) diplomacy aimed at tranquilizing situations in the developing regions before they burst into unwanted violence. The current role of the United States as mediator in the dispute between Britain and Guatemala over the ultimate disposition of the tiny territory of Belize (British Honduras) is only one example out of many. Increasingly the strategy of assistance to developing countries is linked with the problem of ultimate political stability and peaceful orientation. That the United States does not always or consistently act on its growing insights is not due to a lack of desire to stabilize (and preferably forget about) the areas in question so much as to a built-in confusion of competing objectives in a pluralistic society--and government. The point is that, all other things generally being equal, the United States is assumed by many if not most observers to favor conflict-control measures for the developing regions, as a matter of over-all national interest.

But other observers, considering the same problem of defining general U.S. interest, arrive at a very different conclusion. In a word, they do not rate the U.S. interest in minimizing violence as paramount or exclusive. In their view, based on two decades of Cold War, the overriding U.S. general interest in the world is derived from the U.S. role as a committed competitor. When the Communist bloc was

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*General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), December 31, 1965.

viewed as monolithic, the U.S. interest was defined in terms of beating back the onslaught of a united drive by a globally-based Communist conspiracy. As the Communist world visibly fractured and competition simultaneously shifted to the developing areas, U.S. interest was often defined as gaining victory over Communism, whether unified or fragmented, in the third world where the conflict was being fought out. Thus U.S. interest in a given conflict situation, or dispute threatening to become a conflict, was frequently given primary shape by the desire to prevent a Communist take-over, preserve an alliance system, or sustain a reputation for reliable assistance to beleaguered friends. In its starkest and most extreme form, the notion of a Pax Americana, far from being a conflict-control strategy in the sense of minimizing violence, represents a forward strategy of intervention with the goal of political and military victory.

Even discounting the extreme and crusading positions sometimes taken, the United States nonetheless has a remarkably strong interest in political change in certain parts of the world, an interest that could take precedence over conflict control. The United States favors change in much of the Communist world--East Europe, Cuba, Communist Asia. It also has a positive commitment to the dynamic process of modernization throughout the underdeveloped regions, themselves powerful generators of new potential conflicts. As an official with high direct responsibilities in these matters put it privately, "the United States as a counterrevolutionary power has the problem of capturing world-wide revolutions."

What emerges from even a superficial glimpse at national interests with regard to conflict in the developing areas is that there exist conflicting and competing interests. The nature and sources of these interests can be made more specific by formulating some general propositions characterizing the U.S. approach to contemporary situations

of local conflict. Few of the following statements were applicable prior to 1941. All have been generally true since that time, and most of them seem likely to continue to have validity. Some are consistent one with the other; others represent deep-seated inner contradictions in the U.S. policy outlook:

1. The lessons of the 1930s, indelibly imprinted in the minds of this generation of U.S. policy-makers, call above all for discouraging armed aggression by nipping it in the bud as early as possible.

2. A generalized preference exists for an orderly international society in which differences are compromised by pacific means.

3. Recognition of extreme dangers of resorting to nuclear weaponry produces a strongly-held desire to minimize violence and avoid conflict intensification, specifically in the form of great-power involvement.

4. The sense of being in a continuing historic conflict with various forms of Communism carries with it a willingness to employ unilateral force, or to view some situations as irreconcilable--or some combination of both--where the United States believes that a major Communist advance would otherwise result (e.g., the situations in Guatemala, Cuba in 1961, Vietnam, Dominican Republic).

5. The real revolutionary force in the world is the idea of human freedom. As Dean Rusk put it:

> What we are pursuing . . . is not a static concept. For, unlike the Communists, we really believe in social revolution and not merely in power cloaked as revolution. We believe in constructive change and encourage it.*

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*Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, as recorded in the Department of State Bulletin, March 7, 1966.

6. The United States has a traditional antipathy to dictatorial or tyrannical regimes.

7. A persistent--though not necessarily dominant--national tradition insists that there is no substitute for military victory.

8. A deep-seated national desire for some form of isolation lingers, both as a residue of historic tradition and as a reaction to presumed over-commitment abroad.

9. The post-World War II decision to spread U.S. influence and involvement across the globe takes concrete form in collective security and alliance commitments to half a hundred other countries.

10. The failure of the United Nations to act as a kind of world government capable of legislating in situations calling for peaceful change compounds U.S. frustration with the United Nations, and with local conflicts.

The ways in which these basic conditions and preferences take priority depend on circumstances. One way to illustrate this is by dividing the conflicts in question into three basic classes: those in which U.S. military forces have been directly engaged; those in which they were indirectly--but recognizably--engaged; and those in which the United States, while interested in varying degrees, was not recognizably involved as a prime military participant or supplier.

Among 52 non-European local conflicts since 1945*, U.S. military power has been involved directly or indirectly in 12 (Korea,

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*See Chapter III for an explanation of this count. The Greek Insurgency is included as a special exception. It should be borne in mind that our terms of reference also exclude such direct confrontations of Soviet and U.S. military forces as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. For the 52 cases see Typology A in Chapter IV.

Greece, Quemoy-Matsu, Guatemala, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic twice, the Bay of Pigs, Laos, Lebanon, the Congo, and the Chinese Civil War).

Where U.S. military forces have been directly and openly involved, some special elements have obviously applied, growing out of the involvement of U.S. prestige, power, and public opinion. In those cases there has been recurrent tension in the American outlook between the pressures for "victory" and the recognition of "limited" war as part of a continuing power struggle in this age.* The problem was summed up by de Tocqueville when he wrote, "There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult--to begin a war and to end it."**

The most numerous local conflict situations have been those in which U.S. military forces were not significantly involved, directly or indirectly. With regard to these, to the extent that a generalized policy antipathy may be said to exist in the U.S. government, in the main the United States has, on the record, acted as a suppressor of local conflict rather than a fomenter, participant, or party. As a rule, it has disapproved, discouraged, disfavored, and sought to stop such conflicts. In general, it has supported toward these conflicts what might be called a conflict-suppression policy. The characteristic U.S. view was stated by President Johnson when he said:

> Here in the United States we do not like violence. . . .We regard it as a manifestation of failure. . . .Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak of failure. And so also in foreign policy. There, too, violence is one face of failure.#

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*See Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York, Wiley, 1964), p. 14.

**Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York, Mentor, 1965), p. 278.

#Speech at Denver, Colorado, August 26, 1966, as reported in the New York Times, August 27, 1966.

The essential reasons for such a stance are among those described earlier. At their heart is the fact that, by contrast with the policy of first the Soviet Union and then China, the United States as a satisfied power in this historic period has had no *a priori* interest in either territorial expansion or the generation of socio-economic revolutions.

THE COMMUNIST APPROACH TO CONFLICT CONTROL

It ought to be clear how drastically such a policy preference differs from that pursued by the two principal revolutionary forces abroad in the postwar world. One has only to compare it to the agitation of some Communist leaders for world-wide "people's revolutionary wars." And equally contrary to this basic preference are some of the *non*-Communist pressures for drastic or precipitate territorial, political, economic, or social change. The history of local conflict in this period is in many ways that of the interplay between these three prime forces--the status quo powers led by the United States; the Communist powers, increasingly fragmented; and the *tiers monde*, more and more the arena for superpower competition in addition to furnishing its own home-grown conflict situations.

When it comes to deliberate and willful provocation of conflict, the Communists have been the primary *agents provocateurs*. At root, the role the United States has played has been a reactive one. But this defensive, responsive, U.S. strategy has more and more given the appearance of fomenting a conflict. In part this is a tribute to Communist propaganda. In part it stems from U.S. over-reactions. Its consequence has been to give rise to acute ambiguities now besetting world-wide U.S. policy.

To give only one example, the Bay of Pigs represented a U.S.-fomented conflict in reaction to a Communist take-over in the Western Hemisphere. The lengths to which the United States was prepared to go to respond forcibly to such challenges were illustrated again in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The other uses of U.S. force in recent years were in reaction to Communist initiatives. Both the Korean and Vietnam wars involved U.S. power in response to attempted Communist take-overs. This phenomenon has had a reciprocal aspect. China probably would not tolerate a systemic reverse in North Korea or North Vietnam (nor, as Hungary demonstrated, will the Soviet Union in East Europe).

Perhaps, then, the desiderata for U.S. policy vary with the circumstances, and call for quite different postures on the part of the United States in the face of varying conflict threats. This probably represents the consensus in policy-making circles. But the consensus can change. In some instances there may even be a succession of different postures over time, as perceptions of the situation and, consequently, definitions of U.S. interests change.

In Lebanon in 1958, the United States first ran a conflict-manipulation operation with its landings; then the United Nations, with U.S. consent, ran a conflict-suppression operation; U.S. interests and perceptions had changed in the interval. A similar sort of change occurred in the Dominican intervention in 1965. In other conflicts, such as Laos and Vietnam, the violent phase was entered into gradually after starting out as straight political conflict. In some ways the Cuban situation followed this pattern. U.S. posture toward Cuba was at first a disinclination to foment conflict, followed by a waiting period during which the United States watched the revolution "turn sour." In the end the United States adopted a conflict-fomenting policy.

The varying attitudes of the United States toward specific conflict situations are obviously functions of its sense of involvement and commitment. The dilemma facing the United States (and the Soviet Union and perhaps also China) is that what might be called their "impartial" (i.e., conflict-controlling) interests often conflict with their "partial" (i.e., conflict-fomenting or in any event manipulating) interests. A scale of partiality exists, marked by the degree to which threat is perceived. This correlates directly with the degree to which one is prepared to transform nonintervention into intervention. Recent historical cases can be cited in which avoidance of bloodshed was overridden by other contingencies. The most egregious instances are cases of internal insurrections in which a status quo that was at least tolerable to the United States was threatened. In Bolivia, Panama, Colombia, and the Congo, Washington was willing in the end to give some measure of support ranging from tear-gas to organization of a quasi-military force.

Criteria for generalizing about such interest are difficult to come by. But for U.S. policy, Communist involvement has often looked like a constant. In the post-World War II years there was ample reason for the United States to interpret local Communist takeover attempts as part of a unified world-wide strategy. Then, if the Soviet Union was identified as one of the parties, even though the conflict may have been geographically localized, the United States viewed it as part of a world-wide conflict that was by definition unlimited.

Some of this reaction was legitimate. But some of it was overdone. It is striking that out of our 52 local conflict situations since World War II involving actual or potential application of force, 40 were not primarily U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Chinese confrontations. Contrary to common belief, by no means all insurgencies have been Communist-inspired. Of the 90 per cent identified by the U.S. Army

as having taken place in the developing areas, Communist elements were prominent in no more than 50 per cent and conventional military forces were used on both sides in only about 10 per cent.*

These numbers may come as a surprise if one has been assuming that contemporary conflict has been predominantly of the Cold War variety. Such an assumption was supported for a period by the facts. When the facts became mixed, it continued to be fostered both by political rhetoric and by the fact that U.S. military strategy was until this decade geared primarily to great-power confrontation.

But there is no longer anything approaching a unified international Communist movement. The Soviet Union even shows signs of behaving increasingly as though uncontrolled violence, particularly near its borders (as in India and Pakistan in 1965), is something to be met with conflict-control policies rather than with incendiary exacerbations.** Local Communist efforts (as in Africa, for example) have been unpromising and do not seem cause for U.S. alarm. There may even be potential disputes between Communist nations in which the United States is partial as to who wins. Nevertheless the impulses

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*David R. Hughes, "The Army's Role in Preventing Insurgencies," Office of DCSOps, September 1, 1965, p. 21. In a recent count, there was no Communist involvement at all in 62 per cent of 149 postwar insurgencies. Klaus Knorr's recent analysis led him to conclude that it is not easy to start insurrections from the outside, pointing out that "even most foreign-supported insurrections did not involve the Communists as a major party." Knorr, op. cit., p. 147.

**A recent analysis of Soviet risk-taking concludes that "levels and patterns of Soviet risk in 29 crises have been low and narrow. Soviet crisis behavior was found to be conservative rather than radical, cautious rather than aggressive, deliberate rather than impulsive, and rational (not willing to lose) rather than nonrational." Jan F. Trisk., Studies in Deterrence, XIII, "Pattern and Level of Risk in Soviet Foreign Policy-Making, 1945-1963," (China Lake, Calif., U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, October 1966).

and perceptions of the earlier days of Cold War seem likely to persist. As a well-known newspaperman recently put it:

> As a conflict between what is loosely called Communism and anti-Communism, [the Cold War] still magnifies, exaggerates and perhaps even generates conflicts of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States in places and situations that neither might otherwise care about or which might, at worst, be the occasion for quite routine economic and diplomatic competition.*

For the period ahead, assuming the two Communist giants remain estranged, a much sharper distinction may well be made in U.S. eyes between Soviet and Chinese involvement. If the Soviet Union has hovered, like Gertrude Stein's St. Theresa, between the indoors of status quo and the outdoors of revolution, Communist China has given the impression of acting on the revolutionary's belief that it can only gain from stirring up the established order of things, even at relatively high risk. The Chinese role is clear in some local conflicts. For example, Harrison Salisbury recently reported from Burma "where the Communist Chinese make common cause with the tribes and turn a regional insurgency into a full-scale revolt or rebellion"**--almost a classic description of the local conflict-accelerating role both Communist giants have played, but China plays the more actively today.

One analyst of Chinese policy recently offered a fine-grained view of Peking's willingness to intervene and intensify hostilities that is worth quoting in extenso:

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*Max Frankel, "Can We End the Cold War?" New York Times Magazine, January 29, 1967, p. 67.

**"Unrest in the Hills Besets South Asia," New York Times, June 26, 1966.

Chinese experts conclude from their analyses that the capabilities available to Washington and Peking are the reverse of each other. They believe that the leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States prefer different levels of escalation. Given the Chinese perception that the mainland would be at a disadvantage in the wars which U.S. leaders would like to fight, the challenge to Chinese policy is how to inhibit the United States from implementing her escalation preferences.

The Chinese leadership believes that the objective of our policy is the elimination of Chinese Communism. Further, they believe that U.S. élites intend to pursue this goal in a series of steps which subdue surrounding territories first and culminate in an attack on the Chinese mainland. These beliefs imply to the Chinese that there must be escalation at least to the level of sublimited war. They also imply that the Chinese need not greatly fear a sudden U.S. nuclear strike against the mainland.

Between these points on the escalation ladder, the Chinese believe that they can manipulate U.S. policy by affecting the cost-gain expectations of U.S. officials. So long as Washington policy-makers believe that nuclear war will on balance produce negative results, they will opt for limited wars. However, they will do so on the basis of an unrealistically optimistic estimate of the capabilities of the two sides. Peking analysts predict that the resultant tendency will be that unexpected costly wars will become a liability to the U.S. Government which will seek some face-saving escape from the "consequences of an extended war."

The Chinese believe that the highly differentiated conflict spectrum used in our military planning makes Peking's attempts to manipulate our expectations both safe and feasible. These attempts are safe, they say, because Washington will escalate gradually, for example, from bombing raids in Vietnam south of the 18th parallel to strikes north of the 20th parallel. They are feasible because the slow pace of U.S. escalation provides sufficient time for the Chinese proxy to develop militarily, for our domestic opinion to oppose

> continued military sacrifice, and for fears of escalation in the United States, the theatre of war, and allied capitals to inhibit Washington officials.*

It is even implied that a U.S. conflict-control policy will inevitably benefit the Chinese in some situations:

> To the extent that they can restrict American escalation while producing some US military response, the Chinese expect to benefit. Each time we either restrict or downgrade our escalation, the Chinese expect revolutionaries to be less deterred by our military guarantees.**

Perhaps the greatest element of asymmetry between East and West lies in the pacifist strains that historically influence Western liberal thought, by contrast with the amoral notion of ends and means implicit in Marxism and expressed once by Chairman Mao in these terms: "Politics is war without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed."#

In practice, however, there may be a proclivity toward violence avoidance on both sides. Apart from their various belligerent utterances, both Peking and Moscow have in general behaved as Bismarck was reputed to when asked if he wanted war: "Certainly not," he replied, "what I want is victory." Because of the lack of a moral position concerning the use of coercive violence as a tactic, the future policies of Communist powers are essentially unpredictable--including the rhetorically belligerent but astonishingly weak Chinese dragon.

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*David B. Bobrow, "Chinese Views on Escalation," Military Review, January 1966, reprinted in Survival, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March 1966), pp. 97-98.

**Ibid., p. 98.

#Cited by Brig.-Gen. Samuel B. Griffith, II, in "The Glorious Military Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-Tung," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July 1964), p. 674.

AN HYPOTHESIS AND A MODEL

We return to the question of how U.S. interests should be interpreted. Will the United States opt for conflict suppression only where its interests are not directly involved? Where there is a perceived danger of intensification? Is it a potential conflict participant only where Communism is feared? Are there basic differences between the U.S. approach to the control of interstate and of internal conflicts?

One way to generate answers is to trace U.S. preferences and policy activities stage by stage in recent conflicts, noting characteristic preferences when "all other things are equal," perceived advantages and risks involved in various policy options, and policies that the past record shows the United States to have followed.

Preliminary analysis of the likely pathways of official U.S. perception, decision, and action with regard to local conflicts yields a general scheme or model that may provide a structure or framework for further analysis.

This framework can be stated first as an hypothesis.* Then it can be tested against historical evidence. Whether it also has any predictive utility we shall disregard for the moment. The hypothesis is as follows:

> U.S. interests as a general rule favor stability and disfavor conflict. U.S. interests toward local <u>interstate</u> wars outside Europe usually converge with international norms in favoring conflict control. But this is not the case where vital interests (such as direct Soviet or Chinese advantages) appear to be

*This hypothesis is presented graphically in the figure on the following page. The references to "phases" in that figure refer to the model developed in Chapter V below.

MODEL OF U.S. POLICY PREFERENCES AND ACTIVITIES TOWARD LOCAL CONFLICTS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE

ACLIM
MAR. 15, 1967



at stake. Toward most internal wars, U.S. interests derive from strategic concerns (regional security, U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations, modernization). Rather than invariably being subordinate to conflict-control policy, they tend to depend on pragmatic assessments of probability of success, accessibility of the area, and the actual need for U.S. intervention. If Communist take-over does not appear to be a prime issue in internal conflicts, the United States is not likely to perceive a primary U.S. interest as to which faction wins. But both where the United States is relatively indifferent to outcome, and where it is committed to victory for a given side, the crucial independent variable inhibiting U.S. willingness to manipulate rather than suppress both internal and interstate conflicts is a perceived danger of great-power intensification.

One can flesh out this abstract and generalized summation of U.S. policy preferences and activities regarding local conflict by references to our 52 post-World War II cases. Toward interstate conflicts the United States generally has supported preventive diplomatic efforts. Examples are Kashmir throughout; the Palestine wars generally including Suez; even (to British disappointment) the recent confrontation between Sukarno's Indonesia and Malaysia. Day-to-day U.S. diplomacy, particularly at the working level, has shown a lively and continuing sense of concern and responsibility to settle disputes before they become serious, to suppress existing conflicts to the greatest extent possible, and to exercise maximum influence in terminating hostilities where actual violence has broken out. Most explicit was the doctrine of "renunciation of the use of force" which the

Eisenhower administration pursued with respect to other people's quarrels such as that in Suez.* Another relevant policy doctrine that persists to this day is one of discouraging any change in political boundaries through the use of violence, which in turn is an accompaniment of a still more generalized policy of opposing the use of military force to achieve political objectives.

None of this is true in the exceptional instances in which the United States has contributed toward interstate conflict. U.S. dissatisfaction with the East European status quo in the late 1940s and early 1950s led this country to encourage expectations that helped to foment the June 1953 East German uprising, the Poznan riots of 1956, and above all the October-November 1956 Hungarian revolution. That the United States then washed its hands of all these situations because it feared intensification in no way expunges the prior reality of purposeful U.S. pursuit of conflict-producing policies, whether known as "rollback," "liberation," or whatever.

After the "outbreak of hostilities" threshold is crossed, U.S. policy choices tend to be guided by asking whether there will be a direct, major, and measurable Soviet or Chinese gain from suppression and/or termination of the fighting. Unless such direct Communist advantage can be seen conclusively to exist, U.S. policy activity tends predominantly to work toward the earliest possible cease-fire, using the United Nations or regional organizations as primary agencies to help bring this about. Examples from recent history are: Kashmir, Palestine, Suez, Honduras-Nicaragua, and Yemen.

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*The policy was summed up this way by a top U.S. diplomat: "Our primary interest is in getting the disputants to talk rather than fight; any outcome between the parties most concerned is likely to be all right with us." Harlan Cleveland, The Obligations of Power (New York, Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 39-40.

In such cases, on the evidence, the United States has been more concerned in controlling than in resolving conflicts, usually with the hope that procedures of peaceful settlement of disputes will then take over--but not making cease-fires dependent on such solutions. Cases in recent history were the U.S. efforts to get Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in early 1957, and India and Pakistan to stop fighting in 1965. In both cases, promises were implied of future justice for the claims involved. But in fact far less effort was invested in the pacific settlement of disputes than in termination of hostilities. The key to U.S. policy has been an unwillingness to become involved when the stakes were relatively low in terms of alternative outcomes. This then describes the most common category.

In a few instances of interstate wars, one of the parties was a Communist state. According to our hypothesis, what governs U.S. policy in that sort of situation is the assumption that a Communist great power will win an unacceptable political and psychological, if not military, victory if the side it backs is permitted to garner the tactical advantages of an in-place cease-fire. Classic cases in point have been Iran in 1946, the China-India border conflict, and a fortiori, Vietnam (seen for convenience here as an interstate war).

The next test, however, tells how far the United States is prepared to go to implement its general policy preference. Where there has been a serious perceived danger of intensification or the running of other unacceptable risks--as in Hungary--the United States has opted for termination, U.N. condemnation, and nonintervention. In Quemoy-Matsu, for example, the United States officially spoke during the bombardments of a negotiated settlement, even hinting at a possible turnover of the offshore islands if fighting were once terminated. That there was no follow-up is irrelevant to our purposes here; the point is that the risks being run indicated a "termination" policy.

Where no serious intensification danger was perceived, the hard U.S. line persisted, e.g., Iran 1946. Of course it should not be automatically assumed that if there is no danger of intensification the United States will necessarily intervene, any more than it should be assumed that the danger of intensification will automatically preclude intervention if the United States feels sufficiently compelled to protect or promote its interests. Either of these assumptions would be dangerously misleading. At the same time, the absence of the fear of intensification in situations where the United States perceives important interests to be at stake can be said to make U.S. intervention somewhat more likely.

The perceived risk of intensification can profoundly affect how a given war is fought. While the United States was unwilling to be frightened off when the Viet Cong appeared about to win a de facto victory in 1965, it has nevertheless fought a highly limited action, continuously seeking termination, U.N. action, and the like. The dangers of intensification appeared to diminish with the Chinese internal upheavals, but care was still taken not to provoke unduly either Communist great power.

In the internal category, a generalized U.S. preference for stability and peace can also be hypothesized. Before the outbreak or serious threat of hostilities, this takes the form of policy activities generally lumped under the heading of assistance and modernization programs, combined with an increasing attention to preventive social policies that might be called "counter-pre-insurgency."

But here an important exception to the rule exists where there are internal situations with which the United States is unwilling to live, even at the cost of fomenting conflict. The obvious illustrations are Arbenz's Guatemala in 1954, Castro's Cuba in 1961, and Tshombe's Katanga in 1963. Other cases where an official U.S.

conflict-generating impulse existed, although with somewhat less clarity and purposefulness, were the occasion of the crushing of the Tibetan revolt in 1959, and the situation in Trujillo's Dominican Republic in 1961. In neither case did the United States take overt action in support of its impulse.

After the "outbreak of hostilities" threshold is crossed, the United States characteristically inquires about the extent of its vital interests, if any, in the outcome. If no such vital interest is perceived--usually meaning no perceived direct or primary Communist involvement--the U.S. posture is one of nonintervention, encouragement of pacification efforts, and a hope for reconciliation of contending factions. The United States may have "feelings" on the subject, but no significant commitment of blood or treasure to a given outcome is to be looked for. Cases in point are the most numerous: Kuwait, Cyprus in both its stages, the Nationalist Chinese in Burma,* Costa Rica in 1947, Kenya, India from 1945 to 1948 (and, one is required to add, Batista's Cuba and Trujillo's Dominican Republic, whatever rhetorical U.S. distaste may have been felt for non-Communist dictatorships).

If on the other hand a primary U.S. interest is perceived in which side wins, the U.S. preference for victory for "its" side overrides contrary desires for cease-fire, reconciliation, coalition governments, etc. The U.S. action posture is then typically one of seriously considering intervening with significant amounts of prestige and, in varying degrees, money, military hardware, and, in extreme situations, uniformed U.S. forces. In every one of the following cases the issue,

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*We draw a distinction between authorizing a low-level U.S. involvement by a single government agency on one side of a dispute and the adoption of a government-wide public posture favoring large-scale involvement.

real or fancied, was Communist take-over: Venezuela, Laos, the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Bay of Pigs, Guatemala, the Malayan Emergency, the Congo in 1960, Colombia 1960, Lebanon, the Burmese Civil War, the Huks in the Philippines. The Greek Insurgency belongs here too.

As with interstate conflicts, so with internal ones, the test is then applied of the degree of risk that might be involved in extending the fight in scope, scale, or time, rather than suppressing it. Such risks were evidently seen in Hungary and Laos as sufficient to discourage an activist policy. In the first case they suggested a policy of strategic abstention, along with rhetorical condemnation through the United Nations; in the second, they led in 1962 to a policy of termination and reconciliation through the device of a coalition government.

In "primary interest" internal cases where no serious danger of intensification is perceived, the United States appears to disfavor a pure termination and reconciliation policy. Recent examples are: Venezuela, Colombia, Malaya, the Philippines, and, a fortiori, situations in which the United States has directly intervened--Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, and the Dominican Republic in 1965. In the Bay of Pigs there was no serious concern over possible Soviet intervention if the United States should succeed in establishing a rebel regime. Korea, like Vietnam, involved a mixture of calculations producing a policy of serious intervention but with growing readiness to terminate on compromise grounds as a more activist policy was ruled out for fear of the consequences.

With this varied performance in mind, we can repeat our primary proposition--the postulated generalized U.S. preference for conflict prevention, suppression, and termination. Since World War II this has been true of virtually all colonial conflicts, most interstate

local wars, and some internal conflicts where Communism was not the prime issue.

The danger of intensification is generally believed to have declined. Some have pointed to Vietnam as an example of "how hard it is to start a war." This may mean less hesitancy on the part of the United States--and other great powers--in future to intervene, which is related to a final point.

The most crucial element in local conflict is the degree to which the United States, the Soviet Union, and China view their vital interests as seriously involved. The other side of the same coin is the degree to which they can view a given conflict impartially rather than favoring one side.

THE DESIGN STUDY

CHAPTER III

D E S I G N I N G T H E A P P R O A C H

The previous chapters have identified the subject matter of this research--local conflict in the developing areas (conflict in which the United States and the Soviet Union are not both directly engaged)--and the operational policy question to which it is addressed--control of such conflict. But even the degree of precision we were able in the initial stages of this research effort to give to the notions of local conflict and of control left a large area open for further inquiry. For the most part, our initial definitions concentrated on what local conflict was not. It remained to determine what it was. The over-all task of the research approach was thus, in a sense, to define the questions as they were being analyzed. That is to say, we had to elaborate the nature of local conflict and its control while searching for conflict-preventing and conflict-controlling policy-insights.

A further parameter of the research approach was set by the fact that this is a Design Study. Its goals were to generate hypotheses; to test them to the extent possible; and to structure the problem in such a way that additional research and analytic tasks would emerge. This tentative and experimental nature of the study implied several built-in drawbacks: (1) If the field had been more fully cultivated before our research effort began, we could with some degree

of confidence have selected policy measures that seemed most likely to be relevant, and concentrated our analysis exclusively on developing and elaborating them; (2) If our only interest were to advance theoretical understanding of the conflict process, we could have chosen a level of theoretical abstraction far removed from the uncertainties and needs of the policy-maker; (3) If our research had represented the end-product of a long intellectual effort rather than its beginning, we could have selected the most congenial single methodology and pursued it to the exclusion of other possible approaches. But the fact that this was a Design Study in a relatively new field of inquiry with a policy purpose precluded all these simplifications of the task.

Even a Design Study could, we believed, be structured in such a way as to permit each of several approaches to reinforce the others, by testing common hypotheses, using a common body of data, and revolving around a common unifying theme. But the probing nature of a Design Study precluded any imposition on an unstructured field of an artificial order that might blur its complexities and obscure its richness. In a word, while the research would be strengthened by being systematic, it should not be made rigid. While the approach needed to be focused, it would be self-defeating to put blinders on the researchers that might filter out unexpected insights and unforeseen connections between seemingly random data.

THE DECISION TO LOOK TO HISTORY

It was not necessarily true that the only source of knowledge about conflict and its control was to be found in actual human experience. We could have simulated conflict situations on the basis of hypotheses generated from known conflicts. But none of the analogies

or models of conflict that might have been simulated approaches in complexity the real world of conflict within and between states. For this reason, and as a matter of our own preferences, we chose instead to examine in this design stage some actual historic examples of the kind of local conflict phenomenon under study.

What period of history to concentrate upon was a more difficult matter. Limitations of time and the priorities appropriate to a design effort dictated that only a small sample of cases be selected for any detailed study. Several practical as well as theoretical reasons led to the decision to confine the selection to the post-1945 period.* Data of the sort required were more likely to be available, particularly since historians of earlier conflicts have tended to neglect the military aspects. Furthermore, we believe that, in general, the kinds of pressures that characterize this period are likely to be prime movers for many years to come.

The post-World War II period may of course be unique in its conjunction of ideological cleavage, rapid technological change, and decolonization.** With some notable exceptions that are high on any list of potential future conflict areas, the decolonization process has been completed. But the sensitivities of new-found independence and the assertive nationalism to which the decolonization process gave rise are bound to color the perceptions of present and future leaders of the new states. The pace of rapid technological change may slacken, but the impact of that change as it is transferred to the

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*In the configuration analysis which is discussed in Chapter VII, some pre-World War II and pre-World War I cases have been included. It would be interesting, should any of the techniques of analysis described in this report be carried forward, to include cases from the wide sweep of human history, as far back as adequate data can be found.

**This point is cogently argued by our consultant Alastair Buchan.

developing world has surely not yet run its course. And while the character of the ideological split may be changing with the rapid decentralization of both Cold War camps, the perceptions of the earlier era, right or wrong, will doubtless linger among both political leaders and their publics. The post-1945 period, then, was not only a source of many examples of the phenomenon of local conflict but of local conflicts with a character that seemed likely to project into the next decades.

But while our chief source of knowledge about conflict comes from the past, the dangers involved in extracting its lessons are obvious. By confining ourselves to a small slice of history, we were working with a statistically small sample. We were aware of general admonitions to be suspicious of making inferences about the future from the past. As Carl Becker once wrote, "In human affairs nothing is predetermined until after it has occurred." The hazards of trying to understand future phenomena by studying their past manifestations are clear--they are hazards to be constantly recognized and guarded against because they cannot be avoided. But as another wise diplomatic historian wrote, "I have observed that politicians, unlike diplomats, have no time to learn the lessons of history."* We think those lessons worth trying to learn.

There is a surprisingly wide divergence among those who have studied the postwar period as to how many conflicts have in fact taken place within or among states. Numbers range from the middle thirties to the several hundreds. Clearly the explanation for this wide variation in count is not that we are all badly informed; it lies rather in the matter of definition. As has been explained in Chapter I, our definition of local conflicts excludes coups, riots, and other lower

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*Sir Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London, Constable & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 71.

orders of unstructured domestic violence. This Design Study moreover has excluded conflicts in Europe, as well as those in which the military forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States were directly engaged (for example, the Cuban missile crisis). Furthermore, the counts are radically affected by whether a series of military clashes is regarded as distinct conflicts, or as events in one continuing internal or interstate conflict.

Drawing on our own admittedly imperfect memories of the past two decades and after perusing the lists compiled by others, we have settled on a list of 52* postwar cases of local conflict that fit our definition and geographic scope. (The identity of these 52 may be found in Typology A in Chapter IV.) We are not prepared to argue that this number settles the question of how many postwar conflicts there have been. But these 52 fit our definition of local conflict, and represent the population of such conflicts on which the bulk of our work was based.

THE ANALYTIC METHODS

The remaining chapters in this part of the report contain detailed descriptions of the various analytic approaches and steps that have made up our research effort. We shall here seek only to outline the broad research strategy into which each of the following chapters fits.

Having identified the 52 cases that were to be our concern,

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*One, the Greek Insurgency, was included in our list even though it took place on the European continent and was, technically, outside the range of problems we were examining. Its uncanny resemblance to some features of the Vietnam war made it desirable to study as an exception.

we chose as a first approach to look at all 52 cases to see what could be said about the general nature of each conflict that affected its controllability. This involved some crude preliminary classifications or typologies of conflicts. For this task of developing typologies we required some general knowledge about each of the conflicts. How controllable had it in fact been? Were there hostilities or not? Did they end quickly or drag on? Did the scope and scale of the hostilities intensify or moderate? We had to make some assumptions about what features--such as the relative military strength of the adversaries in the conflict, its locale, its substance, the extent of great-power involvement, and so forth--were likely to be highly correlated with controllability. The exercise rested on the supposition that by adding together what we knew had occurred in each conflict and what we knew its gross characteristics to have been, some interesting patterns and clusters of conflicts might emerge. The further supposition was that such patterns might suggest what types have in the past--and may in the future--prove most or least controllable. This aspect of our research effort is described in Chapter IV.

The research and analysis described in the preceding paragraph represents what might be called a macro-analysis of conflict control. At a very early stage in our thinking, we postulated that there might be within conflicts factors that at crucial pressure points could be subjected to conflict-controlling measures. From the concept of pressure points developed the further notion that within conflicts there were phases that differed from each other in ways that were relevant to the problem of conflict control. To examine the extent to which such pressure points and phases might exist required some way in which the dynamic structure of the conflict process itself could be exposed for analysis.

From these relatively uncomplicated notions developed the

model of the structure of conflict and its control. The model may be viewed both as the organizing theme of a large part of our research, and the product of it. In the course of seeking to apply the model to historic conflicts, the characteristics of the separate phases, and of transitions between phases, became more clearly differentiated. And as the content of the phases emerged, the nature of the control objectives that were relevant to each of them was seen with greater precision.

Having constructed the model which is presented in Chapter V, we still of course had only an abstraction. The crucial questions related to its utility as an analytic tool. Could it be applied to data from historic cases without distorting them? Would it yield any further insights into the factors within phases that tended to be conflict-controlling, and factors tending to be conflict-promoting? And would it give some specific content to conflict-controlling measures?

To find the answers to these questions, a series of detailed case studies was prepared, applying the model to sixteen of the initial 52 cases of post-1945 conflict. The process of selecting these cases and of preparing the case studies is described in Chapter VI. Along with the case studies, an intensive look was taken for most of them at the weapons available to each adversary and the manner of their procurement and use. The techniques by which these data were gathered is also reported in Chapter VI.

The case studies and weapons analyses yielded up a large body of data, detailing the circumstances that prevailed in the phases and sub-phases into which the cases divided. The two methods by which these data were analyzed are described in Chapter VII. One of these methods, which we have labeled "historic-analytic," was designed to shed as much light as possible on the concrete conflict-control

measures that were relevant to various control objectives at different stages in the life of specific conflicts. The second, a computerized configuration analysis, looked for patterns of variables that could be related to the known course each conflict took. (Typology F in Chapter IV also drew on the data developed in the model-based case study approach).

THE EXISTENCE OF FACTORS

A final word is in order about another notion, common to each approach but differing in important ways in each instance in which it was applied. One of our basic assumptions was that it is possible to identify, isolate, and classify the salient factors, singly or in combination, that, by their existence or absence, coincided with the extent to which a conflict was controlled or not (or that, in terms of the analysis based on our model of conflict, were tending to favor or operate against the transition from one phase to another).

Hypothesizing the existence of such factors is found in any number of analyses of conflict. Quincy Wright, for example, identified some potent influence factors bearing on what he called "escalation." He prefaced his analysis by saying that "the important variable in determining willingness to escalate or to negotiate is the perception of the situation by the decision-making authority, not the objective reality."* Wright's factors working to abort conflicts before they break out into open hostilities are, generally speaking: a relatively minor national interest of the less-interested party, relatively strong world opinion demanding settlement, rough equality

*"The Escalation of International Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IX, No. 4 (December 1965), p. 437.

of the potential powers involved, and a low interest level of the state resisting change.

When hostilities have broken out, Wright's factors favoring moderation and termination add up to the fact that while the less-interested party had a greater interest in the matter than was true in conflicts that aborted before hostilities, the pressure of world opinion (usually expressed by the League of Nations or the United Nations) was a major factor in ending hostilities. In some cases, such as Quemoy-Matsu and the Berlin Blockade, considerations of potential power indicated either a stalemate or a greatly intensified conflict. In situations such as Goa, the superiority of Indian power in the locality forced the issue even though the pressure of world opinion was divided. In all of the cases in question, "the will to settle or at least to stop hostilities" was indicated. In the cases Wright studied in which hostilities broke out and were intensified, both parties had a strong national interest, and the situation consequently moved toward greater violence in spite of considerable world opinion pressing for peace.

Acknowledging an oversimplification of Wright's views, one could describe his findings as essentially pitting the factors of military strength and national interest against the factor of pressure of world opinion. Movement across the thresholds was determined here by the resultant force of these factors operating in conjunction.

Another close student of the problem is Morton H. Halperin, who focuses chiefly on limited war in the sense of low-level U.S.-Soviet armed conflict, whether in Europe or elsewhere. Halperin sees the greatest probability for intensification of violence as likely to be

> at the time of the outbreak of a local war or at a period when one side achieves a clear tactical superiority within the established limiting

> conditions. There will then be pressure on the losing side to expand the war in order to reverse the battlefield decision and pressure on the winning side to expand its war-termination conditions and hence its military operations. . . .Just as the stabilization of a local war results from a variety of pressures on both sides, so the termination of a local-war situation will not be the result of any single pressure. There is nothing inherent within the logic of local war which determines the time or conditions of war termination. It is rather the broader political-effects objectives of the major powers as filtered through decision makers' image of the world and their domestic political goals which determine when a war is brought to a halt.*

Again oversimplifying in order to characterize Halperin's views, we conclude that he rates as the most influential factors and pressures the decisions consciously made by the parties in the light of the battlefield situation, combined with their estimation of future bargaining probabilities. This is undoubtedly most relevant to the U.S.-Soviet bargaining-type conflicts in which Halperin has been particularly interested. It also focuses exclusively on the hostilities phases of conflicts. To some extent, however, the picture represents what happens at points of decision regarding intensification and moderation of hostilities even in local conflicts not necessarily involving any great power.

Many other illustrations could be given of factors that have been identified by analysts--either of historic conflicts or of theoretical concepts of nuclear conflicts--as bearing on controllability. We have throughout our analysis assumed that such factors exist, but have handled them differently in our several approaches to the data. In Chapter IV on typologies, it was necessary to assume, on the basis of our general understanding of the conflict system, the broad

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*Limited War in the Nuclear Age, p. 32.

characteristics about a conflict that we believed were relevant to its control--the military strength of its adversaries, its locale, the degree of great-power involvement, and so forth. Furthermore, we postulated the specific manner in which these several factors would affect control. For example, we postulated that conflicts that occur in jungles and other rough, inaccessible terrain are less controllable than conflicts occurring in open country. In studying actual historic conflicts in the historic-analytic and configuration analyses reported on in Chapter VII, we postulated in accordance with the model that there were factors or patterns of factors that tended to make control easier or more difficult. But we made no assumption either about what those factors or patterns were, or whether and under what circumstances they would promote or inhibit control. These two historic approaches, in other words, had as one of their objectives a search for the identity of factors; their identity was not assumed at the outset.

In describing our central model, we shall be discussing in some detail the problem of causation, particularly in relation to the identified factors at work. We should stress here that the coexistence of a factor with a given degree of controllability or uncontrollability does not necessarily support the conclusion that there is a cause-and-effect relationship. For one thing, our sample is much too small to justify such an assertion. We do however assert what might be called an "existence-effect" relationship: Where a given factor or group of factors has existed in the past, a given effect has occurred. The most we would be prepared to assert beyond this--and that only about some of the most persistent patterns--is the probability that the existence of the same combination in the future might be associated with the same or similar effect.

CHAPTER IV

L O C A L C O N F L I C T T Y P O L O G I E S

THE PROCESS OF CLASSIFICATION

Classification of phenomena into uniform groupings can not only order data for faster handling, but can also on occasion advance knowledge. Studies that have been made of war have generated various gross classifications of conflict. These have in turn served as points of departure for further studies of the phenomenon of war in the nuclear age.

One of the earliest and crudest classifications, which had emerged by the early 1950s as an important ingredient in the formulation of U.S. defense policy, was the separation of potential conflicts into general wars and limited wars. Nuclear weapons could conceivably be used in a limited war, especially in one between the United States and the Soviet Union, so another early gross category of conflict was conventional wars, a term initially used to stress no use of nuclears.

By the late 1950s, students of defense policy realized that the actual conflicts throughout the world since 1945 included a large number outside Europe that did not belong in the same "conventional war" category as such clear-cut examples as the Korean War and the

Suez conflict. These lesser conflicts were referred to as "unconventional," "sub-limited," "guerrilla," "insurgent," or "internal," depending on particular circumstances in each case. With this additional band, the spectrum of potential conflicts was perceived to comprise: nuclear wars--whether central, theater nuclear, or battlefield nuclear; conventional wars, in which regular national military forces engaged each other without using nuclear weapons; and unconventional wars, in which irregular forces played a major military role on at least one side.

In Limited War and American Defense Policy,* Seymour Deitchman divided over 30 post-World War II conflicts into the classes of conventional, unconventional, and deterred--the last being conflicts that did not involve hostilities. He then further classified them according to geographical areas affected, major issues at stake, resolutions of the conflicts, involvement of third powers, gross military manpower of the adversaries, and presence or absence of the "free world vs. Communist" syndrome. Finally, he discussed factors or circumstances that would tend to make such conflicts likely in the future. Deitchman's classification according to likelihood and gross descriptive characteristics was valid for his purpose of suggesting appropriate measures for U.S. defense policy.

The approach taken here grows out of the central theme of this analysis--the control of local conflict. It thus aims at classifying past and possible future conflicts according to their relative controllability. The latter feature is seen as a function of the intensity of a number of variable factors that have tended to make local conflicts relatively hard or relatively easy to control--control in the sense we have used throughout of keeping them non-military; of preventing, moderating, or terminating armed hostilities; and of

*Cited above.

settling the underlying dispute. The aim of this exercise is to see to what extent typologies as a tool of analysis tend to develop patterns that cast light on the problem of controllability.

TYPOLOGY A

Before proceeding to classifications (or typologies) of local conflicts by variable factors affecting controllability, a word is in order about Typology A. Typology A was originally developed primarily to help ensure that the historical conflicts selected for more detailed study (see Chapter VI) would represent a good distribution among certain rough categories of local conflict. The version reproduced here incorporates some revisions developed in the course of additional study.

Even this primitive typology with which we started generated some usable insights. For instance, of the 32 conflicts that involved continued hostilities, with or without intensification, 25 were basically internal. This suggested to us at the outset that statistically no less than intuitively internal conflicts have generally proven harder to bring under control than interstate conflicts.

In a crude and preliminary way, this was representative of the kinds of conclusions that it was hoped the study of conflict typologies might yield. As a form of macro-analysis, so to speak, these conclusions could later be compared with the micro-analysis represented by the cases studied in detail by the historic-analytic method described in Chapters VI and VII.

TYPOLOGY A

GROSS NATURE OF CONFLICT

HOSTILITIES INDEX

	CONVENTIONAL INTERSTATE	UNCONVENTIONAL INTERSTATE	INTERNAL WITH SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT	PRIMARILY INTERNAL	COLONIAL
NO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	△ Morocco - Spanish Morocco 1957-58 □ Honduras-Nicaragua 1957 ○ Kuwait-Iraq 1961		□ Nicaragua-Costa Rica 1955	□ Costa Rica 1947 ○ Lebanon 1958 US	△ French Cameroun 1955-60 △ Madagascar 1947 ○ Muscat-Oman 1956-58 △ West Irian 1962-63
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	○ Soviet-Iran 1941-47 SU △ Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64	△ Algeria-Morocco 1962-63	□ Bay of Pigs 1960-61 US_I □ Guatemala 1954 US_I		◇ Goa 1961-62
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY AFTER INTENSIFICATION	◇ Kashmir 1965 - Ch_I ○ Suez 1956		□ Dominican Republic 1965 US ○ Cyprus 1963-		
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	◇ Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58 US_I ○ Palestine 1945-48 ○ Aden-Yemen 1954-59 ◇ India-China 1954-62 Ch		○ Yemen 1962- ◇ Laos 1959- US_I - SU_I - Ch_I ◇ Tibet 1955-59 Ch ◇ Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54 ◇ Malaya 1948-60 ◇ Burmese Civil War 1948-54 □ Venezuela 1960-63	○ Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63 □ Dominican Republic 1961-62 US_I □ Cuba 1958-59 ◇ Philippines 1948-54 □ Colombia 1960-	△ Angola 1961- ◇ Indonesia 1945-49 △ French Morocco 1952-56 △ Kenya 1952-58
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITH INTENSIFICATION	◇ Kashmir 1947-49 ◇ Korea 1950-53 US-Ch-SU_I	◇ Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65	△ Congo (Katanga) 1961-64 Greece 1944-49 US_I ◇ Vietnam 1959 - US-SU_I-Ch_I	△ Congo 1960-64 US_I ◇ Chinese Civil War 1945-49 Ch-US_I ◇ India 1945-48	◇ Indochina 1945-54 △ Algeria 1954-62 ○ Cyprus 1952-59

Legend: ○ Middle East, △ Africa, □ Latin America, ◇ Asia

US: Direct
SU: Direct
Ch: Direct

US_I: Indirect
SU_I: Indirect
Ch_I: Indirect

NOTE: Conflicts underlined have been subjects of ACLIM Study.

MAJOR VARIABLE FACTORS AFFECTING CONTROLLABILITY

The basic inputs required for controllability typologies are those variable circumstances, or factors, that are hypothesized to be most salient in terms of their likelihood of influencing the prevention, suppression, termination, or settlement of local conflicts outside Europe.

The following are the major variable factors that will be used here.* For each of them, a scalar breakdown was developed, based on the hypothesized intensity of its effect in a given conflict. This was then used in developing the typologies. The following paragraphs briefly explain each factor and describe how the relative intensity of its influence is scaled.

General Factors

Geopolitical Setting. Three elements that derive from the geopolitical setting of a conflict would appear to influence its controllability. The first is the nature of the terrain. Decisive military outcomes--and therefore potential or actual prevention, suppression, or termination (however accomplished)--occur most readily in relatively open country, less readily in deserts and mountains, and least readily in jungles. Potential or actual peacekeeping operations are also subject to the same index of decreasing effectiveness. Second, the attitudes of nations contiguous to the conflict can affect its controllability. If they are rigorously neutral, it should be easier to bring the conflict under control than if their partiality extends to some form of assistance to one of the adversaries, whether

*These factors are clearly related to the questions posed for the case studies (see Chapter VI) and to the items in the codebook for the configuration analysis (see Chapter VII). Each of these lists contributed to and drew on the others.

that assistance is strong and direct or mild and indirect. The third related element is partly geographical and partly political, and is related to the second element; it concerns the degree of political stability in the region in which the conflict is set.

The effect on controllability of these three elements of the conflict's geopolitical setting can be characterized as creating: (1) low impediment to controllability if the terrain is not difficult, nations contiguous to the conflict are neutral, and the conflict region is politically stable; (2) high impediment to controllability if terrain is difficult, nations contiguous to the conflict are partial, and the conflict region is politically unstable; and (3) moderate impediment to controllability if those geopolitical elements are generally intermediate between (1) and (2).

Gross Nature of the Conflict. This factor classifies conflicts roughly as interstate or internal and conventional or unconventional. In assigning conflicts within this category, sound judgment must prevail over adherence to necessarily imperfect labels. For example, if intervention by external powers in an initially internal conflict is so strong as virtually to determine its course, that conflict could also well be classified as interstate. Conversely, the fact that an insurgent group proclaims its "independence" should not affect the classification of a conflict that by every other standard is primarily internal.

The effect of a conflict's gross nature on its controllability will be assumed to be: (1) low impediment to controllability if the conflict is interstate-conventional; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if the conflict is interstate-unconventional; and (3) high impediment to controllability if the conflict is internal (including colonial).

Adversary-Oriented Factors

Commitment of Adversaries to Outcome. How fully an adversary commits his resources to a conflict would seem in most cases to be a derivative function of how strongly he feels about winning--i.e., how he perceives the importance to him of the conflict objective. Since the extent of resource commitment should be more readily assessible than the fuzzier "objectives" variable, the consideration of past conflicts ought to use the former and consider the latter to be subsumed in it. In weighing appropriate controlling actions vis-à-vis future incipient local conflicts, however, the relative intensity level at which their objectives are perceived by the adversaries may have to be estimated, however imperfectly, since their commitment of resources is not likely to be known beforehand.

The impact on controllability of the adversaries' intensity of commitment to the conflict will be scaled as follows: (1) low impediment to controllability if neither adversary feels a high-intensity commitment (i.e., any combination of low and moderate intensities); (2) moderate impediment to controllability if only one adversary feels a high-intensity commitment; (3) high impediment to controllability if both adversaries feel a high commitment.

Ideological Motivation of Adversaries. Most conflicts in the world since 1945 have been wholly or largely unrelated to ideological compulsions stemming from the struggle between Communism and the "free world." However, when the Communist ideological drive does figure in a given conflict, it doubtless adds an increment of "dedication to cause" that must be taken into account in any assessment of controllability. The same is probably true of other ideological compulsions, including religious and ethnic ones and, in colonial struggles, the desire for independence.

The effect on controllability of the presence of an inspiring

ideology on one or both sides will here be broken down as: (1) low impediment to controllability if ideological motivation is absent or minor; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if ideological motivation is significant; (3) high impediment to controllability if ideological motivation is intense.

Military Balance Between Adversaries. This factor clearly affects the controllability of a conflict. However, the ways in which its influence is felt are so extraordinarily complex that it has proven to be one of the murkiest facets of conflict control that this entire Design Study has identified. The fact that military strengths as perceived are more important in the context of control than actual military strengths is an obvious first finding, but this does not go far toward making possible an ordered approach to the problem.

Despite the difficulties, this factor of military balance has to be included here. Therefore, with no claim of even moderate confidence, its effect on controllability will here focus on the period just preceding the outbreak of hostilities, and will be treated as: (1) low impediment to controllability if that balance approaches parity; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if that balance generally favors one adversary; or (3) high impediment to controllability if that balance heavily favors one adversary. Once again, however, it should be stressed that this is an oversimplification of a complicated subject that needs much further study.

Governments of Adversaries. Well-entrenched authoritarian governments can initiate and engage in conflicts more readily than can democratic governments that are dependent upon public support. Also, even if authoritarian governments are doing badly in hostilities, they can continue by "managing" public opinion or ignoring it. On the other hand, during hostilities democratic governments often find it hard to resist public pressure to intensify hostilities in search of rapid and

decisive victory. On balance, however, this factor will be here accounted as offering: (1) low impediment to controllability if the governments of both adversaries are basically democratic; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if the government of one adversary is basically democratic; or (3) high impediment to controllability if the government of neither adversary is basically democratic.

Economic Burden of Conflict on Adversaries. Nations make great economic sacrifices in pursuit of importantly perceived objectives, especially during the supreme challenge of war. Nevertheless, the economic burden of potential or continued hostilities is a factor that makes for some degree of restraint on most governments. Richer nations of course do not feel this pressure so sharply as do poorer nations. But all, including the extremely rich, must forego other desirable allocations of resources if they become involved in extensive military expenditures. The worst economic situation is for an adversary actually to spend, or to contemplate spending, a high percentage of a low gross national product on military capabilities; this thus represents an encouraging prospect for the acceptability of conflict-control measures. At the other end of the scale, the economic-burden factor will not tend to enhance conflict controllability if one or both adversaries are able to support full participation in the conflict with military expenditures amounting to only a relatively low percentage of a high and growing gross national product.

The effect of economic burden on conflict controllability will be assessed as: (1) low impediment to controllability if the conflict imposes serious economic burdens on both adversaries; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if the conflict imposes serious economic burdens on only one adversary; (3) high impediment to controllability if the conflict imposes serious economic burdens on neither adversary.

Ethnic or Religious Minorities. If, during hostilities, substantial minorities linked to Adversary A are located on the territory of Adversary B, Adversary A enjoys an advantage that can help hasten its military victory over Adversary B. Since victory terminates hostilities, it is one form, albeit a less desirable one, of conflict control. However, the fact of a minorities problem very often plays a major role in bringing on conflict and hostilities in the first place. On balance, therefore, a minorities situation will be assumed to be a conflict-provoking factor and, when present, will be treated as having offered: (1) low impediment to controllability if it plays only a minor role in relations between the adversaries; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if it plays a significant role in relations between adversaries; and (3) high impediment to controllability if it plays a dominant role in relations between adversaries.

Perception by Adversary(s) That Non-Violent Means of Achieving Objectives Are Foreclosed. Occasionally an adversary in a conflict would welcome the introduction of non-violent modalities into its course if it felt that its objectives would or even might thereby be achieved. However, for one reason or another it may become persuaded that only through the initiation, continuation, or resumption of hostilities can it expect to achieve its objectives.

The effect of this factor on controllability will be assessed as: (1) low impediment to controllability if neither adversary feels that hostilities are the only way to achieve its conflict objective; (2) moderate impediment to hostilities if one adversary takes that view of its prospects; and (3) high impediment to controllability if both adversaries take that view of their prospects.

Actual or Perceived Time Pressures on Adversary(s). In some conflict situations, an adversary may believe that, unless it acts

quickly to initiate, intensify, or resume hostilities, the opportunity of achieving its objective in the conflict will disappear or be severely compromised. When this is the case, the presence of this factor works strongly against efforts to bring the conflict under control.

If present at all, the influence of this factor will be assessed in the circumstances of each case as: (1) low impediment to controllability if neither adversary feels that the passage of time would severely compromise the achievement of its conflict objectives; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if one adversary takes that view; and (3) high impediment to controllability if both adversaries take that view.

Great-Power (or Other Third-Power)- Oriented Factors

Great-Power Partiality. The attitudes of the Soviet Union and the United States toward a given local conflict exert an effect on its controllability. This is true in a general sense. It can take a very specific sense of one of them extending material support to Adversary A, and, most seriously, of one extending material support to Adversary A and the other to Adversary B. Short of this degree of involvement, partiality of the superpowers can also influence the controllability of a conflict through such less dramatic actions as hobbling or promoting short-term peacekeeping initiatives by the United Nations or by regional international organizations; mustering world public opinion in support of a favored adversary; or simply abstaining from mid-term and long-term activities designed to remove the underlying causes of a conflict.

The partiality that the Soviet Union or the United States feels toward a local conflict can stem from any of several causes or from a combination of such causes. Five examples are:

1. ideological ties between a superpower and an adversary;

2. belief by a superpower that, if the conflict outcome goes against the adversary it favors, the general strategic balance between superpowers will be adversely affected;

3. fact that one or both adversaries are in the claimed sphere of influence of a superpower;

4. availability of "proxy(s)" for indirect great-power intervention;

5. degree of mutual deterrence sensed by great-powers at the time.

Of course the Soviet Union and the United States have occasionally favored the same adversary in a local conflict. This was probably true in the China-India border conflict of 1962 and during Algeria's struggle for independence from France, and could prove true in a future local conflict involving South Africa. Also, during the Suez conflict of 1956 and the Kashmir conflict of 1965, the two superpowers, though not expressly partial to the same adversary, did collaborate in helping to terminate hostilities. Situations of this kind, which could occur more frequently in the future, naturally favor controllability.

In some contexts of local conflict, the partiality of Britain, France, and China should probably also be considered as key factors in controllability, because of their status (however limited when compared to the Soviet Union and the United States) as relatively great powers. Britain and France often figured in this way during the immediate post-World War II period, and China is beginning to do so, especially in areas contiguous to its national territory.

The effect of great-power partiality on controllability will be scaled as follows: (1) low impediment to controllability if the opposing partialities of two great powers are judged to be not greater than both low; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if those partialities are judged to be one moderate and one low; and (3) high impediment to controllability if those partialities are judged to be one high or both at least moderate.

Great-Power or Third-Power Military Presence In or Near Conflict. In some cases a great-power or other third-power military presence can influence the controllability of a conflict. Depending on circumstances, such a presence can either inhibit or enhance the chance of bringing the conflict under control. Each case must be viewed separately. In those cases in which a third-power military presence figures, its effect will be assessed as offering: (1) low impediment to controllability if it is judged to enhance prospects for the success of conflict-control measures; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if it is judged to exercise little or no effect on prospects for the success of conflict-control measures; and (3) high impediment to controllability if it is judged to inhibit prospects for the success of conflict-control measures.

Factors Oriented to International Organizations

Likelihood of U.N. Involvement. The United Nations has been and will become actively involved in some local conflicts, sometimes directly with action-type measures, and sometimes with persuasive approaches limited to discussion and the passage of resolutions. Hopefully, the more the United Nations enters into the conflict picture, the better the prospects for control. The effect of this factor will therefore be assessed as: (1) low impediment to controllability if U.N. good offices or peacekeeping appears likely; (2) moderate

impediment to controllability if U.N. discussion and resolutions appear likely; and (3) high impediment to controllability if there appears to be very little chance of any U.N. activity coming to bear.

Likelihood of Regional Organization Involvement. The same set of considerations as were noted above for potential U.N. involvement exist for regional organization involvement, with comparable impacts on controllability.

Existence of International Guarantees. No matter how intensely motivated toward conflict a nation may feel, it can feel constrained to some variable extent by applicable international agreements to which it is a party. The effect on conflict controllability of this factor will therefore be assessed as; (1) low impediment to controllability if a conflict-inhibiting agreement exists on the substance of the conflict itself; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if a conflict-inhibiting agreement exists on the behavior of either adversary in the general context of the conflict; and (3) high impediment to controllability if no conflict-inhibiting agreement exists.

World Opinion. Short of formal international agreements that can operate to retard, arrest, or reverse the course of a local conflict, the general power of world opinion must be taken into account, especially by adversaries and any third-power would-be supporters who feel they need the backing of world opinion in their other important international designs. The effect of world opinion on controllability of a conflict will therefore be assessed as: (1) low impediment to controllability if world opinion is strongly adverse to the conflict; (2) moderate impediment to controllability if world opinion is generally adverse to the conflict; and (3) high impediment to controllability if world opinion favors or is neutral toward the conflict.

We shall report first on efforts to work a selected few of these factors into illustrative typological charts covering the 52 conflicts. We also experimented with utilizing all these factors to prepare a comparative tabulation covering the relatively smaller number of conflicts selected for detailed analysis in the Design Study.

FOUR EXPERIMENTAL TYPOLOGIES

Four controllability typologies have been experimentally developed in which a relatively large number of conflicts (52) are entered on matrices in accordance with how intensely a small number of variable factors figured in each of those conflicts. The variables selected from those listed above are: geopolitical setting, gross nature of the conflict, commitment of adversaries to outcome, and great-power partiality. Two of these fall into the category of "general," one into the category of "adversary-oriented," and one into the category of "great-power-oriented." These particular factors have been selected because they apply to all 52 conflicts, and because their relative intensity can be fairly confidently assessed from information readily available. Each "cluster box" in Typologies B through E bears a letter-number designation for convenience in referencing.

Typology B

Typology B has plotted on its vertical axis the hostilities index used in Typology A; this indicates how relatively controllable each of the 52 conflicts proved in fact to be. On the horizontal axis is plotted the factor of great-power partiality in ascending order of

TYPOLOGY B

HOSTILITIES INDEX

HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITH INTENSIFICATION	A-1	Kashmir 1947-49 India 1945-48 UK Cyprus 1952-59 UK Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65 B-1	Korea 1950-53 Greece 1944-49 Vietnam 1959- Congo 1960-64 Congo (Katanga) 1961-64 Chinese Civil War 1945-49 Indochina 1945-54 Fr Algeria 1954-62 Fr C-1
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	Palestine 1945-48 Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54 Burmese Civil War 1948-54 A-2	Yemen 1962- Venezuela 1960-63 Tibet 1955-59 Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63 Angola 1961- Indonesia 1945-59 Aden-Yemen 1954-59 UK Colombia 1960- B-2	Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58 Laos 1959- Malaya 1948-60 UK Dominican Republic 1961-62 Cuba 1958-59 Philippines 1948-54 French Morocco 1952-56 Fr Kenya 1952-58 UK India-China 1954-62 C-2
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY AFTER INTENSIFICATION	A-3	Kashmir 1965- Cyprus 1963- B-3	Suez 1956 Dominican Republic 1965 C-3
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	Algeria-Morocco 1962-63 Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64 Goa 1961-62 A-4	B-4	Soviet-Iran 1941-47 Bay of Pigs 1960-61 Guatemala 1954 C-4
NO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	Morocco-Spanish Morocco 1957-58 Honduras-Nicaragua 1957 Nicaragua-Costa Rica 1955 Costa Rica 1947 French Cameroun 1955-60 Madagascar 1947 Muscat-Oman 1956-58 A-5	Kuwait-Iraq 1961 West Irian 1962-63 B-5	Lebanon 1958 C-5
	BOTH LOW	ONE MODERATE, ONE LOW	BOTH MODERATE OR AT LEAST ONE HIGH

GREAT-POWER PARTIALITY

intensity.

The most immediately striking observations suggested are:

1. Categories A-1, B-1, and C-1 comprise the twelve conflicts that proved most difficult to control in that each involved continued hostilities with intensification. In eight out of the twelve, great-power partiality was "both moderate or at least one high."

2. Categories A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, and C-2 comprise the 32 conflicts in which hostilities were continued, with or without intensification. In only three of these was great-power partiality "both low": Palestine, Burma-Nationalist China, and the Burmese Civil War.

3. Categories A-5, B-5, and C-5 comprise the ten conflicts that did not reach a hostilities phase. In seven out of the ten, great-power partiality was "both low."

4. The void category A-1 indicates that no conflict of the total of 52 combined low partiality by both great powers with continued hostilities that intensified.

5. The 1958 Lebanon conflict in category C-5 was the only one that, although it involved considerable great-power partiality, did not reach a hostilities phase. This was a very unusual case, however, in that the United States intervened early and decisively with its own armed forces.

Based on these prominent features of Typology B, one might provisionally conclude that considerable great-power partiality has usually been a feature of those recent local conflicts that have proved hard to control; the more intense that partiality has been, the more the conflicts have resisted prevention, moderation, or termination of hostilities.

Typology C

The factor of geopolitical setting combines the advantages of fairly high objectivity and ready availability of data. Obviously other factors operating in the course of a conflict can counteract the effects of geography (another way of saying that other things are almost never equal). Typology C plots on the vertical axis the "hostilities index" of preceding typologies, and on the horizontal axis the impact of geopolitical setting.

At first glance Typology C appears rather bland because exactly half the 52 conflicts fall into the category of moderate impediment to controllability (categories B-1 through B-5), and those 26 are widely distributed throughout the five vertical classifications of the hostilities index. However, the results outside the center are more interesting:

1. Of the fifteen conflicts in which geopolitical setting is judged to have offered high impediment to controllability (categories C-1 through C-5), fourteen involved continued hostilities, with or without intensification (categories C-1 and C-2). The fifteenth, Suez (category C-3), of course, witnessed extraordinary initiatives directed toward quick termination of hostilities, initiatives in which the United States and the Soviet Union both participated.

2. Of the eleven conflicts in which geopolitical setting is judged to have offered low impediment to controllability (categories A-1 through A-5), eight either never reached a hostilities phase or involved hostilities terminated quickly without intensification (categories A-4 and A-5). The remaining three were India in 1945-1948 and Kashmir in both 1947-1949 and 1965 (categories A-1 and A-3), in all of which the ethnic-religious animosity between the adversaries was intense.

TYPOLOGY C

HOSTILITIES INDEX	LOW IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY	MODERATE IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY	HIGH IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITH INTENSIFICATION	India 1945-48 Kashmir 1947-49 A-1	Cyprus 1952-59 Algeria 1954-62 Chinese Civil War 1945-49 Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65 B-1	Vietnam 1959- Indochina 1945-54 Korea 1950-53 Congo 1960-64 Congo (Katanga) 1961-64 Greece 1944-49 C-1
HOSTILITIES CONTINUED WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	A-2	Cuba 1958-59 Colombia 1960- Kenya 1952-58 Indonesia 1945-49 Philippines 1948-54 French Morocco 1952-56 Dominican Republic 1961-62 Tibet 1955-59 Aden-Yemen 1954-59 Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58 Venezuela 1960-63 India-China 1954-62 B-2	Malaya 1948-60 Burmese Civil War 1948-54 Palestine 1945-48 Yemen 1962- Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63 Laos 1959- Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54 Angola 1961- C-2
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY AFTER INTENSIFICATION	Kashmir 1965- A-3	Cyprus 1963- Dominican Republic 1965 B-3	Suez 1956 C-3
HOSTILITIES TERMINATED QUICKLY WITHOUT INTENSIFICATION	Algeria-Morocco 1962-63 Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64 Soviet-Iran 1941-47 Goa 1961-62 A-4	Bay of Pigs 1960-61 Guatemala 1954 B-4	C-4
NO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	French Cameroun 1955-60 Kuwait-Iraq 1961 Madagascar 1947 West Irian 1962-63 A-5	Lebanon 1958 Morocco-Spanish Morocco 1957-58 Muscat-Oman 1956-58 Honduras-Nicaragua 1957 Nicaragua-Costa Rica 1955 Costa Rica 1947 B-5	C-5

GEOPOLITICAL SETTING

3. Palestine, Burma-Nationalist China, and the Burmese Civil War, which on Typology B were indicated as having extended into continued hostilities despite low great-power partiality, are shown on Typology C as having occurred in geopolitical settings that offered high impediment to controllability. Thus for those three cases the geopolitical variable and the variable of great-power partiality may have tended to offset each other.

Typology C appears to warrant the assertion that geopolitical setting does exert an influence on the relative controllability of conflicts, in that controllability is adversely affected by difficult terrain and weather conditions, neighboring states that incite or support one side or the other, and political instability in the region.

Typology D

The preceding typologies have all used as their vertical axes the hostilities index, which indicates whether each of the 52 conflicts in fact involved armed hostilities and, if so, their general magnitude. Typology D, on the other hand, is divorced from historical conflict outcome; it presents on one chart a classification of 52 conflicts according to how each rates with respect to the three variable factors of: gross nature of the conflict (interstate-conventional, interstate-unconventional, and internal), great-power partiality, and commitment of adversaries to outcome. The historical course of each conflict thus does not influence where it appears on the chart. What happened in each conflict as far as actual hostilities were concerned is indicated by one of the following numbers before each:

TYPOLOGY D

GREAT-POWER PARTIALITY

ONE HIGH OR BOTH AT LEAST MODERATE	① Lebanon 1958 ④ Dominican Republic 1961-62 ③ Dominican Republic 1965 A-1	⑥ Laos 1959- ⑫ Guatemala 1954 ⑥ Congo 1960-64 ⑮ Kenya 1952-58 ⑥ Congo (Katanga) 1961-64 ⑥ Cuba 1958-59 ⑥ French Morocco 1952-56 ⑥ Philippines 1948-54 B-1	④ Malaya 1945-60 ⑤ Chinese Civil War 1945-49 ⑤ Algeria 1954-62 ⑤ Greece 1944-49 ⑤ Indochina 1945-54 C-1	INTERNAL
	A-2	B-2	⑤ Vietnam 1959- C-2	INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL
	② Soviet-Iran 1941-47 ④ India-China 1954-62 A-3	④ Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58 ② Bay of Pigs 1960-61 B-3	③ Suez 1956 ⑤ Korea 1950-53 C-3	INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL
ONE MODERATE, ONE LOW	A-4	⑤ Cyprus 1952-59 ④ Colombia 1960- ④ Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63 ③ Cyprus 1963- ④ Angola 1961- ④ Venezuela 1960-63 ④ Indonesia 1945-49 B-4	⑤ India 1945-48 ④ Yemen 1962- C-4	INTERNAL
	A-5	⑤ Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-66 B-5	C-5	INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL
	① Kuwait-Iraq 1961 ④ Aden-Yemen 1954-59 A-6	① West Irian 1962-63 ③ Kashmir 1965 B-6	⑤ Kashmir 1947-49 ④ Tibet 1955-59 C-6	INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL
BOTH LOW	① Nicaragua-Costa Rica 1955 ④ Burmese Civil War 1948-54 A-7	① Costa Rica 1947 ① Muscat-Oman 1956-58 ① Madagascar 1947 ① French Cameroun 1955-60 ④ Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54 B-7	C-7	INTERNAL
	② Algeria-Morocco 1962-63 A-8	B-8	C-8	INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL
	① Honduras-Nicaragua 1957 ① Morocco-Spanish Morocco 1957-58 ② Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64 A-9	② Goa 1961-62 B-9	④ Palestine 1945-48 C-9	INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL
	ANY COMBINATION OF LOW AND MODERATE	ONE HIGH	BOTH HIGH	

GROSS NATURE OF CONFLICT

COMMITMENT OF ADVERSARIES TO OUTCOME

1 -- no outbreak of hostilities

2 -- hostilities terminated quickly without intensification

3 -- hostilities terminated quickly after intensification

4 -- hostilities continued without intensification

5 -- hostilities continued with intensification

There are three advantages to the approach taken in Typology D: (1) The arrangement of the three variable factors on the chart enables the reader to sense visually the relative theoretical controllability of the 52 conflicts; (2) the circled prefixed numbers enable the reader to compare theoretical with actual controllabilities; and (3) there are enough cluster-boxes to permit more refined observations than are possible when the number of conflicts per cluster is high.

The following features of Typology D are especially worth noting:

1. The eight conflicts that combined high commitment by both adversaries with great-power partiality that was "one high or both at least moderate" were Malaya, the Chinese Civil War, Algeria, the Greek Insurgency, Indochina, Vietnam, Suez, and Korea (categories C-1 through C-3 on Typology D). All except Suez involved continued hostilities, with or without intensification, and they represent, on balance, a fair grouping of the most serious conflicts of the entire 52. The exceptional circumstances that obtained in the Suez case have already been noted.

2. At the diagonally opposite corner of Typology D (categories A-7 through A-9) appear six conflicts that combined low great-power partiality with low or only moderate commitments by both adversaries. They were Nicaragua-Costa Rica, the Burmese Civil War,

Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya, Algeria-Morocco, Honduras-Nicaragua, and Morocco-Spanish Morocco. Only the Burmese Civil War (the one internal conflict of the six) resisted termination. Of the others, Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya and Algeria-Morocco crossed only briefly into a hostilities phase, and the remainder aborted short of hostilities.

3. Categories C-1 through C-9 show that in twelve of the thirteen cases in which commitment of adversaries was high, hostilities were continued regardless of the extent of great-power partiality. The exception was again Suez.

4. Categories A-1 through A-3, B-1 through B-3, and C-1 through C-3 show that in seventeen of 23 cases in which great-power partiality was strong, hostilities were continued regardless of the extent of the commitment of the adversaries to the outcome. In all six of the remaining cases--Lebanon, Dominican Republic 1965, Soviet Union-Iran, Guatemala, Bay of Pigs, and Suez--both or one of the great powers were involved, directly or indirectly, in highly influential ways related to their strong partiality (except for Suez, here the exception to the exceptions).

Of the three variable factors in Typology D, gross nature of the conflict and great-power partiality have already been examined and commented upon in Typologies A and B, respectively. The third factor in Typology D is commitment of adversaries to outcome. Typology D appears to warrant the conclusion that high commitments of will and resources by conflict adversaries tend to result in continued hostilities--i.e., in conflicts hard to control.

Typology E

In Typology E the variable of geopolitical setting has been substituted for the variable of commitment of adversaries to outcome; hence none of the three variable factors--geopolitical setting, great-power partiality, and gross nature of the conflict--relates directly to the conflict adversaries.

As with the preceding typologies, the results of Typology E are especially striking at the extremes. Great-power partiality and geopolitical impediment to controllability were both highest in nine cases (categories C-1 through C-3); in eight out of the nine, hostilities were continued and in six out of those eight, they intensified as well. The same two factors were low in five cases (categories A-7 through A-9); two out of the five never reached a hostilities phase, and in the remaining three the hostilities terminated quickly without intensification.

It will be recalled that application of the geopolitical factor alone cast 26 conflicts into the category of "moderate impediment to controllability." However, the cross-play of the factor of great-power partiality in Typology E produces an interesting refinement of those 26 cases. In five of the six cases out of the 26 that never reached hostilities, great-power partiality was "both low" (categories B-7 through B-9; the one exception was Lebanon). Also, nine of the thirteen cases out of the 26 that involved continued hostilities (cases with prefixed encircled 4s and 5s) were characterized by a high degree of great-power partiality (categories B-1 through B-3)..

TYPOLOGY E

GREAT-POWER PARTIALITY	LOW IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY	MODERATE IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY	HIGH IMPEDIMENT TO CONTROLLABILITY	GROSS NATURE OF CONFLICT
ONE HIGH OR BOTH AT LEAST MODERATE	A-1	① Lebanon 1958 ② Guatemala 1954 ② Dominican Republic 1961-1962 ⑤ Algeria ② Dominican Republic 1965 1954-62 ⑤ Cuba 1958-59 ⑤ Kenya 1952-58 ⑨ French Morocco 1952-56 ④ Philippines ⑤ Chinese Civil War 1945-49 1948-54 B-1	④ Laos 1959- ⑤ Indochina ⑤ Congo 1960-64 1945-54 ⑤ Congo (Katanga) 1961-64 ④ Malaya 1945-60 ⑤ Greece 1944-49 C-1	INTERNAL
	A-2	B-2	⑤ Vietnam 1959- C-2	INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL
	② Soviet-Iran 1941-47 A-3	④ India-China 1954-62 ④ Quemoy-Matsu 1954-58 ② Bay of Pigs 1960-61 B-3	③ Suez 1956 ⑤ Korea 1950-53 C-3	INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL
ONE MODERATE, ONE LOW	⑤ India 1945-48 A-4	⑤ Cyprus 1952-59 ④ Venezuela 1960-63 ④ Indonesia 1945-49 ④ Colombia 1960- ③ Cyprus 1963- B-4	④ Iraq (Kurds) 1959-63 ④ Angola 1961- ④ Yemen 1962- C-4	INTERNAL
	A-5	⑤ Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-66 B-5	C-5	INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL
	① Kuwait-Iraq 1961 ① West Irian 1962-63 ⑤ Kashmir 1947-49 ③ Kashmir 1965- A-6	④ Aden-Yemen 1954-59 ④ Tibet 1955-59 B-6	C-6	INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL
BOTH LOW	① Madagascar 1947 ① French Cameroun 1955-60 A-7	① Nicaragua-Costa Rica 1955 ① Costa Rica 1947 ① Muscat-Oman 1956-58 B-7	④ Burmese Civil War 1948-54 ④ Burma-Nationalist China 1950-54 C-7	INTERNAL
	② Algeria-Morocco 1962-63 A-8	B-8	C-8	INTERSTATE UNCONVENTIONAL
	② Goa 1961-62 ② Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64 A-9	① Honduras-Nicaragua 1957 ① Morocco-Spanish Morocco 1957-58 B-9	④ Palestine 1945-48 C-9	INTERSTATE CONVENTIONAL

GEOPOLITICAL SETTING

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Typology F

An attempt was made to assess the effects on a given case of all sixteen factors listed above as likely to affect conflict controllability. For this exercise considerable detailed knowledge of a case is necessary. For this approach, therefore, only the sixteen cases were considered that have been studied in detail in this Design Study (see Chapter VI).

It will be recalled that the effect of each of the sixteen factors listed above was broken down into three subdivisions: one reflecting the circumstances most favorable to control, one reflecting the circumstances most inhibiting to control, and one reflecting circumstances intermediate between these two. In Typology F, the sixteen conflicts appear on the vertical axis, and on the horizontal axis are the sixteen factors. With respect to each conflict, each factor is scored as follows:

1 if the effect of that factor was markedly favorable to control;

3 if the effect of that factor was markedly inhibiting to control;

2 if the effect of that factor on control was intermediate between 1 and 3;

(-) if that factor was not applicable or if the data necessary to weigh it are unavailable or unreliable.

The controllability averages that appear in the right-hand column of Typology F are obtained by dividing the totals for each case

TYPOLOGY F

	1 Geopolitical Setting	2 Gross Nature of Conflict	3 Commitment of Adversaries to Outcome	4 Ideological Motivation of Adversaries	5 Military Balance Between Adversaries	6 Governments of Adversaries	7 Economic Burden on Adversaries	8 Ethnic-Religious Minorities	9 Non-violent Means Foreclosed to Adversaries	10 Time Pressure on Adversaries	11 Great-Power Partiality	12 Third-Power Military Presence	13 Likely U.N. Involvement	14 Likely Regional Organization Involvement	15 International Agreements	16 World Opinion	TOTAL	Average X 100
Malaya 1948-60	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	–	3	3	15/41	273
Greece 1944-49	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	–	3	3	15/39	260
Indonesia 1945-49	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	–	2	2	2	2	2	–	3	2	14/32	229
Cyprus 1952-59	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	–	3	2	15/34	227
Angola 1961-	3	3	2	3	1	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	3	1	16/34	212
Suez 1956	3	1	3	2	2	2	2	1	3	2	3	3	1	–	1	1	15/30	200
Venezuela 1960-63	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	–	3	2	2	2	15/30	200
Kashmir 1947-49	1	1	3	3	2	2	1	3	2	2	2	1	1	–	2	2	15/29	192
Cyprus 1963-	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	16/30	188
Bay of Pigs 1960-61	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	3	3	3	3	–	1	1	1	1	15/28	187
Indonesia-Malaysia 1963-65	2	2	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	–	2	1	15/26	173
India-China 1954-62	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	–	1	1	3	2	3	–	2	1	14/24	171
Soviet-Iran 1941-47	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	1	–	1	1	15/25	167
Kashmir 1965-	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	3	2	1	2	1	1	–	1	1	15/25	167
Algeria-Morocco 1962-63	1	2	1	1	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	16/26	163
Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 1960-64	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	1	1	1	–	2	1	2	2	15/24	159

by the number of factors assessed in that case. For example, the total for Algeria-Morocco is 26; since all 16 factors are scored for that conflict, division of 26 by 16 produces the average of 1.625, rounded off to 1.63. Only 14 factors are scored in arriving at the total of 32 for Indonesia 1945-1949; division of 32 by 14 results in the average for that conflict of 2.286+ rounded off to 2.29. The following tabulation, which ignores the decimal points, lists the conflicts in the descending numerical order in which they appear in Typology F. It begins with those conflicts whose scores would suggest the greatest difficulty in controlling, and ends with those whose scores would suggest the least difficulty in controlling. The number in parenthesis before each conflict indicates what the course of hostilities actually was: (5) for continued hostilities with intensification, (4) for continued hostilities without intensification, (3) for hostilities terminated quickly after intensification, (2) for hostilities terminated quickly without intensification, and (1) for no outbreak of hostilities:

(4) Malaya 273
(5) Greek Insurgency 260
(4) Indonesia 229
(5) Cyprus 1952-1959 227
(4) Angola 212
(3) Suez 200
(4) Venezuela 200
(5) Kashmir 1947-1949 192
(3) Cyprus 1963- 188
(2) Bay of Pigs 187
(4) Indonesia-Malaysia 173
(5) India-China 171
(2) Soviet Union-Iran 167

(3) Kashmir 1965 167

(2) Algeria-Morocco 163

(2) Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya 159

Obviously the detailed result of Typology F is not completely satisfactory. If it were, all the (5)s and (4)s would appear with high numerical averages at the top of the above list, followed by the (3)s and (2)s. However, it is worth noting that the results outside the middle are consistent: seven of the top eight--Suez again being the exception--involved continued hostilities; and four of the bottom five--all but India-China--involved hostilities that terminated quickly.

In general, the approach represented by Typology F appears to be broadly validated by cross-reference to the historical outcomes of the sixteen conflicts.

Such classification will never be quantitatively precise, but it has already led to valuable qualitative insights, and its quantitative reliability can be improved in various ways. A master typology based on controllability (such as Typology F) will become more reliable and therefore more valuable as more and better data on more cases of local conflict are brought to bear on analyses of critical factors affecting controllability. Intensive, one-by-one experimentation with the many factors affecting conflict controllability should result in acceptance of some as being generally valid and rejection of others as not being of sufficient general validity to warrant inclusion in a master typology based on controllability.

The kind of intensive experimentation just referred to may also suggest that the factors that affect controllability in a master typology should be weighted differently in arriving at an over-all numerical indicator for each conflict. For example, great-power partiality might be determined to be important enough to justify

according it twice the numerical weight accorded to governments of disputants. Some factors affecting conflict controllability may not be present often enough to include in a general master typology, but when they are present may exert very significant pressures. This suggests working out a "bonus" system--i.e., adding to or subtracting from the numerical total of the conflict or conflicts in which that factor operated, but leaving the other conflicts unaffected.

CONCLUSION

Work with local conflict typologies bears considerable promise. Without having to assert that history necessarily repeats itself, its basis in detailed case studies suggests a degree of reliability at the sensible level of "much more often than not." Without necessarily purporting to recommend what U.S. policy should be toward any of several incipient probable local conflicts, it should provide a quite reliable sensing of which would be hardest and which easiest to control, and thus help promote a "first things first" approach. Without necessarily claiming to render any judgments on the efficacy of possible conflict-control measures in specific cases, it should provide a major assist in the formulation of such measures. And, finally, it could link up productively with the results of studies on other aspects of U.S. policy activity vis-à-vis future local conflicts.

CHAPTER V

A DYNAMIC MODEL OF LOCAL CONFLICT

A DYNAMIC MODEL OF LOCAL CONFLICT

We start with a dynamic image of conflict as a process that moves along in time and space. It is divided into identifiable stages or phases. In each phase, factors are at work that generate pressures. Some tend toward increased violence, and some tend away from violence. Within each phase the factors interact to push the conflict across a series of thresholds toward or away from violence. The transition across thresholds is a function of the combined interaction of the factors during the previous phase. Their relative strength during the phase determines whether or not the conflict worsens.

Our picture of the process envisages conflict arising out of a substantive dispute, whether over territory, borders, legitimacy, ideology, power, race, or whatever. This quarrel (dispute) is not necessarily perceived in military terms by either party. If one or more parties introduces a military option, a threshold has been crossed to a new phase in which hostilities are potentially likely or at least plausible; a conflict has been generated. It becomes a conflict when it comes to be regarded in military terms by one or both parties. (It may be only one party because, pace Dean Rusk, it may

take two to tango, but a trigger only requires one finger. Surprise attack is the classic example of one side being considerably more disposed to violence than the other.) The introduction of a military option does not mean that hostilities have actually occurred, just that they are likely or possible. The conflict is still in a pre-hostilities stage.

If hostilities break out, a new phase is entered. Intensification may take place during this phase. If hostilities are terminated, another threshold is crossed to a new phase in which the conflict continues without fighting necessarily being resumed, but with at least one party continuing to view the dispute in potentially military terms. It ceases to be a conflict when it is no longer perceived chiefly in military terms, real or potential. It then may enter a new phase in which the military option is discarded but the issues remain unsettled, in which case it can be said that the conflict is ended, but not the dispute.

If the dispute is settled, a final threshold is happily crossed. If not, and conflict remains, it can flare up again in hostilities. Even if only the dispute remains, and a military build-up resumes, the situation can revert to the earlier pre-hostilities conflict situation. Stated this way, conflict is a part of the larger context of dispute between parties over an issue or issues; actual fighting is a part of the larger context of conflict. Needless to say, all these phases do not necessarily occur in all conflicts, nor in any invariable order.

A crude picture of the various major elements in this process might look like this:



Let us more formally identify these phases, giving them numbers: Phase I is the dispute stage where a divisive issue exists, but has not yet been cast by either disputant in terms to which it deems its military power to be relevant. Phase II is the pre-hostilities phase where no shooting is taking place, but it begins to "look like war": a military build-up starts, or an arms race develops, military forces are deployed with intent to use them at some point, and in general the conflict is perceived more in military than non-military terms. Phase III--the hostilities phase--has crossed the threshold to actual fighting. Phase IV--the cessation of hostilities phase--is an armed truce, so to speak, but with no end to the conflict, let alone a settlement of the underlying dispute. Phase V is a phase beyond conflict, where the situation is no longer perceived in military terms, but the dispute persists. Finally, there is a stage

beyond the model where the underlying dispute and, a fortiori, the conflict is settled. Let us call the stage Settlement (S).

If the movement of a conflict situation across the band of phases is viewed in physical terms, the opposing pressures favoring and disfavoring violence might be regarded as vectors of force bearing in varying strengths and at various angles of directness on the nodal pressure-points, their product determining the direction and magnitude of the net impulse. Diagrammatically, it might look like this:



This is of course too mechanistic a representation. The notion of thresholds may be particularly open to misinterpretation. It is true that the moment of execution is the only truly operational one, and decisions can be changed right up to that moment. For example, a decision to attack is not irreversible until the attack is actually launched. By this reasoning, it might be thought that for conflict-control purposes one ought to concentrate on the thresholds of transition, rather than the phases, as sources of identifiable points of possible policy leverage.

But the exact points of transition are not only sometimes difficult to identify accurately or to pinpoint at precise moments in time. In addition, they misleadingly suggest that the important moment of change is when an event becomes visible, e.g., when hostilities break out, an arms deal is publicly consummated, or negotiations succeed. But the moment of conception may be really more significant than the moment of birth. It is then that events are, so to speak, foreordained. The violence-producing factors and those tending away from violent outcomes produce their interaction <u>during</u> the phases, rather than exactly at the moment of transition. At that threshold they have accumulated to the point where the change visibly takes place. In short, for our analytical purposes the thresholds are merely convenient points of demarcation at which to separate the phases, with the understanding that the event of transition is itself a product of forces at work throughout the previous phase.

It can be seen that several hypotheses about the nature and course of local conflict are implicit in this picture. Let us make them explicit:

First, local conflicts are amenable to general structural and dynamic rules, rather than being wholly unique and random phenomena.

Second, all conflicts go through the preliminary dispute phase (Phase I) and one or more of three basic conflict phases.



These two hypotheses may be graphically represented by the following figure:



A third general structural hypothesis is that in each phase, specific factors generate pressures that tend to push the conflict across a threshold of transition into another phase. These factors are countered by other factors tending toward the prevention of transition--or toward settlement.

Our fourth hypothesis is that change in the relationship among factors that bear on the pressure-points will alter the likelihood of the conflict's undergoing transition from one phase to another.

This interrelationship of the dynamic process of the conflict and the operative pressure-factors may be represented as follows:

STRUCTURE OF LOCAL CONFLICT

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

PHASE OF CONFLICT	THRESHOLD OF TRANSITION BETWEEN PHASES	DESCRIPTION OF PHASE OR TRANSITION	CRUCIAL FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITION	
			TOWARD CONFLICT CONTROL (AWAY FROM VIOLENCE)	AWAY FROM CONFLICT CONTROL (TOWARD VIOLENCE)
P-I		DISPUTE, NOT PERCEIVED IN MILITARY TERMS BY EITHER PARTY	• TENDING TO KEEP DISPUTE NON-MILITARY • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• TENDING TO INTRODUCE MILITARY OPTION • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT
← T I-II		INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY OPTION BY ONE OR BOTH PARTIES	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PHASE I HAVE COMBINED TO PUSH THE DISPUTE ACROSS THE THRESHOLD TO PHASE II, MAKING IT A CONFLICT)	
P-II		CONFLICT, PERCEIVED IN MILITARY TERMS BY ONE OR BOTH PARTIES	• INHIBITING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES • RESTRICTING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• PROMOTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES • EXPANDING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT
← T II-III		OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PHASE II HAVE COMBINED TO PUSH CONFLICT ACROSS THRESHOLD OF PHASE III, GENERATING HOSTILITIES)	
P-III		HOSTILITIES	• MODERATING HOSTILITIES • TERMINATING HOSTILITIES • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• INTENSIFYING HOSTILITIES • CONTINUING HOSTILITIES • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT
← T III-IV		TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PHASE III HAVE COMBINED TO PUSH CONFLICT ACROSS THRESHOLD TO PHASE IV, TERMINATING ACTUAL FIGHTING)	
P-IV		POST-HOSTILITIES BUT CONFLICT STILL PERCEIVED IN POTENTIALLY MILITARY TERMS BY AT LEAST ONE PARTY	• INHIBITING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES • RESTRICTING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• PROMOTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES • EXPANDING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT
← T IV-V		END OF CONFLICT	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PREVIOUS PHASES HAVE COMBINED TO REMOVE THE MILITARY OPTION OF BOTH ADVERSARIES, BUT THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE REMAINS)	
P-V		DISPUTE, NOT PERCEIVED IN MILITARY TERMS BY EITHER PARTY	• TENDING TO KEEP DISPUTE NON-MILITARY • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• TENDING TO INTRODUCE MILITARY OPTION • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT
← S		SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PREVIOUS PHASES—OR FACTORS UNRELATED TO CONFLICT ITSELF—HAVE COMBINED TO BRING UNDERLYING DISPUTE TO SETTLEMENT)	



Our fifth hypothesis is that the course of local conflicts can be significantly altered, depending on timing and relevance, by policy measures aimed at reinforcing violence-minimizing factors, and offsetting violence-generating factors.

A comprehensive model of the structure of local conflict, including the flow chart, definitions, and interrelations among phases, factors, and conflict-control policy objectives follows:

STRUCTURE OF LOCAL CONFLICT CONTROL

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

PHASE OF CONFLICT	THRESHOLD OF TRANSITION BETWEEN PHASES	DESCRIPTION OF PHASE OR TRANSITION	CRUCIAL FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITION: TOWARD CONFLICT CONTROL (AWAY FROM VIOLENCE)	CRUCIAL FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITION: AWAY FROM CONFLICT CONTROL (TOWARD VIOLENCE)	CONFLICT-CONTROL POLICY OBJECTIVES
P-I		DISPUTE, NOT PERCEIVED IN MILITARY TERMS BY EITHER PARTY	• TENDING TO KEEP DISPUTE NON-MILITARY • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• TENDING TO INTRODUCE MILITARY OPTION • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT	• KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY • SETTLING THE DISPUTE
← T I-II		INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY OPTION BY ONE OR BOTH PARTIES	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PHASE I HAVE COMBINED TO PUSH THE DISPUTE ACROSS THE THRESHOLD TO PHASE II, MAKING IT A CONFLICT)		
P-II		CONFLICT, PERCEIVED IN MILITARY TERMS BY ONE OR BOTH PARTIES	• INHIBITING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES • RESTRICTING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• PROMOTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES • EXPANDING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT	• PREVENTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES • RESTRICTING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • SETTLING THE DISPUTE
← T II-III		OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PHASE II HAVE COMBINED TO PUSH CONFLICT ACROSS THE THRESHOLD OF PHASE III, GENERATING HOSTILITIES)		
P-III		HOSTILITIES	• MODERATING HOSTILITIES • TERMINATING HOSTILITIES • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• INTENSIFYING HOSTILITIES • CONTINUING HOSTILITIES • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT	• MODERATING HOSTILITIES • TERMINATING HOSTILITIES • SETTLING THE DISPUTE
← T III-IV		TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PHASE III HAVE COMBINED TO PUSH CONFLICT ACROSS THRESHOLD TO PHASE IV, TERMINATING ACTUAL FIGHTING)		
P-IV		POST-HOSTILITIES BUT CONFLICT STILL PERCEIVED IN POTENTIALLY MILITARY TERMS BY AT LEAST ONE PARTY	• INHIBITING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES • RESTRICTING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• PROMOTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES • EXPANDING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT	• PREVENTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES • RESTRICTING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES • SETTLING THE DISPUTE
← T IV-V		END OF CONFLICT	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PREVIOUS PHASES HAVE COMBINED TO REMOVE THE MILITARY OPTION OF BOTH ADVERSARIES, BUT THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE REMAINS)		
P-V		DISPUTE, NOT PERCEIVED IN MILITARY TERMS BY EITHER PARTY	• TENDING TO KEEP DISPUTE NON-MILITARY • TENDING TOWARD SETTLEMENT	• TENDING TO INTRODUCE MILITARY OPTION • TENDING AWAY FROM SETTLEMENT	• KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY • SETTLING THE DISPUTE
← S		SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE	(FACTORS OPERATING DURING PREVIOUS PHASES-OR FACTORS UNRELATED TO CONFLICT ITSELF-HAVE COMBINED TO BRING UNDERLYING DISPUTE TO SETTLEMENT)		



As a model, this representation will of course rarely be followed to perfection in real life. Some cases of conflict fortunately never cross the threshold of outbreak of hostilities. Others stay for a mercifully brief time in Phase III, and then are either pacified while moving through Phase IV, perhaps go through Phase V to S, or may even go directly to Settlement from the battlefield (although the Carthaginian version of the latter hardly qualifies as desirable conflict control). A disturbing number of conflicts linger in Phase III, moving through sub-phases representing intensification of hostilities, perhaps resting in a tenuous cease-fire "peace" (Phase IV) until, with renewed wind and limb, the hostilities may be resumed.

Although we believe our choice of phases for the model to be logical and persuasive, other devices than ours might have been chosen for dissecting the course of conflict. Mao Tse-tung's three stages of guerrilla warfare are in a crude sense analogous to our Phase II and Phase III, although his emphasis is on the degree to which terrorism becomes organized into ever-larger military formations. Another scale sees four stages: the first (corresponding to our Phase II) the initial conspiratorial phase; the second (corresponding to our Phase III) the violent stage, followed by the "revolutionary stage"; and lastly, the "final victory stage" which presumably corresponds to either our Phase V, if the issue remains, or S, if it has disappeared.*

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*A. J. Thomas, Jr., Ann V. Thomas, and Oscar A. Salas, The International Law of Indirect Aggression and Subversion (Report Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Under Contract No. ACDA/GC-41, June 30, 1966). A related attempt to refine stages or sub-processes of insurgencies, civil wars, and nationalist movements lists ten: initial alienation; origination of revolutionary organizations; mass revolutionary appeals; revolutionary coalition and movement-building; non-violent revolutionary politics; the outbreak of revolutionary violence; rule of the moderates; accession of the extremists; reigns of terror; Thermidor. See David C. Schwartz, A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior (University of Pennsylvania, Document 6-28-66-86), pp. 9-10.

On balance, we believe that the present model, with the refinements we have made on the basis of subsequent research into actual cases, holds up and moreover has the particular value of accommodating both internal and interstate conflict.

What is the relative importance for conflict-control purposes of the several phases? Obviously some are more relevant than others, depending on one's particular angle of vision. The historian usually wishes to comprehend as much as he can of the total sequence of events, tracking them through until their final disposition. The philosopher is concerned with "first causes"--the innate and often concealed bases for later actions. The peacemaker focuses on the later stages of the process, bent on seeing how the parties may be moved toward settlement. And the policy-maker typically only becomes operationally aware of the matter when it reaches a stage of volatility sufficient to assign it a priority among a range of volatile disturbances.

Our purposes in this analysis are two-fold. First, we wish to learn as much as we can about the general process by which international or internal political differences move across thresholds of transition toward and away from "war," i.e., the process by which local conflicts are generated and ended. Thus we have developed a general model and hypotheses as to the workings of the process.

The reason for our interest in general rules derives from our second concern, which is to try to develop a coherent strategy of conflict control. By necessity the attempt must rely on an understanding of the pressures and factors generating conflict. From that understanding we propose to derive policy measures that would tend to control conflicts in the sense of keeping them non-military, inhibiting the outbreak of hostilities, restricting the scale and scope

of potential hostilities, moderating them if they break out, terminating them, inhibiting their resumption, and, if feasible, tending toward settlement of the underlying dispute.

What does this require of us in terms of understanding the cause-effect relationship? Can historic causes ever be identified with confidence that they are the basis for later effects? Are the "factors" synonymous with "causes"?

THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY

The limitations of any historical model are evident. Because one is able to portray a complex phenomenon schematically does not mean one can entirely understand or even identify all operative elements, or the cause-effect relationships that link them. In consequence, one cannot be certain that any given policy activity will have the effect of reinforcing or offsetting any given combination of factors.

In this connection, we are acutely mindful of the persistent philosophic problems involved in seeking "causes of war." Apart from a few hardy souls in the "peace research" field today, few even try any more in the fashion of, for example, Sidney Fay's monumental--and dubious--attempt to learn the "true causes" of World War I. Some recent official surveys of American intellectual capabilities regarding internal conflict have concluded that there is very incomplete knowledge and understanding in depth of the conditions that generate conflict within nations. Our systemic knowledge about the true causes of interstate conflict is equally deficient.

A related intellectual hazard is to believe that all conflicts are "determined" in the sense that, given the appropriate

ingredients, they will unfold inevitably. But the unfolding of a conflict stretching back into time is due to causes that are only imperfectly knowable. Various situations, occurrences, and constellations of pressures can be identified along the route. Some of them are obviously "causes." But it is equally true that a conflict may explode into hostilities because some hitherto undetected or absent condition is suddenly introduced.

Our thesis is of course that all conflicts are not fatally irreversible. But at the same time, not all the pressures along the time-space continuum are man-made, or visible at the time, or "always there." Some represent gathered momentum, just as some barriers to intensification represent sheer inertia rather than purposeful policy.*

All in all, causality appears to be embodied in a combination of environmental situations, willful intentions, and triggering events, all reaching critical mass at the point a conflict becomes acute. But within these boundaries, we believe some probable cause-effect relationships can be discerned.

In one sense, every correlation may be interpreted as embodying either an explanation or a prediction about probable cause and effect. Just so, in this analysis the correlations we have made between transitions and the presence of factors in the pre-transition stage implies cause and effect in the sense that, for example, medical scientists implicate blood cholesterol in coronary artery disease,

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*For evidence of the presence at critical choice-points of non-rational factors of pressures, acceleration, and a sense of fatality, a classic example may be the World War I case; see especially Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York, Macmillan, 1962), and recent social science experiments in simulating that event, notably Robert North's at Stanford, reported in Appendix B in Robert C. North, et al., Content Analysis (Chicago, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1963).

or tobacco in lung cancer. With the understanding that the implied causality rests on hypotheses, the logic of the model can be pursued through to the making of recommendations about policy measures that may offset violence-correlated factors or reinforce control-correlated ones.

In sum, then, our emphasis is on factors that analysis demonstrates to be present during the identifiable phases of a conflict. They constitute key variables to the extent that they correlate with transitions in the course of a conflict. Only in this sense do we imply that in combination they add up to a body of causation.

Ideally, then, all factors should be identified in order that all elements of probable causality may be translated into relevant conflict-control measures. The process of identification and correlation becomes increasingly difficult, however, the further one tracks a dispute back to the stages prior to its active phase. More remote causes are embedded in factors that one has increasing difficulty in discerning.

THE RELEVANCE OF FIRST CAUSES

The pre-conflict phases are actually two. One is Phase I, the pre-conflict dispute phase, which we do investigate. The other is the pre-dispute phase--"P minus I," so to speak--during which the preconditions for the dispute are maturing.

Is not that "seed-bed" phase where ideally one would concentrate for the application of preventive measures? But where? The UNESCO constitution asserts that "wars begin in the minds of men," and this is undeniable. But efforts to provide general enlightenment to mankind surely belong in another realm of policy. Similarly, conflict

may have a general built-in cause in the human proclivity for conflict, along the lines William James suggested when, in an earlier age, he wrote that "our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bones and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us."* But short of universal brainwashing, this built-in human proclivity for conflict can scarcely enter a policy-oriented search for operational levers for conflict control.

Another root cause of internal conflict is suggested by many recent demonstrations of the correlation of insurgency with economic conditions (and Communist exploitation of those conditions to seize power). Persuasive statistics have been adduced to support the argument that, as one newspaper put it after Secretary McNamara's notable Montreal speech in May 1966 on the subject, "Where the Poverty Is, Is Where the Insurgency Is."** Direct connections have become increasingly evident between the stresses of the modernization process and the incidence of conflict. A general strategy aimed at minimizing conflict over a long future period quite correctly focuses on measures related to basic factors on the path to modernity. But

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*This view of man as susceptible, regardless of culture, to militarism has had a recent public revival at the hands of the ethnologists, led by the celebrated Viennese Konrad Lorenz. See particularly Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1963); Robert Ardrey, African Genesis (New York, Dell, 1963) and The Territorial Imperative (New York, Atheneum, 1966). For the view that violence is a "chronic disease of society," see Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense, cited above, p. 323.

**New York Times, May 22, 1966. In his Montreal speech, McNamara pointed out that since 1958, 87 per cent of the world's "very poor" countries, 69 per cent of its "poor" countries, and 48 per cent of its "middle income" countries had suffered significant conflicts, whereas only one out of 27 "rich" countries had experienced "major internal upheaval on its own territory." Ibid., May 19, 1966, using "rich," "poor," etc., as defined by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

clearly, only some of them lend themselves to purposeful current action likely to control a given conflict.

In sum, then, while preconditions for dispute are of great fundamental importance, the relevant analytical questions in the range of practical policy relate to what might be called "proximate" causality--how conflicts develop after they have been conceived in the human spirit. Thus one asks questions that are finite and localized.

Conflict control, in terms of identifying usable policy activities, of necessity focuses on the "virulent" stages of conflict, i.e., Phase I, Phase II, Phase III, and Phase IV. Preventive medicine searches into the etiology of diseases before they become acute. But clinical medicine has its hands full with the virulent stages of disease. Just so, Phases I, II, III, and IV contain sufficient salient elements in the life of local conflicts to provide ample fare for policy-makers interested in control. It is neither reasonable nor necessary to go beyond them in this kind of analysis. It is not reasonable because it goes well beyond a realistic span of attention, interest, and need on the part of the conflict-controlling policy-maker. It is not necessary because, in focusing on the practical policy question of controlling conflict, the closer one is in time to the actual threshold of hostilities, the more pertinent are concrete policy measures bearing on the conflict itself--and the less relevant are the sorts of measures that might have prevented the conflict from arising in the first place. Put differently, the closer one comes to the threshold of war, the more policy measures need to focus on such tangible present realities as arms and external support, as well as on the various forms of diplomatic influence that can be applied to control the conflict.

If one believed that massive diplomatic efforts were likely

to be employed for preventive diplomacy, it would be tempting to recommend that substantial attention be devoted here to ultimate causation. As a practical matter, we count ourselves fortunate when policy focuses on conflicts in their Phase II stage. This analysis is thus strongly influenced to concentrate on the stages of actual conflict, as the most likely to be feasible for policy action.*

The other pre-conflict phase--Phase I--is, however, of vital interest for better understanding of how to prevent the transition from dispute to conflict, i.e., to Phase II. Social justice in Cuba during the Batista years might have prevented guerrilla warfare from developing in Cuba. Racial, religious, and ethnic collaboration would perhaps have averted the strife on the Indian subcontinent and in Palestine. Certainly new conflicts can and should be approached preventively, and preventive diplomacy remains the ideal of diplomacy itself. We thus focus as much attention on the problem of keeping disputes non-military as on any later conflict phase.

THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

At the far end of the conflict continuum, what should be our

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*A striking "laboratory" example of the diminishing relevance of first causes at points well along the conflict-control scale was suggested in a policy-level M.I.T. political-military exercise in recent years. The U.S. team sought to head off the hypothetical outbreak of violent revolution in a Middle Eastern country through activation of measures of economic reform and aid that had long been agreed to as a means of getting at some of the root causes of strife in the area. But such measures turned out to be far too long-range in impact to affect management of the crisis, and had no appreciable bearing on the violent events that unfolded to carry the situation across the threshold from Phase II to Phase III. See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, et al., Political Exercise II--The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Iran (M.I.T. Center for International Studies, December 1960).

concern with final settlement of the underlying issues? To what extent ought a conflict-control policy to focus on settlement of underlying issues, rather than solely on suppression of violence? How far "forward" in the peacekeeping and pacific settlement process need we look in fulfilling our policy-oriented analytical purposes?

Certainly it is harder to carry a dispute to a successful settlement than to concentrate energy on stopping the fighting. But according to elementary laws of political physics, conflict-generating pressures often build up when temperatures rise under a lid of conflict control without settlement. One needs to ask whether the larger aim of promoting peace is well served by policies that merely put an end to shooting.*

Much of the history of international relations in this century supports the proposition that the processes most wanting, but most needed for moving conflicts toward actual resolution, are those of peaceful change. Without peaceful change, chronic disputes remain unsolved and pressures tend to mount toward new flash-points. It is this shortfall that more than any other leaves unachieved the combined policy recommended by the late Adlai Stevenson of "cease-fire and peaceful change."

Even the simple notion that victory typically solves conflicts will not always stand up, as the German "victory" in 1871 and the Allied one of 1918 amply illustrate. There is also the view of those who have felt that the world situation would be better if, for example, Israel and its neighbor states had been permitted to fight it out in the late 1940s; if Israel, France, and Britain had been permitted to overthrow Nasser's government in 1956; or if India and Pakistan had been allowed to fight to the end in the fall of 1965.

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*See for instance Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1966), pp. 671-682.

The assumption is that the issues would thus have been "settled."

A question once asked by Sherlock Holmes in one of his most famous stories underscores the point. A number of conflicts among our 52 post-World War II cases never went across the threshold to Phase III, i.e., active fighting, or did so only briefly and in a minor way. Some illustrative examples are Goa in 1961 and the Soviet-Iranian case, and the Venezuelan Insurgency. It is instructive to ask, as Holmes did regarding the dog that did not bark, why they did not do so.

Peaceful change, in the sense of change of the existing territorial and political order without substantial bloodshed, took place in Iran, ending the conflict. Not-so-peaceful change took place in Goa, without however provoking "war." Venezuela is undergoing internal alterations that hopefully will be sufficient to offset pressures generating violent change (with, it should be remembered, one of the highest per capita defense expenditures in Latin America).

To date there has certainly been no serious follow-up either on the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal or a plebiscite in Kashmir. U.S. policy emphasis has tended to rest on the aspect of control focused on cease-fire. It has given little real attention to peaceful change. In part this is due to the difficulties of peaceful change. In part it is reflective of the degree of interest the United States has in the outcome of the issues at stake in a given conflict. The United States often takes a relativistic and pragmatic approach to the detailed justice of the causes involved. With regard to other people's quarrels, U.S. diplomacy has tended to conform to Charles Thayer's definition of diplomacy as mediating "not between right and wrong but between conflicting interests."*

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*Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York, Harper, 1959), p. 252.

Still and all, the question for this analysis is: What policy measures tend toward conflict control in the sense of minimizing violence? In our opinion it is not likely that analysis will uncover new or hitherto unsensed policy measures for moving conflicts to S from whatever phase they may happen to be in. This represents the final reason why this inquiry into an active conflict-control policy (while fully recognizing the significance for other, related policy realms of tracking the roots of conflict back to the time of predispute and forward to the post-conflict finale) will, at the present state of the analytic art, focus on the inner stages in which the conflict expresses itself, and in which policy-makers are most likely to practice a conflict-control strategy.

CHAPTER VI

THE COLLECTION OF HISTORICAL DATA

The model of conflict and conflict control described in the preceding chapter clearly was based on our general understanding and assumptions about historic conflicts. If the model was to be anything but an abstraction, however, it had to be compared to real-world conflicts. For this Design Study, the model had two tests to meet: Could it be used as a device to structure real-conflict data without distorting reality? Would the data so structured reveal the things about the conflicts for which we were searching--namely, the factors at work within each phase that were tending toward or away from conflict-control objectives and the policy measures appropriate to a conflict-control strategy?

THE SELECTION OF CASES

To apply the model required detailed examination of a case. Therefore, we needed an even smaller sample than the 52 postwar cases with which we had been working. A combination of pragmatic and theoretical considerations dictated the selection.

We wanted, first of all, to analyze cases from various parts of the developing world. We also wished to include cases representing

categories in what we have called the "gross nature of conflict": conventional interstate; unconventional interstate; internal with significant external involvement; primarily internal; and colonial. The sample should include instances of direct and indirect involvement by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Most importantly, the cases should represent varied patterns of conflict development and control efforts. That is to say, we hoped to include within our sample conflicts that, however threatening, had not reached hostilities;* conflicts in which hostilities had broken out, terminated, and erupted again; cases in which hostilities had come as the climax of a long period of tension; and those in which hostilities had burst into flame during a period of intense crisis. In short, we wanted to examine as many different paths through our model as we could in the time available.

The 52 cases of post-World War II conflict were charted with the level of conflict reached as one dimension and the gross nature of conflict as the other, with notations as to the other important features it was decided to include. (A revised version of this table, with most of our faulty memory corrected, appears as Typology A in Chapter IV.)

From this point, the selection was made on much more pragmatic grounds. We guessed, for example, that repeating one actor in

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*It was at this point that our historic memories proved most faulty and that future research along the lines begun here might be valuable. We had thought we had included in our sample cases in which hostilities never broke out although they were threatened. That we proved to be wrong in every one of these is perhaps as cogent a comment as one could make on the fact that conflicts that seem minor from the perspective of distance, and in contrast to the potential destruction of superpower wars, sometimes involve significant bloodshed among the adversaries. This further reinforces the point made in Chapter I that whether a conflict is "limited" or not may depend on one's distance from the sound of the shots.

more than one conflict might suggest something about "styles" of conflict. Other criteria for selection were availability of data and the interests of the researchers. Ultimately, sixteen cases were selected, with the following characteristics:

The Indonesian War of Independence: Asia; colonial; continued hostilities without intensification

The Malayan Emergency: Asia; internal with significant external involvement; continued hostilities without intensification

The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation: Asia; unconventional interstate; continued hostilities with intensification

*The Kashmir Conflict (1947-1949 hostilities): Asia; conventional interstate; continued hostilities with intensification

*The Kashmir Conflict (1965 hostilities): Asia; conventional interstate; hostilities terminated quickly after intensification; indirect Chinese involvement

The India-China Border Conflict: Asia; conventional interstate; continued hostilities without intensification; direct Chinese involvement

The Bay of Pigs: Latin America; internal with significant external involvement; hostilities terminated quickly without intensification; indirect U.S. involvement

The Venezuelan Insurgency: Latin America; internal with significant external involvement; hostilities continued without intensification

The Somalian-Ethiopian-Kenyan Conflict: Africa; conventional interstate; hostilities terminated quickly without intensification

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*See note on following page.

The Algerian-Moroccan Conflict: Africa; conventional interstate; hostilities terminated quickly without intensification

The Angola Conflict: Africa; colonial; continued hostilities without intensification

The Soviet-Iranian Conflict: Middle East; conventional interstate; hostilities terminated quickly without intensification; direct Soviet involvement

The Suez-Sinai Conflicts: Middle East; conventional interstate; hostilities terminated quickly after intensification

The Greek Insurgency: eastern Mediterranean; internal with significant external involvement; continued hostilities with intensification; indirect U.S. involvement

*The Conflict in Cyprus (Enosis): eastern Mediterranean; colonial; continued hostilities with intensification

*The Conflict in Cyprus (Communal): eastern Mediterranean; internal with significant external involvement; hostilities terminated quickly without intensification

These sixteen conflicts, of course, differ along many dimensions besides those that underlay their selection. It was not assumed that the criteria used to select cases were necessarily going to prove the most important distinctions in terms of structure or control.

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*The conflicts marked with an asterisk were selected separately because of their differing characteristics in terms of the criteria used in this initial selection. In subsequent analysis, the two Kashmir conflicts were combined, as were the two Cyprus conflicts. Indeed, in terms of our model, they are both single conflicts.

THE CASE STUDIES

Our objective in examining the historical record needs constant emphasis: We were not seeking to develop new information about the cases, nor to write exhaustive histories of them. We were trying, rather, to identify the phase structure of each case; to indicate what features, before and after the transition from one phase to another, tended to verify that a transition had indeed taken place; and to lay the foundation for the identification of factors and relevant policy measures.

In some of the cases it was possible to refine the structure further by dividing phases into sub-phases in which the conflict moved perceptibly toward transition. And in the hostilities phase (Phase III) an effort was made to indicate such intensifications and moderations of the hostilities as may have occurred--that is, points at which the "rules of the game" governing the conduct and limitations of hostilities changed.

Individual researchers undertook the task of carrying out the basic research on these cases, using primarily library materials and secondary sources, although in a few instances we were able to talk with individuals who had been intimately connected with one or another aspect of the cases. We deliberately decided not to attempt research into primary materials or to seek access to complete classified records. Either would unquestionably have produced a greater abundance of detail and more precise dates and figures. But the purposes of this Design Study tended to suggest that, if indeed there were benefits to be derived, the additional time such research would require

would make the benefits marginal.*

Beyond instructions to determine and verify the phase structure of each conflict, the researchers were not given a set list of topics, questions, or pieces of information that their research was to produce or answer. (This was not, of course, true for the configuration analysis for which a separate codebook was developed and answered by each researcher writing a case study. See Chapter VII for a more complete description of the particular data needs of that approach.)

Some guidelines were, however, developed to assist the researchers in recognizing features of the cases they were examining that were likely to prove important in establishing the phase structure. While these do not provide the format for the case studies or represent an exhaustive list of relevant questions, they do suggest a number of preliminary hypotheses about the moving forces within conflicts. In all, 23 questions** were formulated, drawn from our general knowledge about conflict and about events in the past two decades:

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*To satisfy our own curiosity and as a kind of reliability check, we did for one case compare the structure and analysis developed by our research with a thorough study based on classified sources. While the conclusion applies only to this one case and that one study, it is worth noting that our analysis was comprehensively supported. No major event described or detail added in the classified study suggested that the phases had been wrongly identified. And the added precision did not alter the factors we had noted.

**These questions reflect many of the same factors listed in Chapter IV as the basis of developing typologies. The crucial differences to be noted are that, in the case studies, these were not regarded as necessarily an exhaustive list and no subsidiary assumptions were made as to how they may have related to the problem of control.

1. Identify the adversaries. In some cases each "side" may in fact be a coalition of several groups; if so, identify the major elements and the relationships among them.

2. Describe briefly the past relationships among the adversaries. Are they long-time enemies? Have they engaged in wars with each other in the past?

3. Has the subject of the particular conflict been a matter of dispute or conflict in the past?

4. What features of geography, climate, terrain, etc., affect the nature and conduct of the conflict--e.g., long, mountainous borders, inaccessible jungles and swamps, monsoons, etc.?

5. In addition to the subject of the present conflict, along what other dimensions do the adversaries differ: ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, ideological, etc.?

6. What formal external security ties do the adversaries maintain? U.N. membership? Regional organization (OAS, OAU, Arab League)? Bilateral or multilateral security alliance (NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS Treaty, Warsaw Pact, special relationships with the United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, etc.)?

7. Has either of the adversaries had previous recourse to the United Nations or a regional security arrangement in connection with this or another conflict? If so, describe briefly and indicate whether it led to the achievement of the adversary's claim, the loss of his claim or of opportunity to press it, or had no effect. In other words, would past experience suggest that the adversary has been frustrated or gratified in seeking to use available machinery for peaceful settlement?

8. The same questions apply to previous attempts to invoke bilateral or multilateral security arrangements.

9. How far is the locus of the conflict from the United States? The Soviet Union? Communist China? A Soviet or Chinese satellite or a U.S. ally? An area generally regarded as of strategic importance by one of the above: e.g., the Suez or Panama Canals, important oil fields or other economic resources, major military bases? If there are third-power military bases in the area, describe them briefly (i.e., are they missile bases constituting part of Western defenses against the Soviet Union, airfields, naval bases, home ports of major fleets, etc.?). In addition to fixed bases, are the waters of the area regularly patrolled by a major fleet?

10. What are the relative sizes of the opposing military forces of the adversaries? How do they compare qualitatively--in terms of training, morale, organization, mobilization procedures? How do they compare in terms of equipment, both qualitatively and quantitatively? How would you estimate the over-all military "balance" between the forces? Define the character of the "deterrent situation" between the adversaries.

11. What is the political role of the military forces in the adversary state or states? Are they or have they recently engaged in political activities? Alone or in alliance with other interest groups? In coups or attempted coups? Do they at present control the government? If so, how did they come to power? By election or other constitutional process? By a coup led by the military leadership? By a coup by younger officers against both the military commanders and the political leadership?

12. Where does the military materiel come from? Is there local production of arms and ammunition? How much and of what? Is local arms production dependent on external suppliers of raw materials, machinery, or technicians? Whose? Are local factories locally owned or are they subsidiaries of foreign firms? Whose? Whether weapons are produced locally or imported, are there local facilities for their repair and maintenance? What portion and what types of weapons are imported? Openly or clandestinely? By purchase, long-term assistance, gift? From whom? How long ago? As part of a long-term modernization

of the armed forces? Are the forces trained in their use and the commanders in appropriate strategies and tactics to employ them? Are spare parts, replacements, and ammunition available in large quantities or does the supplier keep control of these?

13. Does either of the adversaries have a nuclear capability? Is it thought to be seeking to develop one? Is there evidence or speculation that it may have received or be about to receive nuclear weapons from an ally? For use at its discretion or controlled by the ally?

14. The same questions apply to chemical and bacteriological weapons and to delivery systems for CBR weapons.

15. If hostilities broke out in the conflict, in what way? Large-scale surprise attack? A gradually intensifying series of small skirmishes? An attempted surprise that was anticipated and met with adequate counterforce?

16. What are the relationships between the adversaries and the United States, Soviet Union, Communist China, or a major ally of one of the above? Do they maintain diplomatic relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and/or Communist China? Are they receiving economic development assistance from one or more of these or from major allies of one or more of them? At what general level of magnitude?

17. In cases of interstate conflicts, are the adversary countries united behind their government's pursuit of the conflict? Or is the conflict a matter of domestic political difference? Does either adversary have a potential ally within the territory of the other--e.g., a local Communist party? Racial, linguistic, religious, ethnic, or other minority? Are there significant émigré groups that are important factors in the conflict?

18. How do the adversaries describe their aims and objectives? Independence (including secession)? Control of the government? Autonomy? Redress of special grievances? Territory? Procedural

concessions opening the door to future gains (e.g., free elections, representation in government, etc.)? Do these stated aims change in the course of the conflict (e.g., does a stated goal of independence become a stated goal of local autonomy, or does a stated claim to territory become a stated goal of plebiscite)? In terms of conflicts that have been ended and disputes that have been settled, how do the terms of settlement compare with the initially stated goals? In your judgment, how deeply committed are the adversaries to the achievement of their goals? Are the governments (or insurgent leaders) in a position vis-à-vis their own constituents to accept a lesser solution?

19. In terms of the territory or territories of the adversaries, how widespread or restricted is the conflict? For example, does it involve only points on the border or the entire border? Only certain provinces or the entire country? Only urban or only rural areas?

20. What proportion of available military force is committed in the conflict? Does either adversary feel it necessary to station part of its forces elsewhere--e.g., to maintain internal order or protect against encroachments by another neighbor?

21. What size and calibre police force exists? Are the armed forces being used for police-type functions? Why? Because they are regarded as politically more reliable?

22. In terms of the numbers and equipment of the armed forces available, is the adversary's conduct of the conflict "limited"--e.g., is it pursuing a more modest strategy than it is capable of pursuing? Are there classes of targets one or both is capable of hitting that are not attacked? Destructive weapons available that are not used? Vulnerable borders that are not crossed? Supply ports or routes that are not hit, etc.?

23. Does either adversary enjoy on its own or another's territory a sanctuary in which its forces can rest, regroup, train, amass supplies, add recruits, etc.?

Each researcher produced a roughly chronological narrative account of the conflict he was assigned, organized in terms of phases and sub-phases.* In almost all respects, it was possible to state accurately the phase structure of each conflict. Clearly the transitions of outbreak and termination of hostilities were the easiest to pinpoint--although in some instances (e.g., Kashmir in 1947) it is arguable as to the point in an increasing number of clashes between the adversaries at which sustained hostilities shall be said to have broken out. This was particularly true when forces not completely under the control of either adversary and pursuing independent objectives were also active on the scene. In other instances (e.g., the Malayan Emergency) hostilities faded away to insignificance with no formal end to them, by military victory or political agreement. The other transitions--from Phase I to Phase II, and Phase IV to Phase V or to Settlement--were generally more difficult to locate precisely. However, there were some cases (e.g., the Bay of Pigs) where a high-level decision to introduce a military option was rather firmly dated; and others (e.g., the Soviet-Iranian conflict) in which the events that signalled the demilitarization of the conflict and settlement of the dispute were highly visible.

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*These accounts are contained in a separate annex volume. They appear as the section entitled "Identification of Phases" under each conflict. Analytically this initial task of structuring the conflict in terms of our model is essential. Theoretically, of course, there is no comparable need to write it up formally and present it. But at this stage of experimentation, it seemed preferable to formalize the work in all its stages so that the analytic soundness of the approach could be judged. Experimentally, one case, the Greek Insurgency, was prepared without this initial section being formally written. This was possible in part because an excellent account of the insurgency was available that treated military and political events with equal thoroughness. The fact that most historic accounts of the conflicts we have examined do not meet this standard may suggest some useful lessons for future historians seeking to prepare a complete historic record of a given conflict.

The researchers were able to make distinctions that are, we feel, adequate to the model, which relies on phenomena that are generally observable. In any event, control measures are sufficiently blunt instruments and broad in their impact that precision to the minute, hour, week, or even month is not required.

The case studies verify that our model of conflict has a real-world counterpart and that it is a relevant tool for structuring data in ways that illuminate the nature of conflict and the problems and dilemmas of control. One limiting feature to the approach taken in this research should be made explicit: Attention concentrated on events within the conflict itself and not to the same degree on the broad international environment in which it was taking place. Wherever possible, we have sought to note this context, particularly other events taking place at the same time that may have affected the perceptions of the adversaries or involved third parties. We have further sought to minimize this shortcoming by selecting conflicts that overlapped, in time and participants. Nonetheless, it is possible that some interplay between the particular conflict and the general world picture may have been obscured or omitted. If our effort had been solely to describe more fully each separate conflict, this would be more a serious shortcoming than we feel it is in a Design Study aimed at understanding the conflict process more generally, and particularly the conflict-control features of it.*

*Should further work be done along the lines begun here, the problem of incorporating the general environment more fully into the model, while still keeping it a manageable research tool, warrants attention.

WEAPONS DATA

As has been noted earlier, data on the weapons used in a conflict--and on those available but not used--may be central to a study concerned with policy activities, including arms-control activities, that may help control local conflicts. The task of acquiring such data, even about recent conflicts, is difficult. Historians generally are much more concerned with the political and diplomatic aspects of conflict and deal inadequately, almost casually, with the military aspects. Sales or transfers of big, expensive, sophisticated weapons systems, such as jet aircraft, are usually well reported. But many of the conflicts we are examining were armor wars, or artillery wars, or even rifle wars--categories of weapons that scarcely attract the attention of the newspaper reporter, let alone the historian.

It was clear, in short, that a very different type of research effort was required to develop data on weapons than was needed to prepare the narrative case studies. Scattered bits and pieces of evidence would have to be assembled from a wide range of, for the most part, books, newspapers, and journals and technical and trade publications. Frequently these would have been written by observers untrained in weapons identification or military affairs. From these multiple sources, a picture might emerge of the types, numbers, and levels of arms available and used in the conflict. But the degree of assurance with which one could view the resulting data would diminish exponentially as the scale of weapon went from modern jet aircraft toward small arms.

Despite these difficulties, we decided to attempt to amass weapons data for a number of conflicts, overlapping to a large extent the sixteen that had been selected for the narrative case studies. In some cases, as the following list indicates, the time period covered

in the weapons analysis differed from that of the rest of the case study. We were interested, for example, in how the occurrence of hostilities may have affected states' weapons procurements. The cases for which weapons analyses were performed were:

The Sinai Crisis, 1956; and the Israeli-Egyptian Arms Race, 1956-1966

The Ethiopian-Somalian Conflict, 1960-1966

The Kashmir Conflict, 1965; and the Indian-Pakistani Military Build-up, 1955-1965

The Bay of Pigs, 1961

The Greek Insurgency, 1946-1949

The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, 1963-1965

The Conflict on Cyprus (Enosis), 1955-1959

The Conflict on Cyprus (Communal), 1963-1965

The Venezuelan Insurgency, 1960-1966

The Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949

The Soviet-Iranian Conflict, 1941-1946

For each case, data were assembled on the types and quantities of weapons available to the adversaries in the conflict and the sources from and methods by which they were procured.* As was noted earlier, the amount and precision of data varied with weapons type. It also differed from case to case.

The weapons analyses differ from the narrative case studies in another way. Ideally one would hope for a detailed description of

*The case-by-case reports are contained in the annex to this report, in the section labeled "Weapons Analysis" under each case.

weapons acquisitions over time in order to determine in what ways decisions on arms acquisitions are related to the phase structure. Only rarely has this been possible--e.g., in such highly publicized "arms races" as India-Pakistan or Egypt-Israel. In other cases, specific weapons acquisitions constitute significant political events and turn up in the narrative case studies as well as the weapons analyses; examples here would be the arrival of Soviet arms in Cuba in mid-1960 or in Somalia in 1964. But in most cases, arms appear to have been acquired more slowly and with less observable immediate impact on the course of conflict.

Data on weapons in local conflicts are thus not comprehensive. But we feel that they have amply served the purposes of this Design Study. Our weapons data, drawn from open sources, suggest the nature and magnitude of a significant arms-control--and hence conflict-control--problem. The relationship between weapons acquisitions and military "balance" between adversaries in local conflicts--and the relevance of this for varied control objectives--is among the most interesting and puzzling aspects of conflict control to emerge from our analysis of phases of conflict and factors tending toward or away from transitions.

Control measures suggested by the weapons analyses are reported in Chapter VIII. Conclusions about the relationship of arms to various control objectives may be found in Chapter IX.

CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL DATA

The case studies produced a large body of data structured in terms of the model of conflict. These data were enriched by the findings of the weapons analyses. There remained the task of analyzing this organized but as yet unrefined store of information.

It was in keeping with the design nature of this research undertaking that no single method of analysis was selected for exclusive use. In any event, the broad spectrum of questions to which the Design Study was addressed strongly indicated the need to employ a number of analytic methods, each capable of producing a different type and level of insight into the nature of conflict, and the nature of conflict control. By generating a comparable data base for a common set of conflict cases, the reinforcing potentials of the several methods were enhanced.

Two methods of analysis were employed.* One, which we call the historic-analytic technique, sought to bring to bear on the data

*There are, of course, many other methods, quantitative and other, that could have been used. On one of these, factor analysis, a separate paper was prepared by Thomas C. O'Sullivan. Mr. O'Sullivan explored the manner in which factor analysis could contribute to the study of control measures, particularly arms-control measures, relevant to the control of local conflict. This paper appears as a separate report. (See WEC-98 IV.)

the general historical-policy judgment of informed analysts in order to produce detailed insights into the problems and potentials of conflict control. The second, configuration analysis, involved use of a complex computer manipulation of data for a large number of variables to determine those patterns or clusters of factors associated with specified movements within the conflict structure. This chapter will only describe the two methods; substantive conclusions drawn from each of them are reported elsewhere.*

THE HISTORIC-ANALYTIC APPROACH

The temptation of the policy analyst faced with a single case of conflict and asked to discuss how its course might have been altered is to second-guess history--to adopt a "what if" approach to the problem that yields statements such as: "If this had been done earlier (or better, or later, or not at all), the impact on the conflict would have been. . . ."

Many such hindsight "solutions" to past conflicts deal in large abstractions and frequently reflect the analyst's disciplinary preoccupations and philosophical assumptions. Thus one can find conclusions such as the following:

> . . . the Gaza Raid provoked Egypt to buy Communist arms, which provoked Washington to connive at French arms shipments, which provoked Nasser to recognize Red China, which provoked Dulles to renege on aid for the High Dam, which provoked Nasser to seize the canal company, which provided the immediate provocation for the Suez-Sinai war.**

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*The substantive findings drawn from the configuration analysis, as well as a more detailed description of the technique, will be the subjects of a separate report. The substantive conclusions from the historic-analytic approach are contained in Chapters IX and X.

**Kennett Love, The Politics of Force at Suez (unpublished manuscript) p. 26. Italics added.

Or analysts look at the immediate details of events and reach conclusions such as:

> If the [Cuban] underground had been alerted in time and had launched a major sabotage campaign; if Nino Diaz had landed and fought his diversionary action in Oriente; if the second bombing raid on Monday had not been canceled; if the landing area had been explored and charted in advance; if military landing craft had been used instead of boats with outboard motors; if the military experts had recognized how damaging an unopposed T-33 jet trainer could be when armed with rockets; if fighter planes had accompanied the B-26's; if the Brigade had been trained to take alternative action as guerrillas; if the landing area had been adaptable for guerrilla action; if President Kennedy had not publicly stated that the United States would not intervene; if clouds had not obscured the target over San Antonio de los Banos Tuesday morning; if the B-26's had not been an hour early at Girón Wednesday morning; if so vast a majority of the mandatory supplies had not been loaded on the lost Rio Escondido; if the ships had not fled so far and had been in time to land help; and the final, tantalizing "if"--if all these had taken place, would the Brigade have won?*

These statements are not cited here to be critical of them. They may well be chronologically accurate. And their analytic validity may be accepted or not, depending on how persuasive one finds the evidence marshalled in their support. But as a source of insight into the general nature of local conflict, let alone into the types of policy measures that may in the future help to control such conflicts, analysis at either of these levels is of limited utility.

It would be misleading to create the impression that the statements our model enabled us to make are strikingly less of the

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*Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs (New York, W. W. Norton, 1964), p. 173. Italics added.

"what if . . ." variety. But by forcing ourselves to concentrate separately on single factors and by identifying as large as possible a range and number of factors, we sought to neutralize the temptation to see the entire conflict as the product of a limited number of "causes" and all control as achievable through a small range of instruments. We also sought to avoid, at the other extreme, concentrating on events so unique to the individual situation as to have little relevance to conflict as a general phenomenon.

By focusing analytic attention on as many discrete factors as we could identify within each phase and sub-phase of the conflict, and by asking "what if the sole objective were to control the conflict," in the varied senses of control, we attempted to keep simplification at a level where the over-all analysis would not be oversimplified. Furthermore, by making no assumptions at the outset that some measures were always conflict-controlling, at all points in a conflict's life-cycle, we sought to develop a richer, less prejudged view of the meaning of control. We kept rigidly to the assumed overriding policy criterion--despite its frequent historic inaccuracy--of controlling the conflict in the sense of minimizing violence. The purpose was to prevent the blurring of what clearly have emerged as competing and conflicting control goals and means as well as competition and tension between control and the wide range of other policy objectives at stake in the conflict.

It was to be anticipated that there would be variation in the quality and depth of detail of the case studies. More data were available on some cases than others; researchers differed in approach and perception; and in some instances only a segment of the conflict rather than the conflict as a whole had been selected for study. But all of the cases lent themselves to analysis by the method we have called historic-analytic.

The first task in that approach was to develop as elaborate as possible a list of control objectives by phases. These control objectives are described in Chapter V in terms of the model of conflict. They need only be recapitulated here:

In Phase I: To settle the dispute; to keep the dispute non-military

In Phase II: To settle the dispute; to prevent the outbreak of hostilities; to restrict the scope/scale of potential hostilities

In Phase III: To settle the dispute; to terminate hostilities; to moderate hostilities

In Phase IV: To settle the dispute; to prevent the resumption of hostilities; to restrict the scope/scale of potential hostilities

In Phase V: To settle the dispute; to keep the dispute non-military

The second task was to identify within each phase of each conflict as complete as possible a list of factors that tended to support or to make more difficult the achievement of the relevant control objectives. We made no judgment as to their relative importance in determining the course the conflict in fact took. As identified on a case-by-case and phase-by-phase basis, the factors took the form, not of abstractions about conflict, but of economic, political, military, or social events, facts, or perceptions. Every such factor was recorded that was found to have existed or occurred during that phase and that was deemed to have been exerting a pressure however minor on the future course of the conflict.

This portion of the analysis was organized under the following types of headings: [This example is from the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation. The detailed headings would, of course, vary from case to case, depending on the phase structure. The structure here is from Phase I to Phase II to Phase III; in Phase III there was one

intensification (the geographic spread of hostilities from the island of Borneo to the Malaysian mainland) followed by a moderation (when the mainland raids ceased). Our analysis in this case ended with the conflict still in Phase III.]

FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS

A. Phase I to Phase II: Introduction of a Military Option
   1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option
   2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military

B. Phase II to Phase III: Outbreak of Hostilities
   1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities
   2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities

C. Phase III to Phase IV: Termination of Hostilities
   1. Hostilities Confined to Sarawak and Sabah
      a. Factors Tending to Intensify/Continue Hostilities
      b. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities
   2. Extension of Hostilities to the Malay Peninsula
      a. Factors Tending to Intensify/Continue Hostilities
      b. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities
   3. Virtual Termination of Mainland Raids, Continuation of Sarawak, Sabah Raids
      a. Factors Tending to Intensify/Continue Hostilities
      b. Factors Tending to Moderate/Terminate Hostilities

In some cases, particularly in Phases II, III, and IV, multiple control objectives tended to be definable in combinations--although these differed from phase to phase and conflict to conflict.

In the Indonesian-Malaysian example cited above, for instance, our judgment was that intensifying the hostilities made them more difficult to terminate. Or, put differently, the factors tending to intensify hostilities coincided with or complemented those tending away from termination. In the Greek Insurgency and the Malayan Emergency, on the contrary, speedy termination of hostilities tended to be antithetical to the goal of moderating them: The analytic headings thus became "factors tending to moderate and continue hostilities" vs. "factors tending to intensify and terminate hostilities."

The most complex analytic problems--and, it develops, equally vexing control problems--came from what are frequently incompatible control objectives, within phases as well as among them. Thus within Phases II and IV, the control objectives of preventing the outbreak (or resumption) of hostilities may clash with the control objective of keeping future hostilities moderate if they nonetheless occur. This dilemma is particularly evident where arms levels have been raised in Phases II and IV in an effort to secure "peace" by maintaining military "balance" or a "deterrent" posture. The same sort of dilemma spills over into Phase III where, as was suggested, the goal of keeping hostilities moderate may run directly counter to the goal of bringing hostilities to a rapid end.

The time-perspective in which one views control creates additional analytic complications. In a conflict such as that in Angola, for example, one set of measures (e.g., efficient and ruthless suppression) may be appropriate for dealing with the immediate threat, while a completely different set (e.g., accommodation to demands for liberalization and eventual independence) may be appropriate to the longer-run control goal of settling the dispute. The policy dilemma becomes even more acute when the likelihood is recognized that this latter course may itself be conflict-promoting in the short run.

The purpose of our research would have been disserved if we had sought to eliminate these dilemmas and ambiguities, either in our model or in the analysis of data collected in terms of it. Indeed, making the dilemmas patent was one of our central purposes. We did, however, define at the opening of each phase the particular control objective (or combination) that was being discussed. And we pointed out ambiguities and inconsistencies wherever they occurred.

This second stage of our analysis produced a list, at times quite long, of factors that were present within a phase or sub-phase and organized those factors in terms of the relationship of each to a control objective.* The next task was to identify policy activities and policy measures relevant to offsetting those factors deemed to be conflict-producing and reinforcing those deemed conflict-controlling.** We were seeking a conflict-controlling policy response to every factor identified. In format, the analysis took the following shape (again using the Indonesian-Malaysian example):

FACTORS BEARING ON TRANSITIONS	RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES
A. Phase I to Phase II: Introduction of a Military Option	A. Measures Aimed at Keeping the Dispute Non-Military
1. Factors Tending to Introduce a Military Option	1. To Offset These Factors
2. Factors Tending to Keep the Dispute Non-Military	2. To Reinforce These Factors

*These lists are to be found in the left-hand column of the section entitled "Factors Bearing on Transitions" in each case study in the volume annexed to this report. (See WEC-98 III-1 and WEC-98 III-2.)

**These measures and activities appear in the right-hand column of the section referred to above.

B. Phase II to Phase III: Outbreak of Hostilities	B. Measures Designed to Prevent the Outbreak of Hostilities
1. Factors Promoting the Outbreak of Hostilities	1. To Offset These Factors
2. Factors Inhibiting the Outbreak of Hostilities	2. To Reinforce These Factors
C. Phase III to Phase IV: Termination of Hostilities	C. Measures Designed to Terminate/Moderate Hostilities
Hostilities Confined to Sarawak and Sabah	
1. Factors Tending to Intensify/ Continue Hostilities	1. To Offset These Factors
2. Factors Tending to Moderate/ Terminate Hostilities	2. To Reinforce These Factors
Extension of Hostilities to the Malay Peninsula	
1. Factors Tending to Intensify/ Continue Hostilities	1. To Offset These Factors
2. Factors Tending to Moderate/ Terminate Hostilities	2. To Reinforce These Factors
Virtual Termination of Mainland Raids, Continuation of Sarawak, Sabah Raids	
1. Factors Tending to Intensify/ Continue Hostilities	1. To Offset These Factors
2. Factors Tending to Moderate/ Terminate Hostilities	2. To Reinforce These Factors

Anyone reading this section of one of our case studies without careful attention to the function it performs in the research would likely be confused and doubt our good judgment. Because only the object of control is considered, other policy objectives appear to be ignored. Because factors are considered in isolation from each other, inconsistent policy measures may be suggested side-by-side.

Because we were not seeking to discuss control of the whole conflict but only reinforcing or offsetting a particular factor that appeared in it, the individual policy activities or measures identified as relevant may have been unachievable in the actual political context of the conflict, or may have been achievable only within a time span that made them unlikely to have the desired effect quickly enough.

While the specific measures suggested may appear bizarre in isolation, developing them in this manner had genuine analytic value. We deliberately freed ourselves from the strictures of feasibility and from concern about the outcome and side effects of a given policy, in order to develop as imaginative insight as possible into the potentials as well as the problems and dilemmas of controlling local conflicts. And, it should be said, in reality goals often do conflict, steps taken to achieve one objective often do have undesired consequences on others, and things that should have been righted a generation ago often do turn out to be generators of today's troubles.

The next step in the historic-analytic approach was to ask what lessons for conflict control could be derived from the analysis of each single case.* The final step was to look at these analyses for the collection of cases to see what control measures they suggest should be available and utilized to control future local conflicts and what factors, stated in more generalized terms, actually turned out to have been exerting pressures for or against control.

The historic-analytic approach has produced insights and conclusions that, we feel, have demonstrated its utility and commend its further use and refinement. Interestingly, it has also shown some promise as a useful critical tool for assessing the completeness

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*This portion of the analysis, entitled "Lessons for Conflict Control," appears as the concluding section in each case study in the annex to this report. (See WEC-98 III-1 and WEC-98 III-2.)

of treatments of historic conflicts, under the disciplinary rubrics of history, political science, or other, and suggesting gaps in their coverage that need to be filled if the complete descriptive or analytic story is to be told. The technique is also unquestionably adaptable to generating insights into policy problems, other than conflict control in which there are multiple objectives to be achieved that differ over time, and that compete with each other and with other objectives being pursued simultaneously.

CONFIGURATION ANALYSIS*

One of the hypotheses basic to this Design Study is that there exist factors that, alone or in conjunction with others, generate pressures pushing the conflict across a threshold into a new phase or preventing such a transition. The purpose of configuration analysis is to identify those constellations of factors that tend to associate with specific movement within the conflict model or with specific occurrences in the life-cycle of conflicts.

This portion of our analysis proceeded on the assumption--which is complementary to but not necessarily identical with the assumptions of the balance of the research--that conflict is a relative or relational phenomenon. In other words, the significant patterns of factors that will illuminate the nature of conflict will be found in

*The configuration analysis of local conflict data that forms part of this Design Study will be the subject of a separate report by Richard E. Barringer and Robert K. Ramers. We shall deal here only with the general outlines and requirements of the technique. Its detailed description and substantive conclusions drawn from its use will be given in the subsequent report.

the relationships between the adversaries rather than in isolated or absolute characteristics of each separate adversary.

The configuration analysis thus has in common with the Design Study as a whole the assumption of pressures operating within a conflict, and factors exerting those pressures, that determined the course the conflict took. It draws, as does the historic-analytic approach, on the model of conflict described in Chapter V (as well, of course, as contributing toward the model's elaboration). And the configuration analysis was able to utilize the conflict structures developed by the case studies of the post-1945 conflicts discussed in Chapter VI. But the configuration analysis technique has special requirements in terms of data collection and scaling, and data manipulation, analysis, and presentation.

Configuration analysis requires the development of a data base that, while overlapping to a degree with that developed for the research as a whole, is stated in significantly different terms and includes additional areas of information. To collect and order these data, a codebook has been developed, comprising 300 variables, items, or questions* designed as a whole to define and measure the state of relations between adversaries in a conflict, the resources available to each, the procedures available and used for adjustment of the conflict, and the environment in which it was conducted.

These 300 questions have been divided into nine functional sections: general information on the conflict itself, demographic data, economic data, political data, policy activity, third-party involvement, military capability, military performance, and losses due to the conflict. All but the first of these nine sections were answered separately

*These 300 questions are relevant to the sixteen factors utilized in the typologies (Chapter IV) and the guidelines set for researchers doing case studies (Chapter VI). They also draw for their content and formulation on the writings of leading theorists of conflict, from Thucydides to Machiavelli to Mao.

for each adversary. All 300 items were answered for every transition that occurred in each conflict.*

The researchers who prepared case studies on the post-1945 conflicts for the research as a whole filled in codebooks for their cases. (The only variations in coverage were in the multi-party conflicts--Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya and Sinai-Suez. For the configuration analysis these conflicts were defined as Ethiopia-Somalia and Israel-Egypt, with other involved states appearing as third parties.) In addition, one pre-World War I case (the 1906 Cuban Insurrection) and two pre-World War II cases (the Spanish Civil War and the Ethiopian Resistance) were also coded. The conflict cases covered in the configuration analysis undertaken for this Design Study are thus the following:

The Algerian-Moroccan Conflict, 1962-1963

The Angola Conflict, 1959-1961

The Cuban Insurrection, 1906

The Bay of Pigs, 1961

The Cyprus Conflict (Enosis), 1952-1959

The Cyprus Conflict (Communal), 1959-1964

The Ethiopian Resistance, 1937-1941

The Ethiopian-Somalian Conflict, 1960-1964

The Greek Insurgency, 1944-1949

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*A preliminary version of the codebook was completed by independent coders for six cases of conflict (internal, interstate, and colonial). The codebook was then revised in the light of the conceptual difficulties they encountered as well as their comments and criticisms. As a further test of reliability, the revised codebook was completed for the same case (the Malayan Emergency) by two coders, operating independently. Statistical tests of reliability between the two have been performed and indicate a high degree of agreement.

The India-China Border Conflict, 1962

The Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949

The Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation, 1963-1965

The Suez Conflict, 1955-1956

The Kashmir Conflict, 1947-1965

The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960

The Soviet-Iranian Conflict, 1941-1947

The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939

The Venezuelan Insurgency, 1959-1963

Most of the 300 items are closed response alternatives--that is, the coder had a choice from among a fixed number of responses. The largest number of the questions of this sort are qualitative, and, wherever possible, previously established and tested scales were used in structuring the response alternatives. However, 90 questions in the codebook are quantitative (e.g., gross national product, troop commitments, military hardware capabilities). No adequate means existed for pre-scaling such data for cases of conflict spanning a half century marked by revolutionary political, technological, and military changes. It was necessary, in order to perform the configuration analysis, to fill this gap. (The method of analysis used for this study--agreement analysis, which is described below--is at present designed to handle only scaled data.)

The problems in constructing such scales to fit our needs are two. First, almost inevitably historical data of great precision will be lacking on the quantitative types of information we are dealing with here. Precise data would frequently be difficult to obtain even for most contemporary conflicts, and the degree of precision falls off sharply as one moves back in time. A scaling device had, therefore,

to be developed that would incorporate some means of correcting or compensating for this imprecision. Second, since we are treating conflict as an essentially relational phenomenon, the scaling device had to express quantitative data in relational form while preserving significant distinctions and facilitating meaningful comparisons among cases. An original logarithmic scaling technique has been developed to handle these problems.*

The central requirement of the configuration analysis is, of course, a method of analysis adequate to analyze effectively the relatively large number of variables and relatively small number of cases represented by our data base, while imposing a minimum number of assumptions and limitations on the empirical structure of the data. The practical difficulty in determining the most significant empirical patterns residing in any data base is that any large body of empirical data will yield a considerable number of patterns on the basis of random chance, if nothing else. A technique known as agreement analysis** offers one way out of this dilemma. Agreement analysis shifts the focus to partial patterns of non-unique characteristics, classifying cases hierarchically in terms of predominant patterns of response characteristics.

In very simple terms, the method groups all cases at a first level of classification in such a manner that each case is grouped with those other cases with which (in terms of characteristics or item

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*This technique promises to be an especially powerful analytic tool. It will be described in detail in the forthcoming Barringer-Ramers report on configuration analysis.

**The technique was introduced by Louis L. McQuitty in "Agreement Analysis: Classifying Persons by Predominant Patterns of Response," British Journal of Statistical Psychology, Vol. IX, No. 1 (May 1956), pp. 5-16. The analytic method developed for our configuration analysis is based on McQuitty's work.

responses) it has most characteristics in common. Each such grouping of cases is now defined in terms of the common characteristics of all its members--in a sense creating a new "case" for classification at the next level. The second level of classification would again group these new "cases" in terms of a further level of commonality. This procedure would be repeated until either there are no characteristics in common between the groupings or until a single group emerges that contains all the characteristics held in common by all the original cases. The result is a hierarchical series of patterns, each of which defines at each level of classification the predominant configural characteristics existing in the data base. This is not dissimilar in concept to classifications in biology from the most distinct variety through successively larger classes of species, genus, family, order, class, and phylum.

Significant modifications were required in the technique of agreement analysis to serve the needs of the present study. The key difference between the data developed for this study and the type of data used for simple agreement analysis described above derives from our assumption that the essential features of conflict rest in the relationship between adversaries and not in the discrete characteristics of one of them. Thus almost all our data to be analyzed were in the form of the relationship, on a given variable, between two adversaries.

What the agreement analysis will eventually yield is not, of course, an explanation of the patterns of variables. Rather it will yield a series of descriptions of patterns from which the analyst can then seek insight. As with any other ordering and classifying technique, the creative insight and imaginative wisdom of the analyst must then come into play--using whatever means or method he considers appropriate--to determine the nature and significance of the patterns that have

emerged. What the configuration technique used here enables the analyst to do is take into consideration a much vaster number of variables in a much wider range of possible patterns with no initial assumptions--and in a much shorter period of time with fewer human errors--than he could otherwise have done. As with any other method, configuration analysis is a tool to assist the analyst. Ultimately the value of his conclusions rests both with his skill in using the tool and--even more importantly--with his skill in interpreting the results.

P R E L I M I N A R Y F I N D I N G S

CHAPTER VIII

WEAPONS AND LOCAL CONFLICT

This Design Study has amply borne out the fact that control of local conflicts includes many kinds of policy actions that do not involve literal arms control. Nevertheless, weapons remain a central feature of local conflict. Without arms there would be no Phase III (hostilities) nor even a Phase II (dispute perceived in military terms). In a totally disarmed world, indeed, there would be no conflicts in our terminology, only disputes awaiting pacific settlement.

As described in Chapter VI, data were collected for most of the conflict cases studied* on the types and quantities of weapons available to the adversaries, and where and how they were procured. Here we shall record some initial general conclusions, drawn from that limited sample, about patterns of weapons acquisition and use, and about the probable impact of those patterns on local conflict control.

IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRAFFIC

Despite the unevenness of available data, the major pattern of arms acquisitions by adversaries in local conflicts is clear: The

*These case-by-case weapons analyses appear as Section III of each case in the volume annexed to this report. (See WEC-98 III-1 and WEC-98 III-2.)

weapons used in local conflict are usually introduced from external sources.* Although this is not an unexpected conclusion, it is basic to understanding local conflict since 1945. The weapons supplied by outside sources, most often by national governments, have enabled local adversaries to wage military conflicts with heavier firepower, and consequently with higher casualties and greater destruction, than would otherwise have been the case. Furthermore, the introduction of additional weapons into an already distressed environment has on occasion provoked or hastened the outbreak of hostilities.**

The cases studied do not cover all local conflicts that have occurred since World War II, but they provide a basis for some preliminary estimates on the scope of the international arms traffic. Small arms (primarily rifles, submachine guns, light machine guns) that have been transferred outside the major power blocs since World War II can be counted in the low tens of millions.# Crew-served weapons (heavy machine guns, heavy mortars, most recoilless rifles, artillery) can be counted in the hundreds of thousands; and armored vehicles (tanks, self-propelled artillery, armored cars) and combat aircraft (fighters and

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*This observation embraces not only those cases in which an external supplier transferred weapons to the ownership or control of a local adversary, but also cases in which an external power was directly involved in a local military conflict, using weapons of its own manufacture--e.g., the United States in Korea, and Britain in Cyprus. Although the second type is not normally considered part of the arms traffic, the cases studied show clearly that it is part of the same problem of the introduction of increasingly sophisticated arms into local conflict situations.

**See, for example, the case studies of the Sinai conflict and the Bay of Pigs.

#Soviet transfers of small arms to the UAR, for example, probably run into the hundreds of thousands. A single relatively small transaction between Fabrique Nationale of Belgium and the Cuban government called for the shipment of more than 65,000 rifles and machine guns.

bombers) can be numbered in the thousands.* Furthermore, most of the weaponry in all categories has been transferred under the aegis of national governments, rather than by manufacturing sources or private traders acting independently. Among the supplier nations, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France have been responsible for most transfers of weapons in all categories.

Granted that during the past twenty years local conflicts outside Europe have been fought with weapons introduced from abroad, will this hold true for the future? Available data provide some basis for concluding that during the next decade, the majority of local conflicts will continue to be fought primarily with imported weapons, augmented to varying degrees by indigenous manufacture.

A few of the more advanced developing countries have invested heavily in indigenous development and production of small arms, mortars, tanks, artillery, aircraft, and missiles, mainly in an effort to reduce their dependence on outside suppliers. India, for example, acquired at independence several former British arsenals that now manufacture small arms and mortars. The Vijayanta tank, developed by the British firm of Vickers for the Indian government, is assembled in India with British technical support. Under British license, the Indian aircraft industry has assembled the Vickers Vampire and Folland Gnat subsonic fighters; under Soviet license it is now establishing facilities to manufacture the supersonic MiG-21 fighter. The Indian government has also attempted to develop indigenously a supersonic fighter designated the HF-24.

The United Arab Republic manufactures small arms of modified

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*Two recent studies have estimated that about 5,000 jet combat aircraft have been shipped to the developing world since World War II. See Adelphi Paper No. 28 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1966, and the "Diffusion of Combat Aircraft, Missiles, and Their Supporting Technologies," prepared by Browne & Shaw Research Corporation for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), October 1966 (hereafter cited as Project Diffusion).

Swedish design. It has also attempted to develop and produce its own supersonic fighter, as well as a family of surface-to-surface missiles, with the help of West European technical personnel. Another example is Israel, which has established production of several types of arms. The Israeli-developed Uzi submachine gun is being manufactured not only by Israel but also by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium, under Israeli license, mainly for the export market. Israel Aircraft Industries assembles a French jet trainer under license and has built up a highly advanced aircraft maintenance and overhaul facility. The Israeli government is currently seeking to develop a surface-to-surface ballistic missile with French technical support.

Available evidence suggests, however, that these scattered indigenous programs do not signal a rapid or widespread trend among the less developed countries toward local self-sufficiency in weapons manufacture. In fact, although the temptation to draw sharp lines of distinction must be resisted, it seems probable that production of military weapons will continue to take place largely in those states characterized by an annual GNP of $3 billion or higher, an industrial work force of 200,000 or larger, and an annual military budget of $200 million or larger. These criteria eliminate about 95 countries* --over half of the countries in the world. Of the 34 countries that do meet these criteria, nearly all have produced military weapons of the small arms category or larger since World War II (see Table 1).** Of the nearly 100 countries

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*See Project Diffusion, pp. B-2 to B-8.

**Note to Table 1 on following page: This table represents trends relevant to arms-control considerations rather than an exhaustive, fully-documented list. Data on jet combat aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles are drawn from Project Diffusion and are, we feel confident, accurate. Data on tanks and artillery are also reasonably firm; they have been made available by Arthur D. Little, Inc. Data on small arms production are less firm; no clear-cut definition exists of what constitutes significant small arms production, and the technology required to make some of the least sophisticated forms is widespread. The list here is from Joseph E. Smith, Small Arms of the World (Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 1966).

TABLE I

ESTIMATED NATIONAL SOURCES OF MILITARY PRODUCTION SINCE WORLD WAR II

Country	Type of Weapon				
	Small Arms	Artillery	Tanks	Jet Combat Aircraft	Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Argentina	X	-	-	-	-
Australia	X	X	-	X	-
Austria	X	X	X	-	-
Belgium	X	X	X	-	-
Canada	X	X	X	X	-
Chile	X	-	-	-	-
Nationalist China	X	-	-	-	-
Communist China	X	X	X	X	X
Czechoslovakia	X	X	X	X	-
Denmark	X	-	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	X	-	-	-	-
Ethiopia	X	-	-	-	-
Finland	X	-	-	-	-
France	X	X	X	X	X
East Germany	X	-	-	-	-
West Germany	X	X	X	X	-
Hungary	X	-	X	-	-
India	X	X	X	X	-
Indonesia	X	-	-	-	-
Iran	X	-	-	-	-
Israel	X	-	-	-	X
Italy	X	X	X	X	-
Japan	X	X	X	X	-
Mexico	X	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	X	-	X	-	-
New Zealand	X	-	-	-	-
Norway	X	-	-	-	-
Pakistan	X	-	-	-	-
Poland	X	X	X	X	-
Portugal	X	-	-	-	-
South Africa	-	X	-	X	-
Spain	X	-	-	X	-
Sweden	X	X	X	X	-
Switzerland	X	X	X	X	-
U.S.S.R.	X	X	X	X	X
U.A.R.	X	-	-	X	X
U.K.	X	X	X	X	X
United States	X	X	X	X	X
Yugoslavia	X	-	X	X	-

that do not meet these criteria, fewer than 10 have produced small arms or other weapons.

Those few developing countries that meet the foregoing criteria and that are developing a weapons manufacturing potential will probably continue to combine their indigenous programs with large-scale imports from abroad. In each of these countries, the volume of imports and the scope of indigenous programs have increased simultaneously.

.ot only does it seem unlikely that indigenous production will result in substantial reduction of international arms transfers, but also the over-all magnitude of such transfers seems likely to grow with the entry of additional suppliers into the weapons market. This could intensify already heated politically and economically motivated competition among supplier nations to sell or otherwise transfer arms abroad. In the next five years, for example, Communist China could become a more important supplier of jet fighters, tanks, artillery, and small arms. The case study of the Somalian-Ethiopian conflict suggests that Soviet military assistance to Somalia may have been at least partially motivated by a desire to forestall Chinese aid. India could begin to export tanks and small arms; and Israel and the UAR could also become important suppliers of small arms. In addition to an increase in the number of suppliers of arms as new producers emerge, any re-equipment of NATO or Warsaw Pact forces in the next decade could result in a significant number of states having surplus arms available for re-transfer in the international market.

Therefore, although it would be rash to make detailed predictions about the complex problems of weapons for local conflict on the basis of our initial limited inquiry, it seems clear that the main source of arms used in local conflict will continue to be the international arms traffic. It will not be the only source, but it will

probably be the most important one. Furthermore, it is important in the field of arms control because it is recognizable, measurable, and--perhaps to a degree--controllable.

WEAPONS CATEGORIES RELEVANT TO LOCAL CONFLICT

The entire range of weapons categories has been present in local conflicts since World War II. We shall here organize our tentative observations under the following arms categories: (1) small arms; (2) crew-served weapons and artillery; (3) armored vehicles; (4) combat aircraft; (5) surface-to-surface missiles; and (6) naval vessels.*

Small Arms

The category of small arms is defined here to include rifles, automatic rifles, submachine guns, and light and medium machine guns, as well as those light mortars, bazookas, and smaller types of recoilless rifles that can be carried by one man.**

Unlike larger weapons, small arms are sought equally by regular and irregular forces. Because of the many available sources of supply, it is seldom difficult to obtain adequate stocks of both

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*Although potential nuclear weapons diffusion is clearly a grave problem for future local conflict control, it has been extensively studied elsewhere and hence is not included here.

**The dividing line between small arms and crew-served weapons is not a precise one. 60mm mortars weigh only about 30 pounds; to classify them as crew-served would be literally accurate but actually somewhat misleading. Similarly, a 57mm recoilless rifle, weighing about 50 pounds, can be handled by a single man. Antitank rocket launchers (e.g., bazookas) may weigh as little as six pounds.

arms and ammunition. In addition to the relatively large number of manufacturing sources, there is an important surplus weapons market in which both national governments and private traders operate. Small arms, because they are comparatively rugged and durable, and because their designs obsolesce less rapidly than more complex weapons, tend to remain in the active world inventory for a very long time--in some cases as long as a century. In the Cyprus hostilities of 1963-1965, for example, Turkish Cypriots used Mauser bolt-action rifles that the Turkish government had bought from Germany in 1890. In another case, the Indonesian nationalists in the late 1940s obtained submachine guns that had been developed in Germany at the end of World War I, subsequently manufactured in Switzerland for the Japanese army, and abandoned in Indonesia by the Japanese.

Because of their longevity, small arms may change ownership several times in the course of their operational life. The Venezuelan insurgents, for example, have used standard NATO 7.62mm rifles sold by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium to the Castro government in 1960 and later smuggled to Venezuela, and mortars, rocket launchers, and recoilless rifles originally provided to the Batista government of Cuba in the 1950s by the United States. All of these weapons were rendered surplus in Cuba when Castro standardized on Soviet and Czech weapons in 1961.

In the cases examined in this Design Study, small arms procured by national governments for their regular forces have most often been obtained as part of an over-all military assistance agreement that covers the supply of many different kinds of weapons by a single major nation. Under these agreements, the weapons transferred are often taken from surplus stocks of the supplier country. The quantities are frequently large. The Egyptian army of 190,000 men, for example, is equipped mainly with Soviet-supplied rifles and machine

guns, although these are augmented by weapons received from British, Swedish, and Belgian manufacturers prior to the 1955 agreement for delivery of Soviet-bloc weapons, and also by a small amount of indigenous production established under Swedish licenses.

A second and less important method of small arms procurement by national governments involved in local conflict is direct purchase from a foreign manufacturing organization, normally with the approval of the manufacturer's government. One example is the purchase by the Cuban government in 1960 of more than 65,000 rifles and machine guns from the large Belgian arsenal, Fabrique Nationale.

Irregular forces, particularly insurgents, are especially dependent on small arms. The case studies indicate that irregular forces procure their weapons in four principal ways: first, by smuggling the weapons into the country with the aid of outside suppliers or sympathizers--either national governments or private traders; second, by stealing or capturing weapons from the established government; third, by "inheriting" them as a side result of great-power wars; and fourth, by confiscating arms from private citizens. Small arms were smuggled to the EOKA insurgents in Cyprus, for example, by sympathizers on the Greek mainland. These weapons were augmented by shotguns and other private arms confiscated by EOKA from the populace.

In other instances, weapons have been stolen or captured from the national or colonial government. In some insurgencies growing out of great-power wars, such as the Greek and Malayan insurgencies, the major initial weapons sources for the insurgents have been the warring great powers themselves. In these cases, the transfer usually took place in one of two ways: (1) during the war the great powers provided arms to indigenous resistance groups, which later turned insurgent; or (2) after the war the great powers abandoned arms stocks or in other ways allowed them to fall into indigenous hands.

Initially, irregular forces may be compelled to acquire many different types of weapons in small quantities from a variety of sources. However, if the conflict is sustained, irregulars, like any military force, seek to standardize on a few types in order to facilitate training, maintenance, and the supply of ammunition.

Insurgent forces appear to seek to maximize firepower without sacrificing ease and secrecy of movement. Thus, as the case studies confirm, insurgent forces are likely to acquire, whenever possible, weapons such as automatic rifles, machine guns, light recoilless rifles, light mortars, and grenades, which offer high firepower in relation to their size and weight, and which can be transported or concealed without difficulty.

Finally, the greatest quantities of small arms are likely to enter the arena of local conflict when a major power becomes directly involved.* In most of these cases, however, no transfer of control or ownership takes place.

Crew-Served Weapons and Artillery

Crew-served weapons and artillery are defined here as including weapons that require two or more men for transportation and operation. They include heavy machine guns, heavy mortars, larger types of recoilless rifles, and artillery of all kinds. Heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles of 75mm and larger, and mortars of 80mm and larger can usually be described as crew-served. There are continuing innovations in ordnance and organization, however, that will necessitate constant redefinition.

Unlike small arms, which are desired equally by regular and

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*The cases in which this feature is most apparent--the Korean and Vietnam wars--were not studied in detail in this Design Study.

irregular forces, crew-served weapons, such as heavy mortars and artillery, normally become less desirable to irregulars as the size of the weapon increases. The case studies include a few important exceptions to this observation--exceptions in which insurgent forces have abandoned guerrilla or terrorist tactics for more conventional warfare. One example is the Greek Insurgency, in which insurgent forces switched from guerrilla tactics to standard field combat, using Czech-made 75mm and German-made 105mm artillery pieces procured from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Normally, however, as has been noted above, irregular forces such as the Indonesian nationalists, FALN in Venezuela, and EOKA in Cyprus have rejected weapons that could not be transported rapidly and inconspicuously or smuggled with relative ease.

Regular forces, in contrast, treat all of these weapons as essential components of their force structure. Mortars and artillery have been transferred frequently from the major supplier countries to regular forces involved in local conflicts. Direct export of these weapons by manufacturers, in the absence of a governmental agreement, is not common; and their supply by private traders, although not unknown, is also infrequent. Most transfers of crew-served weapons and artillery have probably occurred in the context of inter-governmental military assistance agreements. Since 1964, for example, the Soviet Union has exported to the Somali Republic mortars and heavy field artillery as part of a military assistance agreement. Under the U.S. military assistance program to Ethiopia, enough artillery to equip four battalions has been transferred. In the Greek Insurgency, Britain and the United States supplied the Greek government thousands of medium and heavy mortars, as well as artillery of all types, under their military assistance agreements. As the case studies indicate, it is impossible in most cases to determine from published sources the precise numbers transferred.

In the hands of regular forces in local conflicts, heavy crew-served weapons are most effectively employed in conjunction with aircraft and armor. Adequate road transportation and a well-developed command and control network are essential to their successful utilization. A key point is that, in most of the cases examined, the artillery ammunition was also procured from the external suppliers. If, as happened in certain cases, the suppliers cut off their aid in the course of the conflict, ammunition shortages may quickly become critical.*

As in the case of small arms, the largest transfers of crew-served weapons into the area of a local conflict are likely to occur when a major power takes a direct role in that conflict.

Armored Vehicles

Included in this category are tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery. Tanks of various sizes are usually sought by regular forces. By the outbreak of the Sinai hostilities in 1956, Egypt had about 500 tanks that it had acquired from the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. Half of them were Soviet T-34 medium tanks obtained under the terms of the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms agreement. In addition, Sherman tanks had been obtained earlier from Britain and AMX-13 light tanks from France. Israel, prior to the hostilities, had obtained about 100 AMX-13s and 100 U.S.-built Sherman tanks from France.

Tanks have also been employed by national or colonial forces not only in interstate war but also in order to assert governmental authority against internal threats. To suppress the EOKA insurgency on Cyprus, Britain introduced about 400 armored vehicles, including

*There are indications that such shortages occurred in the Kashmir fighting in 1965.

Centurion tanks, armored personnel carriers, and armored cars; and in Venezuela, the national forces have purchased about 60 AMX-13 tanks from France.

In addition to high initial cost, the costs and complexity of training, maintenance, resupply, and command and control functions associated with tank operations normally make them unsuitable for use by irregular forces. The possession of tanks by the regular forces may, however, stimulate a demand by the irregulars for antitank weapons such as bazookas and recoilless rifles.

In the cases studied, tanks have been supplied mainly by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. In addition, West Germany, Communist China, and India may in the future emerge as tank suppliers. International transfers of tanks in significant numbers are not likely to occur outside of the framework of intergovernmental agreements. Procurements by regional adversaries tend to occur in a spiralling pattern of competition. As with aircraft, their transfers attract international attention.

Combat Aircraft

This category includes tactical and medium bombers, jet fighters and interceptors, and armed jet trainers. Combat aircraft have been used almost exclusively by regular forces, in both interstate and internal conflicts. Aircraft procurements are particularly important in terms of prestige and political effect. Especially in the environment of regional interstate conflict, transfers of modern combat aircraft draw international attention. The decision to transfer combat aircraft is made at high governmental levels, and the transfer itself is usually accompanied by a great deal of publicity. Therefore, transfers are normally a highly visible factor in the creation of a regional arms spiral. The Middle East arms race, for example, finds its major focus

in a spiralling build-up of combat aircraft.*

Significant transfers of combat aircraft have been, and will probably continue to be, carried out under agreements between governments. The high cost of sophisticated systems, the many security aspects surrounding the technology they represent, and consideration of the political and economic impacts of the transfer usually require government participation on both sides of the negotiation.

The main suppliers of combat aircraft--the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France--have accounted for about 98 per cent of all jet combat aircraft shipped to the developing world.** Beyond the four main suppliers of combat aircraft, Sweden, West Germany, Canada, Italy, and Communist China have the strongest existing or future potentials as sources of jet combat aircraft. However, their potentials do not come near matching the capabilities of the four main suppliers. It is clear that the course of combat aircraft diffusion in the next decade lies primarily in the hands of the four main suppliers, even though other suppliers will exert a secondary influence.

The re-transfer (i.e., second or later international transfer) of combat aircraft, particularly from major-power inventories to the developing countries, has recently emerged as an important mode of diffusion. From 1945 to 1965, re-transfers may have represented only about 1 per cent of all jet combat aircraft transferred to the developing countries. Since 1965, the phasing out of aircraft such as the F-84 and F-86 from existing inventories, particularly in West

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*For ten years the competing major suppliers have provided progressively more modern aircraft in larger quantities to the adversaries. Both Israel and the UAR now have hundreds of jet fighters and bombers in their inventories.

**See Project Diffusion.

Germany, has created a new supply source. The re-transfer problem is especially important because of the possible re-equipment of NATO and Warsaw Pact inventories in the 1970's.

It is apparent that aircraft have been extremely effective weapons in local conflict, particularly in the ground-support role. To some extent, as in the Turkish air strikes on Cyprus during the hostilities of 1963-1965, aircraft have given states a means of communicating the most serious intent without having to commit ground forces. The great danger of such operations, given aircraft of sufficient range and payload, is of course that they may intensify into strikes against targets of increasing value, particularly cities.

Surface-to-Surface Missiles

The diffusion of offensive missile systems to adversaries in local conflicts will probably not occur rapidly to a great number of nations. But the strategic and political impacts will be severe wherever missiles are introduced. Study of the Israeli-Egyptian arms race suggests that developing nations are likely to procure these missiles primarily through indigenous development programs, drawing on large amounts of foreign technical assistance.* The trends observable in that arms race further suggest that Israel and the United Arab Republic may deploy ballistic missiles in the early 1970s.

The potential adverse effects of missile diffusion are clear. For example, since use of missiles demands a targeting policy commensurate with the system cost, targeting of cities would be an almost inevitable outcome of ballistic missile deployment. Also, missile procurement might accelerate planning for the development and production of nuclear weapons or lead to military cooperation with a nuclear power, because the high system cost demands high-yield warheads. In

*See Project Diffusion, pp. 7-10.

general, however, it is not likely that missiles will play a widespread role in local conflicts of the next decade.

Naval Vessels

Naval vessels of all types have been transferred in large quantities into local conflict environments. The cases studied indicate that, in the hostilities phase of conflicts, naval vessels seldom played an important role except to cut off seaborne replacement of men and materiel. Examples are the British blockades against the smuggling of arms to the EOKA on Cyprus and against Indonesian infiltration of armed insurgents into Malaysia.

PATTERNS OF WEAPONS PROCUREMENT AND USE

Interstate Conflicts

Interstate adversaries normally procure their weapons inventories during a relatively long pre-conflict, pre-hostilities period, usually five to fifteen years. In most interstate conflicts, no matter what the economic or industrial level of the adversary nations, the inventories of the adversaries most often encompass the full spectrum of weapons, from rifles to jet fighters, often obtained from a single supplier in a package deal. The difference between the force structures of a very small country like Somalia and a relatively large country like India lies in the number of weapons in each category, and not in the generic categories of weapons available.

If the adversaries have achieved independence in the post-World War II period, their arms and arms training have usually been supplied either by the former colonial power (e.g., Britain in India)

or by a supplier country that subsequently assumed a paramount supplier role (e.g., the Soviet Union in the United Arab Republic).

The procurement of weapons may change the strategic perceptions of a recipient sufficiently to stimulate military action. The history of the Sinai conflict and of its related military build-up suggest that possession of a whole range of new weapons from the Soviet Union gave Egypt enough confidence to step up its raids against Israel. It also seems likely that the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt was to some degree a pre-emption aimed at countering the Egyptian arms build-up.

In general, interstate disputants tend to build up forces designed to counter the full potential of the other side. However, an important distinction must be made between the weapons that were available and those that were actually committed. Ethiopia, for example, used only the forces it needed to defend the border against an inferior Somalian force.

When hostilities break out in an interstate conflict, the major suppliers occasionally join in appeals for a cease-fire and sometimes discontinue the supply of arms. For example, the 1964 cease-fire agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia followed a direct appeal by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to bring the fighting to an end. Similarly, in 1965 the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union worked urgently for a cease-fire in the Kashmir hostilities, even though their arms shipments had helped to make the war possible.

Ironically, following the termination of fighting, a more intense military build-up often ensues, in which importation is resumed and accelerated. This phenomenon is most noticeable in the Middle East, where the cessation of Arab-Israeli hostilities in 1948 produced a weapons build-up culminating in the Sinai hostilities of

1956; and the termination of that fighting in turn resulted in the extremely intense arms race in which Egypt and Israel have been engaged in the decade since 1956. One conclusion to be drawn is that the termination of hostilities, if they have not been carried to the point of unconditional surrender by one of the adversaries or otherwise resulted in the settlement of underlying grievances, will lead almost inevitably to the initiation of a new build-up in weapons.

Prior restrictions placed by the supplier nations on the use of weapons transferred to the recipient country have been ineffectual in most cases. The Kashmir conflict demonstrates that the recipient may use the weapons for purposes not intended by the supplier. In the Cyprus conflict of 1963-1965, the Greek and Turkish military establishments used U.S.-made military equipment to support their own national elements on the island, in defiance of understandings within NATO about the use of the weapons.

If the recipient country remains dependent on the supplier country for spare parts or maintenance, then the flow of spare parts can be an effective means of impairing the recipient's military effectiveness. There is some indication that the lack of spare parts, particularly for military equipment in Pakistan, may have hastened termination of the Kashmir hostilities in 1965. If the same restraint can be applied to both sides, then it can also be a means of terminating the hostilities. The use of spares and maintenance to exert control may also result, however, in a greater effort to become self-sufficient or in a search for alternate sources of supply.

Internal Conflicts

One constant feature of insurgencies, wherever they may occur, is the amplification of response to the initial danger signal. Insurgent forces in their early stages are usually small and operate secretly.

Their operations, although well-planned and precisely executed, tend to be carried out infrequently and with great economy. Nevertheless, the uncertain strength of insurgencies in their initial stages probably causes governments to exaggerate their importance. Because the extent of opposition is unknown, the established power tends to respond on a large scale. Colonel Grivas, commander of the EOKA forces in the Cyprus (Enosis) conflict, has claimed that his movement, at its height, had only about 100 active members. Against these terrorists, the British built up a force of 37,000 on Cyprus between 1955 and 1959. As long as it limits its activity to harassment in order to undermine governmental authority, an insurgent force may be very small and its equipment requirements modest.

If the insurgents are victorious, the weapons and equipment of the national force are confiscated, either for their own use or for re-export. For example, weapons provided by the United States to the Batista regime in Cuba were subsequently confiscated and shipped by the Castro government to Venezuela.

An underground insurgent force, if it does not operate from privileged sanctuaries outside the country, is usually restricted to small-scale operations, which compensate with terrorism for the low levels of manpower and equipment available. An insurgent force operating within national borders usually acquires its arms clandestinely; it seldom controls seaports or airfields at which arms can arrive openly. Consequently, the arms must normally be smuggled into the country and are therefore restricted not only in size but in numbers. In a clandestine build-up of insurgent forces, when there are no sanctuaries outside the country, it is vitally important to the insurgents to maintain a few small sanctuaries within the country for the storage of weapons. In the first Cyprus conflict, monasteries and churches were used as weapons caches; in Venezuela, the college campuses were allegedly important as safe hiding places for weapons

and as training centers. These requirements are not so vital to insurgencies that have access to large sanctuaries in bordering states--e.g., the Greek Insurgency or Bay of Pigs invasion. Even here, however, sanctuaries, large and small, must be developed within the insurgents' own country if the insurgents are to be able to operate on a significant scale over a large area.

One of the most difficult decisions facing the leaders of an insurgency is whether to remain semi-clandestine or bring the war into the open and adopt more conventional tactics. If, as in the Greek Insurgency, the insurgents change their tactics from secrecy and terrorism to the conduct of fixed battles in the open, they must have larger weapons. In particular, they must upgrade from rifles, submachine guns, grenades, and light mortars to heavy mortars, artillery, tanks, and other weapons. Most important, they must have a dependable and steady source of ammunition for these weapons. The exhaustion of their ammunition supply was the single most decisive factor in the surrender of the invaders at the Bay of Pigs.

As this chapter has brought out, weapons-related factors affecting conflict control are often two-sided coins--for example, a developing nation's dependence on external suppliers for spare parts and ammunition may facilitate control but may also encourage it to seek self-sufficiency in such items. However, two very important matters covered above are not so clearly two-sided, and therefore may deserve special attention from arms-control policy-makers. They are: (1) the common tendency for arms build-ups to follow cease-fires, armistices, etc.; and (2) the new problem created as original recipients of arms begin to acquire new models and therefore seek to dispose of their existing inventories.

CHAPTER IX

FINDINGS FROM HISTORIC CASES

By far the major part of our effort in the Design Study has focused on the historic-analytic case studies, based on our model of local conflict structure and dynamics described in Chapter V. Our tentative findings of substance are in the form of conflict-controlling measures. These were derived analytically from the identification, in each phase of each case studied, of what we believed to be the crucial factors bearing on transitions toward or away from violence. We formulated the measures on the basis of whether in our judgment they might have either reinforced the factors that tended toward conflict control, or offset the factors that tended away from it. In some cases the measures were actually taken. In the vast majority of instances, they were not.

Our point is not to assert that, if a given measure had been taken at a certain time in a particular case, things would have turned out differently. They might well have, but we shall never know. The point is rather to see how suggestive it is for a general strategy of conflict control to draw up a catalog of policy measures that detailed analysis shows to have been directly relevant to the conflict-influencing factors associated with various phases in the dynamic life of some recent local conflicts.

The analytical process by which these measures were deduced from the crucial factors in the cases analyzed is explained in Chapter VII, and can be found case by case in Sections II and IV of each case in the Studies of Conflict (WEC-98 III), annexed to this report. The detailed catalog of measures derived by this process represents one of our major bodies of substantive research findings. Rather than repeat them exhaustively in this chapter, we have appended them in comprehensive form. (See Appendix following Chapter XI.)

DEFINITIONS REDEFINED

As a result of our analysis, 400 conflict-control measures were deduced from the conflict-promoting and conflict-inhibiting factors identified in the various phases of the cases studied in depth. Several points about the method of analysis need to be made before undertaking any interpretation of the numbers. It is necessary in particular to explain the minor ways in which this interpretation will appear to diverge from earlier case lists and descriptions in this report.

First, the figure 400 represents the number of instances in which conflict-control measures emerged in the analysis; the number of different measures was of course smaller.

During the Design Study, the cases investigated with the use of the historic-analytic method were as follows:

Algerian-Moroccan Conflict: 1962-1963

Angola Conflict: 1950-1961

Bay of Pigs: 1960-1961

Conflict on Cyprus (I and II): 1954-1964

Greek Insurgency: 1944-1949

India-China Border Conflict: 1954-1962

Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation: 1963-1965

Indonesian War of Independence: 1945-1949

Kashmir Conflict (I and II): 1947-1965

Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960

Somalian-Ethiopian-Kenyan Conflict: 1960-1964

Soviet-Iranian Conflict: 1941-1947

Suez-Sinai Conflicts: 1956

Venezuelan Insurgency: 1960-1963

The Cyprus and Kashmir conflicts were originally studied in two parts each, as historically they were in fact divided. The Venezuelan case was not completed due to illness. The final number of cases studied was thus fifteen. The dual Cyprus and Kashmir conflicts were brought within single covers for the reader's convenience and are similarly treated together here in interpreting the conflict-control measures they suggested.

But two conflicts that were analyzed in a single study--the Sinai-Suez conflicts of 1956--involve for our interpretive purposes here two quite different strands of conflict. These were of course: the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, which worsened in mid-1956; and the British-French-Egyptian conflict, which went through all the preliminary dispute and pre-hostilities phases in that period before converging with the other conflict in common hostilities in the fall of 1956. Because of our interest in examining the manner in which one conflict can generate and influence another, these were analyzed jointly. But in order to draw conclusions, given that the measures

relevant to these two parts of the 1956 events were quite different, we have treated the matter in this interpretive chapter as two conflicts--Sinai and Suez.

For purposes of the interpretations that follow, therefore, the list of cases is the same as that reproduced above, minus Venezuela, treating Cyprus I and II and Kashmir I and II as single cases, but analyzing Sinai and Suez separately. The total of the cases here will thus appear as fourteen.

Finally, it will be recalled that in constructing preliminary typologies for the initial purpose of selecting representative cases, we developed some general categories for classification purposes. These divided the 52 post-World War II conflicts we had decided to work with into five broad groups describing the gross nature of the conflict:

Conventional interstate

Unconventional interstate

Internal with significant external involvement

Primarily internal

Colonial

On the basis of our general knowledge of the cases in question, and prior to any major analytical work, we used these categories to classify the 52 cases, including the sixteen chosen for detailed study.

At the conclusion of the analytical process, we have come to appreciate several difficulties concerning what at the start appeared to be a simple, straightforward process of description and labeling. Above all, the distinctions between interstate local conflicts and internal ones now seem by no means as sharp as we once thought. We can still identify as an abstraction a relatively pure form of internal

conflict in which the significant parties are all within a common national boundary, share the same national origin, and do not receive any significant external support. But none of our cases turned out to match this description.

We can with far greater ease identify a pure form of interstate conflict--India-China, Suez, and Algeria-Morocco might be exemplars. But in many others, such as the Bay of Pigs, Cyprus II, Greece, Indonesia-Malaysia, Iran, Kashmir, and Somalia, the sharp edges of the distinction are blurred. These cases combine, in various proportions, characteristics of both interstate and internal conflict.

With respect to all of them, the secondary distinction between conventional and unconventional turns out to have little meaning, since the military forces in the latter category used conventional weapons, and all those in the former employed weapons on the low end of the military hardware spectrum.

The most ambiguous category, in retrospect, was colonial. That label identified a political phenomenon that communicated important historic meaning. But looking ahead to the future, we saw little utility in maintaining a type that may be virtually extinct. The dilemma was solved by reconsidering our operational purpose. Such value as these findings may have will be for the planner looking to the future. Crucial policy decisions regarding the future may turn on such criteria as the relative difficulty or ease of intervention, or the capacity of the international system to cope with one or another act of political violence. These in turn may depend on how much international involvement there in fact is, or how "purely internal" the conflict appears to be.

It seemed to us at this final stage in our Design Study that the most useful way to classify colonial cases was by asking whether they resembled interstate or internal conflicts, and whether this

resemblance outweighed any uniqueness stemming from the special nature of the colonial relationship between metropole and colony.

We concluded that our four colonial cases--Angola, Cyprus (in its first incarnation), Malaya, and Indonesia--could all be reclassified for purposes of this final analysis. Angola, Cyprus in the mid-1950s, and Malaya had many of the characteristics of any non-colonial, indigenous, "subversive," "insurgency" type of movement at violent odds with the local established governmental authority. Whether the latter was imported, or of the same color, seemed relatively unimportant. This was particularly so when one considered the relative comparability of these three cases to <u>non-colonial</u> internal conflicts that entailed revolt against a ruling class, as in Yemen or Venezuela, or among tribal elements, as in the Congo. We have thus reclassified these three cases as internal for the present analysis.

Indonesia in 1945, with Dutch troops ferried in from distant shores and fighting against a national indigenous army, does not look very different from an interstate engagement. For common-sense reasons, we thus have assimilated it here to the category of interstate.

The borderline cases (Cyprus in its more recent form, the Greek Insurgency, the Soviet-Iranian conflict, and the Bay of Pigs), we decided, also on common-sense grounds, should be treated as primarily internal with significant external involvement.

The list of conflicts analyzed in this chapter can thus be divided as follows for purposes of deriving the most useful planning-type interpretations of our findings:

<u>Interstate</u>

Algerian-Moroccan Conflict: 1962-1963
India-China Border Conflict: 1954-1962

Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation: 1963-1965

Indonesian War of Independence: 1945-1949

Kashmir Conflict: 1947-1965

Sinai: 1956

Somalian-Ethiopian-Kenyan Conflict: 1960-1964

Suez: 1956

Internal

Angola Conflict: 1950-1961

Bay of Pigs: 1960-1961

Conflict on Cyprus: 1954-1964

Greek Insurgency: 1944-1949

Soviet-Iranian Conflict: 1945-1949

Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960

DISTRIBUTION OF MEASURES BY PHASES

In an analysis of a relatively small number of cases (fourteen, as we are counting them here), and with some steps in the analysis inescapably dependent on subjective judgments, one cannot attach too much significance to bare statistics. The number of cases is a small one, and even the number of measures suggested by our analysis of crucial factors by stages is relatively small.

Nonetheless, the distribution of numbers is suggestive. We identified a total of 400 instances in which conflict-control measures might have reinforced factors favoring movement away from hostilities or have offset factors favoring movement toward hostilities (see Table I) The first thing we noticed was that the total number of "measures-instances" distributes very unevenly along the time dimension of conflicts. We derived 149, i.e., 37 per cent of the total number of

TABLE I

INCIDENCE OF CONTROL MEASURES, BY TYPES AND PHASES

	P-I		P-II		$P\text{-}III_1$		P-IV		$P\text{-}III_2$		TOTALS	
Arms-Hardware	(6)	3 IS 3 Int	(8)	5 IS 3 Int	(5)	5 IS 0 Int	(4)	2 IS 1 Int	(3)	2 IS 1 Int	(26)	17 IS 9 Int
Military-Strategic	(16)	3 IS 13 Int	(17)	11 IS 6 Int	(16)	6 IS 10 Int	(7)	2 IS 5 Int	(3)	1 IS 2 Int	(59)	23 IS 36 Int
International Organization	(53)	37 IS 16 Int	(33)	20 IS 13 Int	(25)	20 IS 5 Int	(21)	15 IS 6 Int	(4)	2 IS 2 Int	(136)	94 IS 42 Int
External-Political	(33)	12 IS 21 Int	(17)	10 IS 7 Int	(15)	9 IS 6 Int	(12)	8 IS 4 Int	(3)	1 IS 2 Int	(80)	40 IS 40 Int
Economic-Technological	(15)	10 IS 5 Int	(0)		(6)	2 IS 4 Int	(3)	2 IS 1 Int	(1)	1 IS 0 Int	(25)	15 IS 10 Int
Internal-Political	(24)	9 IS 15 Int	(13)	7 IS 6 Int	(11)	6 IS 5 Int	(7)	0 IS 7 Int	(4)	3 IS 1 Int	(59)	25 IS 34 Int
Communications	(2)	2 IS 0 Int	(6)	6 IS 0 Int	(5)	2 IS 3 Int	(1)	1 IS 0 Int	(1)	0 IS 1 Int	(15)	11 IS 4 Int
TOTALS	(149)	76 IS 73 Int	(94)	59 IS 35 Int	(83)	50 IS 33 Int	(55)	30 IS 25 Int	(19)	10 IS 9 Int	(400)	225 IS 175 Int

Incidence = Measure x Case
IS = Interstate Case
Int = Internal Case

measures-instances, in the first, pre-conflict phase (Phase I).* This has extraordinary implications. For if our technique is sound, it implies that between one-third and one-half of all relevant violence-controlling policy activity may be applicable before a dispute has even turned into a conflict.

We are not saying that all such measures can be taken in comparable cases. Lamentably, statesmen and diplomats do not usually take notice of a potential conflict until it has been perceived by at least one party in primarily military terms and begins to frighten people. What we do say is that, with the benefit of hindsight, we see in Phase I a large number of measures to be taken that might go far to prevent the dispute from turning into a later war.

The total number of suggested conflict-control measures then declines through the phases of conflict (pre-hostilities, actual fighting, and the post-hostilities stages). Compared with 149 suggestive instances in Phase I, we identified a total of 94 in Phase II, 83 in Phase III_1, 55 in Phase IV, and 19 in Phase III_2 (resumed hostilities). In an analysis that placed no special weight on any particular phase, the process of derivation from crucial factors yielded fewer and fewer steps that policy-makers might take to avert violence as conflict progressed along its path through actual bloodshed to termination. The

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*It may be convenient to recapitulate here the phase structure followed in our model:

Phase I	Dispute, not perceived in military terms
Phase II	Conflict, perceived in military terms by one or both parties
Phase III	Hostilities (resumed hostilities are designated III_2, III_3, etc.)
Phase IV	Post-hostilities, but conflict still perceived in potentially military terms
Phase V	End of conflict but dispute continues
S	Settlement of dispute

range and variety of such measures declined as options began to close; attitudes hardened; perceptions increasingly narrowed down to a preoccupation with the violent bands of the spectrum of political conduct.

MEASURES ACTUALLY TAKEN

One of the most profound political ironies of our times is thrown into sharp relief when this descending curve of opportunities for conflict control is compared with the opportunities actually seized in these same cases. We would repeat that the total figures have no profound statistical value. But surely it is no coincidence that the record of measures actually taken in these cases (see Table II) is roughly in inverse proportion to those that we now conclude, with the benefit of hindsight, might have been taken in pursuit of a purposeful conflict-control strategy. In Phase I, 9 measures were actually taken (out of 149 possible); in Phase II also, 9 (out of a possible 94). Only when violence broke out in Phase III_1 were there real signs of conflict-control activity: 31 measures out of 83 were taken. In Phase IV, interest began to flag: 10 measures were taken out of 55 seen as possible. And in Phase III_2, 10 were taken out of 19 we identified as relevant.

When it comes to the relative proportion between interstate and internal cases, the measures-instances actually carried out, in relation to the total number of our hypothetical "possibles," was 31, or 14 per cent, for interstate, and 38, or 21 per cent, for internal. There was thus only a modest difference between the two types of conflict when it came to shortcomings in preventive arms-control, economic, diplomatic, and virtually every other conflict-controlling activity.

TABLE II

INSTANCES OF MEASURES ACTUALLY TAKEN, BY TYPES AND PHASES

	P-I	P-II	P-III$_1$	P-IV	P-III$_2$	TOTALS
Arms-Hardware	0 IS 0 Int	0 IS 0 Int	1 IS 0 Int	0 IS 0 Int	1 IS 1 Int	(3) 2 IS 1 Int
Military-Strategic	0 IS 3 Int	1 IS 1 Int	3 IS 6 Int	1 IS 1 Int	0 IS 2 Int	(18) 5 IS 13 Int
International Organization	2 IS 0 Int	0 IS 0 Int	6 IS 3 Int	1 IS 2 Int	2 IS 2 Int	(18) 11 IS 7 Int
External-Political	0 IS 1 Int	1 IS 2 Int	6 IS 2 Int	2 IS 1 Int	1 IS 0 Int	(16) 10 IS 6 Int
Economic-Technological	1 IS 0 Int	0 IS 0 Int	0 IS 0 Int	0 IS 1 Int	0 IS 0 Int	(2) 1 IS 1 Int
Internal-Political	0 IS 2 Int	0 IS 4 Int	1 IS 2 Int	0 IS 1 Int	0 IS 1 Int	(11) 1 IS 10 Int
Communications	0 IS 0 Int	0 IS 0 Int	1 IS 0 Int	0 IS 0 Int	0 IS 0 Int	(1) 1 IS 0 Int
TOTALS	3 IS 6 Int 9	2 IS 7 Int 9	18 IS 13 Int 31	4 IS 6 Int 10	4 IS 6 Int 10	31 IS 38 Int 69

IS = Interstate Case
Int = Internal Case

TABLE III

INSTANCES OF MEASURES ACTUALLY TAKEN, BY CASES

	P-I	P-II	$P\text{-}III_1$	P-IV	$P\text{-}III_2$	TOTALS
Algeria-Morocco			2			2
Angola	2	4	3			9
Bay of Pigs			4			4
Cyprus	3		2		4	9
Greece			2	4		6
India-China			2			2
Indonesia			4	1		5
Indonesia-Malaysia	1	1	3			5
Iran		1		2	2	5
Kashmir			3	2	4	9
Malaya	1	2	2			5
Somalia	1	1	1			3
Suez	1		3	1		5
TOTALS	9	9	31	10	10	69

As to types of measures actually taken, by far the most numerous were in the realm of military or strategic action and U.N. cognizance (with 18 incidences each). Not surprisingly, both peaked after hostilities actually broke out. Next was external-political action (with 16 incidences), also focused heavily on the hostilities phases. As for internal-political action, 6 of the 11 instances noted were acts of repression by the Portuguese authorities in Angola--policies that in the longer run may produce more severe conflict; apart from these, the number of measures actually involved in the areas of internal, economic, or arms control in these cases is insignificant.

These were, as explained earlier, all cases of conflict. But they did not all become equally severe or intense. Rather, they were evenly divided as to the nature of the hostilities that took place. Is there any correlation between this fact and the measures that were taken in individual cases (see Table III)? Let us compare the data. (For this purpose only, we are showing the Kashmir and Cyprus cases in separate parts, since the nature of hostilities varied in both cases.)

	INCIDENCE OF ACTUAL CONFLICT-CONTROL POLICY MEASURES (OUT OF TOTAL OF 69)
Hostilities Terminated Quickly Without Intensification	
Iran*	5
Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya	3
Algeria-Morocco	2
Bay of Pigs*	4
	14
Hostilities Terminated Quickly After Intensification	
Kashmir II	6
Suez	5
Cyprus II*	4
Sinai	0
	15

*See note on following page.

Hostilities Continued Without Intensification	
India-China	2
Malaya*	5
Angola*	9
Indonesia	5
	21
Hostilities Continued With Intensification	
Kashmir I	3
Indonesia-Malaysia	5
Greece*	6
Cyprus I*	5
	19

Clearly, there was no significant relationship between measures taken and the inclination of the conflict to intensify. But it might be observed once again that more effort was actually invested in conflict control after things became too volatile to ignore. In general, we may conclude again that conflict-controlling policy activity actually pursued in these representative cases of local conflict was almost in inverse proportion to the chances to influence events. For it was only as the options dwindled that policy activity increased, coming too late to act as a preventive and trailing off when fighting stopped.

Let us now step away from these bare and not altogether enlightening totals and look at more substantive elements in the presumed incidence of conflict-control measures in our sampling of cases. Can

*Internal conflict, with significant external involvement. Others are interstate conflicts.

anything of even possible statistical significance be discerned?

DISTRIBUTION OF MEASURES BY TYPES

Let us take general types of measures first. The breakdown of types of measures is as follows, with total incidence of measures shown cumulatively for all phases:

Measures Involving:	
Arms	26
Military forces and strategy	59
United Nations and regional organizations	136
Great powers, allies, neighbors	80
Economic and technological	25
Internal-political	59
Communications and information	15

Again, bare totals of incidence of unspecified measures may not communicate very much. Nevertheless, the gross proportions are not uninteresting, recalling that these are all measures that, through a rigorous analytical process, emerged as precisely apposite to particular significant factors or pressures at particular phases in the life of a given conflict. These, in the metaphor with which we approached this study, were the "tourniquets" we saw as applicable at the key "pressure-points" of the conflict.

By far the preponderance (136, or 34 per cent) of instances where potentially conflict-controlling measures seemed relevant lay in the area of international diplomacy, chiefly through the United Nations and/or regional organizations. Next in magnitude (80, or 20 per cent) were political measures to be taken by parties external to the conflict,

notably great powers but also including allies, neighbors, and others. An equal proportion of incidence of measures fell into the categories of military and strategic, and also internal-political (both 59, or 15 per cent). The incidence of the arms-hardware type of measures represented 26, or 6.5 per cent; economic and technological measures totalled 25, or 6 per cent; and measures pertaining specifically to communications or information procedures and policy come to 15, or 4 per cent.

The distribution of the incidence of types of measures <u>across the phases</u> is even more meaningful. Let us recapitulate them:

	P-I	P-II	P-III$_1$	P-IV	P-III$_2$
Arms	6	8	5	4	3
Military-Strategic	16	17	16	7	3
International Organization	53	33	25	21	4
External-Political	33	17	15	12	3
Economic-Technological	15	0	6	3	1
Internal-Political	24	13	11	7	4
Communications-Information	2	6	5	1	1

<u>Arms or hardware measures</u>, i.e., those most directly bearing on potential arms-control policy, appear, not surprisingly, to have offered more suggestions <u>early</u> in the process rather than later. By a small margin, specific measures of arms control were more numerous in Phase II, when arms build-ups were underway, than in any other phase.

Measures of <u>military or strategic policy</u> followed the same pattern. The largest proportions of suggested measures emerged in Phase I and Phase II and, as we shall see in the interpretation of our findings, these tended to center around deterrence postures and policies.

What may not have seemed so evident before our analysis is the relatively large incidence of international organization measures that appeared appropriate and needful in the preventive stage of dispute. Almost twice the number of measures is implied there than is implied in the next preventive stage (conflict, pre-hostilities), and considerably more than the range available and relevant after fighting broke out (which is of course where most actual policy activity has been focused).

The deduced incidence of external-political measures also fell heavily in the dispute phase, and next heavily in the second preventive phase, i.e., Phase II. The same is true of economic-technological measures. That we could derive no such measures in the simmering Phase II stage, and very few in subsequent stages (save for those that merely repeat the desirability of substitutes for bases already covered under the military-strategic category), may reflect upon our lack of expertise or imagination; all we can say is that they are not obvious. However, great-power and related political influence continued to be relevant during hostilities and after as well.

Much the same is true for internal-political measures: preventive activity (chiefly in the form of building sound socio-economic bases for effective political governance) outnumbers later action by a significant margin. Save for out-and-out repression, which a strong government can apply any time (and a weak one can try to, usually expediting its own demise), the best time to carry on nation-building is clearly before the nation is engaged in a serious quarrel with another nation, or has a genuine insurgency movement on its hands.

The last gross inferences to be drawn from the measures-incidence refer to the distinction between interstate and internal conflicts. Some of the figures are interesting:

Of the total of 400, 225 were for cases in the interstate

category, 175 in the internal category. These appear to be roughly comparable when weighted for the slight difference between the number of internal and interstate cases analyzed here. But if we once again make some re-assignments between the two categories in order to boil the internal group down to "pure" subversion-insurgency types, there would then be about twice as many measures suggested proportionately for interstate as for internal. That striking differential might merely show the paucity of the researchers' imagination. But it may equally show the difficulty of thinking up strategies to deal with internal insurgency-type situations--unfortunately not a new difficulty for the Western mind.

In the potential arms-hardware measures categories, 17 out of the total of 26 measures-incidence, across all phases, surfaced in our analysis of interstate conflicts, and only 9 in internal. (As our local-conflict weapons analysis shows, the most relevant weapons in internal conflicts are the hardest to control, i.e., small arms. See Chapter VIII.) The numbers for military-strategic measures favored internal conflict control (23 interstate, 36 internal), chiefly because of great-power involvement. For the incidence of relevant international organization measures, interstate outnumbered internal over two to one (94 to 42), a commentary on the limitations of the international juridical order when it comes to the "new" problems of insurgency and internal defense. Externally-sponsored political measures showed identical incidence (40 interstate and 40 internal).

Economic-technological measures were three to two in favor of interstate (15 to 10). This was doubtless a further reflection of our failure to be more imaginative about the possible relevance of both these types of non-political measures for internal conflicts. But it was also due to the fact that the best time to conceive and initiate economic development and modernization programs is in phase

"P minus I," so to speak, before forces of division and subversion can begin seriously to threaten the internal fabric of inchoate societies.

In the category of policy measures of an internal-political sort, not surprisingly somewhat more measures-incidence emerged for internal conflicts than for interstate (34 to 25). As for measures involving better communications or intelligence, these overwhelmingly were deemed relevant to interstate conflicts, where there are two "sides" usually willing to get in touch, rather than internal ones (11 to 4), where passions for total victory run highest.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY OF SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS

On the basis of a detailed analysis of selected cases of recent local conflict, as well as related inquiries pursued in this Design Study, some tentative substantive findings emerge. They fall into three different categories. Our central findings take the form of specific conflict-controlling measures in each of the several phases of conflict. These are derived directly from the area of our maximum research effort--the historic-analytic case studies.

But two other ancillary approaches also surfaced some policy inferences. The first emerge from the analysis of weapons used in and otherwise relevant to local conflict at the present and for the near future (see Chapter VIII).

SUMMARY OF "HARDWARE" FINDINGS

Weapons used in local conflicts have usually been introduced from outside sources under the aegis of national governments. During the next decade, most local conflicts will continue to be fought primarily with imported weapons, augmented to varying degrees by indigenous manufacture; this applies even to the few relatively high-GNP

developing countries that have or can establish their own arms production programs. The total volume of arms transfers is growing and will continue to grow, as additional suppliers enter the weapons market and as re-transfers arise from the re-equipping of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

All types of weaponry can be used in local conflict, but the most relevant categories are small arms, crew-served weapons including artillery, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, and naval vessels.

Small arms--very important in local conflicts--have extraordinary longevity. They are usually acquired as part of a comprehensive government-to-government military assistance agreement, though some are obtained by direct purchase from manufacturers or traders. Lightweight crew-served weapons are quite common on both sides of interstate and internal conflicts, but artillery is normally used only by regular forces. Tanks, too, are most in demand by regular forces, for use in both interstate and internal conflicts; irregular forces generally find them unsuited to their purposes. Aircraft are considered prestigious, given their high visibility. The United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France still account for 98 per cent of all jet combat aircraft shipped to the developing world, although re-transfer from the inventories of the original receivers is beginning to emerge as an important mode of diffusion. Missiles and naval vessels are not likely to play a widespread role in the local conflicts of the next ten years.

Other major hardware findings can be summarized as follows:

(1) Irregular forces get their weapons by import, smuggling, stealing, or capturing, or by "inheriting" them at the termination of great-power conflicts.

(2) One of the chief characteristics of internal conflict is the amplification of response by governmental

authority to the initial danger signal.

(3) Interstate conflicts are often characterized by a long pre-conflict, pre-hostilities build-up, ranging from five to fifteen years. It usually involves the whole weapons spectrum. Most states acquire the same range of weapons types; their inventories vary only in size and numbers.

(4) The greatest quantities of all kinds of arms are introduced into local conflicts when a major power becomes directly involved.

(5) The fact of weapons procurement in a tense situation may change the perceptions of potential adversaries, and can thus stimulate military action.

(6) A more intense arms build-up often follows a cease-fire instituted at the urging of the supplying countries (unless of course the dispute gets settled).

(7) Restrictions placed by arms suppliers on end-use have so far proved largely ineffectual.

(8) Control of the spare parts and ammunition flow for weapons can impair military effectiveness (but may stimulate efforts to achieve self-sufficiency).

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM TYPOLOGIES EXPERIMENT

Clearly, only very tentative value attaches to conclusions based on our limited experimentation with typologies. Nevertheless, it generated several interesting insights. These are detailed in

Chapter IV, where the typology charts also appear; here we simply recapitulate some of the highlights.

Typology A, our rather crude beginning, plotted relative controllability (which we scaled in the form of an historical hostilities index) against the gross nature of the 52 conflicts (interstate, internal, etc.). It led to the elementary conclusion that internal conflicts are much more likely than interstate conflicts to resist prevention, moderation, and termination. In other words, internal conflicts tend to be harder to control than interstate conflicts.

Typology B plotted relative controllability against the factor of great-power partiality for each of the 52 cases. Examination of the distribution of the conflicts within the matrices of this typology suggested that considerable great-power partiality has usually been a feature of those conflicts that have proved hard to control. The more intense that partiality has been, the more the conflicts have resisted prevention, moderation, or termination of hostilities.

In Typology C, relative controllability was plotted against another major factor assumed to correlate with it in important ways: geopolitical setting (nature of the terrain and weather, attitudes of nations contiguous to the conflict area, and the degree of political stability in the region). The results of Typology C appeared to warrant the assertion that geopolitical setting does exert an influence on the relative controllability of conflicts, in that controllability is adversely affected by difficult terrain and weather conditions, by neighboring states that incite or support one side or the other, and by political instability in the region.

In Typology D, three factors were jointly plotted, and then measured against the relative controllability of the 52 conflicts. The factors were the gross nature of the conflict (interstate, internal, etc.); great-power partiality; and an additional one--the commitment

of the adversaries to the outcome. With respect to this new factor, Typology D suggested that high commitments of will and resources by conflict adversaries tend to result in continued hostilities, and therefore in conflicts hard to control.

Typology E also jointly plotted three factors against the relative controllability of the 52 conflicts. They were: gross nature of the conflict, great-power partiality, and geopolitical setting; hence none related directly to the conflict adversaries. Each of the three factors had appeared in earlier typologies, but using them in combination permitted more refined insights that, in general, reinforced the findings from the earlier typologies.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM HISTORIC CASES

By far the bulk of our effort in the Design Study focused on the historic-analytic case studies, based on our model of local conflict structure and dynamics described in Chapter V.

Consequently, our principal substantive findings took the form of conflict-controlling measures that were derived analytically from identification, in each phase of each case studied, of what we believed to be the crucial factors bearing on transitions toward or away from violence. The measures were formulated on the basis of whether they might have either reinforced factors that tended toward conflict control, or offset factors that tended away from it. In some cases the measures were actually taken. In the vast majority of instances, they were not.

Chapter IX classified all these measures according to the chronological conflict phase in which they applied and a breakdown into functional types: arms-hardware, United Nations and regional organizations, military-strategic, great-power or other external-

political, economic-technological, internal-political, and communications-information. Cross-analysis of these conflict-controlling measures produced the findings summarized below.

In fine-grain study of recent local conflicts, the distinction between interstate and internal tends to become blurred, especially in those apparently internal cases that witnessed direct or indirect involvement of third parties.

The number of theoretically available conflict-control measures was highest in the pre-conflict phase, with the number and variety of such measures progressively declining as conflict developed and progressed through its violent phase. Ironically, however, the incidence of conflict-controlling policy activity actually pursued was almost in inverse proportion to the chances of influencing events. For it was only as the options dwindled that policy activity increased, coming too late to act as a preventive, and trailing off when fighting stopped.

With respect to the relationship between internal and interstate cases, the ratio of measures actually carried out to the total measures presumably available was not impressively different. However, the number of measures both analytically derived and in fact applied to pure "subversive-insurgency" internal cases was far less than the corresponding number for interstate cases, a disparity probably due at least in part to the innate difficulties of dealing with internal insurgency-type situations.

The breakdown of available conflict-controlling measures into functional types disclosed that by far the preponderance (about one-third) of instances where potentially conflict-controlling measures appeared relevant lay in the area of international organization activity--U.N. and/or regional. Then (at about one-fifth of the total) came political measures to be taken by parties external to the conflict, notably great powers but also including allies and neighbors. Military-

strategic and internal-political came next (at about 15 per cent each), followed by arms-hardware, economic-technological, and communications-information.

In comparison, the breakdown into functional types of measures actually taken showed that, while international organization measures remained relatively high (about one-fourth of the total), military-strategic and external-political measures were equally or virtually as high, with both of the latter peaking after the outbreak of hostilities.

Finally, the distribution of the incidence of types of measures available across the chronological conflict phases is interesting. In general, all functional types of available measures were highest in the early Phases I and II (although military-strategic understandably remained high in the Phase III hostilities period). What had not been so evident before our analysis was the relatively large incidence of international organization measures that appeared appropriate in the preventive Phase I stage. Almost twice as many were implied there as in the Phase II pre-hostilities period, and considerably more than the number that appeared available and relevant after fighting broke out (which is of course where most actual policy activity was and is focused).

CHAPTER XI

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF CONFLICT CONTROL

As Americans look out toward the near and middle-term future, few things seem more certain than the continuation of local conflict in the developing regions outside of Europe. Regional instability in turn is the soil in which superpower competition takes root. For most of the developing regions we have studied, the preconditions for conflict thus already exist in abundance. As Leon Trotsky is reported to have said to anyone wanting to lead a quiet and peaceful life, "You should not have been born in the 20th century."

We have suggested, from our preliminary analysis, a broad range of potentially conflict-controlling measures. But up to this point, we have been neutral as to whether the United States ought or ought not to have sponsored some or all of these measures. As said at the outset of this study, some conflict-control measures might, if they had been taken, have disadvantaged the United States in the pursuit of its particular objectives as seen at the time. Other measures would, if taken, have clearly supported the nation's general interest in stability and peace. Still others might have appeared to be disadvantageous, but actually might have had the effect of sparing the United States from committing what looks in retrospect like a blunder.

For these reasons it is far from easy to recommend a posture

for the United States toward local conflict that will be either always consistent or always successful. The first may be undesirable, and the latter impossible. U.S. foreign policy takes its cues not only from what it wants of the world, but also from the complex nature of the international scene and of the forces and pressures that play across it. This in turn gives rise to conflicting interpretations of events, and to the setting of frequently incompatible goals and priorities. It is this tendency that both causes and results from the deep dilemmas to be found in virtually all sectors of policy and strategy.

One paramount dilemma inheres in the orientation of the international system, as presently organized, to the classic models of nation-states, sovereign equality, and the legally impregnable barrier to intervention unless and until uniformed soldiers of one state cross the national boundaries of another. For this type of interstate conflict, the international system is geared to provide a framework for intervention in the name of both law and order. Per contra, particularly until the racial conflicts of southern Africa were re-christened "international" in the 1960s by a growing U.N. majority, the system militated against intervention in civil wars, themselves now re-christened "insurgencies." That the latter type of conflict appears to be more "uncontrollable" than the former probably reflects the weaknesses of the international system as much as it does the uniquely intractable quality of wars of brother against brother (particularly if one brother is a dedicated Marxist-Leninist).

So far, international organizations have proven generally unable to cope with the new format of conflict within borders--subversion, terror, insurgency, and the whole catalog of conflict types that until now have baffled the international community. This may be the single most unsolvable problem in the field of conflict control.

Our analysis has reinforced our intuition that, for these conflicts, internal reforms are as important as any single element in

a conflict-control strategy, and that their absence creates a role for indigenous Communists who, in the still excellent phrase of Walt Rostow, are the "scavengers of the process of modernization."

The cause-effect relationship here has perhaps been clearest where the issue has been primarily colonial. It does not take a Sophocles to describe in advance the nature of the tragedy that could ensue in the southern part of Africa unless the white man's ways are mended, in terms of both colonial and racial policies.

But even here, ambiguities exist for a conflict-control strategy. For in the short term there may be considerably more conflict control if colonial control is firmly retained. This is superficially similar to the security problem in non-colonial internal conflict, where the logic of our analysis has suggested in case after case the prescription of strong, cohesive, and effective local government. In many local interstate conflicts, the same nostrum applies. At its extreme, this policy is conflict-controlling even if repugnantly repressive. This paradox is underscored by the possibility that a liberalizing, reformist policy may temporarily even increase instability and possibly violence. As C. L. Sulzberger has said:

> History shows that extremism doesn't lose its appeal just because reform begins. On the contrary, reform--especially when long overdue--often encourages extremism. The extremists proclaim it is thanks only to their bitter methods that improvement has started. This was true of Palestine's Stern Gang and Irgun. It was true of the E.O.K.A. in Cyprus and the F.L.N. in Algeria.*

The shortcomings of a policy of repression or tyranny are obvious, even conceding its theoretical value as a short-term violence-minimizer. For one thing, it may not always be true that measures directed against dissident groups will minimize the chance of violence.

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*New York Times, June 8, 1963.

Repressive policies, unless accompanied by total social controls as in Communist countries, lead often to new and more widespread political revolution (cf. 1776, 1789, 1848, not to mention such contemporary instances as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Ghana). It may often be the case that longer-term conflict control in the form of political democracy, and civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and dissent, will outweigh short-term conflict-control considerations--unless the fear of intensification is great enough to overcome all, as in Hungary in 1956 and Cuba in 1962. Certainly, with regard to colonial rule in this era, the argument in favor of short-term suppression collapses in the middle range of time.

In general, suppression has reflected a consistently unsuccessful policy from 1815 and the Holy Alliance through the recent Indonesian, Indochinese, and Algerian experiences. Our tentative conclusion here is that prevention must come early, preferably in the pre-conflict phase (Phase I), if dynamic instabilities are not to be set in motion that later suppression--or reform--will not abate.

The prevention of internal conflict engages massive attention in the United States, but perhaps one of the most compelling needs is the one that encounters the greatest diplomatic sensitivity (vide Camelot)--the need to observe a rebellion before it starts, or at least as close to its inception as possible. Thomas C. Schelling, one of our consultants, makes the telling point that the predictions such early warning ought to engender might even be an effective substitute for control. To have foreseen the contours of the Vietnam situation might have altered profoundly the kinds of policies and commitments undertaken in its early stages.

Arms-control measures, of which we have perceived a modest number and range that might be applied in various phases of local conflict, are also subject to ambiguities and paradoxes. It is normally

supposed that a great power intervenes with arms and supplies in a local area dispute because it is already parti pris, committed to one side or one outcome or another. But Senator Fulbright has support from an influential organ of opinion in wondering if it is not rather the other way around: ". . . once a great power has become involved through the supply of arms, it develops an interest in the receiving country."*

A conflict-control policy will by definition seek to make military conflict less violent, destructive, or unmanageable--a function considered by some as reflecting the highest use of arms control. This calls for limiting the availability of arms, ammunition, spare parts, and supplies, whether through: formal disarmament agreements; the discouragement of competitive arming by substituting external agencies of security, national or multilateral; enforcing controls by arms suppliers; or embargoing arms in the course of a given conflict. The ideal here would be either to eliminate arms or in any event not to use them (perhaps employing instead the so-called Brazilian method, whereby one side merely displays its dispositions and deployments, whereupon the adversary surrenders, the regime resigns, or whatever).

But this straight-line approach runs afoul of two perplexing questions. The first arises from the measures suggested by many of our cases (and much favored by, inter alia, the present authors). These measures would serve to reduce regional armaments to the level needed for internal security purposes only, with assistance toward that end. If successful, this would automatically ensure that whatever hostilities did break out would be conducted at a low level.

But there may be two serious negative effects. A strong capability for internal policing may, by suppressing legitimate dissent, help to keep in power a tyrannical regime. And our analysis, not to

*Economist, March 25, 1967, p. 1114.

mention common experience, indicates that, like colonial suppression, this policy tends to generate wider and more bitter later violence.

The second reservation has been suggested by John Hoagland and Geoffrey Kemp. The former points out that the U.S. reprisal in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 set a pattern for "legal" military jet pinpoint attacks subsequently emulated by Syria and Israel (and, in the same week, by Turkey vis-à-vis Cyprus). Hoagland's point is that while seeming to loosen existing barriers and thereby encouraging violence, conflict-control objectives were in fact served because "peace" and "war" were made less brittle concepts, and a single action was no longer necessarily a casus belli. Kemp's point is that in many actual local conflicts, so-called status weapons, being sophisticated and complex, are not very useful for combat compared with the small arms and other internal defense weapons we have suggested focusing on.

The second dilemma and paradox concerning local arms supplies is equally perplexing. It concerns the balance to be established between local adversaries in interstate disputes. If the local situation is in military imbalance, one side may be tempted to strike; if it does so, it is then likely, ceteris paribus, that it will quickly overcome the victim, and violence will be ended. In the alternative scenario favored by, for example, U.S. Middle Eastern policy, arms are supplied to redress such local imbalances. Rationally, the sides are thus mutually deterred from starting anything. But if hostilities nevertheless ensue, they might well intensify, and speedy termination may be much harder to achieve. On a global scale this is of course the central dilemma of superpower mutual deterrence policy. In the regions the same questions would be magnified manifold in the event that nuclear weapons were to proliferate.

In this Design Study our approach was deliberately a fragmentary and particularistic one. Our chief aim was to burrow into the

fine structure, both of theory of conflict and of conflicts themselves. But inevitably, our tentative findings, impressions, and conclusions on the subject ought to be placed in a broader context. Is the simple suppression of violence a legitimate governing principle to inform the U.S. role in international life? Does it not need to be related to some other overarching principle or goal?

For instance, it may be argued that the United States, as the chief beneficiary of the established world political, economic, and social order, has a kind of natural mission to use its power and resources, i.e., to intervene, wherever conflict emerges, for the express purpose of shoring up that particular segment of the status quo. This would always put the United States on the side of legitimate government, always against revolution--scarcely a viable, not to say intelligent, policy. The same ideological principle would choose for the United States the side in an interstate conflict that was most likely to favor stability.

In some cases this "hard-line" advice (which has curiously Marxist overtones) is not necessarily wrong. Take-over attempts by organized Communist-led minorities offend so many principles, both of international stability and of political morality, that sometimes one must defend even an unsavory regime, on the Churchillian principle that "when wolves are about the shepherd must guard his flock even if he does not himself care for mutton."

It is not surprising that the Soviet Union interprets U.S. policy toward local conflict precisely in accordance with Marxist expectations, reinforced by a number of instances when the United States has behaved accordingly. According to one of the shrewdest American Sovietologists, on the basis of 100 conversations in the Soviet Union and East Europe in the fall of 1966:

> Our improvisations are seen as fitting into a pattern of deliberate militancy reflecting a determination to intervene with force in any local situation where political trends are adverse to our interests.*

Whatever may be the ideological name in which great-power intervention takes place--"victory," freedom for the inhabitants, prevention of a larger war, or whatever--the key to such intervention is the existence of great-power partiality as between the sides. This is in many ways the heart of superpower foreign policy toward the regions in question. But one of the most intriguing facts is the rather low batting average of the superpowers in directly intervening in local conflicts in order to score a clear-cut win.

In many ways the Bay of Pigs was a mirror-image of the situation in Iran in 1945-1946. In the background was a wider conflict of which the case in point was merely one sector or front. In both cases one of the superpowers was a close neighbor. In both cases the neighboring superpower fomented internal conflict through subversive guerrilla forces inside, in addition to training and introducing additional indigenous subversives from without. In both cases, justification for intervention was found in historic precedents and frameworks (spheres-of-influence treaties in Iran, the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba). In both instances, current international law, including the U.N. Charter, expressly forbade the policies the superpowers pursued. And in both instances the superpowers were unsuccessful in their aim of overthrowing the neighboring regime.

One principal reason for their mutual failure was the local unpopularity such external intervention generates. But another was surely the deterrent power of the other superpower against any temptation of the intervener to go too far. Strong and purposeful deterrence

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*Marshall Shulman, Washington Post, November 27, 1966.

emerged in our analysis as a vital component of superpower policy in a strategy of conflict control.

But intervention has two faces. Intervention to "win," or to have "our" side win, is one thing. Intervention for another purpose--such as the minimizing of violence--is quite another. Intervention, as Harlan Cleveland used to put it, "in the name of non-intervention," was the strategy followed in the 1960 Congo collapse. The United Nations intervened so that national unilateral intervention, particularly by the superpowers, would not take place. Both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in Laos in 1962 to defuse and neutralize it, and in the India-Pakistan fighting in 1965 to terminate it.

The changing international scene is bound to affect the policy calculations the United States will be making on this issue in the period ahead. The nature and intensity of U.S. interests in local conflicts has been defined so far largely by the extent of the involvement of those conflicts in the Cold War. If both the Communist and the Western worlds continue to grow more pluralistic, and if new political issues, new centers of military power and political activity, and new patterns of conflict and alignment arise to complicate or even subordinate the Cold War issues, U.S. interests may remain as extensive as ever. But U.S. policies and strategies of intervention and conflict control will have to become much more selective and diversified than they have been. Moreover, as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, the United States may also be less likely automatically to interpret local insurrections as part of a coordinated global challenge.

It may finally be ventured that, however the Vietnam war may end, its aftermath will find the United States less rather than more inclined to intervene unilaterally in local internal conflicts to

secure a political or military victory.*

The strategic options open to the United States are not necessarily mutually antagonistic or exclusive on all counts. A selective strategy of conflict control would not necessarily compete or clash at all points with other currently favored U.S. strategies. There is in fact real convergence with the counterinsurgency approach reported to be current in U.S. Defense Department circles.** The prescriptions in that approach for "victory in any counterinsurgency" are remarkably similar to measures we surfaced here in the name of conflict prevention: better communications and information; a well-trained police force to provide local security; and isolation of the guerrillas from external support.

Both strategies, to succeed, need an early approach to a local problem. But a conflict-control strategy will be interested in prevention and suppression even if Communist take-over is not involved. And in other obvious ways it will act in the name of minimizing violence instead of supporting ideology. Yet if either is to succeed, the truth, recognized by other studies of counterinsurgency, is that something deeper, earlier, and more basic is required for insurgencies truly to be prevented from happening. Analysis has suggested that there is still validity in policy toward the developing countries for

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*Straws in the wind, apart from the known views of some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, come from the other end of the political spectrum in the Senate. Under the leadership of Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senate in early 1967 rejected the administration's proposal for construction of seven fast-deployment logistics ships--so-called F.D.L.s, intended to enable the U.S. Army to intervene more rapidly in foreign crises. Senator Russell was quoted as saying that "if it is easy for us to go anywhere and do anything, we will always be going somewhere and doing something." Senator Mike Mansfield said the program "would . . . in effect make us a world policeman and make us subject to actions for which we might not assent in Congress." New York Times, March 30, 1966.

**Hanson W. Baldwin in the New York Times, October 16, 1966.

William James' prescription:

> what we now need discover in the social realm is the moral equivalent of war; something heroic that will speak to men as universally as war does.*

Put in a more contemporary idiom, ways need to be found, particularly where there is hostility and alienation, of channeling the "militant enthusiasms" of the younger generation toward "genuine causes that are worth serving in the modern world." Lorenz' prescription ends with humor, because "laughing men hardly ever shoot."**

As good as any other statement of the practical base that underlies a U.S. effort to master a strategy of conflict control was that made by President Johnson at Freedom House on February 23, 1966:

> If we are not to fight forever in faraway places--in Europe, or the far Pacific, or the jungles of Africa, or the suburbs of Santo Domingo, then we must learn to get at the roots of violence.#

The present study has sought to investigate the problem of local conflict in this spirit--and in so doing rejects the uncharacteristically cynical advice offered by Winston Churchill in his famous Fulton, Missouri, speech when he announced: "It has been the dominant lesson of history that mankind is unteachable."##

But here too, as we seek to articulate a basic tone for U.S. policy to consider, we face perhaps the most serious dilemmas of all that inhere in a strategy based importantly on conflict-control considerations.

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*The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York, Mentor, 1964), p. 284.

**Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 282-294.

#New York Times, February 24, 1966.

##Speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946.

One fundamental dilemma lies in the possible competition between the goal of minimizing violence and the achievement of other goals in the years ahead. It is all very well to say, with Salvador de Madariaga, that "the gun that does not shoot is more eloquent than the gun that has to shoot and above all the gun that has shot," or in purely tactical terms, and assuming the continuation of struggle, with Sun Tzu in his classic precept that "the supreme art in war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."

But non-violence is not the only value to be cherished, and the issue for the U.S. government must never be posed in terms of suppressing violence at the expense of freedom. This dilemma can only be flagged here, not solved. At root it is moral and ethical in nature, and, at a minimum, carries with it limits to the pursuit of any strategy that is overweighted in favor of one value or the other.

The second dilemma is that in conflict control--as in all of life--one must sometimes choose a lesser evil to avoid a greater one. Lesser violence may be acceptable and even desirable in order to avert greater violence--the ultimate justification for the Vietnam war.

Related to this is the argument that certain kinds of local conflict may have the beneficial result of minimizing a wider war by building backfires, or counter-irritants. A possible example of manipulation of one conflict in order to "control" a larger one is the current Yemen conflict that ties down a significant proportion of limited Egyptian resources and keeps them from potentially greater mischief-making elsewhere. The dangers are of course obvious in such a gamble, particularly when one considers, not the trough in the Yemeni fighting, but the initial intense phase and future intensifications possibly to come in conjunction with the fate of the South Arabia Federation and Aden on the final departure of the British. In this context, perhaps we need not be overly fastidious about the possibility of undermining political leadership or opposition, as a tactic directly relevant to

controlling local conflicts that are the product of unstable or over-ambitious personalities.

A third dilemma, mentioned earlier in connection with arms policy, is that conflict control may be achieved either by moderating hostilities--which moderation may allow them to drag on--or by intensifying them with a view to a rapid end to the fighting. This trade-off represents one of the central dilemmas of Vietnam in early 1967, and has no easy answer. The crucial variables are probably the perceived chance of intensification vs. the pressures of public opinion--both able to act in either direction.

Still other dilemmas are embedded in this cluster of issues, and they too have no easy solutions, either on political or moral grounds. For example, the tendency to work desperately for early cease-fires in outbreaks of interstate hostilities, regardless of the asserted justice of the claims made by the parties, can hardly be said to represent long-range conflict-control policy. As we pointed out earlier, it represents only half of the policy of "cease-fire and peaceful change" enunciated by Adlai E. Stevenson. And yet who would advocate delay when a local brush fire threatens to intensify to a world-wide conflagration? If, according to a rational theory of conflict control, hostilities should be suppressed only in accompaniment with relief to legitimate interests at stake, we can only reiterate our sense of urgency that attaches to development of better, workable peaceful change procedures.

We come back inescapably to the arguments favoring an activist U.S. policy of subverting certain tyrannical or anti-American regimes, and thus fomenting rather than controlling conflict. One of the first rules of diplomacy is never to say "never," and it may well be that in the future the United States will on occasion perceive an overriding interest in fomenting rather than suppressing certain kinds of conflict situations where the alternative, on the basis of some kind of net

calculation, is clearly worse.

Conflict-control strategy even contains arguments for U.S.-sponsored intensification of a given conflict under certain circumstances. If the United States could be certain that it would not run an intolerably high risk of bringing China or the Soviet Union more directly into the Vietnam war, it can be speculated that less resistance would be offered to pressures to intensify toward more condign punishment of North Vietnam; an analogous situation existed in Korea in the early 1950s. The same fear of "escalation" has inhibited any temptation to let Israel prove (or disprove) to the Arabs that their ambition to drive it into the sea is unrealistic, or to let Pakistan demonstrate to India the necessity of self-determination for Kashmir. It remains an open question whether the interests of world peace would be advanced, considering the intensification potential in each case.

In the light of this, what can we conclude about the United States and conflict control?

Historically, there have been two ways for this country to play its role. One flourished in the 1920s and 1930s, and took the form of a pretense that the United States had no role to play. Generally, it followed Mark Twain's precept that "to do good is noble. To tell others to do good is also noble and a lot less trouble." Leaving aside any analogies to Vietnam, it remains everlastingly true that Hitler and the rulers of Imperial Japan were thus encouraged to believe that no significant obstacles lay in their path of conquest.

The other way, shaped by the shock of emergence from isolation, was for this country to project its power to deter aggression, oppose injustice, support friends, and police disorder. But this active mode of national behavior has within it two further options. One is for

the United States to project its power with partiality, taking sides in local disputes and conflicts in the developing areas, on the assumption that U.S. interests are vitally involved in their substantive outcome. The other employs the projection of U.S. power as a form of influence aimed above all at the goal of preventing, moderating, and terminating local conflict.

Both of these are forms of intervention. But a strategy of conflict control calls for a strategy of selective nonintervention as well. It emphasizes political rather than military intervention. It emphasizes prevention of conflict in the developing countries, requiring purposeful policies in the political, economic, and social realms in order to lay the foundations of social and economic health, physical security, and political consensus. It also calls for caring less about certain pieces of global real estate, for mobilizing technology to create surrogates for bases and footholds so that they matter less, both strategically and economically. If one were to compare with our analyzed conflict cases some other instances in which there was no great-power partiality and therefore "nothing happened" (the civil strife in Belgium, or the Romanian-Hungarian dispute over Transylvania), one might on conflict-minimizing grounds envisage a purposeful policy of abstention or even collaboration with our partial adversaries. It has been suggested that, whatever its deeper sentiments may be, the United States would serve its own interests by sometimes even feigning impartiality. In sum, the prescription is for a strategy of withdrawal as much as for one of participation, depending on the effect a given act by an external power is likely to have on the probable course of the conflict.

For in the end we would assert that there is, on balance, a generalized U.S. interest in the minimization of international conflict, and the maximization of international procedures for peaceful change and pacific settlement. We would assert a corollary to this in the form

of minimum U.S. involvement consistent with its genuinely vital interests and international responsibilities (and reinforced by C. L. Sulzberger's Fourth Cardinal Rule of Diplomacy, which is never to get between a dog and a lamppost*).

In the final analysis, policy will still operate in the gray area, unable for sound reasons to occupy either black or white. But in our judgment, both world peace and deepest national values will be served by a strategy of conflict control that vigorously seeks to support freedom, in ways that purposefully minimize violence.

*New York Times, May 27, 1957.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

CONFLICT-CONTROL MEASURES DERIVED FROM HISTORIC-ANALYTIC CASE STUDIES

ORGANIZED BY PHASES

ORGANIZED BY TYPES OF MEASURES

LEGEND

[ ]	Measure logically derived but not realistic, desirable, etc.
*	Measure actually taken
Al-M	Algerian-Moroccan Conflict: 1962-1963
Ang	Angola Conflict: 1950-1961
BP	Bay of Pigs: 1960-1961
Cy	Conflict on Cyprus: 1954-1964
Gr	Greek Insurgency: 1944-1949
I-C	India-China Border Conflict: 1954-1962
I-M	Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation: 1963-1965
Indo	Indonesian War of Independence: 1945-1949
Iran	Soviet-Iranian Conflict: 1941-1947
Ka	Kashmir Conflict: 1947-1965
Mal	Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960
Sin	Sinai (part of Suez-Sinai Conflicts: 1956)
Som	Somalian-Ethiopian-Kenyan Conflict: 1960-1964
Suez	Suez (part of Suez-Sinai Conflicts: 1956)
Ven	Venezuelan Insurgency: 1960-1963

(Underlining indicates that conflict was internal, with external involvement.)

ORGANIZED BY PHASES

IN PHASE I, MEASURES AIMED AT KEEPING DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Measures Involving Arms

Efforts to prevent surplus arms from falling into the hands of potential trouble-makers (Mal, Gr, Indo)

Agreement among suppliers to balance and limit arms aid to arms needed for internal security (Som, Indo)

Encouragement of dependence on external support (Cy)

Provision of internal defense arms (Ka)

Measures Involving Military Forces or Strategy

Efforts to keep foreign forces out (Iran)

Minimizing need for colonial, etc., land bases (Ang) and semi-permanent large-scale overseas military installations, as part of general strategy of reducing needs and prospects for intervention, by substituting:

- improved sea power (Cy*, Suez, Mal)
- long-range air-lift capability (Suez, Mal, Cy*, Iran)
- mobile ground forces (Cy*, Ang)
- sea- and land-based missiles (Suez)

Lessening of overseas areas' strategic and economic importance (BP, Mal)

Creation of believable deterrent threat, adequately communicated to would-be interveners (BP, Cy)

Diplomatic Measures, Primarily Involving the United Nations and/or Regional Organizations

Multilateralizing the dispute to apply prophylactic action (BP, Ka)

Isolation of remediable issues (à la Article 33) (BP)
and
"Stand-still" agreement (Ka)

Third-party pressures to utilize good offices, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication (I-M, BP, I-C, Som, Al-M)

Third-party or joint fact-finding, investigation, inspection, and reporting (BP, Indo, Ka, I-C, Al-M, I-M)

Delimitation of disputed borders (I-C)

prior to independence in the case of colonies (Al-M)

at a minimum, their international supervision (I-C)

Joint patrols of disputed areas (Ka)

Creation of buffer states (I-C)

International military presence (Iran)

Peaceful change procedures for disposition of disputed territories (Som*, Ka), including:

U.N. trusteeship (Article 81) (I-M)

plebiscite or other forms of self-determination (Ka, I-C, I-M*, Mal)

equity tribunal (Indo)

partition (Ka, Mal, Cy)

neutralization (Iran)

international regimes for vital waterways (Suez)

enforcement of agreement (Al-M)

Disposition of incompatible populations by:

resettlement of refugees (Ka)

population exchanges (Ka, Som)

[return of immigrants to homeland (Cy, Mal)]

restrictions on immigration (Mal)

resettlement away from sensitive frontiers (Som)

Regional or other agreements to forego territorial claims (Al-M)

Meaningful universal rules against aggressive take-over attempts (I-C, I-M) requiring universal membership (I-C)

combined with

Third-party agreements to abstain from special privilege or exacerbation of local quarrels (Suez) or unilateral intervention (BP)

Preparation for self-rule, with U.N., ILO, etc., help in training and education (Ang)

Guarantee of minority rights, with appropriate machinery (Som, Cy, BP)

External Political Measures Involving Great Powers, Neighbors, Allies, etc.

Avoidance of great-power war (Iran, Gr, Mal)

Abandonment of overseas colonies (Ang, Mal, Indo, Cy) through:

self-determination (Mal*)

provision of constructive outlets such as regionalism (Indo)

Enlightened political view during wartime (Gr)

Containment posture (BP)

Nonintervention policy (BP), through:

agreements to forego special privilege (Suez, Iran)

neutralization (Iran)

Deterrence of unilateral intervention or take-over (I-C, BP, I-M)

or

[Secure hold by intervention (I-C)]

Pressures on autocratic regimes to liberalize (BP, Gr)

Recognition, support, and assistance to non-Communist, liberal, moderate, popular elements (Suez, Gr, Cy)

Third-party guarantee of minority rights (Cy)

Ban on exile military training and activity (BP) with:

dispersal of exile groups (BP)

[avoidance of the harboring of refugees (I-C)]

Democracy in metropole (Ang)

Pressure on local parties to settle peacefully (Som)

Encouragement of regional identity and grouping (Suez, Som, Al-M)

Economic and Technological Measures

Efforts to divert attention from external issues, increase people's stake, and strengthen internal political, economic, and social fabric by focus on constructive modernizing and local and regional development goals (Cy, I-C, Al-M, Som, Suez*, I-M)

Particular effort to domesticate nomads (Som)

with

International financial assistance (Som) preferably multilateral (Suez)

and

Assurance of access to raw materials (Mal)

Reduction of area's strategic importance through development of substitutes for oil, rubber, etc., i.e. synthetic fuels and materials, nuclear energy, etc. (Suez, Iran, Mal)

Relocation of controversial canal routes (BP, Suez)

Internal Political Measures

Strengthening of internal political, economic, social fabric to develop common allegiance, reconcile factions, and strengthen national authority, stability, and cohesiveness (Mal, Iran, Al-M, Suez, BP, Ka, Cy)

Training for effective local police and peacekeeping function (Ka, Cy) preferably using regional organization (BP)

[Effective suppression policy (Cy)]

[efforts to keep indigenes divided (Ang*)]

[building of cohesiveness of minority rulers (Ang*)]

[repression of troublesome minorities (Som)]

[physical separation of factions (Cy)]

Promotion of genuine democracy through:

prevention of demagogic dictatorship (I-M)

encouragement of freedom and moderation (I-M)

avoidance of Communist take-over of legitimate nationalist movement (Gr)

plebiscite on form of government (Gr)

economic, political, social equality (Ang, Som, Cy)

"melting-pot-ism" (Som)

re-education of professional warriors (Cy)

Communications-Information Measures

Good communication between adversaries (Ka)

Improved internal communications and transport networks (Ka)

IN PHASE II, MEASURES AIMED AT PREVENTING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Measures Involving Arms

Suppliers' agreement to limit arms aid and sales to internal security needs (BP, I-M), kept in local area balance (Indo, I-M)

Quarantine of arms import into crisis area (Indo)

Small arms detection and control measures (Cy)

Shorter effective life for small arms (Cy)

U.N. publication of arms inventories and trade (Indo)

Measures Involving Military Forces or Strategy

Believed, clearly defined, great-power deterrence (Gr, I-C, Iran) preferably unified (I-C)

[Soviet deterrence of United States (BP)]

[Accession to successful quick take-over (Ka, Suez)]

Strong countervailing force in area (Iran*, I-M*)

or

[Efforts to keep foreign forces out (Ang)]

Elimination of foreign bases (Suez)

Barring of new forces in area (I-C), including adversaries' (Al-M)

Improvement of local and internal defenses and doctrine (I-C, Som, Cy) and command and control (Som)

Diplomatic Measures, Primarily Involving United Nations and/or Regional Organizations

Strong U.N. jurisdiction and pressures (BP, Iran, Cy) or regional (I-M)

Third-party or joint fact-finding, investigation, reporting (Ka, Al-M, BP, Indo, I-C, Som), and border control (Iran, Som)

Neutral buffer or demilitarized zone (Som, I-C)

Third-party channels, good offices, negotiations, and other peaceful settlement procedures (BP, Al-M, Suez, Som, Cy)

"Stand-still" agreement and other time-stretching devices (Iran, Indo, BP)

Interposition of international peacekeeping force (I-M, Ka, Indo) with ready air-lift capability (Ka)

Provision for self-determination and, if appropriate, transfer of territory (Al-M)

Guaranteed fair administration of plebiscite (Gr)

Sanctions (Iran)

Enforcement of international agreements against intervention (Ang, BP)

International refugee action (Ka) and assisted emigration (Al-M)

External Political Measures Involving Great Powers, Allies, Neighbors, etc.

Abandonment of overseas colonies (Suez)

[Harmonizing of metropole-settler relations (Ang*)]

[Strengthened colonial rule (Ang*)]

U.S.-Soviet cooperation (I-M)

Containment without isolation (I-C)

Encouragement of diversity in Communism (Mal)

Unified great-power deterrence (I-C)

or

[Soviet involvement to stimulate settlement activity (Som*)]

Clearly stated intentions of deterrers (Gr)

Refusal to negotiate under duress (Cy)

Encouragement of forces of moderation (I-M)

Support of popular non-Communist reform elements (Gr)

Meeting of legitimate demands and reasonable offers (I-C, Cy)

Pressure on parties: friendly (Ka); regional (I-M)

Diplomatic recognition to stabilize and legitimize de facto situation (Indo)

Internal Political Measures

Firm governmental cohesion, internal control, and stability (Iran, Indo, Al-M)

Improved defenses and border controls (I-C, Ang*)

Isolation and control of internal dissidence (Mal*) and if necessary expulsion of Communists (Mal*)

[Forceful white suppression (Ang*)]

but preferably

Reform policy accepting indigenous organization leadership leading to independence and majority rule (Ang)

Discouragement and diversion of local warmakers (Suez, I-C, Som) by providing constructive outlets for irredentist passions (Som)

Communications-Information Measures

Better intelligence (Som, Ka, I-C)

Good communications between adversaries (Som, Al-M, Suez)

IN PHASE III_1, MEASURES AIMED AT MODERATING HOSTILITIES

Measures Involving Arms

Arms acquisition by transfer rather than indigenous production (Ka)

Local balance (I-M*)

Measures Involving Military Forces or Strategy

Improved command and control (Ka)

Assistance in clarifying objectives and doctrine (Ka)

Diplomatic Measures, Primarily Involving United Nations and/or Regional Organizations

Accommodation of legitimate interests (Ka)

Supervision of free elections (Gr*)

International-organization presence on ground (Indo*) interposed between sides (Ka)

Border controls (Ka*)

External Political Measures Involving Great Powers, Allies, Neighbors, etc.

Great-power involvement (Indo*)

Discouragement of diplomatic recognition of insurgents (Gr*)

Internal Political Measures

Firm civilian control (Ka) and political education of military leaders (Ka)

Communications-Information Measures

Neutral or third-party communication channel (Ka*)

Improved communications (Ka)

IN PHASE III_1, MEASURES AIMED AT TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Measures Involving Arms

Arms aid made dependent on settlement (Som, Al-M) by agreement among suppliers (Suez)

Measures Involving Military Forces or Strategy

Early and credible superpower deterrent threat (Suez*)

or

Mutual strategic deterrence (BP*)

with

U.S. restraint (BP*)

with

Maintenance of U.S. marginal strategic superiority (BP*) preferably at low levels

Lessening of need for, e.g., Azores base by substitution of floating bases, VLR aircraft, improved ASW technology (Ang)

Reduction of locally available counterforce (Iran) [thus allowing pro-Soviet victory (Iran)]

[Military superiority of one side (Ka*, Som*)] with [local threats to expand conflict (Al-M)]

Attrition with a tolerated degree of violence (Mal*)

Enforcement of international agreements against intervention (Ang)

Efficient military and police action (Ang*)

Destruction of foundations for insurgency support by denial of food supplies, etc. (Mal*)

Diplomatic Measures Primarily Involving United Nations and/or Regional Organizations

U.N. deterrent threat (Suez, Ka, Som)

U.N. pressures to cease fire and negotiate (I-M, Al-M*, I-C, Ang*, Suez)

Pacific settlement (Ka, I-M) with arbitration of alleged violations (Indo*)

Barriers to national intervention (Ang, Al-M)

Third-party fact-finding (I-M)

Border controls (Mal)

Buffer zones (I-M)

Effective peacekeeping capability (Cy*, Indo, Suez*)

Peaceful change procedures (Indo*)

External Political Measures Involving Great Powers, Allies, Neighbors, etc.

Pressures on parties to cease fire, with negotiation and settlement efforts (Al-M, I-M*, I-C*, Ang)

Great-power deterrence (Som) with threat to intervene (Gr)

preferably based on

Superpower common interests (Suez*, Indo, I-C*)

[Disregard of treaty commitments (Iran)]

Interested parties' threat to intensify hostilities (Cy*)

Avoidance of outside intervention (Al-M*)

Isolation of conflict from external support (Mal)

Economic and Technological Measures

Strong economic pressures (Ka, Indo)

Development of substitutes for, e.g., Azores base (Ang):

floating bases (Ang)

VLR aircraft (Ang)

improved ASW technology (Ang)

Internal Political Measures

Stringently limited war aims (Som)

Effectively united and strong country (BP*, I-C, [Ang*])

or

[Prolongation of country's disunity (Iran)]

Reform, aid to liberal opposition, making local leaders allies in process (Cy, Ang)

Relocation from sensitive areas of trans-border ethnic groups (I-M*, Som)

Communications-Information Measures

Better intelligence (Cy, BP)

Better communications among adversaries (Cy)

IN PHASE IV, MEASURES AIMED AT PREVENTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

Measures Involving Arms

Arms limitations by external suppliers (Sin, Ka, Iran)

Joint or impartial supervision, inspection, and control of any arms-surrender agreements (Gr)

Measures Involving Military Forces or Strategy

Internal security operations, including frontiers (Gr, Iran)

Meaningful deterrent threats (Gr*, Iran)

[Threat of military action to restore rights (Suez*)] through [retention of third-party troops (Sin)]

Military assistance for internal security (Gr)

Diplomatic Measures, Primarily Involving United Nations and/or Regional Organizations

Active and specific U.N. cognizance and pressures (Ka*, Iran*, Sin, Gr), fact-finding and reporting (Gr*)

Border controls, including mobile ground and aerial patrols, border-sealing, and enforcement of border guarantees (Ka, Sin)

Peacekeeping force (Indo, Gr, Sin), geared to guerrilla warfare (Indo)

Insulation from great-power competition (Ka), through multilateralized deterrent (Iran, Ka)

Settlement efforts directed to underlying dispute (Sin, Ka)

Condemnation of propaganda warfare (Sin)

Increased U.N. broadcasting capability (Sin) with satellite facilities, etc.

International refugee action to readmit, resettle with compensation, etc. (Sin, Ka)

Population transfers (Cy)

External Political Measures Involving Great Powers, Allies, Neighbors, etc.

Effective guarantees by great powers (Sin, Indo*, Ka, Cy)

with

great-power deterrence (Sin, Iran*)

preferably through

great-power cooperation (Indo)

and

insulation from great-power competition (Ka*, Gr)

with

development of ways to achieve influence without war (Iran)

Pressures by external arms suppliers (Sin, Ka)

Economic and Technological Measures

Economic and financial assistance (Gr*) for refugee movements (Ka, Sin)

Internal Political Measures

Cohesive and effective regime able to maintain internal security (Cy, Gr*, Iran)

Accommodation of legitimate demands and reconciliation policy (Gr, Iran)

or

Effective suppression of Communists (Gr) and [of popular forces (Cy)]

Communications-Information Measures

Better intelligence (Ka)

IN PHASE III_2, MEASURES TO MODERATE AND TERMINATE RESUMED HOSTILITIES

Measures Involving Arms

Restrictions by suppliers of arms, spare parts, ammunition (Ka*)

Detection and control of transfer and storage of arms (Cy*)

Adequate air transport (Ka)

Measures Involving Military Forces or Strategy

Mutual local deterrence with forces balanced at low level (Ka)

One-sided deterrent threat (Cy*, Iran*)

Diplomatic Measures, Primarily Involving United Nations and/or Regional Organizations

Vigorous pressures on parties to negotiate and settle (Cy*, Ka*)

Peacekeeping force (Cy*)

Neutralization of intervention threats (Ka*)

External Political Measures Involving Great Powers, Allies, Neighbors, etc.

[Soviet threat activating U.S. interest and willingness to intervene (Cy)]

Great-power neutralization of contingent threats (Ka*) with increase in costs of fighting

Internal stability in interested outside countries (Cy)

Economic and Technological Measures

Alternative rail and road lines (Ka)

Internal Political Measures

Clarification of parties' aims (Ka)

Cohesiveness and stability (Ka, Iran*)

Strengthened civilian control to restrain military (Ka)

Communications-Information Measures

Better communications (Cy)

ORGANIZED BY TYPES OF MEASURES

MEASURES INVOLVING ARMS

Phase I

Efforts to prevent surplus arms from falling into the hands of potential trouble-makers (Mal, Gr, Indo)

Agreement among suppliers to balance and limit arms aid to arms needed for internal security (Som, Indo)

Encouragement of dependence on external support (Cy)

Provision of internal defense arms (Ka)

Phase II

Suppliers' agreement to limit arms aid and sales to internal security needs (BP, I-M), kept in local area balance (Indo, I-M)

Quarantine of arms import into crisis area (Indo)

Small arms detection and control measures (Cy)

Shorter effective life for small arms (Cy)

U.N. publication of arms inventories and trade (Indo)

Phase III_1

Arms acquisition by transfer rather than indigenous production (Ka)

Local balance (I-M*)

Arms aid made dependent on settlement (Som, Al-M) by agreement among suppliers (Suez)

Phase IV

Arms limitations by external suppliers (Sin, Ka, Iran)

Joint or impartial supervision, inspection, and control of any arms-surrender agreements (Gr)

Phase III_2

Restrictions by suppliers of arms, spare parts, ammunition (Ka*)

Detection and control of transfer and storage of arms (Cy*)

Adequate air transport (Ka)

MEASURES INVOLVING MILITARY FORCES OR STRATEGY

Phase I

Efforts to keep foreign forces out (Iran)

Minimizing need for colonial, etc., land bases (Ang) and semi-permanent large-scale overseas military installations, as part of general strategy of reducing needs and prospects for intervention, by substituting:

improved sea power (Cy*, Suez, Mal)

long-range air-lift capability (Suez, Mal, Cy*, Iran)

mobile ground forces (Cy*, Ang)

sea- and land-based missiles (Suez)

Lessening of overseas' strategic and economic importance (BP, Mal)

Believable deterrent threat, adequately communicated to would-be interveners (BP, Cy)

Phase II

Believed, clearly defined, great-power deterrence (Gr, I-C, Iran), preferably unified (I-C)

[Soviet deterrence of United States (BP)]

[Accession to successful take-over (Ka, Suez)]

Strong countervailing force in area (Iran*, I-M*)

or

[Efforts to keep foreign forces out (Ang)]

Elimination of foreign bases (Suez)

Barring of new forces in area (I-C), including adversaries' (Al-M)

Improvement of local and internal defenses and doctrine (I-C, Som, Cy), and command and control (Som)

Phase III$_1$

Improved command and control (Ka)

Assistance in clarifying objectives and doctrine (Ka)

Early and credible superpower deterrent threat (Suez*)

or

Mutual strategic deterrence (BP*)

with

U.S. restraint (BP*)

combined with

U.S. marginal strategic superiority (BP*) preferably at low levels

Lessened need for, e.g., Azores base by substituting floating bases, VLR aircraft, improved ASW technology (Ang)

Reduction of locally available counterforce (Iran) thus [allowing pro-Soviet victory (Iran)]

[Military superiority of one side (Ka*, Som*)] with [local threats to expand conflict (Al-M)]

Attrition with a tolerated degree of violence (Mal*)

Enforcement of international agreements against intervention (Ang)

Efficient military and police action (Ang*)

Destruction of foundations for insurgency support by denial of food supplies, etc. (Mal*)

Phase IV

Internal security operations, including frontiers (Gr, Iran)

Meaningful deterrent threats (Gr*, Iran)

[Threat of military action to restore rights (Suez*)] through [retention of third-party troops (Sin)]

Military assistance for internal security (Gr)

Phase III_2

Mutual local deterrence with forces balanced at low level (Ka)

One-sided deterrent threat (Cy*, Iran*)

DIPLOMATIC MEASURES, PRIMARILY INVOLVING UNITED NATIONS AND/OR REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Phase I

Multilateralizing of the dispute to apply prophylactic action (BP, Ka)

Isolation of remediable issues (à la Article 33) (BP)

"Stand-still" agreement (Ka)

Third-party pressures to utilize good offices, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication (I-M, BP, I-C, Som, Al-M)

Third-party or joint fact-finding, investigation, inspection, and reporting (BP, Indo, Ka, I-C, Al-M, I-M)

Delimitation of disputed borders (I-C)

settlement prior to independence in the case of colonies (Al-M)

at a minimum, their international supervision (I-C)

Joint patrols of disputed areas (Ka)

Creation of buffer states (I-C)

International military presence (Iran)

Peaceful change procedures for disposition of disputed territories (Som*, Ka), including:

U.N. trusteeship (Article 81) (I-M)

plebiscite or other forms of self-determination (Ka, I-C, I-M*, Mal)

equity tribunal (Indo)

partition (Ka, Mal, Cy)

neutralization (Iran)

international regimes for vital waterways (Suez)

enforcement of agreement (Al-M)

Disposition of incompatible populations by:

resettlement of refugees (Ka)

population exchanges (Ka, Som)

[return of immigrants to homeland (Cy, Mal)]

restrictions on immigration (Mal)

resettlement away from sensitive frontiers (Som)

Regional or other agreements to forego territorial claims (Al-M)

Meaningful universal rules against aggressive take-over attempts (I-C, I-M) requiring universal membership (I-C)

combined with

Third-party agreements to abstain from special privilege or exacerbation of local quarrels (Suez) or unilateral intervention (BP)

Preparation for self-rule, with U.N., ILO, etc., help in training and education (Ang)

Guarantee of minority rights, with appropriate machinery (Som, Cy, BP)

Phase II

Strong U.N. jurisdiction and pressures (BP, Iran, Cy) or regional (I-M)

Third-party or joint fact-finding, investigation, and reporting (Ka, Al-M, BP, Indo, I-C, Som), border control (Iran, Som)

Neutral buffer or demilitarized zone (Som, I-C)

Third-party channels, good offices, negotiations, and other peaceful settlement procedures (BP, Al-M, Suez, Som, Cy)

"Stand-still" agreement and other time-stretching devices (Iran, Indo, BP)

Interposition of international peacekeeping force (I-M, Ka, Indo) with ready air-lift capability (Ka)

Self-determination and, if appropriate, transfer of territory (Al-M)

Guaranteed fair administration of plebiscite (Gr)

Sanctions (Iran)

Enforcement of international agreements against intervention (Ang, BP)

International refugee action (Ka) and assisted emigration (Al-M)

Phase III$_1$

Accommodation of legitimate interests (Ka)

Supervision of free elections (Gr*)

International organization presence on ground (Indo*), interposed between sides (Ka)

Border controls (Ka*)

U.N. deterrent threat (Suez, Ka, Som)

U.N. pressures to cease fire and negotiate (I-M, Al-M*, I-C, Ang*, Suez)

Pacific settlement (Ka, I-M) with arbitration of alleged violations (Indo*)

Barriers to national intervention (Ang, Al-M)

Third-party fact-finding (I-M)

Border controls (Mal)

Buffer zones (I-M)

Effective peacekeeping capability (Cy*, Indo, Suez*)

Peaceful change procedures (Indo*)

Phase IV

Active and specific U.N. cognizance and pressures (Ka*, Iran*, Sin, Gr), fact-finding and reporting (Gr*)

Border controls, including mobile ground and aerial patrols, border-sealing, and enforcement of border guarantees (Ka, Sin)

Peacekeeping force (Indo, Gr, Sin) geared to guerrilla warfare (Indo)

Insulation from great-power competition (Ka), with multilateralized deterrent (Iran, Ka)

Settlement efforts directed to underlying dispute (Sin, Ka)

Condemnation of propaganda warfare (Sin)

Increased U.N. broadcasting capability (Sin), using satellite facilities, etc.

International refugee action to readmit, resettle with compensation, etc. (Sin, Ka)

Population transfers (Cy)

Phase III_2

Vigorous pressures on parties to negotiate and settle (Cy*, Ka*)

Peacekeeping force (Cy*)

Neutralization of intervention threats (Ka*)

EXTERNAL POLITICAL MEASURES INVOLVING GREAT POWERS, NEIGHBORS, ALLIES, ETC.

Phase I

Avoidance of great-power war (Iran, Gr, Mal)

Abandonment of overseas colonies (Ang, Mal, Indo, Cy) through:

self-determination (Mal*)

provision of constructive outlets such as regionalism (Indo)

Enlightened political view during wartime (Gr)

Containment posture (BP)

Nonintervention policy (BP), through:

agreements to forego special privilege (Suez, Iran)

neutralization (Iran)

Deterrence of unilateral intervention or take-over (I-C, BP, I-M)

or

[Acquisition of secure hold by intervention (I-C)]

Pressures on autocratic regimes to liberalize (BP, Gr)

Recognition, support, and assistance to non-Communist, liberal, moderate, popular elements (Suez, Gr, Cy)

Third-party guarantee of minority rights (Cy)

Ban on exile military training and activity (BP)

dispersal of exile groups (BP)

[avoidance of harboring refugees (I-C)]

Democracy in metropole (Ang)

Pressure on local parties to settle peacefully (Som)

Encouragement of regional identity and grouping (Suez, Som, Al-M)

Phase II

Abandonment of overseas colonies (Suez)

or

[Harmonizing of metropole-settler relations (Ang*)]

[Strengthening of colonial rule (Ang*)]

U.S.-Soviet cooperation (I-M)

Containment without isolation (I-C)

Encouragement of diversity in Communism (Mal)

Unified great-power deterrence (I-C)

or

[Soviet involvement to stimulate settlement activity (Som*)]

Clearly stated intentions of deterrers (Gr)

Refusal to negotiate under duress (Cy)

Encouragement of forces of moderation (I-M)

Support of popular non-Communist reform elements (Gr)

Meeting of legitimate demands and reasonable offers (I-C, Cy)

Pressure on parties: friendly (Ka); regional (I-M)

Diplomatic recognition to stabilize and legitimize de facto situation (Indo)

Phase III$_1$

Pressures on parties to cease fire, negotiation and settlement efforts (Al-M, I-M*, I-C*, Ang)

Great-power deterrence (Som) with threat to intervene (Gr)

preferably based on

Superpower common interests (Suez*, Indo, I-C*)

[Disregard of treaty commitments (Iran)]

Interested parties' threat to intensify hostilities (Cy*)

Avoidance of outside intervention (Al-M*)

Isolation of conflict from external support (Mal)

Phase IV

Effective guarantees by great powers (Sin, Indo*, Ka, Cy)

and

deterrence (Sin, Iran*)

preferably with

great-power cooperation (Indo)

and

insulation from great-power competition (Ka*, Gr)

with

development of ways to achieve influence without war (Iran)

Pressures by external arms suppliers (Sin, Ka)

Phase III_2

[Soviet threat activating U.S. interest and willingness to intervene (Cy)]

Great-power neutralization of contingent threats (Ka*) with increase in costs of fighting

Internal stability in interested outside countries (Cy)

ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES

Phase I

Efforts to create diversion from external issues, increase people's stake, and strengthen internal political, economic, and social fabric by focus on constructive modernizing, local and regional development goals (Cy, I-C, Al-M, Som, Suez*, I-M)

Particular efforts to domesticate nomads (Som)

with

International financial assistance (Som), preferably multilateral (Suez)

and

Assurance of access to raw materials (Mal)

Lessening of area's strategic importance by developing substitutes for oil, rubber, etc., i.e., synthetic fuels and materials, nuclear energy, etc. (Iran, Suez, Mal)

Relocation of controversial canal routes (BP, Suez)

Phase II

[No economic measures suggested in Phase II]

Phase III_1

Strong economic pressures (Ka, Indo)

Development of substitutes for, e.g., Azores base (Ang):

floating bases (Ang)

VLR aircraft (Ang)

improved ASW technology (Ang)

Phase IV

Economic and financial assistance (Gr*), for refugee movements (Ka, Sin)

Phase III_2

Alternative rail and road lines (Ka)

INTERNAL POLITICAL MEASURES

Phase I

Strengthening of internal political, economic, social fabric to develop common allegiance, reconcile factions, and strengthen national authority, stability, and cohesiveness (Mal, Iran, Al-M, Suez, BP, Ka, Cy)

Training for effective local police and peacekeeping function (Ka, Cy), preferably using regional organization (BP)

[Effective suppression policy (Cy)]

[keeping indigenes divided (Ang*)]

[building cohesiveness of minority rulers (Ang*)]

[repressing troublesome minorities (Som)]

[physically separating factions (Cy)]

Encouragement of genuine democracy by:

prevention of demagogic dictatorship (I-M)

encouragement of freedom and moderation (I-M)

avoidance of Communist take-over of legitimate nationalist movement (Gr)

plebiscite on form of government (Gr)

economic, political, social equality (Ang, Som, Cy)

"melting-pot-ism" (Som)

re-education of professional warriors (Cy)

Phase II

Firm governmental cohesion, internal control, and stability (Iran, Indo, Al-M)

Improved defenses and border controls (I-C, Ang*)

Isolation and control of internal dissidence (Mal*) and if necessary expulsion of Communists (Mal*)

[Forceful white suppression (Ang*)]

but preferably

Reform policy accepting indigenous organization leadership leading to independence and majority rule (Ang)

Discouragement and diversion of local warmakers (Suez, I-C, Som) by providing constructive outlets for irredentist passions (Som)

Phase III_1

Firm civilian control (Ka) and political education of military leaders (Ka)

Stringently limited war aims (Som)

Effectively united and strong country (BP*, I-C, [Ang*])

or

[Efforts to keep country disunited (Iran)]

Reform, aid to liberal opposition making local leaders allies in process (Cy, Ang)

Relocation from sensitive areas of trans-border ethnic groups (I-M*, Som)

Phase IV

Development of cohesive and effective regime able to maintain internal security (Cy, Gr*, Iran)

Accommodation of legitimate demands and reconciliation policy (Gr, Iran)

or

Effective suppression of Communists (Gr) and [of popular forces (Cy)]

Phase III_2

Clarification of parties' aims (Ka)

Cohesiveness and stability (Ka, Iran*)

Strengthened civilian control to restrain military (Ka)

COMMUNICATIONS-INFORMATION MEASURES

Phase I

Good communication between adversaries (Ka)

Improved internal communications and transport networks (Ka)

Phase II

Better intelligence (Som, Ka, I-C)

Good communications between adversaries (Som, Al-M, Suez)

Phase III_1

Neutral or third-party communication channel (Ka^*)

Improved communications (Ka)

Better intelligence (Cy, BP)

Better communications among adversaries (Cy)

Phase IV

Better intelligence (Ka)

Phase III_2

Better communications (Cy)