


**THINGS FALL APART:
The Disintegration of Empire and the Causes of War**

ARCHIVES

By

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation argues that the disintegration and collapse of empires cause wars and crises by creating some of the conditions and causes of war commonly identified by scholars. When empires disintegrate and collapse, the metropole withdraws its power from its peripheral territories and newly independent successor states emerge. This new situation gives rise to several problems: a power vacuum develops forcing successor states to provide for their own security and leading them and other states to try to fill the vacuum; successor states engage in state-building, which occurs at different rates for different states; ethnic groups are divided from their homelands; multi-ethnic states are created; and, territorial borders become issues of dispute. As a result of these problems, five causes of war develop, which can lead to wars and crises. International rules of the game become unsettled and ambiguous because a new balance of power develops and new issues of international concern arise. Power shifts as successor states build institutions for self-rule, and alliances form and collapse in response to the ever changing situation. Third, the new situation that occurs as the empire disintegrates increases uncertainty about the capabilities of the successor states, about the alliances that exist, and about the intentions of states, making it difficult to determine the new balance of power and the intentions of other states. Fourth, nationalism grows as states seek to unite with their diaspora and protect them from the discrimination of the multi-ethnic state's government. Fifth, competition for leadership in successor states cause leaders to have a weak hold on power. To test this argument, I look at the seven wars and two crises that occurred when the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans disintegrated in the nineteenth century.

This study serve three purposes. First, it studies the causes of war that result from the disintegration and collapse of empires. Second, and more relevant for today's policy-makers, this study can help us understand the consequences of the disintegration of multi-ethnic states and, in the process, provide guidance for policy-makers. Third, this dissertation tests several hypotheses about the causes of war.

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**For My Parents,
Because of the foundation they provide,
I can build my castles in the air.**

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed,
and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

The Second Coming
William Butler Yeats

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

A cursory look at history suggests that wars are more frequent in regions of imperial disintegration and collapse. Since the conclusion of the French revolutionary wars, three “world wars” have occurred—the Crimean War, World War I, and World War II—partly in response to the disintegration and collapse of empires.¹ The disintegration of the Russian Empire as a result of the First World War also spawned several conflicts.² During the mid-1800s, the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire contributed to the Wars of Italian Unification and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Europe, however, is not the only region of the world to suffer from wars that resulted from the disintegration and collapse of empires. In the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict can be traced, in part, to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers’ responses to it.³ In Latin America, the collapse of the Spanish Empire also led to several wars.⁴

This poses an important puzzle: why and how does imperial disintegration and collapse cause war? In this dissertation, I provide an answer to this question. While answering this question, I am also able to weigh in on important theoretical and policy questions. For theoreticians, the study of this question provides a laboratory in which to test theories on the causes of war. Many theories purport to explain the causes of war. These theories, however, need to be further developed and tested. While this research does not provide a definitive test of any general theory about the causes of war, it elaborates and uses some of these theories to explain why wars occur when empires collapse. In so doing, it should provide some insight into the applicability of these theories. For policy-makers, the answer to this question sheds light on the nature of dangers that they will face in

¹On the Crimean War, see chapter 4; on World War I, see Chapter 6; and on World War II, see P.M.H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe*, (New York, NY: Longman, 1986), pp. 14-38.

²Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 129-209 discusses these conflicts. Even though his purpose is to use these conflicts to demonstrate the relationship between revolutions and war, his case studies also provide evidence for the relationship between imperial disintegration and war.

³On the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991).

⁴Pelham Horton Box, *The Origins of the Paraguayan War*, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967); and Robert N. Burr, *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967).

the future when multi-ethnic states disintegrate. Few empires will collapse in the future, but many multi-ethnic states will, and policy-makers will need to deal with the consequences. The answers provided in this dissertation will provide information about future dangers and possible policy prescriptions.

1.1 Definitions

This section defines three key terms: empire, zone of imperial retraction and successor states.

An empire is a political unit in which a dominant political unit, the center, determines the international and domestic politics of a subordinate political unit, the periphery.⁵ The center, which will also be referred to as the metropole, is the dominant political actor in the empire;⁶ it determines the politics of the imperial territories and provides the bulk of the capabilities needed for imperial defense and for imperial order. The periphery is either the state(s) or territories(s) controlled by the center. The periphery has two essential characteristics: (a) the people in the periphery must consider themselves to have a separate identity from the people of the center; and, (b) the people of the periphery must consider themselves to have an ethnic homeland that lies within the territory that the empire controls. Thus, the Soviet Union was clearly an empire. Russia, and Moscow in particular, performed the role of the center, while the Eastern European states and republics of the Former Soviet Union were peripheral territories with people who had distinct identities and territories. Furthermore, Russia determined the politics of its peripheral territories by installing communist regimes and by maintaining their hold on power when local opposition threatened to overthrow these regimes.

Empires differ from multi-ethnic states. A multi-ethnic state, like an empire, has people who

⁵The term empire has been defined in many ways. Unfortunately, these definitions are frequently fuzzy, making it difficult to identify an empire when one sees one. Definitions of empire, and the study of empires, also suffer from the emotional and political baggage that people associate with them. This problem leads people to define empires either too broadly or too narrowly in order to support particular views of empires and imperialism. For definitions of empires, the best source is Michael W. Doyle, *Empires*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 30-47. Doyle defines empire as "a relationship...in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society."

My definition comes from Alexander Motyl, "From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective," in *Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union*, edited by Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 15-43. While this definition does not conflict with Doyle's definition, it is more specific.

⁶The metropole can be a city, like Rome, or a state, like Spain.

have separate identities; however, in multi-ethnic states, these people do not have their own territory within the borders of the state. The fifty states of the United States provide an example of a multi-ethnic state, not an empire. Today, the US is a multi-ethnic state because the many ethnic groups that live in its territories have no "homeland" within the territorial boundaries of America.⁷

The zone of imperial retraction is the territorial area where the empire's control once was, but is now weakened. When the empire declines and collapses, it begins to lose control over some of its territories either because the territories gain their independence or because they are incorporated into other empires and states. These former imperial territories, which become successor states, encompass the area known as the zone of imperial retraction.

Finally, a successor state is a former imperial territory that has gained its autonomy or its freedom from the empire. In other words, it is any political-territorial unit that exists in the zone of imperial retraction. Two types of "states" can be successor states: those territories which were once part of the empire, but have gained some level of independence from the empire and the rump empire that remains once it has lost control of some of its territory. Thus, in 1829, Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire. Both Greece and the remainder of the Ottoman Empire were successor states.

1.2 Related Literature

Little sustained work on the consequences, particularly war, of the disintegration and collapse of empires and multi-ethnic states exists.⁸ Almost all of the work that addresses this issue falls into one of two categories. The first category briefly mentions the relationship between imperial disintegration and war. The second category is the theoretically informed case studies of the collapse of empires. Many people have offered hypotheses to explain why wars occur when empires collapse. These provides a useful field from which to cull ideas. Four areas of study appear to be particularly common when studying the collapse of empires and war.

⁷For most of America's existence, one could consider it an empire because of the presence of the American Indians who had their own territories and their own identities.

⁸One scholar has said that "It is surprising that more scholarship in the field of International Relations has not been directed toward examining the coming apart of empires, particularly since present-day scholars have been eyewitnesses to the disintegration of several great empires." Donald J. Puchala, "The History of the Future of International Relations," *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 8 (1994), p. 189.

1.2.1 Ancient Hatreds⁹

Some scholars, politicians, and journalists claim that when empires collapse ancient hatreds among groups and states cause war.¹⁰ Groups and states will have interacted with each other both before they were incorporated into the empire and during their time under imperial rule. These interactions may have been either peaceful or conflictual. If their interactions have been peaceful, then their post-imperial relations tend to be peaceful. If their interactions have been violent, for example if they fought wars or if one side committed atrocities against another group, then they tend to want to go to war to seek revenge for these wrongs. During the empire's existence, they cannot redress these wrongs. The center's power and authority maintains order within its territories and prevents conflict from breaking out. When the empire collapses, the constraints that prevented these adversaries from fighting each other disappear, and the newly freed groups and states may take advantage of this opportunity to settle their ancient hatreds.

This argument has at least three problems. First, not all adversaries with ancient hatreds go to war with each other. Some go to war, and some do not. Furthermore, not all wars that occur when central authority collapses occur between adversaries who have ancient hatreds. For example, the Europeans who settled in America and their descendants seriously mistreated the American Indians, yet the two groups are not constantly at war.¹¹ This hypothesis fails to provide the

⁹While analysts refer to this explanation as the "ancient hatreds" argument, it is somewhat of a misnomer. The events that create these hatreds are not necessarily ancient. For example, the animosity between the Croats and Serbs stems from the Second World War, not from the pre-Ottoman era. Instead, it would be better to refer to "historical grievances." Since the literature refers to "ancient hatreds," however, I will use this term here.

¹⁰For discussions of the ancient hatreds argument, see Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, edited by Michael E. Brown, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 12-13; S.M. Burke, *The Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies*, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1974); Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*, (New York: Vintage Press, 1993); Charles A. Kupchan, "Introduction: Nationalism Resurgent," in *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, edited by Charles A. Kupchan, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 9; Serge Schmemmann, "Ethnic Battles Flaring in Former Soviet Fringe," *New York Times*, May 24, 1992, p. 10; Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, edited by Michael E. Brown, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 79-102; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 23-25.

¹¹On the treatment of the Indians and the large scale death that followed the colonization of America, see David E. Stannard, *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

conditions under which ancient hatreds will lead to war. Second, this hypothesis fails to distinguish mythical history from reality. Sometimes, leaders and analysts justify or blame wars on ancient hatreds when no ancient hatred actually exists. These hatreds may be non-existent, or they may be myths created by leaders or historians for their own reasons.¹² For example, some analysts blame the conflicts in South Asia on ancient hatreds, when history does not necessarily support this interpretation.¹³

Third, even when the ancient hatreds explanation has some validity, it tells us little about how to prevent war. The best theories should provide policy prescriptions. They provide policy-makers with information that helps them develop policies to prevent or to stop wars. The ancient hatreds argument does not help policy-makers prevent war. It suggests that war results from historical grievances that must be avenged. The only solution that follows from this hypothesis, therefore, is to change the past.

Despite these problems, the ancient hatreds argument highlights two issues that help us to understand why wars occur when empires and multi-ethnic states collapse. First, this argument focuses our attention on the withdrawal of central authority as an important condition for post-imperial war. With the collapse of central authority, the interests of the successor states and the situations in which they find themselves become important issues. Second, this argument suggests that history influences the foreign policy of successor states.¹⁴ Analysts should consider a state's history, particularly its perception of history, to understand when, where and why wars occur.

1.2.2 International Order

A few scholars have asserted that the collapse of empires and states creates an ambiguous

¹²On the manipulation of history, see Holger H. Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War," in *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War*, revised and expanded edition, edited by Steven E. Miller, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 262-300; Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, edited by Michael E. Brown, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 107; Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 17-19, 312-14; and Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," pp. 26-30.

¹³On ancient hatred as it relates to South Asia, see Sumit Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 85-6.

¹⁴Several analysts look at a state's or group's history, particularly its perception of history, to help explain when and why war occur. See footnote 10 for cites.

international order, which leads to war.¹⁵ An international order is a set of rules that define the rights, responsibilities, and spheres of influence of states.¹⁶ Thus, during the Cold War, the international order defined American and Soviet spheres of influence. Rules are ambiguous in two situations. First, when states disagree about what the rules actually *are*, the international order is ambiguous. In this case, two or more states have different interpretations of what the rules are. Second, when states disagree about what the rules *ought* to be, the international order is ambiguous. In this situation, states agree about what the international order is, but they disagree about whether the existing order accurately reflects the interests, will and power of the states that compose the international system.

Many scholars who argue that the collapse of empires and states unsettles the international order fail to explain why this change occurs. Still, they do provide two explanations. First, hegemonic stability theory and the theory of hegemonic war claim that changes in the distribution of power cause the international order to change.¹⁷ When empires and states collapse, the distribution

¹⁵Peter Calvocoressi, *World Order and New States*, (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co. Ltd., 1962); Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 44-75; Peter Lyon, "New States and International Order," in *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C.A.W. Manning*, edited by Alan James, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 24-59; Kemal Shehadi, *Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-up of States*, Adelphi Paper 283, (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 51-52; and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," in *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 231-2.

¹⁶Few of the scholars who discuss the relationship between imperial collapse and international order actually define what is meant by international order. Instead, I equate international order with "international rules of the game." For a discussion of international rules of the game, see Raymond Cohen, *International Politics: The rules of the game*, (New York: Longman Group Ltd, 1981). The literature on international regimes is also useful on this issue. See Stephen D. Krasner, editor, *International Regimes*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and idem, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

¹⁷On hegemonic stability theory, see Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*, (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in *Change in the International System*, edited by Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson, and Alexander L. George, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 131-162; and Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics*, 28 (April 1976): 317-47.

On theories of hegemonic war, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); idem, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," in *The Origin And Prevention of Major Wars*, edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 15-38; A.F.K. Organiski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980); idem, "The Power

of power changes, which causes the international order to change. Second, new issues and new events can cause the international order to become ambiguous.¹⁸

When the international order is ambiguous, war is more likely for three reasons. First, states can go to war to change the international order. In other words, the purpose of the war is to create a new set of rules and territorial boundaries.¹⁹ Second, an unsettled international order can lead states to adopt competing policies, leading to violence.²⁰

While this hypothesis provides an interesting argument, it suffers from two significant flaws. First, it is under-specified. The causal logic relating international order to war is under-developed. Second, this hypothesis has not been empirically tested. This flaw is particularly problematic because of the controversy that surrounds the debate relating international regimes to war.²¹

1.2.3 State-building

When empires collapse, successor states need to engage in state-building.²² Successor states frequently lack legitimate, developed institutions when they gain independence. Thus, they must develop political, economic, social, and military institutions. They must also train personnel to

Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," in *Handbook of War Studies*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 171-194; and Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by R. Warner, (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1954).

¹⁸Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," p. 231 asserts this explanation.

¹⁹Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics*.

²⁰Shehadi, *Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-up of States*, p. 51.

²¹The best work on this is John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/5), pp. 5-49. Also useful is Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in *International Regimes*, pp. 173-194. For criticisms of Mearsheimer's argument and his reply to these criticisms, see Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," John Gerard Ruggie, "The False Premise of Realism," Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," and Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51, 52-61, 62-70, 71-81, and 82-93.

²²On the need for successor states to engage in state-building, see Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, "Introduction," in *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, edited by Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 3-5; P.J. Boyce, *Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), Calvocoressi, *World Order and New States*, pp. 34, 42; Robert C. Good, "State-building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in New States," in *Neutrality and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs*, edited by Laurence W. Martin, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 3-12; and Wilson Carey McWilliams, "Political Development and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy and the Developing Nations*, edited by Richard Butwell, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), pp. 11-39.

manage these institutions. This problem is made more difficult because these states are normally poor. They lack the resources needed to accomplish this goal. In addition to the need to develop institutions, successor states will develop institutions at different rates.²³ Some states will build institutions faster than other states.

The need to engage in state-building and the problems associated with it can create domestic instability, which can lead to war.²⁴ Domestic instability can cause war because insecure leaders may try to divert attention from domestic problems or because outside powers take advantage of the weak state.

This hypothesis provides a potentially reasonable explanation relating the disintegration of empires to war. Nevertheless, the existing literature suffers from two problems. First, it is extremely limited; it makes sense that domestic politics should cause war in more ways than one. Second, the diversionary war hypothesis has not been adequately tested, and those empirical tests that exist are inconclusive.²⁵

1.2.4 Multi-ethnic States and Diaspora

Successor states also tend to suffer from ethnic problems.²⁶ When empires collapse, territorial borders rarely coincide with ethnic, linguistic, or religious boundaries, creating ethnic problems for successor states; they tend to be multi-ethnic. In other words, more than one ethnic group may live within a single state. In addition, successor states may have diaspora, ethnic brethren who live outside their ethnic homeland.

²³On uneven state-building, see Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," pp. 110-111.

²⁴On the general issue of domestic instability and war, see Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in *Handbook of War Studies*, edited by Manus Midlarsky, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 259-288. For a discussion that specifically relates domestic instability in new states to war, see Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," in *America's Strategy in a Changing World*, edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 332-336.

²⁵Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War."


²⁶On ethnic divisions and successor states, see Banuazizi and Weiner, "Introduction," pp. pp. 1-3; Istvan Deak, "Uncovering Eastern Europe's Dark History," *Orbis*, Vol. 34 (Winter 1990), pp. 51-66; Good, "State-building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States"; Lyon, "New States and International Order," p. 51; McWilliams, "Political Development and Foreign Policy," pp. 27, 34; Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 233-236; and Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development," *World Politics*, Vol. 22 (July 1971), pp. 665-683.

These ethnic problems can cause war for two reasons. First, states may go to war to unite with their ethnic brethren. Second, multi-ethnic successor states may suffer from domestic instability and conflict that can lead to war.

As with the previous hypothesis, this one provides a reasonable explanation of the phenomena. It identifies a real issue that arises when empires collapse and relates it to war. Unfortunately, most scholars who frame this hypothesis fail to develop the hypothesis fully or to test it.

1.3 Summary of the Argument

This dissertation argues that the disintegration and collapse of empire is a significant cause of war. Its argument is straight forward. Simply put, the disintegration of empires causes problems that cause causes of war that scholars have identified. These causes, in turn, cause wars and crises. Thus, imperial disintegration does not cause war in some new, unique way. It causes war in ways that scholars have recognized for years. Wars are more common when empires disintegrate and collapse because imperial disintegration and collapse increases the frequency and intensity of these causes. At the same time, disintegration and collapse also increases the number of potential causes of war, further increasing the number of wars that occur.



STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT
FIGURE 1-1

Three characteristics of imperial disintegration and collapse contribute to the outbreak of war: the withdrawal of the metropole's power and influence from its peripheral territories helps create a power vacuum in the zone of imperial retraction; the creation of newly independent successor states that must now provide for their own security; and, the legacy of imperial policies that last long after the empire has disintegrated.

These characteristics lead to several problems that give rise to the causes and conditions of war. First, when empires disintegrate a power vacuum develops in the zone of imperial retraction. Where the metropole once maintained order and provided security within its peripheral territories,

the newly independent successor states must provide for their own security. Second, both outside powers and successor states compete for power and influence in the zone of imperial retraction. Third, the successor states must engage in state-building; they must develop the social, economic, political, and military institutions necessary for self-rule and self-defense. Different successor states, however, will develop at different rates. Fourth, ethnic groups will be divided from their ethnic homeland and live in multi-ethnic states, creating the potential for nationalism to be a problem. Fifth, borders between states will become issues of dispute because they are poorly defined or poorly drawn.

As a result of these five problems, five potential causes of war arise. First, the rules of the game become unsettled. The new issues, new actors, and new balance of power may lead some states to believe that the old rules are outdated and no longer apply. This can lead to wars and crises for three reasons. One reason is that states can unknowingly disagree about the applicability of the old rules or the new rules that replace them, which, in turn, can lead to miscalculations and war. Another reason is that states may compete to create new rules of the game that satisfy their conflicting goals and interests. A third reason is that the absence of mutually acceptable rules makes diplomacy a blunt tool for resolving disputes, forcing states to fall back on their militaries to settle their differences.

Second, power shifts, creating new opportunities for conflict. The successor states are generally weak actors in the international system, making them easy prey. Furthermore, their power is in a state of flux as they engage in state-building and attempt to reform their domestic institutions. Alliances are also shifting. Imperial alliances may weaken and disintegrate, allowing new alliances to form. These new alliances may also be temporary; as the successor states develop their militaries and as all states begin to better understand the new international environment, alliances continue to change. Consequently, new balances of power that form, contributing to the outbreak of war. Both old and new states alike take advantage of the new situation to improve their power and their prestige. States may also compete for power and influence over the spoils of empire, leading to wars and crises. Since the balance of power is temporary, some states will confront windows of opportunity, leading them to go to war quickly while they and their allies are stronger than their potential adversaries. Third, miscalculation occurs. The newness of the situation and the frequent

changes that occur make it difficult to determine the balance of power and the intentions of other states. As a result, states may overestimate their capabilities, overestimate the hostility of other states, or underestimate the threat posed by other states. Each of these problems can cause war and crises.

Fourth, nationalism frequently develops and leads to war. Ethnic groups are frequently divided between their ethnic homelands and other states. When a group's diaspora is mistreated or discriminated against, nationalism frequently develops creating pressures for unification, which can only be achieved through war. Also, states that are home to ethnic diaspora may be threatened by the dangers ethnic nationalism pose to its territorial integrity. To address this threat, these multi-ethnic states may attack the diaspora—militarily, politically, or culturally—or the group's ethnic homeland, which can result in war and crises.

Fifth, most successor states suffer from domestic instability. Weak institutions, corruption, military failure, and discrimination make leaders feel insecure about their hold on power. When these leaders believe that they may lose their power, they tend to act in ways that increase the likelihood of war. They may create diversionary threats that can cause war. They may also be unwilling to oppose public pressure for war. Instead of leading, they follow the crowd and go to war whether or not it is a good policy. Finally, weak, insecure leaders may be unwilling to enact the tough policies necessary to prevent or prepare for war because these policies are unpopular. As a result, diplomacy becomes a weak instrument, leaving military force, or surrender, as the only dispute resolution tool.

1.4 Methodology and Case Selection

This dissertation attempts both to test hypotheses and to explain the past. It takes hypotheses about the causes of war, and uses them to explain why wars occurred when empires disintegrate and collapse. At the same time, it uses historical cases to test the explanatory and predictive power of the hypotheses.

My dissertation accomplishes its tasks both by process tracing and comparing cases.²⁷

²⁷On case studies see Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, Vol. 2, (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 21-58; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 65 (1971), pp. 682-693; Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," paper

Process-tracing allows the researcher to test hypotheses against individual cases.²⁸ A researcher who process-traces seeks to determine whether the process by which the case unfolds conforms with the expectations generated by the hypotheses. To accomplish this, the researcher seeks to develop details of the occurrences and decisions that led to the outcome in order to determine if they conform to the predictions of the hypotheses. The more predictions that are born out by the case and the more demanding these predictions are, the stronger the confirmation of the hypothesis is. These results are then compared across cases.

The case studies in this dissertation are the wars and crises of the successor states to the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. Looking at many events in a single empire helps to control for variables and conditions, such as culture, that may influence the outcomes.

The Ottoman empire was selected for two reasons. First, the disintegration and collapse of the Ottoman Empire occurred over a long period of time and involved many wars and crises, which provides many cases. Second, a large literature exists on the Ottoman Empire and many of the cases. Thus, selecting this case allows me to follow the dictum of "looking under the light." Third, one of the most important goals of this dissertation is to help us understand the consequences of the break-up of multi-ethnic states. The Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire were contiguous to each other and to the metropole, as are the territories of multi-ethnic states. Furthermore, these territories were more tightly controlled than the Empire's Arab and Asian territories. Thus, the Ottoman Empire provides greater similarity to a multi-ethnic state than the British or French Empires.

This selection of cases has a few problems. First, these cases cannot provide sufficient variation on the dependent variable. Looking at the wars and crises of the collapse of one empire

presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, October 15-16, 1982; Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, editor, *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68, Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 7, *Strategies of Inquiry*, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79-137.

More recent work includes Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997)

²⁸On process tracing, see George and McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," pp. 34-41; Van Evera, *Guide*, pp. 64-67; and Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, "Process Tracing in Case Study Research," Presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, October 17-19, 1997, <http://www.georgetown.edu/bennett/PROTCG.htm>.

cannot provide sufficient variation to develop conclusive results. To do this would require the study of wars that did not happen. Unfortunately, as with deterrence, it is difficult to study an event that did not happen. Second, even though I look at many cases within one empire, historians have not studied these cases in equal depth. Of the cases I study, the Crimean War and World War I have received the most study. The Balkan Wars and the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 have also received a significant study. Unfortunately, cases like the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 have received significantly less study. Third, to do these cases justice, one would need to read the primary and secondary sources in a variety of different languages—including French, German, Russian, the Balkan languages, and Turkish—more than one political scientist can be expected to know.

Finally, some may claim that this study suffers from a degrees of freedom problem; there are too many causal arguments and not enough observations to test them. To some extent, this may be true. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this criticism invalidates this study. First, each case study actually contains many observations. This is one of the advantages of process tracing. Second, most of the causes of war hypotheses that I use and test have, to some extent, already been tested by other scholars, which limits the burden placed upon me.²⁹

Despite these problems, this dissertation should provide useful answers to the proposed questions. Future research and future events should tell us how useful these answers are.

1.5 Theoretical and Policy Relevance

A topic worthy of serious social science research should have relevance both for the real world and for theory. This belief may lead some people to wonder "why study imperial collapse and war?" Empires are now in the dust bin of history. With the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the great empires of history have left the international landscape, making the study of the consequences of imperial collapse historically interesting, but politically irrelevant.

In fact, studying the relationship between the collapse of empires and war is relevant both for policy and for theory. First, the collapse of the Soviet Empire is a recent phenomenon, and we will be dealing with its consequences for many years to come. The states of Eastern Europe and the

²⁹One could also argue that the analogy between quantitative and qualitative research that forms the foundation of this issue is inappropriate. See, Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of King, Keohane, and Verba's *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*," *International Organization* 53 (Winter 1999), pp. 161-190.

Former Soviet Union are in the process of developing domestically and internationally. Domestically, they are building economic, political and legal institutions. Many of these states are also attempting to incorporate diverse ethnic populations into single political units. Internationally, these states are trying to develop economic, political, and military relationship with each other and with other states in the wider international system. This process will take time to develop, and, in the mean time, there is the danger that conflict may erupt. And, even though these conflicts may be regional, they may spread to include more states as the Austro-Serbian conflict in 1914 and the French conflict with the Vietnamese did. This dissertation will help to determine where and why dangers of conflict exist, and possibly help to prescribe policies to avoid military conflicts or to limit them if they do occur.

Second, the results of this dissertation may help us to understand the consequences of the disintegration and collapse of multinational states. Multi-ethnic states, like empires, are political units that rule over two or more distinct ethnic groups. The similarities between multi-ethnic states and empires suggest that they may have face similar problems when they disintegrate. Therefore, the lessons learned from the disintegration of empires may help us to understand the consequences of the disintegration of multi-ethnic states. Since the current international system is populated with multi-ethnic states, many of which suffer from serious domestic problems, this study can help us to understand a current and future political problem.

Third, the dissertation allows for the development and testing of theories related to the causes of war. An enormous academic literature attempts to determine what causes war. Some of this literature is theoretical, and some is empirical. Unfortunately, a great deal of the theoretical literature has not been empirically tested. The empirical literature, on the other hand, frequently is not stated in generalizable terms; each explanation claims to apply to one and only one case. Neither approach can work alone. Theoretical explanations help us understand why wars happen and allow policy-makers to develop better policies to prevent the occurrence of war in the future. However, without empirical tests of these theoretical claims, we do not know if the theory is accurate. Empirical explanations of particular wars are also useful, but if they are not stated in general theoretical terms, their utility for policy-makers is limited.

I hope to take theories of the causes of war—theories already in the literature and theories

that I develop—and test them against historical cases. Doing this will provide a number of advantages over pure theory-building and pure case explaining. Testing the theories will help determine whether or not they accurately represent reality. If they do, they may provide a useful guide for future research and policy. If they are not accurate, then policy makers may be forewarned. Of course, they may only be accurate under certain conditions. The empirical tests will help determine what these conditions may be. Finally, many of these theories are poorly specified. Frequently, their independent and intervening variables are specified in a fuzzy, unclear manner, making it difficult to apply them to real world cases. Empirically testing hypotheses may lead to more specific and useful theories.

Fourth, studying the consequences of imperial disintegration and collapse provides us with a better understanding of the consequences of international change. Imperial decline and collapse is one type of international change. The center is normally a major international actor who loses both power and prestige in the international system. Imperial disintegration also leads new actors, the successor states, to enter the international system. Furthermore, the empire's disintegration forces new issues onto the table. In addition to being a type of international change, imperial decline and collapse is also an extreme form of change. The extremity of this change should make the consequences starker, making it easier to study the consequences of international change.


1.6 Organization of the Dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation is presented in six chapters. The second chapter develops the dissertation's theoretical argument. It presents the hypotheses that best explain why wars occur when empires disintegrate. The third provides background for the historical cases by discussing the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire and its system of imperial control. Chapters four through six discuss many of the wars and crises that occurred during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The seventh and final chapter is the conclusion. In the conclusion, I summarize the theoretical and empirical results and look at lessons learned.

Chapter 2

HYPOTHESES ON IMPERIAL DISINTEGRATION AND WAR

The argument presented in this dissertation has a very simple structure. (See Figure 2-1) It starts with the disintegration of empire. The issues and concerns associated with the disintegration and collapse of empires create the causes and conditions associated with existing hypotheses on the causes of war. By so doing, the decline, disintegration, and collapse of empires increase the likelihood of war by increasing the number of causes and conditions of war that occur, by increasing the intensity of the causes and conditions of war that occur, and by increasing the frequency of the causes and conditions for war that occur.



STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT
FIGURE 2-1

The remainder of this chapter presents the argument in four sections. Section 2.1 discusses the issues and concerns associated with the disintegration of empires. Section 2.2 presents the hypotheses relating the disintegration of empire to the causes and conditions for war. Section 2.3 presents the predictions of the argument. The final section, section 2.4, presents a few caveats to the argument.

2.1 The Disintegration of Empires: Issues and Concerns

The issues and concerns that develop when empires disintegrate and collapse result from three factors. First, they result from the policies and actions employed by the empire during its tenure of rule over its periphery. Second, they result from the process of disintegration and collapse and the responses and interests of the metropole and other states to the empire's disintegration. Third, they result from the policies, actions, and interests of the successor states.

When empires develop, the metropole attempts to incorporate new, previously free, territories into the empire's territorial-political system. Many issues make the development of this a particularly difficult problem, including the distance of the metropolitan state from some of its peripheral territories, the difficulty finding capable people to manage the new territories, tensions among the peripheral peoples, and the tendency for the conquered people to resist foreign rule. The

metropole, therefore, needs to develop institutions to manage the economic, military, political, and social relations within these territories, among these territories, between these territories and the metropole, and between these territories and the outside world. When developing institutions of rule, the metropole must be conscious of the costs of empire and seek to minimize these costs.¹ To help minimize these costs, empires sometimes adopt a divide and rule strategy. This strategy can take two forms. One is to separate members of the same group either by creating administrative borders that separate the groups or by forcing large segments of a group to migrate to another area of the empire, sometimes even outside of the empire. Another way to implement a divide and rule strategy is to try and create conflict between groups. A popular way to achieve this goal is to put members of one group in positions of power over other groups. By doing this, the empire gives the groups in authority a stake in the continued existence of the empire. At the same time, since the groups in power exercise influence over other groups, other groups may grow to resent those in power, thereby reducing the possibility of collusion among different peripheral people. Since the center is most concerned about its own interests and not those of the peripheral peoples and territories, these institutions may contribute to problems when the empire declines and disintegrates.

Over time, the empire begins to lose control of its peripheral territories and begins to disintegrate and, eventually, collapse. When empires disintegrate, the metropole's power and influence decline relative to other states and recede geographically. Where the metropole was once able to use its power and influence to coerce other states to obey its demands, it must now work with them or obey their demands. Furthermore, they lose control over their peripheral territories. These territories either gain their independence, or are incorporated into other states and empires.

Imperial disintegration and collapse result from three sources. First, the international system

¹Rational choice assumptions would suggest that the empire is unlikely to expand if the costs of managing the empire exceed the benefits. Nevertheless, history presents us with many examples of over-expansion. Even when over-expansion occurs, the imperial power is still likely to try to minimize the costs of empire. On overexpansion, see Paul Kennedy *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, (New York: Vintage Press, 1989); Charles Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Jack L. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

helps to cause empires to decline and disintegrate.² Most theories that identify the international system as the cause of decline and disintegration focus on the military and economic costs of empire. As an empire grows, the metropole takes on greater military commitments because it must defend and control a larger area. These commitments force the metropole to divert resources from investment and internal order to external defense. Over time, this diversion of resources leads to the loss of relative power by the empire and, eventually, to its disintegration.

Second, tensions within the periphery can cause empires to disintegrate. Individuals and groups within the empire's peripheral territories develop interests, demands, and bases of power that conflict with those of the metropole.³ As these interests and capabilities develop, groups within the periphery may resist the demands of the metropole, and, eventually, demand their independence.

Third, imperial disintegration can result from pressures within the metropole. If, as some people argue, states build empires in response to domestic pressure,⁴ it seems logical that imperial disintegration can also result from pressures in the metropole.⁵ Groups and institutions within the metropole may oppose imperialism on economic, military, political, or moral grounds. If they gain sufficient power, they may force the metropole to decolonize.

²On the international causes of imperial disintegration, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*; and Stephen Peter Rosen, "Introduction and Overview," in *The Decline of Multinational Empires*, edited by Stephen Peter Rosen, unpublished manuscript, pp. 1-15.

Also useful on this issue is Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

³These demands may come from regional leaders, see Alexander Motyl, "From Imperial Decay to Imperial Disintegration: The Fall of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective," in *Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union*, edited by Richard Rudolph and David F. Good, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 15-43. They may also come from nationalist movements as occurred in British India and French Vietnam. On colonial nationalism, see Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, second edition, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1983), pp. 65-85. Also useful is Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics: An Introduction*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 25-37.

⁴Some of the classic works on imperialism claim that domestic interests in the metropole cause imperialism. Two of the most prominent works in this genre are J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991) and V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism*, (Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1975). For a summary of this school of thought, see Michael Doyle, *Empires*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 22-24. Making a related argument is Snyder, *Myths of Empire*.

⁵Although few comparative, theoretical works address this issue, two that do are Miles Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain & France: The Domestic Consequences of International Relations*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire*.

While each imperial disintegration is a unique event, the above description suggests five issues that frequently arise when empires disintegrate. First, with the withdrawal of the metropole's power and influence, a power vacuum develops in the zone of imperial retraction. During the empire's existence, the metropole's capabilities prevent outside powers from interfering in its peripheral territories. Any state that considers attacking these territories knows that the metropole will defend them. This knowledge helps deter attacks on the empire's territories. The metropole's power also helps it maintain order among the peripheral territories. The empire's military and police forces help prevent conflict from breaking out within the empire. When conflict does occur, these forces restore order.

When the empire disintegrates, the metropole may no longer have the capability or the will to maintain peace and order in the zone of imperial retraction. The withdrawal of the metropole's influence and forces from the periphery makes it necessary for the newly independent states to use their own capabilities to maintain order and to deter conflict. The successor states must use their military, police, bureaucrats and leaders to manage their domestic and international relations. Unfortunately, these states tend to lack the military and political abilities necessary to fill the vacuum that develops with the metropole's withdrawal.⁶

The power vacuum causes an additional problem. States will compete for influence in the zone of imperial retraction. Upon gaining independence, the successor states and their leaders want to gain their autonomy. They have just thrown off the imperial shackles and wish to control their own politics. Unfortunately for them, they frequently confront other states—both Great Powers and non-Great Powers—that try to take advantage of the vacuum. As these states compete for power and influence, they interfere in the domestic and international politics of the new states, creating resentment among the newly freed states. These states will then act to maintain or to regain their autonomy. We can see this process occurring in post-World War II Yugoslavia when Tito tried to balance the United States and the Soviet Union against each other. In this way, he was able to use his ties with the United States to prevent Stalin from controlling Yugoslavia while also using his ties

⁶A power vacuum is less likely to develop if these states are incorporated into another state or empire; the state that incorporates these territories provides domestic and international security and order for the newly incorporated territories.

with the Soviet Union to limit the control that the United States exercised over Yugoslavia.

Third, most successor states need to engage in state-building.⁷ States need to have legitimate, developed civil, political, economic, military and police bureaucracies and institutions and trained bureaucrats to manage them. Without these institutions and bureaucrats, states will have difficulty managing their domestic and international politics. Either they will lack the ability to manage the many tasks that a state must manage, or, if the institutions lack legitimacy, social groups within the state will not support the institutions' goals and actions.

Successor states may suffer from both problems. They may lack developed institutions either because no institutions exist, or, more likely, because those institutions that exist are under-developed. For example, the post-communist states of Eastern Europe needed to develop laws to define property rights in order to create a climate for capitalism to succeed. Without these laws, it is extremely difficult for a free market to grow and thrive. Second, the institutions that exist may lack legitimacy; individuals and groups within new states may not recognize the authority of the existing institutions. People may consider a successor state's institutions to be illegitimate for many reasons, including their failure to represent societal values⁸ or to address domestic and international issues. For example, as Belgium prepared the Congo for independence, African nationalists feared that the Belgians were trying to trick them. Instead of creating an independent political system, the nationalists believed Belgium was trying to maintain the empire by different means. They, therefore, demanded to be included in the creation of the Congo's post-imperial institutions.⁹ If they were not

⁷Discussing the need for imperial successor states to develop institutions are Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, edited by Michael E. Brown, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-124, particularly pp. 110-111 and Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, "Introduction," in *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands*, edited by Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 1-16, particularly pp. 3-5. On the problem of inexperienced and untrained personnel, see P.J. Boyce, *Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977).

For a more general discussion of state-making, see the essays in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, edited by Charles Tilly, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). The introductory and concluding chapters by Tilly are particularly useful as a general introduction to the subject.

⁸Discussing problems when a state's institutions fail to correspond to that society's values is Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., *Governance and Politics in Africa*, (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).

⁹Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 162-183.

included, they would perceive the resulting institutions to be illegitimate.

Undeveloped or illegitimate institutions can result from at least three causes. First, the empire may have ruled its territories directly.¹⁰ Direct rule occurs when the metropole uses its own institutions and bureaucrats to manage affairs in the periphery.¹¹ The metropole, therefore, does not need to develop institutions in its peripheral territories. When the peripheral territories gain their independence, they will need to develop their own institutions. South Vietnam provides an example of this type of successor state. France used its bureaucrats and army to rule this territory. As South Vietnam gained its independence, it needed to develop its own institutions to maintain domestic order and international security.¹²

Second, successor states may also need to engage in state-building to centralize power within a single set of political institutions. Many successor states develop by combining two or more imperial political units to form a single state.¹³ The new state must incorporate these political units into a single, centralized state. It must create a *modus vivendi* that balances the need to centralize power with each political unit's desire to maintain its rights and power. Unfortunately, few regional politicians will want to surrender power to a central government that may not represent their territorial or personal interests. For example, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia united to create Yugoslavia. Each of these territories were separate political units before Yugoslavia was created. After Yugoslavia's creation, Yugoslav leaders attempted to create a centralized state, but regional leaders resisted ceding too much power to the central government.¹⁴

¹⁰Michael Doyle, *Empires*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 37-8. Doyle uses the term "formal rule" instead of direct rule.

¹¹Direct rule is the opposite of indirect rule, or, as Doyle refers to it, "informal rule." Ibid, pp. 38-40. When the center rules its empire indirectly, it rules through institutions in the periphery. Sometimes, this requires the center to create institutions that do not exist. Otherwise, the center selects institutions that already exist and uses them. It is important to realize that these are not bivariate variables, they are continuous. Direct rule is on one end of the continuum and indirect rule is on the other end.

¹²George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, third edition, (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1996), pp. 47-79 discusses the issue of state-building in South Vietnam.

¹³Several types of political units can be incorporated into an empire. They can be city-states, territorial states, or even large regions that are not, and never will be, states.

¹⁴On the conflict between regionalism and centralization in inter-war Yugoslavia, see Alex N. Dragnich, *Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), pp. 36-99.

Finally, the increased number of people and groups that enter politics when successor states gain their independence may require these states to engage in state-building. Under imperial rule, few groups are involved in politics, and the institutions that exist tend only to be responsive to these groups. When the successor states gain their independence, previously disenfranchised, groups gain a voice in politics and make demands upon the existing institutions. Unfortunately, these institutions may be incapable of handling the demands and interests of these groups.¹⁵ Successor states, therefore, will need to develop institutions that respond to all of society's interests. For example, until recently, the political and economic institutions in South Africa excluded a majority of its population from participating in these institutions on equal terms.

Ineffective governments of successor states may try to reform their institutions. Upon gaining independence, successor states will have economic, social, political, and military problems. Economic growth stagnates, political corruption may run rampant, and military defeat in war, to name a few problems, may force leaders to reform their institutions. The Habsburg Empire instituted reforms in 1867 when the Emperor created the Dual Monarchy, providing Hungary with significant internal autonomy.¹⁶

These reforms take time to produce results. Social, economic, political, and military problems are complicated issues, and identifying the causes of these problems is a difficult and time consuming task. People may disagree as to what the cause of these problems are. Once the problems are identified, it may be difficult to develop solutions. Then, once these solutions are developed, it may be difficult to implement them. Implementation will be particularly difficult when reform threatens entrenched organizational and political interests. Those people and organizations whose interests are threatened may oppose reform both passively and actively. For example, in 1926 when the Polish government finally introduced much needed land reform legislation, the Socialists left the government coalition. They believed that this reform would hurt the workers, who were their

¹⁵On the inability of institutions to respond to the interests and demands of groups in society, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). Also useful on this topic is Robert W. Jackman, *Power without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation-States*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

¹⁶For a brief discussion of the creation of the Dual Monarchy, see Barbara Jelavich, *Modern Austria: Empire & Republic, 1815-1986*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 59-71.

key supporters.¹⁷

Not only do reforms take time to produce results, but they may also have adverse effects, even if only in the short-term, thereby reducing the institution's capabilities. Reform frequently involves creative destruction.¹⁸ In this case, creative destruction refers to the need to destroy institutions, or at least parts of institutions, in order to reform and to develop better institutions. Thus, when states reform institutions, they destroy the existing institution while developing the improved institutions. Since it is easier to destroy than it is to create, there may be a period of time during the process of reform, when the old institution's effectiveness has been reduced and the reforms have not been completed. During this time, the effects of the reforms will be deleterious. For example, as the post-communist states attempted to create free market economies, they needed to replace the old state-controlled economic system with a free market system. During the period of transition, their GNP plummeted. If the transition is successful, the economy's decline will be temporary. If the reforms are not successful, the economy's decline will be a long-term problem.

Fourth, the intermingling and division of ethnic groups become a more significant concern when empires disintegrate.¹⁹ When empires disintegrate, territorial borders rarely if ever coincide with ethnic, religious, and linguistic boundaries. Instead, the borders of the newly independent states tend to create states inhabited by two or more ethnic groups. These borders also tend to divide individual ethnic groups between two or more states, creating diaspora.

Multi-ethnic states and diaspora occur for two reasons: the migration of groups within and away from the empire and the placement of state borders. During imperial rule, some groups migrate from their ethnic homeland either by choice or by force. When the empire disintegrates, these groups end up living outside of their homeland in states that are populated by more than one ethnic group.

¹⁷C.A. Macartney and A.W. Palmer, *Independent Eastern Europe: A History*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), p. 186.

¹⁸Creative destruction is an idea developed by Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975), pp. 81-86 to refer to the process of industrial evolution.

¹⁹Banuazizi and Weiner, "Introduction," pp. 2-3.

Thus, we see Russians living in many of the successor states to the Soviet Union.²⁰ Not only do groups migrate within the empire, but they may also emigrate to territories outside the empire, thereby creating both multi-ethnic states and diaspora. Serbs, for example, fled the Ottoman Empire and took up residence in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.²¹

The migration of ethnic groups is not only a problem as the metropole creates and maintains its empire. It is also a significant problem during and after the empire disintegrates. The process of disintegration can cause people to leave their home. Wars frequently cause the empires to disintegrate and the violence, or fear of violence, associated with these wars cause people to flee to other territories within the zone of imperial retraction, to other regions of the empire, or away from the imperial territories. After the disintegration, groups may still leave their homes to avoid violence, persecution, and discrimination. During the bloody disintegration of the Yugoslav state, we saw massive movements of Muslims, Croats, and Serbs as they were forced from their homes. And, following the disintegration of the Soviet Empire we have seen and continue to see the emigration of Russians from the Baltic states, where strict citizenship laws limit their rights, back to Russia. These migrants may then form a powerful voice speaking out against the governments of the states they left, calling for reparations for the losses they suffered.

The territorial borders of successor states also influence the demographics of these states. During its tenure of rule, the metropole creates internal administrative borders that rarely, if ever, correspond to ethnic borders. Instead, the location of these borders tends to be determined by the order in which the territories were incorporated into the empire and by the center's desire to minimize the costs it pays to rule the periphery.²² When the empire disintegrates, the empire's internal administrative borders become the territorial borders of the successor states, which occurred in Africa. The borders of successor states may also be determined by the interests and the diplomacy of the Great Powers, as occurred with North and South Korea. Great Powers, for example, may wish

²⁰Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich, and Emily Payin, eds., *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics*, (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1994).

²¹Gunther Erich Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747*, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1960), pp. 92-95.

²²For example, the metropole may locate borders as part of a divide and rule strategy to help minimize the costs to police the peripheral territories.

to create buffer states between each other to limit the possibility for conflict between two states, as occurred following the First World War with the creation of many of the newly independent states of Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union. As with the empire's administrative borders, these borders may divide ethnic groups, creating multi-ethnic states and diaspora.

Fifth, territorial borders can become issues of concern in their own right. Since outside powers frequently impose borders on successor states, these borders may lack legitimacy. For example, the borders of a successor state may not correspond to what it considers its historical borders to be. In the early 1960s, Morocco and Algeria engaged in a border war because Morocco considered the French imposed border between the two countries to be illegitimate.²³ Furthermore, even if leaders of successor states believe the borders imposed upon them are legitimate, the location of these borders may be poorly specified, causing states to disagree upon the exact location of the borders. For example, two treaties may define the borders between two countries differently, as they did between Paraguay and Argentina.²⁴ Finally, some successor states will have indefensible borders, which they will want to change.

2.2 Imperial Disintegration and the Causes of War

In this section, I develop the rest of the hypotheses. Each sub-section looks at a particular cause of war to explain how imperial disintegration causes the cause of war. The hypotheses are organized into five groups: regimes, balance of power, miscalculation and misperception, nationalism, and domestic politics.²⁵

2.2.1 Imperial Disintegration, Regimes, and War

Rules of the game are explicit and implicit rules and norms that help define acceptable and expected behavior as well as the rights and responsibilities of states.²⁶ These rules help to limit

²³John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1992), p. 202.

²⁴On the Paraguay-Argentine border dispute, see Pelham Horton Box, *The Origins of the Paraguayan War*, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), pp. 54-69.

²⁵For a summary of the hypotheses see table 2-1.

²⁶On rules of the game, see Raymond Cohen, *International Politics: The rules of the game*, (New York: Longman, 1981) and Gilpin, *War and Change*, pp. 34-7. In the international political economy literature, they use the term regime to refer to the same, or at least a similar, concept as rules of the game. A good introduction to this literature is Stephen

conflict by providing a context in which states can interpret each other's actions. Actions that violate a rule of the game can lead other states to consider the violator to be a threat. Thus, when the Soviet Union stationed missiles in Cuba, which was generally considered to be in America's sphere of influence, American leaders believed this action demonstrated an escalation of the Soviet threat.²⁷ Rules can also provide standards of behavior that help regulate diplomacy. For example, following the Second World War, the United States helped to create an international trading system that provided for fair and equal treatment among all members of the regime. As a result, all GATT members agreed that any tariff reduction provided to one trading partner would be provided to for all. Without this rule, protectionism would have been greater. These rules develop as the result of many variables, including common interests among states, treaties, precedents, and the power and interests of the most powerful states.²⁸

But, as Bismarck once said about treaties, rules tend to apply "as long as conditions remain the same." The decline and disintegration of empires weaken the international rules of the game by changing the conditions that form their foundation.²⁹ Once these conditions change, that is once interests, power, and treaties change or new issues that the current rules do not address arise, the rules of the game weaken. Frequently, the metropole is one of the great powers in the international system. Even if it is not a great power, the metropole's power and interests help define the rules of the game in its peripheral regions. As its power declines, its influence with respect to the rules of the game weakens. Thus, history shows us that changes in relative power tend to correlate with changes in, or at least challenges to, the rules of the game. Newly independent states also enter the international system when empires disintegrate. Their entry into the international system causes new issues and concerns to arise. States lack rules to help them manage their interactions with respect

D. Krasner, editor, *International Regimes*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

²⁷On rules of the game and US-Soviet competition, see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," in *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 34-42, particularly, pp. 35-36.

²⁸Ibid, p. 35 and Gilpin, *War and Change*, pp. 35-6.

²⁹Rules tend to be weak in the best of times, but during periods of rapid or intense change they may become even weaker. Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Colder War," in *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, editor, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 231-232.

to these new issues and concerns. Or, the attitudes and interests of these states, as well as the attitudes and interests of other states with respect to these successor states, are not represented by the rules of the game. Furthermore, as a result of these changes, treaties and precedents lose their applicability in the new international order, further weakening the rules of the game.

As the rules weaken, they become unsettled—less clear—and states become less likely to obey them. States may question the applicability of the existing rules of the game. These states may believe that the rules ought to be changed because the rules do not provide them with the rights and benefits that they want and believe that they deserve. Thus, as the power of pre-World War I Germany increased, Berlin believed that the spheres of influence ought to be changed to provide Germany with more influence. The rules may also become ambiguous, leading to disagreements among states. Some states may believe that the old rules of the game still apply, while other states may believe that a new set of rules exists to regulate international relations. Still, others may believe that no rules exist, and new ones must be developed. When states have different perspectives about what the actual rules of the game are or ought to be, the international order becomes more ambiguous and less effective.

This ambiguity is further exacerbated by the unwillingness of states to prepare for the post-imperial order. States, particularly the Great Powers, could negotiate new rules prior to, during, or just after the empire's collapse. Unfortunately, they rarely do so. Even when they try to negotiate post-imperial rules of the game, they develop vague, incomplete rules that are open to conflicting interpretations.³⁰ Whether they avoid negotiating new rules or develop vague ones, the result is the same; these states must frequently negotiate and clarify the rules when the issues to which they relate arise. These situations frequently occur during periods of heightened tensions when the rules become issues of greater salience, making diplomacy more difficult.

³⁰States are unwilling to negotiate clear rules of the game prior to the disintegration of empire for several reasons. In some situations, domestic politics may prevent leaders from making the concessions necessary to reach an agreement. In other situations, states may have different opinions on what the appropriate rules of the game ought to be. These opinions could be based on treaties, interests, history, or perceptions of the balance of power. In still other situations, some may consider the action to be premature and more likely to cause conflict than to prevent it.

In addition, the process or form of these negotiations can cause trouble for at least two reasons. First, these negotiations can be secret, thereby limiting the number of people who know about and participate in the negotiations. Second, the agreements reached during the negotiations can be either written or oral. If they are oral, people are more likely to have different interpretations and memories of what rules they actually agreed to.

Perhaps an example can clarify the issue. In the early Cold War years, the rules of the game between the United States and the Soviet Union were ambiguous. Prior to the Second World War, the key actors in international politics were the European Great Powers—France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. During the inter-war years, the United States and the Soviet Union were isolationist and, therefore, had little role in the development of the rules. The war, however, thrust them onto the world stage and demonstrated that they would be the dominant powers in the post-war international system. During the war, they tried to develop a new, post-war international order at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, but the rules they developed failed to provide a clear guide for their behavior. Some issues were unforeseen, such as what each side's rights in Berlin would be. Other issues were difficult to resolve because of domestic interest groups, such as the Soviet Union's rights in Poland. Still other issues led to genuine conflicts of interest, such as Russia's placement of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Time, experience, and several crises helped to resolve these and other issues.³¹

When the international rules of the game become unsettled, war becomes more likely for three reasons. First, weak or ambiguous rules of the game can cause miscalculations. The more unsettled the rules of the game, the greater the likelihood that states will unknowingly have different interpretations about what the appropriate behavior in particular situations ought to be. When a state's behavior conflicts with another state's interpretation of the rules, the other state may consider these actions to be attempts to change the status quo and will interpret these actions as evidence that the state is a threat. This problem can occur even if the state has no aggressive intentions. It believes that its actions are in accord with the rules of the game. Unfortunately, conflicting interpretations of the rules can cause states to miscalculate each other's intentions, leading to crises and even war. One could argue that this problem occurred during the early years of the Cold War. The United States and Soviet Union were acting in an ambiguous international environment. Actions that the United States believed to be violations of the rules of the game, such as the failure to have free and

³¹During the Cold War, there were several superpower crises, including three Berlin Crises, the Taiwan Straits Crisis, Korean War, the Quemoy Crisis, and the Cuban Missile Crises. A useful discussion of these crisis can be found in Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

fair elections in Poland, were considered to be acceptable behavior by the Soviets.

Second, unsettled rules of the game can lead to war as states compete to build a new international order. Since rules define the rights and responsibilities of states, all states will want rules of the game that benefit them most. When the rules are unsettled, states have their best opportunity to alter them. The distribution of benefits, however, frequently is a zero-sum game, leading states to desire different or conflicting rules because their interests conflict. These different desires can lead states to compete to create rules that favor them. The more unsettled the rules of the game, the greater the likelihood that they will compete to create a new set of rules.³² In some situations, this competition leads to crises that can lead to war. Thus, scholars have argued that the growth of German power led Wilhelmine Germany to seek to change the international rules of the game with the Fashoda and Moroccan Crises and the First World War.

Third, the weakness and ambiguity of the rules can contribute to war because they limit the ability of states to manage disagreements and conflicts of interests. When the rules of the game are strong and clear, procedures for the management of disputes are clearer. As the rules become weaker and more ambiguous, this process of dispute management becomes less effective. If states believe that the rules fail to address the issue of dispute, they may resort to force to satisfy their interests.

2.2.2 Imperial Disintegration, the Balance of Power, Opportunism, and the Causes of War

Imperial disintegration and collapse helps cause shifts in the balance of power in three ways. First, there is the effect disintegration has on the metropole. Imperial disintegration causes the metropole to lose control of its peripheral territories, which can reduce its power because it loses the resources³³ provided by the periphery.³⁴ In addition, the loss of these territories can reduce the

³²This hypothesis comes from Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*.

³³These resources include, among others, natural and industrial resources, geographic location, and manpower.

³⁴Imperial disintegration does not always reduce the metropole's power. Sometimes the loss of peripheral territories can increase the center's power. Even though the peripheral territories provide the center with important resources, they can also divert resources from more important interests to less important interests. The metropole uses some of its resources to provide the periphery with security: resources that might be better employed elsewhere, such as to defend the metropole. For example, France's attempt to hold onto its territories in Indochina diverted important military capabilities away from Europe to a region of the world that was a relatively unimportant French interest. The loss of peripheral territories can also increase the center's power by reducing internal, particularly ethnic, divisions. Different ethnic groups may have conflicting interests that create serious divisions among the various groups. These divisions can lead to violence or the threat of violence, forcing the metropole to use its resources to address this problem. By

metropole's ability to influence events in some regions of the world because the metropole loses bases in strategic regions. For example, when Britain lost its Middle Eastern territories, London's access to the region's oil and its ability to project power into the region were reduced.

Second, imperial disintegration can alter the distribution of power by its effect on the peripheral territories. When the empire disintegrates, the peripheral territories tend to lose the support and resources previously provided by the metropole. These territories can no longer depend on the metropole's military, political, and economic resources to maintain domestic and international order. Instead, they must use their own resources to provide for their security. Furthermore, these territories tend to fragment into several separate, independent states. They cannot depend upon each other to help provide domestic or international order; each new state must provide for its own defense. This fragmentation makes the balance of power among the successor states an important issue. Independence forces the successor states to concern themselves with the balance of power among the successor states because of the threats and the opportunities that can and will develop within the zone of imperial retraction.³⁵

The balance of power is further aggravated because successor states tend to lack developed institutions and experienced leaders. Military, police, economic, and political institutions and leaders are necessary for states to be able to extract, to mobilize and to use their resources efficiently. Without developed institutions and experienced, trained leaders and bureaucrats to man these institutions, the successor states are likely to be weak. This problem clearly effects post-colonial Africa. When the states of Africa gained their independence, they lacked the institutions necessary to manage their domestic and international relations.³⁶ As a result, these states were unable to extract sufficient taxes from society or to build the infrastructure, such as highways, needed for economic and political development.

relinquishing peripheral territories, the metropole may reduce the internal divisions, allowing it to focus its attentions and resources on other issues.

³⁵Discussing this issue with respect to South America is Robert Burr, *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

³⁶Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Once they gain their independence, the successor states try to develop these institutions and train bureaucrats to manage them. As they develop these resources, the power of the successor states should increase. The more the state develops its institutions, the more efficiently it should be able to extract and use its resources. Over time, as successor states build more effective institutions and as their leaders gain experience, these states should become more powerful. The United States provides a very good example of this trend. When the United States gained its independence, the central government lacked developed military and political institutions; it lacked a powerful executive that could mobilize and use the resources of all thirteen states as it saw fit. This situation changed when the states adopted the Constitution, which furthered the process of state-building and created a more efficient set of institutions.³⁷

Even though state-building should increase each successor state's power over time, their power will increase at different rates. Those successor states that develop their institutions and manpower more quickly than other successor states will increase their power at a faster rate. This differential rate of growth among successor states occurs for at least four reasons. First, successor states will start at different levels of development. The empire's resources will be unevenly divided among the successor states. Those states that receive a larger share of the empire's assets will initially be stronger than those states that receive fewer of the empire's assets. For example, when the Soviet Empire collapsed, the empire's resources were distributed among the successor states with Russia getting the lion's share. In addition, within a single empire, the metropole may rule its territories differently. Some territories may be ruled directly by the center, while other imperial territories may be ruled indirectly. When the center rules territories directly, these territories will not develop the indigenous institutions needed for self-rule. Territories ruled indirectly, however, have a greater opportunity to develop domestic institutions, or at least the beginnings of them, before they gain their independence. Thus, in the Soviet Empire, the Eastern European countries were given a great deal of autonomy, which allowed them to develop some of the political, economic, social, and military institutions needed for independence, while the republics of the Soviet Union had less autonomy and were less likely to develop these institutions prior to independence.

³⁷The classic argument for the efficiency of the Constitution is Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, (New York: Penguin USA, 1961).

Second, some successor states will have more resources than other successor states, which will allow them to develop their domestic institutions quickly. To build the institutions necessary for self-rule requires resources. The more resources a state has, the easier it will be for that state to engage in state-building. Therefore, those states that have better resource endowments are more likely to develop their states faster than those states that are poorly endowed with resources.

Third, successor states face different levels of international and domestic threats, which can influence the rate of state-building. When states face domestic or international threats, they must use their resources to address these threats which, consequently, cannot be used for state-building. Internationally, successor states will face different threats to their security. Some successor states and non-imperial states will pose threats to other successor states. To manage these threats, these successor states will divert resources to deal with the threat.³⁸ The United States demonstrates the value of a low threat environment for state-building. When the US gained its independence, it faced few threats, which provided America with the opportunity to spend relatively little on defense.³⁹ Instead, America was able to invest its resources in its infrastructure and in private investment that helped form the foundation of its future Great Power status.

Conflict among groups within a state can also limit the ability of successor states to develop the institutions needed to extract and utilize the country's resources.⁴⁰ Institutions frequently result from negotiation and compromise among groups. When groups disagree about the form their state's institutions should take, these institutions tend to develop slowly. Institutional development in

³⁸This statement is not intended to argue that international conflict always prevents successful state-building. In fact, history shows us that external threats and war can contribute to state-building. The exigencies of war force leaders to create more efficient means for extracting resources from society. Arguing for the importance of war for state-building is Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169-191; and Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*, (New York: The Free Press, 1994). Arguing that African states are weak because of the lack of war in Africa is Jeffrey Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 117-139.

History also demonstrates that some states cannot accomplish both tasks. This may be particularly common when authority has not been sufficiently centralized.

³⁹On US diplomacy in the early years of the Republic, see Reginald Horseman, *The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776-1815*, (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc, 1985).

⁴⁰Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) discusses the difficulties states have building and reforming institutions because of competition among groups.

successor states can be a slow process because they tend to have significant domestic cleavages.⁴¹ As long as these cleavages limit the ability of groups within these states to negotiate and compromise, they are unlikely to develop the necessary institutions in a timely fashion. The more time it takes for a state to develop its institutions, the longer it will take for the state to increase its power. Greece provides an excellent example of this problem. Greece suffered from serious domestic cleavages before gaining its independence from the Ottoman Empire and spent seventy years overcoming them.

Finally, imperial disintegration influences the balance of power by its effect on alliances. Although external threats divert resources from state-building, thereby impeding the process of state-building, allies may provide successor states with resources to help further the process of state-building. Allies can help successor states develop their economic, military, and political potential: they can contribute military resources to help provide the successor states with security; they can provide economic aid and markets to help the successor states develop economically; and, they can provide advisors and training to help the successor states develop politically.

More importantly, imperial disintegration causes alliances to change, which can influence the distribution of power in at least three ways. First, states provide military forces to their allies in the event of war. Second, states can help deter attacks against their allies. If state A knows that a war with state B will also lead to a war with state C, then state A is less likely to initiate a war with state B. Thus, when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany informed Russia that a Russian attack on Austria would bring Germany into the war on Austria's side.⁴² Third, states can supply their allies with weapons, munitions and other resources to support the war effort. Early in the Indochina War, the United States assisted both the French and the South Vietnamese government in this way.⁴³

As empires disintegrate and collapse, states may reduce their commitment to their imperial alliances by limiting the support they provide to their allies, by withdrawing from the alliance, or by

⁴¹These cleavages can be ethnic, ideological, regional, religious, or charismatic.

⁴²Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 71.

⁴³Herring, *America's Longest War*, pp. 3-79.

forming alliances with new allies.⁴⁴ Imperial disintegration causes alliances to shift for four reasons. First, disintegration changes the threats states face, which, in turn, can cause alliances to change.⁴⁵ As already stated, the disintegration of empire alters the aggregate and relative power of states. The newly independent states may have revisionist designs against each other or against states outside the imperial zone. They may wish to adjust borders, create ethnically homogenous states, resolve historical grievances, maintain their power and prestige, etc. Even status quo powers may appear threatening when they take actions to provide for their own defense.⁴⁶ Both the successor states and the states outside the zone of imperial retraction must adjust to the newly forming environment. These new states must develop militaries, form alliances, and develop domestic political parties, laws and procedures. The states that were not part of the empire must also adapt to this new environment. Even when these states do not have aggressive intentions, these changes may lead other states to perceive their actions to be aggressive. All of these changes can alter the threats that states perceive and create incentives for them to form new alliances.

The successor states to the Habsburg Empire demonstrate the relationship between alliances and threats. After the First World War, these states—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania—faced threats from Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Italy. As these threats increased, the successor states formed an alliance known as the Little Entente. According to Robert Rothstein, the overwhelming factor in this development was undoubtedly a common realization that they were more threatened by other states than by each other. None could stand alone against the myriad threats of Hungarian revisionism, Italian Irredentism, Soviet revolution,

⁴⁴Scholars have not devoted sufficient attention to the issue of when and why alliances persist or collapse. A useful recent survey of potential hypotheses to explain this phenomenon is Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure and Collapse," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 156-179. Walt adapts these hypotheses, in part, from the literature that seeks to explain why alliances form. For hypotheses explaining alliance formation, see Steven R. David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Randall K. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; and Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

⁴⁵On alliances and threat, see Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, pp. 17-33. Walt defines threat to be a function of four variables: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and offensive intentions.

⁴⁶This problem is known as the security dilemma. On the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 186-214.

and British and French indifference or indecisions. Still, when specific problems arose, the new states invariably reacted in strictly nationalistic terms. *It would take the threatening external environment of the first postwar years to create a felt need for alliance.*⁴⁷

Second, as the disintegration and collapse of empires occur, states with common, or at least complementary, goals may ally to achieve these goals.⁴⁸ Two or more states may wish to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the new situation to increase their territory, to gain resources, or to exact revenge. If these states wish to take advantage of the same adversary,⁴⁹ they may form an alliance against this adversary. Thus, prior to the First Balkan War, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro formed the Balkan League to gain territory from the Ottoman Empire.

Third, when empires disintegrate, successor states may develop new ideologies leading them to form alliances with other states that have similar ideologies.⁵⁰ The history of the past two centuries suggests that successor states and their leaders frequently adopt similar ideologies. During the nineteenth century, many successor states adopted national ideologies. During the twentieth century, successor states tended to adopt anti-colonial, national, and communist ideologies. Successor states that have similar ideologies may consider each other to be natural allies.⁵¹ Successor states, however, were not the only states to adopt these ideologies. Other independent states also subscribe to these ideologies. Nineteenth century France, for example, was intensely nationalistic and supported nationalism in other states. Successor states may ally with those states that have the same ideology.

Fourth, divisions within the society, within the leadership and between society and the

⁴⁷Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 129, italics added. For a fuller discussion of the Little Entente, see *ibid*, pp. 128-178; and Robert Machray, *The Little Entente*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970).

⁴⁸On states allying to achieve similar goal, see Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.

⁴⁹This adversary can be a single state or an alliance of states.

⁵⁰On alliances and ideology, see Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 33-40; and Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 62.

⁵¹Similar ideologies do not necessarily lead to similar interests. In fact, in some situations, similar ideologies can hinder the formation of alliances. Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 35-6.

leadership in successor states may can influence alliance decisions.⁵² Domestic divisions are prevalent in newly independent states. Ethnicity, ideology, regionalism, and charismatic leadership create the potential for domestic competition among groups and leaders. As a result of this competition, these groups and leaders may seek support from a foreign ally to provide them with aid against domestic opposition as Prince Milan of Serbia did in the 1880s when he allied with Austria-Hungary to aid him against the pan-Slavists in Serbia. The state's leaders are not the only ones who seek outside support. Political and social groups that wish to take control of the state may also seek outside support to aid them in their competition, which was relatively common in Africa during the Cold War where some domestic groups allied with the Soviet Union while others allied with the United States.

Not only do alliances tend to change when empires disintegrate, but they may continue to shift over time, particularly in the short-term. The newly independent states face unsettled international and domestic environments. They are trying to determine their own interests and the interests of other states. As more information becomes available, they may discover new threats and new opportunities. As they engage in state-building and nation-building, they may increase their capabilities, thereby increasing the threat they pose to others. Furthermore, ruling coalitions within states may shift, and these new coalitions may have different ideologies than the previous coalition. These coalitions may also face different internal threats to their leadership. All of these changes can lead old alliances to collapse and new alliances to form, thereby creating a new balance of power. The same is true for outside states; their alliances may also shift. These states also confront an unsettled international environment in which they are trying to determine their interests and the interests of other states. As more information becomes available, they too may discover new threats and opportunities which can lead old alliances to collapse and new alliances to form.

These changes in the balance of power create threats and opportunities. The successor states are prime targets for outside states to take advantage of. These outside states may seek to improve their relative power, security, or prestige by increasing their territory or their influence in regions previously controlled by the empire. Just like outside powers, the stronger successor states may also take advantage of the weaker to improve themselves.

⁵²David, *Choosing Sides*.

This situation may lead to war and crises for three reasons. First, the changing balance of power causes windows of opportunity, presenting the outside powers and the successor states with a temporary power advantage.⁵³ The declining state will need to act before it loses its advantage. This process can be seen in the aftermath of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian Empires. A power vacuum developed in Eastern Europe that Nazi Germany filled in the 1930s.⁵⁴

Second, competition among states may lead to crises and war. States may compete for the same spoils, leading to conflict. Or, states that are already competitors may oppose gains by their adversaries and try to prevent them from obtaining the spoils of empire. Thus, during the Cold War, the United States was constantly vigilant in the Middle East lest the Soviet Union gain influence over strategic territories that would provide it with military bases to threaten American and allied access to oil. Or, these powers could seek the same gains, such as a particular territory because of its location or natural resource endowments. Successor states are in the same position as outside powers. For example, in the 1830s, Chile opposed the confederation of Peru and Bolivia because

any system in which the population, wealth and resources of Peru and Bolivia might be at the disposition of a single government, and of a government that has given incontestable proof of its will, is incompatible with the security of this Republic.⁵⁵

Third, the new situation may create security dilemma problems.⁵⁶ As a result of the

⁵³Discussing windows of opportunity and war are Alfred Vagts, *Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations*, (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956), pp. 263-350; Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 229-265; Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107; idem, "Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions and the Long Peace," in *the Long Postwar Peace*, edited by Charles Kegley, Jr., (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), pp. 147-176; Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 73-104. For a critique of this argument, see Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 147-186.

⁵⁴Discussing the disintegration of empires in Europe as a cause of WWII is P.M.H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War In Europe*, (New York: Longman Inc., 1986), pp. 14-38.

⁵⁵Diego Portales, one of the leaders of Chile, quoted in Burr, *By Reason or Force*, p. 40.

⁵⁶The classic statement of the security dilemma is Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." Also useful is the literature on offense-defense theory. See Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies*, 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691; George H. Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977); and Van Evera, *Causes of War*, pp. 117-239.

international situation and the uncertainty and threats associated with it, successor states and outside powers will take actions to provide for their security. Frequently, however, these actions will threaten the security of other states. For example, internal turmoil in one of the successor states may threaten to spread into a neighboring state. This neighboring state may mobilize its military forces in order to defend its border from attacks. Even though the intentions are defensive, other states with interests in the region may believe that the neighboring state is preparing to take advantage of the instability in the successor state. As a consequence, tensions will rise, increasing the likelihood of war.

2.2.3 Imperial Disintegration, Miscalculation of Power, Misperception of Intentions, and War

When empires collapse, uncertainty increases. Other states will have difficulty determining the capabilities and intentions of the new states, at least in the short-term. In addition, these new states may have trouble determining their own capabilities and the intentions and capabilities of other states. Furthermore, other states may have difficulty determining each other's intentions with respect to the zone of imperial retraction. Finally, the nature of post-imperial alliances increases uncertainty.

The capabilities of the newly independent states are particularly difficult to measure. Upon gaining independence, the successor states must provide for their own defense. These states, however, have not been involved in war; they lack recent military experiences upon which leaders both of the new state and of other states can judge their capabilities. Since war provides a yardstick for measuring a country's power, when a state has not been tested in battle, all states, including the successor state itself, will have difficulty determining its capabilities.⁵⁷ The technological base and military organizations of successor states are untried. Furthermore, as they become involved in wars and other conflicts, leaders will be able to use these experiences to help them determine the distribution of power.

State-building also increases uncertainty about the new state's power. As the state develops, its power should increase. Unfortunately, it will be difficult to determine by how much its power has changed. This problem effects successor states even if they gained their independence by force of arms. Wars of independence may help leaders estimate the relative power of these successor

⁵⁷If the state gained its independence by fighting a war, the power of successor states will be easier to determine because this war of independence provides some, albeit limited, information about the state's capabilities.

states, but future changes in power that result from state-building increase the level of uncertainty.

Domestic instability also increases the difficulty leaders have in determining the successor state's power by reducing the resources a state can use to defend itself. When a state suffers from instability, leaders divert resources from external defense to internal policing. Instability may also limit the state's ability to mobilize resources, particularly personnel resources, because some segments of society may refuse to support the government's policies. For example, people may refuse to serve in the military, as has occurred in post-Soviet Russia. Instability, however, is not a constant. Even when instability significantly reduces a state's power, external threats may cause the competing domestic groups to put aside their differences and unite against the threat to their state. These problems make it difficult for all states—the unstable state, its allies, and its adversaries—to know how much instability will effect the state's power.

When empires collapse, it is also difficult to determine if the new state has revisionist or status quo intentions. Newly independent states lack a record of experiences upon which states can base their estimates of the successor states' intentions. Since states use past interactions to help determine what a state's interests are and how the state will respond to specific actions, they will have difficulty determining the successor states' intentions. The inexperience of the leaders of the newly independent states also makes it difficult for other states to determine the new states' intentions. Inexperienced leaders fail to develop clear, consistent strategies, causing them to react to similar situations differently. Thus, other states may miscalculate the interests and intentions of new states because they base their expectations on the new states' past behaviors. One of the most glaring recent examples of this problem occurred when Gorbachev began to reform Soviet domestic and international policies. Many in the United States questioned the sincerity of Gorbachev's desires to reduce tensions between the US and USSR because of the Soviet Union's past behavior.

To overcome this lack of information, states use whatever information is available to determine the intentions of others. Three types of information are frequently used: the previous history of the state, the presence of unresolved issues, and the ideology of the state. These states interacted both in pre-imperial and in imperial times. If their relations were positive, a state is more likely to assume benign intentions. If these relations were not positive, a state is more likely to assume the other state has aggressive intentions. For example, Poland may fear post-Soviet Russia

because of their troubled historical relationship. The second type of information that helps determine the intentions of successor states is the existence of unresolved issues between the states. The more unresolved issues between states and the more serious these issues are, the greater the likelihood that these states will assume that others have aggressive intentions. This problem can be seen in the relationship between India and Pakistan. Upon gaining independence, these two states needed to determine the status of Kashmir. Unfortunately, they did not resolve this issue and, to this day, it creates fear and suspicion between them.⁵⁸ The third type of information that states use to determine the intentions of other states is ideology. Ideologies provide both a world view and a guide for action, thereby helping others understand the interests and intentions of other states.⁵⁹ The most common ideology that successor states adopt is nationalism; but, there exist a plethora of other ideologies that they could adopt such as pan-Slavism, communism, and pan-Africanism. The information gained from these sources sometimes leads to an accurate estimate of intentions, and sometimes it can lead to an inaccurate estimation of intentions. Nevertheless, whether or not the information is accurate, leaders use it to help determine the intentions of other states. If it is inaccurate, states are likely to miscalculate the intentions of other states.

The interests and intentions of successor states are also difficult to determine when they suffer from domestic instability. Domestic instability can cause the leadership of these new states to change. Coups may occur, or new coalitions with different ideologies may take power. This change in leadership may cause the states' interests to change to reflect the interests of the new leaders. Thus, King Alexander of Serbia was pro-Austrian. After his assassination in 1903, he was replaced by King Peter who was pro-Russian.

Domestic instability also makes intentions difficult to determine by causing leaders to use aggressive rhetoric. Leaders need to maintain domestic support for their policies and leadership. To maintain this support, they can either satisfy domestic interests or focus society's attention on a

⁵⁸The Kashmir issue has created such high tensions that it has led to two wars. See Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia*, second edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995) and Alistar Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990*, (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1991).

⁵⁹Discussing the role of ideology and intentions is Walt, *Revolution and War*, pp. 9-10, 22-30, 33-37. Also of interest is Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, editors, *Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

common threat. Aggressive rhetoric helps focus the opposition's attention on a common threat, thereby maintaining the leadership's hold on power.⁶⁰ Even though this rhetoric may not represent the actual opinions or policies of the government, other states may still use it to determine the state's intentions. Some leaders, for example, may use nationalist propaganda to help them keep the support of nationalists without planning to advance a nationalist agenda.

Not only will others have difficulty determining the intentions and capabilities of successor states, but successor states will also have trouble determining the capabilities and intentions of other states. When successor states gain their independence, they have little or no experience managing foreign policy. They lack the institutions needed to manage their foreign policies. Furthermore, they frequently lack an experienced or educated foreign policy elite.⁶¹ Without these institutions and experiences, successor states may lack the ability to accurately acquire and process the information needed to determine their own capabilities and the intentions and capabilities of others. In addition, disagreements within other states will make it difficult for the successor states to determine what the intentions of these other states are. The disintegration of empire forces all states to determine what policies they should adopt. Different individuals, groups, and organizations within the state will adopt different, perhaps competing, policy positions. Each will defend its position and may actually adopt the position and communicate it to the media, to diplomatic representatives, or to decision-makers in other states. With the conflicting information, miscalculation of intentions is more likely to occur.

Great powers and other states outside the zone of imperial retraction will also have trouble determining each other's intentions with respect to the zone of imperial retraction. Some states may take advantage of the power vacuum that develops in the zone of imperial retraction. Others, however, will respect and support the new status quo. Unfortunately, these states will have difficulty determining which states want to take advantage of the new opportunities and which are satisfied.

Finally, alliances can create uncertainty in three ways. First, it will be difficult to determine

⁶⁰This argument is related to the theory of diversionary war, see section 2.2.5.

⁶¹P.J. Boyce, *Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977) discusses the issues of foreign policy institutions and foreign policy elite in the states that gained their independence after the Second World War.

which states are allied. New states and groups will attempt to develop alliances with other states and vice versa. In fact, after gaining their independence, alliances among successor states and between successor states and other states may be in flux, constantly shifting as new relationships develop. Until the situation settles down, states will have trouble determining what alliances exist. The new situation may also make alliances among states outside the zone of imperial retraction uncertain. The new opportunities and threats may create pressures for old alliances to collapse and new, previously unforeseen, alliances to form. For example, prior to the Crimean War, Russia believed that Britain would not form an alliance with France. Nevertheless, Russia's actions in the Near East eventually led Britain to ally with France against the Russian threat.

Second, states will have difficulty determining the level of support each member will commit to the alliance. The alliance may only apply against certain adversaries. Or, the alliance may only require the allies to remain neutral in the event of a war. Without this type of knowledge, states may have difficulty determining the balance of power. While this problem arises with all alliances, it is particularly acute in post-imperial alliances. Finally, states will have difficulty determining whether these alliances are offensive or defensive. After empires collapse, many states will have unresolved disputes with each other. When two or more states form an alliance and these states engage in disputes with other states, the other states will not know if this alliance formed to provide defense or to settle these disputes.⁶²

The uncertainty about the power and the intentions of states that occurs when empires disintegrate and collapse makes war a more likely outcome. When states are uncertain about the power of other states, the possibility exists for them to optimistically miscalculate. In other words, they may believe that they and their allies are more powerful than their adversary and its allies even when this is not the situation. When states are uncertain about the intentions of other states, the possibility exists for them to overestimate the hostility of other states. In so doing, they may perceive a threat where none exists or a great threat where only a small one exists. Uncertain intentions can also lead them to fail to recognize a threat where one exists, causing a false sense of security.

⁶²On the problems associated with the inability to distinguish the offense from the defense, see Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma."

When states optimistically miscalculate their relative power position, war becomes a more likely scenario for at least two reasons.⁶³ First, when leaders believe that their side is more powerful than their adversary's side, they tend to believe that they will win a war at a reasonable cost. This belief can result from several causes: states can believe that they have a quantitative and/or qualitative superiority over their adversary; states can believe that their allies provide them with a quantitative and/or qualitative superiority over their adversary; and, states can believe that their will and the will of their allies is greater than their adversary's will and the will of its allies.⁶⁴ Second, when states optimistically miscalculate their relative power position, diplomacy becomes a less effective tool for peaceful dispute resolution. For diplomacy to work, leaders must be willing to compromise on contentious issues. Unfortunately, when leaders believe that they are more powerful than their adversary, they are less willing to compromise because they will believe either that their adversary will recognize its weakness and concede, or that they can achieve all their goals by military means.

Miscalculating the intentions of other states can also cause war.⁶⁵ When states overestimate the hostility of a potential adversary, the probability of war can increase for at least two reasons. First, leaders may believe that the other state represents a significant threat to their state's security, and go to war to reduce that threat. Second, as with optimistic miscalculation of relative power, overestimating the hostility of a potential adversary can also cause war by its effect on diplomacy. The more hostile an adversary seems to be, the more likely leaders are to believe that the adversary will not compromise during negotiations. This means that, unless the leaders are willing to concede on all key issues, negotiations will be futile, and war becomes the last remaining solution to the problem. American policy with respect to North Vietnam provides a good example of this issue. Because American leaders believed that there was no compromising with communism, they overestimated Vietnam's hostility and were unwilling to take advantage of opportunities for the two

⁶³On miscalculation and war see Jack S. Levy, "Misperceptions and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," *World Politics*, Vol. 36 No. 1 (October 1983), pp. 76-99; Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, third edition, (New York: Free Press, 1988), pp.35-56; and, Van Evera, *Causes of War*, pp. 14-34.

⁶⁴Will refers to the costs that a state is able to bear in pursuit of its objective.

⁶⁵On misperception of intentions and war, see Levy, "Causes of War," pp. 280-282.

sides to develop a peaceful relationship.

Underestimating the hostility of an adversary can also cause war. Without a threat or the perception of a threat, leaders will not prepare for war, and thereby deter it. They will not build the necessary forces, mobilize them for battle, or warn their adversary of the consequences of its potential actions, causing the leaders to be unprepared for war if a threat actually exists. The adversary will see the situation and take advantage of the opportunity. Unfortunately, war may have been avoidable. If preparation had been undertaken or warnings had been given, the adversary may have been deterred from attacking. The Korean war provides a good example of this problem. If the US had recognized North Korea's hostility and clearly stated its interests in the Korean Peninsula, the North might have been deterred from attacking.

2.2.4 Imperial Disintegration, Nationalism, and War

Nationalism is a movement that seeks to provide the national, particularly ethnic, group with its own, independent state endowed with the same rights and responsibilities as any other state.⁶⁶ When nationalism develops, the group tends to develop any of three demands. If the group does not have a state of its own, it may demand either independence from the state in which it currently lives or increased autonomy within the state. If the group already controls a state, it tends to demand unification of its ethnic brethren with the ethnic homeland. Sometimes, nationalism does not focus on the unification of an ethnic group into a single state. Instead, it can focus on the state's desire to increase its independence and defend its sovereignty from outside influence. In the international system, the powerful tend to exploit the weak by trying to force the weak to adopt specific domestic and international policies. These policies may not be in the interest of the weak state, leading the weak state to oppose the policies. In reaction to outside interference, the weak state may become

⁶⁶The literature on nationalism is large. Much of the discussion on nationalism has tried to define the term. Some of the most prominent works are Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition, (London: Verso, 1991); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Charles A. Kupchan, editor, *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, second edition, (New York: Harper & Row, 1983); and, idem, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

nationalistic and demand an end to outside influence and interference.

During the era of imperial rule, the metropole may enact policies that create or exacerbate the potential problems that nationalism can cause. One way in which the metropole helps to create virulent nationalism is through its policy of divide and rule. Empires frequently create borders that divide groups between two or more regions. Or, they can be more direct and simply engage in population transfers. This creates the potential for future problems because, by dividing an ethnic group between two or more territories, the metropole creates the potential that the group will want to unify in the future. Another way in which the empire can create nationalism is by helping to develop ethnic divisions that either previously did not exist or were not politically or culturally salient. The empire does this in at least two ways. It can favor one group over another, which, essentially, is a form of discrimination. It helps stir nationalism among the members of the group against which the empire discriminates as they seek equal rights. The empire can also try to change aspects of the identities of people living in the periphery, thereby creating incentives for individuals to change their identity. For example, many European empires attempted to convert their subjugated people to Christianity. Those who converted, in some situations, developed into new ethnic groups that were not previously present in the region.

The disintegration of empire also causes nationalism to develop and become a problem for several reasons. First, the withdrawal of the empire's power and influence can lead to the growth of nationalism.⁶⁷ The metropole's power may have suppressed nationalism. In other words, nationalist interests always existed, but the metropole prevented nationalism from developing. When the metropole withdraws its power, nationalism can return and flourish. Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union's East European empire, Czech and Slovak nationalisms had the opportunity to express themselves, leading Czechoslovakia to split into a Czech state and a Slovak state.

Second, successor states can suffer from nationalism because of the weakness of their political institutions. The withdrawal of the metropole's power can lead to weak, ineffective states. Institutions help organize society's interests and overcome problems of collective action. Specifically, states provide their citizens with economic and physical security. Since weak states

⁶⁷Charles A. Kupchan, "Introduction: Nationalism Resurgent," in *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, p. 17.

have difficulty providing security to their citizens, their citizens may seek alternative institutions to provide security. The ethnic group provides an existing identity around which to organize politics and to provide security when state institutions fail.⁶⁸ Thus, with the death of Tito and the decline of Yugoslavia's economy, nationalism intensified among the Slovenes, Croats, Albanians, Macedonians, Muslims, and Serbs in Yugoslavia.⁶⁹

Third, nationalism develops when states systematically discriminate against minorities.⁷⁰ Multi-ethnic successor states must decide how to integrate ethnic groups into a single nation, and what rights, benefits, and responsibilities to provide to these groups. If states grant their minorities the same, or similar, rights as they grant to members of the dominant group, nationalism is less likely to develop. On the other hand, if minorities are economically, politically, culturally, or physically discriminated against, nationalism tends to develop. We see this problem in Georgia, where attempts to force a Georgian identity on minorities threatened their identities and helped increase nationalism among them.⁷¹

Not only does nationalism result when successor states mistreat and discriminate against minorities, but it can also occur when outside states discriminate against minorities whose homeland recently gained its independence.⁷² This treatment can exacerbate nationalism in the ethnic homeland because leaders try to use nationalism to gain power and popular support,⁷³ because the public responds to the news that its ethnic brethren is being mistreated by engaging in nationalist behavior, or because members of the group flee to their ethnic homeland and pressure the

⁶⁸Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," pp. 81-85 and Kupchan, "Introduction," p. 8.

For a simple test of this hypothesis, see Jonathan Ladinsky, "The Collapse of the Yugoslavian Empire and the Origins of the Balkan Conflict," Paper presented at the Tenth International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, IL, March 14-16, 1996.

⁶⁹On institutional problems in Yugoslavia following Tito's death, see Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*.

⁷⁰Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Michael E. Brown, editor, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 16-17, 19-21.

⁷¹Suzanne Goldenberg, *Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder*, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books Ltd, 1994), pp. 100-1.

⁷²This problem can also occur in states that are not newly independent.

⁷³Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, (New York, NY: Norton, 2000).

government to intervene.

Fourth, external, particularly Great Power, interference in the internal and foreign policies of successor states helps spur nationalism, particularly when this interference attempts to force successor states to adopt policies that are unimportant or contradictory to their interests. Thus, Russian interference in the Baltic countries has helped spur nationalism in the region.

When empires disintegrate, ethnic groups gain their freedom from the metropole's control. Independence, however, does not necessarily mean that these states have political or territorial control over all their co-nationals. Sometimes, several ethnic groups live within a single state. At other times, ethnic groups may control their own state, but some of their ethnic brethren may live in other states. The existence of these multi-ethnic states and diaspora makes nationalism a danger because force can become an option to achieve national goals. The stronger nationalism becomes, the greater the risks that it will lead to war.⁷⁴

As the empire disintegrates, nationalism can lead to wars in at least two ways. First, nationalism can cause states to go to war to incorporate their diaspora into their state. As nationalism develops and grows, the desire to unite all of one's ethnic group into a single state grows, leading the state to try to acquire the diaspora and the territory in which it lives. This territory, however, is generally a part of another state, and the leaders of that state are unlikely to peacefully cede it. Diaspora of other states may also live in this territory, and they may also lay claim to the territory. As a result of these multiple claims, attempts to incorporate one's diaspora and the territory on which it lives into its ethnic homeland may lead to conflict.

Second, multiethnic states in which the diaspora of another ethnic group that has its own state lives may initiate war as a defensive reaction to nationalism. These states face two threats related to the nationalism of minority populations. First, nationalism in the ethnic homeland, and among

⁷⁴The literature on nationalism and war is limited but growing. Some of the best works on the subject include V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Conflict and International Security: The Case of Serbia," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/5), pp. 130-166; Posen, "The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict"; Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State"; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39, a version of which also appears in Kupchan, *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, pp. 136-158.

One of the more interesting attributes of some of this work is that nationalism is not really the cause of conflict, but a tool used by leaders or a goal of war. For example, in Posen's article, the causes of war are insecurity and power disparities; ethnic groups just happen to be the actors in the conflict.

its diaspora, may cause demands for unification. In this way, nationalism may become a threat to the territorial integrity of the multiethnic state as the ethnic homeland demands the return of its diaspora and the territory in which the diaspora lives. The second threat that nationalism poses to the multiethnic state is known as the Trojan horse dilemma where the leaders of the multiethnic state may question the loyalty of the minority group, viewing it as a potentially subversive threat.⁷⁵ If the multiethnic state and its ethnic homeland become involved in a crisis, the minority may choose to support its ethnic homeland and fight against the multiethnic state from inside, thus presenting an offensive threat to the multiethnic state.⁷⁶

Both of these dangers are limited as long as nationalism among the minority and in the minority's ethnic homeland is weak. As nationalism grows, so does the threat to the multiethnic state. The multiethnic state may address the threat by going to war against the ethnic homeland and annexing it. This war could take the form of a preemptive war in which the multiethnic state initiates the war before the ethnic homeland acts. Or, it could take the form of a defensive war to weaken the diaspora's nationalism. By defeating and annexing the ethnic homeland, the multiethnic state may remove a significant source and goal of nationalism from the international playing field.

2.2.5 Imperial Disintegration, Domestic Politics, and War

Imperial disintegration may also cause internal divisions that, in turn, cause domestic instability in the successor states. Domestic instability occurs when leaders are insecure about their hold on power and worry that they may lose their power. They feel insecure when there are serious divisions among the state's elite or when there are divisions between the elite and society, or at least significant segments of society. In these situations, either other powerful elites or significant social groups may oppose the current leadership and seek to gain power. In the early decades of Brazil's independence, for example, both regional and class divisions helped cause domestic instability.⁷⁷

Problems associated with state-building can cause instability. Successor states must build

⁷⁵On the Trojan horse dilemma, see Alon Peled, *A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 1-2,16-22.

⁷⁶People commonly refer to this subversive threat as a potential "fifth column."

⁷⁷Ronald M. Schneider, *"Order and Progress": A Political History of Brazil*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 37-8.

civil, military, and economic bureaucracies and institutions to manage domestic and international conflict. The process of building these institutions can create internal resistance and conflict.⁷⁸ To build a state, power and authority must be centralized. This requires local and regional leaders to transfer some of their power and authority to the central government. These leaders, however, do not want to lose their power and influence, nor do they want to lose any of the benefits that go with leadership. Thus, they may oppose attempts to centralize power. To some extent, the United States faced this problem in the years leading up to the Civil War. Leaders often debated the issue of state's rights versus federal control. In the years leading up to the Civil War, these concerns increased. Southerners feared that Lincoln would reduce their power and rights. As Brian Reid writes,

There was a strong measure of defiance against a political system that had allowed a candidate [Abraham Lincoln] who was a perceived threat to southern institutions and liberties to walk through the door of the White House...Thus to protect those liberties and institutions,...seven states claimed they had the power to leave the Union if their interests so demanded it.⁷⁹

State-building can also cause problems because of the demands it places on society. To build states, the government must extract resources from society. Any resources that the government extracts cannot be invested or consumed by society. The more resources the government extracts, the fewer resources available for private consumption. The more onerous the government's demands upon society, the more likely the people are to question the government's actions, to withdraw their support from the state's leadership, or to rebel against the government. This is particularly true if people believe that the government is misusing these resources.

Finally, if the successor state's institutions fail to satisfy society's interests and demands, domestic instability may result. In most cases, successor states are both economically and politically weak. During the empire's existence, the economy of the peripheral territories depends upon the center. When the empire collapses, the economic ties between the center and periphery and among the peripheral territories may weaken or end. These disruptions can cause the successor state's economy to suffer, leading people to be dissatisfied with their lot in life.

⁷⁸On institution-building and the conflict among interest groups, see Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

⁷⁹Brian Holden Reid, *The Origins of the American Civil War*, (New York: Longman, 1996), p. 363.

The successor state's political institutions may also fail to satisfy society's interests because they are unable to incorporate the new groups that enter politics, their interests, and their demands into the state's decision-making,⁸⁰ which can lead to two problems. First, the state may try to reform its institutions so that it can incorporate the disenfranchised groups. Unfortunately, since reform frequently leads to winners and losers, it can lead to disagreements and conflicts over what reforms should actually be enacted, thereby causing domestic instability. Second, those groups whose interests are least satisfied by the government, may withdraw their support from the state's leaders. These groups may then seek to satisfy their interests outside of "legitimate governmental channels," as occurred in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. The Croats and Slovenes began to believe that Yugoslavia's central government did not represent their interests; therefore, they withdraw their support from the central government and tried to satisfy their interests through regional institutions.⁸¹ Or, the groups that believe the state is not satisfying their interests and oppose the current leadership can compete with the existing coalitions for votes and power.

Because of these domestic divisions, successor states to empire may suffer from domestic instability, causing the leaders of these states to have, or at least perceive that they have, a weak hold on power causing two sets of problems. One of these problems results from the leadership's own insecurities; those in power may use diversionary tactics to create the perception that an external threat to the state's security exists. Rhetorically, the leaders may discuss the danger a particular country or ideology represents to the state and its way of life. During the Cold War, for example, American presidents used communism in this way. To help support this rhetoric, leaders may take actions such as building weapon systems, mobilizing troops, and stationing these troops in strategic locations.

Leaders of successor states may create these threats to achieve at least two purposes. First, they can use these threats to divert attention away from ineffective leadership and domestic politics. In other words, they may try to create a scapegoat. Creating or exacerbating an external threat may allow leaders either to blame the enemy for their state's problems or to divert attention from their

⁸⁰Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

⁸¹Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, second edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

ineffective governance in the hope that this threat will cause the people to unite behind their leadership.⁸² Leaders adopt this policy in the hope that the people will unite with them and balance against the common external threat.

Second, leaders may create a threat or use existing threats to help mobilize society to support their leadership and their policies.⁸³ In newly independent states, leaders frequently need to enact costly, controversial policies such as raising taxes, centralizing power, mobilizing the military, and restricting civil liberties. Under normal conditions, people may be unwilling to bear the costs of these policies. To overcome this opposition, leaders may create a new threat or exaggerate an existing one in the hope that the society will support the government's policies in spite of the cost.

When leaders use these tactics to achieve domestic goals, war may result for at least two reasons.⁸⁴ First, war can be the diversionary tactic leaders use to unite the people behind them.⁸⁵ Second, diversionary tactics can lead to war if the elite becomes trapped by its own rhetoric and is forced to go to war. The tactics used by the elite may lead the public to believe that the scapegoat is a genuine threat to the state's security. The public may then demand that the leaders go to war to

⁸²Discussing the unifying effects of external threats are Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in *Handbook of War Studies*, edited by Manus Midlarsky, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 259-288 and Arthur A. Stein, *The Nation at War*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). This hypothesis was originally developed by sociologists, who refer to it as the in-group/out-group hypothesis. On the in-group/out-group hypothesis, see Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1956) and George Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations*, translated by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix, (New York: The Free Press, 1955).

Tests of this hypothesis have not proven it to be absolutely true. In some cases, outside threats unite the people behind their leaders, while in other cases outside threats seem to divide a state. Some recent research has tried to propose conditions under which external threats will unite a state. See Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War," for a summary of recent research. For my purposes, the validity of the hypothesis that external threats increase a group's cohesion is not important; it is only important for the leaders who use diversionary tactics to believe that these tactics will increase their hold on power.

⁸³Testing the argument that leaders create external threats to help mobilize domestic resources is Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁸⁴Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War," pp. 259-281.

⁸⁵A good argument against this hypothesis is that when a state suffers from domestic instability it is normally too weak to be able to fight a war. Diversionary tactics, therefore, do not include war. While this argument is logical, it ignores the possibility that these tactics will be used against weaker states, thereby reducing the risks associated with war.

remove this threat.⁸⁶ Christensen uses Sino-American relations in the early years of the Cold War to demonstrate this problem.⁸⁷ The US government needed to maintain a large, expensive military to balance the Soviet threat. To help mobilize the public to support these expenses, the government engaged in a massive anti-communist propaganda campaign. Unfortunately, the success of this campaign also forced the United States to treat the People's Republic of China as a hostile power that threatened American interests.⁸⁸

The other problem that occurs in successor states suffering from domestic instability is a result of the situation under which weak leaders rule; they tend to lack autonomy from domestic opinion and pressure groups. Leaders who are insecure about their hold on power are susceptible to pressure from large, powerful, vocal groups. They fear that if they do not satisfy the demands of these groups, they may lose their position and even their lives. Strong leaders, on the other hand, are not as concerned about their hold on power. Their legitimacy and power provide them with greater control over the government, allowing them greater autonomy from societal demands.⁸⁹ The stronger the leader, the more likely he is to implement the policies that he considers best. Weak leaders who are insecure about their hold on power, however, may develop a "follow the crowd" attitude. Instead of initiating policy and resisting public pressure, these leaders tend to do what the public demands even when they do not believe it to be in the state's best interests. Thus, according to this hypothesis, war occurs when weak leaders believe that important groups in society want war or policies that make war more likely.

Not only do these leaders who have a weak hold on power follow the crowd, but they also have more difficulty resolving crises. Frequently, during crises, unpopular actions have to be taken, e.g., concessions may have to be made. If leaders have a weak hold on power, they may be less

⁸⁶This concept has been termed "blowback," Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 41-42.

⁸⁷Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*.

⁸⁸A third hypothesis would claim that diversionary tactics cause the vilified state to overestimate the hostility of the unstable state. I address this hypothesis in the discussion of miscalculation and war.

⁸⁹This distinction between weak and strong leaders is analogous to the distinction between strong and weak states. On strong and weak states, see Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies in Advanced Industrial States*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

likely to make concessions because compromise will cause them to lose power. Without the ability to achieve negotiated settlements, war becomes more likely. This problem is particularly acute when rivals for power are ready and willing to use any compromise to discredit the leadership and take power. This can clearly be seen just prior to the First Balkan War. Turkey needed to extricate itself from its war with Italy in order to focus its attentions on the Balkan threat. Unfortunately, if the current government had made the concessions necessary to end the war, the opposition would have denounced the action and gained the support necessary to take power.

2.3 Testing the Theory

In order to test the argument made in this dissertation, it helps to have some guidance. This section provides, in broad strokes, the predictions associated with the dissertations argument.

Two prime predictions exist for the argument that the disintegration and collapse of empires causes war.

A: Wars and crises should be more common in eras when empires are disintegrating and collapsing.

B: Wars and crises should be more common in regions where empires are disintegrating and collapsing.

Testing these predictions would require a large-n study comparing wars and crises across time and space. Because of the structure of this dissertation, I do not test these predictions.

The argument, however, also allows us to test two sets of explanatory predictions. The first set of predictions relates to the first arrow in the argument, that the disintegration and collapse of empires causes the causes and conditions for war. Three explanatory predictions can be derived from this hypothesis.

P1: Do intervening phenomena identified by the hypotheses (see table 2-1) correlate with imperial disintegration?

P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts? (This prediction is difficult to address without having some baseline amount to compare them to.)

P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena identified by the hypotheses?

Some analysts might have difficulty determining when some of the key causes of war are present. It is necessary, therefore, to provide standards with which to determine when unsettled rules of the game, power advantages, miscalculation, nationalism, and domestic instability are present.

To determine whether the rules of the game are unsettled, one must ask three questions:

1. What do the key actors consider the relevant rules of the game to be? When and to whom do they apply?
2. Do the key actors disagree about either the relevant rules of the game or their applicability?
3. Do the key actors believe that the current rules are the appropriate rules? In other words, do they believe that a disequilibrium exists between the current benefits conferred by the rules and the status of the states?

If the states have different opinions of the rules, their applicability, or their appropriateness, the rules of the game are likely to be unsettled.

TABLE 2-i

IMPERIAL DISINTEGRATION AND THE CAUSES OF WAR

- A. Ambiguous rules of the game
 1. Changes in the distribution of power cause the rules of the game to become inappropriate or issues of dispute.
 2. The entrance of newly independent states into the international system creates new issues and new interests that may not be represented in the existing rules of the game.^D
 3. Treaties and precedents become outdated.
 4. States may be unwilling to negotiate a new set of rules prior to the collapse of the empire.
 5. Those rules that states do negotiate may be vague and open to different interpretations.
- B. Shifts in the balance of power
 1. Successor states lose power relative to the empire.^{PT}
 2. State-building increases the power of successor states.
 3. Successor states build states at different rates.^{PT}
 4. Inter-state alliances change and shift over time.
- C. Domestic instability
 1. Disagreements about the process of state building create internal resistance to the state's leadership and its policies.
 2. The state may fail to satisfy society's interests.^{PT}
- D. Nationalism
 1. Imperial and Great Power policies create ethnic divisions.
 2. Ethnic groups are dispersed and intermingled.
 3. The withdrawal of the metropole's power and influence creates the opportunity for nationalism to blossom.^D
 4. Successor states that have weak, ineffective institutions spur nationalism.^D
 5. Discrimination against minorities spur nationalism.
 6. External interference in the successor states internal politics increases nationalism.
- E. Uncertain Capabilities and Intentions
 1. The capabilities of successor states are uncertain.
 2. The intentions of successor states are uncertain.
 3. Successor states have difficulty determining the capabilities and intentions of other states.^D
 4. States outside the zone of imperial retraction have difficulty determining each other's intentions.
 5. The capabilities, intentions, and members of post-imperial alliances are difficult to determine.

^D These hypotheses are deductive and receive little to no testing in this dissertation.

^{PT} These hypotheses are only partially tested in this dissertation.

Power advantages and miscalculation are much easier issues to analyze. To determine the relative power of states, one must compare the states' quantitative and qualitative capabilities. Two questions should be asked:

4. What are the distribution of forces among the relevant states?
5. How do the forces compare qualitatively? More specifically, one must look at the quality of the weapons, leaders, and soldiers?

To determine whether capabilities have been miscalculated, after looking at the actual capabilities of the relevant states, one must look at the perceptions of capabilities and ask three question:

6. What did the key actors perceive the quantitative and qualitative balance of power to be? Were these perceptions accurate?
7. Upon what evidence did they base these perception? Was the evidence accurate?
8. Did the outcome justify the perception?

If perception failed to match reality, then miscalculation probably occurred.

States, and their leaders, can also misperceive intentions; they can see hostility where none exists and vice versa. To determine if they inaccurately perceived intentions, two questions must be asked:

9. What were the relevant states' intentions? Did these intentions change in response to the actions of others?
10. What did leaders perceive these intentions to be? Were their decisions a function of these perceptions? Did they understand the effects and consequences of their actions?

If states did not accurately perceive their adversary's intentions or failed to account for the effect of their actions upon their adversary, then misperceptions of intentions may have occurred.

Nationalism is a more difficult problem to address. It involves both intentions and actions.

Like pornography, one knows it when one sees it. Several questions must be asked:

11. Does some organization or organizations—societal or state—exist?
12. What goal do these organizations have? What is its ideologies?
13. Is its goal to unite the ethnic group within a single, independent state?
14. Do the actions conform with this goal?

Finally, one must look at the issue of domestic instability. To determine whether domestic instability exists, one must ask three of questions:

15. Do competitors exist for leadership of the state?
16. Does the leadership fear that it will lose power?
17. Are the current leadership's actions determined or constrained by its weakness?

The second set of explanatory predictions addresses the hypotheses relating the causes of war

to war. These predictions follow the same pattern for each of the causes of war hypotheses as the previous three predictions.

- P4: Do intervening phenomena identified by the hypotheses (see table 2-2) correlate with imperial disintegration?
- P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts? (As above, to test this prediction requires a baseline to which to compare it.)
- P6: Did elites explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena identified by the hypotheses?

TABLE 2-2

HYPOTHESES ON IMPERIAL DISINTEGRATION AND WAR

- H1. The more unsettled the rules of the game, the greater the likelihood of war.
 - H1A. Unsettled rules of the game cause miscalculation of intentions.
 - H1B. Unsettled rules of the game lead states to compete to build a new international order.
 - H1C. Unsettled rules of the game make diplomacy more difficult.
- H2. The greater the change in the balance of power, the greater the likelihood of war.
 - H2A. Shifts in the balance of power create windows of opportunity for states to settle outstanding grievances, to increase their power, or to increase their security.
 - H2B. Shifts in the balance of power lead to competition over the spoils of empire.
 - H2C. Responses to shifts in the balance of power create security dilemma problems.^{PT}
- H3. The more states optimistically miscalculate their relative power, the greater the likelihood of war.
 - H3A. Optimistic miscalculation causes leaders to believe that war can be fought and won at a reasonable cost.
 - H3B. Optimistic miscalculation makes leaders less likely to compromise on disputes.
- H4. The more states overestimate the hostility of other states, the greater the likelihood of war.
 - H4A. Overestimating the hostility of other states increases a state's insecurity.^D
 - H4B. Overestimating the hostility of other states makes negotiations more difficult.^D
- H5. The more states underestimate the hostility of other states, the greater the likelihood of war.
 - H5A. Underestimating the hostility of other states causes states to fail to take actions to prevent or to prepare for war.
- H6. The stronger nationalism, the greater the likelihood of war.
 - H6A. Nationalism leads to the desire to unite one's ethnic brethren into a single state.
 - H6B. Nationalism leads multiethnic states to fear the threat from a minority group and its ethnic homeland.
- H7. The more insecure leaders are, the greater the likelihood of war.
 - H7A. Insecure leaders use diversionary tactics to maintain their hold on power.
 - H7B. Insecure leaders are susceptible to public pressure for war.
 - H7C. Insecure leaders are unwilling to enact unpopular policies that may resolve crises peacefully.

^D These hypotheses are deductive and receive little to no testing in this dissertation.

^{PT} These hypotheses are only partially tested in this dissertation.

2.4 Caveats

Before continuing, it is necessary to present several caveats. First, I do not test or provide evidence for all of the arguments presented in this chapter. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to develop the theoretical argument linking imperial disintegration to war. This requires me to present arguments that I believe to be theoretically accurate even if I do not test them in this dissertation. Second, I am not arguing that the disintegration of empire causes war in new and unique ways. All of the hypotheses presented in this chapter apply to many situations. Nevertheless, I have found them to be useful for explaining the wars that occur when empires disintegrate. Third, some of these hypotheses overlap. For example, wars of miscalculation can occur for at least three reasons: as a result of unsettled rules of the game, as a result of uncertainty associated with the new situation, or as a result of security dilemma dynamics. Since more than one hypothesis is necessary to explain each case, it can be difficult in some cases to determine the relative strength of the hypotheses. Fourth, even though these hypotheses come from more general hypotheses found in the causes of war literature, I am not providing a complete test of the more general hypotheses. My purpose is to understand the wars that occur when empires disintegrate. In the process, I hope to shed some light on the validity of the general hypotheses. The results of this study can provide confirming evidence for the general hypotheses, but only limited disconfirming evidence.


Chapter 3

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, ITS COLLAPSE AND THE EASTERN QUESTION

This section seeks to provide background to the case studies. It discusses the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, the international politics of the Balkans in the 19th century, the political system in the Ottoman Empire, and nationalism in the Balkans.

3.1 The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire was a large, long-lasting empire controlled by a group of Muslims who



Map 3-1: The Expansion of the Ottoman Empire from 1300-1699
Obtained from <http://naqshbandi.org/ottomans/expansionmap.gif>

descended from the Turkish nomads of central Asia.¹ They began to migrate towards the Middle East in the ninth century. During the next four hundred years, various of these Turkish tribes took advantage of the weakness of the many kingdoms, khanates, and empires in the region to expand throughout Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

¹In this dissertation, I use the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Constantinople, and the Porte interchangeably even though this is not strictly accurate.

It was not until the mid-eleventh century, under Osman I that the Ottoman Empire began to form. From 1250 until 1683, Osman and his successors acquired territories in Europe, Central Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East.² (See Map 3-1) By 1683, the Ottoman Empire claimed territories that included present day Turkey, Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, parts of Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, parts of Syria, and other territories along the coast of North Africa and in Central Asia. In so doing, the Ottoman Empire also controlled people belonging to the many ethnic groups and religions that lived in these territories.

Ottoman expansion finally came to an end in 1683 at the gates of Vienna where the Habsburg army defeated Turkish forces. With this defeat, the Ottoman Empire began to lose territory, mostly as a result of the expansion of the Habsburg and Russian Empires. For the next 140 years, the Ottoman Empire fought war after war against these empires. With each war, it was pushed further and further back, forced to concede bits and pieces of territory. The loss of these territories resulted from external conflict, not internal instability, and the territories that the Ottomans lost did not become independent, but were annexed by other states and empires.

Beginning with the Serbian rebellion in the early 1800s, the causes of the Empire's decline changed. Previous Ottoman losses had occurred when other states encroached on Ottoman territory. The Serb rebellion, on the other hand, involved Ottoman subjects actively rebelling against Ottoman rule, specifically against the repression and mismanagement of Ottoman agents in Serbia.³ The Serbs, however, did not seek to gain their independence from Constantinople; they only wanted the Porte to provide for their security. To achieve this goal, they demanded that the Ottoman government allow them local self-rule and provide for their security. Unfortunately, the Ottoman

²Discussing the expansion of the Ottoman Empire are P.M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: A Political History*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 23-60; Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, (New York: Warner Books, 1991), pp. 212-216; Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: the Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*, (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1977), pp. 15-255; and, Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume I: Empire and the Gazas 1280-1808*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 1-11,169-215.

³Discussing the Serbian rebellion are Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States, 1804-1920*, (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1977), pp. 26-37; L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1958), pp. 238-251; and, Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia, Volume I*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 3-128.

authorities in Constantinople did not have sufficient control over the local administration and were unable to guarantee the Serbs security. The Serbs tried and failed to achieve their goals for the first twenty years of the nineteenth century. Finally, in the early 1830s Serbia gained a large degree of autonomy as a result of the Greek revolution and Great Power pressure.

At least in its initial stages, the Serbian rebellion sought greater autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. It was not until the Greek revolution that any of the Balkan people of the Ottoman Empire rebelled to achieve national goals.⁴ Nationalism combined with the Ottoman Empire's mismanagement of Greece helped spur Greek revolts against Ottoman rule in the early 1820s. While these revolts initially led to great successes, internal divisions among Greek leaders prevented a quick, decisive victory. It was not until ten years later that the Greeks, with the support of the Great Powers, gained their independence.


The conclusion of the War of Greek Independence defines the beginning of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This event signals the first time that any of the Ottoman territories gained their independence at their own instigation. The Ottoman Empire had lost territory and influence throughout its Empire since 1653, but these losses did not result in independent states and were not due to internal resistance.⁵ For the most part, previous losses had resulted from the interests and actions of the Great Powers. Furthermore, the territorial losses suffered by the Ottoman Empire had

⁴Short discussions of the Greek revolution and war of independence that occurred between 1821 and 1834 can be found in Douglas Dakin, *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1972), pp. 36-65; Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, pp. 38-52; and, Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 279-292. More extensive discussions of the War of Greek Independence can be found in C.W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1930); and Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821-1833*, (London: B. T. Batsford, 1973).

⁵Some might argue that the Ottoman collapse began around 1806 when Muhammad Ali began his wars to incorporate Arab territories into his Egyptian territories. Since Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire and Muhammad Ali was a subject of the Sultan's, one could make a convincing argument for this claim. I do not for two reasons. First, despite Egypt's victories over the Ottoman Empire, it remained part of the Empire, albeit with a great deal of autonomy. It was not until 1882 when the British occupied Egypt that the Ottoman Empire lost complete control of this territory. Second, the Ottoman Empire never exercised the same level of control over Egypt that it exercised over its European territories. Discussing Muhammad Ali is Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, pp. 176-192.

resulted in the augmentation of the European empires, not in the creation of independent states.⁶

Starting with the war of Greek Independence and lasting until the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire following the First World War, the East European peoples of the Ottoman Empire began to rebel against Ottoman rule and to create independent successor states. After Greece gained



its independence in 1833, Serbia and Romania gained theirs in 1878; Bulgaria gained its autonomy in 1878 and became independent in 1908; Montenegro gained its independence in 1878;⁷ Albania become independent in 1913. Finally, as a result of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire completely collapsed and Turkey became an independent state. (See Map 3-2)

The decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire resulted from several causes. The empire's decline initially began as a result of external security threats. As the Ottoman Empire expanded, its borders grew longer and became more costly to defend. In addition, over time, the Ottoman Empire

⁶Although L. Carl Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 21-30 is trying to date the origins of the Eastern Question, his discussion is also useful for explaining why different dates may be used to define the beginning of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

⁷Even though Montenegro legally gained its independence in 1878, it was never fully incorporated into the Ottoman Empire.

began to lose power relative to the two other continental Great Powers—Austria and Russia. These two problems created opportunities for Austria and Russia to expand at the Ottoman Empire's expense.⁸

Internal problems also contributed to the decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire. First, the empire suffered from the problems of corruption and incompetence.⁹ The Ottoman Empire was ruled by a hereditary leader, the Sultan. As long as the Sultan was an intelligent, capable leader, the Empire was likely to maintain its position. Unfortunately, weak, incompetent Sultans eventually came to power, and, under their leadership, the empire suffered. Furthermore, many among the ruling classes used their positions to gain profit at the expense of the well-being of the empire. For example, they sold offices to the highest bidder rather than selecting the most capable leaders and bureaucrats.

Finally, the resistance of national groups within the empire's peripheral territories helped cause the disintegration and collapse.¹⁰ As a multi-ethnic empire, the Ottoman Empire incorporated many ethnic groups within a single political unit. For a variety of reasons, nationalism developed among these groups, leading them to demand increased autonomy and, eventually, independence. With the support of the Great Powers, these groups were able to achieve some, if not all, of their goals. As nationalism grew stronger, the empire grew weaker until it collapsed under the pressure.

3.2 Decline of the Ottoman Empire, Rise of the Eastern Question, and the Great Powers

With the weakening and resultant disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers became concerned about the fate of the Empire's European territories. During the previous centuries, the Powers did not need to concern themselves with this issue because the Turkish military was able to control these territories. But, as the Ottoman Empire began to lose power relative to the Great Powers and began to lose control over the region, they could no longer be confident that the territories would remain under Turkish control. The Powers now had the capability to influence events in the region and, even, take territory from the Turks. Furthermore, as nationalism grew in

⁸Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000*, (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 11.

⁹Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 170-175.

¹⁰This is the theme of Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*.

the Ottoman territories, the danger grew that these territories might seek and gain their independence. Once independent, they were more likely to become arenas of competition for the Powers as they sought to increase their influence in the region. The Powers, therefore, confronted the question of what territorial arrangement should take the place of the Ottoman Empire; a problem that came to be known as the “Eastern Question.”¹¹

The Eastern Question was important to the Great Powers because many of them had interests in the Ottoman Empire, and any threat to the Ottoman Empire could threaten their interests.¹² Three states had particularly strong interests in the region that they needed to defend—Austria, Russia, and Great Britain.¹³ Austrian interests in the region were two-fold. First, many of the Ottoman territories bordered Austria. If a potentially hostile Power, namely Russia, gained control of these territories, its security would be significantly reduced. Second, the Austrian Empire was a multi-ethnic empire composed of Germans, Hungarians, and South Slavs, among others. Until 1867, the Germans ruled this empire. Then, in 1867, the Dual Monarchy was created whereby both Germans and Hungarians ruled. Both of these groups feared that if the South Slavs living in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire gained their independence, the new states would become a magnet for the Habsburg Slavs with three potential consequences: the Austrian Slavs would seek to unite with their newly freed ethnic brethren; they would demand more rights and responsibilities within the Austrian state; or, the new states would seek to annex the Austro-Hungarian territories in which their ethnic brethren lived. None of these options pleased the Austrian Germans or the Hungarians.

¹¹A large literature exists on the Eastern Question, a few of the most useful include M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966); Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East*; and, J.A.R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1940).

¹²For a concise discussion of the Great Powers' interests in the Eastern Question, see Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, pp. 186-192.

¹³Prussia, later to become Germany, lacked any direct interests in the region. She was more concerned with events among the German states, with France, with Austria, and with Russia. The Balkans only became important when it impinged upon her relationships with any of these states.

France, on the other hand, maintained an interest in the Near East based on its imperial goals and on its prestige as a Great Power. For the most part, Paris involved itself in events in North Africa, the Middle East and the Holy Lands. The Balkans remained a peripheral concern.

Russia's interests in the Balkans were also based on geography and ethnicity.¹⁴ Geographically, the Ottoman Empire bordered Russia in Europe and in Central Asia. In addition, the Ottoman Empire controlled the Turkish Straits, which provided Russian warships and merchant ships with access to the Mediterranean. If a Power other than the Ottoman Empire or Russia controlled these territories, Russia's security would be reduced. The ethnicity of the peoples of the Balkans also increased the importance of the Eastern Question for Russia. As the largest Slav and Orthodox state, Russia considered itself and was considered to be the defender of the Slavs and of the Orthodox faith. Since the majority of the Balkan people were Slav and Eastern Orthodox, their well-being was of interest to Russia.

British interest in the Eastern Question resulted from its interest in India, the jewel of the British Empire. Both the Euphrates and Suez provided access to India, and any state that controlled them could threaten British interests there.¹⁵ British leaders, therefore, worried that the weakening of the Ottoman Empire could threaten India if some other power gained control of Ottoman territory, particularly Russia.

3.3 The System of Ottoman Rule¹⁶

The system of rule used by the Ottoman Empire varied both over time and in regions.¹⁷ For example, as the Empire declined, leaders implemented reforms that decentralized power. Regional variation can be seen in the relative independence of the Ottoman Empire's Arab territories versus the more centralized control that Constantinople exercised over some of the Balkan territories. Despite these variations, key aspects of the system of rule remained relatively constant.

¹⁴David MacKenzie, *Imperial Dreams Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917*, (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), p. 41.

¹⁵Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*, (New York: Kodansha International, 1992), pp. 69-76; and Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, (Unknown: Archon Books, 1964), pp. 93-96.

¹⁶This section is based upon Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire, Volume I*, Stanford Shaw and Ezra Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire, Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 39-126.

¹⁷Discussing the Ottoman system of rule and the efforts at reform is Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire Volume I* and idem and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II*.

At the top of the Ottoman Empire's leadership were the Sultan and the Porte. In theory, the Sultan was both the autocratic leader of the Ottoman Empire and the religious leader for all Muslims. In practice, his influence did not extend that far. He focused his attention on the promotion of Islam and the physical and economic security of the empire and its inhabitants.¹⁸ Helping the Sultan with these decisions was the Porte, sometimes called the Sublime Porte. The Porte refers to the central government led by the grand vezir, whose purpose was to help advise the Sultan and to implement his policies.¹⁹ As the quality of sultans declined, the Porte gained more power.²⁰

Between the leaders in Constantinople and the peasants in the Ottoman periphery were two groups that served as intermediaries. The first was a collection of Balkan notables who served as tax assessors and tax collectors in the Balkan villages.²¹ The second and more important intermediaries were the leaders of the various religions, in particular the leaders of the Muslims, the Orthodox Church, the Armenian Church, and the Jews. The Ottoman Empire was organized along religious lines called *millet*s.²² These *millet*s were communities defined by religion and ruled by the leaders of the particular religion who held both religious and civil authority over their co-religionist. If an Orthodox Christian violated the law, it was the responsibility of the leader of the Orthodox Church to punish the offender. By giving religious leaders this power, the Sultan also gave them a stake in the existence and success of the Ottoman Empire, which he hoped would make them loyal to the Empire.

Despite the rights that the *millet* system bestowed upon non-Muslims, they still suffered from discrimination.²³ Legally, if a non-Muslim subject of the Ottoman Empire were accused of a crime against a Muslim, the case would be tried before a Muslim court under Muslim laws. Non-Muslims

¹⁸Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire, Volume I*, pp. 164-165.

¹⁹Ibid, pp. 280-284.

²⁰Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, pp. 46-47.

²¹Ibid, pp. 57-58.

²²Wayne S. Vucinich, "Some Aspects of the Ottoman Legacy," in *The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics Since the Eighteenth Century*, edited by Charles and Barbara Jelavich, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), p. 81-114.

²³Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, p. 39-72; and Vucinich, "Some Aspects of the Ottoman Legacy," p. 97.

also were not allowed to serve in the Ottoman military. In lieu of military service, non-Muslims aided the Ottoman government in two ways. First, they were required to give the Sultan one unmarried son who would be trained and serve the Empire in various ways, including as soldiers in the Sultan's military. Second, non-Muslims had to pay a head tax, which Muslims did not have to pay. Discrimination against non-Muslims took other forms as well: they were not allowed to wear certain clothing, to own horses, and suffered from other special restrictions that the Empire placed upon them.

3.4 Nationalism and the Balkans

When trying to understand the growth of Balkan nationalism in the nineteenth century, four questions need to be addressed.²⁴ First, why did Balkan ethnic identities survive? The Ottoman Empire controlled the Balkans for several centuries, yet starting from the late 18th century the people of this region began to rediscover and assert their ethnic identity. The survival of these identities after so many years of subjugation requires explanation. Second, and related, why did nationalism return in the 19th century? During the Napoleonic Wars the Balkan people began to direct their political energies towards the achievement of national goals. For the next hundred years, the various people of the Balkans sought to gain political control over the territories they inhabited through diplomacy and war. The timing of the revival of nationalism, therefore, also merits explanation. Third, why did the various national groups of the Balkans develop nationalism at different times? The Balkan people could have rebelled against Ottoman rule at the same time and sought to create a federated Balkan state.²⁵ Instead, different groups rebelled at different times seeking their own independent states. The Greeks were the first to push for independence, later followed by the Serbs, the Romanians, the Bulgarians and the Albanians. Finally, why was nationalism a potential problem as the Balkan people gained their independence? In other words, what policies of the Ottoman Empire and what actions taken by the Empire, the Great Powers, and the newly independent states contributed to the potential for nationalism to lead to war? This section addresses each of these

²⁴L.S. Stavrianos, "Antecedents to the Balkan Revolutions of the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Modern History*, 29 (December 1957), pp. 335-348 directly addresses the first two questions and indirectly address the third question. He does not, however, address the fourth question.

²⁵On the attempts to create a Balkan federation, see L.S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*, (Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing Company, 1944).

questions in turn.

The survival of the ethnic identities of the Balkan people during the centuries of Ottoman rule can be explained, in large part, by two factors.²⁶ First, the *millet* system helped to maintain a distinction between Christians and Muslims, thereby keeping the Christian identity alive. As previously stated, the Ottoman Empire ruled most of its subjects through their religious leaders. The majority of the Balkan people, therefore, were ruled by the Orthodox *millet*. This system of rule helped the Balkan people maintain their identity by preserving a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims.²⁷ A consequence of this system was that the Ottoman Empire failed to assimilate the Balkan people into the Empire, and the Balkan people failed to develop loyalty to the Empire. Second, the Balkan people lived in compact ethnic blocs, allowing them to maintain memories of past glories through oral histories and folk literature.²⁸ These memories provided the basic myths upon which they could build nationalism.

Even though the Balkan people were able to maintain their identities, nationalism did not come to the forefront until the 19th century. Prior to the 19th century, the Balkan people lived under the Ottoman yoke without rebellion. In fact, some worked for the Ottoman Empire as diplomats, soldiers, and tax collectors. During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, certain changes led to a nationalist revival.²⁹ First, the decline of the Ottoman Empire provided both the opportunity and the motive for nationalism to develop. As the Ottoman Empire grew weaker, the Balkan people began to believe that the Empire was not powerful enough to maintain control in the Balkans. This led them to believe they could achieve their independence. Furthermore, as the Empire weakened, the Porte was unable to maintain order and security in the Balkans as those assigned to protect the Balkan people preyed on the peasants, instead. As a consequence of the Empire's failure to provide security, the Balkan people were forced to provide it for themselves.

Second, economic developments contributed to the rise of Balkan nationalism in the 19th

²⁶Stavrianos, "Antecedents," pp. 336-339 provides a more complete list of factors that helped the Balkan people preserve their identity.

²⁷Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, p. 174.

²⁸Ibid; and Stavrianos, "Antecedents," pp. 336-339.

²⁹Stavrianos, "Antecedents," pp. 340-344.

century in several ways. The Ottoman Empire's economic system's failure to satisfy the Balkan peasants led to their dissatisfaction. As a result, these peasants formed a mass base for national rebellions. The expansion of commerce also helped spur the development of Balkan nationalism. With the growth of commerce came a corresponding growth in the size and demands of the middle class. Members of the middle class demanded that the empire build roads, maintain law and order, and provide them with economic and political opportunities.³⁰ The Empire, however, was unable and unwilling to satisfy these demands, leading members of the middle class to look elsewhere. As trade expanded, contacts with the West also increased. Merchants and other members of the middle class met West Europeans and their ideas, particularly the ideas about nationalism and liberty that had grown during the French Revolution.³¹

To some extent, all the people of the Balkans experienced the pressures that helped cause nationalism in the 19th century, yet they did not rebel at the same time. Instead of one united, Balkan rebellion to create a single Balkan state or federation, several rebellions occurred throughout the century. The different timing of the national revivals can be explained by several factors that vary by case.³² Greece had more contacts with the West than the other Balkan states, which helps to explain why nationalism started here. Serbia's high level of local self-government helps to explain its early nationalism. In Romania, the high levels of social stratification limited the ability and desire for all Romanians to unite in a common cause. And, Bulgaria's close ties with Turkey helped delay Bulgarian nationalism.

In the 19th century, nationalism led the Balkan people to rebel against the Ottoman Empire. During the next hundred years or so, these groups gained their independence. Independence, however, did not end the threat nationalism posed to peace and order in the Balkans. Nationalism continued to pose a threat because the borders of the newly independent states never corresponded to the ethnic or historical borders of the nation. In 1832, Greece, for example, contained only one-third of the Greeks, while the remainder continued to live under Ottoman authority. Several factors

³⁰Mentioning the desire for political opportunities, specifically high level positions in the bureaucracy, is Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, pp. 173-174.

³¹*Ibid*, pp. 179-186.


³²Stavrianos, "Antecedents," pp. 345-346.

explain this problem. First, when the borders of these new states were drawn, nationalism and ethnicity were rarely considerations. Most of the borders were drawn by the Great Powers who were more concerned with the balance of power than with the desires of the Balkan people. They tended to favor small, weak states rather than uniting ethnic groups within a single nation-state. Second, during Ottoman rule, people migrated both within the Ottoman Empire and away from it. As a result, ethnic groups moved away from their ethnic homeland to territories populated by other ethnic groups.³³ These migrations created two problems: (1) ethnic groups lived in territories far from their historical homeland and (2) multi-ethnic territories to which several ethnic groups could lay claim developed. These migrations occurred both within the Ottoman Empire, as can be seen by the large Greek population throughout the empire, and outside of the Empire. The largest group to migrate out of the Empire was the Serbs. When the Ottoman Empire conquered Serbia, many fled from the Turks and sought refuge in the Austrian Empire.³⁴ In the 1800s, the descendants of these Serbs continued to live in Austria. Third, under Ottoman rule, many non-Muslims converted to Islam, frequently in an attempt to gain economic, political, and social rights and privileges.³⁵ When the Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate and the peripheral territories began to gain their independence, the new states had large Muslim populations that the Ottoman empire claimed to represent. Fourth, Austria-Hungary annexed the territory populated by Romanians and Serbs. In the late 1600s, Austria defeated the Turks and re-conquered Hungary. Included in this territory was Transylvania, which had a large Romanian population. Then, Austria occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 and annexed the provinces in 1908. These provinces had a large Slav population, particularly Serbian. With the annexation of these territories, the Habsburg Empire became a potential magnet for Romanian and Serbian nationalisms that were to develop when these two states gained their independence from the Ottoman Empire.

³³Vucinich, "Some Aspects of the Ottoman Legacy," pp. 97-102.

³⁴Gunther Erich Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1960.

³⁵George G. Arnakis, "The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism," in *The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics Since the Eighteenth Century*, edited by Charles and Barbara Jelavich, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 115-144, especially pp. 120-126.



Map 3-3
The Medieval Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian Empires


Finally, national goals are not exclusively an ethnic issue, but also tend to be a historical issue. Nationalist ideologies call for the union of the ethnic group within a single territory, while frequently demanding that the nation be restored to its historical borders. They demand that the new state have the same borders that it had in the past. Since states' borders change throughout time, the leaders of the national movement must decide which borders are the historical borders. They tend to choose the time when the state's borders were largest. Thus, many Greeks looked to the borders of the Byzantine Empire, Serbs looked to the borders of the Serbian Empire of the 1400s, and the Bulgarians looked to the Bulgarian Empire of the late 1300s. (See Map 3-3³⁶) Since these three

³⁶Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 25.

empires reached their apogee during different eras, their borders overlapped, creating the potential for nationalism to lead to conflict.

Chapter 4 THE CRIMEAN WAR

In the early 1850s, France, for its domestic and national reasons, took advantage of the decline of the Ottoman Empire to increase its influence in the region and the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in the Holy Places. As a result of France's actions, Russia's influence and prestige in the region were reduced. Russia, therefore, needed to act to restore its position. The Russo-French dispute was easily resolved, but the Russo-Turkish dispute created a crisis that led first to a Russo-Turkish War and then expanded into a war between Russia on one side and Britain, France, and Turkey on the other. Eventually, the crisis escalated to the point that Austria threatened war if Russia did not stop, leading Russia to agree to peace.



Map 4-1

TABLE 4-1: predictions
The Crimean War

	P1: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with imperial disintegration?	P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms of the intervening phenomena?
Rules of the Game	<p>Yes. The weakening of the Ottoman Empire and concerns about Great Power rights and responsibilities in the future zone of imperial retraction led Russia, Austria, and Britain to determine how to manage the post-Ottoman international order. These negotiations, however, failed to define what the new rules ought to be, and they failed to clearly define when a new order ought to be negotiated.</p> <p>No. Contrary to this argument, when Britain and France violated the Straits Convention, war did not result.</p>	<p>Yes. Disagreements about the status of the Ottoman Empire were greater than previously, leading to differing opinions about the need for new rules.</p>	<p>Yes. The Straits Convention, Munchausgratz Convention, and Russo-British negotiations all express concerns about the post-Ottoman order. Nicholas's statements to Aberdeen in 1844 and the Nesselrode Memorandum express concerns about the post-imperial order. Nicholas's statements to Sir Harold Seymour demonstrate his view that the collapse was imminent, while Lord Russell's statements demonstrate that Britain had a different interpretation of the situation.</p>
Power	<p>Yes. The turmoil in Montenegro, Epirus and Thessaly, and resistance to the <i>tanzimat</i> reforms clearly demonstrate the weakening of the Ottoman Empire. Past defeats at the hands of Austria and Russia further demonstrated this decline.</p> <p>Also, the growth of British support for the Ottoman Empire demonstrates shifting alliances. The Porte believed this shift was temporary.</p>	<p>Yes. British support for the Ottoman Empire was clearly greater than it had been at any other time as demonstrated by the Porte's previous attempts and failures to gain British support.</p>	<p>Yes. Russia's circular of May 1830 and Tser Nicholas's statements to Seymour demonstrate the belief that the Ottoman Empire was weakening and the problems it posed.</p>
Uncertainty	<p>Yes. Even though Russian leaders believed they knew the balance of power, they did not recognize the potential danger their actions posed, as demonstrated both by Austrian and British eventual opposition to Russia.</p>	<p>It is difficult to determine if uncertainty was greater during this crisis than at other times.</p>	<p>Yes. British and Russian statements about the condition of the Ottoman Empire differed as to the severity of the current situation.</p>
Nationalism	<p>No. Even though Russia's interference in the Ottoman Empire's internal politics contributed to an increased nationalism, nationalism was not a significant factor in Turkey in the 1850s.</p>	<p>No. Russia had tried to influence Ottoman affairs for over 100 years, and it is unclear if Russia's actions in 1853 were more invasive than before.</p>	<p>No. The elite did not explain their policies in terms that support this prediction.</p>
Domestic Instability	<p>No. While there was internal turmoil in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan and the Porte were not concerned about their hold on power.</p>	<p>It is unclear how strong the domestic instability was during this crisis.</p>	<p>No. The elite did not explain their policies in terms that support this prediction.</p>

TABLE 4-1: predictions
The Crimean War (continued)

	P4: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with war and crises?	P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P6: Did the elite explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena caused the wars and crises?
Rules of the game	Yes. Nicholas believed that his negotiations with Britain in 1844 and the Seymour conversations had created an understanding between the two states. As a consequence of these discussions, he believed Britain would not oppose Russia. This was a miscalculation. Yes. The weakening of the Ottoman Empire provided France with the opportunity to improve its position. Paris's actions led to Russia's response, which essentially was competition for influence in the Ottoman Empire. More importantly, temporary British support for the Ottoman Empire provided a window of opportunity, as is demonstrated by the Porte's increasing its aggressiveness as British support increased.	It is unclear if miscalculations resulting from ambiguous rules of the game were greater than at other times. This miscalculation came at the right time.	No documentary evidence supports this prediction, although Nicholas did say he did not require a formal treaty, and British leaders provided him with some promises.
Power Shifts		Yes. Clearly, the window was greater than in any previous time as was Turkish aggressiveness	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Miscalculation	Yes. Russia expected a short Russo-Turkish war that would end with Turkey's defeat. Consequently, St. Petersburg refused to compromise. British, and later Austrian, opposition to Russia was a complete surprise.	Yes. Not only did Russia think that the Ottoman Empire was significantly weaker than it had been, but Russia was more certain of British and Austrian support than previously.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Nationalism	No. Nationalism did not correlate with the war	No. Nationalism did not correlate with the war	No. The elite did not explain their policy in nationalistic terms.
Domestic Instability	No. Domestic instability did not correlate with the war.	No. Domestic instability did not correlate with the war.	No. The elite did not explain their policy in terms that suggested that domestic instability was a problem.

The Crimean War supports this dissertation's argument. (See Table 4-1 for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the case and the argument's predictions.) The key cause was the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, which had two consequences. First, it caused the rules of the game to become ambiguous. As Tsar Nicholas's statements suggest, he believed that the Ottoman Empire's complete collapse was imminent. He also believed that its collapse could lead to Great Power conflict over the spoils. To limit this conflict, he sought to negotiate a post-imperial order with Austria and, more importantly, Britain. These negotiations led to vague, oral discussions. St. Petersburg considered them to be solid agreements that would keep Britain out of a Russo-Turkish conflict, while London considered them to be significantly less. Second, the weakening of the Ottoman Empire contributed to competition for influence in Constantinople. This competition began with French coercion of Constantinople, which led to a Russian response. Russia could not allow any great power to have more influence of the Ottoman Empire than it had, as the Russian government had made clear repeatedly during the previous twenty years.

Russia's aggressive response caused a shift in alliances, which created a window of opportunity. Britain slowly began to ally itself with the Ottoman Empire. Constantinople recognized this shift was occurring and avoided overly provocative actions as it waited for British support to become stronger. Once the Porte had this support, it was ready to go to war to defend its interests and try to regain some of its previous losses. The Porte knew that British support was temporary; once the current crisis ended, the alliance would also end. In other words, the Ottoman Empire had a closing window of opportunity. It had to go to war now, before the alliance collapsed. Thus, once the Porte was convinced that Britain would support the Turks, it declared war.

This chapter has eight sections, Section 4.1 explains the development of the rules of the game and their ambiguity. Section 4.2 looks at the internal situation in the Ottoman Empire in order to better understand the problems the Empire confronted. Section 4.3 addresses the Holy Places dispute. It explains France's actions and why Russia needed to respond. Section 4.4 explains why Russia expected British and Austrian support. It explains the relationship between the rules of the game and Russia's miscalculation of British support. It also explains the security dilemma between Russia and Austria. Section 4.5 explains why Russo-Turkish diplomacy failed. Section 4.6 looks at the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War and the importance of the British alliance for Turkey.

Section 4.7 explains why Britain and France declared war on Russia. Finally, section 4.8 examines the reasons why Austria threatened Russia with war.

4.1 Great Power Interests and the Development of Rules of the Game¹

During the two decades prior to the Crimean War, Austrian, British, and Russian interests in the Near East converged, which allowed these states to agree to rules that defined how they ought to behave with respect to the Ottoman Empire and its territories. Both Austria and Britain wanted to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Prior to 1829, however, Russia followed an expansionist foreign policy in the Near East. Following the War of Greek Independence, Russia changed its Near Eastern foreign policy, and adopted one that favored the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, albeit under Russian influence. This modification caused Russia's foreign policy to move closer to Austria's and Great Britain's interests. Once the interests of these three powers began to coincide, they were able to develop rules to help regulate their behavior in the Near East. Three rules were particularly important: first, the Turkish Straits were to be closed to foreign warships when the Porte was at peace; second, the Ottoman Empire was to remain independent and its territorial boundaries were to remain unchanged; and, third, if the Ottoman Empire was collapsing, the three Great Powers would negotiate among themselves to create a new order. Unfortunately, these rules were not fully spelled out, creating the potential for future problems.

By the early 1800s, Austrian and British foreign policy supported the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. From 1683 until 1780, the Habsburg Empire, along with its allies, was willing to expand at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.² The situation had changed by 1791 when Vienna had come to recognize that the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire was best for Austrian security. Austria feared that the nationalities of the Ottoman Empire might have irredentist claims against the Habsburg Empire if they gained their independence. In addition, these nationalities might turn to Russia for protection, thereby allowing Russia to encircle Austria. Thus, since 1791, "[f]or

¹See Map 4-1 for the region addressed in this case study. Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the Concert of Europe*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 117.

²Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, second edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 37; and Barbara Jelavich, *Modern Austria: Empire and Republic, 1815-1986*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.9.

the Austrians it had been axiomatic that the Ottoman Empire, for all its faults, was the best possible neighbour for the [Habsburg] Monarchy, which should do nothing to weaken it."³

British foreign policy also supported the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire. In the early 1800s, Britain's Near Eastern Policy was not explicitly stated. By the end of the French Revolutionary Wars, Britain recognized that the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity was in its interest.⁴ To support this policy, the British and the Austrians attempted to negotiate an agreement among the Great Powers to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but Russia refused.⁵ The Near Eastern Crises of the 1830s forced London to be more explicit about its interests in the Ottoman Empire.⁶ Lord Palmerston, who controlled British foreign policy during this period, believed two key interests justified Britain's support of the Ottoman Empire. First, Britain needed to protect its access to India. Currently, British ships reached India by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope. Nevertheless, London hoped to develop a quicker route either through the Suez and Red Sea or across Syria to the Euphrates River and the Persian Gulf, both of which would pass through the Ottoman Empire.⁷ British leaders believed that a relatively weak Ottoman Empire was a better defender of the passage to India than a strong Russian Empire that would be a threat to India. Second, British trade in the area was large and increasing,⁸ providing Britain with a strong

³F.R. Bridge, *The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815-1918*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 28-9.

⁴R.W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968), p. 45.

⁵Ibid, p. 141.

⁶On the Near Eastern Crisis of the 1830s, see Afaf Lufti Al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the reign of Muhammad Ali*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 196-257; Philip E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839*, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961); Frederick Stanley Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832-1841*, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, 1923); and Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.726-755.

⁷Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe*, p. 193.

⁸Discussing British economic interests in the Ottoman Empire are Frank Edgar Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), pp. 39-128; and Vernon J. Puryear, *International Economics and the Diplomacy of the Near East, a study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant, 1834-1853*, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1935).

economic interest in the maintenance of an independent Ottoman Empire.⁹

Russian foreign policy changed more slowly. Throughout the eighteenth century, Russia sought to gain territory at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ In the early 1700s, neither Russia nor the Ottoman Empire achieved significant victories. By the mid to late 1700s, however, Russian victories began to show significant results. Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainarji. This treaty gave Russian merchants access to the Mediterranean via the Turkish Straits, prepared the way for Russia to annex the Crimea, granted Russia certain rights in the Principalities,¹¹ and, most importantly, granted Russia vaguely defined rights to intervene in the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the Orthodox Christians.¹²

Russia's relations with the Ottoman Empire continued to be hostile during the first thirty years of the nineteenth century. From the beginning of the 1800s through the 1820s, Russia supported Serbia in its rebellion against Ottoman abuses.¹³ During the 1820s, Russia also supported the Greeks in their war of independence.¹⁴ Finally, in 1828, Russia declared war on Turkey to force

⁹Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe*, pp. 178, 192-195. For a more complete discussion of Britain's growing interest in the Ottoman Empire, see Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*, pp. 39-62.

¹⁰John P. DeLonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 89-111; Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1-24; David MacKenzie, *Imperial Dreams Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917*, (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), pp. 12-25; and L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1958), 178-197.

¹¹The Principalities refer to the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which later united to form Romania. For a discussion of Russia's rights in the Principalities in the late 1700s, see Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State 1821-1878*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 1-15.

¹²Discussing the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji are MacKenzie, *Imperial Dreams Harsh Realities*, p. 19; and Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, pp. 3-5. For the text of the treaty, see J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1535-1914*, volume 1, (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 54-60; and M.S. Anderson, editor, *The Great Powers and the Near East 1774-1923*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), pp. 9-13.

¹³On the Serbian revolution, see Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920*, (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1977), pp. 26-35; Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia 1804-1918*, volume 1, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 3-128; and L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 244-250.

¹⁴On the War of Greek Independence, see Richard Clogg, editor, *The Struggle for Greek Independence*, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973); and Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821-1833*, (London: B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 1973). For a Great Power perspective, see Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 614-

the Turks to live up to their treaty obligations.¹⁵

Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, Tsar Nicholas I changed Russia's policy towards the Ottoman Empire and adopted a policy to maintain the Empire's territorial integrity under Russian influence.¹⁶ The Russian government knew that if Russia were to try to capture Constantinople or to cause the Balkan states to gain their independence, other European powers would oppose these actions. If Russia could not control the Ottoman territories, the next best solution was to maintain a weak Ottoman Empire that feared Russia. A Russian circular of May 1830 stated the Russian position well,

[i]f we have allowed the Turkish government to continue to exist in Europe, it is because that government under the preponderant influence of our superiority, suits us better than any of those which would be set up on its ruins. If we have left out of the Treaty of Adrianople those stipulations which would have deleted the Porte from the list of powers, it is because the clauses of this act, although marked by a visible magnanimity, appeared to us sufficient to assure us the influence of which we speak, sufficient to demonstrate to the Porte that, nevertheless, any serious difference with us would be a death sentence..., in order to convince it that if it still is able to live, it will only be the life the emperor is in some manner pleased to allow it.¹⁷

Russia demonstrated its commitment to this policy during the Egyptian-Turkish crisis in 1833. When the Egyptian army defeated Turkish forces, the Porte asked Britain and France for help. After both of these powers refused, Turkey turned to Russia for assistance.¹⁸ Nicholas agreed to provide both ground and naval forces to aid in the defense of Turkey. Once peace was achieved, Russia negotiated the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi with Turkey.¹⁹ This treaty was a mutual defense pact between Turkey and Russia. In the event of war, it required the two signatories to provide military

620,637-663.

¹⁵On the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, Barbara Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914*, (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), pp. 73-81; and Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, pp. 75-89.

¹⁶Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, pp. 78-9; and John Shelton Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), pp. 15-17.

¹⁷Quoted in Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, pp. 86-7.

¹⁸Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*, pp. 44-49.

¹⁹For the text to this treaty, see Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East*, pp. 42-44; and Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, pp.105-6.

aid upon request.²⁰ Russia justified its willingness to come to the aid of the Ottoman Empire by claiming "a most sincere desire of securing the permanence, maintenance and independence of the Sublime Porte."²¹

Once these three Great Powers decided that it was in their individual interests to support the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity, they were able to agree to several rules that helped define how they ought to behave in the Near East. The first rule was an agreement to close the Turkish Straits to foreign warships when the Porte was not at war. Historically, when the Ottoman Empire was at peace, Turkey would not allow foreign warships to pass through the Straits. The Egyptian crises of the 1830s helped demonstrate the weakness of the Porte and its inability to support its historic policy. To help maintain the Straits regime, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia agreed in the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant on July 15, 1840 to support the closure of the Straits to foreign warships during times of peace.²² This policy was further reinforced and expanded to include France in the Straits Convention of July 13, 1841.²³ Thus, the closure of the Straits became a generally accepted rule in Great Power politics. Any violation of this rule would suggest that the violator had hostile intentions.

The second rule of the game required Austria, Great Britain, and Russia to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Since each power recognized that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire might lead to conflict among them, they agreed to support the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. To achieve this goal, Russia negotiated with Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain,

²⁰In a secret article, Russia agreed not to ask for such aid. Turkey's only responsibility would be to close the Straits to any foreign warships.

²¹Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, p. 105.

²²For the text of the Convention, see Anderson, *The Great Power and the Near East*, pp. 49-51; and Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, pp. 116-119. Article 4 of the Convention states that

"the Sultan...hereby declares that ..it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire; and as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above-mentioned principle."

²³Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East*, pp. 51-52; and Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, p. 123.

individually. Russia and Austria signed the Convention of Münchengrätz in September 1833.²⁴ In this Convention, the two powers agreed to maintain the Ottoman Empire under its current leadership. Article 1 of the Convention says

The Courts of Austria and Russia undertake mutually to implement their resolution to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire under the Present dynasty and to devote to this end...all the means of influence and action in their power.²⁵

About three weeks after the signing of the Convention of Münchengrätz Prussia agreed to the same arrangement, in a slightly different form, in the treaty of Berlin.²⁶

In addition, the Convention of Münchengrätz provided the basis for the third rule of the game—to negotiate a new international order if the Ottoman Empire should be overthrown. Russia knew that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire could lead to a European war over the Empire's remains. To reduce the likelihood of an Austro-Russian conflict once the Ottoman Empire collapsed, a separate, secret article was included in the Convention. According to this article,

in such an eventuality [that the present order of things in Turkey may be overthrown], the two Imperial Courts will act only in concert to and in perfect spirit of solidarity in all that concerns the establishment of a new order of things, destined to replace that which now exists, and they will take precautions in common that the change occurring in the internal situation of this Empire should not endanger the safety of their own States and the rights assured them respectively by treaties, or the maintenance of the European balance.²⁷

Austria was not the only Great Power with interests in the Ottoman Empire. Russia was also concerned about an Anglo-Russian conflict arising when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. To address this problem, Russia negotiated an agreement with Britain in which the two countries agreed to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the two powers agreed to negotiate a new international order if the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was imminent. On several occasions, Tsar Nicholas I tried to form an alliance with Britain to manage the Ottoman Empire's

²⁴For the text of the Convention of Münchengrätz, see Anderson, *The Great Power and the Near East*, pp. 44-5; and Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, pp. 107.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian Question*, p. 32, footnote 95.

²⁷Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East*, pp. 44-5; and Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, p. 107.

collapse and had repeatedly been rejected.²⁸ Lord Palmerston informed the Tsar that England could not enter into an agreement about an event that had not happened or was not imminent because it would be difficult to get the British parliament to agree. When Nicholas asked for a secret, spoken understanding, Palmerston said

it [a spoken understanding] would scarcely be consistent with the spirit of the British constitution for the crown to enter into a binding engagement of such a nature, without placing it formally upon record, so that parliament might have an opportunity of expressing its opinion thereupon, and this could only be done by some written instrument...But if the engagement were merely verbal, though it would bind the Ministers who made it, it might be disavowed by their successors, and thus the Russian Government might be led to count upon a system of policy on the part of Great Britain which might eventually be pursued.²⁹

Nicholas refused to be denied. In 1844, he traveled to England to meet with the British Prime Minister, Lord Peel, and Britain's Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen. In these meetings, Nicholas informed them that he believed that Ottoman Empire would collapse soon.

Turkey is a dying man. We may endeavor to keep him alive, but we shall not succeed. He will, he must die. That will be a critical moment...[The situation will lead to] a Russian army, an Austrian army, and a great English fleet, all congregated together in those parts. So many powder barrels close to the fire, how shall one prevent sparks from catching?³⁰

Nicholas claimed that he did not want any Turkish territory. He wanted to preserve the Ottoman Empire as long as possible. But, if its collapse seemed imminent, the two countries should consult to determine the actions they should be take.³¹

These discussions resulted in an agreement among the two countries. Unlike the Convention of Münchengrätz, however, the Russo-British agreement was neither a formal, written agreement nor a public agreement. It was both oral and secret. To confirm the agreement, however, Count Nesselrode, Nicholas' Foreign Minister, sent a memorandum, known as the Nesselrode

²⁸Discussing these attempts is Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, (NA: Archon Books, 1964), pp. 251-253.

²⁹Quoted, *ibid*, pp. 252-3.

³⁰This quote is from the memoirs of Baron von Stockmar discussing the Tsar's statements. Vernon Puryear, *England, Russia and the Straits Question 1844-1856*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1931, reprinted in 1965), p. 46.

³¹On the discussions, see John Shelton Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), pp. 27-31; Puryear, *England Russia and the Straits Question, 1844-1856*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1931), pp. 40-52; and Temperley, *England and the Near East*, pp. 253-257.

Memorandum, to Lord Aberdeen. The British and Russians then exchanged letters confirming the agreement on the points outlined in the Memorandum.³² According to this memorandum, the two powers agreed to try to maintain the Ottoman Empire in its current condition. If they expected the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and Russia agreed to negotiate a new international order with respect to the Empire's territories.

This agreement had several flaws. It was both oral and secret, making its applicability to future British leaders questionable. Secrecy meant that the British parliament and public did not know of the agreement. They never had the opportunity to debate the issue, thereby reducing the applicability of the obligation for future administrations. Second, the agreement failed to specify when the Great Powers would negotiate a new order. According to the Nesselrode Memorandum,

If we [Russia and Britain] foresee that it [the Ottoman Empire] must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists, and in conjunction with each other to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of that Empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own States and the rights which the Treaties assure to them, or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.³³

This statement was inherently vague because it was possible for one power to look at the Ottoman Empire and consider its collapse to be imminent, while the other power could consider its collapse to be years, or even decades, away. Without a clear understanding of the criteria that would determine when the Ottoman Empire will collapse, the two powers could have different perceptions of the imminence of its collapse. These differing perceptions, in turn, could lead to misunderstandings and conflicts. Finally, the agreement failed to specify what the new international order would be. It only required that the two powers establish a new order when they foresaw the Empire's collapse. This failure was problematic because, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, tensions and confusion would probably be high, leading the powers to negotiate their agreement at a time when misunderstandings could have serious, even violent, consequences.

While these issues could cause problem in the future, they were also insoluble at the time of

³²Discussing the Nesselrode Memorandum are Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, pp. 27-31; and Puryear, *England, Russia and the Straits Question*, pp. 52-64. For the text of the Memorandum, see Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East*, pp. 66-68; and Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, pp. 130-132.

³³Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East*, p. 67; and Hurewitz, *Diplomacy and the Near and Middle East*, p. 132.

these discussions. If these negotiations became public, they could bring about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Enemies of the Turks would take these negotiations as evidence that the Great Powers no longer supported the Ottoman Empire, emboldening them to attack the empire now. Determining what should replace the Ottoman Empire and when was equally problematic. Nobody knew what the domestic or international situation would be like at some unknown, future date and how best to address it. Furthermore, the domestic constituencies within Britain and Russia might cause complications by demanding that their leaders satisfy their interests with respect to the Ottoman Empire and its territories.

4.2 The Internal Situation in the Ottoman Empire

The internal situation in the Ottoman Empire was somewhat unsettled. The Turkish government was in the process of reforming the Empire's system of government. In addition, there was turmoil in three provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The leader of Montenegro was trying to gain more autonomy, and the Turks wanted to prevent this from happening. In so doing, Turkey and Austria confronted each other. The Greek provinces of Epirus and Thessaly were also causing trouble. With the support of the Greek government, these provinces were rebelling. These rebellions threatened to develop into a Greco-Turkish War. Britain and France, however, acted to prevent this war from occurring.

The first internal problem was the *Tanzimat* reforms. These reforms sought to centralize power in the Ottoman Empire and to create equality between Muslims and Christians.³⁴ Unfortunately, many Muslims were upset with the reforms, leading to two problems.³⁵ First, it led to anger against the West and anything associated with the West. While some Ottoman leaders supported these reforms, the main champion was Britain.³⁶ The Muslims, therefore, blamed any problems raised by the reforms on the West. Second, Muslims reacted to the reforms by mistreating Christians. This mistreatment was particularly problematic in Bosnia where it led to rebellions and thousands of refugees, many of whom fled to the Habsburg Empire, causing tensions to develop

³⁴Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 74-128.

³⁵Ann Pottinger Saab, *The Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1977), pp. 4-7, 17-22, 23.

³⁶Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*.

between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires.

The second internal problem was an uprising in Montenegro.³⁷ Prince Danilo of Montenegro tried to increase his autonomy without the approval of the Sultan.³⁸ This action challenged the Sultan's authority. The Sultan feared that caving in to Prince Danilo's actions could lead other groups in the Balkans to try to increase their autonomy. In response, Turkey massed forces along the Montenegrin border, which happened to be next to Austria. Vienna considered these Turkish forces to be a threat to Austria's internal security,³⁹ and, therefore, demanded that these forces be removed from the border.

When Turkey refused to remove its forces, Austria decided to send a special mission, the Leiningen Mission, to force the Porte to withdraw its troops.⁴⁰ Count Leiningen went to Constantinople to negotiate with the Porte to resolve the crisis. At the same time Austria mobilized troops and stationed them along the Austro-Turkish border to help coerce the Porte. Further support was provided by Russia who encouraged Austria to support Montenegro and threatened the Turks with war if they attacked Austria.⁴¹ In the end, these actions succeeded. The Porte agreed to Austria's demands.

The third internal problem was the uprising in Epirus and Thessaly.⁴² The Greek government had adopted an irredentist foreign policy; its goal was to expand its territorial borders to include all

³⁷David M. Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, (New York: Longman Publishing, 1994), pp. 101-2; Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 17-22; and Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. 24-29.

³⁸Unlike other territories associated with the Ottoman Empire, Montenegro was never completely under the Sultan's control. Following the battle of Kosovo in 1389, the Montenegrin ruler moved his court into the hills of Cetinje. From there, the Montenegrins continued to resist the Ottoman attempts to control Montenegro. In fact, over the next 500 years, Montenegro expanded at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. See John D. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914*, (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1983), pp. 6-8.

³⁹Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, p. 102.

⁴⁰On the Leiningen Mission, see Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp.23-40,

⁴¹Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War*, p. 27.

⁴²On Greek foreign policy in general and Greek behavior during the Crimean War in particular, see Jon V. Kofas, *International and Domestic Politics in Greece During the Crimean War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

territories where Greeks lived. To further this goal, the Greek government supported uprisings in Thessaly and Epirus as a prelude to a Greek attack against the Ottoman Empire. Starting in 1852, the Russo-Turkish crisis provided Greece with an additional advantage because it created a window of opportunity during which the Greeks could attack the Ottoman Empire. The Turks would be forced to divert their forces to deal with the Russian military threat. While these forces were diverted, Greece would have a temporary advantage. King Otho of Greece prepared to take advantage of the situation when he mobilized his troops and stationed them along the Greco-Turkish border. Britain and France, however, opposed a Greco-Turkish war because it would divert Turkey's attention from the current crisis, which they considered to be much more important. They, therefore, sent warships to Greece and forced the Greeks to remain at peace with the Ottoman Empire.

4.3 The Dispute over the Holy Places

The crisis that precipitated the Crimean War was a dispute over the Holy Places. France, for reasons unrelated to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, decided to take advantage of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and came to the aid of the Roman Catholics in their attempt to restore their rights in the Holy Places; rights they had lost a century earlier. By entering the dispute, France threatened Russia's position in the Ottoman Empire and Europe. As a consequence of this dispute, Turkey was put in a difficult position.

The Holy Places refer to the sanctuaries and churches in Jerusalem. These places held significant symbolic importance for both the Orthodox and Latin Christians. Since the Holy Places were Ottoman territories, the Ottoman Empire determined what rights each group had with respect to these places. During the late 1700s and early 1800s, the Orthodox Church had increased its rights in the Holy Places at the expense of the Roman Catholic Church. They received preferential access to many of the Holy Places and the right to repair certain Churches as they saw fit.⁴³

In the late 1840s, the Latin Catholics sought to regain the rights they had previously lost to the Orthodox Church. To help them regain these rights, they turned to France, one of the key supporters of the Latin Church, for support. In 1850 General Aupick, the French ambassador to

⁴³While the right to repair the churches may seem to be a trivial matter to people today because "Christians are Christians," this right was symbolically significant. Some of the ornamentation, as well as the languages used by each religion, differed.

Constantinople, demanded that the Porte restore to the Latins all the Holy Places that they controlled under the Treaty of 1740.⁴⁴

Although Napoleon III, the emperor of France, had no personal interests in the Holy Places, he championed the rights of the Latins for two reasons. First, and most importantly, he sought to overthrow the international order that constrained France.⁴⁵ Following the Napoleonic Wars, the Great Powers—Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia—created the Concert of Europe to prevent France from again trying to conquer Europe.⁴⁶ The most important pillar of the Concert system was Russia and the Austro-Russian alliance. In 1812, 1838, 1840, and 1848, Russia helped prevent France from achieving its goals.⁴⁷ By initiating the Holy Places dispute, Napoleon hoped to split the Austro-Russian alliance and weaken Russia's prestige. Since this dispute pitted the Latin Church against the Orthodox Church, Napoleon expected the dispute also to split Catholic Austria and Orthodox Russia. Napoleon's foreign minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, explained the policy well when he said

The question of the Holy Places and everything affecting them was of no importance whatever to France...All this Eastern Question which provoked much noise was nothing more for the imperial government than a means of dislocating the continental alliance which had tended to paralyze France for almost a half a century. When finally an opportunity presented itself to provoke discord within this powerful coalition, the Emperor Napoleon immediately seized it.⁴⁸

If successful, the Holy Places dispute would also weaken Russian prestige by weakening the power of the Orthodox Church. Russia was an Orthodox nation, and the Tsar considered himself

⁴⁴Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, p. 78.

⁴⁵Making this argument are Winfried Baumgart, *The Peace of Paris 1856: Studies in War, Diplomacy and Peacemaking*, translated by Ann Pottinger Saab, (Oxford, England: Clio Press Ltd., 1981), pp. 18-21; Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, pp. 40-1, Rich, *Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale*, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1985), pp. 20-21; and Saab, *The Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁶For discussions on the Concert of Europe, see René Albrecht-Carré, *Concert of Europe: 1815-1914*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); Richard Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 159-174; Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957); and Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 517-636.

⁴⁷Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, p. 20.

⁴⁸Quoted in Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp.20-21.

to be the defender of the Orthodox Church. In previous negotiations and treaties with the Ottoman Empire, St. Petersburg had sought to defend its co-religionists. Napoleon's challenge to the rights of the Orthodox, therefore, was also a challenge to Russia's prestige.

Second, and less important, Napoleon championed the Latins in the Holy Places to gain domestic political support from Catholics.⁴⁹ Napoleon needed the Clerical party's support against the revolutionaries who may have opposed his plans, particularly his plans to overthrow the republic.⁵⁰ Supporting the Catholic cause in the Holy Places was one way to try to gain the Church's support in France.

All of this would not have been possible, however, if the Ottoman Empire had not been disintegrating. During the previous twenty-five years, the Turks had suffered several serious setbacks. In the 1820s, the War of Greek Independence led the Ottoman Empire to lose territory and the Serbian rebellion led to the creation of an autonomous Serbia. Then, in the 1830s, the Empire fought and lost two wars against Egypt, further demonstrating the Empire's weakness. These losses gave France the confidence needed to take bold action. Since the Empire was in the process of collapsing, France did not fear strong military resistance from Turkey.

France's demands for increased rights in the Holy Places put the Porte in a difficult position. Any rights that Turkey ceded to the Latins would be rights that were taken from the Orthodox. St. Petersburg was likely to respond to protect the rights of the Orthodox Church and, by extension, to defend Russia's honor. The Porte, therefore, needed to carefully deal with this issue.

Initially, the Porte avoided making any decision. Between May and mid-August, the Porte did not try to resolve the issue. When the Porte finally attempted to resolve the issue, France, Russia or both powers objected to the decision.⁵¹

In the summer of 1852, France used its naval forces to coerce the Turks to rule in favor of the Catholic Church. Early in the summer, France forced the Porte to allow the warship

⁴⁹Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, p. 43; and Temperley, *England and the Near East*, pp. 283-286.

⁵⁰Temperley, *England and the Near East*, p. 286.

⁵¹The details of these early attempts to resolve the crisis are not important for understanding the causes of the Crimean War. For those readers interested in the early attempts, see Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 75-87; and Temperley, *England and the Near East*, pp. 280-300.

Charlemagne to pass through the Straits and travel to Constantinople, even though it violated the Straits Convention of 1841. Later in the same summer, twelve French warships threatened Tripoli in an attempt to force the Ottoman authorities to return two French deserters. Even though these actions were not explicit attempts to force the Porte to cave in to French demands in the Holy Places, the Turks agreed to settle the dispute in a way that satisfied France and angered Russia.

More importantly, Russia believed that the Turks caved to French demands because of the display of French naval power, which weakened Russia's interests in two ways. First, Russia's prestige declined because its client, the Orthodox Church, lost rights to France's client, the Roman Catholic Church.⁵² Second, Russia's strategy with respect to the Ottoman Empire was threatened. As previously stated, Russia supported the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire *so long as Turkey feared Russia more than any other Great Power*.⁵³ France's successful coercion of Turkey demonstrated that Turkey feared another Great Power, France, more than it feared Russia.

4.4 Russia's Expectations of Allied Support

Tsar Nicholas wrongly believed that Britain and Austria supported his Near Eastern policy. In 1844, he and the British government had reached an agreement about how to deal with the Ottoman Empire. This agreement called for the two countries to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It also called for them to negotiate a new international order when the Empire's collapse was imminent. Unfortunately, the agreement failed to define the conditions that would demonstrate when collapse was imminent. By 1853, Nicholas believed that the Ottoman Empire was going to collapse soon, so he initiated discussions with Britain. After agreeing to several ground rules, Nicholas believed that Russia was now prepared to address the coming collapse of the Ottoman Empire, secure in the belief that the British supported him and his policies. The British, on the other hand, believed that the Empire could survive for many more years, even decades. They considered their discussions with the Tsar to be diplomacy intended to help manage the current crisis in the Near East rather than negotiations to help determine a post-imperial international order. Thus, the negotiations created misperceptions. At the same time, Nicholas was so secure about his alliance

⁵²Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, p. 84.

⁵³Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, pp. 118-9; and Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, p. 35.

with Austria that he did not discuss the issue with Francis Joseph, the emperor of the Habsburg Monarchy. Nicholas believed that his past support for Vienna had earned its loyalty. But, he was wrong. He failed to take into account the danger the collapse of the Ottoman Empire posed to Austria's interests.

Nicholas wanted to confirm that he had British support. To confirm this support, he held a series of discussions with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador to Russia, between January and March 1853. In these discussions, known as the Seymour Conversations, Nicholas sought to reach an agreement on the new international order that would follow the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁴ By taking this action, Nicholas was following through with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1844 which called for the two countries to negotiate a new international order when the Ottoman Empire's collapse appeared imminent. In early 1853, Nicholas believed that Ottoman Empire was ready to collapse.⁵⁵ He justified this perception in two ways. First, he believed that the uprising and conflict in Montenegro demonstrated that the Turks could not maintain order within their empire. Further demonstrating Turkey's weakness were Constantinople's concessions to Austrian threats during the Leiningen Mission and its concessions to France during the Holy Places disputes. By making these concessions, Nicholas believed the Porte was demonstrating that it could not maintain its sovereignty over its territories against an external threat.⁵⁶

When Nicholas met with Seymour, he expressed his desire to prepare for the eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In his report of January 22, 1853 to Lord Russell, Seymour reported that the tsar said

Turkey...has by degrees fallen into such a state of decrepitude that...eager as we all are for the prolonged existence of the man...he may suddenly die upon our hands...; we cannot resuscitate what is dead; if the Turkish Empire falls, it falls to rise no more; and I put it to

⁵⁴Discussing the Seymour Conversations are M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 118-119; Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, pp. 64-82; Gavin Burns Henderson, "The Seymour Conversation, 1853," in *Crimean War Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays*, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1975/1947), pp. 1-14; Puryear, *England Russia and the Straits Question*, pp. 208-214, 223-230, 242-255; Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 28-33; Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 14-17; Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe*, pp. 305-307; and Temperley, *England and the Near East*, pp. 270-279.

⁵⁵Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, pp. 119-120; Henderson, "The Seymour Conversation, 1853," p. 5; and Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe*, p. 305.

⁵⁶Puryear, *England, Russia and the Straits Question*, p. 212.

you, therefore, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency, than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of an European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched; this is the point to which I am desirous that you should call the attention of your government.⁵⁷

Nicholas did not require a formal agreement. "I do not ask for a Treaty or a Protocol; a general understanding is all I require—that between gentlemen is sufficient."⁵⁸ In a meeting on February 20, Nicholas even proposed a partition scheme: No great power could have Constantinople; Serbia, the Principalities, and Bulgaria would be put under Russian protection; and England would receive Egypt and Crete.⁵⁹

The British rejected Nicholas's proposals.⁶⁰ The British did not believe that the Ottoman Empire's collapse was imminent because they did not consider those events that led the Tsar to believe that the Empire's collapse was imminent to be significant. Lord Russell wrote to Seymour on February 9th,

Disputes have arisen respecting the Holy Places, but these are without the sphere of the internal government of Turkey, and concern Russia and France rather than the sublime Porte. Some disturbance of the relations between the Porte has been caused by the Turkish attack on Montenegro; but this, again, relates rather to dangers affecting the frontier of Austria than the authority and safety of the Sultan; so that there is no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours.⁶¹

In other words, the British believed that recent events reflected issues related to Great Power politics while Nicholas believed that they demonstrated the Sultan's weakness and inability to maintain control over his territory. This is not to say that the British did not believe that the Ottoman Empire had internal problems; but, Constantinople could fix these problems if it reformed the Empire. Since London did not believe that the Ottoman Empire was about to collapse, it could not negotiate an agreement about the post-Ottoman international order. Russell

⁵⁷Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Volume 1, p. 136.

⁵⁸This quote comes from Seymour's February 21, 1853 message to Lord Russell, *ibid*, p. 141.

⁵⁹Puryear, *England Russia and the Straits Question*, pp. 226-230; and Temperley, *England and the Near East*, p. 276

⁶⁰Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe*, p. 306.

⁶¹Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Volume 1, pp. 138-139.

justified this position by using some of the same arguments that Palmerston had used to resist Nicholas's attempts to negotiate a similar understanding in the 1840s when he claimed that the agreement would eventually become public and help cause the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

In these circumstances it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings towards the Sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion. Besides this consideration, however, it must be observed, that an agreement made in such a case tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to provide....An agreement thus made, and thus communicated, would not be very long a secret; and while it would alarm and alienate the Sultan, the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his enemies to increased violence and more obstinate conflict....Thus would be produced and strengthened that very anarchy which is now feared, and the foresight of the friends of the patient would prove cause of his death.⁶²

Since British policy supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, London refused to negotiate.

London, however, did not completely reject Nicholas's proposals. British leaders threw a fig-leaf to St. Petersburg by agreeing to renounce any intentions to take control of Constantinople and to communicate with Russia before making any agreement with another Great Power to create a post-Ottoman international order.⁶³ In addition, Britain acknowledged that Russia had certain rights with respect to the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire.

By agreeing to these conditions, the British government helped fuel Nicholas's confidence.⁶⁴ As stipulated in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1844, Nicholas had consulted with Britain prior to the Ottoman Empire's collapse, and he now believed that he had assurances that Russia's interests were safe from Britain and any British alliances. He also believed that Britain had acknowledged his right to represent the Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, with these assurances in hand, Nicholas was confident no conflict would develop over the remains of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁵ If the British had been clearer about their position or if the Anglo-Russian

⁶²Lord Russell to Seymour, 9 February 1853, Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, volume 1, p. 139.

⁶³Ibid, p. 130.

⁶⁴Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, p. 72.

⁶⁵With 20-20 hindsight, we can see that Nicholas was mistaken and, maybe, even stupid to believe that Britain supported him. At the time, however, this belief did not seem so ridiculous. If the British and Russians had negotiated a clearer agreement and/or if the Seymour Conversations had occurred prior to the Russo-Turkish crisis, Nicholas may

agreement of 1844 had been clearly spelled out, Nicholas might not have been as confident of British support and may have behaved differently. In other words, war may not have occurred.

While the Seymour conversations may have contributed to Russia's miscalculation, it is unclear how they effected Britain. Since the agreement of 1844 was verbal and never ratified by parliament, it did not bind British policy makers. Furthermore, British policy makers differed about how to interpret the Seymour conversations. Some leaders, such as Russell and Seymour, grew suspicious about Nicholas's repeated assertions that the Ottoman Empire was going to collapse and his proposal to partition the Empire.⁶⁶ Other more prominent British statesmen, such as Aberdeen, Clarendon, and Palmerston, however, did not fear the Russian threat.⁶⁷ They believed that Nicholas was just talking and that he had no aggressive intentions against the Ottoman Empire or against British interests. In addition, the hostility that developed may have been unrelated to the Seymour conversations; the British press was Russophobic, and had begun to stir up anti-Russian public opinion prior to these discussions.⁶⁸ For both of these reasons, Nicholas's statements probably did not cause Britain to consider Russia to be a threat.

Not only did St. Petersburg need London's support, but it also needed Vienna's support, or at least its neutrality. Austria bordered the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. If Russia were to attack the Ottoman Empire, Russian forces would be vulnerable to an Austrian attack. Nicholas failed to consider the possibility that Austria would attack because he believed that Vienna would support him and his policy.⁶⁹ He based this belief on Russia's past support of Austria. In 1848, Russia had helped Austria put down the Hungarian rebellion which might have succeeded without this aid. Furthermore, Russia had supported the Leiningen Mission by supporting an Austrian

not have miscalculated British interests or attentions. Adding to the problem, Nicholas's advisors failed to provide him with a clear, truthful assessment of British interests and public opinion.

⁶⁶Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, p. 77; Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 31-32; and Temperley, *England and the Near East*, pp 276-279.

⁶⁷Rich, *Why the Crimean War*, p. 32; and Temperley, *England and the Near East*, p.278.

⁶⁸Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, p. 32. On British Russo phobia, see John H. Glisten, *The Genesis of Russo phobia in Great Britain*, (Cambridge, MA: ????, 1950).

⁶⁹Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 21-22; and Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. 25-28.

occupation of Montenegro and Bosnia and, also, by threatening Turkey with war if the Turks attacked Austria.⁷⁰ Nicholas believed that this past support obligated Austria to return the favor and support him in the current crisis.

Nicholas's calculations were wrong, and his actions helped create a security dilemma for Austria. He failed to recognize that with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Russia posed a potential threat to Austria, making the Austrian government less grateful than expected.⁷¹ Since the majority of the people living in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire were Orthodox and Slav, Austria believed that the Ottoman collapse would lead Russia to gain territory and influence in the Balkans, resulting in the encirclement of Austria by Russia and its allies. Thus, even though St. Petersburg's actions may have been defensive, they threatened Austria. As a result, Austria decided to support the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire.

4.5 The Menshikov Mission

Nicholas believed that he needed to restore Russia's position in the Ottoman Empire. To achieve this goal, he sent a mission to Constantinople to negotiate an agreement. Unfortunately, Russia's demands were too aggressive because they threatened the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. The Porte, with the support of the British and French representatives in Constantinople, rejected Russia's demands. As a result, diplomacy failed and brought war a step closer.

French actions had hurt Russia's interests, and Tsar Nicholas wanted to rectify the situation. In response, he sought to accomplish three goals: to restore the Orthodox Church's rights in the Ottoman Empire; to restore Russia's dominance in the Ottoman Empire; and to restore Russia's position in Europe.⁷² To accomplish these goals, Nicholas decided to send a special envoy, Prince A.S. Menshikov, to demand that the Porte give Russia satisfaction.

To support this mission, Russia initiated military preparations in December 1852 and January 1853. First, Nicholas ordered the mobilization of the 4th and 5th corps, which totaled over 128,000

⁷⁰Ibid, p. 27.

⁷¹Puryear, *England, Russia and the Straits*, pp. 281-283; and Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 13-14.

⁷²Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, p. 84. Also useful for understanding Nicholas' goals and policies are notes that he wrote in early 1853 in which he considers possible objectives of Russian policy, the means for attaining these objectives, and the possible results. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East*, pp. 68-9.

troops.⁷³ With these forces he intended to coerce the Porte into accepting Menshikov's demands. Second, Nicholas and his military advisers prepared military plans for an attack against the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁴ These plans focused on an attack against Constantinople so that Russia could take the Straits, thereby preventing foreign warship from entering the Black Sea, and against the Balkans.

The Menshikov Mission, named after the special envoy who led it, had two main goals.⁷⁵ Prince Menshikov was to settle the Holy Places dispute to Russia's satisfaction. He would demand that the Turks revoke most of the concessions given to France and the Latin Church and execute the firman of February 1852, which granted Russia many of the concessions it had demanded.⁷⁶ If Turkey agreed to these demands, the Holy Places dispute would be settled in Russia's favor.

Simply settling the Holy Places dispute, however, would not satisfy Nicholas; he also wanted assurances that the Ottoman Empire would continue to fulfill its obligations in the future. To gain these assurances, Menshikov was to demand that the Turks sign a formal convention guaranteeing the new status quo.⁷⁷ This convention would guarantee the rights of the Orthodox church in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, it would guarantee Russia's right to represent the Orthodox Church and Orthodox Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire.

If Constantinople refused to agree to these demands, Menshikov had two options.⁷⁸ On one hand, if Constantinople rejected these demands because it feared French military reprisals, Menshikov was to offer a defensive alliance to Turkey. On the other hand, if Constantinople rejected these demands under any circumstances, Menshikov was to leave Constantinople and cut diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. Diplomacy would have failed, making the confrontation a military matter.

Menshikov was supposed to leave for Constantinople in early January 1853. This timing

⁷³Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 109-110.

⁷⁴Ibid, pp. 109-110; and Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 27-28.

⁷⁵Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, pp. 85-9; and Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 131-133.

⁷⁶A firman is a royal edict from the Sultan.

⁷⁷Curtiss *Russia's Crimean War*, pp. 107-110.

⁷⁸Ibid, pp. 85-9.

would coincide with the Leiningen Mission, allowing Leiningen to support the Menshikov Mission and Menshikov to support the Leiningen Mission. Menshikov, however, was ill, delaying his departure until the end of January. He finally arrived in Constantinople on February 23rd, by which time the Leiningen Mission had already achieved its goal. Even though Leiningen was not present to provide diplomatic support for Menshikov, the Leiningen Mission influenced Russia's perceptions about the likelihood that Menshikov would be successful.⁷⁹ Since Russia had supported Austria, St. Petersburg expected Austria's support in return. Thus, Nicholas believed he had an ally in Austria. Furthermore, Austria's successful coercion of Turkey increased Nicholas's belief that his threat would also succeed. Leiningen used threats and military coercion to help Austria achieve its goal. Nicholas believed that if the Porte caved in to Austrian pressure, the Porte would also cave to Russia when Russia employed the same tactics. He failed to recognize that the Turks might consider Russia to be a greater threat than Austria. Agreeing to Austria's terms allowed the Porte to focus on the Russian threat without having to worry about the Empire's northern neighbor.

Upon arriving in Constantinople, Menshikov went to work in a very imperious manner.⁸⁰ He met with the grand vezir, and announced that he would not meet with Fuad Effendi, the Turkish foreign minister, because the minister had been duplicitous. He demanded that the sultan replace him with somebody more to Russia's liking. In addition, Russia's troop buildup increased the threat to Turkey. In the end, the Sultan caved to Menshikov's demand and replaced Fuad with Rifaat Pasha.

Starting on March 4, Menshikov presented Russia's demands. He presented a note to Rifaat that focused on Russia's demands in the Holy Places, while also hinting at future demands.⁸¹ Then, on March 10, he gave a second note to Rifaat in which Russia explained the historical basis of its claim. In this note, Russia also presented a copy of the draft Convention and demanded Turkey sign both as compensation for Turkey's actions with respect to the Holy Places and as a guarantee of

⁷⁹Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, pp. 90-92.

⁸⁰Describing his behavior is *ibid*, pp. 92-93; and Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 134-136.

⁸¹Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, p. 29.

Turkey's future behavior. Russia made two key demands in this convention.⁸² First, and less important, Russia demanded that the Porte restore lifetime tenure to the patriarchs of the Orthodox Church.⁸³ Second, Russia demanded the right to protect the Orthodox Church and its clergy in the Ottoman Empire. Russia based this demand on the Articles 7, 8, 14, and 17 of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji and the Treaty of Adrianople.⁸⁴ These demands led Rifaat to fear that Russia wished to reduce Turkey's independence.

The convention was controversial for two reasons. First, the demands threatened the sovereignty and independence of the Ottoman Empire. As I discussed in chapter 3, in the Ottoman Empire religious groups were organized into millets, and these millets had civil as well as religious responsibilities. Nicholas's demands to increase Russia's influence over the Orthodox Church and its clergy was tantamount to providing Russia with control over Turkey's domestic affairs. Second, the demands were based on a misinterpretation of the treaties. Neither Nicholas nor Nesselrode, his foreign minister, had not read the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji. In Article VII, the key article, Russia was given the right to represent the Church at Constantinople, not the entire religion. According to this article,

VII. The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches, and it also allows the Minister of the Imperial Court to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favour of the new Church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made in Article XIV, as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly power.⁸⁵

The Treaty of Adrianople did not justify Russia's demands either. It only provided Russia with rights in the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and in Serbia.

The Turks were intimidated by Russia's demands, and needed time to prepare. To gain this

⁸²Discussing the convention and the problems with it is *ibid*, pp. 27-8

⁸³The patriarchs were the leaders of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire.

⁸⁴The Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji was the peace treaty ending the Russo-Turkish War in 1774, while the Treaty of Adrianople ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1828. The text of these treaties can be found in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, volume 1, pp. 54-61; and Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East*, pp. 9-14, 33-35.

⁸⁵Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Volume 1, pp. 56-7.

time, they implemented their traditional strategy of procrastination.⁸⁶ Turkey used this time for two purposes: to mobilize its forces and to gain European support.

Rifaat asked the French and British charges d'affaires to bring their fleets into the Straits to help support the Empire.⁸⁷ Colonel Rose, the British charges d'affaires, and Benedetti, the French charges d'affaires, agreed to have their fleets move closer to Constantinople. The British government, however, refused to support the request and the British fleet remained outside the Straits.⁸⁸ Even though the British did not move the fleet, these actions suggested to the Turks that they might be able to gain European aid in time. Colonel Rose had been willing to support Turkey, suggesting that some British favored aiding Turkey. This support was likely to grow as Russia continued to take aggressive actions.

Napoleon III, seeing that he was isolated, decided to moderate his behavior. He blamed the Holy Places dispute on a former French ambassador to Constantinople who was overly aggressive, and expressed his willingness to withdraw from the confrontation if Russia would provide him with a graceful exit. Since Russia did not wish to punish France, Nicholas was willing to help Napoleon save face. All Russia wanted was the restoration of its rights, compensation, and guarantees that Turkey would not challenge its rights in the future. Thus, the issue of the Holy Places seemed easily resolvable.

Uncertain how to respond to Menshikov's imperious demands, Rifaat turned to the new British ambassador to Constantinople, Stratford de Redcliffe, for advice. Stratford advised him to negotiate the two issues separately.⁸⁹ First, he should settle the Holy Places dispute. Then, if Menshikov raised other issues, Rifaat should ask Menshikov to provide more details. If these demands threatened the sovereignty of the Empire, he should reject the demands. On the other hand, if Menshikov's demands were relatively minor, Rifaat should accept them.

When the Ottoman foreign minister suggested that he and Menshikov negotiate the issues

⁸⁶Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, p. 41.

⁸⁷Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, pp. 90-102; and Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 134-140.

⁸⁸Even though the British fleet did not enter the Straits, the French fleet did with the expectation that the British fleet would follow. Once this failed to occur, the French government withdrew its fleet.

⁸⁹Temperley, *England and the Near East*, pp. 316-319.

separately, Menshikov agreed. The Holy Places dispute was resolved relatively quickly.⁹⁰ Since the dispute was actually a Franco-Russian dispute, they negotiated a settlement that was agreeable to France, Russia, and Turkey. This agreement was reached by the beginning of May 1853.

When Menshikov tried to negotiate a Russo-Turkish convention, Turkey rejected the Russian proposal. One of the key reasons for rejecting Menshikov's demands was the support the Turks were receiving from Britain and France.⁹¹ John Shelton Curtiss states it clearly when he writes,

When he [Menshikov] first arrived, the Turks, lacking the support of both the French and the British ambassador, were terrified and would have signed almost any demand that he might have presented to them.... When, however, the Russians advanced more far-reaching demands, the Turks, now relying on Redcliffe to save them, rejected what earlier they would have agreed to.⁹²

Early in the crisis Britain had refused to send its fleet, suggesting that Britain would not support Turkey. As time passed, the Turks grew to believe that Britain's position was changing. On May 9th, Turkey received a different message from Stratford. He informed the Porte that he could call the British naval squadron from Malta.⁹³ This information helped to strengthen the Porte's resolve, and on May 10th the Porte rejected Russia's demands. Another reason for Turkey's refusal was its desire to maintain its sovereignty. The Ottoman Empire, like all states, wanted to maintain its independence. If Constantinople accepted this proposal, Turkey would be subservient to Russia.

Once the Porte rejected Menshikov's demands, the mission was a failure. Direct Russo-Turkish diplomacy had not resolved the situation, so Menshikov followed his instructions and, on May 21, 1853, left Constantinople.

4.6 Failed Diplomacy and the Start of the Russo-Turkish War

Turkey had suffered from Russian aggression throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The crisis provided it with the opportunity to stand up to Russia and, possibly, recoup some of its losses. But, the Porte could not stand up to Russia alone. It needed an alliance with Britain, which the Porte had been trying to gain for years. Britain, however, continued to refuse to

⁹⁰Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 146-148.

⁹¹Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, pp. 135-137.

⁹²Ibid, pp. 135-136.

⁹³Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, p. 153.

make any explicit promises.⁹⁴ This situation finally changed as a result of the harsh Russian demands. Since this support was temporary, a window existed. The Porte had an incentive to act before the crisis was resolved and Britain withdrew its support.

On May 31st, Nesselrode gave the Turks one more opportunity to resolve the crisis. He informed the Porte that if it did not accept Menshikov's ultimatum, Russia would occupy the Principalities.⁹⁵ He made it clear to the other powers that the purpose of this occupation would be to coerce the Porte to agree to the Russian demands, not to annex any territory.

Despite the threat, Turkey rejected Russia's demands because of British and French naval support. After Menshikov left Constantinople, Reshid, who replaced Rifaat as foreign minister, asked the British and French for aid. Fear of a Russo-Turkish war led Lord Clarendon, the foreign secretary, to give Stratford the authority to order the British squadron in the Mediterranean to sail to Constantinople.⁹⁶ This fear had developed because the Russians had been making military preparations since January. By moving the squadron closer to Constantinople, the ships would be available in the event of war. On June 2nd, Clarendon ordered the squadron to move to Besika Bay, close to the Dardanelles, and to be placed under Stratford's command. A few days later France followed Britain's lead and ordered its squadron to join the British at Besika Bay in order to better cooperate with the British. When the two squadrons arrived at Besika Bay by June 14th, their presence led the Turks to believe that Britain and France would support them in the event of a Russian attack, leading Reshid to again reject Russia's demands.⁹⁷

With Turkey's rejection of Russian demands, St. Petersburg finally tired of diplomacy and, in early July, ordered its troops to enter the Principalities. It was confident that these actions would result in a satisfactory result: either Turkish concessions or a short, Russo-Turkish War. Russia's past victories over Turkey combined with Turkey's continued weakness led Russian leaders to believe that Turkey would not be able to stand up to a Russian military threat. They also believed

⁹⁴Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, p. 8.

⁹⁵Ibid, p. 54.

⁹⁶Ibid, pp. 53-5.

⁹⁷Ibid, pp. 54, 56-7.

that the Turks knew that the balance of power favored Russia, which helped to justify the belief that Turkey would concede to Russia's demands. If Turkey did not concede and a war developed, Russia was confident that the Turks would not have any Great Power allies.

The Porte, however, chose neither to go to war nor to concede Russia's demands. Despite Russia's occupation of the principalities, Turkey did not declare war against Russia, primarily because the Porte had yet to secure British support against Russia. Neither England nor Austria considered the occupation of the Principalities to be sufficient provocation to justify a Turkish declaration of war.⁹⁸ In fact, Stratford specifically advised the Turks not to declare war against Russia.⁹⁹ Although the majority of the Turks wanted to fight, they also recognized that the time was not right.¹⁰⁰ Their military preparations were weeks from completion, and they did not have the alliance they needed. They knew that they had British support if Russian forces crossed the Danube River, which provided Turkey with a defensive alliance, although they were not confident of British support if Turkey initiated hostilities against Russia. The belief that a defensive alliance with Britain existed gave the Porte the confidence not to cave to Russian coercion. Instead, the Turkish government took the high ground by protesting that Russia's occupation of the Principalities violated the treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Russian actions also caused tensions between Russia and the other European powers to increase. In addition to occupying the Principalities, Russia ordered the Romanian leaders to pay their tributes to Russia instead of paying it to the Porte.¹⁰¹ This action concerned Britain, Austria and France because it suggested that Russia was planning to stay in the Principalities or to go to war. It also suggested that Russia was taking actions that could bring about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, violating the international rule that supported the territorial integrity of the Empire. Britain and Austria decided to respond. As previously stated, Stratford informed the Porte that he could call the squadrons to Constantinople if needed. Vienna, on the other hand, mobilized 25,000 troops on

⁹⁸Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, p. 151.

⁹⁹Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 56-57.

¹⁰⁰Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 190-191; and Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 56-57.

¹⁰¹Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, p. 190.

its southern frontier because Austria feared that the Slavs living in the Habsburg empire might revolt. This action was not intended to support Russia against the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰²

Despite the occupation of the Principalities, the Great Powers continued to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Two negotiations occurred simultaneously: one in Constantinople and one in Vienna. In Constantinople, Reshid and the ambassadors of the Great Powers developed the "Turkish Ultimatum."¹⁰³ In this ultimatum, the Turks protested Russia's occupation of the Principalities, replied to Nesselrode's demands, and sent copies of the latest Turkish decrees that confirmed the spiritual privileges of the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. The representatives of the four Great Powers in Vienna, however, did not accept this proposal. Instead, they favored a proposal of their own known as the "Vienna Note."¹⁰⁴ On August 5th, Nicholas had approved the Vienna Note on the condition that Turkey accept it without any modifications.¹⁰⁵ This proposal, like the Turkish Ultimatum, confirmed the spiritual privileges of the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. It differed from the Turkish proposal in one key respect. In the Turkish Ultimatum, these privileges were granted by the Sultan; the Vienna note attributed them to the Tsar. While this change may seem minor, the Turks claimed that it violated the Empire's sovereignty and, therefore, rejected the Vienna Note.¹⁰⁶

The Porte felt secure when it rejected this Note for two reasons.¹⁰⁷ First, on August 4, approximately 10,000 Egyptian troops arrived outside Constantinople; the presence of these troops raised Turkish moral and strengthened the position of the war party. Second, Turkey did not believe that all the powers supported the note. Specifically, the Porte believed that Britain supported the

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 70-72.

¹⁰⁴Rich, *Why the Crimean War*, pp. 73-4

¹⁰⁵Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, p. 156.

¹⁰⁶This interpretation is not without its detractors. Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 74-78 claims that the two notes were identical in meaning. Saab, *The Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 51-75, however, claims that from the Turkish perspective the minor differences changed the meaning significantly. The text of the Vienna Note can be found in Anjerson, *The Great Powers and the Near East*, pp. 77-78.

¹⁰⁷Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, p. 206; Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 74-78; and Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 71-75.

Turks.¹⁰⁸ In July, Britain's attitude had become increasingly pro-Turkish. The British were upset at Russia's occupation of the Principalities. Also, the British press was anti-Russian and pro-Turkish. Most importantly, Musurus, the Turkish ambassador to London, had learned that Stratford had the authority to call the British squadron to Constantinople. Since Stratford was more pro-Turkish than the leaders in London, it was likely that Turkey would receive the support desired.

In early and mid-September 1853, riots occurred in Constantinople, which Turkey used to help increase the British and French commitment to the defense of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰⁹ Muslim students and members of the ulema, who were the Muslim religious leaders, protested and rioted against the *tanzimat* reforms—which called for Muslim and Christian equality—and for war against Russia. It is unclear how serious the riots actually were, but some people feared that the Sultan would be overthrown or that the life and property of west Europeans might be threatened. To prevent this from occurring, the Turks asked the British and the French to call their fleets to Constantinople. Stratford feared that calling the entire fleet would add to the international tensions; he, therefore, only called a few more ships to Constantinople. De la Cour, the French ambassador, did likewise.

These ships were not brought to Constantinople to help address the Russian threat, but they influenced the Russo-Turkish conflict. While the movement of these ships violated the Straits Convention of 1841 and angered the Tsar, it had a much stronger effect on the Turks. By bringing the ships to Constantinople, England demonstrated its support for the Ottoman Empire. England's credibility was now tied, in part, to the success of the Ottoman Empire. The Porte may not have been given a blank check in dealing with Russia, but it now had concrete proof that Britain and France would provide support.

On September 26th, Turkey was confident enough of Western support to declare war against Russia. On September 23rd, the British and French governments had ordered their fleets to enter the

¹⁰⁸Mentioning Britain's potential lack of support for the Vienna Note is Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, p. 59.

¹⁰⁹Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 222-224; Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 82-84; and Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 82-85.

Dardanelles.¹¹⁰ The Turks did not learn about this order before they decided to go to war, but their ambassador in London had informed the Porte that the British press and public were pro-Turkish. This information combined with Stratford and La Cour's decision to have a few ships pass through the Dardanelles provided the Porte with sufficient evidence that the two western powers would provide military aid against the Russians. The Porte recognized, however, that this support was temporary; it provided Turkey with a window of opportunity. Britain had never given Turkey this level of military support and once the current crisis ended the Porte believed that the support would disappear. The Turks, therefore, knew that they must take advantage of Western military support to achieve their goals—revenge for past humiliations at the hand of Russia and, possibly, the return of lost territories—before they lost it.¹¹¹ The Turks faced another closing window of opportunity.¹¹² The riots suggested the possibility of a revolution if the Porte did not oppose Russia. The longer the Porte waited, the greater the likelihood that a revolution could occur. The Ottoman army was also facing a closing window of opportunity. The forces that had been mobilized could only maintain their spirits for so long. The morale of the army would become particularly problematic over time because the Ottoman government was poor and unable to raise enough money to pay its soldiers. If the war did not occur soon, the army would lose its fighting spirit and might even disperse. On October 4th, Turkey declared war on Russia, but it was not until October 23rd that hostilities commenced.

4.7 The Crimean War Expands: Britain and France declare war on Russia

Once Turkey and Russia were at war, it was only a matter of time before Britain and France joined the Turks. They had acted to support the Turks and, in doing so, put themselves in a situation where their credibility was tied up with Turkish success. But, this was not the only reason why Britain and France favored war. Russia was Britain's main rival in the Near East, and this crisis provided Britain with the perfect opportunity to weaken Russia. France, on the other hand, had no real interest in the Near East. Paris's goal was to destroy the Concert of Europe that had constrained

¹¹⁰Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 222-226; and Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 86-88.

¹¹¹Rich, *Why the Crimean War*, p. 5.

¹¹²Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, p. 223 and Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, p. 92.

French behavior since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. This crisis, and a Russo-British war, would go a long way towards achieving this goal. Thus, Britain's and France's declarations of war were only loosely connected to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

With the initiation of hostilities, Britain and France needed to decide where to station their fleets. Winter was coming and the two powers faced a choice; they could order their fleets either to return to Greece or to go to Constantinople. Unfortunately, each option had its flaw. If the fleet returned to Greece, Russia might interpret this action as a sign of weakness and press its attack until the Ottoman Empire collapsed. On the other hand, moving the fleet to Constantinople would clearly violate the Straits Convention of 1841, increasing tensions with Russia. Also, with the fleet at Constantinople, Turkey would have even less reason to reach a diplomatic solution. The presence of the warships would further convince the Turks that they had British support. Despite these potential problems, the British cabinet decided to have the fleet enter the Straits while Britain remained neutral. To maintain this air of neutrality, the fleet would not enter the Black Sea unless Russia took aggressive actions.¹¹³

On October 10th, the British cabinet ordered Stratford to tell the Russians that if their Black Sea fleet attacked Turkish forces, Britain would intervene. Britain hoped that this warning would prevent serious trouble from occurring. Instead, it helped to cause trouble. With the presence of the fleet and the warning that Britain had given to Russia, Turkish confidence increased.¹¹⁴ The Porte believed that Britain's warning would deter Russia from taking naval actions against the Turks, freeing the Turks to act with impunity in the Black Sea. In mid-November the worst happen. A Russian fleet pursued and destroyed a Turkish fleet in Sinope harbor in what came to be known as "the Sinope Massacre."¹¹⁵

¹¹³Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, p. 99; and Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. 86-89.

¹¹⁴Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, p. 113.

¹¹⁵Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, pp. 240-241; Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 96-99; and Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 115-117.

This massacre provided the British government with the opportunity to act.¹¹⁶ When word of the “Sinope Massacre” reached London, the already pro-Turkish public opinion pressured the government to act. The government also believed that it had a responsibility to support Turkey. Britain had provided Turkey with support, and, in so doing, created a link between Turkish and British success. If London failed to support the Turks now, Britain’s prestige would suffer a serious blow. Russell said it well when he told Clarendon, “[t]o have held out such encouragement to the Turks as we have done, and afterwards to desert them would be felt as a deep disgrace and humiliation by the whole country.”¹¹⁷

On December 22nd, Britain and France informed Russia that they would sink any Russian ship found outside its harbor.¹¹⁸ The Russian ambassadors to Britain and France asked if their fleets would also protect Russia or if they would only protect Turkey. The ambassadors were informed that the fleets would help move Turkish troops and war equipment and defend Turkish interests. In response, the Russian ambassadors returned to St. Petersburg.¹¹⁹

To help them implement their policy, British and French fleets entered the Black Sea on January 3, 1854. Then, in March, Britain and France formed an alliance with Turkey and demanded that Russia leave the Principalities. Finally, on March 27th and 28th, Britain and France, respectively, declared war on Russia.

While there were divisions among British leaders, Britain’s war aims show that the crisis provided Britain with an opportunity to weaken the Russian adversary. Many leaders wanted to take the Russian base at Sevastopol and sink the Russian Baltic and Black Sea fleets before they agreed to any further negotiations.¹²⁰ By accomplishing these tasks, Britain would reduce Russia’s

¹¹⁶Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, pp. 96-99; and Saab, *Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, pp. 119-130. The Sinope massacre was not the only reason for Britain to escalate the war. Several factors caused this to occur, including cabinet politics, public anger, French pressure and confusion. Discussing these other factors is Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. 65, 116-121.

¹¹⁷Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, p. 86.

¹¹⁸Rich, *Why the Crimean War?*, p. 99

¹¹⁹Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, pp. 230-237.

¹²⁰Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, p. 134.

capabilities and prestige.

4.8 The Austrian Ultimatum

As the war continued, security dilemma concerns caused Austria to perceive that its interests were threatened. Buol, the Austrian Foreign Minister, had begun to believe that Russia sought to cause the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire, thereby posing a serious threat to Austrian interests. This belief had started when Prince Menshikov made his demands to the Porte,¹²¹ and was significantly strengthened when Russia occupied the Danubian Principalities. In itself, the occupation threatened Austrian interests, particularly when the Russian occupation force was twice the size that Austria expected.¹²² But, when St. Petersburg's actions suggested that Russia would incorporate the Principalities into its empire, the threat to Austria was even greater. Two other Russian actions increased the threat to Austria.¹²³ First, Russia seemed to support a Balkan revolution as part of its strategy against the Ottoman Empire. This policy concerned Austria because of its potential to incite the Slavs living in the Austrian Empire. Second, some within Russia also supported moving Russian troops across the Danube. If these troops crossed the Danube, they would present an increased threat to Austria.

Initially, Austria tried to solve the problem by helping to negotiate a peace treaty that would maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁴ No matter who won, war was not in Austria's interest.¹²⁵ If Russia won the war, St. Peterburg would be able to expand its influence in the Balkans and among the Balkan Slavs. If the western powers won, they might impose peace terms that threatened Austrian interests. Finally, a long war would cause Austria to suffer serious commercial and financial costs. Unfortunately, attempts to negotiate a settlement failed, forcing Austria to

¹²¹Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. 41-46, 53-55.

¹²²*Ibid*, p. 43.

¹²³Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. 76, 113, 138-140.

¹²⁴On the peace negotiations, see *ibid*, pp.41-255.

¹²⁵*Ibid*, p. 157.

defend its interests more aggressively.¹²⁶

Once negotiations failed, Austria decided to use threats to obtain Russian concessions. In late May 1854, Austria demanded that Russia evacuate the Principalities.¹²⁷ If Russia did not do so, Austria threatened war. On August 7th, Russia agreed to withdraw its troops, claiming that it was a strategic move, not the result of Austrian pressure.

It is important to recognize that Austria's threats of war were not an attempt at aggressive expansion, but a means to improve its security. The defensive nature of Austrian interests can be clearly seen by the failure of France and Britain to force Vienna to join the war against Russia. Buol, the Austrian foreign minister, opposed joining the Western allies as long as they refused to state their war aims and to negotiate. On July 30th, Buol advised his Emperor, "Your majesty could raise justified scruples against proceeding any further with an ally [Britain] who cannot even speak out openly on the purpose of the war."¹²⁸

Still, the war continued and Austria feared that the Western allies would agree to terms without Vienna's help and without supporting Vienna's interests.¹²⁹ Buol, therefore, decided to help Britain and France by communicating peace terms to Russia. In addition to communicating these terms to Russia, Austria agreed to cut diplomatic relations with Russia—a prelude to war—if Russia refused to accept them.¹³⁰

St. Petersburg had not expected Austria to threaten war. Russia believed it could fight France, Britain and the Ottoman Empire because they lacked large, capable armies bordering Russian territory. Austria, on the other hand, was a continental power that had both the large army and the geography from which to threaten Russia. When the war started, Russia had expected that monarchical solidarity would lead to Austrian support or, at worst, benevolent neutrality. Now,

¹²⁶For the most part, these attempts at negotiation failed as a result of British and French intransigence. These powers, for their own domestic and international political reasons, did not want the war to end before they achieved their goals.

¹²⁷*Ibid*, pp. 178-196.

¹²⁸Quoted in *ibid*, p. 195.

¹²⁹Discussing these concerns is Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, pp. 221-230.

¹³⁰Discussing the Austrian Ultimatum is Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War*, pp. 311-346.

however, the Austrian threat changed the situation. Russia had miscalculated Austria's actions and was forced to agree to peace terms.

4.9 Conclusions

The Crimean War helps to demonstrate the validity of the argument of this dissertation. First, we see that the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire helped cause the causes of war. Three problems were particularly prominent: ambiguous rules of the game; shifts in the balance of power; and uncertainty about capabilities. The rules of the game became ambiguous as a result of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, when the three key Powers—Austria, Britain, and Russia—determined that it was in their interests to negotiate new rules, they did. Unfortunately, these rules were vague and open to different interpretations. Specifically, they did not spell out when the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would be imminent.

The balance of power also shifted. The Ottoman Empire had been weakening for years, and internal turmoil further reduced its power. In addition, the alliances were uncertain, although that was not necessarily clear to the leaders at the time. Russia believed that it had the support of Austria and Britain. Turkey was unsure who supported it initially, although, it eventually gained British and French support.

These three factors provide a significant part of the explanation of how the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire led to war. The weakening of the Ottoman Empire provided France with the opportunity to achieve its goals: increase its power and prestige and try to satisfy domestic interests. French opportunism, however, threatened Russian interests and caused a Russian response.

Unexpectedly for Russia, its response threatened British and Austrian interests. Russia believed that the Anglo-Russian negotiations that led to the development of the rules of the game had demonstrated a community of interests between the two states. Britain's interpretation of the rules, however, differed from Russia's. Russia's actions threatened British interests and, surprisingly to Russia, led to strong British opposition and to support for Turkey. Russia's actions also unintentionally threatened Austria, creating security dilemma problems. In an attempt to restore its influence in the region, Russia unknowingly engaged in several actions that could bring about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which would threaten Austrian interests. Consequently, Austria

eventually took sides against Russia.

By threatening British interests, Russia also helped Turkey decide to go to war. The Porte had been trying to form an alliance with Britain for years. The British, however, continually refused. This changed as Russia's actions became more threatening. As the crisis developed, British support for the Ottoman empire became clearer and stronger. The Porte recognized that this support was temporary. Once the crisis was resolved, Britain would withdraw its support. Turkey, therefore, had a window of opportunity: act before Britain withdrew its support. As a result, Turkey went to war.

Chapter 5

THE BALKANS 1860-1885

Following the Crimean War, over twenty years of peace occurred in the Balkans. None of the Balkan states went to war. At the same time, none of the Great Powers went to war over Balkan issues. Then, during the next ten years, three wars occurred—the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885. This chapter seeks to explain why peace reigned during the first twenty years and why three wars occurred during the next ten. To do this, I look at two crises that could have led to Serbo-Turkish wars, but did not. Then, I look at the three wars that were fought.

The first case looks at the formation of a Balkan Alliance in the 1860s and its failure to lead to war. This case provides limited evidence for the hypotheses, partly, because the historical literature does not delve into this event in significant detail.¹ Nonetheless, it provides useful evidence for evaluating the hypotheses on nationalism and on power. As for the nationalism hypotheses, there are three key pieces of evidence. First, we see Serbia develop a policy to gain greater autonomy and independence from the Ottoman Empire. Second, this policy develops, at least in part, as a response to Turkish intervention in Serbian affairs. Both of these pieces of evidence support the hypotheses relating nationalism to war. The third piece of evidence weakens the validity of this hypothesis: despite nationalism, war did not occur. This case also provides three key pieces of evidence in support of the power hypotheses. First, we see that Serbia, the successor state, needed to develop a military, which contributed to its weakness. Second, Serbia also lacked strong allies to support its policies. Initially, Serbia had no allies. Then, over time, Serbia negotiated alliances with several of the Balkan states. These states, however, were militarily weak. Third, as a result of Serbia's weakness and the weakness of its allies, Serbia never went to war to achieve its goals.

The second case, the Serbo-Turkish War, is a much more fruitful case for evidence related to the hypotheses. The evidence clearly demonstrates that nationalism had a role in the origins of the Serbo-Turkish War. First, territorial borders separated Serbs between Serbia and Bosnia, helping to create the potential for nationalism. Second, the taxation policies of the Ottoman Empire imposed

¹Two factors help explain this lack of information. First, Serbian history in the 1860s has received very little study. Second, this case addresses a non-event, peace, leading scholars to avoid it for more exciting issues of study.

an onerous burden on the peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which created a rebellion. The suffering of the Bosnian peasants and their rebellion led to an increase in nationalism in Serbia, as is demonstrated by the press, the public demonstrations and the actions of the government. Serbian nationalism, in turn, led to increased tension in the region. The role of nationalism is also demonstrated by Serbia's goal of annexing Bosnia. Contrary to the theories prediction, however, Serbia did not go to war when Serbian nationalism was at its peak in the summer and early fall of 1875.

The Serbo-Turkish War also provides evidence supporting the power-based hypotheses and the miscalculation hypotheses. Because Serbia was militarily unprepared and lacked allies in 1875, war was delayed. Serbia's military weakness is clearly demonstrated by the failure to go to war in 1875, statements made by Prince Milan and Jovan Ristic, the leader of the pro-war Liberal party, and the military reforms in which it engaged in late 1875 and early 1876. Serbia's diplomatic unpreparedness is clearly demonstrated by its lack of allies—both Balkan and Great Power—and its negotiations to gain these allies. In 1876, Belgrade believed that it was capable of defeating the Turkish forces as is clear from Serbia's declaration of war in 1876. While the improvement of the Serbian military partly explains this decisions, the expectation of allied support appears to be the most significant reason for this policy change. In particular, Serbia expected both Bulgarian and Bulgarian military support. The expectation of Bulgarian military support can be seen both from Serbia's military strategy and statements by Serbian leaders. The expectation of Russian support can be seen from both from Serbia's reaction to the arrival of General Cherniaev, a Russian war hero, and from Milan's discussions with Russia.

Serbia's expectation of victory, which in large part was based on the belief in allied support, was a miscalculation that resulted from two factors addressed by the dissertations argument. First, and most importantly, were the divisions within Russia's government that led Serbia to believe that Russia would provide sufficient military support when the Serbo-Turkish War began. We see that within the Russian government there was a division between those who favored a unilateral, pro-Serb policy and those who favored a European solution to the crisis. The statements made by key leaders shows that this division effected not only the policy-making process, but also the policy-implementation process. Adding to these divisions was the strong pan-Slav public opinion in Russia

that made it difficult for Serbia to determine Russia's position. This can be seen by General Cherniaev's presence in Serbia and its influence on the Serbians. Russia's failure to help Serbia defeat the Turks demonstrates that Serbia's expectation of Russian support was a miscalculation. Second was the failure of the Bulgarians to rise up against Constantinople and support the Serbian effort. While it is clear that Serbia expected Bulgarian support, it is not clear why the Bulgarians failed to provide it.

The evidence in this case also demonstrates that the rules of the game become an important issue, although they do not provide a significant explanation for the outbreak of the Serbo-Turkish war. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire clearly helped to unsettle the rules of the game. The instability in the Balkans led the Great Powers to recognize that the rules of the game were unsettled and needed to be clarified as is clearly demonstrated by their attempts to deal with the situation. The influence that these negotiations had on the issues of war and peace is unclear. Clearly, they did not prevent Serbia and Turkey from going to war. Nevertheless, they may have influenced Austrian and Russian decision-makers.

The case study of the Russo-Turkish War provides evidence relating to the hypotheses on the balance of power, miscalculation, and unsettled rules of the game. As a result of the Balkan crisis of 1875-1877, Russia's interests and prestige were engaged, increasing the necessity for St. Petersburg to intervene and leading to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. The timing of Russia's decision to go to war clearly supports the power-based hypothesis. Russia did not go to war until St. Petersburg reached an agreement with Vienna, out of fear that Austria would intervene. After Austria agreed to remain neutral, Russia went to war. Further supporting this hypothesis was Constantinople's rejection of all Great Power attempts to negotiate and impose a settlement. Constantinople rejected these proposals with the knowledge that the Great Powers were not united and, therefore, were unlikely to unite to use military force to impose a settlement on Turkey.

This case also supports the miscalculation hypothesis. Russia expected a cheap, quick victory over the Ottoman Empire as demonstrated by its rejection of allied support from the Balkan states. Unfortunately, the cause of this miscalculation is unclear. In part, it resulted from miscalculating how much the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire weakened its military. St. Petersburg's expectations were clearly erroneous as demonstrated by the strong

Ottoman resistance and by St. Petersburg asking for Balkan support once Russia's military encountered this resistance.

Unsettled rules of the game also influenced the crisis and war, as can be seen by several pieces of evidence. First, Austria and Russia negotiated an agreement that sought to spell out each state's rights and responsibilities during the impending crisis and afterward. Second, the basis of this negotiation were the Austro-Russian negotiations that occurred prior to the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876. These negotiations, however, were verbal, leading to confusion and disagreements about what the two sides had agreed to. Third, as a result of this agreement, Austria did not oppose Russia's actions during the Russo-Turkish War and Russia declared war against Turkey, confident of Austria's neutrality.

The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, the final case in this chapter, provides strong support for the power-based, miscalculation, and nationalism hypotheses. The evidence for the power-based hypotheses is strongest. We see the effects of state-building on the perception of the balance of power. As a newly independent state, Bulgaria needed to develop the institutions necessary for self-rule. When Russia responded to Bulgarian unification by recalling its troops from Bulgaria, Serbia saw two windows of opportunity. First, since Russian officers held important posts in the Bulgarian military, Bulgaria would be temporarily weakened by their loss. Second, when Sofia incorporated the newly annexed territories into Bulgaria, the Bulgarian state would be significantly more powerful. Serbia needed to act while these windows were open. Further supporting the power-based hypotheses was Serbia's choice of compensation. Serbia could have sought compensation from Austria or Turkey, but their strength deterred Belgrade. Instead, Serbia chose to seek compensation from Bulgaria.

Two types of miscalculation—of power and of intentions—also played a role in this conflict. Serbian leaders miscalculated the relative power between Serbia and Bulgaria as is clearly demonstrated by Serbian expectations and the war's outcome. Serbia expected to win, and then lost. It is unclear why Serbia miscalculated. Sofia, on the other hand, miscalculated Belgrade's intentions. Bulgarian leaders did not expect Serbia to be opposed to Bulgaria's gains as is clearly demonstrated by Bulgaria's expectations and the placement of Bulgarian troops. Bulgaria expected a possible Turkish attack. To address this potential danger, Bulgaria placed its military forces along the Turco-

Bulgarian border, which left the Serbo-Bulgarian border defenseless.

This case also provides some support for nationalism as a cause of conflict. The division of Bulgaria into three territories—Bulgaria proper, Eastern Rumelia, and Macedonia—created the potential for nationalism to become a problem. Bulgarian nationalism became a problem as a result of the conditions in Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia, the presence in Bulgaria of refugees from these territories, and Russian interference in Bulgarian politics. Once Bulgaria unified, Bulgarian nationalism threatened Serbia's interests in Macedonia, which led Serbia to seek compensation at Bulgaria's expense.

Domestic politics and unsettled rules of the game seem to have weakly contributed to the problems that led to war. In terms of domestic politics, we see internal divisions in Bulgaria that helped to make Prince Alexander a weak ruler. This weakness forced him to follow popular opinion and accept unification despite the possibility that it would lead to war with Turkey. Nevertheless, this war did not occur. Bulgarian unification violated the rules established in the Treaty of Berlin. If the Great Powers had enforced the rules peace could have been maintained. The failure to maintain these rules limited Serbia's options.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in five sections. The first section explains why Serbia did not go to war in the 1860s despite two opportunities. The next three sections look at the wars that did occur. In the second section, I look at the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 first to explain why war did not occur in 1875 and then to explain why it did occur in 1876. The third section explains the causes of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. In the fourth section, I explain the origins of the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885. The fifth and final section briefly summarizes the conclusions from these cases.

5.1 THE BALKAN ALLIANCE OF THE 1860s AND BALKAN PEACE

While monumental events were occurring in Europe in the 1860s, the Balkans were relatively calm. No wars occurred among the Balkan countries, between the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, among the Great Powers over Balkan issues, or between the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire. The lack of Great Power conflict in or concerning the Balkans is not a surprise since their attentions were turned elsewhere. Britain had turned inward, Russia was addressing internal social and economic problems, and the Wars of German and Italian Unification held the attention of the

remaining powers. The lack of a war between the Balkan countries and the Ottoman Empire, however, is more surprising.

In the Balkans, Serbian nationalism was developing. Its goals was for Serbia to gain its independence and unite the Balkan Slavs. In 1862 and again in 1866, Serbia had the opportunity to go to war to try to achieve its goals. This opportunity, however, remained untaken. The most significant reason for this was the balance of power. The Serbian military was weak, even after Prince Michael of Serbia introduced reforms, and Serbia's Balkan allies were even weaker. Furthermore, the danger of Austrian opposition added to Serbia's hesitancy to act.

TABLE 5-1: predictions
The Balkans in the 1860s

	P1: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with imperial disintegration?	P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms of the intervening phenomena?
Rules of the Game	No. Unsettled rules of the game did not correlate with imperial disintegration during this crisis. Yes. When Prince Michael took the throne, the Serbian military was weak and limited by Turkish control. To deal with this weakness, Serbia engaged in state-building in an effort to increase its military capabilities. At the same time, Serbia tried to develop alliances with the Balkan states and with the Great Powers.	No. Unsettled rules of the game did not correlate with imperial disintegration during this crisis. Yes. Serbia was militarily and diplomatically significantly more active in its efforts to increase its power than previously. These efforts led to a significant increase in Serbia's power as demonstrated by the quantitative improvements in the Serbian military and by the impressions of many of the Great Powers and the Turks.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion. The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Power	Yes. It was difficult to measure the growth of Serbia's power. The Turks considered it to be greater than the Serbs did.	Yes. The variation of opinion about Serbia's capabilities suggests that uncertainty about its relative power was greater than normally. It is unclear how great this problem was. Even though nationalism was stronger than under normal circumstances, Ottoman restrictions on Serbia had existed for centuries.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Uncertainty	Yes. Ottoman restrictions on Serbian domestic politics and Turkey's mistreatment of the Serbs, namely the bombing of Belgrade, increased Serbia's desire to gain its independence. Unfortunately, the arguments on nationalism fail to provide an understanding of how individuals such as Garasanin and Prince Michael, led Serbia to adopt a nationalist agenda.	No. Domestic instability does not correlate with imperial disintegration during this crisis.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Nationalism	No. Domestic instability does not correlate with imperial disintegration during this crisis.	No. Domestic instability does not correlate with imperial disintegration during this crisis.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Domestic Instability	No. Domestic instability does not correlate with imperial disintegration during this crisis.	No. Domestic instability does not correlate with imperial disintegration during this crisis.	No. Domestic instability does not correlate with imperial disintegration during this crisis.

TABLE 5-1: predictions
The Balkans in the 1860s (continued)

	P4: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with war and crises?	P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P6: Did the elite explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena caused the wars and crises?
Rules of the game	No. Unsettled rules of the game did not correlate with this crisis.	No. Unsettled rules of the game did not correlate with this crisis.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Power Shifts	Yes. Serbia increased its power and alliances. Nevertheless, these windows were small. Serbia and its allies were still too weak to be confident of victory.	No. The power shift that occurred was small. Thus, Serbia was stronger than in previous years, but not strong enough to be confident of victory.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Miscalculation	No. Neither Serbia nor Turkey was sure who was stronger, thus they were able to reach a diplomatic settlement without war.	It is unclear who miscalculated, Serbia or Turkey. This miscalculation, however, was under-estimating the state's capabilities.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Nationalism	No. Even though Serbia wanted to unite the Balkan Slavs in a single Serbian state, it refused to act to achieve this goals when the opportunities arose.	It is unclear how strong nationalism actually was. The key leaders, Garasamin and Prince Michael, pushed for unification, but there was no strong, popular national movement.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Domestic Instability	No. Domestic instability does not correlate with this crisis.	No. Domestic instability does not correlate with this crisis.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.

The Balkans in the 1860s provide limited support for this dissertation's arguments.² (See Table 5-1 for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the case and the argument's predictions.) The two key issues were state-building and uncertainty. In 1860, Serbia was militarily very weak. To increase its power, Prince Michael sought to develop the Serbian state, namely the military. Uncertainty existed as to how much Serbian power had grown as a result of this policy. Several Great Powers and the Turks were impressed. Russian military leaders, however, were not as impressed as their evaluations made clear. During the crisis of 1867, neither the Turks nor the Serbs believed that they were significantly stronger than the other. Serbian leaders did not believe that Serbia, along with its allies, were strong enough to defeat the Turks. The Porte, on the other hand, was sufficiently impressed with Serbian improvements to agree to a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Obviously, one side was wrong. But, since both underestimated their own capabilities, peace was the outcome.

This case also provides important information related to the nationalism arguments. Clearly, nationalism was an issue for Serbia. As this dissertation argues, part of the cause of this nationalism was Turkish abuses and interference in Serbian politics. The main driving force for Serbia's national policy, however, was its leaders, Prince Michael and his foreign minister Garasanin, which can not be adequately accounted for by this dissertation's argument. Furthermore, despite the national policy of Serbia's leadership, war did not occur. This outcome suggests that while nationalism may contribute to the outbreak of war, power is a more important variable.

This case is organized in three parts. The next part provides the background necessary to understand the two opportunities that presented themselves to Serbia. Two issues are prominent. The growth of Serbian nationalism and the development of the Serbian military. The remaining sections look at the crises of 1862 and 1866 to explain why neither of them led to a Balkan war. The Fortress crisis of 1862 resulted from the inability of the Ottoman Empire to maintain order among its own military. The second crisis resulted, not from changes in the Ottoman Empire, but from Great Power politics and its potential effect on the balance of power in the Balkans.

5.1.1 Prince Michael and His Nationalist Program

In 1860, Prince Michael Obrenovic ascended to the throne of Serbia with a strong nationalist

²Since the historical record on the Balkans in the 1860s is limited, the lessons from this case are also limited.

program.³ While Serbia had been autonomous since the early 1830s, it was still part of the Ottoman Empire as the Turkish troops and six Turkish-controlled fortresses in Serbia demonstrated. In addition to Serbia, Turkey controlled other territories—such as Bosnia, Bulgaria, Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Thrace—populated by Slavs. Michael wanted to lead these territories to freedom, as Piedmont had done for the Italians. Piedmont freed the Italians from colonial rule and united the Italian people in a single Italian state.⁴ Following in Piedmont's footsteps, Michael wanted Serbia to free the Balkan Slavs from Turkish rule and, eventually, unite them within a single Slav state dominated by Serbia.

To accomplish his goal, Michael set three tasks for Serbia.⁵ First, he needed to develop a strong army. The size of the Serbian military was limited by Turkey. If Serbia wanted to fulfill its nationalist ambitions, it would need to build a large military capable of competing with the Turkish military. Second, he needed to get the Turks to withdraw their troops from Serbian territory and from the fortresses in Serbia. As long as the Turks controlled these fortresses, Serbia could not become independent. Furthermore, as long as the Ottoman flag flew over these fortresses, Serbian national pride would be injured. Third, Serbia needed to establish ties and alliances with the other Christian states and people of the Balkans. Prior to taking the throne, Michael had traveled through Western Europe, and learned that the Great Powers would not free the Balkan Christians from Turkish, or Austrian, rule. They would need to act on their own. By developing a network of Balkan alliances, the Balkan states and people would be better able to act together to throw the Turks out of the Balkans and obtain independence.

Nevertheless, united Balkan action did not mean that they could succeed without Great Power support. Great Power opposition could prevent the Balkans from achieving their goals. British and

³Discussing Michael's political program is Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 295-297. While Michael developed his own opinions on a Serbian nationalist program, the ideas were developed and implemented by Ilija Garasanin in 1844. Garasanin, who some have called the Balkan Bismarck, became Michael's Premier and Foreign Minister. See David MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin: Balkan Bismarck*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). MacKenzie discusses the two leaders' goals and policies on pp. 240-253.

⁴For a short discussion on Italian unification, see Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*, revised edition, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc, 1973), pp.94-107.

⁵Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 312-316.

Austrian opposition were particularly problematic. Both Austria and Britain continued to support the status quo, and opposed any actions that might harm the Ottoman Empire.⁶ Austrian opposition was particularly problematic because Garasanin believed that Austria wanted Bosnia and Herzegovina and would intervene if Serbia tried to annex these territories.⁷ To help balance against this opposition, Serbia looked to France and Russia for support. France had supported Italian nationalist ambitions against the Habsburg Empire in 1859 and was an ardent supporter of the principle of nationalism. Serbia, therefore, hoped that France would also support its nationalist ambitions. Russia, on the other hand, was a Slav state who had supported the Balkan people in the past and might support them again. This support would be necessary both to provide Serbia with money and arms and to help protect Serbia from Austrian intervention. Russia, however, was still recovering from the Crimean War and implementing domestic reforms,⁸ which made Serbia uncertain of Russian support.

When Michael became ruler of Serbia, the Serbian military was too weak and poorly organized to achieve any of his goals. He knew he needed to reform the military before implementing his plans.⁹ The Serbian military suffered from three problems. First, it was small. Turkey made sure that the Serbian military was only large enough to maintain internal order but no larger. Thus, Michael needed to increase the size of the military. Second, Serbian soldiers lacked weapons and training. Each soldier was responsible for supplying his own guns and ammunition. In addition, no system of training or drills existed, which would reduce the military's effectiveness in the event of war. Finally, the Serbian military lacked officers to lead the military in the event of war.

These problems partly resulted from Turkish control over Serbia, but that was not the only

⁶MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp. 260-261.

⁷Ibid, pp. 240-241, 258.

⁸Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914*, translated by Bruce Little, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 15-101.

⁹This discussion is based upon Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 312-316.

reason. Domestic competition within Serbia also contributed to the problem.¹⁰ Serbia's two parties—the Liberals and the Conservatives—competed with each other and with the Prince for influence, making reform difficult.¹¹ The Liberals opposed centralizing power and developing a centralized military because it would give too much power to the Prince and to the bureaucracy. Also, Serbia's geographic position limited its ability to acquire the weapons and ammunition needed. To reach Serbia, this equipment had to travel either through Turkish-controlled territory or through Austria. Since neither of these powers wanted Serbia to become stronger, they tried to prevent any military equipment from getting through, which limited the amount of equipment Serbia could receive and made what little equipment they could get very expensive.

Despite these obstacles, Prince Michael began to improve Serbia's military once he took the throne. His first action was to increase the number of garrisoned troops from 2,529 to 3,529. Then, in August 1861, he established a standing militia. He also established an organizational structure for the military. In April 1862, he created a War Ministry. He also reorganized the militia, the Serbian military districts, and created a system to train the military. Despite these efforts, Serbia did not introduce modern drills, military science, or maneuvers until 1866. Thus, the military was still not prepared for war. Michael also decided to supply the army with guns and ammunition so that soldiers would not have to provide their own. In 1863, Serbia had only 7,000 rifles. In 1866, when Prussia defeated Austria, 55,000 rifles and several cannons were able to reach Serbia. Unfortunately, it took the Serbs several years to assemble the rifles. Finally, Serbia lacked officers to lead the army. Officer training produce only ten officers a year. By 1868, Serbia still had only 200 officers, ten of whom were generals. Recognizing that Serbia could not resolve this problem indigenously, Prince Michael signed a law that made it easier to accept foreign officers into the Serbian military.

These actions helped Serbia develop a seemingly impressive military. Out of a population of 1.25 million people, Serbia could field 90,000 soldiers.¹² These results impressed Austria, Turkey

¹⁰Ibid, pp.297-311. Also useful are Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920*, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1977), pp. 53-68; MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp.245-247; and Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy Through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanovic and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975).

¹¹The Conservatives supported a strong central government.

¹²Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 313-314.

and the Balkan Christians as Serbia became the leader of the Balkan people. Nevertheless, Serbia was still weak. When three Russian officers inspected the Serbian military, they came away from the inspection with an unfavorable view of its capabilities.¹³ It was still badly equipped and undisciplined.

During the 1860s, Serbia was also negotiating alliances with the other Balkan states and with the Balkan Christians.¹⁴ The most important state for Belgrade to arrange an alliance with was Greece.¹⁵ Greece was an independent state with a navy. Furthermore, it had outstanding grievances against Turkey and, therefore, would be willing to join an anti-Turkish alliance.¹⁶ In late 1861 Serbia and Greece began to secretly negotiate an alliance. Secrecy was necessary because they feared that Austria would learn about their plans and intervene.¹⁷ Once they reached an agreement, the two countries decided to delay signing. Belgrade was unprepared to act against Turkey, and did not want to commit to any actions until Serbia was prepared. Garasanin expressed this view when he said “[Serbia] had proposed delay in signing a Serbo-Greek convention since it did not wish to enter into solemn engagements without the hope of being able to fulfill all its obligations.”¹⁸ Belgrade, therefore, needed to improve its military before formally agreeing to join an alliance. Serbia also needed to unite the Serbian people behind this nationalist policy. Thus, Michael needed to end the divisions between the Liberal and Conservative parties and unite them behind his policies before Serbia could be prepared to go to war.¹⁹ Athens provided another reason to delay signing of the alliance. Although willing to reach an agreement, Greece was unprepared to act. Its already weak

¹³Ibid, pp. 314-315.

¹⁴The best sources on the Balkan alliances are MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp. 240-347; Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 329-330; and L.S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*, (Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing Company, 1944), pp. 84-121. For a short summary, see idem, *The Balkans Since 1453*, (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1958), pp 394-396.

¹⁵Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 84.

¹⁶For the Greek perspective on the Balkan Alliance, see Douglas Dakin, *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*, (London: Ernst Benn Limited, 1972), pp. 87-120.

¹⁷Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 86,

¹⁸Quoted in MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, p. 248.

¹⁹Ibid, p. 247.

military had been further weakened by domestic turmoil that eventually led to the overthrow of the Bavarian dynasty in Greece.²⁰

For the next six years, the alliance was put on hold as Serbia and Greece addressed their domestic concerns. Nonetheless, Serbia continued to lay the groundwork for a Balkan alliance and for united Balkan action against the Turks. Prince Michael negotiated with George Rakovski, a leader of the Bulgarian revolutionaries. They agreed that Bulgaria would revolt against the Ottoman Empire, and then Serbia would respond by declaring war.²¹ At the same time, Garasanin organized a secret committee whose job was to spread propaganda in European Turkey and to prepare the Balkan Christians to revolt against the Porte.²² Romania and Montenegro were the only states with whom Belgrade had not negotiated, and Michael decided to continue to put off negotiations with them. Romania's government was too weak to provide any support and Serbia was confident that Montenegro would join an alliance whenever Belgrade asked.²³ He, therefore, decided to wait for a more opportune moment.

In 1866, events created an opportunity for the Balkans to renew their negotiations for an alliance.²⁴ The Austro-Prussian war diverted Austria's attention from Balkan events, while the Cretan revolt against Ottoman rule increased the likelihood that the Balkan states could force the Porte to cave to their demands. The result was a series of alliances between Serbia and the other Balkan states: in September 1866, Serbia and Montenegro signed an alliance; in August 1867, Greece and Serbia signed an alliance; later in 1867, Serbia reached an agreement with the Bulgarian revolutionaries; and, in 1868, Serbia and Romania signed an alliance.²⁵

Despite this effort, the alliances collapsed by the end of 1868 without taking any actions. There were three reasons for this collapse. First, Prince Michael, who was the leader and catalyst

²⁰Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, pp. 86-87.

²¹Ibid, pp. 87-88.

²²MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp. 249-250.

²³Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 86.

²⁴Ibid, p. 90.

²⁵Discussing the details of the negotiations and the alliances is *ibid*, pp. 91-96.

for these alliances, was assassinated, leading the alliance to fracture. The new Serbian leadership turned its attention away from foreign policy and towards domestic issues, and without Serbian leadership the alliances could not hold together. Second, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia had conflicting territorial ambitions; all three states had designs on the same territories and could not agree how to divide the territories among themselves.²⁶ Finally, the alliance had failed to achieve its goals. Negotiations had begun in the early 1860s and were finally completed by 1868, yet no war occurred. Thus, in the end, the divergent interests of the alliance partners combined with the alliance's ineffectiveness led to its collapse.

5.1.2 The Fortress Crisis and Serbia's Decision Not to Go to War

On June 3, 1862, Turkish soldiers shot and killed a Serbian youth, precipitating a crisis.²⁷ When Serbian police arrived at the scene, the soldiers fired upon them and a night of conflict ensued. The next morning the Serbs and Turks arranged a truce, which lasted until June 5th when the Turkish fortress of Kalemegdan fired upon the city of Belgrade. In response, Michael called troops to Belgrade. Constantinople reacted, in turn, by concentrating its troops along the Serbian border. These events created public pressure for the Serbian government to respond more forcefully to the Turkish behavior, while Turkish leaders asked the Great Powers for approval to deal with Serbia as they saw fit. Except for Britain, the Great Powers refused to give Turkey a free hand against Serbia. In fact, they supported the Serbs. This opposition convinced the Porte to try to settle the crisis peacefully. It did this by removing the commander who had ordered the bombardment of Belgrade and by evacuating all Turks living outside the fortresses.

This crisis confronted the Serbian government with a major decision: go to war against the Turks or remain at peace. Belgrade wished to free Serbia from Turkish suzerainty and the crisis presented the opportunity to try to achieve this goal. Prince Michael believed that Serbia should use this crisis to free itself from Turkey. Garasanin, however, disagreed, believing that war was not the appropriate policy at this time. In the end, Serbia followed this recommendation and remained at peace.

²⁶Ibid, pp. 97-103.

²⁷The following description of events comes from MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp. 254-257.

One of the most important reasons for this decision was Serbia's lack of military preparation.²⁸ Serbian military reforms were in their infancy. Its military was small, untrained, and under-supplied. If Belgrade went to war with Turkey, Serbia would lose. This weakness strengthened Garasanin's position against war because others also recognized it.

A second important reason for Serbia not to go to war was the lack of Great Power support for aggressive Serbian action. Belgrade feared Austrian intervention if Serbia went to war with Turkey.²⁹ At the same time, it lacked the support of its potential Great Power allies, France and Russia.³⁰ France could only offer moral support and Russia was involved with internal problems. If Belgrade went to war, Serbia would have to face Turkey, and possibly Austria, alone. Instead, the French Foreign Minister Thouvenel recommended that Serbia

Prepare as best you can, train your militia, arm yourselves, work on an alliance with Montenegro, and gain for Serbia the support of all Turkish Christians. The Porte believes that Serbia is preparing for war against her; England and Austria agree and thus are aiding Turkey in its accusations against Serbia. If Serbia wishes to fight Turkey, Russia is the one which must help her and do for her what France did for Italy. France cannot aid Serbia with troops. At this moment Russia also can do nothing for Serbia.³¹

A third reason for Serbia's decision was the lack of capable Balkan allies.³² Serbia did not even begin to negotiate with any Balkan states until late 1861, and these negotiations had not achieved anything. Even if Serbia developed these alliances, none of the states in the Balkans were capable of helping Serbia. They were all weak and unprepared.

5.1.3 Peace in the Balkans in 1866

In 1866, Serbia and the Balkan states had another opportunity to go to war to achieve their nationalist goals. The Austro-Prussian War occupied Vienna's attentions. While Austria was fighting Prussia, Vienna would not be able to prevent the Balkan states from trying to achieve their

²⁸Ibid, pp.258, 264.

²⁹Ibid, p. 258.

³⁰Ibid, pp. 258, 262-263.

³¹Ibid, p. 263.

³²Ibid, pp. 264-274.

goals.³³ In addition, Crete revolted against the Ottoman Empire in 1866 and declared its independence.³⁴ This revolt diverted the Porte's attention away from the Balkans and occupied its military. Since the Porte was unable to put down the rebellion promptly, other groups under Ottoman rule began to believe that they could successfully oppose Ottoman rule.³⁵

In addition to these incentives for war, Germany, Russia, and Greece also pressured Serbia to become more involved in the crises. Berlin tried to convince Serbia to join Germany in an alliance against Austria.³⁶ If Belgrade agreed to this alliance, Bismarck claimed that it might achieve all its goals; however, he would not guarantee that it would achieve any of these goals. Greece and Russia also tried to get Serbia involved. Greece wanted an alliance in which the two states would agree to go to war against Turkey, and Russia supported this alliance.³⁷

Despite these incentives, neither Serbia nor its allies went to war. The two most important reasons for their remaining at peace were their lack of timely preparation for war and their military weakness. The Balkan states did not sign any of their alliances until late 1866. Belgrade and Athens signed their alliance in August 1867. By the time they signed these alliances, the Austro-Prussian War had ended, increasing the likelihood that Austria would be able to intervene in any Balkan conflict. Also, they did not have the time to prepare the Balkan Christians to revolt against the Ottoman Empire. If the Austro-Prussian War had lasted a few more months, the Balkan states might have been able to complete their preparations for war.³⁸

Not only were the Balkan states diplomatically unprepared, but they were also militarily

³³Both MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, p. 279-280; and Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 91 claim that the Austro-Prussian war provided Serbia with the chance to address its nationalist ambitions.

³⁴Discussing the Cretan revolt is Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, pp. 107-114.

³⁵Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 91.

³⁶MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp. 279-283.

³⁷Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, pp. 111-116; and MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp.303-304.

³⁸Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 104-105; and Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 91.

unprepared.³⁹ As of September 1866, Greece only had 8,000 soldiers.⁴⁰ Athens further reduced the resources available for a Balkan war by diverting forces to Crete.⁴¹ At this time, Bucharest also was in no position to participate in a Balkan war. Militarily, Romania was weak, having only 15,000 rifles, no ammunition, and untrained soldiers.⁴² Politically, it was even worse. Prince Cuza had recently been expelled from Romania and replaced by Prince Charles, creating domestic turmoil between those who supported Cuza and those who supported Charles.⁴³ Even the Serbian army was poorly prepared. An evaluation of the Serbian military claimed that

Elements of the army in Serbia are good, but...it is as if organization were wholly lacking.... For defensive war, the most important points in the war theater...are not secured at all, and the roads are in deplorable condition. They have general staff officers but no general staff, and thus there are no precise maps.... From the foregoing you can see to what extent Serbia is prepared, or more correctly unprepared to open hostilities. It could be considered prepared only if the enemy were even less ready.⁴⁴

In other words, the Serbian military could not defeat the Turkish military.

Despite the weakness of the alliance, Serbia still achieved one significant success. The Porte was willing to remove its forces from Serbian soil. The Porte saw that Serbia had a large military and allied support. This posed a threat to Turkey at a time when it faced a rebellion in Crete. Therefore, when Prince Michael asked for Constantinople to return the Serbian fortresses, the Porte to agreed.⁴⁵ By doing so, the Porte bought Serbian neutrality and gained time to put down the rebellion in Crete.

5.2 THE SERBO-TURKISH WAR OF 1876

In the summer of 1875, the Christians in the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina rebelled. During the summer and fall, Serbian nationalists wanted to go to war, yet no war occurred.

³⁹MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp. 300-322.

⁴⁰Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 103.

⁴¹Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 105.

⁴²Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 103.

⁴³MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp. 301-302.

⁴⁴Quoted in *ibid*, pp. 313-314.

⁴⁵*Ibid*, pp. 305-306.

During the winter and spring of 1876, the Great Powers tried to resolve the crisis diplomatically but they failed. Then, on June 30th, Serbia declared war.

In 1875, pressure for war was strong, yet Serbia did not go to war. Most of the pressure for war came from Serbia's domestic politics. The insurrection led to nationalism which, in turn, led to pressure for war. This pressure was so strong that Milan Obrenovic, the Prince of Serbia, feared that he would face a revolution if he did not go to the aid of the insurgents. Serbia, however, was not prepared for war. Militarily, Serbia's army was too weak to defeat the Ottoman army. Diplomatically, Serbia had no allies to help against the Turks. Just as important was the united opposition of the Great Powers. Both Austria and Russia—who were the most important Great Powers at this stage of the crisis—opposed war. They feared that a Balkan war would hurt their interests, and possibly lead to a Great Power war. They, therefore, warned Belgrade that Serbia should not expect any support from them in the event of a Serbo-Turkish War.

Over the next ten months, the situation changed so as to make war more likely. As the crisis continued, Serbian nationalism continued to pressure Prince Milan to go to war. Also, the delay provided Serbia with the opportunity to improve its military and seek allies. While Serbia prepared for war, the Great Powers tried to resolve the crisis diplomatically. Unfortunately, their conflicting interests made it difficult to agree on what their demands would be. Then, once they agreed on a proposal, divisions among them made it difficult to convince the insurgents and the Turks to carry out their demands. Not only were there significant divisions among the Great Powers, but there were also divisions within Russia over what policies to support. These divisions caused St. Petersburg to project an ambiguous foreign policy. One moment Russia seemed to oppose war, and the next it favored war. This ambiguity provided Belgrade with the opportunity to believe that Russia would support Serbia in the event of a Serbo-Turkish War. The new situation in the Ottoman Empire also led Belgrade to believe that Serbia could win a localized conflict with Turkey. Thus, at the end of June Belgrade declared war in the belief that Serbia was strong enough to defeat the Turks and that Russia would support its policy. Serbia, however, miscalculated, and Turkey easily defeated the Serbian military.

TABLE 5-2: predictions
The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876

	P1: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with imperial disintegration?	P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms of the intervening phenomena?
Rules of the Game	<p>Yes. The crisis created concerns about the rights and responsibilities of Austria, Russia, and Turkey, leading to the Andrassy Note and the Berlin memorandum.</p> <p>Yes. The Serbian state was militarily and economically weak in 1875, lacking both allies and a strong military that had not been improved since the 1860s. To overcome this problem, Serbia engaged in military state-building in the winter and spring of 1875-6 and formed alliances with Montenegro and with the Bulgarian revolutionaries.</p>	<p>Yes. Austrian and Russian concerns about the rules were greater than normal.</p> <p>Yes. In 1875, Serbia's military was no stronger than it had been in the 1860s but in 1876, Serbia believed that it had significantly increased its military power and gained allied support.</p>	<p>Yes. The Andrassy Note and Berlin Memorandum demonstrate the concerns that policy-makers had regarding the current crisis and the Balkan order.</p> <p>Yes. The conservative leader Jovan Marincovic, the Liberal leader Jovan Ristic, and Prince Milan all recognized and acknowledged that Serbia was too weak for war in 1875.</p>
Power	<p>Yes. Divisions within the Russian leadership and between the Russian leadership and a large segment of society increased uncertainty about Russia's position with regards to a Serbian war. Also, Serbia's capabilities in 1876 were unclear. Serbia and many in Russia believed that Serbia was capable of defeating the Turks without Russian intervention. At the same time, Russian military observers believed Serbian military needed significant improvement.</p>	<p>Yes. The unusually large and significant divisions within Russia increased the uncertainty about Russia's position.</p>	<p>Yes. Russia's foreign minister explicitly stated that Russia's leaders were divided and that this should be accounted for in Russia's relations with the Balkans. This led Kartsov, the Russian ambassador to Belgrade, to give Serbia unclear signals as to what Serbia ought to do and what Russia's position would be. He also expressed the view that the Russian public's support for the Serbian cause increased Belgrade's belief that the Russian government would support war.</p>
Uncertainty	<p>Yes. The division of Serbs between Serbia and Bosnia created the potential for nationalism to be a problem. Nationalism was exacerbated by the inability of the Turkish administration to satisfy the interests of the Bosnians and by its mistreatment of Bosnians.</p>	<p>Yes. Serbian nationalism was higher than in previous years as demonstrated by the broad public and political support for war. The mistreatment of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also greater than normal.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>
Nationalism	<p>Yes. Prince Milan lacked popular support because he failed to satisfy societies interests. Consequently, he feared that the Serbs would replace him with Prince Nicholas of Montenegro who was a stronger nationalist.</p>	<p>No. Prince Milan's unpopularity does not appear to be unusually high during this period.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>
Domestic Instability			

TABLE 5-2: predictions
The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 (continued)

	P4: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with war and crises?	P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P6: Did the elite explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena caused the wars and crises?
Rules of the game	<p>No. Serbia and Turkey did not have any rule-related problems between them. Furthermore, the Great Powers were concerned about the rules, even though no war occurred among them.</p> <p>Yes. The growth of Serbia's power combined with its alliances provided Belgrade with the confidence that it could defeat Turkey. At the same time, divisions among the Great Powers convinced Constantinople that the Powers would not intervene.</p>	<p>No. Even though the rules seem to have been more unsettled than normal, it did not contribute to the origins of the war.</p> <p>Yes. Serbia's growth in power was greater than at most other times.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion..</p> <p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>
Power Shifts	<p>Yes. Serbia overestimated its own capabilities and the support that its allies would provide.</p>	<p>Yes. Serbia's belief that it could defeat the Turks as a result of Bulgarian and Russian help was greater than in previous periods, which is partly demonstrated by the decision not to go to war in 1875 when Serbia lacked allies.</p>	<p>Yes. Both the Serbian Minister of War and President blame Serbia's defeat, in large part, on the failure of the Bulgarians to join in the war.</p>
Miscalculation	<p>Yes. Both the government, the press, and the public desired to create a greater Serbian state that incorporated the Serbs in Bosnia.</p>	<p>Yes. Nationalism was stronger during this period than at most other times.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion..</p>
Nationalism	<p>Probably not. Prince Milan feared revolution if he did not go to war, which may have made him cave to public pressure. But at the same time he successfully opposed war in the summer and fall of 1875.</p>	<p>It is unclear if this fear was greater than during previous times. If it was, it may have been caused by nationalism.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion..</p>
Domestic Instability			

This case supports several of this dissertation's arguments, particularly those related to power and to nationalism. (See Table 5-2 for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the case and the argument's predictions.) The timing of the war can, in large part, be explained by the growth of Serbia's power. In 1875, when the Bosnian crisis began, Serbia's military was weak and it lacked allies. This weakness caused Serbian leaders to oppose war at this time. During the winter and spring Serbia built up its military and sought allies, particularly in Bulgaria and Russia. By May 1876, the Serbs thought they were strong enough to defeat the Turks. They had increased their military capabilities, gained an alliance with the Bulgarians, and gained Russian support. The war showed them to be wrong. The Bulgarians failed to support the Serbian war effort, which was a great disappointment to Belgrade and the main reason cited by Serbian leaders for their loss. In addition, Serbia had miscalculated Russia's support. As the dissertation's argument predicts, divisions within Russia's government led Russia to send mixed signals to Serbia. The Tsar opposed war while his heir supported war. Consequently, Russian diplomats both urged restraint and supported Serbia's military aims. These mixed signals led Serbia to expect Russian support. Support that never came.

This case also supports the arguments related to nationalism, although not as strongly as the power-based arguments. The division of Serbians between Serbia and Bosnia created the potential for nationalism to be a problem. The Turkish mistreatment of the Bosnians also contributed to the growth of Serbian nationalism that, in turn, developed into a national movement as politicians, the media, and the public pushed for war to free Bosnia and unite it with Serbia. While nationalism was a powerful force, it was not stronger than the balance of power. In 1875, Prince Milan and other Serbian leaders successfully resisted national pressure for war because Serbia was too weak. This is clearly demonstrated by their statements claiming that Serbia was not ready for war and the fact that no war occurred in 1875. As Serbian state-building and alliance-building bore results, war became a more reasonable option, as demonstrated by Serbia not declaring war until mid-1876.

This case is organized into six sections. Section 5.2.1 explains how problems associated with a declining and disintegrating empire contributed to the outbreak of the insurrections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Section 5.2.2 discusses the attitudes of the Great Powers with respect

to the Balkan crisis. Section 5.2.3 discusses how the crisis increased the pressures for Serbia to go to war, focusing on the problems of nationalism and domestic turmoil. Section 5.2.4 demonstrates that the balance of power led Serbia to avoid war in 1875. Section 5.2.5 discusses the changes that occurred in the winter of 1875 and spring of 1876 that led Serbia to go to war. Section 5.2.6 shows that Serbia optimistically miscalculated its relative power and the likelihood of Russian support.

5.2.1 The Insurrections in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 1875, revolts against Ottoman rule took place in the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These revolts resulted from two causes: the mistreatment of the citizens of the provinces and external support. The Ottoman bureaucrats put an undue burden on the territory, creating dissatisfaction with the Empire. At the same time, Serbian nationalists and Russian pan-Slavs were organizing the Orthodox Slavs to rebel. Austria also helped to incite the Bosnians by the support it gave to the Bosnian Catholics.

Bosnia and Herzegovina were multi-ethnic provinces in the East European territories of the Ottoman Empire located east of Serbia, northeast of Montenegro, and south of Austria-Hungary, next to Austrian Dalmatia.⁴⁶ (See Map 5-1⁴⁷) Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Roman Catholics lived in these two provinces: in 1875, about 40 percent of the 1.2 million population was Muslim; 42% was Orthodox Christian; and 18% was Catholic.⁴⁸ Despite these religious differences, the national distinction was not as large. An overwhelming majority of the population was Slavic. Many of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Christians who converted to Islam in order to maintain their land and privileges.⁴⁹ Thus, the Serbs in Serbia considered the Bosnian Muslims to be ethnic Serbs, and the Croats in the Austro-Hungarian

⁴⁶Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina are considered one territory, most commonly referred to as "Bosnia." When the Ottoman Empire controlled this territory, however, the empire administered it as two territories.

⁴⁷David MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. frontispiece.

⁴⁸L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1958), pp. 396-7.

⁴⁹Robert J. Donia & John V.A. Fine, Jr., *Bosnia & Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 37-44.

Empire considered them to be ethnic Croats.⁵⁰

In the years preceding the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78, the internal situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina created dissatisfaction among the provinces' residents. Between 1839 and 1876, the Porte had been implementing a series of reforms—known as the *tanzimat* reforms—that upset



Map 5-1
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Surrounding Areas, 1875

both the Christians and the Muslims in the empire.⁵¹ Key leaders in the Ottoman Empire recognized that the empire was becoming weaker relative to the European states and relative to the nationalities within the empire. To stop the Empire's decline and, hopefully, restore its power, these leaders tried to centralize administrative and fiscal power in Constantinople and to

⁵⁰Donia & Fine, Jr., *Bosnia & Herzegovina*, p. 104.

⁵¹For an in-depth discussion and analysis of the reforms, see Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963). For a shorter discussion of the reforms and the people behind them see Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Dural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, volume II, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 55-171. Looking at the influence of the reforms on the Balkans is Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 381-392.

create an economic, social, political, and legal order that provided equality between Christians and Muslims.⁵² Unfortunately, local leaders refused to implement these reforms because they did not want to reduce their political or economic power.⁵³ Furthermore, many Muslims opposed the idea of Muslim-Christian equality because they believed it to be sacrilegious.⁵⁴ Thus, these reforms failed, and their failure had significant consequences. The continued failure of these reforms caused the Christian population to lose faith in the ability of the Ottoman Empire to reform itself and to keep its promises. In other words, the Christians did not trust the Porte.

Both nature and the policies of the Ottoman government magnified their dissatisfaction with the Ottoman administration. In 1873 and 1874, the two provinces suffered from droughts and floods, which led to bad harvests and famine.⁵⁵ During this time of need, the government failed to help the peasants, leading them to want political change. Ottoman taxes further exacerbated the problems. In the Empire, expenses had been growing faster than revenues, leading to excessive borrowing.⁵⁶ The government desperately needed money. In an attempt to get this money, the Ottoman tax farmers demanded that the people in Bosnia and in Herzegovina continue to pay the same level of taxes as they had paid prior to the bad harvests. If the peasants were unable or unwilling to pay, the tax farmers used force to collect.⁵⁷ These actions further increased the dissatisfaction felt by the peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the Ottoman government.

These three internal factors created conditions under which rebellion was likely to occur,

⁵²Discussing the different rights and attitudes between Muslims and Christians in the Ottoman Empire, see Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," *The American Historical Review*, 59 (July 1954), pp. 844-864.

⁵³Discussing the groups who opposed the *tanzimat* reforms and why is Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, pp. 156-158.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 301-3; and William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, with an appendix, 1927-1936*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1936), p. 359.

⁵⁶Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, pp. 155-6; and Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 304.

⁵⁷Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 397; and Mihailo D. Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans 1875-1878*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 15.

but they were not the only pressures pushing the Bosnian and Herzegovinan Christians towards rebellion. In addition, Serbia, Austria, and Russia prodded the Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina to rebel by providing them with organization, arms, and the perception of allies.⁵⁸ Serbian and Russian pan-Slavs disseminated propaganda and helped organize the Christians to revolt. The Serbian government had been planning to unite all Serbs within a single Slav state. To help achieve this goal, Serbia organized the Ottoman Slavs so that these people would be prepared to help Belgrade defeat the Turks.⁵⁹ Unlike Serbian activity, Russia's pan-Slav activity was not part of its official policy. Instead, Count Ignatiev, Russia's ambassador to Constantinople, controlled Russian pan-Slav activities in the Balkans. "[Ignatiev] coordinated the activities of Russian consuls in the Near East and Panslav agitation in Russia and in the Balkans."⁶⁰ Austria also supported the Bosnian and Herzegovinan Christians. The Austrian Slavs in Dalmatia provided the Christians in the two provinces with arms and supplies.⁶¹ Then, in the spring of 1875, Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria made a trip to Dalmatia. During this trip, he heard the grievances of many Christians from the two provinces, and, in so doing, led them to believe that Austria would support them against the Turks.⁶²

These factors contributed to the uprisings that occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of 1875.⁶³ The revolt started in June 1875 when a small number of Christians in the

⁵⁸Attributing the crisis to external factors is Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, pp. 158-160.

⁵⁹Making the argument that the insurrection was the result of Serbian activities is Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, p. 15. Discussing the origins and early execution of this policy is MacKenzie, *Ilija Garašanin*. Also useful on this subject is MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, pp. 6-8.

⁶⁰David MacKenzie, *Imperial Dreams Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917*, (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), p. 72.

⁶¹David Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1936), pp. 67-68.

⁶²Ibid, pp. 32-33.

⁶³Discussing and critiquing the competing explanations for the causes of the insurrection is Richard Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-1878*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 13-18.

Nevesinje district of Herzegovina revolted.⁶⁴ The insurrection quickly spread throughout Herzegovina. Then, on August 15, the revolt reached northeastern Bosnia. By the end of the month all the Christians of Bosnia and Herzegovina were rebelling.

The Ottoman authorities used two tactics to put down the insurrection. The first tactic was to promise the Christians that the Porte would institute reforms in the provinces. These attempts to negotiate failed. The Christians of Bosnia and Herzegovina had heard these promises before, and each time the promises were broken.⁶⁵ In addition to the offer of reforms, the Turks used force to put down the insurgency, which failed for two reasons. First, the Turks feared Great Power intervention if they responded too aggressively, which led them to limit their military actions.⁶⁶ Second, given this limited use of force, the Ottoman military had difficulty defeating the guerilla tactics employed by the insurgents.⁶⁷ Thus, the insurrection spread throughout the two provinces, and the Porte provided no evidence that it would be able to defeat the insurgents any time soon.

5.2.2 The Great Powers and the Balkan Crisis

The Balkan Crisis engaged the interests of several of the Great Powers, most importantly Austria and Russia. For both political and ethnic reasons, Austria opposed changes to the *status quo*. Russia, on the other hand, supported the Slavs. Unfortunately, Russian leaders were divided about how strong this support ought to be. The remaining Great Powers—Germany, France, Italy, and Britain—stayed out of the crisis during its early stages. Germany had no interests at stake in the Balkans, and only wished to maintain peace among its allies, Austria and Russia. France and Italy, on the other hand, were too weak to have any significant influence in

⁶⁴No author presents a detailed historical discussion of the start of the rebellion in the provinces. I, therefore, have had to use pages here and there from several sources, which include William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors*, pp. 359-362; Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question*, p. 13; Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, pp. 158-9; Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 14-15; and B.H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880*, (London: Archon Books, 1962), pp. 139-140.

⁶⁵Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 88-93; and Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors*, pp. 360-361.

⁶⁶Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, p. 63.

⁶⁷Barbara Jelavich and Charles Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States, 1804-1920*, (Seattle, WA and London: University of Washington Press, 1977), p. 144.

the crisis or its diplomacy. Finally, Britain, who had been the main supporter of the Ottoman Empire, had withdrawn from continental politics after the Crimean War.

Austria's policy with respect to the Balkan Crisis was to support the maintenance of the *status quo*.⁶⁸ In other words, its government believed that the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present form was the best method to maintain Austria's security. As long as the Ottoman Empire maintained control over its territories, Austria would feel secure because the Turks would be able to keep the Russians out of the Balkans and to keep the Balkan Slavs down. Austria, however, feared that if Russia tried to resolve the crisis, the status quo could not be maintained. Russian support for the Slavs would increase St. Petersburg's influence among them. Furthermore, any Russian solution would probably involve increased autonomy for Serbia and Montenegro,⁶⁹ thereby increasing the Slav threat to Austria. Vienna, therefore, opposed any active intervention in the crisis. Instead, the insurrections should be treated as an internal Ottoman problem.

Austria also opposed internal changes in the Ottoman Empire. If Bosnia and Herzegovina gained their autonomy, other Ottoman territories might also demand increased autonomy or independence.⁷⁰ Since these territories were predominantly populated by Orthodox Christians, Austria assumed that they would turn to Russia for advice and protection and become Russian satellites, thereby increasing the Russian threat to Austria.⁷¹ The same consequences would occur if the Ottoman Empire collapsed. The East European successor states would probably ally with Russia, thereby increasing the Russian threat to Austria.⁷²

Austria also opposed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbia or

⁶⁸F.R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914*, (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 61-2, 67; and G.H. Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria, 1876-1878*, (Philadelphia, PA: Porcupine Press, 1976), p. 85.

⁶⁹Although Serbia and Montenegro were *de jure* territories of the Ottoman Empire, by the 1870s they were *de facto* independent.

⁷⁰F.R. Bridge, *The Habsburg Empire Among the Great Powers, 1815-1918*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 114.

⁷¹Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, pp. 73-4.

⁷²Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, pp. 62-3; and Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 69-70.

Montenegro.⁷³ Annexation would create a large Slav state on Austria's border. This "Greater Serbia" or "Greater Montenegro" would be a natural magnet for the national aspirations of the Slavs living in the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, these Slavs would either demand more political rights as members of the Habsburg Empire, or they would try to secede from the Empire. Furthermore, the large Slav state that would be created by the union of Serbia or Montenegro with Bosnia and Herzegovina would also have nationalist ambitions, wanting to expand to incorporate the Austrian Slavs.

An alternate policy would be for Austria to annex the rebellious provinces and incorporate them into the Habsburg Empire. This strategy, however, was problematic. If Austria annexed these territories, the Empire's Slav population would considerably increase, which, in turn, would increase the pressure on the Dual Monarchy to grant the Slavs more political power.⁷⁴ Both the Hungarians and the Germans in the Empire opposed this policy option.⁷⁵ Austria's military leadership, however, supported annexation.⁷⁶ They believed that annexing the two provinces would help secure Austrian Dalmatia by providing more strategic depth. In addition, Franz Joseph, the Austrian Emperor, believed that annexation would increase Austria's prestige.⁷⁷ In the end, the Austrian government decided that if the status quo could not be maintained, Austria would annex the two provinces rather than allow them to become autonomous or to be annexed by Serbia or by Montenegro.⁷⁸

Russia, like Austria, had ethnic and political interests in the Balkans that required St. Petersburg to develop a policy to deal with the Balkan Crisis. Ethnically, Russia had ties to the

⁷³Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 30-1.

⁷⁴Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, p. 33.

⁷⁵Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 67-8; and Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, pp. 77, 80-1.

⁷⁶Bridge, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, pp. 112-3; and idem, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, pp. 71-2.

⁷⁷As a result of its defeat in the Austro-Prussian war, Austria suffered a serious blow to its prestige. This defeat also prevented Austria from expanding northward into the territory of the German states. Since Russia blocked Austria in the East, Vienna's only other area for expansion was in the south, William Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, second edition, (New York: Vintage Books, 1950), pp. 69-71. Also, see Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, pp. 25, 35.

⁷⁸Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, p. 72; and Mackenzie, *The Serbs*, pp. 38-9.

Orthodox Slavs who populated the region. Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, and the Orthodox people of the Ottoman Empire looked to Russia and Tsar Alexander II for support and protection. Politically, the Balkans had strategic value to Russia. The location of the Balkans made them important for Russia's economic and physical security. In addition, since other Great Powers, particularly Austria, had interests in the Balkans, there was the danger that the Balkan Crisis could re-open the Eastern Question. If it did, a European war might occur. Furthermore, St. Petersburg feared that if it acted unilaterally to resolve the Balkan Crisis, the Great Powers might form an anti-Russian coalition as they had during the Crimean War.⁷⁹ Russia's weakness caused St. Petersburg to fear these possibilities.

Russia's foreign policy was also constrained by its domestic situation. Following the Crimean War, St. Petersburg recognized that it needed to reform its economic and political systems if it were to remain one of the pre-eminent European powers.⁸⁰ Alexander II, therefore, instituted a series of reforms.⁸¹ Until these reforms were completed, domestic politics would take precedence over foreign policy. In other words, Russia's internal situation constrained its foreign policy.⁸²

These issues and concerns caused Russian leaders to work through the *Dreikaiserbund* to resolve the Balkan Crisis.⁸³ Until Russia implemented its domestic reforms, St. Petersburg could not afford to become involved in a costly conflict. Russia, therefore, preferred to maintain the status quo in order to avoid any complications.⁸⁴ Unfortunately, its ethnic and political interests forced St. Petersburg to be involved in the crisis. The best way to protect these interests and limit the dangers of European complications, therefore, was to work with the other great powers

⁷⁹Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, p. 68.

⁸⁰On Russia's internal situation, see Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 1-18.

⁸¹Discussing these reforms are MacKenzie, *Imperial Dreams*, pp. 54-57; and Geyer, *Russian Imperialism*, pp.15-32.

⁸²Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 2.

⁸³The *dreikaiserbund*, also known as the Three Emperor's League, was an alliance between Austria, Germany, and Russia, see Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*, pp. 18-26.

⁸⁴*Ibid*, p. 72.

to resolve the crisis.⁸⁵

Even though Tsar Alexander II supported the status quo and wished to work with Austria and Germany to resolve the crisis, many influential Russians believed that the Balkan Crisis provided Russia with the opportunity to free the Slavs from Turkish control.⁸⁶ Two of the most influential of these pan-Slavists were Count Ignatiev and Alexander III. Count Ignatiev was the Russian ambassador to Constantinople.⁸⁷ This office provided him with the opportunity both to promote the pan-Slav agenda in the Ottoman Empire and to promote pan-Slavism among the Balkan people.⁸⁸ Alexander III, the heir to the Russian throne, also favored a pan-Slav foreign policy.⁸⁹ The bureaucrats in the Russian Foreign Ministry, therefore, were put in the unenviable position of trying to satisfy leaders with contradictory goals: the tsar who wanted to work with the Great Powers and maintain peace, and the slavophile heir who wanted to support the Balkan Slavs in their quest for independence. As a result, Russia's foreign policy frequently appeared ambiguous.

The other three Great Powers—Britain, France, and Germany—did not take clear, forceful positions during the early stages of the crisis. While London normally supported of the Ottoman Empire, Britain had withdrawn from European politics after the Crimean War.⁹⁰ Paris,

⁸⁵Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, p. 42.

⁸⁶In Russia, an ideology had developed called pan-Slavism which called for Russia to lead the Balkan Slavs against Austria and the Ottoman Empire. The result of this would be one or more Slavic state under Russian control. On the origin of Russian pan-Slavism, see Michael Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism, 1856-1870*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).

⁸⁷Discussing Ignatiev's actions while in Constantinople prior to the Balkan Crisis of 1875 is B.H. Sumner, "Ignatyev at Constantinople, 1864-1874," *Slavonic Review*, XI (1833), pp. 341-353, 556-571.

Count Ignatiev was not the only member of the Russian Foreign Ministry who advocated pan-Slavism. In fact, the Foreign Ministry was divided between the Chancellory and the Asiatic department. The Chancellory had a European outlook and favored working in concert with the other Great Powers, while the Asiatic department was nationalistic and favored unilateral action to achieve the pan-Slav goals. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880*, pp. 21-32.

⁸⁸The pan-Slavs also opposed German and Hungarian rule over Slavs. They, therefore, also wished to help the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire achieve their independence.

⁸⁹Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 62.

⁹⁰On British isolationism prior to the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78, see Robert Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics*, (London: MacMillan and Co., 1935), pp. 3-4.

on the other hand, was too weak to take an active interest in the crisis. France had recently lost to Germany in the Franco-Prussian War, and was still recovering from the humiliating defeat. Germany, on the other hand, had no direct interests in the Balkans. During the Wars of German Unification, Berlin had been able to achieve its revisionist goals and now wished to maintain its security. To achieve this goal, Bismarck, the German Chancellor, believed that Austria and Russia must remain at peace. His policy, therefore, was to support any plan upon which both Austria and Russia agreed.

5.2.3 Pressures for War: Domestic Politics in Serbia, Serbo-Montenegrin Competition, and the Balkan Crisis

The Balkan crisis created pressure for Serbia to go to war. Once the provinces revolted, nationalism grew in Serbia. Both the press and politicians favored a war of Serbian unification so strongly that Prince Milan feared that he had to choose between war and revolution. In addition, competition for leadership of the Balkan Slavs and of Serbia increased the pressure on Milan to go to war.

Serbia had been planning to create a unified Serbian nation-state for decades. In 1844, Ilija Garasanin developed the *Narcertinje*—a nationalist plan to liberate all Slavs from Turkish and Austrian control and to unite them in a greater Serbian state.⁹¹ To help Serbia achieve this goal, he developed a network of agents in the Slav populated territories of the Ottoman Empire whose purpose was to prepare the Slavs to revolt against Turkish rule. In addition, these agents were to convince the Slavs to recognize Serbia as the leader of the nationalist movement. Garasanin's plan became the official policy of the Serbian government in 1860 when Prince Michael brought him into the government. This policy lasted for only seven years. With the fall of Garasanin in 1867 and Prince Michael's death shortly thereafter, the Serbian government turned its attention away from nationalist expansion and towards domestic issues.⁹²

Serbia's attentions returned to the Serbs of the Ottoman Empire in 1875 when the uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina began. The physical, economic, and political repression suffered by the Slavs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was partly communicated by refugees

⁹¹MacKenzie, *Ilija Garasanin*, pp. 42-77 and MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, p. 6.

⁹²Petrovitc, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 372.

who fled from the Turkish provinces, spurred public support for the insurgents. Serbian citizens formed committees to finance the insurrections and to recruit and equip volunteers who went to Bosnia to support the insurgents. The press also helped to inflame Serb nationalism. *Istok*, the most popular and influential newspaper in Serbia, wrote articles calling for the government to fulfill Serbia's nationalist goals. In late July, *Istok* reported that

Now is a relatively favorable time to fulfill the national mission...Serbia, the Piedmont of Serbdom and Southern Slavdom must not abandon to others the leadership in the cause of national liberation and unification.⁹³

Liberal papers like *Istok*, however, were not the only ones to make nationalist appeals. In August, the conservative newspaper, *Vidov Don*, also advocated a nationalist policy when it reported that the current crisis provided Serbia with the perfect opportunity to achieve its nationalist goals and liberate all Serbs from foreign rule.⁹⁴

Public opinion did not go unnoticed by the government. Just after the uprisings in Bosnia began, the government run by the conservative Danilo Stevanovic encouraged Serbian nationalism.⁹⁵ As a group, conservatives generally opposed nationalist groups and nationalist policies. Nevertheless, in the current circumstances, Stevanovic's government was swept up in the nationalist fervor. The government authorized "private recruitment of volunteers, publication of pro-insurgent appeals in the press, and dispatched Mico Ljubibratic [a native Herzegovinan who was living in Serbia] to his homeland to lead the insurrection."⁹⁶

Nationalism continued to increase as indicated by the victory of the Liberal party in the elections on August 16th. Serbian political parties were in the early stages of development in the 1870s. For the most part, they focused on personalities rather than ideologies.⁹⁷ Nonetheless, the leaders of the Liberal party and the Liberals who were elected to the Assembly favored an

⁹³Quoted in MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, p. 33.

⁹⁴Ibid, p. 44.

⁹⁵Ibid, p. 32.

⁹⁶Ibid, p. 32.

⁹⁷Gale Stokes, *Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 33-34.

aggressive nationalist foreign policy. They believed that Serbia must expand to remain independent; otherwise, Serbia would eventually become an Austrian or a Russian puppet.⁹⁸ They, therefore, wanted to go to war against the Ottoman Empire in order to annex the Empire's Serb-populated territories. Once elected, the Liberals acted to further their goals by authorizing a three million ducat loan, which they intended to use to aid the insurgents and to help rearm Serbia for the impending war of unification.⁹⁹

Nationalism put pressure on Prince Milan to help the insurgents fight the Turks. The pressure for war was increased by Milan's fear that he might lose the Serbian throne. Milan was not a popular leader. While he was intelligent and well-educated, he was willing to give his personal whims priority over Serbia's interests.¹⁰⁰ The lack of public support for him was demonstrated by the Liberal victory in the August elections. Milan opposed an activist Bosnian policy, as did most Conservatives. The Conservative leader, Jovan Marinovic, stated his party's position when he said "the country is not prepared, the people have no money, and the state has not the means to conduct war like a Great Power."¹⁰¹ In the elections, however, Liberals who supported an activist policy were elected to the Assembly, leading Milan to fear that he would have to choose between a Serbo-Turkish war and revolution.¹⁰²

Milan's insecurity was increased by the existence of two challengers to his throne. Since the early 1800s, the Obrenovic dynasty, now represented by Milan, had competed with the Karageorge dynasty, which helped cause domestic instability.¹⁰³ The current Karageorge candidate for the throne, Peter Karageorge, supported the insurgents. When the Bosnian revolt began, he traveled to Bosnia to help them. Milan feared that those Serbs who supported an

⁹⁸Stokes, *Politics as Development*, p. 103.

⁹⁹MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, p. 53.

¹⁰⁰Harris, *A Diplomatic History*, pp. 99-100, 102.

¹⁰¹Quoted in Stokes, *Politics as Development*, p.76.

¹⁰²Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 382.

¹⁰³MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, p. 21. For the history of the competition, see Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*. Also useful is Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, pp. 26-37, 53-67.

activist policy would also support Peter Karageorge.

At the time, a greater threat to Milan's power was Prince Nicholas of Montenegro.¹⁰⁴ Nicholas, like Milan, faced domestic pressure for war. Montenegrins wanted Nicholas to act, and eventually forced him to support the insurgents. He helped organize the insurgents in Herzegovina so that the leaders of the insurrection worked together. He also informed them that he would go to war against the Turks if the insurrections failed.¹⁰⁵ The insurgents believed Nicholas's promise because Montenegro had gone to war against the Turks during the previous insurrection in 1862.¹⁰⁶ Recognizing that he might lose support among the Balkan Slavs, and even his own people, if they believed that Nicholas was more sympathetic towards the insurgents than he, Milan informed Count Andrassy that if Montenegro declared war on Turkey, Serbia would also declare war.¹⁰⁷

5.2.4 Why War was Averted in 1875: Serbian Military Preparations, the Lack of Allies, and Great Power Pressure

Despite these pressures, for war, Serbia was too weak to go to war. First, Serbia was militarily and diplomatically unprepared to go to war. Serbia's military was the same one developed in the 1860s, and nothing had been done to improve it since then. Belgrade also lacked Balkan allies, who were needed if Serbia was going to be able to defeat the Turks. In 1875 Belgrade was unable to find any Balkan allies who were willing to support its policies. Finally, Serbia needed the support of the Great Powers—or at least their neutrality. Instead, the Great Power opposed a war at this time. They wanted to continue to try to resolve the crisis diplomatically, and informed the Serbs of this desire.

Probably the most important impediment to a Serbo-Turkish war in 1875 was Serbia's military and diplomatic unpreparedness. Serbia was militarily unprepared for a war with

¹⁰⁴Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, p. 102.

¹⁰⁵MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, pp. 46-7.

¹⁰⁶Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, volume II, p.150.

¹⁰⁷Harris, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 103-4.

Turkey.¹⁰⁸ The Serbian military was developed in the 1860s by Prince Michael and had not been improved since his assassination.¹⁰⁹ In 1875, the military had few officers, and those few officers lacked command experience. Also, the Serbian government had made no attempt to supply its troops, and lacked a transportation system to transport foodstuff and fodder to the front. Furthermore, the medical corps was totally unprepared; only twenty-nine people served in the medical corps, and nine of those were assistants. Most importantly, Serbia did not have enough weapons to arm its forces.

Prince Milan recognized this problem and opposed going to war before Serbia was prepared. When Milan spoke to the *skupstina* on September 10th, he told the assembled members of parliament that he supported the insurgents, but Serbia was not militarily prepared to go to war.¹¹⁰ Jovan Ristic, the leader of the pro-war Liberal party, also recognized that Serbia was not prepared to go to war, and probably would not be prepared until December. He once said that “As a Serb I favor war; but as a minister I am opposed to it.”¹¹¹

Not only was Serbia militarily unprepared for war, but it was also diplomatically unprepared. Serbia needed allies to overcome its military weakness. During the 1860s, Prince Michael had negotiated a series of alliances with other Balkan states.¹¹² Following his assassination, however, the alliances collapsed.¹¹³ The regency that ruled Serbia from 1868 until 1871 focused its attention on domestic matters and let these alliances collapse. In addition, divisions among the Balkan states—between Greece and Serbia, between Serbia and Montenegro, and between Bulgaria and Serbia—caused the alliances to weaken. As a result, when the Balkan crisis erupted, Serbia had no Balkan allies to help it fight the Turks.

¹⁰⁸MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, p. 61

¹⁰⁹Gale Stokes, “Serbian Military Doctrine and the Crisis of 1875-1878,” in *Insurrections, Wars, and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s*, Bela K. Kiraly and Gale Stokes, editors, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 261-275.

¹¹⁰MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, p. 51.

¹¹¹Ibid, pp. 54-55.

¹¹²On the formation of the Balkan alliance of the 1860s, see L.S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, pp. 84-105.

¹¹³Ibid, pp. 105-107.

Belgrade could have overcome these problems if Serbia had Great Power—particularly Russian—support. But, Belgrade did not. Of the Great Powers, Austria-Hungary gave Belgrade the most cause for concern. Belgrade knew that Austria opposed any Serbian gains in the rebellious provinces, and feared that Austria would attack in the event of a Serbo-Turkish War erupted.¹¹⁴ Thus, Serbia needed to gain Austrian neutrality. The best way to achieve this goal would be to have Russian support. If Russia supported Serbia, Austria would be less likely to intervene out of fear of Russia. Russian support would also prevent Turkey from committing atrocities if the Turks invaded Serbia. Turkish forces had committed atrocities against the insurgents, and might do the same to Serbs if given the opportunity. Russia could intervene to prevent Turkey from seeking retribution against Serbia. Finally, the Great Powers could provide Serbia with supplies. As previously stated, the Serbian military lacked weapons and money to buy these weapons. The Great Powers could help Serbia overcome this problem by shipping arms to Serbia and providing the Serbian government with loans to pay for these arms.

Russia, however, did not support Serbia's aggressive aspirations. Tsar Alexander opposed Serbia's aspirations because he feared that a Serbo-Turkish war would expand to include Greece and Montenegro, reopening the Eastern Question and an anti-Russian Austro-British alliance.¹¹⁵ At the same time, Russian public opinion did not demand that Russia intervene to help the insurgents.¹¹⁶

Russia, therefore, joined Austria in warning Serbia not to attack.¹¹⁷ Alexander ordered Kartsov, the Russian consul to Belgrade, to tell Prince Milan that Russia would not support him if Serbia started a war against Turkey. Specifically, he ordered Kartsov to tell Milan that “[t]he Guarantor Powers of the Treaty of Paris will find it impossible to preserve the Principality from Turkish occupation if the Serbian government resorts to aggressive acts against the Porte.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, p. 114.

¹¹⁵Ibid, pp. 48-49.

¹¹⁶MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, pp. 42, 56-58.

¹¹⁷Harris, *A History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 75-81, 140-154; and Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, pp. 90-95.

¹¹⁸Quoted in MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, p. 59.

Even though these warnings were not unambiguous, they still gave Prince Milan the support he needed to oppose war. While the Great Powers were warning Serbia not to initiate hostilities, some Russian officials told Prince Milan to continue to prepare his military for war.¹¹⁹ This way, Serbia would be prepared for war if diplomacy failed. Nevertheless, Austria's and Russia's warnings gave Milan the confidence to confront his pro-war, Liberal cabinet and the Serbian assembly on October 4th, which resulted in the cabinet's resignation and the assembly's support of Milan's policies.¹²⁰

5.2.5 The Coming of the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876

During the winter and spring of 1875/76, the situation changed, making war a more favorable policy for Serbia. The Great Powers tried to resolve the crisis diplomatically, but divisions among them hindered any successful resolution to the crisis. This diplomacy also helped hinder Turkey's attempts to put down the insurgency and provided Serbia with the opportunity to prepare for war. As Serbian nationalism continued to press for war, the Serbian government worked to strengthen its military and to build alliances with its Balkan neighbors. The failure of the Great Power negotiations also provided the pro-Slavs within Russia and the Russian government with the opportunity to exert their influence. Consequently, Russian foreign policy became increasingly ambiguous, which allowed the Serbs to interpret it as support for their war efforts.

The Great Powers made two concerted efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the Balkan crisis: the Andrassy Note and the Berlin Memorandum. The Andrassy Note demanded that the Ottoman government enact religious and economic reforms. More specifically, Andrassy, the Austrian foreign minister and the author of the note, proposed that the Porte abolish tax-farming, eliminate tithes, and permit religious freedom—all of which helped cause the current crisis.¹²¹ He developed this proposal for two reasons.¹²² First, he did not want Russia

¹¹⁹Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, p. 82.

¹²⁰Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 118-120; and MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, pp. 59-60.

¹²¹MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, pp. 68-9; and Langer, *European Alliances and Alignment*, p. 75.

¹²²Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 29-30, 43; and MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, pp. 68-9.

to receive credit for resolving the crisis because, if it did, the Balkan people would consider Russia to be the liberator of the Slavs and would be even further under Russian influence. Second, he did not want a large Slav state to be created in the Balkans because of the threat it would represent to the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. Andrassy believed that the longer the crisis continued, the greater the likelihood that either or both of these outcomes would occur. He, therefore, wanted to settle the issue quickly.

On December 30, 1875, Andrassy presented his plan to the powers for their comments and, hopefully, for their agreement. Germany had already agreed to accept any proposal upon which Austria and Russia agreed. Russian leaders, however, were divided over whether they should accept this proposal. Count Ignatiev wanted Russia to receive credit for resolving the crisis, and, therefore, opposed the Andrassy Note. Instead, he favored direct negotiations with the Porte in Constantinople where he could control the them.¹²³ If these negotiations succeeded, Russia would receive credit for their success. Tsar Alexander, on the other hand, believed that this crisis might cause the Ottoman Empire to collapse. If it collapsed, he wanted to make sure that an anti-Russian coalition, like the Crimean alliance, did not form.¹²⁴ By supporting the Andrassy Note and maintaining close ties with the *Dreikaiserbund*, Alexander believed that he would be able to prevent this eventuality. British support for the Andrassy Note was also important and difficult to gain.¹²⁵ Initially, British leaders hesitated to support Andrassy's proposal because they believed that Turkey had already agreed to enact most of the reforms that Andrassy proposed.¹²⁶ The Turkish foreign minister, however, asked Britain to support the note.¹²⁷ If Britain did not support the proposal, he believed that Turkey would be at the mercy of unfriendly powers. Disraeli, therefore, agreed to support the Andrassy Note.

¹²³Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, p. 40.

¹²⁴Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, p. 43; and MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, pp. 69-70.

¹²⁵On Britain and the Andrassy Note, see Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question*, pp. 39-57.

¹²⁶Discussing the Turkish reforms is Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 231-239.

¹²⁷*Ibid*, p. 53.

In spite of unanimous Great Power support for the Andrassy Note, it failed to end the crisis for several reasons, the two most significant being that the insurgents refused to end the insurrection and that Turkey did not believe that the Great Powers would enforce the demands made in the Andrassy Note. The Andrassy Note failed to satisfy the insurgents and end the insurgency because they did not trust the Turks to implement the promised reforms.¹²⁸ In the past, Constantinople had promised reforms and, each time, failed to fulfill its promises. The insurgents wanted the Great Powers to guarantee that the reforms would be implemented. Since they did not receive any guarantees, the insurgents refused to lay down their arms and the insurrection continued. A second reason for the failure of the Andrassy Note was the Turkish belief that the Great Powers would not force them to implement the reforms. Austria and Russia disagreed over how and when the Turks should implement the reforms. Austria wanted the Turks to pacify the rebellious provinces before they implemented the reforms, while Russia wanted them to implement the reforms before they pacified the provinces.¹²⁹ As long as the powers disagreed about the order of implementation, the Turks would continue to believe that the powers would not enforce the agreement.

With the failure of the Andrassy Note, the *Dreikaiserbund* needed to find another solution to the crisis, and between May 11th and May 13th Andrassy, Bismarck, and Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, met in Berlin to develop a new proposal. Initially, Gorchakov proposed that an international commission supported by a foreign military occupation of the two provinces be used to force Turkey to resolve the crisis.¹³⁰ Andrassy found this proposal to be unacceptable and countered with his own proposal—the Berlin Memorandum—which called for a two month armistice during which time the Ottoman Empire would execute a series of reforms. At the same time, the Turks and the insurgents would negotiate an agreement to end the insurrection.¹³¹ Gorchakov accepted this proposal as long as a statement was added to the end of

¹²⁸Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 51-53.

¹²⁹Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 257-259.

¹³⁰Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, p. 295.

¹³¹For a more detailed discussion of the Berlin Memorandum, see *ibid*, pp. 296-298; and Langer, *European Alliances and Alignment*, pp. 81-82.

the Memorandum that threatened Great Power intervention if the armistice did not lead to the resolution of the crisis. Specifically, the statement said

If, however, the armistice expires without the effort of the powers successfully attaining the object they have in view, the three imperial courts are of the opinion that it would be necessary to add to their diplomatic action the sanction of an understanding, with a view to effective measures which would seem to demand in the interest of general peace, in order to arrest the prevailing evil and prevent its development.¹³²

On May 13th, Andrassy, Bismarck, and Gorchakov informed the British, French, and Italian ambassadors of the results of their meeting and asked them to inform their governments of the results.¹³³ They also told the ambassadors that they would like a response by May 15th, the day Gorchakov would be leaving Berlin. Italy and France quickly agreed to support the Berlin Memorandum because they were too weak to do otherwise.¹³⁴ Britain, on the other hand, refused to support the memorandum for several reasons.¹³⁵ Many within the British government believed that Britain was being treated as a third rate power.¹³⁶ The three eastern powers developed the Berlin Memorandum without any input from London, and then demanded that London comment on the proposal within two days, which led Disraeli to express his anger when he said

We have nothing to reply to the Berlin proposition...since England has been treated as if we were Montenegro or Bosnia...Prince Gorchakov and Count Andrassy have informed us that they will remain in Berlin until Monday and that they give us twenty-four hours to formulate England's reply.¹³⁷

Disraeli was not the only British leader angered by this behavior. Lord Carnarvon, a member of the cabinet, was also incensed by the eastern powers, which he expressed when he wrote "[w]ith most of us there was, I think, a desire to resist what we considered insolent dictation...."¹³⁸ In

¹³²Quoted in Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, p. 298.

¹³³Ibid, p. 299.

¹³⁴Ibid, pp. 301-303.

¹³⁵Discussing Britain's attitude towards the Berlin Memorandum are ibid, pp. 305-311; and Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question*, pp. 87-101.

¹³⁶Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question*, pp. 93-94.

¹³⁷Quoted in Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 305-306.

¹³⁸Ibid, p. 308.

addition to their anger over how the Three Emperor's League was treating Britain, British leaders had more substantive criticisms of the Berlin Memorandum.¹³⁹ They believed that the armistice favored the insurgents. More importantly, the last paragraph of the memorandum would limit the effectiveness of the negotiations. This paragraph suggested that the eastern powers would intervene if the negotiations between the Turks and the insurgents failed, thereby reducing the incentive for the insurgents to negotiate in good faith. They would expect the Great Powers to intervene if Turkey did not meet their demands. London expressed both its displeasure over how it was being treated and its belief that the proposals would fail when London informed the eastern powers that Britain would not support the Berlin Memorandum. Derby responded to the powers,

...None of these proposals had previously been discussed with Her Majesty's Government, or, so far as they are aware, with the other Powers' signatories [*sic*] of the Treaty of Paris; and the inconvenience has consequently arisen again, as in the case of Count Andrassy's note of a set of Articles being submitted for acceptance of Great Britain without any opportunity having been afforded for a preliminary consideration of their details by Her Majesty's government, or for the possible objections of Her Majesty's Government to be considered by the three Governments concerned.

Her Majesty's government attach little importance to forms in matters of this kind, and would readily have accepted the present proposals had they appeared to them to afford a feasible plan for pacification of the insurgent districts; but they cannot accept, for the sake of the mere appearance of concert, a scheme in the preparation of which they have not been consulted and which they do not believe to effect the object with which they are informed it has been framed.¹⁴⁰

While Derby was informing the other Powers of Britain's position, London also informed the Porte.¹⁴¹ By so doing, London strengthened Turkey's willingness to oppose the Berlin Memorandum. Turkey believed that without British support for the memorandum the divisions among the other Great Powers would prevent them from taking any serious action to enforce their demands.

Despite Britain's lack of support, the remaining five powers decided to present the Berlin

¹³⁹The substantive criticisms are discussed by Harris, *ibid*, p. 306.

¹⁴⁰Quoted in *ibid*, p. 310.

¹⁴¹*Ibid*, p. 311.

Memorandum to the Porte on May 30th, but events in Constantinople altered their plans.¹⁴² In the spring of 1876, Muslim anger against the Ottoman government, particularly the Sultan, was rising. Muslims were demanding a new government and a new constitution.¹⁴³ On May 29th, this dissatisfaction led to action when Sultan Abdul Aziz was deposed and replaced with his heir, Murad V, who promptly promised a new constitution. Constantinople was promising, on its own initiative, to institute reforms. At the same time, there were rumors that the Turks were going to declare an armistice, which was the centerpiece of the Berlin Memorandum. The domestic turmoil in Constantinople and the changes associated with it convinced the five powers to wait and see what would happen in Turkey before they presented their demands.¹⁴⁴

Not only did Great Power diplomacy fail to resolve the crisis, it also helped prevent the Turks from resolving it.¹⁴⁵ Great Power attention caused Turkey to limit the vigor with which it responded to the insurgency. Constantinople feared that if Turkey responded with too much force, the Great Powers might set aside their differences and unite to coerce the Turks to resolve the dispute. A forceful response, however, was not a guarantee for success. Even if the Turks had used all the means at their disposal they may not have defeated the insurgents; but, they could not defeat them as long as fear of Great Power intervention restrained them.

Great Power diplomacy also provided Serbian nationalism with time to grow and to drive Serbia towards war. Serbian newspapers favored war for nationalist reasons. In April, the Conservative newspaper *Vidov Dan* claimed that “[t]o fulfill our patriotic duty we would be ready to sacrifice everything.”¹⁴⁶ The Liberal newspaper *Zastava* also supported war when it wrote “[i]f Serbia does not utilize the present opportunity to achieve her mission in the Balkans,

¹⁴²Ibid, p. 324.

¹⁴³Discussing the domestic turmoil in Constantinople are, Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 311-357; and Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 325-335.

¹⁴⁴Even after the coup, Gorchakov wanted to present the proposal to the Turks. He had heard that the Turks were planning to propose an armistice and knew that once they proposed it, the Berlin Memorandum would be a moot issue. Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 339-342.

¹⁴⁵Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, p. 79

¹⁴⁶Quoted in MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, p. 78.

she will have lost her future forever.”¹⁴⁷ Finally, *Istok* favored war to achieve nationalist goals even more clearly when it stated “only an aggrandized, powerful Serbia will possess the requirements for independent life. What we want is the unification and liberation of the Serbian people in Turkey into a *single national* state.”¹⁴⁸ The newspapers were not the only forces advocating nationalism. Both the public and political leaders wanted war. In late March, a socialist protest quickly became a call for war, increasing Prince Milan’s fear that he must chose between war and revolution.¹⁴⁹ Finally, when seeking Russian support, Serbia explained its desires by saying that “[w]e only wish to liberate the Serbian areas from Turkey.”¹⁵⁰

During the winter and spring of 1876 Serbia also prepared militarily and diplomatically for war. Belgrade based its military doctrine on the expectation that it could achieve its goals by combining military actions with peasant uprisings.¹⁵¹ As I have already said, the Serbian military was in poor shape and needed significant improvements before going to war. During the winter and spring of 1875/76, Serbia implemented military reforms in order to be better prepared for war. By February 1876,

Militiamen of the first and second classes were ordered to hold themselves ready; reserve lists of able-bodied men were made up; new commissions were granted; a staff was being prepared; horses, weapons, and uniforms were being bought.¹⁵²

Even after these preparations, Serbia’s military was not prepared for war, so on March 12th, Milan and the assembly agreed to increase military preparations.¹⁵³

While Serbia was preparing its military for war, it was also supporting the Slavic peasants in the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan Slavs were important for Serbia’s military preparation because

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸Ibid, pp. 78-79, emphasis in the original.

¹⁴⁹Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 383-384.

¹⁵⁰MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, p. 81.

¹⁵¹Stokes, “Serbian Military Doctrine and the Crisis of 1875-1878,” p. 261.

¹⁵²Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, p. 378.

¹⁵³MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, p. 81.

Serbia counted most on the participation of her oppressed Slav brethren with whose help she hoped to achieve some successes on the battlefield, then through the diplomatic mediation of the tsarist government obtain confirmation of these results.¹⁵⁴

Belgrade, therefore, sent money, weapons, and ammunition to the insurgents in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵⁵ Belgrade also provided Bulgarian nationalists with arms and money.¹⁵⁶ By supporting the insurgents and the Bulgarian nationalists, Serbia expected to have their active support when war came. The rebels in Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue to fight against the Turks, and the Bulgarians would rebel when the Serbo-Turkish War began.

In addition to developing ties with the Slav peasants, Belgrade sought to renew its alliances with the Balkan states, particularly Greece, Romania, and Montenegro.¹⁵⁷ Unfortunately for Serbia, both Greece and Romania refused to support the war effort. Although the Greeks claimed that they were unprepared for war, which was true, they also had grievances against the Balkan Slavs and Serbia.¹⁵⁸ Athens believed that the Balkan Slavs, along with Russia, posed a threat to Greek interests in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵⁹ As for Serbia, the Greeks had not forgiven Belgrade for its failure to support Greece in the 1860s.¹⁶⁰ Bucharest refused to ally with Serbia in 1876 because Romania was militarily unprepared. In addition, Romanians believed

¹⁵⁴Jovan Ristic quoted in MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, p. 102.

¹⁵⁵Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, p. 79.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid*, pp. 56-57.

¹⁵⁷On the Serbian attempts to renew its alliances, see Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, pp. 108-113.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid*, pp. 108-109, pp. 112-113. For a more complete discussion of the Greek situation, see Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, pp. 121-132.

¹⁵⁹In 1870, Russia had supported Bulgaria's desires for a separate Bulgarian national church, known as an exarchate. Creating a Bulgarian exarchate would separate the Bulgarians from the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire that was controlled by the Greeks, creating a threaten to Greece. Interestingly, the threat was political not religious. Since churches were a strong influence in the creation and spread of nationalism in the Balkans, the creation of a Bulgarian church would lead to the growth of Bulgarian nationalism. Any place where Greeks and Bulgarians lived could now become regions of nationalist competition between Greeks and Bulgarians. This problem was greatly exacerbated when the Porte agreed to allow the Bulgarian exarchate in many regions outside of Bulgaria proper. On the creation of the Bulgarian exarchate and the Greco-Bulgarian problems that resulted from it, see Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 371-375.

¹⁶⁰In the 1860s, Greece helped incite rebellions in Crete, Epirus, and Thessaly—all territories of the Ottoman Empire. Athens hoped and expected its Serbian ally to join the Greeks in a war against the Turks, but the Serbs did not.

that they were a different nationality than the Slavs and should not get involved in Slav struggles.¹⁶¹

The alliance with Montenegro was significantly more complicated to negotiate. Between August 1875 and April 1876, Serbia tried to negotiate an alliance with Montenegro, but failed. Russia opposed a war against Turkey and pressured Montenegro to avoid an alliance with Serbia. If Montenegro acted contrary to Russia's wishes and agreed to an alliance, Russia would cut off aid to the Montenegrins. This threat had the desired effect. Prince Nicholas of Montenegro told the Serbian representative that, "[w]e are preparing for war, but I do not believe it will come to that. We cannot do so against Russia's will."¹⁶² Russia's threat was not the only obstacle to a Serbo-Montenegrin alliance. They also had difficulty because both states were competing for leadership of the Balkan Slavs. Each leader worried that the other would somehow use the alliance and the war to increase its prestige and influence with the Balkan Slavs.¹⁶³ Finally, Cetinje believed that Montenegro would be able to achieve some of its goals without going to war. Turkey did not fear a war with Serbia, but feared one with Montenegro. The Porte, therefore, sought to buy Montenegro's neutrality by offering to settle outstanding issues once it resolved the Balkan Crisis. Even though the offer was tempting, Nicholas rejected Turkey's offer because he could not trust the Turks to fulfill their obligations once the Balkan Crisis was resolved.¹⁶⁴

Britain's rejection of the Berlin Memorandum led Nicholas to change his mind and ally with Serbia.¹⁶⁵ Without British diplomatic support, the crisis was likely to continue and public pressure for war would increase, which increased his willingness to negotiate an agreement with Serbia. On June 16th, the two countries signed an agreement in which they agreed to go to war within ten days of the treaty's ratification. In addition, they agreed to divide Bosnia and

¹⁶¹Keith Hitchins, *Rumania: 1866-1947*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 37-38.

¹⁶²MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, p. 79.

¹⁶³MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, pp. 380-381.

¹⁶⁴Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 402-406.

¹⁶⁵MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, p. 89.

Herzegovina between them; if they won the war, Serbia would receive Bosnia and Montenegro would receive Herzegovina.

Still, Serbia would not go to war without Russian support, and in the summer of 1876 Belgrade believed that Russia's attitude towards a Serbo-Turkish War had changed. Prior to the spring of 1876, Russia helped deter Serbia from going to war by withholding its support. In the spring and summer of 1876, Russia's attitude towards a Serbian war began to change. Official Russian policy continued to oppose war, while unofficial Russian support for Serbia increased.¹⁶⁶ Russian army officers traveled to Serbia to help organize and train the Serbian army. In addition, Russia provided Serbia with weapons and ammunition. To the Serbs, this was strong evidence of Russian support, but the strongest evidence came in April 1876 when General Cherniaev, a Russian war hero and leader in the pan-Slav movement, arrived in Serbia.¹⁶⁷ Cherniaev's presence alone led many Serbs to believe that Russia supported Serbia's ambitions, and he did nothing to dissuade them of this belief. Instead of telling them that he was there on his own initiative, he talked as if he had the support of Russia and its government.¹⁶⁸ The Russian consul in Belgrade, Kartsov, stated Cherniaev's effect on Serbia when he wrote

I dare not pass in silence...the disastrous effect this incident [Cherniaev's arrival in Serbia] is producing in the already thin ranks of the partisans. It threatens to entail consequences of greatest gravity by establishing in the minds of the naive Serbian people the erroneous conviction that the moment for action has at last arrived since Russia herself has sent one of her generals to lead them to the field of battle.¹⁶⁹

Further evidence of Cherniaev's effect on Serbia was that the week after his arrival, Milan formed a new, pro-war cabinet led by Ristic and the liberals.¹⁷⁰

Russia could have dissuaded Serbia from the belief that Belgrade had Russian support if St. Petersburg had clearly and definitively told Serbia that Russia opposed war. Unfortunately,

¹⁶⁶Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, p. 125.

¹⁶⁷David MacKenzie, *The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev*, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974).

¹⁶⁸MacKenzie, *The Lion of Tashkent*, p. 127.

¹⁶⁹Quoted on Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, p. 394.

¹⁷⁰MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, p. 87.

Russia's advice was ambiguous.¹⁷¹ One moment Kartsov would tell Prince Milan that Russia opposed war, and the next moment he would tell the Prince to prepare for war.¹⁷² Russia also demonstrated the ambiguity of its position in March when Prince Milan explicitly asked whether Russia supported Austria's opposition to a Serbo-Turkish War. Instead of expressing its opinion, St. Petersburg did not respond to Milan's query.¹⁷³ By failing to clearly state its position, Russia allowed Milan to interpret Russian actions any way he wanted, and he chose to believe that Russia supported Serbia's nationalist aspirations.

Russia's schizophrenic behavior was not caused by Kartsov but by divisions between slavophiles and Europeanists within Russia. When he communicated Russia's advice to the Serbian government, he was only relaying orders from Russian leaders. For example, in January 1876, Giers wrote to Kartsov and told him that both Alexander II and Gorchakov wanted peace, but that Serbia should prepare for war.¹⁷⁴ In April, Gorchakov explicitly recognized the divisions within the Russian government when he conveyed the tsar's orders that Kartsov sever all contact with Cherniaev. Nonetheless, he also told Kartsov, "[d]espite all this, do not forget that although the tsar is opposed to war, his son, the heir to the throne, stands at the head of the [Slav] movement."¹⁷⁵

The final factor that led Serbia to declare war on Turkey was the instability within the Ottoman Empire. At the end of May, reformists within the Ottoman Empire deposed the Sultan. Then, in June, Bulgaria revolted against Turkish rule. These events convinced Serbian leaders that the Ottoman Empire was too weak to defeat the Serbian military.¹⁷⁶ If the Ottomans were unable to maintain order within their empire, they would be unable to defeat a military attack. In

¹⁷¹MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, pp. 92-99 and Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 177-188.

¹⁷²Ibid, p. 118 and Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 180.

¹⁷³Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 385-387 and MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, pp. 81-83.

¹⁷⁴Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, p. 118.

¹⁷⁵Quoted in MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, p. 93.

¹⁷⁶Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 73-74.

addition, the Bulgarian insurrection convinced the Serbs that the Bulgarian peasants would actively support the Serbian war efforts.

5.2.6 Serbia's Miscalculations

When Serbia attacked Turkey, the Serbs expected to defeat the Turks for two reasons. First, they expected the Slav peasants in the Ottoman Empire—particularly in Bulgaria—to revolt against Ottoman rule and support the Serbian war effort. Second, they expected Russia to provide financial, diplomatic and military support. Unfortunately for Serbia, they overestimated the level of support they would receive both from the Slav peasants of the Ottoman Empire and from Russia. If Serbia had not made these miscalculations, Belgrade might have avoided a war against the Turks.

Serbia based its military doctrine on a combination of Serbian military action and Balkan uprisings leading to victory. Thus, during the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876, Serbia expected the Bulgarian peasants to revolt and help defeat the Ottoman forces. This expectation led Belgrade to undertake two tasks. First, Serbia helped arm the Bulgarian peasants and nationalists so that they could help fight the Turks. Second, the main Serbian military offensive focused in Bulgaria instead of Bosnia.¹⁷⁷

Unfortunately for the Serbs, the war taught them that they had greatly overestimated Bulgarian support. Only 3,000 Bulgarians fought for Serbia during the war, and no peasant uprising took place.¹⁷⁸ In fact, some Bulgarians gave the weapons they had received from Serbia to Ottoman officials. The failure of the Bulgarians to support the Serbian war effort was obviously unexpected. Serbia's Minister of War expressed this opinion when he said that "It is especially disconcerting to our troops that there is no uprising in Bulgaria."¹⁷⁹ Jovan Ristic also expressed Serbia's surprise at this failure when he said

Serbia counted most on the participation of her oppressed Slav brethren with whose help she hoped to achieve some successes on the battlefield, then through diplomatic mediation of the tsarist Russian government obtain confirmation of these results. *But the participation of the Christians, particularly of the Bulgarians, failed in a manner which*

¹⁷⁷Stokes, "Serbian Military Doctrine and the Crisis of 1875-1878", p. 269.

¹⁷⁸Stokes, *Politics as Development*, pp. 113-114.

¹⁷⁹Quoted in Stokes, *Politics as Development*, p. 114.

*amazed everyone.*¹⁸⁰

Serbia also overestimated the support it would receive from Russia.¹⁸¹ Belgrade expected Russia to provide weapons, money, and, eventually, a great power ally to help fight against the Turks. Alexander, however, was upset that Serbia declared war against his advice and refused to provide official aid to the Serbs. Nonetheless, Russia supported Serbia in other ways. For example, St. Petersburg convinced the other Great Powers not to intervene in the war. Since many Russian pan-Slav believed that Serbia would win a local war, they expected this support to be sufficient to ensure a Serbian victory.¹⁸² Russians also provided limited, unofficial aid in the form of money and officers. Unfortunately, both of these were provided in limited supply. Instead of the 3.75 million rubles in financial aid that was expected, Serbia only received 1 million rubles,¹⁸³ most of which went to support the Russian volunteers who joined the Serbian war effort.¹⁸⁴ Not only were these volunteers expensive, but they were few and often inept. By the end of the war, only 2,700 Russian volunteers arrived in Serbia, most of whom arrived after Serbia had asked Turkey for an armistice.¹⁸⁵ Those volunteers who arrived in time to participate in the war were relatively inept and developed a condescending attitude towards the Serbian military.

After suffering great hardships, the Serbs had to sue for peace. Out of a population of 1.3 million, Serbia suffered 15,000 casualties and 200,000 homeless.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, Serbia had borne almost the entire economic costs of the war. In the end, the Great Powers negotiated an armistice, thereby saving Serbia from being totally overrun by Ottoman forces.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁰Quoted in MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, p. 102. Emphasis in original.

¹⁸¹See MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, pp. 105-120; and Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 91-93.

¹⁸²MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, pp. 109-111.

¹⁸³Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, p. 93.

¹⁸⁴MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, pp. 120-121.

¹⁸⁵Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 92-93.

¹⁸⁶Petrovich, *A History of Serbia*, p. 389.

¹⁸⁷Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 89-91.

5.3 THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1877-78

Events in the Balkans in the mid-1870s, which, as previously discussed, partly resulted from the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, put St. Petersburg in a very difficult position. The defeats and sufferings inflicted on its co-religionists were a threat both to Russia's prestige and to Russia's interests. Initially, because of its weakness and lack of preparation, Russia tried to resolve the problem diplomatically by bringing the Great Powers together at Constantinople to force Turkey to accede to their terms. This attempt at diplomacy failed when the Great Powers were unable to present the Porte with a united front. In particular, divisions within the British government gave the Turks hope that Britain would prevent the Great Powers from imposing its terms on the Empire. The diplomatic failure forced Russia to try to achieve its goals by other means. Before St. Petersburg could act, it needed to prevent the other Great Powers from intervening as they had done during the Crimean War. St. Petersburg, therefore, negotiated an agreement with Austria to obtain Austrian neutrality in the event of a Russo-Turkish War. Finally, in April 1877, Russia was prepared for war. Austria had agreed to remain neutral, and Russian leaders believed that their forces would quickly and decisively defeat the Turks. Unfortunately for Russia, they had miscalculated. After some initial successes, Turkish forces slowed the Russian advance. To help renew its advance, Russia asked the Balkan states to enter the fray. Finally, in January 1878, Russia achieved victory with the help of its Romanian ally.

TABLE 5-3: predictions
The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8

	P1: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with imperial disintegration?	P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms of the intervening phenomena?
Rules of the Game	<p>Yes. New issues developed from the decline of the Ottoman Empire and its mistreatment of the Bosnians and the Bulgarians. In particular, there was the question of what new states would form in the Balkans. This led Russia and Austria to negotiate the Reichstadt Agreement which sets the terms for a post-imperial order.</p>	<p>Yes. Problems in the Balkans made these issues a pressing problem.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>
Power	<p>Yes. Turkey's mistreatment of the Balkan Slavs and the defeat of Serbia harmed Russia's prestige. Furthermore, divisions among the Great Powers limited Constantinople's willingness to compromise. Also, Russia was able to gain Austria's neutrality, thereby guaranteeing no repeat of the Crimean alliance.</p>	<p>Yes. The threat to Russia's prestige was greater than normal and Russia's "alliance" with Austria was a rare occurrence.</p>	<p>Yes. After meeting with the Tsar, a British diplomat claimed that all Russia's prestige demanded were substantive guarantees protecting the Balkan Slavs. Ignatiev, the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, acknowledged that Turkey would not cave to the Powers terms unless the Powers were united, and the British ambassador to Turkey let the Turks know that England would not support any coercive measures against Turkey.</p>
Uncertainty	<p>Yes. It is clear that Russia under-estimated the Turkish military capabilities as demonstrated by its rejection of Balkan military support.</p>	<p>It is difficult to determine whether this underestimation was greater than normal.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>
Nationalism	<p>No. Nationalism was not an issue in this case.</p>	<p>No. Nationalism was not an issue in this case.</p>	<p>No. The evidence does not suggest that the elite did discuss nationalism as a cause of this war.</p>
Domestic Instability	<p>Yes. Sultan Abdul Hamid feared that he would be overthrown.</p>	<p>It is unclear whether this fear was unusually strong.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>

TABLE 5-3: predictions
The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 (continued)

	P4: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with war and crises?	P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P6: Did the elite explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena caused the wars and crises?
Rules of the game	Russia and Austria negotiated an agreement that satisfied Austria and led to Austro-Russian peace.	As a result of the Austro-Russian agreement, the rules were not as ambiguous or unsettled as normally.	The agreement was oral and no text of it exists.
Power Shifts	Yes. Once Russia gained Austrian neutrality, St. Petersburg was assured that no Great Power coalition would intervene. This meant that Russia had a power advantage against Turkey, leading St. Petersburg to believe that the war would be short and cheap.	It is not clear that the power shift at this time was qualitatively or quantitatively greater than other power shifts.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Miscalculation	Yes. Russia believed it had a significant power advantage that would lead to a cheap, quick victory.	Yes. Russia's belief in a quick victory was greater than normal. This belief was a function of Russia's belief in its power advantage over Turkey and the lack of Great Power opposition.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Nationalism	No. Nationalism was not an issue in this case.	No. Nationalism was not an issue in this case.	No. The evidence does not suggest that the elite did discuss nationalism as a cause of this war.
Domestic Instability	Yes. The Sultan feared he would be overthrown and, partly for this reason, was unable to oppose public demands for war.	Yes. Public pressure for war was stronger than usual.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.

The Russo-Turkish War provides evidence to support the power arguments of this dissertation.¹⁸⁸ (See Table 5-1 for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the case and the argument's predictions.) Russia feared the Great Powers might unite against it in a repeat of Crimean alliance. To forestall this outcome, St. Petersburg negotiated an agreement with Austria that provided for Austria's neutrality. Once this agreement was reached, St. Petersburg believed that the balance of power would favor Russia. The importance of this agreement is clearly demonstrated by Russia's worries about united Great Power opposition, by the excessively generous terms St. Petersburg gave Vienna in exchange for Austrian neutrality, and by the timing of the war, which occurred after the agreement was reached. Russia's expectations of a quick, cheap victory over Turkey was demonstrated by Russia's rejection of all support from the Balkan allies. If St. Petersburg thought that the balance of power was even, Russia would have accepted their support.

The evidence also makes it clear that Russia optimistically miscalculated. Despite its initial successes, the Russian military was unexpectedly stopped at the Ottoman fortress of Plevna. Demonstrating that this outcome was a surprise was St. Petersburg's change in attitude towards the Balkan states. Once its forces were stopped, Russia asked the Balkan states to enter the war. Unfortunately, the evidence fails to explain why Russia miscalculated. Obviously, Russian leaders underestimated the strength of the Turkish military, as this dissertation would predict. But, the evidence does not support any explanation for this miscalculation. It could have resulted from variables associated with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, or it could have resulted from something endemic to Russia and totally unrelated to the empire's disintegration.

This case is organized in five parts. Section 5.3.1 explains how the recent events associated with the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire threatened Russia's interests. Section 5.3.2 discusses the diplomatic attempts to resolve the problem and explains how both divisions among and within the Great Powers, namely Britain, and domestic instability in Turkey contributed to the failure of diplomacy. Section 5.3.3 discusses Russia's negotiations with Austria and explains how Russia gained Austria's neutrality. Section 5.3.4 explains why Russia needed a Romanian

¹⁸⁸The Russo-Turkish case provides the weakest support for this dissertation's argument. Like the Balkans in the 1860s, the Russo-Turkish War has been studied very little, limiting the information available with which to draw lessons. In addition, most literature related to this case actually addresses the war and not the issues leading up to the war.

alliance and why, despite problems, Romania agreed to it. The final section, 5.3.5, discusses the Russo-Turkish war in order to demonstrate that Russia optimistically miscalculated its relative power.

5.3.1 Russian Interests in the Balkans

Events in the Balkans created pressure for Russia to intervene. As has already been stated, the insurrections in Bosnia and Herzegovina pitted the Christians in these two provinces against Muslim, Turkish authorities. Then, in May 1876, Bulgarians revolted against Turkish rule, leading the Muslims in the region to violently squash the Bulgarian revolt. In quashing the rebellion, Turkish atrocities against the Bulgarians inflamed European opinion against the Turks. Finally, the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 led to the defeat of the Serbian army and the occupation of Serbian territory by Ottoman forces.

These events put pressure on the Russian government to respond against the Turks. Pan-Slavs within Russia wanted to free the Balkan Slavs from Turkish control and, in the process, create Russian satellite states. To accomplish these goals, many Russians sent money to the Serbs to help them prosecute the Serbo-Turkish War. In addition, thousands of Russians traveled to Serbia to help fight against the Turks and free Serbia. While the Russian government did not officially intervene to support the Serbs, many pan-Slavs expected Russia to aid Serbia. When Serbia started to suffer serious reverses they more strenuously demanded that the Tsar intervene.¹⁸⁹ Finally, in late 1876, pan-Slav pressure forced Russia to intervene. Tsar Alexander II demanded that Turkey agree to an armistice with Serbia, or Russia would militarily intervene in support of the Serbs.¹⁹⁰

The Russian government also felt pressured to intervene in order to defend its prestige. As the largest Slav and Orthodox state in Europe, Russia was considered to be the protector of the Orthodox Slavs both by the Balkan Christians and by the European Great Powers. Any reverses

¹⁸⁹Scholars disagree as to how great an influence pan-Slavism was on Alexander II's decisions. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 203 correctly says that the Russian government was strong enough to resist the domestic Slav pressure for war. Public opinion, however, was not the only source of pan-Slav pressure. Key members of the government, such as Count Ignatiev and Grand Duke Nicholas, also favored Russian intervention to support the Balkan Slavs, and their positions provided them with access to the Tsar, *ibid*, pp. 274-275.

¹⁹⁰Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 406.

suffered by the Balkan Christians reflected unfavorably on Russia.¹⁹¹ The Christians in the Balkans might then turn away from Russia and seek the support of some other Great Power, probably Austria-Hungary. The Bulgarian atrocities and Serbia's defeat reduced Russia's prestige with the Balkan people, which could become permanent if Russia did not act in support of its Balkan allies.

Russian prestige was further engaged in the Balkans by the support Russians provided to the Slavs during the Serbo-Turkish War.¹⁹² Since some Russians fought with the Serbs against the Turks and others supported the Slavs with money, Russian prestige was clearly engaged. If the Serbo-Turkish War ended without reducing the Turkish burden on the Balkans, it would appear to some that the Ottoman Empire had defeated Russia.

St. Petersburg, therefore, needed to resolve the crisis in order to defend its interests and prestige. A satisfactory resolution to the crisis required that the security of the Balkan Christians be guaranteed, not with vague promises, but with substantive actions. Lord Augustus Loftus of Britain stated it clearly after meeting with the Tsar when he said "[a]ll he [the Tsar] required was the amelioration of the position of the Christians, but not resting on Turkish promises, but on real efficient guarantees."¹⁹³ War, however, was not the only solution to Russia's problem. In fact, Russia preferred to avoid war.

5.3.2 Russian Diplomacy and Its Failure

By November 1876, the pressure for war was receding. In October, Russia had issued an ultimatum to Turkey, demanding that the Turks agree to an armistice with Serbia. If Constantinople rejected the armistice, Russia would sever diplomatic relations with Turkey—a prelude to war. Turkey promptly agreed to the Russian demand. By forcing an armistice, St. Petersburg provided the south Slavs with some level of security, thereby reducing pan-Slav demands for immediate intervention.¹⁹⁴

At this time, St. Petersburg wished to avoid war because Russia was neither economically

¹⁹¹Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, p. 145.

¹⁹²MacKenzie, *Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*, pp. 123-126.

¹⁹³Quoted in R.W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question*, p. 100.

¹⁹⁴Rupp, *Wavering Friendship*, pp. 260-1.

nor diplomatically prepared for war. Since the Crimean War, Russia had been economically weak and had spent the previous twenty years trying to recover.¹⁹⁵ This recovery, however, was tenuous, and Mikhail Reutern, the Russian finance minister, believed that war would ruin it.¹⁹⁶ Consequently, he advised Alexander to avoid war at this time.

Diplomatically, St. Petersburg was also unprepared. The Crimean War had demonstrated that Russia could not act against the combined interests of the Great Powers. Even though the Great Powers did not support Turkey as strongly as they had in the 1850s, they still had interests within the Ottoman sphere of influence that a Russo-Turkish war would endanger. Vienna feared that war would increase Russian and Slav influence in the Western Balkans. If this occurred, Austria would be encircled by Russia and Russia's allies. Furthermore, the growth of Slav influence in the Balkans or the creation of a large Slav state would create a magnet for the Slavs who lived in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and wanted either more political power or their freedom. Germany, on the other hand, had no direct interests in the Balkans. Berlin only wished to maintain its current status. To maintain Germany's security, Berlin needed a strong Austrian ally. This meant that Germany did not oppose a Russo-Turkish war, but, at the same time, could not support Russia against Austria if Austria decided to intervene to protect its interests. Bismarck expressed this opinion when he wrote "a war between Russia and Austria is for us and our future an extraordinarily difficult and dangerous dilemma: and we cannot be expected to make it easier so long as it is not absolutely inevitable." He, therefore, advised Russia to reach an agreement with Austria before declaring war. Finally, St. Petersburg had to confront London's concerns. While the atrocities in Bulgaria had reduced London's support for Constantinople, Britain still had interests in the Ottoman Empire that London needed to defend. In particular, London could not allow Russia to control Constantinople or Egypt. Since a Russian attack against Turkey might threaten these interests, St. Petersburg could not discount the possibility that Britain would oppose Russia.¹⁹⁷

Still, Russia needed to act. St. Petersburg could not allow the situation in the Balkans to

¹⁹⁵Ibid, p. 239.

¹⁹⁶Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 218-223, 230-231.

¹⁹⁷Discussing Britain's domestic situation and interests in the Near East is Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question*.

remain as it was. If St. Petersburg continued to wait for Turkey to change its behavior or for the other Great Powers to act, Russia would lose face with the Balkan Christians. In November 1876, Russia had put its prestige further on the line when it mobilized four army corps.¹⁹⁸ By mobilizing these troops, Russia was announcing to the Great Powers, to the Turks, and to the Balkan Christians, that its interests were threatened by Turkish actions. If Russia demobilized its troops without Constantinople changing its behavior, Russian prestige would suffer a serious blow.

Mobilizing its troops also made time an important factor. Mobilizing and maintaining four army corps was expensive. In Russia's current financial situation, it could not keep these troops mobilized indefinitely. But, if Russia demobilized these troops without reaching a satisfactory resolution to the crisis, St. Petersburg would lose prestige. This situation presented Russia with two options, either quickly resolve the crisis diplomatically or negotiate with the Great Powers in order to gain their support—or at least their neutrality—in the event of a Russo-Turkish war.

Tsar Alexander II, therefore, agreed to a British proposal to organize a conference in Constantinople to resolve the Balkan crisis.¹⁹⁹ Alexander recognized that the conference would provide Russia with two opportunities. First, the conference would present a united, Great Power front. He believed that if the Great Powers were united, the Turks would make significant concessions, which, in turn, would allow Russia to declare victory. Ignatiev expressed this opinion well when he said “[the Turks] will yield only if all hope of discord between the Powers disappears.”²⁰⁰ On the other hand, if the Porte rejected the demands of the Great Powers, St. Petersburg would be in a stronger position to declare war against Turkey because it could justify its actions as being in the interest of all of Europe.²⁰¹ Second, the conference would provide Russia with the time to negotiate for German and Austrian support, or neutrality, in the event of a Russo-Turkish war. By reaching an agreement with these powers, Russia would be able to deal with Turkey without

¹⁹⁸Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 231.

¹⁹⁹The British government suggested the conference because London feared that Russia was going to invade the Ottoman Empire. Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 114-115. The conference would provide the opportunity to resolve the crisis increasing the threat to Britain's interests in the region.

²⁰⁰Quoted in Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, p. 262.

²⁰¹Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 247.

fear of an opposing Great Power alliance.

Prior to the Constantinople Conference, representatives of the Great Powers met to negotiate the demands they would present to Turkey.²⁰² They hoped that this meeting would allow them to accomplish two goals. First, they hoped to present the Turks with a united front. In the past, Turkey had used divisions among the Great Powers to delay and to evade reforms. By presenting the Turks with a set of demands upon which they all agreed, the Great Powers hoped they would be able to convince the Porte to implement real, substantive reforms. Second, negotiating the demands before the conference allowed each Great Power to protect its interests. Vienna, for example, opposed the creation of a large Slav state and autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and used this meeting to defend its interests.

Russia arrived at this meeting with two sets of proposals—a maximum and a minimum set of demands.²⁰³ Russia's main goal was to gain some measure of protection for the Christians in the Balkans, particularly the Bulgarians. Both sets of proposals would provide Bulgaria with a sufficient degree of autonomy to achieve this goal. In addition, Russia sought to arrange a peaceful resolution to the problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to provide Serbia and Montenegro with additional territory as a reward for their efforts.

At the pre-Conference meeting, Russia achieved many of its goals. Ignatiev, who chaired the conference and set its agenda, focused the discussion on the creation of a large Bulgaria which included a large part of Macedonia.²⁰⁴ Britain and Austria, however, objected to this proposal, but for different reasons. Britain believed that a large Bulgaria would lead to the end of Turkey's independence because it would probably be a Russian satellite and provide Russia with access to key strategic regions. Austria, on the other hand, opposed any large, Slav state that could be a magnet for its Slavic minorities. Instead, the participants agreed to divide Bulgaria into two parts—a small Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia—and to exclude any Macedonian territory from the settlement.²⁰⁵ As

²⁰²Langer, *European Alliances and Alignment*, pp. 105-107.

²⁰³Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 234-236.

²⁰⁴Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 130-131; and Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 240-243.

²⁰⁵Eastern Rumelia, which is currently part of Bulgaria, was a large, Bulgarian-populated territory to the south and south-east of Bulgaria proper.

for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the delegates agreed to create a united province out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be governed by a Vali²⁰⁶ nominated by the Ottoman government and approved by the powers. In addition, the Powers agreed to form a committee to oversee Turkish reforms in the region.²⁰⁷ Ignatiev also proposed giving Serbia and Montenegro additional territory. The Powers were willing to agree to the territorial changes that he proposed except for the provision to give Montenegro a port on the Adriatic Sea, which both Austria and Italy opposed. All in all, Russia left the meeting pleased with the results. Even though Russia did not achieve all its goals, it achieved most of them. More importantly, the Powers were united in their demands against the Turks.

On December 23rd, the Constantinople Conference began with the Powers informing the Turks of their proposal. This same day, however, the Turks preempted the Great Powers by announcing that they would adopt a new constitution that would significantly reform the Ottoman Empire.²⁰⁸ The constitution provided for an elected assembly and various forms of Christian-Muslim equality. By creating and promulgating the constitution at this time the Porte hoped to remove the impetus for Great Power interference in Turkish affairs. Turkey, like all states, did not want others to interfere in its internal affairs. Since the Powers were demanding that Constantinople implement reforms that would protect the Ottoman Christians and the new Ottoman constitution provided these reforms, Great Power interference was unnecessary to achieve these goals. After announcing the adoption of a new constitution, the Turks declared the conference unnecessary and the proposals of the Powers moot.

Why were the Ottomans willing to reject the demands of the Great Powers, particularly when confronted with a united front? First, the Turks did not believe that the Great Powers were united. Specifically, divisions among British leaders led the Turks to believe that London would support

²⁰⁶A *Vali* was a type of provincial governor in the Ottoman Empire.

²⁰⁷Among the reforms were the creation of an elected assembly, a militia composed of Christians and Muslims, and a governor-general appointed by the Porte and approved by the Powers.

²⁰⁸For a detailed discussion of the new constitution and the process that led to it, see Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 358-408. Also useful is Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, second edition, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 160-169.

them, although they did not believe that Britain would not fight with them against Russia.²⁰⁹ When Lord Salisbury arrived in Constantinople for the conference he had informed the Porte that if the Turkish government rejected the proposals, Turkey could not count on Britain's support. This threat, however, was counterbalanced by Sir Henry Elliot, the British ambassador to Constantinople, and Lord Derby, the British Foreign Minister. Elliot believed that Britain had to support Turkey to balance against the Russian threat. In a letter, he wrote.

Conduct here has never been guided by sentimental affection for them [the Turks], but by a firm determination to uphold the interests of Great Britain to the utmost of my power; and that those interests are deeply engaged in preventing the disruption of the Turkish Empire is a conviction which I share with the most eminent statesmen who have directed our foreign policy.... We have been upholding what we know to be a semi-civilized nation, liable under certain circumstances to be carried into fearful excesses; but the fact of this having been just now strikingly brought home to us all cannot be sufficient reasons for abandoning a policy which is the only one that can be followed with due regard for our own interests.²¹⁰

Not only did he express this view to the British government, but he also expressed it to the Porte. Derby's support was equally clear. The day before the conference began he informed the Turks that "England would not 'assent to or assist in coercive measures against Turkey,'"²¹¹ This information led the Turks to believe that they had Britain's support and that they need not fear Great Power pressure.²¹²

Second, the domestic situation supported resistance by the Ottoman government. Sultan Abdul Hamid was a weak, paranoid leader who feared that he might be overthrown.²¹³ The current crisis caused this fear to increase. Ever since the Russian ultimatum demanding that Turkey accept an armistice with Serbia, popular opinion favoring war had been growing.²¹⁴ Popular support for war increased the evening after the Constitution of 1876 was promulgated when young liberals, soldiers,

²⁰⁹Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 133-135.

²¹⁰Quoted in Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 106-107.

²¹¹Quoted in Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, p. 134.

²¹²Ibid, p. 134-135.

²¹³Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 199), pp. 87-88.

²¹⁴Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 405-406 and Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 243.

students, and bankers marched in support of the government.²¹⁵ It is important to note that this support was not limited to Turks and Muslims, but also including the leaders of the Greek and Armenian millets.²¹⁶

5.3.3 Russia and the Great Powers

Russia could not proceed without Great Power support, and the Constantinople Conference gave St. Petersburg the opportunity to seek Great Power allies in the event that the conference failed and Russia needed to go to war with Turkey. Russia had a choice of three allies—Austria, Britain, and Germany.²¹⁷ Britain did not make a good ally for two reasons. First, as a naval power, Britain posed less of a threat to the Russian army. For its military to be a significant barrier to Russian aspirations in Eastern Europe, Britain needed to have a continental ally to provide ground forces.²¹⁸ Second, Russia believed that Britain would not provide Turkey with military support. Many Brits believed that the Ottoman Empire could not survive much longer. Even if Turkey could, they believed that its mistreatment of the Ottoman Christians justified its removal from Europe.²¹⁹ Germany, unlike Britain, could be both militarily and diplomatically useful. Militarily, it was a continental power that could pose a threat to the Russian army. Germany could also use its military to threaten Austria and prevent Austria from intervening in a Russo-Turkish War. Diplomatically, Bismarck held great influence with Count Andrassy, the Austrian Foreign Minister. He could use this influence to convince Count Andrassy to agree to terms that would either keep Austria out of a Russo-Turkish War or lead Austria to participate in such a war with Russia. Bismarck, however, would not ally with Russia. Germany had no Balkan interests that would justify participating in a war. Also, he believed that German security required a strong Austria, and opposed any actions that might significantly weaken Austria.

²¹⁵Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 383-384.

²¹⁶*Ibid.*

²¹⁷France was not a viable ally for Russia. Even though France was geographically well-situated to threaten Austria and Germany if they intervened in a war, the French military was still weak from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

²¹⁸Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 206.

²¹⁹Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 274.

Russia, therefore, had to seek an alliance with Austria. On October 10, 1876, Alexander sent a letter to Francis Joseph in which he offered to enter into secret negotiations with Austria in order to conclude a treaty between the two states in which they would agree on what actions to take and on the divisions of the spoils in the event of a war against Turkey.²²⁰ Alexander hoped Austria would agree to join the Russian war effort. On October 29th Alexander received Austria's reply in which Austria refused to join Russia in a war, but agreed to negotiate a secret treaty.²²¹

In November, the two sides began to negotiate political and military agreements. The basis of these agreements was the Reichstadt Agreement of July 1876 in which Austria and Russia had agreed how the spoils of the Serbo-Turkish War would be divided. Unfortunately, this was an oral agreement. They had not written down the terms to which they had agreed. Consequently, when the negotiators met in November, they learned that their interpretations of Austria's territorial gains differed.²²² Vienna claimed that they had agreed to give Austria all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Russia claimed that the agreement gave Austria only a small part of these territories. This put St. Petersburg in a bind. Russia needed to reach an agreement with Austria in order to be free to act against the Ottoman Empire if war became necessary. Therefore, Russia was willing to agree to Austria's terms.

By the middle of March 1877, they had completed negotiations on both a political and a military convention. In the military convention, which was signed on January 15, 1877, Austria agreed to remain neutral and to try to prevent the other Great Powers from intervening in a Russo-Turkish war. Austria also agreed not to extend its military influence into Romania, Serbia, Herzegovina, or Montenegro. In exchange, Russia agreed to keep its military out of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. The political convention, which was signed on March 18th, defined the territorial adjustments that would result from a Russian victory, which were, essentially, the same as the Austrian version of the Reichstadt Agreement. Austria would receive Bosnia and

²²⁰Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 210.

²²¹*Ibid*, pp. 210, 221.

²²²See Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, pp. 275-307; *idem*, "The Reichstadt Agreement," *American Historical Review*, 30 (April 1925), pp. 503-510; Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 147-150; and Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 284-288. For the text of the two interpretations, see M.S. Anderson, editor, *The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 89-92.

Herzegovina, except for a small piece of territory between Serbia and Montenegro. In addition, Austria demanded that no large state would be formed in the Balkans. The only territory that Russia would receive was to be Bessarabia, which had been lost after the Crimean War. The agreement also provided for other states and territories to benefit from a Russian victory. Bulgaria, Albania, and Rumelia might gain their independence, and Greece would be allowed to annex Thessaly, part of Epirus, and Crete.

Even though these terms were unfavorable to Russia, St. Petersburg had no choice but to accept them. The terms were unfavorable because Austria gained important territorial concessions without providing any military support. Furthermore, Austria had been able to limit the territorial and political gains that Russia could obtain from a war. All that was required of Austria was its neutrality and diplomatic support. Because of the disagreeable nature of these terms, St. Petersburg continued to search for a diplomatic solution to its Balkan problems. Unfortunately, none of the Great Powers were willing to act in any significant way to resolve the crisis.²²³ St. Petersburg, therefore, had to accept Vienna's demands because Russia could not go to war against the Ottoman Empire without Austria's support.

5.3.4 Russia and Its Romanian Alliance

In addition to the Austrian alliance, Russia needed to reach an agreement with Romania.²²⁴ The Austrian alliance provided Russia with Great Power support and helped to secure the lines of supply from attack. To attack the Ottoman Empire, however, Russian troops and supplies would have to cross Romanian territory in order to reach the Ottoman forces and march towards Constantinople. If Bucharest opposed Russia, Romania could threaten Russia's supply lines. Russia would then have to divert troops from the offensive against Turkey to protect its flanks.

Romania knew that Russia would need an alliance, but was of two minds on how to respond when negotiations began. Prince Charles of Romania wanted to gain Romania's independence from

²²³ At the end of March, Russia and England negotiated the London Protocol, which demanded that the Turks reduce the burden on the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. This agreement, however, had no bite. If Turkey rejected it, the Great Powers were supposed to continue negotiations. On the London Protocol see pp. Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question*, 254-273; and Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 260-270.

²²⁴ On Romania and the Russo-Turkish War, see Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State 1821-1878*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 241-276; and Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 290-301. Also useful is Hitchins, *Rumania 1866-1947*, pp. 37-54.

the Ottoman Empire, and Russian support was essential to achieve this goal. Even if Romania gained its independence, Bucharest would have difficulty keeping it, because Austria and Germany would pose a serious threat. Bratianu, a Romanian minister, believed that "Russia alone is able to assure the Romanian nationality against an absorption that threatens it from the side of the Germans."²²⁵ On the other hand, St. Petersburg made no secret that Russia wanted Bessarabia, which had been incorporated into Romania as part of the Peace of Paris ending the Crimean War. Bucharest, however, wanted to keep all of its territory, and, if it allied with Russia, Romania would probably lose Bessarabia. In addition, history caused Romania to fear that it would be politically dominated as had occurred during past Russian occupation.²²⁶

In this situation, Bucharest had three options: seek Great Power support against Russian attempts to take Bessarabia; ally with the Ottoman Empire; or negotiate with Russia and try to gain Russian guarantees that Romania's territorial integrity would be respected. Unfortunately for Romania, the Great Powers were unwilling to provide any support. In October and November 1876, Romania asked the other Great Powers to guarantee Romania's neutrality in the event of a Russo-Turkish War.²²⁷ While they talked a good game, none of them would offer any substantive guarantees. At the Constantinople Conference, Romania again tried to gain Great Power support, and, again, was rebuffed.²²⁸ The Great Powers were focused on resolving the current crisis, and did not want to complicate matters further by adding another issue to their agenda.

An alliance with the Ottoman Empire was even less useful.²²⁹ Since the Porte would not grant Romania its independence, Constantinople had nothing to offer. Furthermore, if Romania allied with the Turks and a Russo-Turkish war ensued, the combatants would end up doing battle on Romanian territory, thus imposing the costs of the war on Romania.

The only option that remained was for Romania to negotiate an alliance with Russia and try

²²⁵Quoted in Jelavich, *Russia and the formation of the Romanian national state*, p. 239.

²²⁶Ibid, p. 241.

²²⁷Ibid, pp. 244-245.

²²⁸Ibid, pp. 249-250.

²²⁹Ibid, pp. 248-249, 253-254.

to gain territorial guarantees. Romania's negotiators attempted to convince Russia to protect Romania's territorial integrity, but failed. As one of the negotiators said

It [the loss of Bessarabia] is the first time since Russia has existed that she has been obliged to cede a part, even a small fragment of territory that she has conquered by her arms. On these grounds Alexander II would consider it a pious duty toward his father to return to the Russia of Nicholas I what the Treaty of Paris made us lose.²³⁰

Russia met Romanian attempts with threats. They told Bucharest that if Romania refused Russia's requests, the war would be fought on Romanian soil. Finally, in early April 1877, Prince Charles of Romania admitted that he must ally with the stronger power, Russia, in order to end his country's status as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, and on April 16, an agreement was signed.²³¹

5.3.5 Russia's Declaration of War and Optimistic Miscalculations

On April 24, 1877, St. Petersburg declared war on the Ottoman Empire in the belief that Russia would achieve a quick, painless victory.²³² Once Turkey lost its first battle, Russia expected the Porte to sue for peace. This optimism was clearly demonstrated by the fact that Russia began the war with approximately the same number of troops as the Turks.²³³ Russia also demonstrated its optimism when St. Petersburg discouraged the other Balkan states from joining the war against Turkey. Romania, Greece, and Serbia offered to join Russia against the Turks.²³⁴ Russia, however, believed that the war would be short, and their help would be unnecessary. In addition, if St. Petersburg accepted their support against the Turks, the interests and demands of the Balkan states would constrain St. Petersburg when peace was made. It was easier for Russia to refuse their support and not be indebted to any more allies.

Russia's expectations, however, were overly optimistic. The initial attacks were successful, but once the Russian forces reached the Ottoman fortress at Plevna the attack stopped. They were

²³⁰Quoted in *ibid*, p. 244.

²³¹*Ibid*, pp. 255-256.

²³²Langer, *European Alliances and Alignment*, pp. 121-122; and Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkan Crisis*, pp. 151-152.

²³³Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 302-303. Despite equality in the number of troops, Russia's troops were qualitatively better than Turkey's.

²³⁴*Ibid*. Discussing Russia's attitudes toward Serbian military support is MacKenzie, *The Serbs*, pp. 198-209.

unable to take the fortress quickly and were forced to lay siege to it. This led the Tsar to reverse his previous decision and ask the Balkan states to enter the war. Serbia and Greece now questioned whether Russia would be able to achieve the decisive victory previously expected and decided to remain at peace.²³⁵ On the other hand, Romania was already a party to the war by virtue of its support for Russia, and, therefore, ordered its forces to join Russia against the Ottomans.

The entry of Romania's forces turned the tide of the war. They helped Russia capture the fortress at Plevna and then marched towards Constantinople. Finally, on January 27, 1878, the Ottoman Empire accepted Russia's terms and agreed to an armistice on January 31st.

5.4 THE SERBO-BULGARIAN WAR OF 1885

With the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the Russo-Turkish War, a new Bulgarian state was created. Unfortunately, Great Power politics prevented this state from incorporating all of the territories claimed by the Bulgarians, leading to Bulgarian nationalism. For the first six years of the new state's existence, nationalism was not a problem because its leaders focused their attentions on domestic problems, particularly the conflict between the Prince and the legislature. Once these problems were resolved, the issue of Bulgarians living outside of Bulgaria returned to the forefront of Bulgarian politics. In September 1885, Bulgaria united with Eastern Rumelia, the largest Bulgarian territory that was not part of the original Bulgarian state.

Even though the unification of these two territories reduced Bulgarian nationalism, it increased tensions between Serbia and Bulgaria. These two states, as well as Greece, claimed territories in Macedonia on national grounds and competed for influence in Macedonia. With the addition of Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria doubled its territory and population, thereby increasing the threat it posed to Serbian interests in the region. King Milan of Serbia believed that he had to deal with this threat or face the likelihood that he would lose his throne. He also believed it would be better to act sooner rather than later. Problems of state-building and diplomacy had weakened the Bulgarian military. Furthermore, Bulgaria feared a Turkish attack to restore the *status quo ante* and, therefore, was unprepared for a Serbian attack. These advantages, however, would be temporary. Eventually, Bulgaria would solve both its domestic and Turkish problems. Finally, Bulgaria lacked Great Power allies. These problems combined with the belief that Serbia's military was stronger

²³⁵Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 407.

than Bulgaria's led to the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885. Unfortunately for Milan, he overestimated Serbia's capabilities, leading to the defeat of its military forces.

TABLE 5-1: predictions
The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885

	P1: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with imperial disintegration?	P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms of the intervening phenomena?
Rules of the Game	<p>Yes Russia's initial treaty with the Ottoman Empire violated its agreements with Austria. As a result, a new settlement was agreed to at the Congress of Berlin. This agreement satisfied the interests of the Powers while failing to account for the interests of the Balkan states, particularly Bulgaria and Serbia. Then, by unifying with Eastern Rumelia in 1885, Bulgaria violated the rules created at the Congress of Berlin.</p> <p>Yes. Newly independent Bulgaria was weak because it lacked developed institutions, which helps explain why Russia helped build and staff the new institutions, particularly the military. Unification further weakened Bulgaria in two ways. First, in protest, Russia withdrew its troops from Bulgaria, reducing the capabilities of the Bulgarian military. Second, unification forced Bulgaria to prepare for a potential Turkish attack, thereby diverting Bulgarian forces from other potential threats.</p>	Yes.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Power	<p>Yes Bulgaria failed to understand that unification threatened Serbian interests, thereby underestimating Serbian hostility. Belgrade also confronted uncertainty with regard both to the level of support Austria would provide and with the actual capabilities of the new Bulgarian state. Divisions in the Austrian government caused Vienna to be uncertain about the level of support to give to Serbia.</p> <p>Yes. Bulgarian nationalism posed a potential problem both because the Great Powers divided Bulgarian populated territories into three administrative units and because of Russian interference in Bulgarian domestic politics.</p> <p>Yes. Prince Alexander, who was not Bulgarian or Orthodox, lacked legitimacy and faced stiff opposition from the legislature and particularly the liberal party for control of the government. In Turkey and Serbia, the Sultan and King Milan, respectively, also feared that they would be overthrown.</p>	Yes. State-building and threats from other states, namely Turkey, were greater than normal.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Uncertainty	<p>Yes Bulgaria failed to understand that unification threatened Serbian interests, thereby underestimating Serbian hostility. Belgrade also confronted uncertainty with regard both to the level of support Austria would provide and with the actual capabilities of the new Bulgarian state. Divisions in the Austrian government caused Vienna to be uncertain about the level of support to give to Serbia.</p>	It is difficult to say how much larger than normal the uncertainty about intentions or capabilities was.	Austrian officials gave contradictory advice to Milan, advising him to keep the peace while also supporting Milan's desire to obtain compensation for Bulgaria's gains.
Nationalism	<p>Yes. Bulgarian nationalism posed a potential problem both because the Great Powers divided Bulgarian populated territories into three administrative units and because of Russian interference in Bulgarian domestic politics.</p>	Yes. Russian interference in Bulgarian was extremely high, contributing to the strength of Bulgarian nationalism.	Yes. Bulgarian leaders expressed their outrage at the division of Bulgaria and the need to unite these territories. They, as well as others, attributed the strength of Bulgarian nationalism, in part, to Russian interference in Bulgarian domestic politics.
Domestic Instability	<p>Yes. Prince Alexander, who was not Bulgarian or Orthodox, lacked legitimacy and faced stiff opposition from the legislature and particularly the liberal party for control of the government. In Turkey and Serbia, the Sultan and King Milan, respectively, also feared that they would be overthrown.</p>	Yes. Prince Alexander lacked the support of the Bulgarian political parties and Russia. In fact, he faced their outright opposition to his rule and policies. It is unclear how significant this problem was in Turkey and Serbia.	Yes. Prince Alexander was told that he must either support unification or lose his throne.

TABLE 5-1: Predictions
The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 (continued)

	P4: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with war and crises?	P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P6: Did the elites explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena caused the wars and crises?
Rules of the game	Yes. Since Bulgarian unification violated the rules, both Belgrade and the Sultan expected the Great Powers to intervene. When Serbia received no compensation, it meant that diplomacy had failed.	It is unclear if these phenomena were present in above normal amounts.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Power Shifts	Yes. Serbia confronted a temporary window of opportunity against Bulgaria. The troubles associated with unification, the loss of Russian support, and the danger of a Turkish attack weakened Bulgaria. Yes. Greece's military weakness and Great Power opposition prevented Greece from going to war against Bulgaria.	Yes. Bulgaria greatly increased its population and territory, creating the potential for a significant increase in power. The time it would take Sofia to actually mobilize these resources is unclear.	Yes. A prominent Serbian official expressed the fear that Bulgaria's future increase in power threatened Serbia's interests.
Miscalculation	Yes. Bulgaria left its border with Serbia relatively undefended. Yes. Serbia wrongly believed that it could easily defeat the Bulgarian military.	Yes. Bulgaria failed to prepare for a Serbian attack contributing to Serbia's strong optimism.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Nationalism	No. Since neither Serbia nor Bulgaria went to war to unite with their ethnic brethren or defend itself against the elites' nationalism, Nationalism offers little explanation for the war.	No.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Domestic Instability	No. Contrary to the diversionary war theory, the Sultan's insecurity led to peace.	No. Diversionary tactics and public pressure for war did not occur.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.

This case supports several of this dissertation's arguments, the most significant of which are those associated with power. The Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia nearly doubled Bulgaria's territory and population. Once Sofia incorporated this territory into the Bulgarian state, as one Serbian official observed, Bulgaria would be significantly stronger and pose a greater threat to Serbian interests in the Balkans. Thus, Serbia confronted a window of opportunity. Further supporting Serbia's window-based logic were two other factors. First, as the argument predicts, when Bulgaria gained its independence, it needed to develop its political and military institutions. Russia provided this help. But, when Bulgaria unified against the Tsar's wishes, he withdrew all Russian support. By so doing, it appeared that he temporarily weakened Bulgaria. In addition, Bulgarian unification created the threat of a Turco-Bulgarian war. To prepare for this possibility, Bulgaria stationed its troops along its Turkish border. Eventually, Bulgaria would recover from the loss of Russian support and settle its differences with the Turks. Until Bulgaria resolved these problems, it would be weaker. Thus, Serbia decided to declare war in 1885 while Bulgaria was at its weakest.

At the same time, this case demonstrates the weakness of the diversionary war arguments. The Sultan had a weak hold on his throne, and feared that he might be overthrown. Bulgaria's annexation of Turkish territory presented him with a perfect opportunity to divert attention from domestic problems with a war against Bulgaria. Contrary to the hypotheses prediction, however, his insecurity led to peace; he believed that a war would require him to send his loyal troops to the front, thus, providing his opponents with the opportunity to revolt.

This case is organized in seven parts. Section 5.4.1 explains how Great Power politics helped to create an irredentist Bulgaria. Section 5.4.2 discusses the importance of Russia in Bulgarian state-building. Section 5.4.3 discusses the growth of Bulgarian nationalism and the unification of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia. Section 5.4.4 explains how conflicts of interests and concerns about the balance of power caused both Serbia and Greece to oppose Bulgarian unification. Section 5.4.5 discusses the failed Great Power attempts to resolve the impending crisis that resulted from unification and Turkey's limited reaction to Bulgaria's actions. Section 5.4.6 discusses how Milan's weak domestic position and concerns about the balance of power led Serbia to go to war against Bulgaria. Finally, Section 5.4.7 explains how the balance of power prevented Greece from also

going to war with Bulgaria.

5.4.1 The Treaty of San Stefano, the Congress of Berlin and the Creation of Bulgaria

With the defeat of Turkish forces at Plevna, Russian forces rapidly advanced towards Constantinople. Turkey recognized the hopelessness of its military situation, and willingly accepted Russia's draconian peace terms in the armistice of January 31, 1878. During the next several months, the two combatants negotiated the Treaty of San Stefano, in which Russia achieved most of its goals.²³⁶

Many of the terms of this treaty were controversial, but the most controversial were those related to the creation of a large, autonomous, Bulgarian state. Russia had hoped to create a Bulgarian state that would provide Russia with a strong Slav ally and a potential military base in the Balkans.²³⁷ In the treaty, Turkey agreed to the creation of a Bulgarian state that included Macedonia, Eastern Rumelia, a strip of territory along the Aegean Sea, part of Serbia, and part of present-day Albania. (See Map 5-2²³⁸) These borders were exactly what the Bulgarians wanted. The new state would control all the territory that Bulgarian nationalists claimed to be Bulgarian.

By forcing Constantinople to accept these borders, St. Petersburg was not trying to help the Bulgarian nationalists achieve their goals. Russia's goals were significantly more selfish. Russia believed that a large Bulgaria would provide it with a military outpost from which it could defend its interests in the Straits and from which it would be able to increase its influence among the Balkan Slavs. Also, with Bulgaria as a military outpost, the Russian military could be stationed close to Constantinople. Thus, anytime a Russo-Turkish crisis broke out, St. Petersburg could force the Porte to concede to its demands before the Turks could receive British or Austrian military support.

²³⁶W.N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement of 1878-1880*, second edition, (Hamden, Ct: Archon Books, 1963), pp. 10-12.

²³⁷Charles Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 1.

²³⁸Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, p. 154.

The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano generated a great deal of opposition. The Balkan countries felt they were not receiving their fair share of the spoils of war and opposed it.²³⁹ Neither Serbia nor Greece received the territorial gains that they believed they deserved. Serbia had actually fought against the Turks and occupied Turkish territory, some of which Belgrade would have to cede



Map 5-2
Treaty of San Stefano Borders

to Bulgaria under the terms of San Stefano. Just as important to both the Serbs and the Greeks, Russia gave Bulgaria territories claimed by both of these states—namely Macedonia.

²³⁹Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After*, p. 134.

More important than the complaints of any Balkan country were British and Austrian opposition to the treaty. With the Treaty of San Stefano Russia created a new order that threatened their interests and violated agreements that they had previously made with Russia. Both Britain and Austria assumed that Bulgaria would be a puppet of the Russian government, providing Russia with quick, relatively easy access to Constantinople and the Straits.²⁴⁰ St. Petersburg could then close the Straits to British warships, thereby threatening British interests in Egypt and India. The Russian threat to Austria was more direct. A large Bulgarian state might attract the attention and loyalties of the Austrian Slavs, thereby threatening Austria's internal security. Since Russia was responsible for the creation of Bulgaria, as well as the independence of the other Balkan Slav states, Russia's prestige in the Balkans would increase relative to Austria's prestige.

Austria's losses were compounded by the fact that to achieve these results, Russia had violated the Budapest Convention and the Constantinople Conference.²⁴¹ In the Budapest Convention, Russia agreed not to create a large Slav state in the Balkans, while at the Constantinople Conference the Great Powers had agreed to create a small Bulgaria, a separate Eastern Rumelia under Turkish-control, and a Turkish-controlled Macedonia. By creating a large Bulgarian state, St. Petersburg violated both of these agreements, further humiliating Austria. Count Andrassy clearly expressed Austria's feelings when he said

Russia has played us false. Prince Gorchakov seems to want to settle the whole Eastern question by *coup* like that of 1871. For us is reserved the endorsement and the humiliation. No minister can survive before the Austrian or Hungarian parliament in such a situation, myself least of all.²⁴²

The opposition of these two powers forced Russia to agree to a Congress of the Great Powers where they would discuss the Treaty of San Stefano and try to negotiate terms acceptable to all the Powers. Bulgaria still gained its autonomy, but as a result of the Congress its size was significantly less than both the Russians and the Bulgarians wanted. Macedonia and Albania were returned to the Ottoman Empire. The remainder of Bulgaria was divided into two parts: a small, autonomous

²⁴⁰Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*, p. 140.

²⁴¹Discussing the two conferences are Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship*, pp. 249-274, 275-307; Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans*, pp. 95-144, 145-150; and Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 225-251, 275-289.

²⁴²Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, p. 87.



Map 5-3
Congress of Berlin Borders

Bulgarian state and a semi-autonomous Eastern Rumelia under the control of the Ottoman Empire.²⁴³ (See Map 5-3²⁴⁴) In addition, Russia agreed to occupy Bulgaria for only nine months rather than the two years allowed in the Treaty of San Stefano.

²⁴³Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History*, (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983), pp. 22-24.

²⁴⁴Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, p. 154.

5.4.2 Russia and Bulgarian State-Building

Now that Bulgaria had, for all intents and purposes, gained its independence, Sofia needed to develop the institutions necessary for self-rule. As a colony of the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria was ruled by the Ottoman system of government. This system, however, was not appropriate for an independent state. Bulgaria needed a prince, a constitution that stated the laws, political and economic bureaucracies, bureaucrats to staff the new institutions, and a military with officers and soldiers to serve in it. The Bulgarians did not have to do anything about selecting a prince because the Great Powers took the decision out of their hands. At the Congress of Berlin, the Powers agreed to select a Prince for Bulgaria with two conditions. The new prince could not be Bulgarian, nor could he be a member of one of the ruling families of Europe. The Powers settled on Alexander of Battenburg who arrived in Bulgaria in June 1878.²⁴⁵

For the rest of the state-building enterprise, Bulgaria would have Russia's aid. The Congress of Berlin allowed Russia to occupy Bulgaria for nine months, in part, so that Russia could help Bulgaria build these institutions. Under Turkish rule, most Bulgarians had no role in governing, which meant that the new Bulgarian territories lacked trained or experienced statesmen and administrators.²⁴⁶ During Russia's nine month occupation of Bulgaria, Russians administrators would manage Bulgarian politics. Over time, as the Bulgarians gained the ability to manage their own domestic politics, the administration would be turned over to Bulgarians.

By providing this support, St. Petersburg was trying to advance its interests. Russia believed that it would be able to defend its interests by helping to develop the Bulgarian state. Of particular importance to Russia was a strong Bulgarian military under Russian control that could cooperate with Russian troops if necessary.²⁴⁷ Russia gained and maintained control of the Bulgarian military in two ways. First, between 1879 and 1885, the Bulgarian Minister of War was a Russian who followed the orders of the Russian Minister of War, thereby putting Russia's interests over

²⁴⁵On the selection of Alexander of Battenburg as Prince of Bulgaria, see Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 35-36.

²⁴⁶Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 14 and Black, *The Establishment of Constitutional Government*, pp. 8, 157, 265.

²⁴⁷Black, *The Establishment of Constitutional Government*, p. 54.

Bulgaria's.²⁴⁸ When he became concerned that Prince Alexander was gaining too much control over the Bulgarian military, he acted to reassert Russian control by firing over 100 officers and administrators loyal to the Prince.²⁴⁹ Second, Russians were put in key positions in the Bulgarian military. About 400 Russian officers and 2,700 Russian non-commissioned officers trained and commanded the Bulgarian military.²⁵⁰ In fact, all officers above the rank of captain were Russians.

5.4.3 Bulgarian Unification

By dividing San Stefano Bulgaria into several parts, the Congress of Berlin helped to create a revisionist Bulgaria. The treaty of San Stefano created a large Bulgarian state that included the territories of Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, and Macedonia, which the Bulgarian nationalists considered to be part of the Bulgarian nation, in part, because the majority of their population was Bulgarian. 57% of Macedonia's population was Bulgarian, while 70% of Eastern Rumelia's population was Bulgarian.²⁵¹ In other words, Bulgarian nationalists believed the ethnic composition of both of these territories justified uniting them within a single state. This ethnic distribution partly resulted from the natural demographics of the region, but it also resulted from outside factors. During the Russo-Turkish War, many Turks fled the advancing Russian army, thereby reducing the non-Bulgarian population of the territory.²⁵² Despite the ethnic similarities of these three territories, the Great Powers divided them into individually administered territories with different rights and different levels of autonomy with respect to the Ottoman Empire. The Powers did not care about the ethnography of the territories. Their concerns focused more on their own strategic interests and the balance of power than on the ethnic composition of the territories and the desires of the largest ethnic groups.²⁵³

²⁴⁸Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 566.

²⁴⁹Duncan Perry, *Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870-1895*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 63.

²⁵⁰*Ibid.*

²⁵¹Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*, p. 349; and Perry, *Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria*, p. 13.

²⁵²Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 87-88.

²⁵³Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After*, pp. 56-7, 61.

The division of San Stefano Bulgaria caused some Bulgarians to oppose the Congress's agreement. Bulgarian nationalists believed that the Powers were cheating them out of their ethnic homeland. Some of them were so angry, that they wanted to reject the entire Berlin agreement—both the good and the bad.²⁵⁴ Stefan Stambolov, one of the leading political figures in Bulgaria's early political history, expressed this outrage when he said

Bulgaria proper, Eastern Rumelia, Thrace, Macedonia, and the Dobruja...Where are Adrianople, Salonika, Debur..., Bitola..., Ohrid, Skopje, Prilep, Veles, Shtip, and other parts of our fatherland, where? [All towns in Macedonia]... Where is Plovdiv, Batak, Pangiurishte, Sliven, Kazanluk, Stara Zagora and Karlovo—diamonds of our fatherland? [These towns all became part of Eastern Rumelia.] Broken away from us by garrisons! Terrible. Terrible and sickening. We must not accept the Berlin Treaty. We must shout loudly, loudly, that Europe may hear us, and its diplomats and rulers give us our common fatherland.²⁵⁵

Instead of rejecting the agreement, the Bulgarian Constitutional Assembly sent a document to the Great Powers putting forth the claim that all Bulgarians should live within one state.²⁵⁶ By so doing, the Assembly hoped that the Powers would allow all Bulgarian territories to unite. The protests, however, were to no avail. The end result of this process was an irredentist Bulgaria.

Despite Bulgaria's desire to unite with Macedonia and, most importantly, Eastern Rumelia, for the first six years Bulgaria's attentions were engaged by domestic concerns, which prevented Sofia from acting to satisfy its nationalist desires.²⁵⁷ When the Bulgarian Constitutional Assembly finally focused on the business of writing a Constitution, two political blocs developed, representing two political parties.²⁵⁸ These two parties were a continuation of the competing interests that had developed under Ottoman rule. Under the Ottoman Empire, the main division between the two groups was reform versus revolution. The "conservatives" had favored reform within the Ottoman Empire and the "liberals" had favored revolution in order to achieve independence.²⁵⁹ Now that

²⁵⁴Ibid, p. 38.

²⁵⁵Quoted in *ibid*, p. 37.

²⁵⁶Ibid, p. 39.

²⁵⁷Discussing Bulgaria's domestic problems are Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 27-73; and Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 31-138.

²⁵⁸Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 30-33.

²⁵⁹Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 427.

Bulgaria had gained its autonomy the division still existed, but the issues about which they disagreed had changed. In post-1878 Bulgaria, the main disagreement between the two parties concerned the type of government Bulgaria ought to have. The Liberals favored a strong legislature, and the Conservatives favored a strong executive. Due to the number of Liberals and Russian support for a liberal constitution, the Assembly adopted the constitution favored by the Liberals.²⁶⁰

Unfortunately, Prince Alexander, who had not participated in the Constitutional Assembly, opposed the liberal constitution, partly because he believed that Bulgaria was not prepared for it. According to the Prince's view, Bulgaria's social and economic status required a strong executive. Consequently, for the first five years Alexander tried to amend the Constitution. Each attempt, however, was opposed by the Liberals in the legislature. Since they controlled the legislature, Alexander could not achieve his goal through constitutional means without their support. He, therefore, turned to Russia for support for these changes. As the liberator of Bulgaria, the author of the Treaty of San Stefano, and the protector of the Balkan Slavs, Russia held a great deal of prestige and influence in Bulgaria: prestige that Prince Alexander lacked. Prince Alexander was a German who the Great Powers had selected to be the prince of Bulgaria. He was not a Bulgarian, an Orthodox Christian, or a democratically elected leader, which meant that he lacked legitimacy among the Bulgarians. His power and influence came from Russia and the support Russia provided to him. Thus, he needed Russian support in order to overthrow the constitutional order without the support of the legislature. Russia, however, refused to support Alexander against the Liberals because Russia believed that the best way to achieve Bulgarian unification on Russian terms was to support the liberal constitution.

When Alexander III became Tsar in 1881, Russia's policy changed. Alexander III gained his throne following the assassination of his father. He believed that this assassination resulted from the liberal reforms his father had implemented. Consequently, Alexander III believed all liberals posed a serious danger to Russia and the world. Since Prince Alexander's main opposition was the

²⁶⁰While Russian leaders were divided over how liberal a constitution to allow Bulgaria, the Minister of War's view won out. He believed that Bulgaria's constitution must be at least as liberal as Eastern Rumelia's. Russia favored the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia under Russian tutelage. If Bulgaria's constitution were not as liberal as Eastern Rumelia, Russia would have a great deal of difficulty achieving this goal. Russia, therefore, supported the Liberal's constitution. See Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 35.

Liberal Party in Bulgaria, the Tsar considered them to be part of this danger and, therefore, was willing to support Prince Alexander's decision to suspend the liberal Bulgarian constitution and rule Bulgaria in a more autocratic manner.

As a result of the suspension of the constitution, many members of the Liberal party fled to Eastern Rumelia where they helped increase the level of nationalism and focus it. Nationalism had clearly been a powerful force in Eastern Rumelia prior to the arrival of the Bulgarian Liberals.²⁶¹ The Rumelians felt that the Ottoman Empire's taxes were excessive and its administration was too intrusive, which helped to create opposition to Ottoman administrative control.²⁶² When they looked at Bulgaria, they saw a liberal constitution that they believed would provide them with greater economic, cultural, and intellectual opportunities.

Nationalism in Eastern Rumelia also gained strength as a reaction against Russian interference in its internal politics.²⁶³ After occupying Eastern Rumelia during the Russo-Turkish War, Russia developed and trained the Rumelian militia. When St. Petersburg withdrew its troops from Eastern Rumelia in 1879 Russia left behind 40,000 trained Rumelian troops and weapons.²⁶⁴ This withdrawal, however, did not free Eastern Rumelia from Russia. Russia and its agents continued to try to control Eastern Rumelia, particularly its military. Russia's actions helped to further incite nationalism as Eastern Rumelia sought to increase its independence and reduce Russia's control over the province.²⁶⁵ This desire increased when the Liberals arrived from Bulgaria. Because of Russia's support for Prince Alexander's suspension of the constitution, the Liberals developed an anti-Russian attitude.²⁶⁶ They brought this attitude with them to Eastern Rumelia,

²⁶¹As in Bulgaria, there were two political parties in Eastern Rumelia—the Liberals and the nationalists. Both of these parties favored union; their key difference was to which Great Powers they looked for support. The Liberals favored the West while the nationalists looked to the East. See Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 71.

²⁶²Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918*, pp. 92-93; and Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, pp. 72-73.

²⁶³Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 210-212; and Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, p. 164.

²⁶⁴Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 71.

²⁶⁵Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 90; Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 210-212; and Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 71.

²⁶⁶Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 88-89.

which served to increase opposition to Russian interference in Eastern Rumelia's internal politics when they gained political dominance.

Eastern Rumelia, however, was not the focus of Bulgarian nationalism. For both domestic and international reasons, it initially focused on union with Macedonia. Domestically, Macedonian refugees had taken residence in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia where they pressured the Bulgarians to focus on Macedonia. In addition, the constitutional crisis in Bulgaria led Eastern Rumelia, for the moment, to look away from Bulgaria, which had become less liberal. In other words, because Bulgaria no longer offered the freedoms that Eastern Rumelians desired, they turned their attention to Macedonia. The international situation also led Bulgarians to focus on union with Macedonia before they focused on union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The powers had already recognized that Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia would eventually unite.²⁶⁷ If these two territories united and then tried to incorporate Macedonia, the Powers would strongly resist this action. On the other hand, if Bulgaria or Eastern Rumelia were to incorporate Macedonia before they united, the Powers' resistance would be weaker. By August 1884, however, leaders of the nationalist committee, known as the Bulgarian Secret Central Revolutionary Committee, recognized that Bulgarian diplomacy and Macedonian sedition had failed to achieve its national aims.

The Bulgarian nationalists' failure to accomplish their goals in Macedonia led them to redefine their goals to the more limited aim of union with Bulgaria under the rule of Prince Alexander.²⁶⁸ The Central Revolutionary Committee decided to overthrow the government of Eastern Rumelia and announce the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in the middle of September.²⁶⁹ On September 18, 1885, the uprising occurred and succeeded.²⁷⁰ The insurgents formed a provisional government and then asked Prince Alexander to accept union.²⁷¹

²⁶⁷Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 426.

²⁶⁸Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 96-7.

²⁶⁹Ibid.

²⁷⁰It is unclear why the Committee decided to revolt in September and not wait a few months or more.

²⁷¹Discussing the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia are Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 97-98 and Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, pp. 74-81.

While the nationalists were actively trying to unite all Bulgarians territories, the domestic situation in Bulgaria proper was settling down. In 1881, Alexander, with Russian support, had suspended the constitution. Unfortunately, the new situation created even more instability.²⁷² Divisions within the Conservative party made the cabinet an ineffective decision-making body. In its place, the Russian generals Sobolev, who became Minister-President and Minister of the Interior, and Kaulbars, who became Minister of War, controlled the government.²⁷³ Sobolev's and Kaulbars' heavy-handed leadership, however, led to conflict with Prince Alexander and the Bulgarians.²⁷⁴ Prince Alexander was politically too weak to remove the generals on his own. He, therefore, asked Tsar Alexander III to recall them. Not only did Russia refuse the Prince's request, but Giers made it clear to Prince Alexander that Russia opposed him personally. Without Russian support, Prince Alexander was in a difficult position. His role as leader of Bulgaria lacked legitimacy. He had not gained the throne by popular means, but had been installed by the Great Powers. He was only able to rule because Russian support provided him with legitimacy. Now that he lacked this support, he needed to take a different approach or else he could lose his throne. He encouraged the Liberals and the Conservatives to negotiate a rapprochement. Since both of these parties as well as the Bulgarian public resented Russia's interference in Bulgaria's internal politics, they were willingly to negotiate an agreement to restore constitutional rule in Bulgaria. The Austrian consul to Bulgaria stated it well when he said "[t]he real common basis of this compromise is the prodigious hatred that developed...of the Russian yoke which is becoming increasingly intolerant."²⁷⁵ As with many successor states, Bulgaria had replaced one master—the Ottomans—with another—the Russians. While the Bulgarians were grateful to St. Petersburg for Russia's help obtaining Bulgaria's freedom, they did not want to be a Russian satellite. Thus, by late 1884, the constitutional crisis, which had started with the suspension of the constitution, had abated significantly when Alexander agreed to restore constitutional rule.

²⁷²On this period, see Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 59-72.

²⁷³Discussing Bulgarian politics during the rule of the two generals is Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 116-137.

²⁷⁴Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 430.

²⁷⁵Quoted in Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 430.

While this helped alleviate some of Alexander's problems, he was still a weak leader. The actions in Eastern Rumelia provided him both with both a threat and an opportunity. The threat was that if he did not accept the union of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria as the Great Powers wanted, the people might revolt against his leadership and remove him from the throne.²⁷⁶ Eastern Rumelia also provided him with an opportunity to make his position more secure.²⁷⁷ By jumping on the nationalist bandwagon and accepting the union of the two territories, Alexander could use nationalism and his support of nationalist goals to strengthen his hold on the throne. Stefan Stambolov, a leading Liberal, explained Alexander's situation well when he told Alexander

Sire, the Union is made—the revolt is an accomplished fact, past recall, and the time for hesitation is gone by. Two roads lie before your Highness: the one to Philippopolis [accepting Union], and as far further as God may lead; the other to Sistova, the Danube, and Darmstadt [giving up the throne]. I counsel you to take the crown the nation offers you.²⁷⁸

For these reasons, Alexander decided to accept the leadership of the nationalist movement, and on September 21, 1885 he announced the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.²⁷⁹

Union, however, presented its own problems. Alexander had to protect the new state from both internal and external threats. Internally, there was the danger that chaos would erupt in Eastern Rumelia now that no acceptable government controlled the territory. He, therefore, traveled to Eastern Rumelia to take control of the government and maintain domestic order.²⁸⁰ Externally, he feared a Turkish attack to prevent the union of the two territories.²⁸¹ Eastern Rumelia was under Turkish control, and its loss could cause the Ottoman Empire to lose prestige. If the Porte failed to respond to its loss, other Ottoman territories might believe that the Ottoman Empire was unwilling or unable to respond to secessionist movements. These territories might then try to secede from the empire. In preparation for a possible Turkish attack, he mobilized the Bulgarian army and stationed

²⁷⁶Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 98-99.

²⁷⁷Ibid, p. 84; Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, p. 214; and Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, p. 165.

²⁷⁸Quoted in Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 431.

²⁷⁹Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, pp. 76-77.

²⁸⁰Ibid.

²⁸¹Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, p. 219.

the majority of the troops along the Turco-Bulgarian border to defend Bulgarian gains against a possible Turkish attack.²⁸²

Clearly, Bulgaria did not recognize the potential Serbian threat. Bulgarian leaders did not believe that its actions threatened Serbia. Both Serbia and Bulgaria were Slav states. This kinship led Bulgaria to fail to realize the potential threat unification posed to Serbia. Thus, Bulgaria only prepared its military for a potential Turkish attack, demonstrating Prince Alexander's belief that Turkey represented the only military threat to unification.²⁸³

5.4.4 Greek and Serbian Reaction to Bulgarian Unification

Bulgarian unification altered the balance of power in the Balkans. Unification almost doubled Bulgaria's population, adding over 800,000 people.²⁸⁴ It also went a long way towards restoring the 108,000 square kilometers Bulgaria had lost at the Congress of Berlin.²⁸⁵ While Bulgaria was achieving these gains, Serbia and Greece gained nothing. Thus, Bulgarian unification clearly caused a shift in relative power among the three states.

This shift led both Greece and Serbia to demand compensation, although Serbian protests were more vocal.²⁸⁶ King Milan of Serbia believed Bulgarian unification threatened Serbian independence. Ilija Garasanin, a prominent Serb official, expressed Serbia's position when he said that Serbia "could not possibly look with indifference to a sudden doubling of the size and power of Bulgaria...Serbia could not and would not stand any such arrangement detrimental to her own interests."²⁸⁷ The union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was dangerous because it was the first step

²⁸²Ibid, p. 76.

²⁸³Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, pp. 77, 81.

²⁸⁴Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 13. Prior to unification, Bulgaria's population was approximately 890,000, Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, p. 159.

²⁸⁵Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 13.

²⁸⁶This discussion focuses on Serbian concerns and demands for compensation. Both Greece and Serbia objected to Bulgarian unification, and for the same reasons, but Belgrade was significantly more aggressive in its protests. For a short discussion from the Greek perspectives, see Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, pp. 129-131.

²⁸⁷Quoted in Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 81.

in the process of restoring the Bulgaria created in the Treaty of San Stefano.²⁸⁸ The next step would be to annex Macedonia, creating a Greater Bulgaria. These annexations would irreparably upset the Balkan balance of power, and eventually lead to the end of Serbian independence.

Competition for control of Macedonia exacerbated the problems presented by the potential shift in the balance of power. Macedonia was a small, strategically important territory claimed, in part or in whole, by Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia.²⁸⁹ While they justified their claims on historical grounds, the principal justification was the ethnic composition of Macedonia. Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs, among others, lived in Macedonia, and each state justified its right to Macedonia by citing its diaspora.²⁹⁰ Thus, if Bulgaria annexed Macedonia, it would also be annexing territory occupied by Greeks and Serbs.

The growth of Bulgarian power also caused Serbia to fear for its security because Serb rebels lived in and were supported by Bulgaria. In 1883, the Timok Rebellion against King Milan and his government took place.²⁹¹ After Milan's forces put down the rebellion, many of the rebels fled to Bulgaria where they lived and, with the support of some elements in Bulgaria, continued to cause trouble in Serbia. The presence of Serbian rebels in Bulgaria and the support they received increased the strain between Serbia and Bulgaria and increased the level of distrust Milan felt for Bulgaria.

5.4.5 The Great Powers' and Turkey's Reactions to Bulgarian Unification

By accepting the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, Prince Alexander was reopening the Eastern Question and creating the possibility for war. At the Congress of Berlin, Austria and Britain had forced Russia to accept a smaller Bulgarian state because a large one threatened their

²⁸⁸Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, pp. 165-167; Langer, *European Alliances and Alignment*, pp. 349-350; and Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 430-431.

²⁸⁹On the importance of Macedonia, see Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 517-519.

²⁹⁰It is very difficult to determine the exact distribution of each nationality. Since the Ottoman Empire recognized religions, not nations, any census that the Empire may have taken would lump all three of these nationalities together as Orthodox Christians. Later, these states used attendance in their churches and schools; each organized branches of their own church in Macedonia. Unfortunately, this method of measurement did not always correlate with individual ethnic identifications. Furthermore, each state had an incentive to lie. Thus, all cites about the ethnic composition of Macedonia are questionable. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the largest ethnic group was Bulgarian. Bulgaria had spent more time organizing churches and schools in Macedonia because Greece and Serbia had focused their attentions on ethnic brethren in other areas. On Macedonia's demography, see Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 517-521.

²⁹¹Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 428-430, 434, 436-437.

interests. Given these interests, Austria and Britain could have looked at unification as a threat to their interests and threatened to go to war to restore the *status quo*. Furthermore, unification threatened Turkish interests by removing Eastern Rumelia from Turkish control without the Sultan's approval. If the Sultan decided to oppose unification, a Turco-Bulgarian war could have resulted. Fortunately, neither the Great Powers nor Turkey decided to militarily oppose union. Even though these countries remained at peace, their actions significantly influenced how Greece and Serbia responded to the new Balkan situation.

The most important reaction to unification were those actions taken by Tsar Alexander III and Russia. Russia was Bulgaria's Great Power protector. All of the Great Powers—including Russia—expected Bulgaria to be a Russian puppet. For this reason, Russia had supported Bulgarian unification both in its actions and in its statements. Despite this support, two obstacles led St. Petersburg to oppose unification in 1885. First, the Tsar disliked Prince Alexander and refused to support Bulgarian unification as long as he ruled in Bulgaria.²⁹² Second, Russia wanted unification to occur under Russian auspices. Anti-Russian feeling had been developing in both Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.²⁹³ This attitude would change, according to St. Petersburg, if Russia could be seen as the leader of Bulgarian unification. Then, Bulgarians would consider Russia to be their benefactor and would continue to be indebted to the Tsar.²⁹⁴ As a result, when the Bulgarians achieved unification on their own, Russian officials were divided over whether or not to support it.²⁹⁵ In the end, Tsar Alexander decided that the process that led the Bulgarians to unite would not provide Russia with the desired influence.

Russia, therefore, responded to unification by withdrawing all of its officers from Bulgaria in the belief that chaos would break out in Bulgaria in response.²⁹⁶ Since all officers in the Bulgarian military who were above the rank of lieutenant were Russian, this left the Bulgarian

²⁹²Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 225-226; and Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 78.

²⁹³Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 213-214.

²⁹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 221-223.

²⁹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 217-219.

²⁹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 219-220; and Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, pp. 78-79.

military without any senior officers. Tsar Alexander believed that, in this weakened state, the Bulgarians would not be able to maintain order. Once they recognized the dangers of the situation and how important Russia was to Bulgaria, the Bulgarians would obey Russia's dictates.²⁹⁷

He was wrong. Chaos did not break out, nor did Bulgarian popular opinion call for Russia to return. In fact, many Bulgarians were happy to be free of Russian shackles.²⁹⁸ Bulgarian officers were particularly happy. They had chafed under the control of the Russian officers, whose presence prevented them from advancing to higher ranks. Now that Russian officers were gone, Bulgarians could gain promotions to the rank of captain and above.

Although Austrian opinion was somewhat divided, Vienna also decided to oppose unification.²⁹⁹ At the Congress of Berlin, Austria had supported Britain's opposition to San Stefano Bulgaria because Vienna believed that Bulgaria would be a Russian puppet state. This belief changed in the mid-1880s because Bulgaria had turned away from Russia. Nevertheless, once Bulgarian unification became a reality, official Austrian policy opposed it, in part, because the Three Emperor's League (the alliance of Austria, Germany, and Russia) opposed it. More importantly, Vienna opposed unification because its Serbian ally opposed it. Austrian leaders believed that it must support Serbia or lose what little good will existed between the two states.

The only Great Power to support unification was Britain. At the Congress of Berlin, Britain led the opposition to Russia and the Treaty of San Stefano in the belief that Bulgaria would become a puppet of St. Petersburg and provide Russia with a military base from which the Russian army could easily threaten both Constantinople and the Straits. During the previous two years, however, Prince Alexander and the Bulgarians had demonstrated that they were not Russian puppets. In fact, Bulgarians had come to resent Russian interference in Bulgarian internal affairs. Consequently, a large Bulgarian state that included both Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was not a problem for the British government.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 219-220.

²⁹⁸Ibid, p. 220.

²⁹⁹On the divisions in Habsburg opinion, see Ibid, pp. 223-224.

³⁰⁰Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 100.

Even though Austria and Russia opposed union and wanted a return to the *status quo*, neither of them believed that military force should be used to achieve this goal.³⁰¹ Bulgaria, however, feared an Ottoman attack. Prince Alexander, therefore, tried to convince the Porte that unification was not a threat to its interests or an injury to its prestige.³⁰² He did this by trying to maintain order in Eastern Rumelia and by continuing to pay homage to the Ottoman Empire. By maintaining order in the newly acquired territory, Alexander was able to protect the Muslims living in Eastern Rumelia. This action reduced the chances that the Muslims would be mistreated, which would force the Ottomans to invade to protect their co-religionists. Alexander also continued to pay homage to the Ottoman Empire by offering prayers for the Sultan in a mosque and by continuing to display the Ottoman flag in Eastern Rumelia's capital.³⁰³ With these actions, he hoped to limit the loss of prestige that Constantinople might suffer from the union of the two territories, thereby reducing the likelihood that the Porte would go to war to protect its prestige.

Despite these actions, the Porte found it necessary to respond. Constantinople slowly mobilized its forces and moved them to the Eastern Rumelian-Ottoman border. It also protested Bulgaria's flagrant violations of the Treaty of Berlin. Prince Alexander responded to these actions by mobilizing the Bulgarian military and stationing it in Eastern Rumelia.

Other than these relatively minor actions, however, Turkey did nothing. This inaction resulted from three causes. First, the Sultan's concerns focused more on the potential problems in Albania and Macedonia.³⁰⁴ He had already come to recognize that Eastern Rumelia was lost to him and his empire, but he feared that Bulgarian unification could lead to uprisings and nationalist demands in Albania and Macedonia. Ever since the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, a nationalist movement had been developing in Albania.³⁰⁵ While Albanians had supported the Ottoman Empire

³⁰¹Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, p. 226.

³⁰²Ibid, p. 219.

³⁰³Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 77.

³⁰⁴ Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors*, p. 416.

³⁰⁵Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a shorter discussion of Albanian nationalism see Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, pp. 222-234.

during this war, they had come to realize that the Empire was disintegrating, forcing them to decide between becoming part of some other state or empire—such as Bulgaria—or becoming an independent state. The Porte feared that Bulgarian unification would provide Albania with the opportunity to achieve either of these goals. At the same time, the Sultan feared that an uprising might occur in Macedonia. For the previous two decades, Macedonia had been an arena where Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia competed for influence. Any of these states, or even the Macedonian people themselves, could take this opportunity to help Macedonia escape the burden of Turkish rule. Since Macedonia and Albania were under direct Turkish rule, their loss would be significantly more problematic than the loss of Eastern Rumelia. Thus, the Sultan was unwilling to send his army to fight against the Bulgarians out of fear that he would lose other territories. Second, the Sultan feared for his throne.³⁰⁶ If he went to war against Bulgaria, he would have to send his reliable troops from Constantinople to the Balkans, which would provide his enemies with the opportunity to unseat him. Third, the Sultan expected the Great Powers to act to uphold the decisions reached at the Congress of Berlin.³⁰⁷ At the Congress of Berlin, the Powers had gone to a great deal of trouble to prevent the creation of a large Bulgaria. Bulgaria was now overturning the international order that they had created, and the Turks expected them to restore this order.

In November 1885, the Powers tried to resolve the situation when their ambassadors in Constantinople met.³⁰⁸ Unfortunately, divisions among the Powers prevented them from presenting a united front and resolving the problem.³⁰⁹ Britain opposed dissolving the union. On the other hand, the three continental empires, under Bismarck's leadership, pushed for a return to the *status quo ex ante*. While Austria agreed that Bismarck's position was preferable, Vienna also believed there was little, if anything, the Powers could do to achieve this goal. This being the case, Austria believed it would be better not to act than to act and fail because failure might reduce the influence

³⁰⁶Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 79.

³⁰⁷Miller, p. 416.

³⁰⁸Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*, p. 353.

³⁰⁹Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, p. 165.

of the Three Emperors' League.³¹⁰ The Great Powers inability and unwillingness to take any substantive actions combined with Turkey's unwillingness to reconquer Eastern Rumelia created the impression that nobody would act to restore the *status quo*.³¹¹

5.4.6 Serbia and Bulgaria Go to War

Since Bulgarian actions violated the Treaty of Berlin and altered the balance of power in the region, Belgrade hoped, and expected, that the Great Powers would compensate Serbia.³¹² Once it became clear that the Power would not compensate Serbia in a timely manner, it became clear that diplomacy had failed and Belgrade must take matters into its own hands. In other words, Serbia must compensate itself. This compensation could come by attacking one of three territories: Bosnia, Macedonia, or Bulgaria.³¹³ Bosnia would have been a popular choice because a plurality of the population was Serb. Belgrade had tried to acquire these territories in the 1870s, but Great Power politics and military defeat had prevented Serbia from achieving this goal. Unfortunately for Serbia, following the Russo-Turkish War, Austria gained control of this territory. As a Great Power, Austria possessed a military that was significantly superior to Serbia's. If Belgrade tried to acquire this territory, Serbia would have been crushed. This outcome was particularly likely because Serbia lacked a Great Power ally to help in the event of an Austro-Serbian war. At San Stefano and Berlin, Russia abandoned Serbia, forcing Milan to turn to Austria for support. In 1885, Austria was Serbia's only Great Power ally, and this alliance would end once Serbia tried to take Bosnia.³¹⁴ Macedonia also would have been a popular territory for King Milan to attack. For historic and ethnic reasons, Serbs claimed that Macedonia ought to be part of Serbia. Since it was part of the Ottoman Empire, Milan would have no trouble mobilizing public support to fight against the Turks.³¹⁵ Milan, however,

³¹⁰Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, p. 226.

³¹¹Bridge, *The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers*, p. 168.

³¹²Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, 2: 430-431.

³¹³Discussing the pros and cons of each option is Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, p. 228.

³¹⁴Discussing the relationship between Austria and Serbia is Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 162-182, 203-204.

³¹⁵Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 81.

remembered how badly the Turks had defeated the Serbs in 1876, and feared that history would repeat itself if he invaded Macedonia.³¹⁶ In addition, even if Serbia could defeat the Ottoman Empire in a contest of arms, the Great Powers would oppose any Serbian gains in Macedonia.³¹⁷ Consequently, no matter what the results, a Serbo-Turkish war would not lead to Serbian gains in Macedonia.

Since Serbia was blocked in Bosnia and in Macedonia, Bulgaria was the only reasonable target. Bulgaria posed a significant threat to Serbia's security. Thus, by seeking compensation from Bulgaria Milan would be killing two birds with one stone. While he was gaining territorial compensation, he would also be weakening the main Balkan threat to Serbia's security and to Serbia's interests in Macedonia.³¹⁸

Although King Milan strongly believed that Serbia's independence and survival required that it receive compensation for Bulgaria's acquisitions, it was not his sole motive for war. He also believed that he would lose his throne if he did not take some action. Milan was not a popular leader in Serbia.³¹⁹ During his reign, he had lost a war against the Turks, allied with an Austro-Hungarian Empire that subjugated Slavs, and blatantly interfered in the leadership of the Serbian church, among other things. All of these actions cost Milan popular support. In addition to these problems, a popular rival to the throne existed in the person of Peter Karageorge.³²⁰ The Serbian people wanted compensation for Bulgaria's gains, and if King Milan did not get it for them, he feared he would lose his throne.³²¹

Not only did Milan have a motive for war, but he also believed that Serbia had the ability to easily defeat the Bulgarians.³²² Prior to Bulgarian unification, people believed that the Serbian

³¹⁶Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 431.

³¹⁷Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, p. 228.

³¹⁸Petrovich, p.431.

³¹⁹Discussing Milan's unpopularity is Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, 423-425, 427-429.

³²⁰On the popularity of Peter Karageorge, see Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 429.

³²¹Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, pp. 227-228.

³²²Ibid, pp. 230-231; and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 433.

military was superior to the Bulgarian military, and unification only appeared to increase this advantage.³²³ St. Petersburg had recalled all Russian officers from the Bulgarian military, leaving Bulgaria with an inexperienced officer corps. Just as importantly, Turkey had stationed troops along the Turco-Bulgarian border, forcing Prince Alexander to position the bulk of his forces along this border to defend against a potential Turkish attack, leaving the Serbo-Bulgarian border weakly defended. Finally, there were problems incorporating Eastern Rumelia into Bulgaria. Once the Eastern Rumelians overthrew the Ottoman administration and announced the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, chaos broke out in Eastern Rumelia.³²⁴ The overthrow of the Ottoman administration left the territory without a government to maintain order. One of Prince Alexander's first tasks was to take control of Eastern Rumelia and maintain order there. This, however, would take time, during which Bulgarian attention and resources would be engaged. As a result of these issues and problems, Serbia believed its military could defeat the Bulgarian military.

King Milan also believed that he had Austria's support. In the years following the Russo-Turkish War, Austria and Serbia had developed a close relationship where Serbia became both an Austrian ally and an Austrian satellite. In the convention of June 1881, Serbia gave up a great deal of its independence to Vienna in exchange for Austrian support for Serbian expansion into Macedonia.³²⁵ Now Milan needed this support, but to attack Bulgaria, not Macedonia. Milan told the Austrian government if he did not get any compensation for Serbia he would lose his throne.³²⁶ Fearing that the next Serbian king would not be as pro-Austrian as Milan, Vienna preferred that Milan keep his throne. Despite this preference, Austria's leaders were divided over what policy they should adopt.³²⁷ Austria's Foreign Minister, Count Kalnoky, advised patience. He told Milan to allow the Great Powers to handle the situation. Count Khevenhuller, the Austrian minister in Belgrade, however, provided Milan with contradictory advice. While informing Milan of Austria's

³²³Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 100.

³²⁴Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 81.

³²⁵Discussing the contents of the agreement is Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 413-415.

³²⁶Jelavich, *Tsarist Russian and Balkan Nationalism*, p. 224.

³²⁷*Ibid*, p. 229.

position he also expressed his support for Serbian compensation. As he told a British diplomat, “[the] only outlet [for Serbia]...was toward Macedonia and Old Serbia, through Sofia [!] which town with its surrounding districts ought, in his opinion, to have been assigned to Serbia in 1878.”³²⁸ With these divisions in Austrian policy, Milan was able to choose who he wanted to believe. In the end, he chose to listen to those who would support Serbia.

Since Bulgaria’s actions violated the terms of an international treaty, the Great Powers tried to address the situation in Constantinople in November 1885. The international rules of the game required that they approve of the change and decide how to compensate the other states. As Serbia’s protector, Austria was responsible for arranging this compensation. Unfortunately, the speed with which Bulgaria’s actions occurred prevented the powers from addressing the issue.³²⁹

With the failure to resolve the issue, King Milan decided to go to war with the expectation that Serbia would easily defeat the Bulgarians.³³⁰ While Serbia was initially successful, it quickly became clear that Milan had optimistically miscalculated. On November 14, 1885, Serbia declared war, and for the first ten days, its forces advanced into Bulgaria. In response to the Serbian attack, Prince Alexander transferred troops from the Ottoman border to the Serbian border. During this time, he was able to transfer 70,000 troops to the Serbian front, which turned the tide of the battle against Serbia.³³¹ Against all expectations, the Bulgarian military decisively defeated the Serbian military and proceeded to invade Serbia. Bulgarian forces would have proceeded to occupy Serbia but Austrian intervention prevented them when representatives of the Austrian government threatened joint Austro-Russian action against Bulgaria if Sofia did not accept an armistice. As a result of this pressure, Bulgaria agreed to end the war and restore the *status quo ante bellum*.

³²⁸Ibid.

³²⁹Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, p. 224.

³³⁰Discussing the war are Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 101-103; Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, pp. 81-85; and Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 431-433.

³³¹Perry, *Stefan Stambolov*, p. 83.

5.4.7 Greece Stays Out of the War³³²

Though both Greece and Serbia believed that they would suffer as a result of Bulgarian unification and demanded compensation, only Serbia declared war on Bulgaria. Greece, like Serbia, confronted public pressure for war. Public demonstrations and the press demanded that the Greek government invade Epirus and support a rebellion in Crete. This pressure led the Greek government to mobilize its armed forces on September 25, 1885. Nevertheless, Athens did not declare war against the Bulgarians.

In fact, at no point did the Greek government actually plan to go to war.³³³ The decision not to go to war can be explained by three reasons. First, and most importantly, the Great Powers opposed any Greek military actions. At the ambassadors conference in Constantinople, the Great Powers agreed to warn Greece to stay out of war. They even blockaded the Greek coasts when Athens refused to demobilize its army. The second reason for Greece's inaction is related to the first. Greece lacked a Great power ally/protector. Without a Great Power ally, nobody would prevent any of the Great Powers from intervening against Greece. Serbia was allied with Austria, and Austria helped prevent the Great Powers from interfering in the Serbo-Bulgarian War. Recognizing the need for a Great Power ally, Athens tried to secure Austrian support. Unfortunately, these attempts failed because the Austrian government did not see any value in an alliance with Greece.³³⁴ Third, Greece needed and was trying to deal with internal problems, particularly its financial and military problems. These problems led the Greek leaders to avoid foreign adventures until they had been resolved. Greek leaders were able to maintain this focus, partly, because the government was not afraid of being overthrown if it did not gain compensation for Bulgaria's gains.

5.5 CONCLUSIONS

The cases in this chapter provide support for the dissertation's hypothesis that the

³³²This section is based on discussions in Douglas Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, pp. 137-139.

³³³*Ibid*, p. 138 states that when the Greek government mobilized its military, Athens informed the Great Powers that Greece did not intend to go to war.

³³⁴The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Kolnaky, opposed a Greco-Austrian alliance for two reasons. First, he believed that the weak Greek military could not justify the alliance on military grounds. Second, by allying with the Greeks, Austria might alienate the Slavs, whose interests conflicted with Greece's interests. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, p. 145.

disintegration of empires causes the causes and conditions for war that, in turn, lead to crises and war. The power and miscalculation arguments receive the strongest supported. The lack of a Balkan war in the 1860s clearly exists because of perceptions of the balance of power. Serbia was a militarily weak state that needed to further develop its military institutions in order to be able to confront the Turks. Because of this weakness, and the weakness of its Balkan allies, Serbia avoided war. At the same time, Constantinople looked at the growth of Serbian military and decided that war was not a reasonable option for Turkey. To prevent Belgrade from declaring war, the Porte offered some concessions to Serbia. Whether either side miscalculated is difficult to determine since the war never occurred.

The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 also demonstrates the importance of perceptions of the balance of power. When the Bosnian Crisis began in the summer of 1875, nationalism strongly pushed for war. Belgrade, however, recognized that it was militarily and diplomatically unprepared for war. Serbian leaders, therefore, decided to wait and prepare for war. During the fall and winter, Serbia prepared its military and sought allies, and the neutrality of the Great Powers. Once Serbia had accomplished these goals, Belgrade was ready to declare war with the expectation of victory. Unfortunately for Serbia, the Serbs miscalculated. They overestimated the support of their allies, specifically the Bulgarians and the Russians, and the strength of their military. The expectation of Russian support came from divisions within Russia where two camps had developed, an interventionist and a non-interventionist. This division caused Russia to send mixed signals to Belgrade which contributed to Serbia's miscalculation.

Perceptions of power also contributed to the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Russia was considerably stronger than Turkey, and the recent events in the Ottoman Empire served to reinforce this power advantage. Thus, in a one-on-one confrontation, St. Petersburg was confident that Russia could defeat the Turks. To prevent Austria from intervening in the war, St. Petersburg negotiated an agreement with Vienna that guaranteed Austria's neutrality. St. Petersburg's expectation of a quick, cheap victory, however, was optimistic miscalculations. The Turks, surprisingly, strongly resisted Russia's advance, forcing Russia to ask its Balkan allies for support.

Finally, the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 supports the power and miscalculation arguments of the dissertation. Bulgaria gained its independence in 1878 as a consequence of the Russia's

victory in 1878. Upon gaining its independence, Bulgaria needed to build the institutional structure necessary for self-rule. A large part of the manpower, particularly military manpower, came from Russia. When Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, against St. Petersburg's wishes, united with the Turkish controlled territory of Eastern Rumelia, Russia withdrew its people from Bulgaria creating a temporary window during which Bulgaria would be weaker. This led Belgrade to believe that Serbia had the opportunity to settle its grievances at Bulgaria's expense quickly, and with little cost. Adding to Serbia's advantage was Sofia's belief that Turkey, not Serbia, was the threat to Bulgaria. To address this threat, the Bulgarian military stationed the majority of its troops along the Turco-Bulgarian border. Both Sofia and Belgrade made important miscalculations. Sofia did not recognize the threat unification posed to Serbia and, partly for this reason, did not believe that Serbia would attack. Belgrade, on the other hand, over-estimated its military and under-estimated the recovery time of the Bulgarian military. Consequently, Serbia lost a war it expected to win.

The cases in this chapter also provide some support for the argument related to nationalism. Prior to the 1860s, Serbian nationalism grew, partly, in response to Turkish intervention in Serbian affairs. Consequently, the Serbian government developed a network of organizations in Serbia and the Slav lands of the Ottoman Empire in order to prepare for a war of unification. Despite the strength of nationalism, war never occurred. The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 also resulted, partly, from nationalism. A large number of Serbs lived in Bosnia, and when they revolted, Serbian nationalism increased. War did not occur immediately, however, because Serbia lacked the military capabilities needed to defeat the Turks. The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 also resulted, partly, from nationalism. Bulgarian nationalism was a potential problem because of the division of Bulgaria into two territories. Once Bulgaria united with Eastern Rumelia, the danger existed that Turkey would intervene to reverse Sofia's actions. Turkey did not.

The arguments related to rules of the game do not fare as well. Rules of the game did not influence the Balkan Crises of the 1860s nor did they influence Serbian behavior leading up to the Serbo-Turkish War. Nevertheless, the rules may have influenced Austrian and Russian behavior during this crisis. The threat of war created the possibility that the situations in the Balkans would change. These changes created the danger of an Austro-Russian confrontation. To prevent this from happening, the two sides agreed to rules of behavior. These negotiations may have prevented the

Serbo-Turkish War from expanding to include these powers. Prior to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, Vienna and St. Petersburg used these rules to achieve an agreement that would allow Russia to go to war against Turkey without Austria intervening. Nevertheless, Russia violated these rules with the Treaty of San Stefano, which forced the Great Powers to intervene and negotiate a new agreement at the Congress of Berlin.

The domestic politics arguments receive almost no support from these cases. Prior to the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876, Prince Milan did worry that failure to act could lead to a revolution, but that did not prevent him from delaying war until he believed Serbia was ready. And, in 1885, Prince Alexander of Bulgaria accepted unification, partly, because the failure to agree would lead to his overthrow. Furthermore, contrary to the diversionary theory hypothesis, the Sultan's weakness contributed to his decision not to respond to Bulgarian unification by going to war.

Chapter 6
THE BALKANS, 1900-1914:
THE BOSNIAN CRISIS, THE BALKAN WARS, AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

This chapter looks at the three Balkan crises at the beginning of the 20th century: the Bosnian Annexation, the Balkan Wars, and the Austro-Serbian War of 1914. The Bosnian Annexation of 1908 is the only one of these crises that did not lead to war, although the danger existed that an Austro-Serbian or an Austro-Russian war would occur. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 involved no Great Power combatant. The First Balkan War involved the Balkan League—Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia—against Turkey. Following this war, disagreements over the division of the spoils of the First Balkan War led to a war between Bulgaria on one side and Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Turkey on the other. The final case, the Austro-Serbian War of 1914, occurred when Austria took advantage of the crisis that developed following the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to try to settle accounts with Serbia. Unfortunately, this crisis did not remain localized and eventually escalated into the First World War.

This chapter provides significant support for this dissertation's argument that the disintegration of empires contributes to the causes and conditions of war, which, in turn, can lead to crises and war. The evidence suggests that the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire contributed to several of the problems identified by the hypothesis, particularly shifts in the balance of power, nationalism, and increased ambiguity about the rules of the game, that then contributed to outbreak of the wars and crises. The Bosnian Crisis provides evidence relating the disintegration of empire to each of the three previously mentioned problems. First, the Crisis shows that the growth of Serbian power created concerns that lead Austria to annex the Bosnia. Prior to 1908, Serbia was weak and dependent upon Austria. Following the Serbian coup of 1903, Serbian state-building succeeded in developing a more stable political and economic system. Consequently, in 1908, Austria decided it had to deal with the growing Serbian threat as statements made by Austrian leaders demonstrate. The first step in this strategy was to annex Bosnia. Second, turmoil within the Ottoman Empire caused a temporary reduction in Turkish power. In the summer of 1908, a revolt occurred in Constantinople that weakened the Ottoman military. This weakening provided Vienna with a window of opportunity during which Turkey would be incapable of militarily responding to Austrian actions. Furthermore, the revolt created a closing window of opportunity for Austria. At

the core of the revolution was the desire to reform the Ottoman Empire in an effort to gain the loyalty of the peripheral peoples. If these reforms succeeded, Austria would lose control over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Vienna, therefore, believed that it was necessary to annex the provinces before Constantinople implemented the reforms.

This case also provides evidence to support the relationship between imperial disintegration, nationalism, and war. As a result of Great Power politics and Ottoman policy, a large number of Serbs lived in Austria-Hungary. This situation combined with Vienna's treatment of Serbia and the Serbs in Austria-Hungary helped increase the threat posed by nationalism. This threat was two-fold. First, there was the danger that Serbia would eventually seek to unite with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Second, in the event of an Austro-Serbian conflict, there was the danger that the Serbs in Austria might be a fifth column in support of Serbia. As a consequence, Vienna felt that it was necessary to take actions to address the Serbian national threat. When Austria announced the annexation of the two provinces, Serbian nationalism helped cause a crisis between the two states.

The Bosnian crisis also supports the argument relating imperial disintegration, ambiguous rules of the game, and war. During the fifty years prior to the Bosnian annexation, Austria and Russia had developed a set of rules to help maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans. As the situation in the Balkans developed, particularly with respect to Serbia and the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, these rules no longer satisfied Austria's interests. Austria, therefore, sought to negotiate a new international order with Russia. Unfortunately, these negotiations were secret and the agreements were oral, which helped to create disagreements about the actual terms of the agreement. When Vienna announced that Austria was annexing the two provinces, Russia thought that Austria was being aggressive because Vienna's actions violated St. Petersburg's interpretation of the agreement.

This case provides limited support for the arguments related to miscalculation and absolutely no support for the arguments related to domestic instability. Uncertainty about how to respond led Russia to give Belgrade mixed signals about what support Serbia would receive, which probably contributed to Serbia's aggressive opposition to Austria's actions. As for domestic instability, Serbia did not suffer from significant internal divisions.

The First Balkan War supports the arguments related to power and nationalism, and limited

support for the argument related to domestic instability. As the dissertation's argument would predict, shifts in the balance of power created opportunities for the Balkan states to make gains in the Balkans. Due to common interests—dividing the spoils of the Ottoman Empire—and a common threat—potential Austrian and Italian gains in the Balkans—the Balkan states formed a series of alliances. This alliance combined with Ottoman weakness due to domestic turmoil and a war with Italy provided the Balkan states with a power advantage. Adding further support to the power-based argument was the value to the Balkan states of Russian support. These states recognized the potential for Great Power, particularly Austrian, opposition. They actively sought Russian support to balance this threat as is demonstrated by the Balkan negotiations and the timing of the attack. As with the Bosnian crisis, the division of ethnic groups made nationalism a potential problem. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia each had ethnic brethren who still lived under Ottoman rule and they worried that these Turks would mistreat the Slavs under their rule. These states, therefore, wished to annex the territories populated by their ethnic brethren.

This case also supports the domestic instability hypothesis. In Constantinople, significant divisions had developed between the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) power and members of the opposition, army, and provinces. These divisions were so severe that the party in power was afraid to make any concessions either to Italy in an attempt to end the Italo-Turkish War or to the Balkan states in an attempt to prevent them from attacking. If the party in power made any substantive concessions, the opposition would use these concessions to attack the government. Consequently, the Porte was unable to engage in diplomacy to prevent or to prepare for the First Balkan War.

The case of the Second Balkan War provides evidence to support the arguments related to rules, power, and miscalculation. Prior to the First Balkan War, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia negotiated alliances. In the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, the two sides also negotiated a division of the spoils. Unfortunately, this division failed to take into account the possibility that the Great Powers would intervene and prevent them from achieving their goals. On the other hand, in the Greco-Bulgarian agreement the two sides failed to agree to a division of the spoils. Consequently, when the First Balkan War ended, disputes and competition over the division of spoils developed and contributed to the outbreak of war.

As a result of the First Balkan War, a power shift also occurred, which contributed to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War. Since both Greece and Serbia disagreed with Bulgaria over the division of spoils, they decided to reach an agreement to ally against Bulgaria and to divide the spoils between them. Since they did not have competing territorial claims with each other, as they did with Bulgaria, Belgrade and Athens were able to achieve an acceptable agreement on how to divide the territorial gains.

Evidence for the hypotheses on miscalculation come from Bulgaria's actions. The war had taken a toll on Bulgaria's army. Nonetheless, Bulgaria believed that it was stronger than Greece and Serbia. This belief led Bulgaria to make miscalculations. First, Bulgarian military leaders believed that Serbia and Greece would not fight. Second, they believed that it could achieve a quick victory against the Greco-Serbian forces, thereby forcing them to concede to Bulgaria's demands. Bulgaria was wrong.

The final case, the Austro-Serbian War of 1914, provides evidence that supports the power and nationalism arguments of the dissertation. With Serbia's gains in the Balkan Wars, Serbian power increased and would increase further as Belgrade incorporated its acquisitions into Serbia. This created a window of opportunity for Austria. In addition, we see the tightening of alliances. After the previous humiliations that Austria and Germany had inflicted on Serbia and Russia, St. Petersburg increased its support for Belgrade.¹

Serbian nationalism and the threat it posed to Austria also increased. Austria-Hungary's mistreatment of Serbia and the Slavs in Austria-Hungary contributed to the rise in nationalism among the Serbs in Serbia and in Austria, particularly in Bosnia. This rise in Serbian nationalism caused Austria to fear Serbia and Serbia's intentions. Vienna responded by taking the first reasonable opportunity to address the threat.

6.1 THE BOSNIAN ANNEXATION CRISIS, 1908-1909

As the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, the status of its territories was addressed. In 1878, the Great Powers allowed Austria to occupy the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although they were still *de jure* Ottoman territories. These territories were populated by Balkan

¹Germany also increased its support for Austria. This support, however, was more a function of the decline of the Austro-Hungarian Empire than of the Ottoman Empire.

Slavs, many of whom were Serbian. Over time, Serbian nationalism grew both in Serbia and, partly as a result of Serbian propaganda, in the occupied territories. Because the Austro-Hungarian Empire was multi-ethnic and contained many Slavs, the growth of Serbian nationalism posed a threat to the Empire.

In the late 19th century and first years of the 20th century, the threat to Austria was limited. Starting in 1903, the situation began to change. In 1903, a new pro-Russian, nationalist government took power in Serbia with two effects. First, the Serbian government sought to free itself from Austrian dominance. Second, this government began to set its sights on Bosnia. Consequently, the Serbian threat began to grow. Then, in 1908, the Young Turks revolted and took control of the Ottoman government. This revolt created two windows of opportunity. One was military: the instability in the Ottoman Empire temporarily weakened its military. During this period, Austria was unlikely to confront any serious Turkish opposition. The second was political: since the occupied provinces were still part of the Ottoman Empire, Vienna worried that the Bosnians might take advantage of the new situation and try to assert themselves politically, which would threaten Austrian influence in the region.

To address this threat, Count Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, decided to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to accomplish this task, he needed to gain Great Power support. Germany and Italy, Austria's allies, quickly agreed to the action. All that remained was to gain Russian support. In July 1908, the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, had suggested a deal: Russia would support Austria's annexation of the occupied provinces in exchange for Austria's support for the opening of the Straits. Aehrenthal decided to take Izvolsky up on his offer. The two met and discussed an agreement. Unfortunately, they did not keep records of the discussions, which led the two to disagree about what they actually agreed to.

Aehrenthal promptly took advantage of his version of the agreement and annexed the two provinces. This created a crisis that threatened to escalate into war. Serbia felt threatened by Vienna's actions because Austria had annexed Serb-populated territory and because the annexation threatened Serbian security. Russia felt threatened by the action because the annexation was a blow to Russia's prestige and influence in the region and because they believed that Aehrenthal had violated the agreement that he and Izvolsky had made. Finally, the Porte opposed the loss of territory

that was legally Turkey's.

These crises—the Austro-Russian, the Austro-Serbian, and the Austro-Turkish—failed to escalate to a war. Russia and Serbia, eventually caved in to Austro-German pressure because the balance of power favored Austria. Austria had strong German support while the Russian military was weak and unprepared for war and Serbia was a relatively weak secondary state. On the other hand, the Austro-Turkish crisis ended with a negotiated settlement. Because of the strong Russian and Serbian reaction to the annexation and the dangers these two states presented, Austria decided to negotiate an agreement with the Turks. Initially, however, Austria refused to provide any significant compensation to Turkey. Turkish resistance and Great Power pressure finally convinced Austria to offer a meaningful settlement, and the threat of war disappeared.

TABLE 6-1: predictions
The Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908

	P1: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with imperial disintegration?	P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms of the intervening phenomena?
Rules of the Game	<p>Yes. Both Russia and, more importantly, Austria wished to change the rules because they no longer satisfied their interests. For Austria, the growth of Serbian power and the threat it posed created the need for Austria to change the rules. The agreement that Austria and Russia negotiated, however, was oral and secret leading to different interpretations.</p> <p>Yes. Serbia was weak, lacked allies, and was under Austrian control. In 1903, a new leadership took control over Serbia and implemented policies to improve its political and economic position, to free itself from Austrian dominance, and to develop closer ties with Russia. For the first five years, however, internal divisions in Serbia weakened it. Not only did Serbia's increased independence improve its power, but it also reduced Austria's prestige. Over time, Serbia's power would continue to increase.</p> <p>Yes. Austria had strong allied, i.e. German, support.</p> <p>Yes. In the summer of 1908, a revolution occurred in Constantinople as a new group sought to reform the Ottoman Empire. This revolution temporarily reduced the power of the Ottoman Empire.</p>	<p>Yes. For the previous 30 years, Russia and Austria had developed and abided by a set of rules that maintained the <i>status quo</i> in the Balkans. In 1908, Austrian leaders decided these rules fit neither Austria's interests nor the developing balance of power.</p> <p>Yes. Serbia's power was growing quickly in the early 1900s.</p> <p>Yes. Austria rarely had such strong allied support.</p> <p>Yes. The weakness of the Ottoman Empire following the revolution was significant.</p>	<p>Yes. Both Izvolsky, the Russian foreign minister, and Aehrenthal, the Austrian foreign minister, said that the rules did not reflect their interests or the current power situation and wished to change them.</p> <p>Yes. Prior to 1908, Austrian leaders did not intervene in Bosnia or Serbia because they were stronger than Serbia. In 1908, Aehrenthal identified the growth of Serbian power as a problem.</p> <p>Yes. German leaders expressed strong support for Austria and its Balkan policy.</p>
Power	<p>Yes. Russia gave conflicting advice to Serbia, advising Belgrade to remain at peace while also supporting Belgrade's demands for territorial compensation. At the same time, Russia also advised Serbia to prepare for war.</p>	<p>It is unclear how much greater the uncertainty was than normal</p>	<p>Yes and no. Russian leaders told Serbia to be cautious while also expressing support for Serbia's demands for territorial compensation and advising Belgrade to prepare for war. But, there is no evidence that Serbian elites were uncertain of Russian support.</p>
Uncertainty	<p>Yes. Serbia had a large diaspora living in Austrian controlled Bosnia. This minority was discriminated against by the Austro-Hungarians. In addition, Austrian interference in Serbian affairs greatly increased Serbian resentment.</p>	<p>Yes. Prior to 1908, Serbia lacked strong, active nationalist organizations. In 1908, nationalism and nationalist organizations gained strength as a result of Austria's actions.</p>	<p>Yes. Serbian leaders talked about the problems associated with Austrian interference in Serbian politics and the need to gain their independence from Vienna. Leaders in Vienna also recognized that the division of Serbs contributed to Serbian nationalism.</p>
Nationalism	<p>Yes. Domestic instability occurred in Serbia in 1903 when the King was assassinated, but not in 1908.</p> <p>Yes. There was a revolution in Constantinople. Obviously, prior to the revolution there was domestic instability, but not following it.</p>	<p>Yes. For three years following the assassination of the King, Alexander of Serbia, Serbian instability was greater than normal.</p> <p>Yes and No. Prior to the revolution, domestic instability was greater than normal, but following the revolution it was not.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>
Domestic Instability			

TABLE 6-1: predictions
The Bosnia Annexation Crisis of 1908 (continued)

	P4: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with war and crises?	P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P6: Did the elite explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena caused the wars and crises?
Rules of the game	Yes. Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina violated existing rules and conflicted with Russia's interpretation of the recent Austro-Russian agreement. Yes. Austria confronted two windows of opportunity: Serbia's power would grow as the state developed and expanded; and, as Serbia's Russian ally recovered from its recent troubles, St. Petersburg would be more supportive of Serbia. Yes. Bulgaria and Austria confronted a window of opportunity created by the Turkish revolution. Eventually, Turkey would recover and might be better able to hold onto its Bosnian and Bulgarian territories.	Yes. Russia believed that the Austro-Russian agreement would lead to a Great Power conference and strongly opposed Austria's interpretation. Yes. Austria confronted more windows at one time than normal.	Yes. Izvolsky expressed his outrage at Austria's violation of their agreement. Yes. Austrian leaders explained the annexation as a response to the potential danger posed by future shifts in power.
Power Shifts	Yes. Belgrade continued to demand compensation because it expected Russian support. Russia, however, was too weak to give this support and eventually caved to Austrian, and German, pressure.	Yes. Serbia seriously underestimated the level of Russian support.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Miscalculation	Yes. Because of Austria's Slav minority, Serbian nationalism threatened Austria's survival. As Serbia increased its independence from Austria this nationalist threat also increased. Austria decided to annex Bosnia as a first step in dealing with the Serbian nationalist threat. Yes. Serbian nationalism sought to unify Serbia with Bosnia. Austria's annexation threatened this goal.	Yes. Serbian nationalism failed to pose a threat to Austria prior to the early 1900s because of Serbia's dependence on Austria and because it lacked strong national leadership. By the time of the annexation, Serbia and Serbian nationalism were stronger and more unified.	Yes. Austrian leaders expressed their concerns about Serbian nationalism and stated that one of the main purposes of the annexation was to address the threat. Yes. Serbian leaders were concerned about the threat unification posed to Serbian nationalism, leading them to support the growth of nationalist organizations.
Nationalism	No. Domestic instability did not correlate with the outbreak of the crisis.	No. Domestic instability did not contribute to the outbreak of the crisis.	The elites did not explain their policies in terms that suggest domestic instability caused the crisis.
Domestic Instability			

The Bosnian Annexation Crisis provides significant evidence to support several of the arguments presented in this dissertation. (See Table 6-1 for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the case and the argument's predictions.) Of particular importance is the evidence related to the nationalism and power arguments. Austria's actions were predicated on the threat posed by Serbian nationalism. As the argument predicts, Serbians were divided between their ethnic homeland, Serbia, and territories outside of Serbian control, in this case Bosnia. This division created the potential for Serbian nationalism to direct its focus towards Austria. Austrian actions helped to increase the strength of Serbian nationalism, in part, because Austria discriminated against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary and, more importantly, because of Austria's interference in Serbian politics. This interference is clearly demonstrated by the unequal terms of the Austro-Serbian economic agreements, by Austria's demands that Serbia reject a Serbo-Bulgarian economic agreement, and by Austria's attempts to economically coerce Serbia into obeying Vienna's dictates. Austria took these actions, in large part, to keep Serbia and Serbian nationalism weak, as implied by the statements made by an Italian politician. When Austria annexed Bosnia, Vienna was trying to manage the Serbian national threat as is clearly demonstrated by the statements of several Austrian leaders, particularly the Austrian foreign minister and the Austrian chief of staff.

Instead of weakening Serbian nationalism, Austria's actions strengthened it. This can clearly be seen in the statements of Serbian leaders, the growth of Serbian national movements in response to Austria's attempts to economically subjugate Serbia and, more importantly, the growth of Serbian nationalism in response to the annexation of Bosnia. By annexing Bosnia, Austria was threatening the independence of Serbia and interfering with its national mission. Therefore, Serbia had no choice but to oppose Austria's actions.

Nationalism, however, does not explain the entire case. The evidence also shows that the power-based arguments are also important. Prior to 1908, Vienna did not annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reason for this inaction was Serbia's weakness. As long as Serbia was weak, Vienna would be able to crush Serbia if Belgrade acted against Austria's interests, as the Austrian foreign minister clearly stated in the early 1900s. Between 1903 and 1908, Serbia began to increase its power and independence from Austria, which increased the threat that Belgrade posed to Austria. With Serbia's power continuing to grow, the threat continued to increase. Therefore, as Austrian

leaders clearly stated, Vienna decided to deal with Serbia before it was too strong. The plan, as explained by a member of the Austrian foreign ministry, was to annex Bosnia as the first step towards the eventual annexation of Serbia.

Not only do the power arguments help explain Austria's behavior, but they also help explain Serbia's behavior. For national and security reasons, the annexation of Bosnia was a threat to Serbia. Therefore, Belgrade actively opposed it and demanded territorial compensation. Serbia, however could not accomplish this goal alone, as demonstrated by Serbia's search for Great Power allies. Serbia found this in Russia. While Russia was unprepared for war, Russian leaders gave mixed signals to Serbia; at one moment they would tell Serbia to be quiet, and in the next they would support Serbia's demands for territorial compensation and advise Serbia to prepare for war. Thus, Serbia believed it had strong Russian support, which evened the balance of power. This expectation was wrong. Russia's weakness forced St. Petersburg to cave under German and Austrian pressure. The importance of Russian support is demonstrated by Belgrade agreeing to Austria's terms once Russia withdrew its support for Serbia's demands.

This case is organized in six sections. Section 6.1.1 examines the potential threat Serbian nationalism posed to Austria-Hungary and how the international situation allowed Vienna to manage the situation. Section 6.1.2 examines the evolution of Austria's interests and how they led to the decision to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. The changes that were occurring in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the Balkans threatened Austria's position in Bosnia and in the Balkans, leading to the decision to annex the province. Section 6.1.3 helps to explain why Austria acted when it did. Section 6.1.4 explains Serbian and Russian outrage and actions over the annexation that caused the Bosnian Crisis. Section 6.1.5 shows that Serbian and Russian weakness relative to Austria and Germany forced St. Petersburg and Belgrade to concede to Vienna's and Berlin's humiliating demands. Section 6.1.6 provides a brief discussion of an understudied aspect of the crisis, the Turco-Bulgarian crisis that resulted from Bulgaria's declaration of independence.

6.1.1 The Berlin Settlement and Balkan Peace, 1878-1903

Starting in the late 1860s, Vienna changed the focus of its foreign policy away from Germany and sought to satisfy its offensive and defensive interests in the Balkans. Prussia's victory in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the unification of the German states that followed blocked

Austria's northward expansion, forcing the leadership in Vienna to look to the Balkans if it wished to increase its territory and prestige. The Balkan states were weak; some had recently gained their independence and were in the process of developing the political, military, and economic capabilities necessary to survive; others remained part of the Ottoman Empire under its limited protection.

While many leaders, particularly in the military, looked to expand and increase Austria's prestige in the Balkans, most leaders focused on the Balkans for security reasons. The Balkan states posed a significant, potential threat to the security—even the very existence—of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in two ways. First, Austria feared that these states would become Russian outposts, allowing Russia to encircle Austria, thereby increasing the potential Russian threat to the Habsburg Empire. Because the Balkans were populated by Slavs and Orthodox Christians, Russia, the largest Slav state and self-appointed leader of the Orthodox church, appeared to be the natural ally for the Balkan states. Second, the Balkan states threatened the Habsburg Empire because of their potential effect on the ethnic minorities within the Empire. Following Austria's defeat in 1866, the Hungarians living in the Habsburg Monarchy demanded and obtained the creation of a Hungarian state within the Monarchy. With this change, the Austrian Empire became the Austro-Hungarian Empire, ruled by two ethnic groups—the Austrian Germans and the Hungarian Magyars.² This change in the empire's structure led to a change in its interests.³ Prior to the creation of the Dual Monarchy, the Empire's policies reflected the interests of its German citizens. Even though Emperor Francis Joseph still led the Empire, it now needed to cater to the whims of both German and Hungarian interests. At the same time a large Slav minority lived within the Hungarian region of Austria-Hungary. Not only did these Slavs lack power and representation within the Empire, they also suffered under Hungarian rule which discriminated against and repressed some the Slavs. As a result of these changes, many Slavs were dissatisfied with their situation, leading to increased

²I will use the terms Vienna, Austria, Austria-Hungary, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Habsburg Empire, and the Dual Monarchy to refer to Austria-Hungary and its government.

³Istvan Diószegi, *Hungarians in the Ballhausplatz: Studies on the Austro-Hungarian Common Foreign Policy*, translated by Kornel Balas and revised by Mary Borsos, (Budapest: Zrinyi Printing House, 1983).

nationalism.⁴

To achieve their national aspirations, the Habsburg Slavs could either reform the Dual Monarchy into a Tripartite Monarchy or they could secede from the Monarchy. The leaders in the Habsburg Empire opposed both of these options. Magyar opposition to the creation of a Slav state within the Habsburg Empire was particularly strong because this reform would force them to share the power that they had gained. Just as important, the creation of a Slav state within or outside of the Empire would entail the loss of a great deal of territory and population from the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy. (Map 6-1 shows the ethnic distribution of the Habsburg Monarchy.⁵)

The Balkan Slavs and the newly independent states in the Balkans functioned as a powerful magnet for the Habsburg Slavs. Their existence provided the Habsburg Slavs with a goal. They saw the freedoms, rights, and responsibilities of their ethnic brethren and desired the same. The Balkan Slavs also spread propaganda to stir nationalism among the Slavs in Austria-Hungary, causing Vienna to fear that Austria's Slav population might rebel against the government. Of particular concern for Austria was Serbia. Serbia considered the Habsburg Slavs to be co-nationalists, and, therefore, had irredentist claims against Austria-Hungary.⁶ This problem was compounded by Serbia's self-image as the Piedmont of the Balkans.⁷ Belgrade wished to unite all Slavs, even those living in Austria-Hungary, within a single Slav state, just as Piedmont united the Italians within a single Italian state.


⁴The Slav nationalists were not united in their views. Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 90-102 discusses the effect of the creation of the Dual Monarchy on the Habsburg Slavs and the different national ideologies.

⁵This map comes from Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 23,

⁶On Serbian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, pp. 409-410.

⁷David MacKenzie, "Serbia as Piedmont and the Yugoslav Idea, 1804-1914," in *Serbs and Russians*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 24-53. This article was originally published in *East European Quarterly*, 28 (June 1994), pp. 153-182.

In addition to the threat posed by the Slavs living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the new Slav states in the Balkans posed a direct threat to the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. The presence of the Habsburg Slavs led the new states to have irredentist claims against Austria. As long as Austria was militarily stronger than the Balkan states, Vienna was unlikely to face a direct military attack. This situation, however, was not necessarily permanent. As the Ottoman Empire declined, a large Balkan state could form from its rubble, the most likely combination being the union of



Map 6-1
The Ethnic Distribution of Austria-Hungary

Serbia and Montenegro.⁸ If they did, Vienna would be confronted by a large, hostile Slav state with irredentist claims on its southern borders. Another possible threat to Vienna was an alliance of the Balkan states. This alliance, particularly when combined with Russian support, could pose a serious threat to Austria-Hungary. Indirectly, the Balkan Slavs could threaten the Habsburg Monarchy by

⁸Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *The Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909*, (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p. 3.

their influence on the Habsburg Slavs. Vienna could not be sure of the loyalty of the Slavs living in its territory. There was the danger that they would rebel against Vienna in order to unite with their ethnic brethren. Or, in the event of a war against a Balkan state, these Slavs could be a potential fifth column, helping to destroy Austria-Hungary from within.

The potential Slav threat in the Balkans increased in importance with the Balkan crises of the mid and late 1870s. In 1875, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina revolted against the Turkish government.⁹ Since Orthodox Slavs were suffering and rebelling against Turkish rule, there was the danger that Serbia, Montenegro, or Russia would intervene to support the Orthodox insurrectionists,¹⁰ which could result in a large Serbian state or a new Slav state beholden to Russia for its independence. Either way, Austria's interests would suffer.

To address this problem, Austria tried to unite the Great Powers behind a diplomatic solution that would end the insurrection and maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, diplomacy failed to resolve the crisis, leading to war. First, the Serbs attacked the Turks in 1876. Not long after Serbia lost, Russia attacked and defeated the Ottoman Empire in 1877-1878.

During this period, the Great Powers, particularly Russia, recognized Vienna's interests in the two provinces.¹¹ Prior to both these wars, Russia had recognized Austria's interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and codified this rule in various agreements. In July 1876, just after the Serbo-Turkish War began, Russia and Austria negotiated the Reichstadt Agreement in which Russia agreed to allow Austria to acquire territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹² Later, when Russia sought Austrian support—or at least neutrality—in the upcoming Russo-Turkish War, Russia agreed to allow Austria to control most of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the Russo-Turkish War, Austria

⁹For a discussion of the Bosnian insurrection and the wars and crises that resulted, see chapter 5.

¹⁰F.R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914*, (Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1972), p. 73.

¹¹Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 3-4.

¹²Even though the two countries later disagreed upon the extent of Russia's concessions to Austria, the concessions clearly demonstrated that Russia acknowledged Austria's interests in the two provinces. Discussing the disagreement is George Hoover Rupp, "The Reichstadt Agreement," *American Historical Review*, 30 (April 1925), pp. 503-510.

received further proof that the Powers recognized its interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, all the Great Powers agreed to let Vienna occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹³ In a secret agreement, Russia went further by agreeing not to oppose Austria's annexation of the Principalities at a later date, if Austria decided this action was necessary.¹⁴

Following the agreement at Berlin, Austria gained the right to administer Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵ On July 31, 1878, 78,000 Austro-Hungarian troops entered the two provinces and proceeded to subdue resistance to Vienna's rule. Not long after, Austrian administrators, whose responsibility it was to rule over the provinces, entered.

Despite the occupation, and the Great Powers' approval for Austria to annex the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vienna did not alter the relationship between the provinces and the Empire. Instead, Austria spent the next 30 years administering the territories but never incorporating them into the Dual Monarchy. This action can be explained by three factors. Domestically, the Hungarians opposed annexing Slav territories. An increase in the number of Slavs in Austria-Hungary would lead them to demand greater political rights and, in so doing, put more pressure on the Empire to reform. Since any such reform would reduce the power of the Magyars, they opposed it. Second, during the last 20 years of the nineteenth century, Russia did not pose a serious threat to Austria or to Austrian interests in the Balkans. Following the Balkan crises of the 1870s and 1880s, Russia turned its attention to the Far East where it was confronted by a growing Japanese threat.

Finally, Serbia did not pose a serious threat to Austria or to Austrian interests. Part of the reason that Serbia did not threaten Austria was its lack of Great Power support. Prior to the Congress of Berlin, St. Petersburg shifted its support from Serbia to Bulgaria.¹⁶ Nikolai Giers, the

¹³The best discussion of the Congress of Berlin is W.N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880*, second edition, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1963), pp. 1-146.

¹⁴Ibid, p. 77.

¹⁵Discussing the Austrian occupation and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., *Bosnia & Herzegovina: A Tradition of Betrayal*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 93-115.

¹⁶On Russia's changing support for Bulgaria leading Serbia to seek Austrian support, see Charles Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1876-1886*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1958).

Russian assistant foreign minister, told the Serbs that “the interests of Russia came first, then came those of Bulgaria, and only after them came Serbia’s.”¹⁷ Russia’s priorities forced Belgrade to depend upon Austria for what little gains Serbia received at the Congress of Berlin.¹⁸ Following the Congress of Berlin, Vienna continued to dominate Serbia’s political and economic life.¹⁹ In 1881, Serbia signed two treaties that essentially made Serbia an Austro-Hungarian satellite. The first treaty regulated trade between the two countries. In it, Serbia agreed to grant Austria most favored nation status without any reciprocity. The second treaty was a secret convention in which Prince Milan agreed not to sign any political treaty without Austria’s prior approval and not to incite the Slavs in Austria-Hungary or Bosnia against the Empire. In exchange, Austria agreed to recognize Prince Milan as king, whenever the Prince decided to take the title and to support Serbia’s southward expansion.

Vienna used these agreements to control Serbia. With the Austro-Serbian trade treaties, Austria was able to exert significant influence over Serbia.²⁰ Austrian trade was essential for Serbia’s economic life, and any threat to Serbo-Austrian trade posed a serious threat to Serbia. This leverage permitted Austria to coerce Belgrade if Serbia acted contrary to Vienna’s wishes. With the political treaties, Vienna prevented Serbia from negotiating treaties and alliances with other states. Thus, Vienna did not need to use military means to control Belgrade’s behavior.

6.1.2 Changing Circumstances and the Austrian Decision to Annex Bosnia and Herzegovina

For twenty-five years after the Congress of Berlin, Serbia remained relatively loyal to Austria. Even though Belgrade made some attempts to adopt a nationalist policy, at least domestically, and to seek closer relations with Russia, the Serbian threat was limited. In the late 1890s and early 1900s, King Alexander of Serbia tried to develop a more nationalist, pro-Russian

¹⁷Quoted in Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 396.

¹⁸David MacKenzie, “Russia’s Balkan Policies and the South Slavs, 1878” and “The Serbian-Russian Relationship in History,” in *Serbs and Russians*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 13-15, 368-287.

¹⁹Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 411-415.

²⁰Discussing economic relations between Austria and Serbia is Wayne Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West: The Events of 1903-1908*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 165-180, 189-209.

policy. By taking these positions, however, Alexander was not trying to adopt an anti-Austrian attitude. His real intent was to strengthen his position within Serbia which had weakened as a result of his policies, attitudes, and choice of wife.²¹ Alexander believed that playing the national card, which required the support of the Tsar, would increase his domestic support. By the end of 1902, he had failed in his goal and again turned to Austria for support.²²

As Alexander's unpopularity continued to grow, a group of junior officers led by Captain Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic, nicknamed Apis, decided to take matters into their own hands.²³ They planned a coup in which they would kill King Alexander Obrenovic and his wife, Queen Draga. Following the coup, they would replace Alexander's dictatorship with a constitutional monarchy led by Peter Karadjordje. On May 3, 1903, the conspirators implemented their plan and succeeded in overthrowing the Obrenovic dynasty and replacing it with a constitutional monarchy.

The new Serbian government shift its foreign policy from pro-Austrian to pro-Russian.²⁴ This shift occurred for two reasons. First, the new constitution created a more democratic system that led to the election of the Radical Party. This party sought to unite all Serbs within a single Serbian state. To accomplish this nationalist agenda, it favored closer ties with Russia. At the same time, the Radicals regarded Austria as the chief enemy of the Serbian cause and sought to free Serbia from Austrian control.²⁵ Second, King Peter, the new king of Serbia, was also pro-Russian. Although he tried to maintain friendly relations with Austria, he clearly shifted Serbia towards Russia.

The new government enacted many policies that had the potential to cause problems in the Balkans.²⁶ Domestically, the Radicals balanced the Serbian budget, expanded education, and freed

²¹Discussing King Alexander and his problems are Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 474-504; and Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West*, pp. 1-60

²²Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West*, pp. 38-41.

²³David MacKenzie, *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator: The Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 31-49.

²⁴Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West*, is very good on this issue.

²⁵Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, i:140, 142.

²⁶MacKenzie, "Serbia as Piedmont," pp. 40-41.

the press. These changes improved Belgrade's image among the Balkan states, which helped Serbia become a magnet for a Greater Serbian nationalism that could threaten the Dual Monarchy. Internationally, the Radicals developed close ties with Russia and worked to improve Serbia's relationship with Bulgaria and with Montenegro. Furthermore, Serbs increased their nationalist activities in Macedonia, Croatia, and Dalmatia.

Initially, these changes did not cause Austria any significant Balkan problems. Following the coup, Serbia was too weak and too internally divided to take any overt actions to alter the Balkan *status quo*. Militarily, Serbia's army used outdated equipment. Before adopting an aggressive, revisionist foreign policy, Serbia needed to implement serious reforms. Domestically, divisions existed between those who supported the old Obrenovic dynasty and those who supported the new ruling family. In addition, there was serious resistance against those responsible for the murder of King Alexander and his wife. Many of the leaders of the coup occupied important positions within the military and took advantage of their power to place allies in positions of authority, which created opposition within the military.

Serbia's weakness was compounded by the lack of Russian support. Prior to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, Russia had accepted an Austrian sphere of influence in the Western Balkans, and, for the next quarter century, continued to accept this situation. Compounding Serbia's lack of Russian support was Russia's focus on expansion in Asia.²⁷ As long as St. Petersburg's foreign policy focused on Asia, Austria would be able to prevent Serbia from achieving its goals. In 1905, after Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, St. Petersburg turned its attention back to Europe and the Balkans.²⁸ This shift in focus, however, did not help Serbia. Russia's losses significantly weakened St. Petersburg's ability to resist domestic and international foes, which made St. Petersburg unwilling and unable to support Belgrade's revisionist interests in the Balkans.²⁹

²⁷Discussing Russia's focus on Asia is Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, translated by Bruce Little, (New York, NY: Berg Publishers Ltd, 1987), pp. 86-100, 186-220.

²⁸On the Russo-Japanese War, see Ian Nish, *The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War*, (New York, NY: Longman, 1985).

²⁹Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 206.

Despite the opportunity offered by Serbia's weakness, Austria also was reluctant to alter the status quo in the Balkans. Part of the reason for Vienna's reluctance was the belief that the Balkans posed no significant threat to Austria or to Austria's interests. St. Petersburg was not a threat because Russia and Austria had agreed to rules that provided for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans, to which Vienna believed that St. Petersburg would live up, particularly after Russia's defeat at the hands of the Japanese. Without Russian support, Serbia could not stand up to Austria in a military confrontation, and Vienna knew it; therefore, Vienna was confident that she could easily defeat Serbia in the event of a military confrontation. Count Goluchowski, the Austrian foreign minister, expressed this sentiment when he told the German Ambassador to Vienna that "[w]e shall simply crush Serbia if the situation in the Balkans becomes serious or if by chance she dares to carry on a policy different from what we want."³⁰ Furthermore, Austria still dominated Serbia economically. Over time, Austria's control over Serbia's economy had increased, which increased the costs that Serbia would pay if Belgrade sought to gain its independence from Austria. Vienna recognized its position and believed that the threat of economic sanctions was enough to control Serbia; war would be unnecessary.³¹

Just as important for explaining Vienna's inaction is the domestic situation in Austria.³² In 1903, the Hungarian minority tried to increase their independence from the crown by demanding that the Hungarian units in the Austro-Hungarian army use the Magyar language. This demand threatened the unity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and led to a crisis that lasted until 1906 when the Hungarians agreed to drop their demands.³³ Even if the leaders in Vienna had wanted to take advantage of Serbia's weakness, these domestic divisions would have prevented such action.

³⁰Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1:141. Albertini dismisses this statement claiming that it would have been dangerous if Austria went to war against Serbia. While Albertini is probably correct that Austria would not initiate a war against Serbia because of the dangers entailed, it also seems reasonable to believe that Austria would go to war if provoked by Serbia.

³¹By 1905, ninety percent of Serbia's exports went to Austria-Hungary. David MacKenzie, *Violent Solutions: Revolutions, Nationalism, and Secret Societies in Europe to 1918*, (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1996), p. 239.

³²Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:141-142.

³³ A.J.P Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-191: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 206-212.

The Balkans gained renewed prominence in 1905 when Belgrade sought to gain greater economic and political independence from Austria. When the Austro-Serbian trade treaty expired in 1905, the two sides made a provisional agreement that provided them with the time needed to negotiate a new treaty.³⁴ These negotiations, however, did not go well. In an attempt to maintain its dominance over Serbia, Vienna proposed draconian terms to further reduce Serbia's economic freedom. These demands clashed with Belgrade's policy to free Serbia from Austria-Hungary's control. Nikola Pasic, the Serbian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, recognized that Serbia would suffer if he rejected Austria's terms, but he also wanted Serbia to maintain its independence. He wrote "perhaps there will be an economic war. There was no way out if the independence of our country was to be protected. We will pay with material sacrifices."³⁵ Pasic, therefore, rejected the proposed treaty in order to maintain Serbia's independence.

Serbia also tried to increase its independence, while complicating the Austro-Serbian trade negotiations in the process, when Belgrade agreed to the Serbo-Bulgarian customs treaty.³⁶ This treaty, which was signed on June 22, 1905, created a virtual free trade zone between the two countries that would lead to a customs union in March 1917. For Belgrade, the most immediate effect of this treaty was to provide Serbia with an export route that Austria did not control. Serbia could transport goods through Bulgaria's seaports, thereby reducing the control that Vienna could exercise over Serbia's economy.

These attempts to gain greater independence threatened the Dual Monarchy's interests.³⁷ As Serbia's independence increased, Belgrade would become freer to implement a nationalist foreign policy to unite all South Slavs within Serbia. Since a large number of Slavs lived in Hungary and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this policy posed a serious threat to the unity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Furthermore, Austria believed that Serbia's actions, particularly the Serbo-Bulgarian

³⁴Discussing the negotiations and the problems that occurred during this time is Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West*, pp. 180-209.

³⁵Quoted in Alex N. Dragnich, *Serbia, Nikola Pasic, and Yugoslavia*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974), pp.94.

³⁶*Ibid*, pp. 180-182 and Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 546-548.

³⁷Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, pp. 277-279; and Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West*, pp. 182-183.

agreement, were a first step towards the creation of an alliance of Balkans states: maybe even the union of Serbia and Bulgaria. If this belief was true, Austria would face a grave threat from the Balkan Slavs.³⁸ The *Neue Frie Presse* expressed this fear on January 3, 1906, saying “the conclusion of such an agreement is a symptom of the endless agitation and ambition prevailing amongst the Balkan states, of the continual scheming and intriguing, which...Austria-Hungary...will be [un]able to pass over in silence.”³⁹ If Vienna was correct, the Balkan alliance or large Serbian state that would arise from this process would pose a serious threat to Austria’s control over the Slavs living in the Dual Monarchy.

In response to Belgrade’s attempts to extricate Serbia from Austria’s web of control, Vienna tried to economically coerce Belgrade into agreeing to Austria’s demands⁴⁰ and, according to one Italian, to crush “all aspirations to independence in that nation [Serbia] and to...[hinder] the formation of any bond of solidarity between the peoples of one kin.”⁴¹ In what came to be known as the “Pig War,” Vienna cut off all trade with Serbia, particularly the trade of livestock which was Serbia’s main export. Having successfully used this tactic in the past, Austria expected to succeed again and force Belgrade to submit to Vienna’s demands again.

Vienna was greatly mistaken. Unlike past attempts to coerce Belgrade into accepting Austria’s demands, the “Pig War,” which lasted on and off until 1911, failed to accomplish its goals. In fact, despite the short-term costs suffered by Serbia, particularly by the Serbian peasants, the trade war improved Serbia’s economic position and, in so doing, reduced Austria’s control over Serbia. It did so by forcing Serbia to increase its trade with other European states.⁴² By the end of the

³⁸Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 546.

³⁹Quoted in Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West*, p. 183.

⁴⁰These demands were three-fold. First, Belgrade must withdraw from the Serbo-Bulgarian Customs Treaty. Second, Belgrade must agree to the new Austro-Serbian Trade Treaty that provided Austria with additional advantages over Serbia’s economy. Third, when Belgrade was deciding from where to buy arms, Austria demanded that Serbia buy them from Austria. This demand further complicated Austro-Serbian negotiations because, if Belgrade agreed to Vienna’s demand, Serbia would depend on the Austrians even more. Ibid, pp. 183-199.

⁴¹Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:145.

⁴²The shift in Serbian exports can clearly be seen in the tables below. This data, however, is slightly skewed since it does not control for inflation.

customs war, Austria's share of Serbian trade had declined from 90 percent to 30 percent.⁴³ In addition, Serbia began to develop certain industries, such as food processing, that previous Austro-Serbian trade treaties had caused to remain undeveloped, further increasing Serbia's independence from Austria.

As a result of Serbia's successes, Austria's international prestige declined further. Since the late 1860s when the Hungarians gained their autonomy, Austria had suffered from domestic divisions that limited its ability to act in the international arena.⁴⁴ These divisions caused a decline in Austria's prestige. Further exacerbating the perception of this decline was Germany's aggressive

SERBIAN IMPORTS IN DINARS:

Country	1906	1907
Austria-Hungary	22.2	25.6
Germany	9.7	20.3
England and her colonies	4.6	10.2
Italy	0.9	2.3
France	1.1	2.4
Holland	0.2	1.1
Turkey	1.8	3.3

SERBIAN EXPORTS IN DINARS:

Country	1906	1907
Austria-Hungary	30	12.9
Germany	19	32.9
Italy	0.5	4.9
Russia	0.2	3.1
Belgium	6.3	13.0

⁴³Ibid, p. 208.

⁴⁴Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1:191.

foreign policy.⁴⁵ During the European crises of the early 1900s, Austria appeared to be a subordinate actor who followed Germany's lead, not an active participant with independent interests and capabilities. Serbia's successful actions provided further evidence of Austria's weakness, further weakening Austria's prestige.

In 1906, Baron Alois von Aehrenthal, who replaced Count Goluchowski as foreign minister, decided to try to solve Austria's Slav problem and restore Austria's prestige by adopting an aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans.⁴⁶ Specifically, Aehrenthal sought to rid Austria of the Serbian threat to the Austro-Hungarian Empire's territorial integrity. The first step in his plan was to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁷ By annexing these provinces, Aehrenthal expected to remove all Serbian hopes of acquiring them. Then, at some future date, the Monarchy would provide the Habsburg Slavs with a share of the political power, thereby creating a tripartite monarchy. Providing the Slavs with a say in the Empire's decision-making, according to Aehrenthal, would cause them to become loyal to the Empire instead of to Serbia. His reasoning was explained by one of his subordinates in the foreign affairs ministry,

It did not escape Aehrenthal's attention that in the South Slav peoples of the Monarchy, though living separated in three different administrative territories, thought of unity was beginning to develop, and he was of the opinion that this thought of unity, loyal to Austria as it was and devoid of all irredentist tinge, deserved the friendly regard and favour of those directing the affairs of the Monarchy. Since the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could not withdraw without committing a sort of political hari-kiri, while on the other hand, without Bosnia-Herzegovina the Monarchy's South Slav problem could not be solved in the way indicated above, Aehrenthal recognized that the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the pre-condition of any further step towards a satisfactory solution of the Monarchy's Southern Slav question.⁴⁸

The final step in Aehrenthal's plan was the partition of Serbia between Bulgaria and Austria.⁴⁹ As a result of their competition for influence in Macedonia, tensions between Bulgaria

⁴⁵Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, pp. 290-291, 294-295; and Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, p. 61,

⁴⁶Ibid, pp. 66, 68.

⁴⁷Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:191-194.

⁴⁸Quoted in *ibid*, 1:192.

⁴⁹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 197,200, 205; Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years*, p. 187; and Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 11-13.

and Serbia were high. Aehrenthal sought to use these tensions to gain Bulgaria's support against Serbia. Bulgaria would annex all Serbian territory populated by Bulgars and Austria would annex the rest, providing Austria with secure frontiers: a large Bulgarian state that would owe its status to Vienna's generosity and no Serbian state on its southern borders to spread nationalist propaganda among the Balkan Slavs.

6.1.3 The Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

To annex the occupied provinces, Austria needed Russian support, or at least assurances that Russia would not intervene. The strength of Russian slavophilism and Russia's support for Serbia made it difficult for Vienna to gain this support until 1906, when A.P. Izvolsky, an ambitious man, became Russia's foreign minister.⁵⁰ At this time, Russian warships could not travel through the Straits, and Izvolsky wished to alter the Straits regime to allow Russian warships through the them,⁵¹ thereby accomplishing two goals.⁵² First, Russia considered the opening of the Straits to be a historic right. By opening the Straits, St. Petersburg would be able to restore some of the honor and prestige it had lost with its defeat against the Japanese.⁵³ Second, St. Petersburg considered the Straits to be important for Russian commerce and defense.

Russia's military weakness prevented Izvolsky from acting unilaterally to achieve his goal, forcing him to use diplomacy. In a memorandum of July 2, 1908, Izvolsky offered to support Austria's annexation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar in exchange for Vienna's support for changes in the Straits regime.⁵⁴ Since these two issues were part of the Great Power rules of the game,⁵⁵ Izvolsky did not expect each side to unilaterally implement any changes. Instead, he

⁵⁰Discussing Izvolsky's foreign policy is Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 217-218.

⁵¹M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 279-281.

⁵²For a discussion of the Straits, see Barbara Jelavich, *The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 13-24, 48-56, 85-151; and Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 1:361-364.

⁵³Geyer, *Russian Imperialism*, pp. 252-253, 275.

⁵⁴Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 9-10.

⁵⁵The status of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak were governed by the Treaty of Berlin, and the Straits regime was governed by long standing rules that were codified in 1841 and 1856.

sought an Austro-Russian agreement that the two powers would then present to the other Great Powers. He made his position clear in his memorandum to Aehrenthal when he wrote

We continue to be of the opinion that the question of modification of things created by Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, that is to say, the annexation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, possesses an eminently European character and is not of a nature to be adjusted by a separate understanding between Russia and Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, we are ready to recognize that the same reservation applies to the question of Constantinople, its adjacent territory and the Straits. Nevertheless in view of the extreme importance to the two countries to see the two questions mentioned above adjusted in conformity with their reciprocal interests, the Imperial government would be ready to enter upon a discussion in a spirit of friendly reciprocity.⁵⁶

While Aehrenthal appreciated the spirit of cooperation contained in Izvolsky's memorandum, he did not immediately reply. The problem with Izvolsky's offer was that it provided Russia with the "lion's share" of the gains.⁵⁷ Austria would be allowed to annex the two provinces, a right to which Russia had approved in previous agreements, while Russia gained new rights.⁵⁸ When Izvolsky made this offer, these agreements were still secret. He did not know of them and, as a consequence, believed that was making a generous offer.⁵⁹

More important for explaining the delay were events in the Ottoman Empire. On July 6, 1908, members of the Turkish military in Macedonia revolted against Sultan Abdul Hamid, and the revolution quickly spread.⁶⁰ The leaders of this revolt, known as the Young Turks, looked at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and blamed it on the corruption and autocratic rule of the Sultan. To address this problem, they sought the removal of the Sultan and the restoration of the constitution of 1876. This constitution provided all citizens—Christians and Muslims—with equal rights and responsibilities within the Empire. By adopting it, the Young Turks hoped to create greater loyalty to the empire from its minorities, which, in turn, would help prevent the further

⁵⁶Quoted in *ibid*, p. 9.

⁵⁷Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:196.

⁵⁸Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, pp. 218-219.

⁵⁹Dwight E. Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years: The Diplomatic Background of World War I, 1902-1914*, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1974), p.193.

⁶⁰Discussing the revolt are Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 1-14; and A.L. Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1923*, (New York: Longman, 1998), pp. 20-38.

disintegration of the empire.

This revolution helped convince Aehrenthal that the time to annex the provinces had come by creating temporary windows of opportunity. Militarily, the revolution created a window of opportunity. Following the revolution, events were unsettled in the Ottoman Empire, and the Empire's military forces focused their attentions on the internal turmoil, which would limit their ability to oppose Austria's annexation.⁶¹ If Vienna ever needed to negotiate with the Porte, Aehrenthal believed that the Porte would recognize the weakness of its position and concede without making any significant demands. He, therefore, did not consider offering any concessions to the Turks for their losses. The political situation also created a closing window of opportunity for Austria.⁶² Because of the new Turkish government's focus on equality within the Ottoman Empire, Austrian leaders worried that Constantinople might seek to reassert its authority in the two occupied provinces by offering them a degree of self-government within the structure of the Empire. As it was, Turkish newspapers favored inviting Bosnian representatives to the Ottoman parliament in Constantinople. Vienna also feared that the Bosnians would take advantage of the unsettled situation and create an independent Bosnian parliament. Either of these possibilities would reduce Austria's control over the provinces and, with it, any justification for annexation. Aehrenthal, therefore, believed that he needed to act soon or he might never be able to annex the provinces.

In early September 1908, Aehrenthal sought to shore up allied—namely Italian and German—support when he met with the Italian foreign minister, Tittoni, and the German foreign secretary, Schoen.⁶³ In these meetings, Aehrenthal expressed his view that Bosnia and Herzegovina were Austrian territories and would eventually be annexed, although he failed to inform them that annexation was imminent. With Schoen, Aehrenthal went further by explaining that his Balkan policy included the partition of Serbia between Austria and Bulgaria. In so doing, Aehrenthal

⁶¹Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 18, 100.

⁶²Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:205; and F.R. Bridge, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, 1900-1918," in *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, edited by Marian Kent, (Boston, MA: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 31-51, in particular see p. 38.

⁶³Discussing this meeting is Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:202-206; and Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 14-16.

expected to eliminate the threat of Serbia's revolutionary nationalism posed.⁶⁴ These conversations led Aehrenthal to believe that neither Italy nor Germany would actively oppose the annexation.

All that remained for Vienna was to gain Russia's approval. To this end, Aehrenthal and Izvolsky arranged to meet at Izvolsky's Buchlau castle.⁶⁵ The two men discussed the issue of Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Russia's desire to open the Straits to Russian warships. Since no notes were taken, the details of any agreement cannot be completely known. Aehrenthal claimed that they agreed on three issues. First, Russia "would assume a friendly and benevolent attitude" if Austria annexed the two provinces.⁶⁶ In exchange, Vienna would adopt the same attitude towards a change of the Straits convention. Second, if Bulgaria declared independence and Crete joined Greece, neither power would consider these changes to represent a change in the status quo. Third, neither Serbia nor Montenegro would gain any compensation for Austria's gains. Aehrenthal claimed that this settled the issues between them.

Izvolsky's interpretation of the Buchlau meeting differed from Aehrenthal's.⁶⁷ Although they discussed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he did not believe that they had not reached a formal agreement. Izvolsky also claimed that he informed Aehrenthal that, even though Russia did not consider the annexation of the two provinces to be justification for war, it would require a conference of the Powers to alter the Treaty of Berlin, which defined the status of the occupied provinces. Helping to support Izvolsky's position was the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897 in which St. Petersburg clearly stated that Austria must obtain Great Power approval prior to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶⁸ It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that Izvolsky did not knowingly agree to the outright annexation of Bosnia without European approval.

Also influencing Vienna were events in Bulgaria. In the two months prior to the annexation

⁶⁴Aehrenthal believed that by allowing Bulgaria to annex Balkan territory populated by Bulgarians, a sated Bulgaria with coterminous ethnic and territorial borders would result. Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:204-205.

⁶⁵On this meeting, see Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:206-206-210; and Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 19-29.

⁶⁶Quoted in *ibid*, p. 20

⁶⁷Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:207-210

⁶⁸Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, p. 212.

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, rumors swirled that Bulgaria was going to declare its independence. Since the Congress of Berlin, Bulgaria had been an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire. And, since that time, Bulgaria had recognized the problems associated with this status.⁶⁹ Finally, in 1907, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria decided that Bulgaria should declare independence when the opportunity arose.

The opportunity presented itself when the Young Turk revolution occurred. The confusion that followed the revolution provided Bulgaria with the opportunity to make territorial gains. But, more importantly, the Ottoman nationalism of the revolutionaries threatened the existing territorial borders of Bulgaria.⁷⁰ In 1885, Bulgaria had gained control over the Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia. Now, many Bulgarians feared that the Young Turks would try to reclaim this province. To avoid this outcome, Ferdinand took advantage of a minor incident and declared independence on October 5, 1908.⁷¹

Aehrenthal used Bulgaria to his advantage.⁷² As has already been stated, he hoped to use Bulgaria to help destroy the threat posed to the Empire by Serbia and by Serbian nationalism. In addition, he hoped that a Bulgarian declaration of independence, which was also a violation of the Treaty of Berlin, would divert some of the protests from his actions. To this end, Aehrenthal expressed his support for Bulgaria on several occasions.⁷³ In March and August 1908, Aehrenthal made it clear that Austria would not oppose Bulgaria's independence, although he advised Ferdinand to wait. Then, in September, Prince Ferdinand visited Budapest and met with Aehrenthal. Aehrenthal expressed his belief to Ferdinand that recent events in Turkey might force Vienna to address the issue of Bosnia. He went on to say that

Bulgaria should not neglect an opportunity which was perhaps favourable to realize her

⁶⁹Mentioning some of these disadvantages is Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 308-309.

⁷⁰Ibid, p. 309.

⁷¹Discussing Bulgaria's declaration of independence are ibid, pp. 307-314; Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 217-218; and Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 30-33.

⁷²Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, pp. 303-304; and Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 31.

⁷³Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 217; and Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 30-31.

legitimate wishes and allow to pass unused the superiority which the Principality enjoyed in the Balkans by virtue of its army, so long as it could be maintained at its present strength.⁷⁴

With these statements, Aehrenthal helped convince Ferdinand to decide on a prompt declaration of independence while also trying to reduce the problems that would result when he announced Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6.1.4 The Bosnian Crisis

The Austrian decision to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina put Russia and Serbia in a particularly difficult position. Austria's precipitous action caused serious problems for Izvolsky and his plans. Izvolsky had expected Aehrenthal to give him more time before proceeding with the annexation, as his actions clearly demonstrate. Following the Buchlau meeting, he took a brief vacation and then started a tour of the European capitals where he hoped to gain support for the opening of the Straits.⁷⁵ When he arrived in Paris on October 4th, Izvolsky was surprised to learn of the impending annexation of the two provinces. Aehrenthal's swift announcement prevented Izvolsky from laying the groundwork needed for him to accomplish his goals. First, he needed to gain the support of the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to change the Straits regime. Second, he needed to prepare the Russian public for the Austrian annexation of territories populated by Slavs. Russians kinship with the Balkan Slavs, based on their common religion, caused many to consider Russia to be the protector of the Balkan Slavs. Izvolsky knew of this attitude and that many Russians considered it heresy to allow Austria to annex Slav territory. By not preparing the public for Austria's actions, Izvolsky guaranteed public opposition to his Balkan policy. As expected, the people opposed his policy, putting pressure on the Russian Prime Minister, Count Peter Stolypin, to disavow it.⁷⁶

Aehrenthal's actions were made worse because they violated the Buchlau agreement. Izvolsky had made it clear that the right to annex the two provinces involved a modification of the Treaty of Berlin and, therefore, could not be settled by an Austro-Russian agreement alone. Any

⁷⁴This quote comes from a memorandum of the conversation and can be found in Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 31.

⁷⁵Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:210.

⁷⁶Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:221-222; and Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years*, pp. 189-190.

modification of the Treaty would require a European conference.⁷⁷ By presenting Europe with a *fait accompli*, Aehrenthal was violating their agreement.

The Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina also created tensions between Belgrade and Vienna because it posed two significant threats to Serbia. First, by annexing the two provinces, Austria created a serious obstacle to Belgrade's ability to implement its national policy.⁷⁸ Serbia considered the people of the two provinces to be ethnic Serbs, and planned for them eventually to unite with Serbia. The Serbs could continue to hold out hope for unification as long as Austria-Hungary only occupied the territories, but once it annexed them, these hopes were crushed.⁷⁹ Second, and most importantly, Belgrade considered Austria's actions to pose a threat to the independence, even the very existence, of Serbia.⁸⁰ Some Serbian leaders went so far as to expect Austria to use the next opportunity to take control of Serbia.

The strong nationalist reaction in Serbia also put pressure on the leaders in Belgrade to respond to Austria's actions. In Serbia, the citizens quickly and violently reacted to the Austrian annexation of territory populated by fellow Serbs.⁸¹ Protests erupted in Belgrade, some of which turned violent, forcing the police to intervene. Many of these protesters supported war against Austria to free Bosnia. Just as important was the creation of the *Narodna Odbrana*, also known as

⁷⁷This interpretation clearly comes through in Izvolsky's memorandum to Aehrenthal of July 2, 1908, where Izvolsky stated that

“We continue particularly to be of the opinion that the question of the modification of the state of things created by Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, that is to say, the annexation of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, possess an eminently European character and is not of a nature to be justified by a separate understanding between Russia and Austria.”

Quoted in Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 9.

⁷⁸Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 556.

⁷⁹Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920*, (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1977), p. 216.

⁸⁰Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 222.

⁸¹On the public's reaction to the annexation, see Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 558; and Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 46-47.

the “National Defense.”⁸² This organization mobilized Serbian resistance to the annexation. To achieve this goal, it quickly developed a guerilla army, enlisting and training thousands of Serbs who lived in Serbia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also spread nationalist propaganda among the populace of the occupied provinces in order to counter Vienna’s attempts to gain their loyalty.

With temperatures high, the Serbian government quickly responded to Vienna’s actions. First, Belgrade ordered the mobilization of 120,000 troops, and the Assembly obtained a 16 million dinar war loan.⁸³ Milovan Milovanovic, the Serbian foreign minister, also issued a protest. On October 7th, he stated Belgrade’s position that the *status quo* should be restored. If not, he demanded guarantees for Serbia’s territorial integrity.⁸⁴ Then, on October 12th, he escalated his demands by asking for territorial compensation for the Austrian annexation and for Bulgarian independence.⁸⁵

These pressures also forced Russia to respond to Austria’s actions. War, however, was not an option.⁸⁶ The Russian military was still recovering from the Russo-Japanese War and was not ready to fight another war.⁸⁷ Also, the Tsar was unwilling to risk a European war over Vienna’s annexation of two provinces that Austria had occupied for the past thirty years. Furthermore, after checking the archives, St. Petersburg had learned that, on several occasions, Russia had agreed not to oppose Austria’s annexation of the occupied territories.⁸⁸ Russia recognized it had helped create a rule that St. Petersburg would not oppose Austria’s actions. Having agreed to this rule, it would be difficult to oppose it now.

The solution was to organize a conference of the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin. Izvolsky

⁸²Discussing the *Narodna Odbrana* is MacKenzie, *Violent Solutions*, pp. 239-240 and his *Apis: the Congenial Conspirator: the Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 65.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 223.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶D.C.B Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), p. 35.

⁸⁷David G. Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 113.

⁸⁸Lee, *Europe’s Crucial Years*, p. 193.

hoped to accomplish three goals at this conference.⁸⁹ First, the conference would discuss the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bulgarian declaration of independence. Second, the conference would try to find a way to compensate Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey for the changes in the Balkans. Third, Izvol'sky still held out hope that the conference would alter the Straits regime.

To gain support for the conference, Russia turned to the only other Great Power that expressed serious reservations about the Austria's actions, although less vociferously than Russia, Great Britain. London took the position that by unilaterally modifying the Treaty of Berlin, Austria was violating the protocol of 1871.⁹⁰ According to this protocol, no state could revise an international agreement without the approval of all the signatories to the agreement. Since the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin had not approved the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vienna was violating this rule. Consequently, Britain refused to recognize the annexation until the other signatories accepted the change in the status quo.

To a lesser degree, London also opposed the changes in the status quo because Britain wished to gain influence within the Ottoman Empire.⁹¹ For the previous twenty-five years, British political and public opinion had looked unfavorably upon the Ottoman Empire because of its failure to reform. While Britain turned away from Constantinople, Germany filled the vacuum and developed a close relationship with the Ottoman Empire.⁹² The Young Turk revolt provided Britain with an opportunity to change this situation.⁹³ The new leaders claimed a desire for real reform, leading Britain to be favorably inclined towards them while the change of leadership provided Britain with the opportunity to replace German influence. To achieve these goals, London provided the Ottoman

⁸⁹Discussing Russia's interest in a conference is Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 225-226.

⁹⁰Ibid, 1: 226.

⁹¹ See Joseph Heller, *British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire 1908-1914*, (Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass, 1983), pp. 9-28; and R.W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968/1937), p. 615.

⁹²Discussing the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire is Ulrich Trumpener, "Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* edited by Marian Kent, (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 111-140.

⁹³Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993), pp. 398-399.

Empire with diplomatic support during this crisis.

On October 9th, Izvolsky arrived in London to gain British approval for a European conference to address the problems in the Balkans.⁹⁴ At this meeting, it quickly became clear that even though the British government supported a European conference, it would not support Izvolsky's plans to change the Straits regime because it did not want to cause more trouble for the reformist Ottoman government.

We [the British government] could not agree to add to her [Turkey's] hardships by forcing upon her at once the embarrassing question of the Straits. If, later on, the consent of Turkey was obtained, this must be by satisfactory voluntary agreement and not by pressure or squeeze.⁹⁵

Izvolsky, therefore, dropped the idea of changing the Straits regime. In the end, he and Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, agreed upon nine points to be discussed at the conference. Included in these nine points were the status of Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar as well as compensation for Serbia and Montenegro.⁹⁶

While Russia was trying to gain British support for a conference, Belgrade also sought outside assistance. Most Serbian leaders recognized that Serbia was too weak to stand up to Austria without Great Power support. Serbian representatives, therefore, traveled to the capitals of the various Great Powers in an attempt to gain their support for Serbia's demands.⁹⁷ For the most part, Serbia received little support. Berlin was standing behind its Austrian ally. France and Britain expressed their sympathy, but were unwilling to go to war for Serbia.⁹⁸ All of the Great Powers agreed on one thing; Serbia should moderate its behavior.

The most important ally for Serbia, Russia, was also unwilling to go to war for Serbia, in large part because St. Petersburg recognized that the Russian military was weak. In October 1908,

⁹⁴Discussing Izvolsky's negotiations in London is Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 49-54.

⁹⁵Quoted in *ibid*, p. 50.

⁹⁶*Ibid*, p. 54.

⁹⁷Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 223-224.

⁹⁸London and Rome sympathized with Serbia and were willing to try to support Belgrade's interests through diplomacy, but were unwilling to risk war. France, on the other hand, refused to support any territorial compensation for Serbia. Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 68-70 and Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 260.

Prince George of Serbia and Pasic, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, visited St. Petersburg in search of Russian assistance. Instead, the Russian government advised Serbia to be moderate in its demands and its behavior out of fear that Austria would take advantage of the crisis and attack Serbia. This fear led Izvolsky to tell Pasic

Serbia must remain quiet and should do nothing which could provoke Austria and provide an opportunity for annihilating Serbia. Russia is not yet ready with her armaments and cannot now make war, and she is not willing to do so now on account of Bosnia and Herzegovina, come what may.... We Russians have not abandoned the demands for territorial compensation for Serb, but according to all that I have heard, we cannot make them good.⁹⁹

Despite these trepidations, Russia also offered hope. The Russian foreign office informed Pasic that Russia would demand territorial compensation for Serbia. The foreign office went on to say that, if Vienna did not agree to Russia's terms, than it would refuse to recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁰⁰ Even though St. Petersburg continued to say that Russia would not go to war over Bosnia, this information led Belgrade to believe that it would achieve some of its goals. The Tsar further buttressed Serbian hopes when he informed Belgrade that "the Bosnian question will be decided by war" and advised Serbia to prepare for this war by negotiating an "understanding with Turkey" and quietly preparing the Serbian army.¹⁰¹

The opportunity for Serbia to try to negotiate an alliance with Turkey quickly arose when the Porte sought Serbian support.¹⁰² For the Porte, the purpose of these negotiations was to obtain help against the Bulgarian threat. Serbia, on the other hand, sought an ally against Austria. For the next three months, Belgrade and Constantinople negotiated a convention that would determine the rights and responsibilities of each side in the event of a war with Bulgaria or with Austria-Hungary. In the end, they failed to reach an agreement, leading Turkey to negotiate settlements with both Austria and

⁹⁹Memorandum to Pasic, quoted in Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 71-72.

¹⁰⁰Ibid, p. 72.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Discussing these negotiations is Hasan Unal, "An Example of Balkan Diplomacy: Ottoman Foreign Policy During the Bulgarian Independence Crisis, 1908-1909," in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, edited by Gunay Goksu Ozdogan and Kemali Saybasili, (Istanbul: Muhittin Salih EREN, 1995), pp. 37-54, particularly pp. 45-50.

Bulgaria.¹⁰³

In addition to attempts to negotiate a Serbo-Turkish alliance, Belgrade sought an alliance with Montenegro.¹⁰⁴ Montenegro, like Serbia, had interests in the occupied provinces. Ever since the Balkan crises of the mid-1870s, Montenegro had laid claim to Herzegovina. For this reason, the Austrian annexation threatened Montenegro's interests and led the leaders in Cetinje to demand compensation.¹⁰⁵ Prince Nicholas of Montenegro was trying to obtain this compensation through negotiations with Austria, but he recognized that the chances for the negotiations to be successful were slim.¹⁰⁶ He, therefore, was willing to agree to an alliance with Serbia, which was signed on October 24th. In this alliance, the two countries agreed to three key terms.¹⁰⁷ First, the two states would coordinate their diplomatic and military actions. Second, if Austria attacked either state, the other would come to its aid. Third, the alliance divided the two provinces into spheres of influence: Serbia was responsible for Bosnia and Montenegro for Herzegovina.

Despite these reactions, Aehrenthal did not rescind the annexation, but he did tread carefully. Austro-Serbian tensions, Russian opposition, and Turkish refusal to recognize the annexation prevented him from rejecting a European conference outright.¹⁰⁸ Instead, he placed two conditions upon it.¹⁰⁹ He opposed discussion of the annexation of Bosnia. Austria would only take part in the conference if Turkey accepted the annexation and the Powers acknowledged this agreement. He also opposed any discussion of territorial compensation for Serbia and Montenegro. The purpose of the annexation was to reduce the power and prestige of Serbia and the Slav cause, and any territorial compensation might encourage Serbia's aspirations. Nevertheless, he was willing to discuss other

¹⁰³Despite this failure, the negotiations provided the Porte with some benefits in its negotiations with Vienna. See Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 104-105.

¹⁰⁴Discussing the negotiations for a Serbo-Montenegrin alliance is John D. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914*, (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1983), pp. 30-31.

¹⁰⁵Discussing the response of the people and government of Montenegro to the annexation is *ibid*, pp. 22-28.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid*, pp. 28-30 discusses the negotiations.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁸Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 79.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid*, pp. 55-56.

forms of compensation.

Austria confidently took this position for two reasons. First, Vienna had Berlin's support.¹¹⁰ As early as June 23, 1908, Chancellor Bulow of Germany had informed Aehrenthal that "the guiding thought of our Near Eastern policy in the past as in the future must culminate in the desires and interests of our Austro-Hungarian friend and ally." Two days later, he decided that "the aspirations and needs of Austria-Hungary, our friend and ally, are and remain a rule for us."¹¹¹ As the crisis began to unfold and London sought a European conference, Bulow continued to support Austria, declaring that "it was impossible for Germany to abandon her ally, and if Austria-Hungary declined to take part in conference, Germany would decline also."¹¹² Berlin's support went beyond its opposition to the conference; it also included support for Austria's plan to destroy Serbia. Bulow expressed this view to the German Ambassador at Vienna Tschirschky, when he wrote

We have no reason to oppose the fulfilment of these plans. Above all, I do not see why we should oppose the joining to Bulgaria of Serbian territories situated on the Bulgarian frontier and inhabited by Bulgars. The idea that, to this end, Serbia should be partitioned between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria has no terrors for us. We should raise no objection if the merging of the existing Kingdom of Serbia in the Danubian Monarchy should bring the whole Serb people under the Hapsburg sceptre....The consideration of our alliance relationship imperatively demands that with Baron Aehrenthal we avoid all that might be capable of crossing him in this so vital question for Austria-Hungary.¹¹³

Second, even without German support, Aehrenthal believed that he could prevent Russia from intervening. As it was, Aehrenthal recognized that the Russian military was too weak to intervene in support of Serbia.¹¹⁴ He was also able to limit Russia's opposition by threatening to expose past Austro-Russian agreements in which Russia supported Austria's annexation of the occupied provinces.¹¹⁵ In the Budapest Convention, the secret Austro-Russian agreement of 1878, and Izvol'sky's memorandum of July 2, 1908, Russia had agreed to support Austria's annexation of

¹¹⁰Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1:228-233; and Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 57-60, 84-86, 90-99.

¹¹¹Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 229.

¹¹²Quoted in Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 57.

¹¹³Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 231.

¹¹⁴Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe*, pp. 113-114, 116-117.

¹¹⁵Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years*, p. 196; and Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 61-64.

Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar. Publication of these documents, particularly Izvolsky's memorandum, would cause trouble for Izvolsky. He would lose support within Russia for selling out the Balkan Slavs, and Russia would lose prestige among the Balkan Slavs. Finally, if these agreements became public, St. Petersburg might also lose what little British support it had.

Aehrenthal took advantage of these past Russian agreements to threaten Izvolsky and Russia with their public exposure. In early October, he informed Izvolsky that

A direct denial of the fact that between ourselves and Russia negotiation took place which preceded the annexation, will compel me, entirely against my will, to repeat the declarations which I made in the confidential sessions to the Delegations [that Russia had agreed to support Austria's annexation of the occupied provinces], and to repeat with them that I am in a position to offer documentary proof of the declarations made by me.¹¹⁶

Izvolsky took this threat seriously as can be seen by his protests against Aehrenthal's threats to Count Berchtold, the Austrian Ambassador to St. Petersburg.¹¹⁷ These threats and Russia's weak military contributed to Izvolsky's limited calls for a conference, although he still refused to support the annexation.¹¹⁸

Even though Russia was no longer a direct obstacle to Aehrenthal's plans, he still had a problem. He had expected to use Russia's support to help gain the approval of the Great Powers to alter the Treaty of Berlin. Since he did not have this support, he decided to try to obtain Turkish acceptance of the annexation, which he believed would lead the other Powers to accept the new *status quo*.¹¹⁹ This was a significant change in strategy. When Aehrenthal had decided to annex the occupied provinces, he had ignored Turkey because Russian support combined with Turkish military weakness had led him to expect that Turkey would be unable to offer any meaningful resistance to Austria's actions.¹²⁰ Furthermore, he also expected Turkey to recognize that the annexation was defensive in nature.¹²¹ By annexing the two provinces, Vienna felt that Austria was only clarifying

¹¹⁶Quoted in Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 61.

¹¹⁷Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 249-250.

¹¹⁸Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 79-99.

¹¹⁹Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years*, pp. 198-199.

¹²⁰Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 18, 100.

¹²¹*Ibid*, p. 16; and Kent, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire," p. 38.

a somewhat ambiguous situation. According to Aehrenthal, “the mere change from a *de facto* to a *de jure* status” should not lead the Young Turks “to extreme decisions, especially if simultaneously our troops leave the Sandjak and our renunciation of any further acquisition of Turkish territory is thus clearly manifested.”¹²²

When Aehrenthal tried to obtain Turkey’s acceptance of the annexation of the two provinces, Turkey’s attitude surprised him.¹²³ The leaders in Constantinople recognized that they could not reverse Austria’s actions, but they demanded compensation for their loss. One of the main reasons for this demand was the support of the British government.¹²⁴ Not only did the British government inform the Porte that Turkey should receive monetary compensation for its losses, but Sir Edward Grey also assured the Porte that at a conference Britain would support Turkish demands.

Having been given Grey’s assurances that Britain would support the Turks, Constantinople took several actions that made life difficult for Vienna.¹²⁵ First, Turkey protested Austria’s annexation of the occupied provinces. Second, the Young Turks organized a boycott of Austrian goods and shipping.¹²⁶ Third, Constantinople continued to demand a conference to discuss the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Included in this discussion would be the issue of financial compensation for Turkey’s losses. Clearly, Ottoman obstinacy was in large part a result of British support. When Berlin tried to convince the Turks that a conference at which the Bosnian annexation was discussed might lead to other claims against the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans responded “that Great Britain would protect Turkey from the disadvantages of a conference.”¹²⁷

At first, Aehrenthal was unwilling to enter into any substantive negotiations with the Porte; he just wanted Constantinople to accept Vienna’s actions. Nevertheless, he slowly recognized the

¹²²Quoted in Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 16.

¹²³Discussing the Austro-Turkish negotiations is *ibid*, pp. 100-124.

¹²⁴*Ibid*, p. 101.

¹²⁵Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 101-103.

¹²⁶Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 101-102,107; and Bridge, “The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire,” p. 38.

¹²⁷Quoted in Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 102.

need to negotiate with Turkey. The Turkish boycott caused Austrian businessmen to complain to the Austrian government.¹²⁸ Perhaps more importantly, his actions had led to disagreements with Britain, Russia, and Serbia. In fact, Aehrenthal correctly believed that Turkey and Serbia were negotiating an alliance, which could further increase the trouble he would have managing the crisis.¹²⁹ With so many irons in the fire, Aehrenthal decided it would be best to negotiate with Turkey.

These negotiations, however, did not go smoothly. Aehrenthal opposed offering any financial compensation; instead, he offered economic concessions to help Turkey develop its commerce and industry. The Turks rejected this proposal and continued to demand financial compensation. As the diplomatic standstill continued, the number of Turks supporting the boycott grew, increasing the pressure on Austria to offer financial compensation. Aehrenthal, however, continued to oppose negotiations even after Berlin began to push Austria to settle the dispute.¹³⁰ Baron Marschall, the German ambassador at Constantinople, recognized that Austria's tactics were failing. In fact, the Young Turks were becoming bolder in their claims. Marschall reported that "Young Turkish circles are talking of a war with Austria, as if the chances were in favour of Turkey."¹³¹

While Austria was negotiating with the Turks, Serbia continued to oppose the Austrian annexation. As previously stated, following the announcement of Austria's annexation of the two provinces, Belgrade engaged in several hostile actions: Serbia had mobilized 120,000 reservists and obtained a "war credits." In addition, Vienna also knew about Belgrade's negotiations both with Turkey and with Montenegro. These actions led Count Forgach, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade, to believe that Serbia was preparing for war in the spring. He told Aehrenthal

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹Unal, "An Example of Ottoman Diplomacy," pp. 42-50. The Porte approached three Balkan states—Greece, Romania, and Serbia—about a possible alliance against Bulgaria. As an ally of Austria, Romania quickly rejected the offer. While friendly, the negotiations with Greece did not go very far. Serbia, on the other hand, was receptive to the Ottoman offer.

¹³⁰Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 107-110, 115, 117.

¹³¹Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 109.

The minister [Serbian Foreign Minister Milovanovic] does not conceal from a limited circles his conviction that Serbia cannot satisfy her demands in a peaceful manner; so war must be prepared for the spring in order to strike then, in case assistance or intervention can be hoped for.¹³²

Compounding these actions were the activities of the “National Defense” and other Slav nationalist organizations that were helping to create sympathy between the Serbs and the Habsburg Slavs. Furthermore, Belgrade’s continued support for a conference and demand for territorial compensation irritated Vienna. Then, in December the Serbian assembly increased the war credits from 16 million dinars to 34 million dinars.¹³³ Tensions were further exacerbated when Serbia decided to call up its new recruits at the end of January, instead of May.¹³⁴

In response to Serbia’s “impertinent” behavior, Vienna took several actions. First, Austria-Hungary engaged in military preparations: the 15 corps stationed in Bosnia were strengthened and preparations for mobilization against Serbia were underway.¹³⁵ Second, Vienna worked to further its close ties with Germany.¹³⁶ In December 1908, Aehrenthal, upon the recommendation of General Holtzendorf, suggested to Berlin that the German and Austrian general staffs discuss their views of a potential Austro-Russian war. Bulow approved of the plan and also approved of Aehrenthal’s policy, suggesting that “the whole crisis can be brought to a good end by firmness towards Russia and a corresponding conciliatory attitude towards Turkey.”¹³⁷ Holtzendorf quickly took advantage of the offer and wrote to General Helmut von Moltke, the chief of the German general staff. In his letter, Holtzendorf asked Moltke what actions Germany would take if Russia mobilized against Austria.¹³⁸ With the approval of the Kaiser and Bulow, Moltke replied that Germany would enter the war on Austria’s side. Specifically, he wrote

¹³²Quoted in *ibid*, p. 76.

¹³³*Ibid*, p. 145.

¹³⁴*Ibid*, p. 146.

¹³⁵*Ibid*, p. 75, particularly footnote 4.

¹³⁶*Ibid*, pp. 92-99.

¹³⁷Quoted in *ibid*, p. 94.

¹³⁸*Ibid*, p. 95; and Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 269-273.

It is to be anticipated that the moment may come when the patience of the Monarchy towards the Serbian provocations will come to an end. Then there will be hardly anything left for the Monarchy to do but to march into Serbia.

I believe that only an Austrian invasion of Serbia could bring about an eventual active intervention of Russia. This would create the *casus foederis* for Germany. The joint military action which would then begin would—according to the statement of your Excellency—rest on the basis that at first Austria can concentrate only 30 divisions in Galicia against Russia.

At the same moment that Russia mobilizes, Germany will also mobilize and will mobilize her entire army.¹³⁹

Third, Aehrenthal finally decided to settle the dispute with Turkey.¹⁴⁰ He, therefore, offered Turkey 2.5 million Turkish pounds as compensation for the loss of Bosnia.¹⁴¹ Britain and Russia, as well as Germany, approved of the offer and suggested that the Porte accept it. Once compensation was agreed to, Vienna and Constantinople quickly agreed on the terms of the settlement by early January, which they finally signed on February 26, 1909.¹⁴²

6.1.5 The Peaceful Resolution of the Bosnian Crisis

By February, Aehrenthal finally decided that Vienna's relations with Belgrade were reaching their breaking point.¹⁴³ He rightfully claimed that Serbia had no legal rights with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina and, therefore, was not entitled to any political or territorial compensation. With the recently completed Austro-Turkish negotiations and with strong German support, he was prepared to act. He planned to issue an ultimatum to Belgrade to force Serbia to accept the new *status quo*. In this ultimatum, "Austria would demand not only immediate cessation of military armaments, but also guarantees that the Serbian government would stop all further intrigues and propaganda in Bosnia and Croatia....Austria would require Serbia to reverse her policy completely."¹⁴⁴ If Belgrade did not agree to Austria's terms by the end of March, Vienna would impose them by force of arms.

¹³⁹Quoted in Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 96.

¹⁴⁰Ibid, p. 117.

¹⁴¹Ibid, pp. 117-118.

¹⁴²Discussing the problems that arose is *ibid*, pp. 119-123.

¹⁴³Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 275-276.

¹⁴⁴Quoted in Schmitt, *The Annexation of Bosnia*, pp. 155-156.

When St. Petersburg and London learned that Aehrenthal was planning to issue an ultimatum to Serbia, they feared the potential consequences.¹⁴⁵ Izvolsky recognized that the recent Austro-Turkish agreement freed Aehrenthal's hands of the Turkish problem, making an Austro-Serbian compromise more difficult to achieve.¹⁴⁶ If Austria did not offer any compromises, it would be difficult for Russia and Serbia to extricate themselves from the crisis without caving in to Aehrenthal and his high-handed tactics. Britain also feared the consequences of an Austrian ultimatum. Leaders in Belgrade could not accept Austria's terms unless all the Great Powers, particularly Russia, forced them upon Serbia. London, therefore, feared that an Austro-Serbian war might result, forcing Russia to come to the defense of its Slav brethren.¹⁴⁷ If Britain did not support Russia, the Anglo-Russian entente would end.¹⁴⁸ Consequently, Britain might, then, be forced to go to war to protect the entente.

To prevent these dangerous possibilities from occurring, Grey proposed that the Great Powers intervene. He would ask Aehrenthal what recent Serbian actions posed a threat to Vienna and what concessions Austria would be willing to make to settle the crisis. With this information, he believed he would be able to convince Serbia to accept Austria's actions.¹⁴⁹ Both Russia and France approved of this policy, but Germany did not.¹⁵⁰ Bulow believed that Austria had been extremely patient with Serbia, and the "appearance of having given way to external pressure" would be a blow to Vienna's prestige. He went on to suggest that the Powers should convince Belgrade to stop all actions that were provoking Austria. Because of Bulow's refusal to support the proposal, Grey never implemented it.

It was becoming clear that Serbia would have to offer serious concession to Austria.

¹⁴⁵Ibid, p. 150.

¹⁴⁶Ibid, pp. 146, 161.

¹⁴⁷The British recognized that Russia was in no position to go to war, but worried that slavophilism would force Russia to intervene. Ibid, p. 155.

¹⁴⁸Ibid, p. 150.

¹⁴⁹Ibid, pp. 150-151.

¹⁵⁰Ibid, pp. 153-155.

Following the failure of Grey's proposal, the French government offered to intervene and recommended to London and St. Petersburg that Belgrade should drop all demands for territorial compensation and enter into bilateral negotiations with Vienna.¹⁵¹ While Paris's actions helped cause Grey to recognize that Serbia must abandon its claim for territorial compensation,¹⁵² they caused serious trouble and consternation for Russia.¹⁵³ Russia had been supporting Serbia's call for a Great Power conference that would address the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and territorial compensation for Serbia. It would be difficult for Russia to change course. Recent events put St. Petersburg in a difficult position. St. Petersburg feared that Austria was more likely to go to war now that Berlin had declared its support for Austria, and at a time when Russia was not capable of going to war now. Compounding this problem was the loss of allied—specifically British and French—support for Russia's position.

This situation led Izvolsky to advise Serbia to give up its demand for territorial concessions. On February 27th, he wrote to Belgrade saying that

We have been able to convince ourselves through various sources that the Powers are not disposed to support the idea of a territorial aggrandisement of Serbia. The Royal government must deduce from this that all efforts to move the Powers to support such demands would remain futile and that Serbia can be assured of the sympathies of the Powers only if she refrains from insisting on demands which must lead to an armed conflict with Austria. We deem it necessary to warn the Royal government against adopting any attitude which might expose it to such a danger. We hope that Serbia, as she has declared, will remain true to her commitments to follow the advice of the Great Powers. At the same time, we believe that the Serbian government must, in the prevailing circumstances, clearly declare to these Powers that it does not insist on its territorial demands and that it will rely upon the decisions of the Powers in all pending questions. These could then devote all their efforts to protecting the interests of Serbia.¹⁵⁴

Izvolsky specifically told Belgrade to present a note to the Powers that expressed its desire to be on good terms with Austria, that rejected any demands for compensation, and that left all issues in the

¹⁵¹Ibid, p. 159.

¹⁵²Ibid, pp. 159-160.

¹⁵³Ibid, pp. 161-166.

¹⁵⁴Quoted in *ibid*, p. 164.

hands of the Powers.¹⁵⁵ The Serbs accepted Izvolsky's advice and sent a note on March 10th.¹⁵⁶

The note, however, failed to resolve the crisis. Following the signing of the Austro-Turkish agreement, and sure of German support, Aehrenthal escalated his demands.¹⁵⁷ He demanded that Belgrade accept the Austro-Turkish agreement and guarantee that its behavior will be "correct and peaceful." Once Serbia agreed to these demands, Austria would be willing to bilaterally negotiate an economic agreement with Serbia. Direct Austro-Serbian negotiations were important for Vienna because Austrian leaders believed that "the question is exclusively one between ourselves and Serbia and one therefore in which no third party has a right to interfere."¹⁵⁸

Both St. Petersburg and London expressed their anger at Austria's attitude,¹⁵⁹ but to no real effect. Aehrenthal knew that neither Russia nor Serbia wanted war and that they were both willing to make concessions.¹⁶⁰ He, therefore, continued to press his demands and gave Serbia until the end of March to accept their terms. Otherwise, the Austrian army would march into Serbia.¹⁶¹ To bolster the strength of this threat, Vienna reinforced its troops along the border.¹⁶² Russia, with British support, believed that it was inappropriate to force Serbia to accept the Austro-Turkish agreement before the Great Powers had accepted it, and, therefore, refused to order Belgrade to accept the agreement until a conference had met and examined the annexation issue.¹⁶³

Berlin decided to assert its influence and authority in the process in the middle of March.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁵Ibid, p. 170.

¹⁵⁶For the text of the note, see *ibid*, p. 171.

¹⁵⁷Ibid, pp. 171-172, 180.

¹⁵⁸Quoted in *ibid*, p. 172.

¹⁵⁹Ibid, pp. 172-173.

¹⁶⁰Ibid, p. 174.

¹⁶¹Ibid, p. 174.

¹⁶²Stevenson, *Armaments and the Coming of War*, pp. 121-122.

¹⁶³Ibid, pp. 176-178

¹⁶⁴For a complete discussion of Berlin's actions, see *Ibid*, pp. 186-207; and Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 279-288.

Bulow suggested that the Powers accept the Austrian annexation by notes. Russia, in turn, would use its influence in Belgrade to gain Serbia's acceptance of Austria's demands.¹⁶⁵ Even though the solution offered a way out, Izvolsky believed that it would eliminate the need for a conference.¹⁶⁶ To deal with this concern, Russia accepted the proposal while also saying that this acceptance "does not exclude the necessity of the meeting of a European conference."¹⁶⁷ This reaction infuriated some in Germany, leading Bulow to issue a statement that Russia took to be an ultimatum: accept the proposal or suffer the consequences.¹⁶⁸ Bulow felt confident expressing this ultimatum because he knew that Russia would not go to war. Izvolsky had informed Bulow that Russia was not preparing for war and would not go to war even if Austria invaded Belgrade.

This threat had the desired effect. Russia was unprepared for a war against Austria, much less against Austria and Germany.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, Russia accepted Bulow's solution on March 23. With Russia's capitulation, Serbia was left without a leg to stand on and agreed to Austria's demands on March 31, 1909, ending the Bosnian crisis.

6.1.6 The Turco-Bulgarian Crisis and Its Resolutions

Concurrent with the Austro-Turkish crisis and negotiations was the Turco-Bulgarian crisis and negotiations. This crisis also held the potential for war. The Porte, as with the Serbs in 1885, believed that Bulgarian actions threatened Ottoman interests in Macedonia and, therefore, demanded the return of Eastern Rumelia. The Great Powers, however, opposed war, and because of their efforts, a peaceful settlement was arranged.

Initially, when Bulgaria declared independence, the Porte made strong demands. Turkey demanded the restoration of the *status quo*, going so far as to threaten war, if necessary, to retain the

¹⁶⁵Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 187-188.

¹⁶⁶*Ibid*, pp. 188-189.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid*, pp. 191-192.

¹⁶⁸*Ibid*, pp. 189-196.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid*, pp. 200-201.

Porte's control over Eastern Rumelia.¹⁷⁰ The Porte believed that Eastern Rumelia was necessary as a buffer between Bulgaria and Macedonia. Without it, "Bulgaria will inevitably have designs on Macedonia, which would lead to a great conflagration."¹⁷¹ Bulgaria, however, refused to make any concessions to the Turks. As a result of these tensions, rumors spread that both sides were mobilizing their forces and war seemed to be a serious possibility.

Fortunately for the sake of peace, the Powers opposed war. The European situation was dangerous enough with the Austro-Russian crisis and the Austro-Serbian crisis. A Turco-Bulgarian war could provide the spark needed to ignite a larger war. France, therefore, decided to intervene in the crisis. Paris informed Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria that if Bulgaria goes to war, the Powers would demand that he cede Eastern Rumelia to Turkey.¹⁷² This threat had the desired effect. Ferdinand assured the French that he would not go to war. He also offered the first olive branch by saying that Bulgaria was willing to compensate Constantinople for its losses. These assurances satisfied Turkey sufficiently to stop its mobilization and led to negotiations.

The negotiations, however, did not go smoothly.¹⁷³ The Bulgarian government was willing to pay 100 million francs for the Oriental Railway and to replace the Eastern Rumelian tribute. In exchange, Bulgaria wanted the Turks to allow the headquarters for the Bulgarian church to remain in Constantinople and to guarantee the protection of the Bulgarians living in Macedonia. The Turks, however, wanted more. They demanded that Bulgaria compensate them for the loss of the Eastern Rumelia and the loss of the Bulgarian tribute as well as for their part of the Turkish debt. This was more than the Bulgarians were willing to pay. Sofia, therefore, asked the powers to help while also threatening to mobilize troops.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰Eastern Rumelia had been a separate territory from Bulgaria in 1878 when Bulgaria gained its autonomy. In 1885, the two territories united under the rule of the same Prince. Nevertheless, the Porte continued to consider Eastern Rumelia to be part of the Ottoman Empire and continued to receive tribute for it.

¹⁷¹Quoted in Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 126.

¹⁷²Ibid, p. 127.

¹⁷³The most complete discussion of the negotiations is *ibid*, pp. 127-143. Also useful, are Unal, "An Example of Balkan Diplomacy" and Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 313-314.

¹⁷⁴Schmitt, *The Annexation*, p. 128.

Unfortunately, the Powers were divided about how to resolve the crisis. Austria supported Bulgaria and supported Great Power mediation in Constantinople. Britain, on the other hand, supported the Porte, believing that Turkey had been more willing to compromise than Bulgaria. Grey believed the Turks were entitled to 125 million to 250 million francs as compensation, which was significantly more than Sofia was offering.¹⁷⁵

To break the deadlock, Izvolsky suggested that “‘some Power should propose a fixed amount’ for Bulgaria to pay.”¹⁷⁶ Grey agreed to this plan under the condition that the amount be no less than 125 million francs.¹⁷⁷ The problem with Grey’s proposal was that Bulgaria could not afford to pay 125 million francs. Both France, who happened to be the main lender to Bulgaria, and Russia claimed that the most Bulgaria could afford to pay was 100 million francs.¹⁷⁸ At the same time, Sofia refused to offer even that much, instead offering 82 million francs.¹⁷⁹ Izvolsky again came to the rescue. He proposed that Bulgaria pay Russia 82 million francs, on very favorable terms, and Russia would forgive 125 million francs worth of war reparations that the Turks owed Russia from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877.¹⁸⁰ On April 19, 1909, the agreement was signed.

6.2 THE BALKAN WARS, 1912-1913

As a result of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, several newly independent Balkan states came into existence, Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. When they gained their independence their territorial borders did not coincide with the borders that they desired. Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria wanted to expand into Macedonia and Albania in order to acquire territory populated by their ethnic brethren.¹⁸¹ Serbia and Montenegro wanted to acquire Albanian

¹⁷⁵Ibid, p. 128.

¹⁷⁶Quoted in *ibid*, p. 130.

¹⁷⁷Ibid, p. 131.

¹⁷⁸Ibid, pp. 132, 135.

¹⁷⁹Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 313.

¹⁸⁰Schmitt, *The Annexation*, pp. 135-143.

¹⁸¹Romania’s borders also failed to encompass all Romanians. Unfortunately, the territories Bucharest desired were part of Austria-Hungary—Transylvania—and Russia—Bessarabia.

territory in order to provide for their security.

These states, however, did not try to reach their goals until 1912. Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, had conflicting territorial ambitions. Greece and Bulgaria sought to acquire southern Macedonia, and Serbia and Bulgaria sought to acquire northern Macedonia. These conflicting ambitions prevented them from jointly acting against the Ottoman Empire. Great Power politics also hindered action by the Balkan states. Austria and Russia, the two Great Powers with the greatest interests in the region, developed rules to help maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans. As long as the Great Powers strongly opposed change in the Balkans, the Balkan states would not be able to achieve their ambitions.

The situation began to change in 1908 with the Bosnian crisis. With this crisis, Austria abrogated the rules of the game and re-opened the Eastern Question. What little influence the rules had was further weakened when Italy declared war on Turkey in 1911. These actions demonstrated that the rules supporting the *status quo* had lost their strength. Furthermore, the Bosnian Crisis created divisions between Russia and Austria that raised the possibility that Russia might support the Balkan states in an effort to balance the growing Austrian threat. The possibility now existed that the Balkan states could seek to satisfy their interests without unified Great Power intervention to prevent them.

The final impetus came with the turmoil in the Ottoman Empire in 1911 and 1912. In addition to the Italo-Turkish War, which distracted the Turks from the Balkan threat, the Turkish government faced rebellions in Albania and Macedonia. These rebellions had two effects. First, they demonstrated to the Balkan states that the Ottoman Empire's complete collapse was coming soon. Second, they led to the mistreatment of some Balkan people, mostly Bulgarian but also Greeks and Serbs, thereby increasing the power of nationalism. At the same time, divisions among the political groups in Constantinople distracted and weakened the Turkish government.

The Balkan states, therefore, believed that the opportunity to act had come. They negotiated a series of alliances, known as the Balkan League. These alliances provided for united action by the Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire. With these alliances and the belief that Russia would support them, they believed that they were strong enough to defeat the Ottoman forces. On October 12, 1912, they declared war against Turkey.

The war was an overwhelming success for the Balkan states. Within a couple of months, the Turks had been evicted from all but two fortresses in Albania, from Macedonia, and from most of Thrace. Because of the demands of the Balkan states and Turkish domestic politics, this victory did not lead to peace until April 1913.

Because of their interests, the Great Powers took the initiative to impose a territorial settlement on the Balkan states. They would allow the Balkan states to divide Macedonia, a small part of Albania, and part of Thrace among themselves. Most of Albania, however, went to the newly created Albanian state.

This territorial settlement created difficulties for the Balkan states. In the treaties that created the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, the two signatories agreed to a division of the spoils. This agreement assumed that Serbia would receive a section of Albanian territory that would provide Belgrade with access to the Adriatic. When the Great Powers, at the request of Austria, decided to create an independent Albania, Serbia demanded compensation in Macedonia. Bulgaria, however, was unwilling to agree to this deal. Greece and Bulgaria also engaged in a dispute over the division of the spoils. In their alliance, their competing interests had prevented them from negotiating a territorial settlement. Now that the war was over, they needed to determine how to divide southern Macedonia. Unfortunately, Sofia believed that its army was stronger than Greece's army, and, consequently, was unwilling to satisfy Athens' demands. As a result of their common interests, Serbia and Greece agreed to an anti-Bulgarian alliance in which they would divide most of Macedonia between themselves and pledged defend each other against Bulgaria. In addition to the Serbo-Bulgarian and Greco-Bulgarian dispute, Bulgaria also confronted Romania. Romania believed Bulgaria's gains changed the balance of power and demanded compensation. Bulgaria, however, was drunk from its victories over the Ottoman Empire and refused to sacrifice any territory.

St. Petersburg did not want to see the Balkan League disintegrate and tried to use its good offices to resolve the issue. Unfortunately, nobody was willing to accept Russia's proposals. In the end, Sofia believed that its strength along with Russian support would lead to victory. Bulgaria was wrong on both counts. Its military had suffered greatly during the First Balkan War and Russia was not prepared to support Sofia against Serbia. Furthermore, Serbia and Greece had prepared for a war against Bulgaria, leading them to expect victory.

Once Bulgaria attacked, the war began and quickly escalated. Within two weeks, Romania and Turkey joined Greece and Serbia against Bulgaria, forcing Bulgaria to quickly sue for peace.

TABLE 6-2A: predictions
The First Balkan War

	P1: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with imperial disintegration?	P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms of the intervening phenomena?
Rules of the Game	Yes. The Bosnian Crisis of 1908 and the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12 demonstrated that rules maintaining the <i>status quo</i> in the Balkans no longer held force. Thus, the Balkans existed in a relatively rule-free environment.	Yes. Even though rules are generally weak and implicit, they were practically non-existent in 1912.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Power	Yes. Their common enemy led the Balkan states to form an alliance against the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire had weakened as a result of the Italo-Turkish War and domestic instability. Further shifting the power was strong Russian support for the Balkan states, which they believed would prevent the Powers from intervening.	Yes. These states had rarely been strongly united against Turkey, and it was even rarer for their alliances to have any substantial effect on the balance of power.	Yes. The leaders of the Balkan states actively pushed for an alliance against their common enemy. In addition, St. Petersburg told the Balkan states that Russia supported them and was working to prevent Austrian intervention.
Uncertainty	Yes. Turkey had difficulty determining its capabilities relative to the Balkan states.	It is unclear if uncertainty was greater than normal.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Nationalism	Yes. Turkish mistreatment of Macedonian Slavs, particularly the Bulgarians, and competition among the nationalist competition among the Slavs groups strengthened nationalism.	Yes. Bulgarian nationalism, in particular, was growing more powerful as the months went by.	Yes. Bulgarian leaders frequently expressed concern about their ethnic brethren in the Ottoman Empire. The three main Balkan powers—Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia—actively worked to support their ethnic brethren.
Domestic Instability	Yes. Competition for leadership in Constantinople made the parties in power insecure about their hold on power.	Yes. With the growth of the power of the Turkish parliament and the relatively even balance between the opposing groups, the leadership was particularly insecure about its hold on power.	No Turkish quotes support this prediction, but the German ambassador to Constantinople observed that domestic instability was a serious problem.

TABLE 6-2A: predictions
The First Balkan War (continued)

	P4: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with war and crises?	P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P6: Did the elite explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena caused the wars and crises?
Rules of the game	<p>Yes. The failure of any accepted diplomatic rules to mediate the crisis allowed the Balkan states to use military means to achieve their goals.</p> <p>Yes. Because of the shifts in the balance of power resulting from the formation of the Balkan League, Turkish instability and Russian support, the Balkan states expected to achieve their goals.</p>	<p>It is unclear if these issues were more problematic than normal.</p> <p>Yes. Prior to the formation of the Balkan League, these states had failed to form alliances and stayed out of war.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p> <p>Yes. Balkan leaders justified their support for war by citing the Balkan alliance, Russian support, and Turkish weakness, leading them to expect a quick victory.</p>
Power Shifts	<p>Yes. Turkey expected to be able to field a military at least as large as the Balkan states, which would lead to victory.</p> <p>Yes. Bulgaria wished to unite the territories populated by its ethnic brethren.</p>	<p>Yes. Turkey's expectations of victory were greater than normal.</p> <p>Yes. Two problems made this issue pressing. First, the decline in the number of Bulgarians lived in Macedonia created a closing window. Second, Macedonian refugees living in Bulgaria pressured the government to act.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p> <p>Yes. Bulgarian leaders justified their desire to go to war to unite with Macedonia in language that suggested nationalism was the reason for acting.</p>
Miscalculation Nationalism Domestic Instability	<p>Yes. The Turkish leadership was unwilling to compromise either with Italy or with the Balkan states, thereby preventing them from using diplomacy either to prepare for war or to prevent it.</p>	<p>Yes. Previously, the Turkish government made decisions without serious concerns about how it would effect its hold on power.</p>	<p>No Turkish leaders discuss this issue, but the German ambassador to Constantinople attributes Turkish inaction to the domestic situation.</p>

The First Balkan War provides evidence to support several of the arguments made in this dissertation. (See Table 6-2A for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the case and the argument's predictions.) First, the evidence demonstrates that nationalism contributed to the Balkan states' decision for war. The three main Balkan states had diaspora living in the Ottoman Empire, most of whom lived in Macedonia. They wished to unite with ethnic brethren as demonstrated by the active support each state provided to its diaspora. For Bulgaria, nationalism was particularly strong. A large population of Bulgarian refugees from Macedonia lived in Bulgaria and pressured the government to acquire Macedonia. This pressure was so strong that many leaders feared they would be assassinated if they did not work towards this goal. Further demonstrating the importance of nationalism in Bulgaria were statements by Bulgarian leaders, particularly by Geshov who was both President and foreign minister, claiming that the government must seek to protect its ethnic brethren and unite Macedonia with Bulgaria. Finally, when negotiating with its potential allies, Sofia demanded a division of the spoils that would satisfy Bulgaria's national interests.

The case also provides evidence that supports the power-based arguments. We see the Balkan states forming an alliance, the Balkan League, against its common enemy, Turkey. Since they all wished to make gains at Turkey's expense, they had an incentive to ally. Thus, as the alliance treaties demonstrate, they decided to ally for a war against Turkey. With the formation of this alliance, they had the capabilities necessary to defeat the Turks. Further supporting the power arguments is Russia's support for the Balkan states. These states knew that the Great Powers might intervene in a Balkan war. They, therefore, needed Russian support to help them deal with this possibility as is clearly stated by Bulgarian leaders. They even waited until after the Russian elections to declare war so that they would be assured of Russia's attention. We also see that the expectation of Russian support was not a miscalculation, as St. Petersburg demonstrated when it informed the Balkan states that Russia was working to keep Austria out of the war.

TABLE 6-2B: predictions
The Second Balkan War

	P1: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with imperial disintegration?	P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms of the intervening phenomena?
Rules of the Game	Yes. The Serbo-Bulgarian and the Greco-Bulgarian alliance treaties were made under pressure of time. At the same time, competing goals caused none of the signatories to want to make significant concessions. Consequently, the agreements failed to adequately address the division of spoils. This problem became greater when the Great Powers intervened to limit the spoils.	Yes. Prior to the First Balkan War, either the Great Powers or the Turks had maintained order in the Balkans. With Turkey's defeat and Great Power divisions, no order was imposed.	Yes. Serbian and Bulgarian leaders recognized that Great Power interference in the division of the spoils created an conflict between the two states. When they were negotiating, Greek and Bulgarian leaders recognized that the division of spoils would be a significant problem that either would be insoluble or take too long to solve. They, therefore, did not address the issue in their agreement.
Power	Yes. Bulgaria, who had been the strongest of the Balkan states, suffered great losses from the war and fought the Turkish forces for longer than the other states. Greece and Serbia suffered fewer losses and accomplished their aims more quickly. Thus, they were able to move their troops into position before Bulgaria. In addition, since they had a common enemy, Bulgaria, they allied.	Yes. Serbia and Greece's quick victories in the first Balkan War and their alliance led them to believe that their power was greater than Bulgaria's, which they had not previously believed.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Uncertainty	Yes. Bulgaria believed both that it was more powerful than Serbia and Greece, and that Russia would support Bulgaria and Bulgarian interests.	It is unclear how much greater this uncertainty was than normal.	Yes. Bulgarian leaders expressed their belief in Bulgaria's power advantage and Russian support, while Russia was also advising Bulgaria to compromise with Greece and Serbia.
Nationalism	Yes. Serbian and Greek occupation of Macedonian territories claimed by Bulgarians, and the mistreatment of Bulgarians in these territories led Macedonian refugees to go to Bulgaria and pressure Sofia to annex these territories.	Yes. Nationalism was extremely strong because of the treatment of the Bulgarians in Macedonia and the euphoria from Bulgaria's recent victories.	Yes. Politicians partly justified their unwillingness to cede Macedonian territories by citing of the pressure of the Macedonian refugees.
Domestic Instability	In this case, domestic instability does not correlate with imperial disintegration.	Domestic instability was not a problem at this time.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.

TABLE 6-2B: predictions
The Second Balkan War (continued)

	P4: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with war and crises?	P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P6: Did the elite explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena caused the wars and crises?
Rules of the game	<p>Yes. The unsettled rules contributed to war because they failed to adequately specify a Balkan order, which led to competition among the Balkan states.</p>	<p>Yes. In the past, the Great Powers intervened to impose an order on the Balkan states, which limited competition among the Balkan states.</p>	<p>Yes. Serbian leaders partly justified their demands for territorial compensation by citing the Great Powers' interference in dividing the spoils. At the same time, Greece and Bulgaria justified their actions on the conflict over the division of the spoils.</p>
Power Shifts	<p>Yes. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece all refused to reach negotiated agreements to settle their disputes because each believed that the balance of power favored them.</p>	<p>Yes. Serbia and Greece were stronger than at most other times.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>
Miscalculation	<p>Yes. Sofia wrongly believed both that Bulgaria was stronger than the other Balkan states and that Serbia and Greece knew this. Consequently, Bulgarian leaders wrongly expected Serbia and Greece to cave to their demands.</p>	<p>It is unclear how much greater this miscalculation was than normal.</p>	<p>Yes. Bulgarian leaders expressed certainty that they were more powerful than their adversaries. As a consequence, they refused to compromise and declared war.</p>
Nationalism	<p>Yes. Bulgaria wanted to unite with the Macedonian territories populated by Bulgarians.</p>	<p>Yes. This is demonstrated by the fear that Bulgarian politicians had that they would be assassinated if they did not achieve this goal.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>
Domestic Instability	<p>Domestic instability does not correlate with the war.</p>	<p>Domestic instability does not correlate with the war.</p>	<p>The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.</p>

The Second Balkan War also provides evidence that supports this dissertation's argument. (See Table 6-2B for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the case and the argument's predictions.) Most prominent is the evidence supporting the hypotheses related to unsettled rules of the game. Prior to the First Balkan War, Bulgaria negotiated agreements with both Serbia and Greece. These agreements, however, failed to adequately address how the spoils of war would be divided among the allies. The Serbo-Bulgarian treaty divided Macedonia between the two states with Bulgaria getting the lion's share. As the argument would predict, however, this treaty was too vague. It failed to explicitly address the division of Albania because Bulgaria had no desire to annex. Nonetheless, it assumed that Serbia would receive compensation in Albania. This is clearly supported by the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations where Serbian leaders based their desire for Macedonian territory on Serbia's need to have a corridor connecting Serbia to Albania. But, again as the theory would predict, Great Power interests, specifically Austrian, led the Powers to intervene and prevent Serbia from acquiring the Albanian territory it desired. Sofia recognized that Albania was implicitly included in the treaty by strongly supporting Serbia's claims to Albanian territory, in large part, because Bulgarian leaders knew that if Serbia failed to achieve its goals in Albania, it would seek compensation in Macedonia. In the end, the Great Powers forced the Balkan states to accept their will. As expected, Serbia demanded compensation for its losses in Macedonia which Bulgaria opposed.

To be fair, the loss of Albania only provides part of the explanation for Serbia's behavior. When Belgrade and Sofia negotiated their agreement, there were divisions within the Serbian leadership over how much territory Serbia should concede. Before the war began, there were rumors that Belgrade was going to expand its demands. Nevertheless, it wasn't until after the Powers had interfered in Albania that Serbia made its demands.

The Greco-Bulgarian dispute also provides evidence in support of the rules argument. As predicted, the Greco-Bulgarian treaty failed to address the post-war division of spoils. These states were unwilling and unable to negotiate these rules for reasons identified by the argument: conflicting interests and time pressure, which is clearly demonstrated by the statements of both Bulgarian and Greek leaders. Thus, as the First Balkan War was coming to an end, Athens and Sofia put forward their conflicting claims. Since both sides were competing for the same territories and

neither side wished to compromise, war became the most likely solution.

The other arguments that get significant support are the power arguments. Complementary interests and a common enemy led Greece and Serbia to form an anti-Bulgarian alliance. This is demonstrated by the terms of the alliance that called for a common policy against Bulgaria and divided most of Macedonia between the two signatories, including territory that the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty gave to Bulgaria. As a result of this alliance, Athens and Belgrade believed that they could stand up to Bulgaria. Bulgaria, on the other hand, thought that it was stronger than its adversaries. Furthermore, Bulgarian leaders believed that Serbia and Greece knew that the balance of power favored Bulgaria and would concede rather than go to war. This faith in Bulgaria's strength contributed to Bulgaria's refusal to make any compromises to resolve the disputes. These beliefs are clearly expressed in the statements of the Bulgarian leadership, particularly by the commander-in-chief of the Bulgarian military, General Savov. As the war demonstrated, Bulgaria seriously overestimated its power and was easily defeated.

These two cases are organized in nine sections. Section 6.2.1 discusses the Balkan situation and explains how and why the Balkan states developed their revisionist aims. Three interests are particularly prominent: nationalism, rules of the game, and security. Section 6.2.2 explains how the Bosnian Crisis re-opened the issue of changes in the Balkans. It does this by looking at how Austria's actions weakened the rules of the game and caused Russia to support a Balkan League. Section 6.2.3 explains why previous attempts to form a Balkan League failed. The most important cause of this failure was the conflicting interests of the Balkan states; Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia all wanted Macedonian territory. Section 6.2.4 explains why the Balkan states finally agreed to ally in 1911-1912. For the most part, this change in policy resulted from instability in the Ottoman Empire, which weakened the Ottoman military. It also increased nationalism, particularly in Bulgaria. It discusses the failure of the alliance agreements in order to lay the groundwork for peace in an attempt to explain why the tensions that would lead to the Second Balkan War developed. Section 6.2.5 discusses the turmoil in the Ottoman Empire—the Italo-Turkish War, the rebellions in Albania and Macedonia, and the political instability in Constantinople—to help explain the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and why its leadership was not able to better prepare for war with the Balkan states. Section 6.2.6 explains the origins of the First Balkan War and discusses its

outcome. Simply put, the First Balkan War occurred because the balance of power favored the Balkan states. They formed an alliance in which they agreed to jointly attack the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, divisions among the Great Powers prevented them from intervening in a timely fashion and preventing the Balkan states from attacking the Turks. The discussion of the wars outcome helps lay the groundwork for the problems that eventually led to the Second Balkan War.

Section 6.2.7, 6.2.8, and 6.2.9 explain the causes of the Second Balkan War. Section 6.2.7 discusses the decisions of the Great Powers that limited Greek, Montenegrin, and Serbian gains in Albania. Section 6.2.8 explains how the division of the spoils of war led to Greco-Bulgarian, Serbo-Bulgarian, and Romanian-Bulgarian disputes. Because of the incomplete terms of the Greco-Bulgarian and Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations, they were unable to come to a mutually agreeable division of the spoils. This led Serbia and Greece to ally against Bulgaria. At the same time, Romania demanded compensation for Bulgaria's gains, but Bulgaria refused. Section 6.2.9 shows that Sofia's belief in its military strength and expectations of Russian support led Bulgaria to attack Greek and Serbian forces. Bulgaria's army, however, was weaker than expected and was successfully repulsed. Adding insult to Bulgaria's injury, Romania and Turkey quickly took advantage of the situation and attacked Bulgaria.

6.2.1 The Balkan Quagmire

In the early 1900s, the Balkans were a cauldron of tension and conflict. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia had all developed states in the previous century, and eventually gained their independence. Unfortunately, all of them also had revisionist aims; they believed that some of their ethnic and historical territories still remained outside their states' political borders. Further complicating these problems were three Great Powers, Austria, Russia, and Italy, who for reasons of ethnicity, security and prestige also had interests in the Balkans. For the most part, these problems came together in conflicting claims on the remaining European territories of the Ottoman Empire. This section discusses the competing claims made by the Balkan states and by the key Great Powers on the remaining Ottoman territories in Europe. It concludes with a brief discussion of the main inter-Balkan territorial dispute between Bulgaria and Romania over the region of Dobrudja. This discussion is intended to demonstrate the relationship between the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the key issues that contributed to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars.

By the early 1900s, the Ottoman Empire in Europe had shrunk considerably, yet still contained five important territories. (See Map 6-2¹⁸²) First, to the south of Serbia, north of Greece, and west of Bulgaria was Macedonia, which included the three provinces of Salonika, Monastir, and Kosovo. Second, to the south of Montenegro, west of Serbia, northwest of Greece and laying along the Adriatic Sea was Albania. Third, to the south of Greece was the island of Crete. Fourth, to the south of Bulgaria, northeast of Greece, and North of Turkey was Thrace. Fifth, between Serbia and Montenegro was the Sanjak of Novibazar.


Of all the Turkish territories in Europe, Macedonia caused the greatest disputes among the Balkan states with Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia claiming all or part of its territory. Strategically, Macedonia was desirable because it was located upon the main route from Central Europe to the



Map 6-2
The Balkans Prior to the Balkan Wars

¹⁸²Andrew Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan rivalries and Russian foreign policy 1908-1914*, (Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 20.

Mediterranean, and it contained fertile plains as well as a port on the Aegean Sea.¹⁸³ Most importantly, however, Macedonia was a multi-ethnic territory populated by Bulgarians, Greeks, and



Map 6-3
Medieval Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian Empires

Serbs.¹⁸⁴ Further complicating the situation, each state justified its claims to Macedonia on historical grounds. At different times in the past, each of them controlled Macedonia, which they used to

¹⁸³L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1958), p. 517.

¹⁸⁴In addition, there were Albanians, Jews, Turks, and Vlachs. Vlachs are an ethnic group claimed by Romania. At one point, Romania claimed that it should gain Macedonian territory since Romania had ethnic co-nationals living there. Because of the geography—Macedonia does not border Romania—Romanian leaders never expected to gain any territory in Macedonia. Instead, they hoped to use their claim as a bargaining chip for future gains elsewhere. See *ibid.*, pp. 494-495, 521; and Steven W. Sowards, *Austria's Policy of Macedonian Reform*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 4.

These ethnicities, however, were very fluid. If an individual changed the church it belonged to or adopted a different language, it changed its ethnicity. The various Balkan states took advantage of this situation by competing for converts to their respective churches, sometimes by force.

justify their future control over the territory. (Map 6-3¹⁸⁵) Greece and Serbia used the ancient and medieval empires to justify their claims to Macedonia while Bulgaria justified its claim by citing both the borders of its medieval empire and the Treaty of San Stefano.

Despite these conflicting claims, Macedonia did not cause any serious disputes among these states until the 1870s. Prior to this time, Greek and Serbian attention focused elsewhere.¹⁸⁶ Greek attention focused on Thessaly and Epirus while Serb attention focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, Bulgaria was a large, unorganized territory under the complete control of the Ottoman Empire. This situation changed in 1870 when the Porte allowed the creation of a Bulgarian exarchate.¹⁸⁷ Since the Ottoman Empire recognized religious identities, not national identities, the creation of a Bulgarian church created a previously unrecognized, politically distinct ethnic group within the Empire. The Porte further complicated matters when it agreed that any Macedonian district in which two-thirds of the people voted to join the Bulgarian church could do so.¹⁸⁸ Many Slavs decided to take advantage of this offer, not because they were Bulgarians, but because they opposed the Greek clergy that currently dominated the Orthodox church and used its position to try to hellenize the Macedonian Christians. As a result, the Bulgarian and Greek churches competed for control over the residents of Macedonia.

The Macedonian issue became even more important in 1878. Following the Russian victory over the Ottoman Empire, St. Petersburg imposed the Treaty of San Stefano on Constantinople. This treaty called for the creation of a large Bulgarian state that included Macedonia. The other Great Powers opposed this treaty and forced Russia to agree to the Congress of Berlin at which they would discuss the peace terms and modify them as they saw fit. The Congress implemented two changes that exacerbated Balkan tensions. First, the powers decided to create a truncated Bulgarian state and return Macedonia to the Ottoman Empire. As a result, Bulgaria became a revisionist state whose primary goal was to restore its borders to those created by the Treaty of San Stefano. Second, the

¹⁸⁵Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 25.

¹⁸⁶William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935), p. 305.

¹⁸⁷Prior to 1870, all Orthodox Christians came under the control of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople.

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*

Great Powers agreed to allow Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Serbia claimed on ethnic grounds. By giving these territories to Austria-Hungary, the Great Powers dealt a serious blow to Serbia's national ambitions and forced Belgrade to look toward Macedonia if it wanted to expand.

From this moment, the three states intensely competed for influence in Macedonia. They built schools, tried to increase the membership in their churches, and sought Turkish concessions in Macedonia that might help them make gains at the expense of their opponents. Most importantly, in the 1890s, Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs developed organizations that sought to prepare Macedonia for annexation by their respective homelands.¹⁸⁹ These groups effected events in Macedonia in two ways. The most prominent effect was through their activities in Macedonia which included attempts to convert Macedonian Christians into Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs. At times, they used violent means to achieve this goal. This violence reached a new level in October 1902 and peaked in August 1903 when the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) revolted and demanded autonomy for Macedonia.¹⁹⁰ The Turks responded with brutal savagery, forcing Austria and Russia to intervene. Second, these groups put pressure on their ethnic homelands to intervene in Macedonia.¹⁹¹ Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs living in their ethnic homelands created organizations through which they tried to influence their governments' decisions with respect to Macedonia. These attempts at influence were particularly serious for the government when the members of the military were prominent leaders of these groups, as occurred in Serbia.

Both Austria and Russia wanted to maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans. Vienna was focusing its attentions on domestic problems while St. Petersburg wished to focus on the Far East.

¹⁸⁹Many of these groups, though not all, were supported, and even run, by the governments of their respective homelands. See Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 229-240, 271-286; Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993); idem, *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1972), pp. 163-166; and Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, pp. 495-501.

¹⁹⁰IMRO was an organization of Bulgarian Macedonians who favored Macedonian autonomy over union with Bulgaria. On the violence in 1902 and 1903, see Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, pp. 44-114

¹⁹¹Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 36-47; Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, pp. 163-166; and David MacKenzie, *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator: The Life and Times of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 64-86.

To help further their goals, in 1897 the two states concluded an agreement in which they resolved to maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans.¹⁹² The turmoil in Macedonia threatened this *status quo*, and led them to try to resolve the crisis. They first proposed a series of procedural reforms for Macedonia known as the “Vienna scheme.”¹⁹³ These reforms focused on ways in which the Turks could better govern Macedonia. Having feared worse, the Porte quickly accepted the proposal. When the Turks failed to adequately implement these reforms and the insurrections reached new levels of violence in August 1903, Vienna and St. Petersburg developed a new proposal known as the Murzsteg Program. After gaining the approval of the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, they presented the proposal to Constantinople, and on November 24, 1903, the Porte accepted it.

The Murzsteg Program called for the Porte to implement a series of reforms.¹⁹⁴ As with the Vienna Scheme, this program called for the Ottoman Empire to reorganize the police, administrative, judicial, and tax systems. This program differed from the Vienna Scheme in one significant way; it provided for Austrian and Russian representatives to supervise Turkish actions in Macedonia. Austria and Russia hoped that, as a result of this proposal, the Christians living in Macedonia would feel secure, thereby helping to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Unfortunately, this program failed to restore peace and order to Macedonia.¹⁹⁵ The Sultan did not appreciate Great Power interference in the Empire’s internal affairs and, therefore, obstructed the implementation of reforms.¹⁹⁶ More importantly, the Murzsteg Program increased the level of conflict among Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs. According to one of the terms of the program, the Turks were to implement “a modification of the territorial boundaries of the administrative units with a view to a more regular grouping of the different nationalities.”¹⁹⁷ In other words, the administrative

¹⁹²Sowards, *Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reform*, p. 14; and Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 522.

¹⁹³Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, pp. 86-91.

¹⁹⁴Ibid, pp. 114-116.

¹⁹⁵Discussing the implementation of the reform program are Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, pp.146-162; and Sowards, *Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reforms*.

¹⁹⁶Bridge, “The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire,” p. 36.

¹⁹⁷Quoted in Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 114.

borders within Macedonia were to be adjusted to coincide with the ethnic borders of the three groups. Conflict increased as the three groups competed to expand the territory under the control of their respective churches.¹⁹⁸

The Turks helped to further increase this competition when the sultan recognized the Serbian nationality. Prior to the uprisings in Macedonia, the Serbs did not have a separate church. Despite their Slavic identity, they were members of the Orthodox church and, therefore, considered to be Greek. Thus, only the Greeks and the Bulgarians, as of 1870, were recognized as ethnic groups within the empire. When the Macedonians rose up in August 1903, the Sultan decided to recognize the Serbian ethnicity.¹⁹⁹ He blamed the Bulgarians for this revolt and, by recognizing the Serbs as a separate ethnic group, he believed that he would decrease the power of the Bulgarian church.²⁰⁰

Albania, a small territory located along the Adriatic, was a second area of conflict in the Balkans.²⁰¹ Of the Balkan states, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro were the main claimants to Albanian territory.²⁰² Greece claimed the southern portion of Albania, justifying this claim on historical and ethnic grounds.²⁰³ Neither Serbia nor Montenegro, on the other hand, justified their claims to Albanian territory on ethnic grounds. Both of these states desired to expand for geopolitical reasons. As a landlocked state, Serbia desired a port that would provide access to the sea.²⁰⁴ By gaining a port, Belgrade could transport its goods by sea without having to cross the another state's, namely Austria's, territory.²⁰⁵ Montenegro was a small, rocky territory whose people

¹⁹⁸Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 523.

¹⁹⁹Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 545.

²⁰⁰This action continued the Sultan's policy of divide and rule. Recognizing the Serbian ethnicity helped to divide Serbs and Bulgarians, both of which were Slavic groups.

²⁰¹Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 287-316.

²⁰²Bulgaria also tried to lay claim to Albanian territory by including some of Albania within the boundaries of Macedonia.

²⁰³*Ibid*, pp. 305-315.

²⁰⁴Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920*, (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1977), p. 230.

²⁰⁵See section 6.1.2 for a discussion of Austria's control over Serbia's economy.

were warriors and shepherds. Nicholas, the ruler of Montenegro, wished to enrich his land, and he believed that he needed to expand its territorial borders to accomplish this goal.²⁰⁶

Adding to Nicholas's aggressiveness with respect to Albania was a border dispute with Turkey. With the Treaty of Berlin, the Great Powers had transferred Albanian territory to Montenegro.²⁰⁷ Unfortunately, the new borders were poorly drawn. Some Albanian towns that wished to remain in the Ottoman Empire were transferred to Montenegro, while Slav towns that wished to unite with a Slav state remained part of Albania. Adding to the trouble was the inability of Montenegro and Turkey to determine where the borders were located. This situation contributed to conflicts between the two states.²⁰⁸

In addition to these Balkan states, two Great Powers, Italy and Austria-Hungary, had interests in Albania.²⁰⁹ For the most part, Rome's interests in Albania focused on security. Italy believed that any country that controlled Albania would control the Adriatic Sea and, as a consequence, would pose a serious threat to Italy's security.²¹⁰ Vienna's security was also influenced by the Albanian situation.²¹¹ If another country controlled Albania, that country could threaten Austria's position in the Adriatic and possibly Austria's territory along the Adriatic. Particularly vexing for Austria was the possibility that one of the Slav states—Serbia or Montenegro—would gain control over Albania.

²⁰⁶Edward C. Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912*, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1965), pp. 29-30; and Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 1-8.

²⁰⁷Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 90-93.

²⁰⁸Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 92-93, 97.

²⁰⁹Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 238-286.

²¹⁰Discussing Italy's interests in Albania are R.J.B. Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian foreign policy before the First World War*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 46-47, 87; idem, *Italy and the Approach of the First World War*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 59, 113, 115; idem, "Italy and the End of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, edited by Marian Kent, (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), pp. 52-75, particularly p. 64; and Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 240, 242, 256.

In addition to the strategic interest, a large Albanian population lived in Italy. This population influenced the development of Albanian nationalism, but it is unclear what influence it had on the interests of the Italian state and the formation of policy. See *ibid*, pp. 215-237.

²¹¹Discussing Austria's interests in Albania are Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, pp. 114, 214, 226, 265; idem, "The Habsburg Monarchy," pp. 33, 41; Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 242, 256; Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan States*, p. 29; and Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 66-67.

If this occurred, Austria would be surrounded by Slav states that were likely to ally with Russia. Austria, therefore, supported the territorial integrity of Albania.²¹²

In 1878 a new group entered the fray, the Albanians. Prior to 1878, Albanians were not a united group. Poverty, poor communication among communities, and religious divisions helped prevent them from organizing.²¹³ The one unifying factor was the Albanian language. This language, however, was not taught in the schools, which the Turks and Greeks controlled. Instead, Albanian was learned in the local villages, which had different dialects and alphabets.

In 1878 the Treaty of San Stefano helped awaken the Albanian nation.²¹⁴ This treaty gave Bulgaria and Montenegro territory that Albania claimed. Even though the Treaty of Berlin reduced the amount of territory that Albania lost, the threat was still clear; the successor states to the Ottoman Empire coveted the remaining European territories of the Empire, including Albanian territory. A group of Albanian leaders, therefore, created the Albanian League to resist partition and, later, to gain autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.²¹⁵ They believed that the creation of an autonomous Albania would provide the rationale for Albanian independence, rather than partition, when the Empire collapsed. Initially, the Porte supported the Albanian League in order to help check the expansion of the Slav states. Once the League demanded autonomy, however, the Turks moved in and crushed it. With the end of the Albanian League, other organizations developed to help defend Albania's interests and further the creation of an Albanian nation.²¹⁶

As a result of the political awakening, an Albanian cultural awakening occurred and focused on the Albanian language.²¹⁷ Unlike most other Balkan nationalities, religion did not unify the

²¹²Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 358-359.

²¹³Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, p. 223. Prior to the Turkish occupation of Albania, two religions dominated, Orthodox and Catholic. Turkish domination led many to convert to Islam, adding a third religious group, Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 498.

²¹⁴On the development of the Albanian national movement, see Skendi, *The Albanian Nationalist Awakening*. Also useful is Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 502-504.

²¹⁵On the Albanian League, see Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 31-108.

²¹⁶Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, p. 224.

²¹⁷Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 111-144.

Albanians.²¹⁸ Prior to the Ottoman occupation of Albania, religion divided Albanians, for the most part, between Orthodox and Catholics. Turkish control added to the religious divisions when many of the Albanian leaders converted to Islam in an attempt to maintain their hold on power and property.²¹⁹ The Turks used these divisions as part of a divide and rule strategy. They suppressed the Albanian language in the belief that, without the unifying force of a common language, the religious differences would divide the Albanians.²²⁰ Those organizations that developed after the suppression of the Albanian League recognized the unifying potential of a common Albanian language and sought to develop one.

In 1908, when the Young Turks decided to take control of the Ottoman Empire, the Albanians supported the new leadership in the belief that it would further the Albanian national cause.²²¹ The Albanians believed that the new regime would be able to protect them. The previous regime had been unable to maintain order in Macedonia, where Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian armed bands threatened the Albanians living in Macedonia. In addition, the Young Turk policy of decentralization of authority appealed to the Albanian nationalists who desired autonomy because they believed it would eventually lead to independence.

This support was short-lived.²²² By mid-1909, it became clear that two policies of the Ottoman government threatened Albanian interests. First, instead of decentralizing power, the Young Turks sought to centralize it. By so doing, the new regime threatened the interests and privileges of the Albanian Muslims, pushing them further into the camp of those who sought an autonomous Albanian state. Second, the new regime adopted a policy of turification.²²³ This policy

²¹⁸Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 497-502.

²¹⁹Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 498.

²²⁰Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 501.

²²¹Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 335-365; and Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 2: 86-87.

²²²Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 391-404.

²²³I use the term turification instead of ottomanization, which the CUP and some authors used. Both policies refer to the creation of a single identity for all citizens of the Ottoman Empire as the British ambassador to Constantinople made clear when he said

That the Committee have given up any idea of Ottomanizing all the non-Turkish elements by

posed a serious threat to the already developing Albanian national identity and the development of an autonomous Albanian state.

The troubles associated with the situation in Albania came to a peak between 1910 and 1912. The Young Turks raised taxes, increased Albania's military commitment, centralized political control, and clamped down on the teaching and use of the Albanian language. As a result of these actions, a series of Albanian revolts against the Ottoman government occurred.²²⁴

These revolts had important implications for Montenegro.²²⁵ King Nicholas wanted to expand Montenegro's borders at the expense of the Ottoman empire, and the revolts provided him with the opportunity to increase his influence among the Albanians.²²⁶ He, therefore, provided the Albanians with arms, diplomatic support among the Europeans, and refuge from the Turks. Montenegro also took this opportunity to mobilize its forces and prepare for war against the Ottoman Empire, which may have occurred if not for Russia's pressure on Nicholas.²²⁷

Unlike the previous territories, only Greece laid claim to the Turkish territory of Crete. Crete was an island located south-southeast of Greece populated by Greek Christians and Muslims. As a result of the somewhat oppressive regime that the Sultan set up in Crete, the proportion of Christians to Muslims had been shifting more in favor of the Christians.²²⁸ Many of these Christians

sympathetic and Constitutional ways has long been manifest. To them 'Ottoman' evidently means 'Turk' and their present policy of 'Ottomanization' is one of pounding the non-Turkish elements in a Turkish mortar...

Quoted in Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 218-219. Since the CUP based this identity on the Turkish language and culture, turcification appears to be a more specific term for the policy.

²²⁴Discussing these revolts are Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 405-437; Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 506-511; and Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 66-82.

²²⁵Discussing Montenegro and the Albanian revolts are Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 66-86; Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 408-415; and Edward C. Thaden, *Russia and the Balkans*, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), pp. 27-37.

²²⁶Prior to these revolts, Montenegrins and Albanians were enemies, with each side raiding each others lands and killing each others people, although never at the level of a war.

²²⁷Montenegro was a very poor country dependent upon Russian aid. By threatening to cut off all military and financial aid to Montenegro, Russia was able to prevent Nicholas from going to war against the Turks, for the time being. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 73, 81-82; and Thaden, *Russia*, pp. 33-34.

²²⁸Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, pp. 107-108. According to Dakin, between 1821 and 1866, the number of Muslims decreased from 160,000 to 60,000 while the Christian population increased from 129,000 to 200,000.

sought *enosis*, or union, with the Greek state. To achieve this goal, the Cretans rebelled against their Turkish overlord on several occasions. Unfortunately for the Cretans and Greeks, these revolts failed to achieve their goals. Despite this failure, however, the Cretans continued to seek unification with Greece and the Greeks continued to plot and plan for the acquisition of Crete.

The remaining two territories—Thrace and the Sanjak of Novibazar—were of less importance prior to the First Balkan War. Thrace was claimed by both Greece and Bulgaria.²²⁹ The Greek claim to Thrace rested on both history and ethnicity. Historically, Thrace had been part of the Byzantine Empire and many who supported the *Megali idea* sought to restore this empire. Ethnically, a large Greek population lived in Thrace and competed against the Bulgarians for influence. The Bulgarian claim also rested on both history and ethnicity. For Bulgaria, the important historical precedent was the Treaty of San Stefano, which, in addition to Macedonia, had given Thrace to Bulgaria. There was also a significant Bulgarian population in Thrace, mostly living on the Eastern coast. This population influenced Sofia through the large number who immigrated to Bulgaria. The Sanjak of Novibazar was important to Serbia and Montenegro for at least two reasons. It was populated by Serbs, leading nationalists in both countries to push for the annexation of this territory, and it separated Serbia and Montenegro. By acquiring this territory, these states would border each other, putting them one step closer to the goal of a Greater Serbian state. Since 1878, Austria-Hungary had occupied this territory in order to prevent the union of the two Serbian peoples. Then, in 1909, Austria returned this province to Turkey as part of the Austro-Turkish settlement that helped resolve the Bosnian crisis.

In addition to the competition over the remaining European territories of the Ottoman Empire, there was one other territorial conflict between Balkan states. In 1878, the Great Powers divided the province of Dobrudja between Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria gained southern Dobrudja due to Russian largess, while Romania acquired northern Dobrudja as compensation for the loss of Bessarabia to Russia. This caused problems for two reasons. First, each wanted the entire

²²⁹No detailed discussion of Thrace exists, but snippets of information can be found in Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 1, 309, 322, 347; Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, pp. 1, 132-133, 193; Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, pp. 77, 156, 171; and Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, pp. 27, 44, 93, 97, 100.

province.²³⁰ Second, Romanian discrimination against the Bulgarians living in northern Dobrudja helped cause tensions between the two states.

6.2.2 Consequences of the Bosnian Crisis²³¹

For the thirty years prior to the Bosnian Crisis, the Great Powers, particularly Austria and Russia, had created an international order that helped maintain peace in the Balkans. Starting with the Austro-Russian agreements that preceded the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and the Congress of Berlin, St. Petersburg and Vienna developed spheres of interest that defined the areas under each state's control.²³² In broad strokes, Austria gained a predominant influence over the Western Balkans, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Russia gained a predominant influence over Bulgaria. Further strengthening this entente was the Three Emperors' Alliance of 1881 in which Germany, Austria, and Russia pledged to support each other's position in the Balkans.²³³ Even though this alliance failed to last through the Bulgarian crises of the mid-1880s and Austria and Russia diplomatically competed in the Balkans,²³⁴ Vienna and St. Petersburg avoided conflicts that could lead to war. In 1897, they further solidified the international order when they agreed to maintain the Balkan *status quo*.²³⁵ With the Murzsteg program in 1903, they demonstrated their commitment to the *status quo* by seeking to put an end to the turmoil in Macedonia while maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.²³⁶

Unfortunately, the Bosnian Crisis helped put an end to the Austro-Russian spirit of cooperation and the rule to maintain the Balkan *status quo*. During this crisis, Austria annexed the

²³⁰For information on Dobrudja see Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 22, 28, 239, 247; and Keith Hitchins, *Rumania 1866-1947*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 50-53, 146-147.

²³¹See section 6.1 for a more complete discussion of the Bosnian Crisis.

²³²A.J.P. Talyor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 237-244.

²³³F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1815-1914*, (London and New York: Longman, 1980), pp. 126-128.

²³⁴*Ibid*, pp. 134-135; and Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 515-516.

²³⁵Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*, pp. 149-150. For the text of this agreement, see M.S. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East 1774-1923*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 130-132.

²³⁶Bridge and Bullen, *The Great Powers*, p. 154.

Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina while also humiliating Russia and Serbia.²³⁷ As a consequence the Balkan order collapsed. Austria's annexation of the two provinces altered the Balkan *status quo* and, in so doing, violated the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897.²³⁸

By destroying the Austro-Russian rules of the game in the Balkans, Austria helped end the era of cooperation that had developed and helped to replace it with renewed competition.²³⁹ Austria's violation of the rules of the game combined with the humiliating means used to impose the changes in the Balkans led some Russian leaders to believe that Austria wished to dominate the Balkans.²⁴⁰ This new situation led St. Peterburg to try to balance the threat that Austria posed in the Balkans. One means to achieve this goal was the Racconigi Agreement which Russia and Italy negotiated in October 1909.²⁴¹ With this agreement, St. Petersburg and Rome agreed to maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans. If this failed, they would support the nationality principle and oppose any attempts by the Great Powers to dominate the Balkans. Since Austria was the only other Great Power with significant interests in the Balkans, this agreement was clearly an attempt to block Austrian expansion in the Balkans.

More important than the Racconigi agreement was St. Petersburg's decision to support the creation of Balkan alliances.²⁴² Russian leaders believed that a Balkan League could form a significant barrier to Austrian expansion in the Balkans. Izvolsky, the Russian foreign minister, stated this policy in the midst of the Bosnian Crisis when he gave a speech in the Russian parliament calling for the creation of an alliance of Balkan states with the purpose of this alliance being to contain Austria. He said that

²³⁷The crisis also involved Bulgaria's declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire.

²³⁸Furthermore, the annexation also overturned the Treaty of Berlin. By not obtaining the prior approval of the other signatories to the treaty, Austria violated the rule that required all signatories of a treaty to agree to alterations in its terms prior to the changes being implemented. The violation of this rule, however, was not a cause of the formation of the Balkan League or the origins of the Balkan Wars.

²³⁹*Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 6-7.

²⁴⁰Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, pp. 224-225.

²⁴¹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 306-310.

²⁴²Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 6-7; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 29-30.

Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro...must become imbued with the consciousness of the necessity of moral and political union. Russia's aim is to bring these states together and to combine them with Turkey, through means of common interests for the defense of their national and economic independence.²⁴³

This continued to be St. Petersburg policy when Serge Sazonov replaced Izvolsky as foreign minister. This is clear from the report of the British charge at St. Petersburg in which he wrote

Monsieur Sazonov...has already given me to understand that he has definitely adopted the policy of promoting a combination between Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro, which in the event of a breakdown of the existing Turkish regime or of any other eventuality bringing a general conflict in the Balkans would offer a substantial obstacle from a military point of view to an advance of Austria southwards.²⁴⁴

As these quotes show, there were still divisions among Russian leaders about the form this alliance should take. Some, Izvolsky among them, believed that it would be best to create a Balkan alliance with the Balkan states and Turkey, while others opposed the inclusion of Turkey.²⁴⁵ Unfortunately for Russia, these divisions limited the influence that St. Petersburg could have on the creation of the alliance as various leaders worked at cross purposes.

The collapse of the rules of the game in the Balkans also encouraged the Balkan states to believe that they could achieve their revisionist foreign policy goals.²⁴⁶ The Austro-Russian agreement and their willingness to support its terms helped to deter the Balkan states from attempting to change the *status quo* in the Balkans. With the collapse of this order, these states believed that they had gained some freedom of action to achieve their goals.

Nevertheless, they still needed Russian support.²⁴⁷ The Bosnian Crisis had demonstrated the dangers that Serbia faced from Austria; dangers that would increase when Belgrade tried to achieve its expansionist aims. Sofia also recognized the need for a Great Power ally if Bulgaria was going

²⁴³Quoted in Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 20.

²⁴⁴Quoted in *ibid*, pp. 29-30.

²⁴⁵Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 39-44; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, pp. 65-70, 81.

²⁴⁶Douglas Dakin, "The Diplomacy of the Great Powers and the Balkan States, 1908-1914," *Balkan Studies*, 3 (1962), pp. 327-374; Richard C. Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.7; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 7.

²⁴⁷*Ibid*, pp. 7, 21; and Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins*, p. 104

to achieve its aims in Macedonia.²⁴⁸ Leaders in Bulgaria recognized that any actions in Macedonia would lead the other Balkan states and some Great Powers to try to stop them. As one Bulgarian authority claimed

On the way to its national unification Bulgaria would have inevitably been confronted by the enmity of her Balkan neighbours and the Great Powers, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. That is why the unification of the Bulgarian race could have been prepared and secured only with the assistance of Russia and her allies. Together they possessed the connections and influence necessary to remove all perils to Bulgaria from her Balkan neighbours and the Great Powers, friends and allies of Turkey...

Whoever attempted to unify the Bulgarians along different lines (or sought Macedonia without the support of Russia and her small and great allies) would have failed not only to realize our national unification, but would have also perpetrated a thoughtless adventure and caused a tragedy for the Balkan nation.²⁴⁹

The Bosnian Crisis also influenced the Balkan states in two additional ways. First, it threatened Serbia's interests in the region.²⁵⁰ By annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vienna incorporated more Serbs into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This posed a threat to Belgrade's national policy which called for the incorporation of all Serbs with Serbia. In response, nationalism among the Serbs increased in Serbia, and in the Slav territories of the Habsburg Empire.²⁵¹ In addition, Austria's actions threatened Serbia's political and economic independence. Serbia feared that Austria would now try to economically strangle and, eventually, incorporate Serbia into the Monarchy.

Second, the Bosnian Crisis led the Balkan states to consider the possibility that the Ottoman Empire might collapse in the near future.²⁵² The loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Bulgaria's declaration of independence helped demonstrate the Ottoman government's inability to maintain control over its territories. Once the Empire completely collapsed, a free-for-all might ensue as the Balkan states competed with each other and, possibly with Austria, for the Empire's

²⁴⁸Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 7; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 21.

²⁴⁹Quoted in *ibid.*

²⁵⁰Discussing the consequences of the Bosnian Crisis for Serbia are Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, p. 62; and Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 593.

²⁵¹Williamson, Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins*, p. 75; and Donia and Fine, *Bosnia & Hercegovina*, pp. 101-103.

²⁵²Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, p. 45.

remains. The Balkan states, therefore, needed to prepare for this possibility.

6.2.3 Failed Attempts at a Balkan Alliance

The first attempt to create a Balkan alliance occurred in the 1860s under the leadership of Prince Michael Obrenovic.²⁵³ During this time, Serbia negotiated alliances with Greece, Montenegro, Romania and the Bulgarian revolutionaries.²⁵⁴ Serbia intended to use these alliances for concerted action against the Ottoman Empire.²⁵⁵ They, however, failed to achieve this goal. The main reason for this failure was the weakness of the allies. Without greater military strength, they were unlikely to defeat the Turks. The failure of the alliance to achieve any of its goals combined with the assassination of the Serbian prince, the recognized leader of the Balkan cause, led the alliance to fall apart as the allies competing territorial ambitions created intra-alliance competition.

Competition among the Balkan states continued to prevent any significant alliance negotiations for the next twenty-five years. As previously stated, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia had conflicting territorial claims in Macedonia, which increased the difficulty for the three states to agree to terms of an alliance.²⁵⁶ This competition was so antagonistic that in 1885 Serbia declared war against Bulgaria.²⁵⁷ In the early years of the competition, instead of allying with the other Balkan states, these states sought support elsewhere. Both Greece and Bulgaria turned to the Ottoman Empire to achieve their goals. The Greeks, particularly the Greek church, sought Constantinople's support against the Slav propaganda that was hurting Athens' interests in Macedonia.²⁵⁸ Bulgaria

²⁵³See section 5.1 for a complete discussion of the Balkan Alliance of 1860 and its failure to act.

²⁵⁴Bulgaria gained statehood in 1878. Serbia, therefore, had to negotiate with those Bulgarian revolutionaries who sought to gain their freedom from the Ottoman Empire.

²⁵⁵The goals of each group varied: Serbia desired complete independence from the Ottoman Empire and territorial aggrandizement; Greece, Montenegro, and Romania wanted territorial gains; and, some Bulgarians wanted independence and others wanted union with Serbia.

²⁵⁶The best discussion of the inter-Balkan conflicts and the obstacles they produced is L.S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*, (Menasha, WI: George Banata Publishing Company, 1944), pp. 123-151.

²⁵⁷One of the main reasons for Serbia declaring war against Bulgaria at this time was fear that Bulgaria's recent gains would enable it to take Macedonia and, in so doing, pose a significant threat to Serbia's independence. See section 5.5 for a fuller discussion of the causes Serbo-Bulgarian War.

²⁵⁸Stavrianos, *The Balkan Federation*, p. 124.

under Stefan Stambolov also adopted a friendly foreign policy with respect to the Ottoman Empire in an attempt to gain concessions that would provide Bulgaria with greater influence in Macedonia.²⁵⁹ Serbia, on the other hand, allied with Austria and depended upon Austrian support to help make gains in Macedonia. In the 1890s, the competition among these states continued, but shifted away from the use of allies to the creation of schools and churches and the organization of terrorist groups to convert Macedonians into Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs.²⁶⁰

Added to the competition among the key Balkan states was the creation of an international order that favored the maintenance of the Balkan *status quo*. Starting in the early 1870s and lasting until the early 1900s, Austria and Russia—the two key powers in the Balkans—agreed to maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans.²⁶¹ Vienna and St. Petersburg had negotiated agreements to maintain the current balance of power in the Balkans, which limited the ability of the Balkan states to achieve their revisionist goals. These states could not depend upon either St. Petersburg's or Vienna's support for their foreign policy goals. More importantly, they knew that the two powers would actively oppose any actions that threatened to change the Balkan situation.

The first attempt to ease inter-Balkan tensions, somewhat, occurred in 1903 when the pro-Austrian Obrenovic dynasty in Serbia was overthrown and replaced with a constitutional monarchy led by Peter Karageorge and the pro-Russian radical party. Upon coming to power, this new government was in a tenuous position. It lacked allies and had a weak hold on power. Adding to its problems was Serbia's economic weakness. It, therefore, turned to Bulgaria in search of an

²⁵⁹Duncan M. Perry, *Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870-1895*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 152-153. In support of this foreign policy, Stambolov went so far as to inform the Porte when Serbia initiated negotiations for an anti-Ottoman alliance..

²⁶⁰This process had been a central policy for many years. The Greek church had always been a hellenizing force, just as the Bulgarian church had sought to increase the number of Bulgarians in Macedonia. The process took on new dimensions in the 1890s with the creation of terrorist groups such as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.

²⁶¹Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 152; Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, pp. 171, 177, 212; and A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 219, 237-243, 370.

ally.²⁶² The two states negotiated two treaties.²⁶³ The first addressed cultural and economic issues. The second treaty called for the two states to defend the status quo in the Balkans.

Despite the success that Serbia and Bulgaria achieved in negotiating these agreements, it was short-lived, foundering on the Macedonian dispute. This sentiment was clearly expressed in the Bulgarian assembly when a member of the government said

He was sorry to say that the relations with Serbia were not permeated with the spirit of brotherhood which should prevail between two nations of the same race; the Macedonian problem was the question which separated the two countries.²⁶⁴

In a memorandum the Serbian Foreign Office echoed this sentiment, stating

...The Bulgarian dissatisfaction with Serbia is caused, no matter what reasons one might advance, solely and alone by the fact that they feel that Serbia is the chief obstacle to the realisation of their aspirations. They desire that the Macedonia question should be a purely Bulgarian matter. The more the Serbian element in Macedonia gives evidence of its power, the sharper the tensions between Serbia and Bulgaria will become.²⁶⁵

In 1908, new developments led the Balkan states to seek an alliance. The threat that Austria posed to Serbia's future led Belgrade to seek a Balkan alliance to help balance the Austrian threat.²⁶⁶ Bulgaria was the natural ally.²⁶⁷ Bulgaria had the largest army of Balkan states and the greatest prestige. Furthermore, Serbia feared that Bulgaria would ally with Austria-Hungary. By negotiating a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, Belgrade hoped to prevent this alliance from forming. Finally, both Britain and Russia favored a Serbo-Bulgarian entente as a means to stop the Austrian expansion into

²⁶²Discussing Serbia's reasons for turning to Bulgaria are Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 4-5; and Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 153.

²⁶³Discussing the terms of the treaty is Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 5-7.

²⁶⁴Quoted in *ibid*, pp. 10-11.

²⁶⁵Quoted in *ibid*, p. 10.

²⁶⁶Thaden, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 62.

²⁶⁷Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 22-23; and Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 593.

During the Bosnia Crisis, Serbia also tried to negotiate alliances with the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro. Since both of these states believed that their interest were threatened by Austria's recent actions, Belgrade hoped to gain their support. After intense negotiations, Serbia and Montenegro agreed upon an alliance while Turkey reached a negotiated settlement with Austria. Discussing the Serbo-Turkish negotiations is Unal, "An Example of Balkan Diplomacy"; discussing the Serbo-Montenegrin negotiations is Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 30-31.

the Balkans and provide order to the region.²⁶⁸

Serbia, therefore, initiated discussions with Bulgaria in January 1909.²⁶⁹ Belgrade proposed that the two states form an alliance against Austria. Bulgaria, however, was not interested in an alliance on these terms. Vienna had supported Bulgarian independence and posed no threat to Bulgaria. Sofia, therefore, was uninterested in an anti-Austrian alliance. Nevertheless, Sofia continued to hold discussions with Serbia. Bulgarian leaders recognized that to obtain Russian support for Bulgaria's interests, they needed to come to an understanding with Belgrade.²⁷⁰

By April 1909 the negotiations lost their importance with the end of the Bosnian crisis,²⁷¹ only to re-emerge later in the month after the counter-revolution against the Young Turks.²⁷² Belgrade worried that Austria might take advantage of the turmoil in the Ottoman Empire and re-occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar. Milovanovic, therefore, decided to try to reach an understanding with Bulgaria. Sofia, however, wished to know what the Serbs proposed be done with respect to Macedonia before entering into negotiations. In particular, Bulgaria wanted Serbia to agree to an autonomous Macedonia in the belief that autonomy would eventually lead to its union with Bulgaria. Serbia was willing to accept Macedonian autonomy, but doubted that it would work. Milovanovic, therefore, wished to agree upon a division of Macedonia should autonomy fail. If this happened, all he asked for was the Skopje district so that Serbia would be able to gain access to the Adriatic Sea. He clearly stated this position to the Bulgarian minister at Belgrade, A. Toshev, when he said

In the end even we could accept it [Macedonian autonomy]. Personally, however, I have no confidence in autonomy. It would be superfluous for me to hide that one of our principal aims is Skopje. The largest part of Macedonia will, of course, be yours, but as far as Skopje is concerned, you must rightfully cede it to us. While for you that place had only secondary value, for us it is of capital importance. Only that way could we secure access to the Adriatic Sea...Stated more clearly, we must reach a final agreement on the division in case

²⁶⁸Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 27-32; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, pp. 83-86.

²⁶⁹Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*; and pp. 21-23; Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 21-24

²⁷⁰Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 21.

²⁷¹Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 23-24.

²⁷²Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 23-24.

autonomy proves impossible to realize.²⁷³

Bulgaria, however, was unwilling to compromise. By the end of July, these negotiations had failed to lead to a Serbo-Bulgarian understanding. The most significant reason for this failure were competing claims to Macedonia that continued to divide the two countries.²⁷⁴ Serbian interests required a small part of Macedonia, but Sofia would not accept this division. Bulgaria wanted either annexation or autonomy. Nationalism partly explains Sofia's unwillingness to compromise. Bulgaria considered the Orthodox Christians living in Macedonia to be Bulgarian and, therefore, sought to unite Macedonia with Bulgaria at some future date. Just as important, many Macedonian refugees lived in Bulgaria and had a significant influence on Bulgarian politics. These refugees sought Bulgarian support for their cause, and many in the military, politics, and the press supported them. Thus, politicians in Sofia had to be cautious not to take any actions that threatened the interests of Macedonia. Otherwise, they might lose their positions and, possibly, their lives. The lack of threats in the Balkans also helps to explain Bulgaria's behavior. As long as Sofia confronted no threats to Bulgaria or Bulgaria's interests, there was no not need for allies and no reason to compromise.²⁷⁵

With the failure of the Bulgarian government to achieve any foreign policy successes in Macedonia, King Ferdinand decided to install a new government. This new, pro-Russian government was led by Ivan Geshov, the Minister President and foreign minister, and Stoyan Danev, the president of the Bulgarian assembly.²⁷⁶ It focused its foreign policy on Macedonia and Thrace, two of the remaining European territories of the Ottoman Empire. Geshov expressed this focus when he wrote "My first task as the leader of Bulgarian policy was to deal with the unfortunate problem of Macedonia and Thrace which had been tormenting Bulgaria ever since the Treaty of Berlin."²⁷⁷

²⁷³Quoted in Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 24.

²⁷⁴Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 28; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 23-25, 28-29.

²⁷⁵Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 34.

²⁷⁶Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 7-12.

²⁷⁷Quoted in *ibid*, p. 12.

To accomplish this goal, Geshov decided to adopt a pro-Ottoman foreign policy and seek a rapprochement with Constantinople.²⁷⁸ The Young Turk's turcification policy threatened Bulgaria's interest in Macedonia and he hoped that, by negotiating with the Turks, he would be able to reach an understanding that would protect Bulgaria's interests in Macedonia and lay the groundwork for the eventual annexation of Macedonia.

As the leader of a pro-Russian government, Geshov also had the opportunity to develop closer ties with the Balkan states. When his government came to power, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro believed that it would be more receptive to a Balkan alliance and made overtures.²⁷⁹ Geshov, however, rejected these offers. He believed that any Balkan alliance, particularly one with Serbia, would threaten his pro-Ottoman foreign policy. Furthermore, any alliance with Serbia or with Greece would involve the partition of Macedonia, an outcome most Bulgarians opposed. In addition, he avoided negotiating with Greece because he feared that a Greco-Bulgarian alliance might lead Greece to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy in Crete, resulting in a Greco-Turkish War; an outcome Bulgaria did not desire.²⁸⁰

Despite Geshov's desire to come to an understanding with Constantinople, his negotiations with the Young Turks failed to achieve any results. Throughout June and July, the Bulgarian government tried and failed to negotiate an agreement with the Ottoman Empire.²⁸¹ In fact, while these negotiations were taking place, Constantinople continued to mistreat the Bulgarians in Macedonia and to implement the turcification policy, which angered the Bulgarian public.²⁸² Finally, by the end of August, Geshov had come to the conclusion that his policy had failed, not only because there was no Turco-Bulgarian treaty, but also because the number of Bulgarians in Macedonia was

²⁷⁸Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 12-26; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 31-32.

²⁷⁹See Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 436; Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 15-20; Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, pp. 51-52; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 31-32.

²⁸⁰Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 436.

²⁸¹Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 24.

²⁸²Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 32-33.

declining.²⁸³ This demographic change was significant because Bulgaria, in large part, justified its claim to Macedonia on the number of Bulgarians living there. The declining Bulgarian population in Macedonia created a closing window of opportunity; the more the population declined, the weaker Bulgaria's claim to Macedonia became.

6.2.4 The Formation of the Balkan League

As a result of the failure of the pro-Ottoman foreign policy, Bulgaria decided to adopt a pro-Balkan policy. Geshov made this clear in a speech on August 19 when he said

...we have decided to carry out a peaceful policy, a policy of sincere good neighborly relations with all Balkan states. We do this because the present government is deeply convinced that our policy is imperative for the Bulgarian people and that only through it can we demonstrate our ardent desire to reach the accord so necessary for the people of the Balkan peninsula.²⁸⁴

The driving force behind this realignment was the treatment of Bulgarians in Macedonia as Geshov demonstrated when he wrote

No Bulgarian statesman responsible for the future of the Bulgarian nation could remain indifferent to such a condition of things, or ignore the open threats to the Turks to aggravate the measures aiming to the annihilation of the Bulgarians in Macedonia. My manifest duty was to examine how Bulgaria could best be enabled to these excesses. Among the various methods that suggested themselves, the most important consisted in an understanding not with Turkey who had rejected our advances, but with our neighbors.²⁸⁵

In addition, as a result of the failure of Geshov's policy, popular opinion began to turn away from the government in the belief that Sofia was doing nothing to satisfy the public's interests.²⁸⁶ This helped cause both Geshov and King Ferdinand to fear that the worsening condition in the Ottoman Empire might lead the Macedonian revolutionaries to gain the upper hand with respect to

²⁸³Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 431; and Hall *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 25. Neither Dakin nor Hall explain why the Bulgarian population in Macedonia was declining. There are at least three possible explanations for this demographic change. First, the policy of turcification could be succeeding in converting Bulgarians to Turks. Second, Greece and Serbia could be succeeding in converting the Orthodox Christians to Greeks and Serbs. Third, Bulgarians could be fleeing Macedonia in an attempt to escape the consequences of the Turkish policy.

²⁸⁴Quoted in Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 24.

²⁸⁵Quoted in *ibid*, p. 26.

²⁸⁶Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 405; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, pp. 73-74.

Macedonia, thereby threatening Bulgaria's eventual annexation of Macedonia.²⁸⁷

The turmoil in the Ottoman Empire—particularly in Macedonia—convinced Bulgaria of the need for a Balkan ally to help deal with the eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire.²⁸⁸ Bulgaria decided to negotiate with Serbia first for several reasons. First, after Bulgaria, Serbia was the most powerful Balkan state and, therefore, could provide the most effective support. Also, Serbia had been trying to reach an agreement with Bulgaria for the past few years, leading Geshov to believe that Belgrade would be open to negotiations.²⁸⁹ Finally, Russia advised Sofia to negotiate a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance before negotiating with Greece or Montenegro.²⁹⁰ For these reasons, Geshov decided to meet with Milovanovic in early October in order to begin discussions for a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance.²⁹¹

Prior to this meeting, Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire.²⁹² Italy had wanted to expand its empire by annexing Tripoli, which was Ottoman territory. Recent events—namely Austria's annexation of Bosnia and French gains in Morocco—had increased pressure on the Italian government to act to achieve this goal. This pressure combined with a jingoistic nationalism led to increased tension between Italy and Turkey during the summer of 1911, until, finally, Italy declared war in September.

The Italo-Turkish War helped spur the Balkan states to action for several reasons.²⁹³ One was

²⁸⁷A division existed between Bulgarians and Macedonians. Bulgarians, for the most part, favored either outright annexation of Macedonia or autonomy to be followed by annexation. A large, powerful Macedonian nationalist organization, however, existed and favored Macedonian independence.

²⁸⁸Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 406.

²⁸⁹Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 406.

²⁹⁰Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 32-33.

²⁹¹Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, p. 74.

²⁹²On the Italo-Turkish War, see William C. Askew, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya 1911-1912*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1942); Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers*, pp. 127-195; idem, *Italy and the Approach of the First World War*, pp. 71-107; Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years*, pp. 270-275; and, Albertini, *Origins of the War*, 1: 340-363.

²⁹³Askew, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya*, pp. 71-76; Dakin, *Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 430; idem, "The Diplomacy of the Great Powers and the Balkan States," p. 338; Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 25-26, 35-36; Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years*, p. 204; Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, p. 594; Stavrianos, *The*

that it threatened the *status quo* in the Balkans. Even though Italy sought gains in North Africa, there was the possibility that the war would expand to the Balkans, particularly Albania. This posed the danger that Italy might acquire territory desired by the Balkan states. Adding to this danger was the possibility that other powers, particularly Austria, would seek compensation for Italy's gains by annexing territories that Bulgaria and Serbia claimed.²⁹⁴ The war also led the Balkan states to seek closer relations with each other out of fear that the Ottoman Empire might mistreat the Balkan Christians living in the Empire's European territories.²⁹⁵ During the past thirty years, the Ottoman Empire had developed a reputation for mistreating Christians. The Italo-Turkish War created the possibility that the Ottoman Empire might mistreat its Christian subjects to suppress the potential for internal turmoil while the Turks to focus on the Italian threat. Mistreatment of Christians was a particularly significant concern for Bulgaria because of its large Macedonian population.²⁹⁶ Third, these events helped to weaken the Ottoman Empire, providing a window of opportunity for the Balkan states.²⁹⁷ The Balkan states, therefore, needed to develop alliances so that they could take advantage of the opportunity provided by the war.

Before beginning formal negotiations with Belgrade, Sofia sought to learn more about the Italo-Turkish War.²⁹⁸ In particular, Bulgaria was concerned about the scope and length of the war as well as the possibility that the war might increase turmoil within the Ottoman Empire.²⁹⁹ A long war that expanded to include the Balkans territories of the Ottoman Empire would eventually draw Bulgaria into the conflict. Internal turmoil in the Ottoman Empire could also force Sofia to enter the war in order to protect the Bulgarians living in Macedonia. On his way to meet with Milovanovic,

Balkans since 1453, p. 532; *idem*, *Balkan Federation*, pp. 160-162; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 34-36.

²⁹⁴Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 25; Askew, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya*, pp. 74-75.

Events in Albania and Macedonia had already created doubts about the viability of the Balkan *status quo*. The war with Italy served to increase the danger that the Great Powers would intervene.

²⁹⁵Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 25.

²⁹⁶Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 36-40.

²⁹⁷Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 34-36.

²⁹⁸Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 40.

²⁹⁹*Ibid*, pp. 25-26, 40.

Geshov stopped in both Paris and Vienna to determine their opinions on these issues. Both powers believed that the war would be short and localized, although the French, but not the Austrians, admitted that turmoil could develop within the Empire.³⁰⁰ With these assurances, Geshov believed that he had time to negotiate and did not feel the need to make overly generous concessions in order to quickly conclude the negotiations.

While in Vienna, Geshov also met with several advisors to develop a negotiating strategy for the upcoming Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations.³⁰¹ At this meeting, they agreed on several issues. First, Bulgaria still wished to create an autonomous Macedonia. If this were not possible, however, Bulgaria would agree to partition; the most Sofia was willing to give to Serbia was the Sanjak of Skopje. They also decided that Serbia and Bulgaria should act under any of five conditions: an attack on Serbia or Bulgaria; an attack on any Balkan state by the Ottoman Empire; an attempt by Austria to occupy Albania or Macedonia; internal turmoil in the Ottoman Empire; or when their interests demand that they act. Finally, the terms provided for the participation of Montenegro and Russia's acceptance of the agreement.

On October 11th, Geshov traveled from Vienna to Belgrade where he met with Milovanovic. During their three hour discussion, they discussed the broad outlines of an agreement.³⁰² Serbia held similar views on the conditions that would initiate a response by the two allies. Milovanovic also recognized that the Great Powers wished to localize the Italo-Turkish War and agreed that no actions should be taken until its conclusion. He is reported to have said "we must wait until the end of the war and try in the meantime to secure the backing of Russia. Without her support nothing can or ought to be undertaken. But before turning to Russia we must come to an understanding and conclude a treaty."³⁰³ As for Macedonia, Milovanovic agreed that autonomy should be discussed.

³⁰⁰Ibid, p. 40. For a good discussion of Austria's diplomatic attempts to limit the geographic scope of the Italo-Turkish War, see John D. Treadway, "Temperate Coercion: Aehrenthal's Balkan diplomacy at the Outbreak of the Turco-Italian War," *Essays in History* 18 (1973/74), pp. 5-32.

³⁰¹Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 40-41; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 48.

³⁰²Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 48-49; Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 41-43; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, pp. 75-76

³⁰³Quoted in Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 38.

Nevertheless, he also expressed Serbia's desire for part of Macedonia. He proposed that the exact boundary should be decided by the Tsar.³⁰⁴

After their discussion, Geshov continued to Sofia where he confronted a crisis.³⁰⁵ The Turks had mobilized troops in Thrace. Despite Constantinople's assurances that this mobilization was not a threat to Bulgaria, both the Bulgarian public and government feared an Ottoman attack. Adding to the danger was the fear that Romania, Greece, or Serbia would join with the Turks in an attack on Bulgaria.³⁰⁶ Geshov, however, did not want war and took control of the situation upon his arrival in Bulgaria.³⁰⁷ He convinced the government that, Bulgaria should wait because, at some point in the future, Sofia would be able to count on Belgrade's support.³⁰⁸

Even though the crisis was settled peacefully, it helped convince Sofia that it was important to negotiate alliances with the other Balkan states. First, the threat of an Ottoman attack helped increase an anti-Ottoman attitude in Bulgaria, which put pressure on the government to intervene.³⁰⁹ Second, this threat demonstrated that Balkan allies were important to Sofia both for defense against a Turkish attack and for an eventual attack against Turkish forces.³¹⁰ Third, the crisis increased Geshov's willingness to compromise with Serbia over the issue of Macedonia.³¹¹ As a consequence, both the Turkish threat and domestic pressure became more important issues.

Between November and December, Serbia and Bulgaria agreed to the terms of an alliance

³⁰⁴Ibid.

³⁰⁵Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 43-45.

³⁰⁶Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 406.

³⁰⁷In addition to reducing the hysteria in Bulgaria, Geshov gained an Ottoman promise to withdraw Turkish troops from the Bulgarian frontier and Russia's assurance that Turkey would not attack.

³⁰⁸Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 45.

³⁰⁹Ibid, p. 42.

³¹⁰Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, p. 162.

³¹¹Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p. 406.

except for the division of Macedonia.³¹² Serbia first proposed terms for an alliance on November 3rd, which did not satisfy Bulgaria for three reasons. First, they allowed Serbia to declare war without Bulgaria's approval. Second, they failed to provide for the possibility of Macedonian autonomy. Third, the territorial divisions proposed by Serbia were unacceptable; Bulgaria could not give up so much. Geshov expressed this concern when he wrote "the Serbians were reserving for themselves the right to declare war without [Bulgarian] consent, and article four not only says nothing about Macedonian autonomy but actually proposed that the two vilayets of Solanica and Monastir should be reserved for the arbitration of the Russian Emperor."³¹³ A few days later, Serbia presented a new proposal. This proposal satisfied Bulgaria's concern about Serbia precipitating a war without Sofia's approval, but it failed to satisfy Bulgaria's interests in Macedonia.³¹⁴ It called for the creation of three zones: a Serb zone, a Bulgarian zone, and a contested zone. Russia would arbitrate to decide how the two states divided the contested zone. Nevertheless, the proposal still failed to mention Macedonian autonomy.

By the end of January, the two sides had narrowed their differences over Macedonia to a disagreement over a small area within the contested zone.³¹⁵ Bulgaria had begun to worry that a Great Power, such as Italy, might intervene in the Balkans or that Serbia might turn elsewhere to achieve its goals.³¹⁶ To prevent these problems from arising, Geshov decided to hasten negotiations by compromising with Belgrade. He dropped the demand for Macedonian autonomy. Still, certain territories essential to Bulgaria's security continued to be included in the area that the Tsar would arbitrate. To address this problem, Sofia turned to Russia and asked St. Petersburg to guarantee that Bulgaria would receive these territories when the Tsar arbitrated the issue, and Russia agreed.³¹⁷

³¹²On the negotiations, see Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 49-52; Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 47-49; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 40-44.

³¹³Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 49-50.

³¹⁴Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 50; and Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 47-48.

³¹⁵Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 53.

³¹⁶Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 50-51; and Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 406-407.

³¹⁷Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 49-50; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 44-45.

Once they settled the territorial divisions, they were able to sign their treaty. On March 13, 1912 Bulgaria and Serbia signed the accord which was later supplemented with a general military convention and a military agreement between the chiefs of staff.³¹⁸ The treaty had two parts: a treaty of friendship and alliance, and a secret annex.³¹⁹ The main part of the treaty had two key, defensive clauses. First, each state agreed to come to the other's aid in the event that either one is attacked. This term provided protection from Austria, Turkey, and Romania. Second, they agreed "to come to each other's assistance with all their forces in the event of any Great Power attempting to annex, occupy, or even temporarily to invade with its armies any parts of the Balkan territories which are today under Turkish rule, if one of the parties considered this as contrary to its vital interests and a *casus belli*."³²⁰ This term was particularly important for Serbia because Belgrade frequently worried that Austria would re-occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar.³²¹

Sofia and Belgrade put the offensive clauses of the treaty in the secret annex. In the first article, they defined the conditions for military action. If either state believed that conditions in the Ottoman Empire justified war, that state would recommend war to its ally who could either agree that war was justified or not. Either way Russia would be informed of the decision. If Russia did not oppose war, they could go to war. This helps explain why Russia agreed to an obviously offensive treaty; St. Petersburg believed that it had veto power over any Serbo-Bulgarian decision to go to war.³²² If only one state favored war, the other promised to remain neutral and come to the other's aid if a third party supported the Ottoman Empire. The second article concerned the division of spoils.³²³ The treaty divided Macedonia into four parts. The first two parts were to be divided

³¹⁸Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 52-53.

³¹⁹Discussing the terms of the treaty are Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 53-58; Thaden, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 93-96; and Dakin, "The Diplomacy of the Great Powers and the Balkan States," pp. 341-342.

³²⁰Quoted in Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 59.

³²¹Thaden, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 93. The Sanjak was a strip of territory that separated Serbia and Montenegro. Vienna had relinquished its claim to this territory when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the Serbs feared that Austria would reoccupy the territory, thereby preventing Serbia from annexing it.

³²²Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War: Before Sarajevo*, (New York: Free Press, 1966), 1: 437; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, p. 86.

³²³For the specific territorial boundaries, see Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 15.

between Serbia and Bulgaria. If autonomy was not possible, than the third part would go to Bulgaria. The Tsar would arbitrate to determine how the two states would divide the fourth part.

One of the most significant problems with this treaty was its failure to address Albania or southern Macedonia, also known as Salonica.³²⁴ Since Bulgaria had no interests in Albania, the agreement made no mention of it. Nevertheless, the two sides recognized Serbia's interests in Albania and assumed that Serbia would make significant gains in northern Albania. On the other hand, southern Macedonia was of no concern to Serbia. Bulgaria and Greece were the two Balkan states interested in this territory, and it was left to them to address this territory's status in the event of a Balkan war.

Serbia was not the only country that sought to negotiate an alliance with Bulgaria, nor the only country with whom Bulgaria wished to negotiate; Greece also wished to form an alliance with Bulgaria. The Italo-Turkish War led Athens to propose a Greco-Bulgarian alliance in mid-October 1911.³²⁵ For Venizelos, the Greek leader, the purpose of this alliance was two-fold. The first purpose was purely defense; he wished to secure Bulgarian support in the event of a Turkish attack on Greek territory. The second purpose was offensive; he wished to secure an opportunity to gain a share of the spoils when the Ottoman Empire completely collapsed. Bulgaria was not unreceptive to the Greek proposal. While Bulgaria considered the Greek army to be weak and unnecessary in the event of a war with Turkey, the Greek navy was valuable because it could interdict Ottoman troop transports.³²⁶ Nonetheless, Bulgaria did not negotiate with Greece at this time.³²⁷ Both Bulgaria and Russia worried that a Greco-Bulgarian alliance would lead Greece to adopt a more aggressive Cretan policy that might result in a war that Sofia was unable or unwilling to fight. Also, Russia believed that a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance was more important and should be given top priority. Since Russian support would be necessary for the conclusion of an alliance with Belgrade, the

³²⁴Ibid, p. 35; and Dakin, "The Diplomacy of the Great Powers and the Balkan States," pp. 343-344.

³²⁵On this proposal, see Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, pp. 436-437; Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 53; Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 73-75; Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, pp. 92-96; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, pp. 100-101.

³²⁶Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 53.

³²⁷Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, pp. 436-437; and Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 53.

Bulgarian government decided to reach an agreement with Serbia before negotiating with Greece.

By February 1912, Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations were nearing a successful conclusion, creating the opportunity for Prime Minister Geshov to open negotiations with Athens.³²⁸ He, therefore, suggested that Athens make a proposal. Panas, the Greek representative in Sofia, presented a proposal that called for united Greco-Bulgarian action to defend the Ottoman Christians as well as a defensive alliance should the Turks attack either state.³²⁹ Geshov rejected this proposal for two reasons.³³⁰ First, he still feared that Bulgaria might be drawn into a Greco-Turkish war over the issue of Crete. Second, the proposal failed to mention the autonomy of Macedonia. He, therefore, proposed that they add a clause to the treaty saying

Greece undertakes not to offer any opposition to an eventual demand by Bulgaria of administrative autonomy for Macedonia and the Vilayet of Adrianople, guaranteeing equal rights to the nationalities there.³³¹

Venizelos was unwilling to concede Macedonia to Bulgaria.³³² He preferred to avoid the issues of the status of Macedonia, partition plans, or spheres of influence.³³³ He adopted this position because the Greek military was weak, and this weakness would limit his ability to negotiate a partition agreement that was favorable to Greece. Instead, he favored the philosophy that “possession is nine-tenth of the law.” Rather than negotiate a partition agreement, he believed Greece should occupy as much territory as possible during the upcoming war and then claim it for Greece.

In late April, Athens made a new proposal.³³⁴ The Greeks proposed a secret alliance to last

³²⁸Discussing these negotiations are Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, pp. 437-439; Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 53-54; Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 76-77; Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, pp. 96-101; and, Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, pp. 165-166

³²⁹Katsiadakis, pp. 96-97.

³³⁰Ibid; and Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 53-54.

³³¹Quoted in Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 438.

³³²The assumption both in Bulgaria and in Greece was that an autonomous Macedonia would eventually become part of Bulgaria the same way that an autonomous Eastern Rumelia became part of Bulgaria in 1885.

³³³Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, pp. 97-100.

³³⁴Ibid, pp. 99-100.

three years.³³⁵ The two states would provide military aid to each other if the Turks attacked their territory or violated their treaty rights. Furthermore, the two states would adopt common measures to defend the rights of the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. To satisfy Sofia's concern about Crete, the treaty removed any obligation for the Bulgarian military to provide support in the event of a Greco-Turkish war caused by the Cretan affair. Bulgaria would only be obligated to maintain its neutrality.

The two sides continued to haggle, with Geshov pushing for Macedonian autonomy, until the end of May when they finally reached an agreement that basically matched the last Greek proposal.³³⁶ Sofia decided to accept this agreement without providing for Macedonian autonomy or partition for three reasons. First, Geshov recognized that Bulgaria was militarily stronger than Greece and geographically closer to its goals. Bulgaria, therefore, should be able to occupy the contested area first. Greece would then be confronted by a superior military force and compelled to accept the new situation.³³⁷ Second, Geshov felt time pressure. He said "I may mention that, owing to lack of time, we were unable to conclude with Greece an agreement with respect to the frontiers of Macedonia."³³⁸ This pressure was the result of the Kocane Massacre of August 1912. A group of terrorists exploded a bomb in the central square of Kocane, Macedonia, leading to a Turkish response that included the massacre of Bulgarian Christians in Macedonia. This massacre created an uproar in Bulgaria and an outcry for war to free Macedonia from Turkish control. As a result of this reaction, Geshov worried that he had little time to negotiate.³³⁹ He feared that the public would force Bulgaria to go to war before the alliances were complete. He also feared that the public outcry would attract Constantinople's attentions and lead the Porte to prepare for the impending Balkan war. Third, even if there had been time for negotiations, it was unlikely that the

³³⁵The treaty would be renewable for an additional year.

³³⁶For the terms of the agreement, see Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, pp. 438-439; and Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan War*, pp. 76-77.

³³⁷Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 54-55.

³³⁸Quoted in Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 438.

³³⁹Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 73.

two sides could have come to an agreement since they both desired the same territory.³⁴⁰ All that remained for Greece and Bulgaria to negotiate was the military convention, which they concluded in September.

The final Balkan state to join the developing inter-Balkan alliances was Montenegro. This delay was not completely Montenegro's choice. King Nicholas was an ambitious man who sought to expand Montenegro's territorial borders, and he used the frequent turmoil in the neighboring Ottoman territories to try to achieve this goal.³⁴¹ To help accomplish his goal, Nicholas sought Balkan allies. During the Bosnian Crisis, Montenegro and Serbia put aside their differences to form an alliance. This alliance, however, was short-lived, collapsing by the end of 1909. For the next two years, Montenegro was constantly at odds with Turkey over Albania and the Turco-Montenegrin border, during which time Cetinje continued to seek allied support without success.³⁴² None of Montenegro's offers led to anything serious.³⁴³

These attempts to negotiate alliances failed for several reasons. Serbo-Montenegrin tensions prevented these two states from engaging in serious negotiations.³⁴⁴ Not only did the leaders of the two states have a certain level of personal animosity, but Serbia and Montenegro also competed for leadership among the Serb national movement.³⁴⁵ There were also worries that Montenegro might drag its allies into a Turco-Montenegrin conflict.³⁴⁶ Starting in October 1911, a third reason for this failure was that Bulgaria had decided to negotiate an alliance with Serbia. Bulgaria favored reaching

³⁴⁰The main conflict between the two was Salonika, in southern Macedonia.

³⁴¹There is no history of Montenegro and its foreign relations. The best source is Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*.

³⁴²Ibid, pp. 51-86; and Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 19-20; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan War*, p. 84.

³⁴³Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 105-106.

³⁴⁴Discussing Serbo-Montenegrin tensions is *ibid*, pp. 52-55, 93-95.

³⁴⁵Ethnically, Serbs and Montenegrins are the same; they speak the same language and practice the same religion.

³⁴⁶Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 72; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 84. On Turco-Montenegrin relations, see Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 92-93, 101-105.

an alliance with Serbia first for several reasons.³⁴⁷ Bulgaria and Montenegro were close and had no conflicts of interests, leading Bulgaria to expect that the two states could quickly reach an agreement. Thus, Bulgarian-Montenegrin negotiations were not a pressing matter. Russia also favored a Serbo-Bulgarian treaty over a Bulgarian-Montenegrin treaty because Cetinje's loyalty to Russia and to the Slav cause was questionable. If Montenegro were allowed into the alliance, St. Petersburg expected that Vienna would quickly learn of any treaties and their terms. Furthermore, as with the Balkan states, Russia worried that King Nicholas might take advantage of any alliance and go to war against the Turks. Since Russia did not want and was unprepared for a Balkan war, this was a serious danger.

By mid-summer of 1912, Bulgaria had decided to negotiate an agreement with Montenegro.³⁴⁸ For Sofia, a Bulgarian-Montenegrin alliance offered three advantages.³⁴⁹ Montenegro provided, at a minimum, the appearance of Balkan unity. Also, through marriages, Cetinje had close ties to the Russian royal family. By allying with Montenegro, Bulgaria hoped to improve its ties with St. Petersburg. Finally, because of the Serbo-Montenegrin tensions, Bulgaria hoped to be able to use Montenegro to balance against Serbia, if it became necessary. The negotiations went quickly with the two sides reaching an oral agreement by the end of August and a military convention that they signed in September.³⁵⁰ Bulgaria promised monetary aid to Montenegro and all the territory that Montenegro captured during the war. In return, Montenegro agreed to go to war by September 28th with 40,000 troops.

The final steps in the creation of the Balkan League occurred when Serbia negotiated agreements with Montenegro and with Greece.³⁵¹ These alliances were not significant causes of the

³⁴⁷Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 71-72; Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 56-57; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, pp. 84-86.

³⁴⁸Discussing the Bulgarian-Montenegrin negotiations is Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 71-72, 78-79; Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 86-88; and Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 105-108.

³⁴⁹Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 71-72.

³⁵⁰Terms of the agreement can be found in *ibid.*, p. 79; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 86-88.

³⁵¹There is no text to a Greco-Montenegrin treaty, but at least one author, L. S. Stavrianos, believes that the two states probably reached an oral agreement on a defensive treaty. See *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 533.

Balkan War because both were negotiated after the decision for war was reached. Montenegro needed Serbia's support in order to achieve its territorial ambitions.³⁵² But, as a result of Serbia's enmity, King Nicholas had been unable to negotiate an alliance with Belgrade.³⁵³ Finally, in mid-September 1912, Serbia accepted his offer to negotiate a military and political alliance.³⁵⁴ Belgrade wanted this alliance to address a war against the Turks without discussing the division of the territorial spoils. Therefore, when Montenegro proposed a treaty that provided generous territorial gains for Cetinje, the Serbs rejected it. On October 6, 1912, King Nicholas finally agreed to Serbia's terms and signed a treaty that called for an offensive war against Turkey in order to liberate the Ottoman Serbs.

Unlike Serbia and Montenegro, Greece and Serbia had been negotiating throughout the summer of 1912.³⁵⁵ These negotiations failed to lead to any agreement until October 22nd, after the war had already begun. In this treaty, the two states agreed to support each other in a war against Turkey. They also agreed not to make peace without the other's support and to protect the rights of the Serbs and the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire.

The only Balkan state left out of the Balkan League was Romania, which is not to say that Bucharest did not have any influence on the negotiations. Sofia worried that Romania might take advantage of a Balkan war to attack Bulgaria in order to acquire the Dobrudja region of Bulgaria. This fear seemed well-founded in March 1912 when Kalinkov, the Bulgarian Minister in Bucharest reported that the Romanian Foreign Minister, Titu Majorescu, had told him that

...in case of any kind of conflagration in the Balkans, as long as Bulgaria maintained the *status quo*, Romania would also uphold it. If Bulgaria should move toward the complete or partial realization of the San Stefano aspiration, however, Romania, with every means, will want the correction of our artificial Dobrudzha [Dobrudja] frontier more or less according to the Bulgarian gains from the Turkish inheritance.³⁵⁶

Since Bulgaria sought to make extensive gains at Turkey's expense, this statement was clearly a

³⁵²Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, p. 107.

³⁵³Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, p. 106.

³⁵⁴Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, p. 107; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 62-63.

³⁵⁵Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 440.

³⁵⁶Quoted in Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 76.

threat to Sofia's goals. Romania feared that Bulgarian gains in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire would unfavorably alter the Balkan balance of power unless Romania gained compensation, which Bucharest would seek in Dobrudja.³⁵⁷ To deal with the potential Romanian threat Danev, the president of the Bulgarian parliament, sought Russian support against Romania.³⁵⁸ In July 1912, Majorescu again broached the subject of Bulgaria's response to turmoil in the Balkans.³⁵⁹ Geshov took this action to be an invitation to negotiate. Even though a Bulgarian-Romanian agreement would be advantageous for Bulgaria, Geshov was very cautious. He feared that Romania would inform Austria of Bulgaria's impending actions, which might lead Austria to intervene. Furthermore, since Romania did not border the territories of the Ottoman Empire, he recognized that any agreement would require Bulgaria to cede Bulgarian territory to Romania—an unpleasant option. For these reasons, the negotiations could not lead to any agreement.

6.2.5 Turmoil in the Ottoman Empire

The condition of the Ottoman Empire helped cause the First Balkan War in three ways. The turmoil in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire, particularly Albania and Macedonia, threatened Balkan interests and created opportunities for the Balkan states to exploit. At the same time, the internal divisions centered in Constantinople helped weaken the Ottoman Empire, thereby shifting the balance of power in favor of the Balkan states. These internal divisions also created intense competition for leadership of the Ottoman government which made it difficult for those in power to make the compromises necessary to forestall a Balkan attack.

In the European territories of the Ottoman Empire, two problems remained thorns in Constantinople's paw. The first was Albania. In an attempt to suppress Albanian nationalism, the Ottoman government opposed the cultural and political goals of the Albanian nationalists, creating a great deal of resentment among the Albanians. Adding to this resentment were the onerous taxes and military commitment that Constantinople imposed on the Albanians. As a result, the Albanians rebelled against the Ottoman government in 1911 and then again in 1912. The rebellion of 1911

³⁵⁷Hitchens, *Rumania*, pp. 146-147.

³⁵⁸Russia agreed to provide Bulgaria with diplomatic support. Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 68.

³⁵⁹*Ibid*, pp. 76-78.

lasted for a few months and ended in August when Russia forced Cetinje to withdraw its support.³⁶⁰ The 1912 rebellion began in the spring and ended in September when the Turks agreed to the Albanians' demands.³⁶¹ These demands essentially provided for Albanian autonomy. The main reason the Turks agreed to these demands was to prepare for the potential war against the Balkan states.³⁶² The Porte recognized that the Balkans were preparing for war, and Turkey needed to prepare. To do this, they needed to settle as many of the outstanding problems as they could.

The second problem in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire was Macedonia. After the initial euphoria that followed the Young Turk's rise to power, the condition under which the Christians in Macedonia lived deteriorated, leading to a renewal of tensions between the Ottomans and the Christians. These tensions escalated in December 1911 and reached a new peak in August 1912.³⁶³ In December 1911, Christian terrorists blew up a train station and the Turks responded by killing approximately 15 people and wounding over 150 others. Then, in August 1912, the Turks responded to an explosion in Kocane, a Macedonian town, by massacring over a hundred Bulgarians.

These Albanian and Macedonian problems had several effects on the Balkans. The resolution of the Albanian crisis concerned the Balkans because they considered it to be a danger to their plans.³⁶⁴ With the creation of an autonomous Albania, any justification that Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia had for the acquisition of Albanian territory became weaker, making it less likely that the Powers would allow any such acquisition. At the same time, the Turks included Macedonian territory among the four regions of Albania, which threatened the interests of all the Balkan states. Furthermore, the changes in Albania created a stir among the Greek public, who then put pressure on the Greek government to acquire the territory, namely Epirus in southern Albania, that Greece

³⁶⁰Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 74-81.

³⁶¹On the Albanian revolt of 1912, see Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 426-437.

³⁶²Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire: Reform, Revolution, and Republic*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2: 293.

³⁶³Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 405-410; and Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 73.

³⁶⁴Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, pp. 106-109; Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 53; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, pp. 105-106

desired.³⁶⁵

Greece was not the only state that struggled with domestic demands for action. As a result of the turmoil in Macedonia, Bulgaria confronted strong domestic pressures to attack the Turks.³⁶⁶ The opposition parties and the Bulgarian public called for the government to intervene in Macedonia to save the Bulgarian Christians living there. This sentiment was clearly expressed by one of the more moderate Bulgarian newspapers, which wrote

If the maintenance of the *status quo* means the toleration of anarchy in the Turkish Empire until the complete obliteration of the Christian population, every Balkan state, which has nationals there, is obligated to protest. And if these protests are not heeded, they themselves must take care that the anarchy is stopped.³⁶⁷

The Macedonian exiles and refugees also pushed Sofia to adopt a more aggressive, militaristic policy towards the Ottoman Empire in order to stop the Turkish mistreatment of Christians. In addition to these pressures for action, the Bulgarian government feared that the military might revolt if it did not take strong actions.

Finally, these crises caused the Balkan states to fear that the Great Powers might intervene in the Balkans and prevent them from attaining their territorial goals. Count Leopold Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister who replaced Aehrenthal, recognized that the turmoil in Albania and Macedonia might encourage the Balkan states to attack the Ottoman Empire.³⁶⁸ To forestall this attack, he proposed that the Great Powers suggest that the Porte decentralize power within the Ottoman Empire while also warning the Balkan states to avoid any actions that would intensify the problems in the Balkan territories.³⁶⁹ If adopted, Berchtold hoped that this proposal would help maintain the *status quo*. He believed that decentralization would strengthen the Ottoman Empire

³⁶⁵Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, p. 106.

³⁶⁶Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp. 407-410 ; and Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 73.

³⁶⁷Quoted in *ibid.*

³⁶⁸Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, pp. 344-345; Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 73-75; Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 116-118; Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, pp. 107-108; and Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years*, pp. 306-307.

³⁶⁹It is important to note that the Berchtold made his proposal before the Turks accepted Albania's terms to end the revolt. Thus, the Balkan states were reacting to the proposal's effects on Albania and Macedonia.

and maintain peace between the Balkan states and the Porte.³⁷⁰ Instead, the proposal increased the incentives for the Balkan states to act soon. They believed that Ottoman reforms would increase the support of the Great Powers for Constantinople, making it more difficult for them to go to war to achieve their goals. Furthermore, there was the danger that, despite the proposed reforms, the Christians in the Empire's Balkan territories might continue to suffer. If the Balkan states did not help them, they might respond by increasing the terrorist activities which, in turn, would increase instability in the Balkan provinces.

The Ottoman government in Constantinople also suffered from serious instability that limited its ability to adequately prepare for war.³⁷¹ The turmoil within the Ottoman Empire and the heavy-handed tactics that the leaders of the CUP employed to maintain power created divisions within the party, opposition in the army, and opposition in the provinces. This opposition made it difficult to resolve the crises that confronted the Ottoman Empire because any resolution would involve compromises and concessions. If the group in power made concessions, then the opposition would use these concessions to attack the government. As a result, those in power in Constantinople were impotent; any actions would lead to political conflict and, possibly, military intervention. The German ambassador to Constantinople recognized the effect of these divisions when he wrote to his superiors that

Today, two parties of almost equal strength stand opposed, carefully and suspiciously watching each other. Any kind of concession of the government in regard to an attempt of the powers to intervene would become a weapon in the hands of the opposition, for the army, i.e. the officers corps, which, as the supreme power, controls the political life, would immediately forsake the government to join the opposition.³⁷²

In addition to the governmental inertia, the turmoil in Constantinople had a serious effect on the military. As the above quote makes clear, the military played an important role in politics, posing a threat to those in power. When the opposition gained power from the CUP in late summer of 1912, the new minister of war decided to purge the military of those he considered to be unreliable

³⁷⁰Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 116-117.

³⁷¹Discussing the instability in the Ottoman Empire are Ahmad, *The Young Turks*; A.L. Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1923*, (New York: Longman, 1998), pp. 39-70; Shaw and Shaw, *The Rise of Modern Turkey*, pp. 279-289, 290-292; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 90-102..

³⁷²Quoted in Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 98.

and replaced them with new recruits.³⁷³ By so doing, he weakened the Turkish army.

6.2.6 The First Balkan War: Origins and Outcome

With the creation of the Balkan League, the Balkan states were prepared for war. The agreements provided for Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro to act jointly. To justify war, they would demand that the Porte implement the reforms required by treaty. Montenegro would then declare war. Bulgaria and Serbia would enter the war within one month.³⁷⁴ By the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian military convention, which was concluded on May 12, 1912, Serbia would mobilize at least 150,000 men and Bulgaria would mobilize 200,000 men.³⁷⁵ In the Greco-Bulgarian agreement, Greece agreed to provide 120,000 troops and Bulgaria would provide 300,000 troops.³⁷⁶

What remained for these states to decide was when to declare war. Cetinje was continually interested in going to war against the Ottoman Empire. For the previous two years, King Nicholas had been supporting the Albanians in their revolts against the Ottoman Empire, at times he even threatened war. In the summer of 1912, the Turco-Montenegrin border dispute threatened to escalate into a war as the two sides engaged in several border skirmishes.³⁷⁷ Now that he had allies, Nicholas was more determined than ever to go to war; hence, the decision for Montenegro to start the hostilities. Bulgaria, on the other hand, thought that war should be delayed for two reasons. First, Sofia and Athens had not completed their negotiations for a military convention. These negotiations were being held up by disagreements over the future status of Macedonia. Second, Russia was in the midst of an election, which was to take place in mid-September. Geshov believed that the Balkan states should delay the war until after the elections. Otherwise, the Russian public and press might be so focused on internal politics that they would ignore the war and fail to push the Russian

³⁷³Ibid, p. 98.

³⁷⁴Since the Greco-Bulgarian military convention was not signed until 5 days after war began, there was no agreement with regards to when Greece would enter the war.

³⁷⁵Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Condition of the Balkan Wars, *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict* by George Kennan, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), p. 48.

³⁷⁶Ibid.

³⁷⁷Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 101-105.

government to support the Balkan states and their cause.³⁷⁸ Without the support of Russia, the Balkan League faced many potential dangers: a Romanian attack against Bulgaria; Austro-Hungarian intervention against Serbia; and an Ottoman invasion in the event of defeat. In the end, the Bulgarian plan won the day. The Bulgarian-Montenegrin agreement committed Montenegro to go to war no later than September 28th, while committing Bulgaria to enter the war within a month.

The fact that the Balkan states were planning a war was not a complete secret. While it is true that only Russia was kept fully informed about the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, it was common knowledge that the Balkan states wished to take advantage of the current challenges that the Ottoman Empire confronted. The Turks, therefore, decided that the time to prepare for war had come. Preparation required that they settle their current conflicts and prepare their military for war. As previously stated, the Porte agreed to the demands of the Albanian rebels. In late August 1912, Constantinople also decided to try to settle the Italo-Turkish War.³⁷⁹ Previous attempts to negotiate had foundered on the divisions in Turkish politics,³⁸⁰ but with war clouds growing in the Balkans, Turkish leaders recognized that they must end this war in order to deal with the more significant threat.³⁸¹ In addition, the Turks decided to prepare their military for war by ordering the mobilization of 100,000 troops in Thrace on September 22nd.³⁸²

During this time, the Great Powers were also involved in the Balkan problem.³⁸³ Specifically, they were trying to prevent a war from occurring. To accomplish this goal, they used two methods: they tried to convince the Porte to implement serious reforms in its Balkan territories, and they tried

³⁷⁸Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 72-73.

³⁷⁹Askew, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya*, pp. 234-241.

³⁸⁰*Ibid*, p. 234.

³⁸¹Tripoli was less important to the Ottoman Empire than the Balkans. The Empire's control over many of its Arab provinces had been, for the most part, ceremonial for quite some time. For this reason, the loss of Tripoli was relatively insignificant. The loss of the Balkan territories, however, threatened the Empire's existence. Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 95-96.

³⁸²Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 115.

³⁸³Even though all the Great Powers, to some extent, wanted to prevent a Balkan War, the two Powers that led these attempts were Austria-Hungary and Russia, with some support from France.

to convince the Balkan states to avoid war. The first attempt in this direction occurred in mid-August when Vienna sent the Berchtold Note to the Great Powers. As previously stated, Berchtold hoped the Great Powers would persuade Constantinople to decentralize power in the Balkans while also convincing the Balkan states to provide the Ottoman Empire with the time needed to implement these reforms. From the beginning, Turkish politics guaranteed that the proposal would not succeed. Any attempt by the Turkish government to decentralize power would strengthen its opposition.³⁸⁴ Because of the effect that this proposal could have on Constantinople, neither Britain nor Germany would support it.³⁸⁵ Both states had interests in the Ottoman Empire and did not wish to create resentment against them. St. Petersburg, on the other hand, opposed making any demands on the Balkan states that might harm them or their interests.³⁸⁶ Sazonov believed that he could control the Balkan states because the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty provided St. Petersburg with veto power over any decision to go to war.³⁸⁷ Finally, alliance solidarity contributed to the failure of the Berchtold Note. With the development of two competing, balanced Great Power alliances, alliance solidarity became more important. France and Russia, therefore, sought to develop a solution that would maintain the unity of the Triple Entente.³⁸⁸

St. Petersburg began to change its tune and try to prevent a Balkan war in mid-September 1912. This shift occurred when Bulgaria informed Russia that a Balkan war against Turkey was inevitable.³⁸⁹ Russia was not prepared for war and, therefore, advised Bulgaria not to go to war. Sazonov informed Sofia that if Bulgaria declared war, Russia would not provide it with any

³⁸⁴Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 117-118.

³⁸⁵R.J. Crampton, *The Hollow Detente: Anglo German Relations in the Balkans 1911-1914*, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), p. 56; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 126. In addition, Britain worried that any actions taken against the Ottoman Empire might incite the Muslims living in India against British rule.

³⁸⁶Ibid, p.127.

³⁸⁷Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 109.

³⁸⁸On the divisions of the Great Power and its influence on the management of the Balkan crisis, see *ibid*, pp. 119-122.

³⁸⁹Ibid, pp. 109-110; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 64.

support.³⁹⁰ He then sent notes to Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, warning them not to go to war.

In these notes he wrote

If it [the government] does not forewarn Bulgaria of its refusal to follow her, in our opinion, into a disastrous attack and takes the decision against which we repeatedly warned it, Russia renounces all responsibility for the consequences. The Balkan states cannot count on her intervention in the impending struggle.³⁹¹

To further emphasize Russia's position, he told the Russian ambassadors to Belgrade and Sofia to inform the two governments that

In the event that in spite of our warnings the two states decide now to employ their alliance to launch a joint attack on Turkey...and to expose their territorial integrity and independence to a ruinous ordeal, then we deem it our duty to warn them in advance that in such a case we will be guided solely by our concern for the direct and immediate interests of Russia.³⁹²

These, however, were not the first warnings that St. Petersburg had given, particularly Bulgaria.³⁹³ In April, May, and again in July Russia warned Bulgaria against attacking the Ottoman Empire. In April, Sazonov told the Bulgarians that Russia did not have a legal obligation to defend Bulgaria if Sofia attacked the Ottoman Empire. And, in May, the Tsar informed the Bulgarians that Russia would be unprepared for war for at least a year.

Despite these warnings, Bulgaria remained confident of Russian support. Perhaps the most important reason for this confidence was the expectation that the Russian public would not allow St. Petersburg to abandon the Balkan Slavs.³⁹⁴ This helps to explain why Geshov wanted to delay the war until after the Russian election. After the elections, public opinion would be more likely to notice events in the Balkans and put pressure on the St. Petersburg to intervene in support of the Balkan states.

Adding to the faith in the Russian public was the schizophrenic nature of the Russian

³⁹⁰Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 109-110.

³⁹¹Quoted in Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 65.

³⁹²Ibid.

³⁹³Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 68-69; Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 106-107; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 111-114.

³⁹⁴Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 68; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 112, 154.

government and the signals it sent. The Russian government gave reason to believe that they would provide the Balkan states with diplomatic support. Even though Sazonov warned the Balkan states in September that they would not receive any support if they went to war, he had previously offered diplomatic support.³⁹⁵ Furthermore, on September 22nd, A.A. Neratov, who was occasionally the acting Russian foreign minister, informed the Serbian ambassador to St. Petersburg that “she could again count [as in 1908] on Russia’s diplomatic support, and that Russia was already negotiating with Austria-Hungary in order to keep her from undertaking an independent action.”³⁹⁶ Also, while Sazonov warned the Balkan states against war, other leaders—specifically Nekludov and Hartwig, the Russian ambassadors to Bulgaria and Serbia respectively—supported the Balkans in their goals and led them to believe that Russia would also support them.³⁹⁷ In the end, the Balkan states decided to accept the advice that fit their interests; if necessary, Russia would support the Balkan states.

This is not to say that Russia’s warnings did not effect the Balkan states. Belgrade feared that without Russian support Austria would be more likely to attack.³⁹⁸ Berchtold, however, had informed Bulgaria that Austria would not go to war over the Turkish collapse, leading Bulgaria to believe that Serbia was safe from Austria.³⁹⁹ Sofia used this information to convince the Serbian leaders that Vienna would not intervene.

The Balkan states did not make their final decision for war until September 24th.⁴⁰⁰ Between September 22nd and September 24th, Turkish actions convinced them that the time for war had come. First, the Turks confiscated a shipment of Serbian war materials. This action was considered aggressive because the Turks had approved the transport of these materials ten days earlier. Then, on September 24th, Turkey ordered the mobilization of 100,000 troops in Adrianople and called-up

³⁹⁵Hall, *Bulgaria’s Road to the First World War*, p. 70; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 111-112, 114..

³⁹⁶Quoted in *ibid*, 114.

³⁹⁷*Ibid*, pp. 156-157.

³⁹⁸Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 112-115; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 68.

³⁹⁹Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 185; and Hall, *Bulgaria’s Road to the First World War*, p. 113.

⁴⁰⁰Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 68.

10 divisions throughout European Turkey. The rising tension led Bulgaria to begin to mobilize its forces on September 25th, and the remaining Balkan states soon followed.⁴⁰¹ With this decision, the Balkan states were finally on their way to war. On October 8, 1912, Montenegro attacked the Ottoman Empire.

Between September 22nd and October 8th, the Great Powers tried to prevent a Balkan War from breaking out. Once Bulgaria informed St. Petersburg of the impending war, Sazonov felt the need to intervene in some way to protect Russia's interests.⁴⁰² He first proposed that the Great Powers jointly act in Constantinople by recommending that the Porte guarantee the same reforms in Macedonia that were granted in Albania.⁴⁰³ This proposal, however, floundered as Great Power politics caused delays. Then, he and French Premier Poincare tried to develop a proposal that would both defend their interests in the Balkans and maintain solidarity among the Triple Entente.⁴⁰⁴ On September 22nd, Poincare had proposed that the Great Powers make a joint representation to the Balkan states.⁴⁰⁵ Britain and Russia rejected the parts of the proposals that called for military demonstrations, but they supported the idea that called for them to inform the Balkan states that they would not allow any Balkan territorial gains.⁴⁰⁶ They also rejected the idea of presenting the completed proposal to the Triple Alliance because it would emphasize the divisions between the two alliance blocs.

With these concerns in mind, Poincare decided to seek more help. He, therefore, initiated discussions with Germany.⁴⁰⁷ These discussions led to a proposal that Austria and Russia, the states

⁴⁰¹Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 444.

⁴⁰²Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 120-123.

⁴⁰³This proposal differed from the Berchtold Note in one significant way; it did not call for any Great Power representations in the Balkan capitals.

⁴⁰⁴Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 120-121; John F. V. Keiger, *France and the Origins of the First World War*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 97-98; Lee, *Europe's Crucial years*, p. 307; and Thaden, *Russia and the Balkans Alliance of 1912*, pp. 127-128.

⁴⁰⁵Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 123.

⁴⁰⁶Britain also opposed making it a joint proposal.

⁴⁰⁷Ibid, pp. 127-129.

with the greatest interests in the Balkans, would inform the states involved that, regardless of the outcome of any war, the territorial *status quo* would be preserved.⁴⁰⁸ It is important to note that the purpose of this proposal was *not* to prevent a war from breaking out, but to localize it. By guaranteeing the territorial *status quo* neither Austria nor Russia would have any reason to intervene in the war. The Balkan states would not be able to make gains that would threaten Austrian interests, and they would not be able to suffer any territorial losses that would threaten Russian interests. To satisfy the Balkan states, the Powers would also recommend that Turkey implement reforms in its Balkan territories. On October 8, 1912, Russia and Austria informed the Balkan states about their decision, which was too late. On the same day Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

For ten days Montenegro fought alone. During this time, the other members of the Balkan League continued their preparations. On October 17th, the military preparations were complete: Bulgaria had mobilized 366,000 men; Serbia had mobilized 190,000 men; Greece had mobilized 120,000 men plus its navy; and Montenegro had mobilized 40,000 men.⁴⁰⁹ Turkey, which had planned to mobilize over 1 million only mobilized 420,000.⁴¹⁰ The next day, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia declared war on the Turks, beginning the First Balkan War with high hopes of victory. The Balkan allies had 716,000 troops to the Ottoman forces of 420,000 troops, a 1.7:1 advantage.⁴¹¹

By October 18th, all the members of the Balkan League had declared war against the Ottoman Empire and begun their attacks.⁴¹² The Bulgarians attacked along the valley of the Maritza River into Thrace towards the cities of Adrianople and Constantinople. Greece pushed northward into

⁴⁰⁸Ibid, 127-132.

⁴⁰⁹Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 79.

⁴¹⁰Ibid.

⁴¹¹Kemal Sayupak and Huseyin Kabaskal, "The Turkish Army in the First Balkan War," in *War and Society in East Central Europe Volume XVIII: East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, edited by Bela K. Kiraly and Dimitrije Djordjevic, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 158-162 provide a lower estimate, 474,000 Balkan troops to 240,000 Turkish troops, which gives the Balkan states a 1.6:1 advantage.

⁴¹²Discussing the military aspects of the Balkan War are Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 377-379; Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 101- 130; Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, pp. 195-196; Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 193-203; Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, pp. 123-136; William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successor States, 1801-1927*, with an appendix 1827-1936, fourth edition, (New York: Macmillan, 1936), pp. 501-504; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 70-106.

Macedonia and, eventually, into southern Albania. The Serbian army started its attack in Macedonia and the Sanjak of Novibazar, where the Montenegrins joined it, and then expanded into Albania. Montenegro's attack focused on northern Albania towards the port at Scutari and the Sanjak of Novibazar.

To almost everyone's surprise, the Balkan states easily defeated the Ottoman forces and achieved most of their goals within a few weeks.⁴¹³ Montenegro began the war by invading Albania to the south, the Sanjak of Novibazar to the east, and the vilayet of Kosovo in Macedonia to the south east. Cetinje's two main goals were Scutari in northern Albania and Prizen in Kosovo.⁴¹⁴ Initially, King Nicholas's forces achieved significant successes and quickly took parts of the Sanjak and northern Albania. Within a few days, Montenegro's army began the attack against Scutari, which quickly failed and required a siege of the city if Nicholas were to conquer it. Montenegro's goal of occupying Prizen was destroyed when Serbia entered the war on October 18th. Serbian forces joined Montenegro in occupying the Sanjak. The main Serbian forces, however, attacked southward into Kosovo, which they captured by the first week of November. Included in these gains was the city of Prizen. Following these successes, Serbia attacked in two directions. One force continued southward towards Monastir in Macedonia,⁴¹⁵ while the other force turned east into Albania. By November 18th, Serbian forces captured the city Monastir. By the end of November, Serbia had conquered a significant portion of Albania, thereby accomplishing Belgrade's military goals.

Greece also entered the war on October 18th. The Greek military divided its forces into two groups. The largest group concentrated in northern Thessaly and raced into Macedonia towards Salonika. The smaller force's goal was to conquer southern Albania up to the fortress of Janina. The large force in Thessaly easily defeated the four weak Turkish divisions that it confronted and

⁴¹³It is difficult to determine what expectations existed. As previously stated, the Turkish military recognized its weakness and opposed war. Although doubts crept in every now and then, the Balkan states seem to have been optimistic about the likelihood of victory. The attitude of the Great Powers, however, is unclear. Some sources suggest that they expected a Turkish victory and others suggest they expected a Balkan victory. What is clear is that nobody expected the quick, complete Balkan victory that occurred.

⁴¹⁴Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 112-113.

⁴¹⁵It is important to note that Monastir and some of the other Macedonian territory captured by Serbian forces was promised to Bulgaria in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty.

raced towards Salonika, capturing the city on November 8th, one day before Bulgarian forces arrived. From Salonika, Greece sent some troops to the northwest into Macedonia and towards Albania. The smaller Greek force did not take offensive actions until November 1st, when reinforcements arrived. After the reinforcements arrived, this force made little progress in southern Albania during the next two weeks. When the Greeks learned that the Turks had asked for an armistice on November 15th, the pressure to advance into southern Albania increased. This force, therefore, continued to advance into Albania with the goal of capturing Janina, which it entered on December 23rd.

The Bulgarian attack was equally successful. Bulgaria entered Thrace with eight divisions and reached Adrianople by October 24th.⁴¹⁶ One division remained to lay siege to Adrianople while the rest continued southward towards Constantinople. By November 2nd, the Ottoman forces in Thrace had withdrawn to the fortifications along the Chatalja line, forty kilometers (25 miles) north of Constantinople. Long supply lines and an outbreak of cholera among the Bulgarian troops prevented them from pressing their attack against the Turkish lines until November 17th. Unfortunately for Bulgaria, the Turkish defenses held.

The Turkish situation was desperate. The Ottoman Empire had lost all its territory in Europe except the fortresses of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari. At the same time, Constantinople was threatened by a Bulgarian army only forty kilometers away. The Turks, therefore, sought a cease-fire. On November 3rd, they asked the Great Powers to help negotiate an armistice. This attempt did not bear fruit, so the Turks asked Bulgaria for an armistice on November 13th. Bulgaria wanted to capture Constantinople and, initially, rejected the offer. After the failed attack against the Chatalja line, Sofia changed its attitude. Since Serbia and Montenegro had, for the most part, achieved their goals, they also were willing to accept an armistice, which was signed on December 3rd.⁴¹⁷ Athens decided to reject the terms of the armistice because the Turks refused to surrender Janina to Greece. Nevertheless, the Greeks agreed to send representatives to the peace conference in London.

Between December 16th and January 6th, representatives of the Balkan states and Turkey met

⁴¹⁶In addition, Bulgaria sent two divisions to Salonika. They arrived on November 9th, one day after Greek forces captured the city.

⁴¹⁷Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 202-203.

to discuss peace terms.⁴¹⁸ These negotiations proceeded with difficulty because the Turks worried that the Committee of Union and Progress would use any concessions to increase their political power.⁴¹⁹ Thus, when the Balkan states demanded that Turkey cede Adrianople and the islands in the Aegean in addition to the territories already controlled by the Balkan states, the Turks rejected these terms, leading the negotiations to be suspended on January 6th.⁴²⁰

Since the Powers did not want the war to resume, they advised the Balkan states not to abrogate the armistice. Then, they prepared a note that they presented to the Porte on January 17, 1913.⁴²¹ In this note, the Powers warned Turkey that a continuation of the war threatened further territorial losses—perhaps even Constantinople. They also warned the Porte that they would not help Turkey rebuild from its two wars if it did not accept their advice.

Just when it appeared that the Turkish government was going to agree to peace terms, the CUP initiated a coup to regain power.⁴²² The new government promptly prepared a response to the Powers' note.⁴²³ Since the new government would not accept the Balkan League's terms, they decided to present a proposal that might gain the support of the Great Powers. Turkey would cede the western section of Adrianople, which was on the right bank of the Maritza River, but not the eastern section because the eastern section contained many important Muslim and Ottoman landmarks. Furthermore, Turkey would not cede the Aegean islands to Greece because of their importance for Turkish security, but would accept the Great Power's decision on the status of these islands.

⁴¹⁸Discussing these meetings is Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 115-116; Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 131-162; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 259-260.

⁴¹⁹Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 114-115.

⁴²⁰Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 260.

⁴²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 260-262.

⁴²²Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 116-120; Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 225; Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 77-80; and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2: 295. The evidence suggests that the CUP had been planning a coup for quite some time, suggesting that the decision to reach a peace settlement with the Balkan states did not cause the coup. The belief that the current government was about to accept a peace treaty that ceded significant territory, particularly Adrianople, however, influenced the timing of the coup.

⁴²³Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 121-124; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 268.

The Balkan states rejected Turkey's reply and resumed their attack on February 3rd.⁴²⁴ Bulgaria focused its offensive on Adrianople while maintaining a defensive position against the improved Turkish forces at the Chatalja line⁴²⁵; Greece attacked Janina and other areas in southern Albania; and, Montenegro continued its siege of Scutari. Serbia, on the other hand, had already achieved its goals with its conquests in Macedonia and in Albania. Instead of trying to conquer more territory, Belgrade sent aid to Adrianople and to Montenegro to assist its allies in their sieges of these two cities.

During the next four months the Balkan states proceeded to finish off the Turks in Europe. On March 6th, Greece captured Janina and proceeded to occupy more territory in southern Albania. On March 26th, Bulgaria finally captured Adrianople. And, finally, on April 24th, the Turkish forces in Scutari surrendered to Montenegro.⁴²⁶ With these successes, the Balkan states had achieved their goals. All that remained was for them to reach a peace settlement with the Turks that satisfied the Great Powers and to divide the spoils of war amongst themselves.

6.2.7 The Great Powers and the Division of the Spoils of the First Balkan War

The quick, overwhelming victory of the Balkan states had two significant effects on the Great Powers. First, it caused them to recognize that their previous decision to prevent any changes in the territorial *status quo* was a dead letter. They recognized that they could not return the lost Balkan territories to the Ottoman Empire because the Empire lacked the ability both to control its Balkan territories and to protect these territories from the Balkan states. With this realization, they also recognized that they had to determine what territorial settlement would be acceptable to them. Britain, France, and Germany had no direct interests in the Balkan settlement and, therefore, had no national interests that would place limits on the peace terms. Russia, on the other hand, opposed

⁴²⁴Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 268-269, 281-282.

⁴²⁵The Bulgarian military was not in good shape and needed a couple of months to be ready for an offensive. At the same time, the Turkish military was improving with forces moving into the area and morale on the rise. This situation helps to explain why the Bulgarians adopted a defensive strategy against the Turkish lines. Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 137, 139, 164-165; and Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 124.

⁴²⁶By this time, the Serbian forces that had been helping Montenegro with the siege of Scutari had withdrawn under pressure from the Great Powers.

Bulgaria's occupation and annexation of Constantinople.⁴²⁷ Fortunately for Russia, this problem became a non-issue when the Turks repulsed the Bulgarian attack of November 17th.

What became the most important issue for the Great Powers was the status of Albania. Groups within Vienna opposed Serbian and Montenegrin expansion into the Sanjak of Novibazar and into Albania.⁴²⁸ If the two Balkan states occupied the Sanjak, they would be able to unite, thereby forming a large Slav state on the Austro-Hungarian Empire's southern border. A Serbian or Montenegrin attempt to acquire territory in Albania would also threaten Austria's interests.⁴²⁹ Austria had obligations to the Albanian Christians that Vienna would not be able to live up to if they became citizens of either Slav state. More importantly, a Greater Serbia with a port on the Adriatic Sea threatened Austria's security.

Even though Austria did not expect a Turkish victory, leaders in Vienna expected the war to be a long, drawn out affair that would provide them with time to develop a Balkan policy. The unexpected speed with which the Balkan states dispatched the Turks forced Vienna to decide what territorial settlement was acceptable given Austria's interests.⁴³⁰ Austrian leaders decided that the Sanjak was not of sufficient importance to justify war.⁴³¹ The acquisition of the Sanjak would not alter the balance of power and, since its population was ethnically Serb, Austria decided not to object to its acquisition by the two Serb states. Albania, however, was a different story. If any of the Balkan states—Greece, Montenegro, or Serbia—acquired an Albanian port, the balance of power could shift against Austria.

At the end of October, Austria, therefore, decided to advocate the creation of a large Albanian state.⁴³² Vienna would allow Greece to keep Albanian territory from the city of Janina south to the Greek border. Montenegro would receive some territory in northern Albania, but not the city of

⁴²⁷Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 87-90.

⁴²⁸Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, pp. 385-391.

⁴²⁹Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 91.

⁴³⁰Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, p. 124.

⁴³¹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 390-391

⁴³²Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 91-93.

Scutari. Serbia would make no gains in Albania. Adding insult to injury, Austria claimed that Albania should include several key Macedonian cities that Serbia both claimed and occupied.

To some extent, Austria had the support of its allies in the Triple Alliance—Italy and Germany—for this goal. Albania was important to Italy for both economic and security reasons. Because of its importance to Vienna and Rome, they had made several agreements that called for Albanian autonomy if any changes in the Balkan *status quo* occurred.⁴³³ These agreements and the rules behind them were not the only reason Italy supported Austria's position. Italy did not strongly oppose a Serbian port on the Adriatic. What Italy feared most of all was Austrian gains in Albania.⁴³⁴ By supporting Vienna, Rome hoped to prevent Austria from making gains that could harm Italy's interests. Berlin's support for Vienna, on the other hand, had nothing to do with Germany's Balkan interests. Berlin supported Austria's position with respect to Albania because Germany could not afford to let its ally become weaker.⁴³⁵

Serbia and Montenegro strongly opposed this plan.⁴³⁶ Belgrade believed that Serbia's independence and economic well-being required an Adriatic port. Without this port, Serbian trade would depend upon the good will of others, particularly Austria. Pasic, the Serbian prime minister and foreign minister, demonstrated the strength of this belief in a letter to the *London Times* in which he wrote

It is essential that Serbia should possess about fifty kilometers from Alessio to Durazzo. This coastline would be joined to what was formerly Old Serbia, approximately by the territory between a line from Durazzo to Ochrida Lake in the south, and one from Alessio to Djakova in the north.

For this minimum Serbia is prepared to make every sacrifice, since not to do so would be false to her national duty. No Serbian statesman or government dare betray the future welfare of the country by considering for a moment even the abandonment of this minimum.

Cetinje also opposed Vienna's proposal because King Nicholas demanded Scutari and was unwilling

⁴³³ Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 122, 381-382, 419; and Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers*, pp. 199, 221.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 222-226.

⁴³⁵ Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 397-402.

⁴³⁶ Athens also opposed the Austrian proposal because Greece would be required to cede some of the territory its military had conquered. Since no crisis occurred between Greece and any of the Great Powers as a result of this opposition, I do not discuss the issue.

to give it up.⁴³⁷

Belgrade had the support of two allies in its opposition to Austria's proposal. One was Bulgaria. Even though Bulgaria had no direct interests in Albania an underlying assumption of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was that Belgrade would acquire sufficient Albanian territory to provide Serbia with access to the Adriatic.⁴³⁸ Sofia feared that if Serbia did not gain territory in Albania, Belgrade would demand compensation in Macedonia.⁴³⁹ More importantly, Russia supported the Serbian position.⁴⁴⁰ The level of this support, however, was uncertain. In October 1912, Russia took actions to increase its number of active troops, which was perceived to be support for Serbia and its Balkan allies.⁴⁴¹ When Belgrade informed Berlin that Serbia would go to war for an outlet on the Adriatic and that Russia would support Serbia, Russia publicly rejected Serbia's claim.⁴⁴²

A crisis ensued as Austria, with the support of its allies, and Serbia, with the support of its allies, refused to compromise. Austria responded to the Serbian, and Russian, threats by putting its troops in a greater state of readiness.⁴⁴³ Thus, the potential for a European war existed. If Austria attacked Serbia, Russia might intervene. Germany would then come to the aid of its ally which would draw a military response from France.

In an attempt to prevent the war from expanding, England, France, and Germany decided that the Great Powers ought to meet in London to settle the issue. The other Great Powers agreed to this proposal. The Austrian public, however, demanded that Serbia agree to abide by the decision of the Powers before the conference commenced. If Serbia refused to accept these terms, Austria

⁴³⁷Aside from King Nicholas's expansionist goals, it is unclear why Scutari was so important for him or for Montenegro.

⁴³⁸During the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations, Belgrade claimed that Serbia needed a small amount of Macedonian territory in order to gain access to the Adriatic Sea through Albania.

⁴³⁹Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, 141-142; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 97.

⁴⁴⁰Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, pp. 390, 402-418, 424; Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 231-236; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 94, 96, 99-101, 103-104.

⁴⁴¹Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 157-160.

⁴⁴²Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 95-96. This rejection was blunted by Hartwig's continued support for Serbian aspirations.

⁴⁴³Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 188-189.

threatened war. Pasic turned to England, France, and Russia for advice. All three recommended that he accept Austria's terms. Without Russia's support, Serbia could not stand up to Austria. At the end of November 1912, therefore, he agreed to leave the issue of Albania's borders and Serbia's access to the Adriatic in the hands of the Great Powers.⁴⁴⁴

Montenegro was not as easily cowed. When the Great Powers had agreed to create an independent Albania that would deny Serbia access to the Adriatic and Montenegro control over Scutari, Montenegro had yet to capture the city. When the initial peace negotiations between the Balkan League and Turkey failed to produce any results and the war resumed, Montenegro continued its attack on Scutari. This time, however, Montenegro had Serbian military support.

Vienna was angered at King Nicholas's defiance of the Great Powers. They had agreed, at Vienna's insistence, to create an independent Albanian state that included Scutari.⁴⁴⁵ Austria, therefore, strongly advocated Great Power intervention to force Cetinje, and its Serbian ally, to accept the Great Powers' decision and to end the siege of Scutari. Unfortunately, divisions among the Great Powers made it difficult for them to agree to any action to enforce their decision. Nevertheless, after a great deal of negotiations, the Great Powers agreed to blockade Montenegro and northern Albania.⁴⁴⁶

The blockade succeeded in convincing Belgrade to withdraw its forces, but failed to stop Montenegro's siege. On April 4th, Serbia announced that it was withdrawing its forces from Scutari.⁴⁴⁷ Montenegro continued the siege of Scutari. The Great Powers now tried to buy King Nicholas's good behavior by offering him financial compensation if he withdrew from Scutari.⁴⁴⁸ Nicholas rejected this offer and continued the siege. Finally, on April 24/25, Montenegro's efforts

⁴⁴⁴Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 106.

⁴⁴⁵Vienna was the principle proponent of a Albanian state that included Scutari. Initially, St. Petersburg opposed this proposal. Russia eventually withdrew its support for Montenegro in exchange for Austrian support for additional Serbian gains in Macedonia. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, 290-295.

⁴⁴⁶Ibid, pp. 310-311; and Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 135-136. Russia agreed to the blockade but refused to participate.

⁴⁴⁷Ibid, p. 137. The Serbs, however, left their military equipment for the Montegrin forces to use.

⁴⁴⁸Ibid, pp. 138-139.

succeeded and the Turkish forces in Scutari agreed to cede the city to Montenegro.⁴⁴⁹

Montenegro's success increased tensions. Vienna believed that its prestige, in addition to its interests, would suffer if Montenegro kept Scutari. Without forceful Great Power action, the Montenegrin public would force King Nicholas to keep Scutari.⁴⁵⁰ Austria was willing to provide this action. The Austrian military prepared to intervene while Austrian politicians tried to convince the other Powers to assist.⁴⁵¹ As the military threat became more serious and it became clearer that nobody would support Montenegro, King Nicholas finally agreed to withdraw from Scutari.⁴⁵²

6.2.8 The Balkan States and the Division of the Spoils of the First Balkan War

As a result of the course of the Balkan Wars and the creation of an independent Albania, three inter-Balkan disputes developed: the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute over Serbia's demands for territorial revisions to their treaty of alliance; the Greco-Bulgarian dispute over the division of spoils in Macedonia; and the Romanian-Bulgarian dispute over compensation to Romania for Bulgaria's gains. These disputes resulted from several considerations, including concerns about the balance of power and unsettled rules of the game.

By denying an Adriatic port to Serbia, the Great Powers helped create the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute.⁴⁵³ In the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, Belgrade and Sofia agreed to divide Macedonia between them with the lion's share going to Bulgaria. Even though they failed to mention Albania in the treaty, they assumed that Serbia would acquire enough Albanian territory to provide it with a secure port on the Adriatic Sea. When the Powers denied Serbia this goal, Belgrade demanded compensation in Macedonia.⁴⁵⁴ This demand was made easier by the distribution of forces in the region. The Balkan military plan called for Serbia to attack to the east and south-east into

⁴⁴⁹Ibid, pp. 141-143.

⁴⁵⁰Ibid, pp. 142-143.

⁴⁵¹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, pp. 443-448.

⁴⁵²Ibid, pp. 150-152.

⁴⁵³This is not the only reason for the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute. Leaders in Belgrade began to expand Serbia's claims in Macedonia before the war even began. Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 161.

⁴⁵⁴Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 153

Macedonia while Bulgaria attacked south into Thrace. As a result, Serbian forces occupied a significant portion of Macedonia, including territories that the treaty reserved for Bulgaria.

Even before the war began, Belgrade had expressed a desire for a greater share of the spoils. When the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations began, there were divisions within Serbia over whether Serbia should concede so much territory of Macedonia. Then, between September 1912 and November 1912, Serbia began to unilaterally expand the Serbian portion of Macedonia to include several key cities in the contested zone and in Bulgaria's zone, including Skopje, Prilep, and Bitola.⁴⁵⁵ As it became clear that the Powers were going to deny Serbia an Adriatic port, Serbian leaders further expanded their demands in Macedonia.⁴⁵⁶ This planning was unofficial until February 1913 when Pasic informed Bulgaria that Serbia would seek to alter the boundaries proposed in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty.⁴⁵⁷ At this time, Pasic did not provide a proposal, he just announced Serbia's intentions to seek changes in the proposed boundaries.

Serbia was not the only Bulgarian ally involved in a territorial dispute over the spoils of the Balkan War. Bulgaria was also involved in a dispute with Greece. The Greco-Bulgarian treaty failed to address how the two states would divide Macedonia between them. Of particular importance in the dispute was Salonica, which both Greece and Bulgaria claimed.⁴⁵⁸ Both sides expected the war to determine the new *status quo*. Athens believed that possession would determine how the territory would be divided. Thus, from the beginning of the war, Greece sought to occupy the territory it wished to acquire. Sofia, on the other hand, believed the balance of power would determine who got the lions' share of Macedonia. Bulgaria, therefore, worried less about occupying the territory that it claimed. With the early allied victory, the division of Macedonia quickly came to the forefront. Starting in November, Greece tried to initiate discussions with Bulgaria about the

⁴⁵⁵Ibid, pp. 161.

⁴⁵⁶Ibid, pp. 161-162.

⁴⁵⁷Discussing Pasic's explanations for why the boundaries ought to be revised are Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 343-354; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 364-366.

⁴⁵⁸Ibid, p. 160.

division of Macedonia.⁴⁵⁹ Since Bulgaria was unwilling to make any concessions, these discussions failed to make any progress towards a solution.

Not only did Bulgaria have to address problems with its allies, but Sofia also had to deal with Romania. Since the early 1900s, Romania worried that Bulgarian gains in the Balkans would unfavorably alter the balance of power.⁴⁶⁰ Bucharest, therefore, made it clear that if a Balkan war led to significant Bulgarian gains, Romania would demand compensation. This was a problem for Sofia. Since Romania did not border the Ottoman Empire, any territorial compensation would come at Bulgaria's expense.

When the First Balkan War began, Bucharest did not promptly act to protect Romania's interests because it believed the war would be a long, drawn out affair.⁴⁶¹ Leaders in Bucharest believed that, after a long, costly war, the Great Powers would intervene and impose a settlement on the warring parties. Then, they could present Romania's demands and trust the Great Powers to provide adequate compensation.⁴⁶²

The decisive Balkan victory forced Romania to act sooner than expected.⁴⁶³ On November 3rd, Romania informed Bulgaria of the territory it expected as payment for Romania's neutrality.⁴⁶⁴ This demand was unacceptable to Sofia. Bulgaria's military had just achieved significant successes against the Turkish military, helping to create a euphoric feeling of invulnerability among the Bulgarian military, public, and politicians. They would not accept the loss of any Bulgarian territory. At the same time, Sofia could not ignore Romania's demands. A large majority of the Bulgarian military was still engaged in the war against Turkey, causing Bulgaria's northern frontier to be vulnerable to a Romanian attack. In addition, both Austria and Russia supported some compensation

⁴⁵⁹Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 156-157.

⁴⁶⁰Ibid, pp. 134-135; and Hitchens, *Rumania*, pp. 146-148.

⁴⁶¹Ibid, p. 150; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 137.

⁴⁶²Ibid, p. 138.

⁴⁶³Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 112-113.

⁴⁶⁴Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 139.

for Romania.⁴⁶⁵

Sofia, therefore, had to try to satisfy Bucharest's demands. Bulgaria started by engaging in half-hearted negotiations in which it first avoided providing any territorial concessions and then offered small adjustments to the Romanian-Bulgarian border.⁴⁶⁶ These negotiations were partly an attempt to reach an agreement with Romania, but they also were an attempt to buy time. Sofia knew that the longer the negotiations dragged on, the more time Bulgaria would have to finish off the Turks and transfer troops to Bulgaria's northern border.

These tactics failed as both Romania and the Great Powers tired of them. The Great Powers feared the disagreement might lead to an armed conflict. They, therefore, pressured, both Romania and Bulgaria to allow the Great Powers to mediate the dispute.⁴⁶⁷ In May 1913, this arbitration took place in St. Petersburg and culminated in the St. Petersburg Protocol. Russia, in an attempt to try to gain influence in Bucharest, along with the other Great Powers decided that Romania should receive the Bulgarian city of Silistria and a three kilometer area around it.

This solution failed to satisfy both Bulgaria and Romania. The population of the city of Silistria was Bulgarian, and to cede the city, was a bitter pill for Sofia to swallow.⁴⁶⁸ Bucharest, on the other hand, wanted more than just Silistria.⁴⁶⁹ Even though Romania had previously stated that Silistria would be sufficient compensation for Bulgaria's gains, leaders in Bucharest demanded further territorial concessions.⁴⁷⁰ The Romanian government, therefore, suggested to Bulgaria that the two states negotiate further.

⁴⁶⁵Ibid, pp. 139-140; and Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, p. 233.

⁴⁶⁶Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 113-114, 135, 142-146, 171 ; Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan War*, pp. 269-278; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 140-149.

⁴⁶⁷Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 172-176, 203-204; Helmreich, *the Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 300-307; Hitchens, *Rumania*, p. 152; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 150-151.

⁴⁶⁸Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 171.

⁴⁶⁹Helmreich, *the Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 341-342.

⁴⁷⁰It is not clear why Romania now escalated its demands. Although, one reasonable explanation seems to be related to the tensions between Bulgaria and Bulgaria's Balkan allies. As a result, the importance for Romania to remain neutral increased, thereby Romania's negotiating position.

6.2.9 The Second Balkan War: Origins and Outcome

Sofia refused to engage in any serious negotiations with any of the three states in which it was engaged in a territorial dispute. Sofia opposed negotiating with Serbia for two reasons. First, the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty provided for a solution to territorial disputes; if the two sides could not agree, Russia would arbitrate the dispute. Second, Sofia believed that Russia would support the existing treaty.⁴⁷¹ An influential Bulgarian newspaper expressed this belief when it wrote

We are very grateful to the Russian government for wisely emphasizing that the Balkan Slavs must remain faithful to their alliance. We do not doubt that the Russian tsar and the Russian government will exert all of their influence over the allied Slavs to force them to maintain the holy and sacred obligations undertaken in the alliance agreement concluded among them.⁴⁷²

As long as Bulgaria believed that Russia supported its position, Sofia had no incentive to negotiate with Belgrade. Instead, Bulgaria suggested that the two sides ask Russia to arbitrate the dispute. Sofia's opposition to Greco-Bulgarian negotiations, on the other hand, resulted, in large part, from the belief that the Bulgarian army could defeat the Greek army. All Sofia needed was time to complete peace negotiations with Turkey.⁴⁷³ Once peace was achieved, the Bulgarian military would transfer the bulk of its forces to Macedonia. To gain this time, Sofia hindered the negotiations with Athens.

As a result of their common interests, Serbia and Greece decided to seek an alliance against Bulgaria.⁴⁷⁴ The purpose of this alliance was to create a common Greco-Serbian border in Macedonia and to defend it against Bulgaria. The two states began to discuss an alliance in January 1913, but the resumption of the First Balkan War and the belief that a Greco-Bulgarian agreement might still be achieved prevented these negotiations from achieving any meaningful agreement. On May 2nd, following several clashes between Bulgarian and Greek forces in Macedonia, Athens decided to negotiate in earnest with Serbia. Within three days, Greece and Serbia signed a protocol.

⁴⁷¹Ibid, pp. 167-168.

⁴⁷²Quoted in Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 179.

⁴⁷³Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 158-159.

⁴⁷⁴Discussing these alliance negotiations are Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 343, 346-349; and Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbrolio*, pp. 189-192.

In this protocol, the two sides agreed to adopt a common policy against Bulgaria, to divide all territory west of the Vardar River in western Macedonia, and to create a common Greco-Serbian border. On May 17th, they added a preliminary military convention to the protocol. On June 1st, Athens and Belgrade agreed to a treaty of alliance.⁴⁷⁵ In this treaty, they decided on the territorial division of Macedonia and on spheres of influence in Albania.

Greece and Serbia also tried to take advantage of the Romanian-Bulgarian dispute by seeking to negotiate an alliance with Romania.⁴⁷⁶ These negotiations had limited success. Bucharest was unsure if Serbia and Greece were serious about an anti-Bulgarian alliance. Maiorescu, the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, believed that Belgrade and Athens were negotiating in order to coerce Sofia into compromising. For this reasons, he refused to sign an alliance. Nevertheless, he offered to cooperate with Greece and Serbia, thereby creating the possibility that Romania would join them in a war.

In addition to their diplomatic activities, both Greece and Serbia consolidated their gains in Macedonia and prepared for a possible war against Bulgaria. To help justify their claims to Macedonia and to make it easier to control, they engaged in a process of de-bulgarization.⁴⁷⁷ This process involved forcing those who worshiped in Bulgarian churches, spoke Bulgarian, and considered themselves to be Bulgarian to give up these characteristics and become Greek or Serbian. Sometimes, military and militia groups would harass and abuse Bulgarians into “converting.” On other occasions, they would forcibly deport Bulgarians. The situation in Macedonia was clearly demonstrated in a letter written by a Macedonian Bulgar in Serbian controlled Macedonia, in which he wrote

Anyone calling himself Bulgarian risks being killed. The Serbians have introduced their communal administration throughout the villages, installed a Serbian schoolmaster for every ten villages. We cannot act and we are in a difficult position because the Serbians have taken all the Bulgarians’ arms. We do what we can, we call to the people...Even the staunchest Bulgarians are ready to become Serbians. The secret police has numerous agents.

⁴⁷⁵Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 347-349.; and Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia*, pp. 196-203.

⁴⁷⁶Ibid, pp. 349-351; Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 172-173.

⁴⁷⁷Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 351-352; and International Commission, *The Other Balkan Wars*, pp. 49-56.

Anyone who ventures to speak ill of the Serbians exposes himself to much suffering. In the South of Macedonia, in the Greek occupation zone the same endeavors are being made to make the population Greek.⁴⁷⁸

Greece and Serbia also worked to improve their military position in Macedonia.⁴⁷⁹ During the war, both states had focused their attacks on Albania and Macedonia. Once they had defeated the Turkish forces in Macedonia, their forces made defensive preparations to repulse any attack. Furthermore, once they achieved victory in Albania, they transferred the bulk of their Albanian forces to Macedonia. By April 1913, Greek ships were transporting both states' troops to Macedonia.⁴⁸⁰

Sofia was unable to respond promptly to these moves. Since the Bulgarian attack focused on Thrace, Bulgarian troops were not in Macedonia in force. Furthermore, since Bulgaria maintained a border with Turkey, Sofia could not transfer its troops from Thrace to Macedonia until a peace treaty had been signed. By May, Bulgaria was trying to quickly conclude a peace treaty so that it could transfer its troops to Macedonia.⁴⁸¹ Unfortunately for Bulgaria, both Greece and Serbia recognized Bulgaria's predicament and delayed the peace process in order to buy more time to consolidate their forces.⁴⁸² Eventually, the Great Powers grew tired of the Balkan delays, and forced them to sign a preliminary peace treaty on May 30th. With the signing of the peace treaty, Bulgaria began to transfer its troops to Macedonia.⁴⁸³

The transfer of troops removed all incentive for Bulgaria to compromise. Bulgarian political and military leaders believed that the Bulgarian military could defeat the Greek and Serbian forces.⁴⁸⁴ As a result of this belief, Bulgaria refused to offer any concessions to Greece and Serbia.

⁴⁷⁸Quoted in *ibid*, pp. 55-56.

⁴⁷⁹Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 193-194, 198-199; and Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglio*, pp. 181-182, 184-185, 194-195.

⁴⁸⁰Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 169.

⁴⁸¹Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 197.

⁴⁸²*Ibid*, pp. 205-207.

⁴⁸³*Ibid*, pp. 209-210.

⁴⁸⁴*Ibid*, pp. 141, 170, 197, 209-210; and Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 343, 364-365.

Furthermore, since Sofia believed that the balance of power favored Bulgaria, Sofia also believed that Athens and Belgrade would concede once they recognized that Bulgaria was willing to go to war. General Savov, the commander-in-chief of the Bulgarian military, expressed this opinion to Geshov when he wrote

In view of the singular superiority we would enjoy over the allied Serbian and Greek armies and the absolute guarantee of success in case of an armed conflict, a persistent and energetic language against our faithless allies will force them to agree to our proposals in order to avoid defeat.⁴⁸⁵

Bulgaria's confidence in its military superiority was not the only cause of Sofia's unwillingness to compromise. Domestic concerns also influenced Sofia's decision. Geshov wanted to make some compromises, but the Bulgarian public, military, and politicians opposed any concessions in Macedonia.⁴⁸⁶ The military believed that now was the time best time to go to war and, therefore, rejected Geshov's policy. The public also pushed for war, led by Macedonian exiles who demanded that Bulgaria take all of Macedonia.⁴⁸⁷ This pressure led the politicians to oppose Geshov's policy out of fear of assassination.⁴⁸⁸ With the rejection of his policy, Geshov resigned from the government.

As a result of its perceived military situation and its domestic situation, Bulgaria continued to oppose any concessions. Nevertheless, Bulgaria agreed to diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. The Serbo-Bulgarian treaty called for Russian arbitration in the event the two states were unable to resolve any territorial disagreements. Sofia proposed that they allow Russia to arbitrate their dispute. The Bulgarian government was willing to turn to Russia because Russian public opinion and the statements of Russian leaders suggested that St. Petersburg would support Bulgaria and the existing terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. Consequently, Bulgarian leaders expected Russia both to arbitrate the dispute in Bulgaria's favor and to prevent Serbia from attacking Bulgaria.⁴⁸⁹ The belief

⁴⁸⁵Quoted in Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 210.

⁴⁸⁶Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 199-200; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 180-183.

⁴⁸⁷Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 359-362.

⁴⁸⁸Ibid, p. 366; and Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 231.

⁴⁸⁹Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 345-346; and Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 162, 167, 170-172.

in Russian support also led Bulgaria not to worry about the two other disputes. Since Sofia believed that the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute would not lead to war, Greece would have to confront Bulgaria alone, thereby reducing the likelihood that the Greco-Bulgarian war would occur.⁴⁹⁰ Instead, Athens and Bulgaria could allow the Powers to arbitrate the dispute. Furthermore, since these two disputes would be peacefully settled, Romania would pose no threat to Bulgaria and Sofia would not have to grant any concessions to Bucharest.

It had become clear by early June that diplomacy would not resolve the crisis. Part of the explanation for this situation was that Russian support was not as strong as Sofia expected. Russia opposed a war because it would mean the end of the Balkan League. Sazonov, therefore, recommended that Bulgaria compromise with Greece and Serbia; otherwise, Bulgaria could lose everything. He warned Bulgaria that

In the event of a fratricidal conflict of the Bulgarians with the Greeks and the Serbs, even our public opinion will turn its back on Bulgaria and the Imperial Government will remain...a disinterested observer of the ruin of the Bulgarian cause, confining itself exclusively to the protection of the interests of Russia. The Bulgarians must by no means overlook also the fact that in case of an armed conflict with the Serbs, and together with it, will collapse the entire agreement of 1912 upon which are based the Bulgarian rights of delimitation of Macedonia.⁴⁹¹

Despite this warning, Bulgaria eventually decided on war. Time was not on Bulgaria's side.⁴⁹² The military's morale was weakening.⁴⁹³ On June 18th, General Savov warned the political leaders in Sofia that the army must attack by June 28th or demobilize.⁴⁹⁴ He also told them that if it comes to war, Bulgaria would win within seven days.⁴⁹⁵ Sofia, therefore, decided to make one last effort at a negotiated settlement, provided that it occurred within the ten day period.⁴⁹⁶ When this

⁴⁹⁰Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 201-202.

⁴⁹¹Quoted in Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 170.

⁴⁹²Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, p. 233

⁴⁹³The Bulgarian military was composed, for the most part, of farmers. With the summer approaching, they wished to leave the army and return to their land.

⁴⁹⁴Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 186-188.

⁴⁹⁵Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 364.

⁴⁹⁶*Ibid*, pp. 359-361.

attempt failed, Bulgaria attacked.

Bulgaria attacked the Greek and Serbian positions in Macedonia on June 30th. General Savov claimed that this attack was intended to force Greece and Serbia to negotiate in earnest and make concessions to Bulgaria.⁴⁹⁷ Unfortunately for Bulgarian leaders, they made three faulty assumptions. First, they believed Bulgaria was stronger than the Greco-Serbian alliance. Second, they believed that Romania did not pose a threat to Bulgaria.⁴⁹⁸ And, third, they believed that Turkey did not pose a threat to Bulgaria.⁴⁹⁹

Bulgaria quickly learned of its mistakes. Within a week of the initial attack, the Bulgarian army was retreating as the Greek and Serbian forces advanced. Adding to Bulgaria's problems were the Romanian and Turkish responses. St. Petersburg had made it known to Bucharest that, in the event of a Serbo-Bulgarian War, Russia would not intervene to protect Bulgaria. Bucharest, therefore, felt confident on June 27th, when it warned Sofia that in the event of a Serbo-Bulgarian War, Romania would intervene.⁵⁰⁰ Then, on July 3rd, Romania lived up to its warnings by ordering a general mobilization, which it followed a week later with an attack on Bulgaria's exposed northern border. Even Turkey took advantage of the Balkan War to regain some of its territory lost in the First Balkan War. Both Serbia and Greece had been trying to persuade Turkey to attack. This encouragement, combined with the failure of the Great Powers to oppose Turkish action, led the Turks to enter the war in early July.⁵⁰¹

As a result of Sofia's miscalculations, Bulgaria was badly outmanned. Its military could not even defeat the Greco-Serbian forces in Macedonia. When combined with the Romanian and Turkish militaries, Bulgaria had no choice but to sue for peace. On August 10, 1913, the combatants signed the Treaty of Bucharest, thereby ending the Second Balkan War.⁵⁰² (See Map 6-4 for the

⁴⁹⁷Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 189-190.

⁴⁹⁸Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, pp. 235-236.

⁴⁹⁹*Ibid*, p. 236.

⁵⁰⁰Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 192.

⁵⁰¹*Ibid*, p. 195.

⁵⁰²Discussing the war and the Treaty of Bucharest is Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 380-406.

gains and losses that resulted from the Balkan Wars.⁵⁰³⁾ As a result of this war, Bulgaria suffered



Map 6-4
Territorial Gains from the Balkan Wars

considerably: Romania gained territory in northern Bulgaria; Serbia and Greece, for the most part, gained the territory that they claimed in Macedonia; and, Turkey reclaimed a large portion of Thrace, which Bulgaria had acquired in the First Balkan War.

6.3 THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN WAR OF 1914

The study of World War I has become a cottage industry for historians and political scientists. A plethora of books and articles exists to explain why war occurred among the Great Powers. Unfortunately, relatively few of these works seek to explain in detail the causes of the conflict that provided the opportunity for the First World War to occur, the Austro-Serbian War.

⁵⁰³Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 198.

This case study seeks to provide some perspective on this war.

In large part, the Austro-Serbian War of 1914 is a continuation of the two previous crises of the early 20th century, the Bosnian Crisis and the Balkan Wars. As the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was also declining, confronted the threat posed by Serbia, a successor state to the Ottoman Empire. This threat had two components. First, there was the threat of Serbian nationalism. Not all Serbs lived in Serbia; many lived in Austria-Hungary, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs in Austria and in Serbia wished to unite, which would be at Austria's expense. Second, for religious and historical reasons, Serbia looked to Russia for support. This made Austria fear that any gain for Serbia would be a gain for Russia and increase the Russian threat to Austria.

With Serbia's gains in the Balkan Wars, the Serbian threat grew significantly. Serbian nationalism became a greater problem for Austria because Belgrade had acquired all Ottoman territory occupied by Serbs. All that remained to complete Serbia's national mission was to annex Bosnia. The security threat posed by Serbia also increased because of the Serbia's gains from the wars which had significantly increased its territory and population.

Austria, however, could not do anything about this problem until June 1914. During the Balkan Wars, Austria tried to work through the Concert of Europe. The other members of the Concert, however, did not support Austria's position in 1912 and 1913. Another option for Austria was to act unilaterally. Austria did not take this option because Vienna feared that Russia would come to Serbia's defense if Austria attacked Serbia. Since Austria lacked strong allied support, at the time, Vienna did not act.

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand provided Austria with the opportunity for which many Austrian leaders had been waiting. Berlin recognized that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was declining, and if it did not respond to this provocation, Austria would become a second rate power. Consequently, not only did Germany support Austria's decision for war, but Berlin also pushed Vienna to declare war as soon as possible. With this support, war was inevitable.

**TABLE 6-3: predictions
The Austro-Serbian War of 1914**

	P1: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with imperial disintegration?	P2: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P3: Did elites explain their policies in terms of the intervening phenomena?
Rules of the Game	Maybe. The past failure of the rules to satisfy Austrians interests made diplomacy a blunt tool for resolving crises.	Yes. Great Power diplomacy, particularly Concert diplomacy, had lost all its effectiveness.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Power	Yes. Serbia's recent gains in the Balkan Wars created the potential for the future growth of Serbian power. In addition, St. Petersburg's support for Serbia was expected to grow as Russian power grew. Also, Austria had strong German support.	Yes. Serbia, and its Russian ally, was slowly growing in strength, thereby increasing the potential threat to Austria. At the same time, German support was stronger than ever before.	Yes. Austrian leaders discussed the growth of Serbian power and the importance of German support.
Uncertainty	Yes. Austria and Germany believed that Serbia would not have strong, Russian military support.	It is difficult to say what level of uncertainty existed.	Austrian and German leaders clearly believed that Russia would not intervene in an Austro-Serbian conflict. No discussions support any uncertainty about this belief.
Nationalism	Yes. Serbian nationalism was growing because Austria continued to interfere in Serbian politics. At the same time, nationalism was growing in Bosnia because of the mistreatment of Slavs.	Yes. Serbia's recent successes increased the strength and activities of Serbian national movements.	Yes. Some Serbian elite planned ways to unite Serbian populated territories of Bosnia with Serbia and justified this by the situation in Bosnia
Domestic Instability	Yes. Serbia suffered from civil-military conflict over how to manage the recently acquired territories in Macedonia.	Yes. This conflict was greater than normal.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.

**TABLE 6-3: predictions
The Austro-Serbian War of 1914 (continued)**

	P4: Do the intervening phenomena correlate with war and crises?	P5: Were the intervening phenomena present in above normal amounts?	P6: Did the elite explain their policies in terms that suggest the intervening phenomena caused the wars and crises?
Rules of the game	Yes. Austria's unwillingness to negotiate corresponds to a weakening of the rules of the game.	Yes. Austria was unwilling to even consider rule-based solutions to the situation.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Power Shifts	Yes. Austria recognized both that the power of Serbia and its Russian ally was growing and that German support was temporary, creating a window of opportunity to act.	Yes. The power of Austria's enemies was growing quickly.	Yes. Austrian and German leaders both pushed for war as a function of the growth in Serbian power. Vienna also justified its unwillingness to find a diplomatic solution to the problem of the shifting power.
Miscalculation	Yes. Austria and Germany miscalculated the importance that Russia attached to Serbian independence.	It is unclear how much greater this miscalculation was than normal.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.
Nationalism	Yes. Serbian nationalism threatened Austria's territorial integrity, forcing Austria to respond.	Yes. The growth of Serbian power and the increase in Serbian nationalist activity made this threat greater than ever before.	Yes. Austrian leaders frequently referred to the Serbian national threat and the need to deal with it. Furthermore, some of them justified the war on these grounds.
Domestic Instability	No. Serbia did not start the war and its domestic politics did not lead to calls for war.	The evidence is too thin to determine how significant a problem domestic instability was.	The evidence of how elites explained their policy is too thin to reach a firm conclusion.

The Austro-Serbian War has both the advantage and disadvantage of occurring as the consequences of the disintegration of two empires: the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For this reason, it ought to be a strong case for this dissertation's argument, and it is. Clearly, the evidence provides the greatest support for the nationalism and power arguments. (See Table 6-3 for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the case and the argument's predictions.) As the previous cases demonstrate, Serbians were divided among Serbia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. With Serbia's annexation of Macedonian territory, Serbian nationalism could focus its full attention on the Serbians in Austria-Hungary, which Nicola Pasic, the Serbian leader explicitly stated after the Balkan Wars when he said, "The first round is won; now we must prepare for the second, against Austria." Thus, the Serbian national threat to Austria was great. The evidence also suggests that Serbian nationalism was strengthened by Austria's continued dominance over Serbia as national organizations grew and expanded their activities into Bosnia. The assassination of the Archduke also provides evidence that nationalism was a significant cause of the crisis. The assassination was committed by members of one of the Bosnian national organizations with the support of the "Black Hand," which was a Serbian national organization that included many members of the Serbian military. Further supporting the nationalism argument is the reason for this assassination. The Archduke intended to grant the Austro-Hungarian Slavs political power within a federal empire. If this policy were successfully implemented, it would reduce the support that many of the Austrian Slavs had for Serbian nationalism.

Nationalism also helps to explain Austria's actions as well. As discussed in the section dealing with the Bosnian Crisis of 1908, Austrian leaders considered Serbian nationalism to be a significant threat. This threat continued to drive Austria's policy as Conrad, the chief of the Austrian general staff claimed, when he explained that Serbian nationalism, not revenge for the assassination of the Archduke, was the Austrian motive for war.

The evidence also suggests that power was an important factor in this conflict. As predicted, the Serbian successor state was rapidly growing in strength. This can be seen in the economic growth of the early 1900s and the military successes and territorial acquisitions that Belgrade gained during the Balkan Wars. In addition, Serbia's main Great Power ally, Russia, was gaining power. Over time, these shifts in power would threaten Austria and, because of its alliance, also would

threaten Germany.⁵⁰⁴ Unfortunately, no Austrian statesman explicitly explains Austria's decision-making as a function of power shifts. German leaders, however, make this explicit when they discuss Austria's decline relative to Serbia as an explanation for Germany's support for Austria and, by extension, for Austria's actions against Serbia.

The evidence also shows that power considerations are important for understanding Serbia's response to the Austrian ultimatum. Upon receiving the ultimatum, the evidence suggests that Serbia was prepared to concede to Austria's demands. But, once the Tsar expressed his support for Serbia, Belgrade was willing to express minor reservations. By so doing, Serbia was guaranteeing war.

This case is presented in six sections. Section 6.3.1 explains the growth of the Serbian threat to Austria, focusing on the problems of nationalism and Russia. Section 6.3.2 discusses how nationalism led to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Section 6.3.3 explains that the threat of Serbian nationalism, not the assassination, was the real reason that Austria wanted to go to war. It also discusses the importance of German support. Austria knew that an attack on Serbia might provoke a Russian response. To deal with this possibility, Austria needed German support. Not only did Germany support an Austro-Serbian War, but as soon as possible. Part of the reason that Germany supported Austria was because the declining Austro-Hungarian Empire presented a closing window of opportunity; act now to stop the hemorrhaging, or confront an unfavorable European balance of power in a few years. Section 6.3.4 explains why the Great Powers who were friendly to Serbia failed to take actions to prevent war. Section 6.3.5 demonstrates that the Austrian ultimatum was not intended to reach a peaceful settlement of the crisis, but was intended to be the precursor to war. It also shows that Russian support led Serbia to take a harder position than originally planned. The final section, 6.3.6, explains why the declaration of war was delayed and demonstrates the importance of German support for Austria's actions.

6.3.1 Serbia and the Serbian Threat to Austria-Hungary After the Balkan Wars

With the end of the Balkan Wars, Turkey was evicted from all but a small strip of its Balkan territories: Albania became an independent state; Serbia and Greece partitioned most of Macedonia

⁵⁰⁴There are two ways to look at this power shift. One is as a result of the decline of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Another is to look at it as a consequence of the growth of a successor state to the Ottoman Empire, namely Serbia. Either way, it relates to the argument made in this dissertation.



Map 6-5
Serbian Expansion, 1817-1913

between themselves; Montenegro acquired territory in northern Albania and the Sanjak of Novibazar; and Bulgaria occupied a large portion of Thrace and a smaller portion of Macedonia. All that remained of the Ottoman Empire's European territory was a small portion of Thrace that included Constantinople.

Serbia's successes in the Balkan Wars allowed Belgrade to achieve one of its two main goals. Since it had developed, Serbian nationalism had a strong influence on Belgrade, helping to cause Serbian leaders to seek to unite all Serbs within a single state.⁵⁰⁵ This process was slow and drawn

⁵⁰⁵This nationalism was composed of two strands: pan-Slavism and pan-Serbism. On one hand, there was pan-Slavism which adopted an ideology that called for the union of all Slavs within a single state. This movement gained its strength from the common threats the Slavs faced from Austria and the Ottoman Empire. Over time, however, this nationalism failed to develop into an effective movement for the unification of all Slavs, in large part, because of the competition among the Slav groups and their states. Nonetheless, it helped form the basis for alliances among the Slav states and groups. On the other hand, pan-Serbism was a stronger and more influential nationalism. Its proponents sought to unite all Serbian territories within a "Greater Serbia." Thus, they sought to annex the Serbian territories controlled by the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. See Louis L. Snyder, *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, (Chicago and London: St. James Press, 1990), pp. 309-315; and Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History,*

out. (Map 6-5⁵⁰⁶) Starting in 1817, Serbia began to acquire the Serb-populated territories of the Ottoman Empire. With the Balkan Wars, Belgrade completed its acquisition of Ottoman territory when it annexed large parts of Macedonia and the Sanjak of Novibazar. With these acquisition, Serbia increased its territory by more than eighty percent and its population by more than fifty percent.⁵⁰⁷ Now, in order to complete its national mission, all that remained was to annex the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pasic, the Serbian Prime Minister, expressed this sentiment following the Balkan Wars when he said “The first round is won; now we must prepare for the second, against Austria.”⁵⁰⁸ The second Serbian goal was to provide for Serbia’s independence and security by gaining a port on the Adriatic. In the past, Austria had used its control of Serbia’s trade routes to coerce Belgrade to obey Vienna’s dictates. Serbia, therefore, needed a trade route that was not controlled by any other state so that it could be economically independent. To achieve this goal, Belgrade believed that Serbia should acquire an outlet to the Adriatic Sea. With a port on the Adriatic, Serbian trade would no longer be at the mercy of its neighbors. During the Balkan Wars, Belgrade had tried to achieve this goal by annexing a large strip of Albanian territory. Austrian opposition, however, prevented Serbia from achieving this goal. Thus, despite its successes in the Balkan Wars, Serbia still lacked the economic and political freedom it had sought. Pasic made this clear when he said

What we need is a trade treaty with most-favored nation treatment, a free port at any suitable Adriatic harbor, and commonly agreed transit traffic charges. Given those things we could become trustworthy neighbors....The animosity felt throughout my land for the Monarchy derives directly from the stranglehold of duties....in our hopeless economic plight we can neither develop our industry nor exploit the fruits of our soil...I am a man of peace, but Austria-Hungary pushes me to the road of war.⁵⁰⁹

As a result of Serbia’s successes in the Balkan Wars, the Serbian threat to Austria and to Austria’s interests increased in two ways. First, Serbia was a significantly larger, more populous

Politics, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 70-115.

⁵⁰⁶Dragnich, *Serbia, Nikola Pasic, and Yugoslavia*, p. 2.

⁵⁰⁷Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 540.

⁵⁰⁸Quoted in May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, p. 466.

⁵⁰⁹Quoted in Dragnich, *Serbia, Nikola Pasic, and Yugoslavia*, p. 105.

state than it been. These gains created the potential for a stronger Serbian state that was better able to challenge Austria. Second, Belgrade's foreign policy goals directly conflicted with Austria's interests. Serbia wanted to annex the Serb-populated territories of the Habsburg Empire which was a direct threat to Austria-Hungary's territorial integrity. Serbia also desired a port on the Adriatic, which could be accomplished either by annexing Albanian territory or by uniting with Montenegro. Either outcome would threatened Austria's interests because it would increase Serbia's power.

Helping to further Serbia's national goals with respect to the Habsburg Empire were two organizations: *Narodna Odbrana* and the Black Hand. *Narodna Odbrana* formed during the Bosnian Annexation Crisis with the purpose of disseminating Serbian propaganda and organizing Serbs in Bosnia to prepare to fight Austria.⁵¹⁰ Austrian pressure during the crisis forced Serbia to limit the activities of the *Narodna Odbrana*. The weakening of *Narodna Odbrana* led some to believe that a new, more aggressive organization was needed to further Serbia's national interests. As a result, a small group of men, mostly military officers, under the control of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic formed the Black Hand, also known as "Unification and Death," in 1911.⁵¹¹ Its purpose was to engage in revolutionary activities in Bosnia and Macedonia in order to further the creation of Greater Serbia. Even though its goals were explicitly pan-Serb, the organization worked with and used other pan-Slav organizations. Initially, the "Black Hand" focused its activities on Macedonia where it organized guerilla forces to help terrorize the non-Serbs and, when the time came, to help fight the Turks. With Serbia's successes in the Balkan Wars, the "Black Hand" turned its attention on Bosnia. But, instead of working openly, its leaders decided to use *Narodna Odbrana's* organization to hide its activities.⁵¹² It is unclear what activities the "Black Hand" actually engaged in, although some argue that it engaged in assassinations of Habsburg leaders and pressured the

⁵¹⁰David MacKenzie, *Violent Solutions: Revolutions, Nationalism, and Secret Societies in Europe in 1918*, (New York, NY: University Press of America, 1996), p. 239.

⁵¹¹Little reliable information exists about the Black Hand, meaning that much of the history is based on limited, and often inaccurate, information. The best sources are David MacKenzie, *The "Black Hand" on Trial, Salonika 1917*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995) and idem, *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 64-138.

⁵¹²Discussing the relationship between the "Black Hand" and *Narodna Odbrana* is Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 25-30.

Serbian government to adopt a more pro-military domestic and international policy.⁵¹³

Two factors contributed to the danger Serbia could pose to the Austro-Hungarian Empire: the Habsburg Slavs and Russia. As mentioned in previous cases, the Habsburg Monarchy contained a significant Slav minority, the most prominent of which were the Croats and, most importantly, the Serbs.⁵¹⁴ The Croats, most of whom lived in Croatia-Slovenia and Dalmatia joined the Habsburg Empire in 1527 when the Turks conquered the Hungarians.⁵¹⁵ The Serbs, on the other hand, migrated to the Habsburg Empire in the 15th and 17th centuries when they fled the Ottoman forces that had conquered Serbia and Bosnia.⁵¹⁶ Most of these Serbs settled in Croatia-Slovenia along the southern border of the Habsburg Empire where they provided the front-line of defense against the Ottoman Empire.⁵¹⁷ The Croatian and Serbian presence in the Empire further increased in 1878 with the occupation, and later annexation, of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵¹⁸

The addition of these South Slavs, however, did not increase the Serbian threat to the

⁵¹³Vladimir Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 371-381; and MacKenzie, *The "Black Hand" on Trial*, pp. 42-47.

⁵¹⁴Discussing the relationship between the Croats and the Serbs in the Habsburg empire are Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*; Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, pp. 247-261; Nicholas J. Miller, *Between Nation and State: Serbian Politics in Croatia Before the First World War*, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997); and, Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 461-466.

In addition, Czechs, Italians, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovenes, and Slovaks lived in the Habsburg Monarchy. While these minorities caused problems for the Empire, their influence on the origins of the Austro-Serbian War was limited.

⁵¹⁵Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, p. 247; and Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 232-233.

⁵¹⁶*Ibid*, pp. 98, 234.

⁵¹⁷Discussing this military border is Gunther Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747*, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1960).

⁵¹⁸In 1910, about 66 percent of the population of Bosnia—434,000 Croats and 825,000 Serbs—was Slav. These numbers are rough estimates taken from the Austrian census. The actual categories used in the census were religion. I classify Orthodox as Serb and Catholic as Croat. It is quite possible that not all Orthodox were Serbs and not all Catholic were Croats, in part, because some may have considered themselves to be Bosnian. Furthermore, some of the over 600,000 Muslims could have been ethnic Serbs or Croats who converted to Islam in order to gain economic and social benefits. The Serbs and Croats believed this to be true and, therefore, considered the Muslims to be members of their ethnic groups. Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., *Bosnia & Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 87.

This was in addition to the 1.6 million Croats and 645,000 Serbs living in Croatia at the time. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 462.

Habsburg Empire until the early 1900s. Prior to this time, two factors limited this threat. First, Serbs and Croats were not a united, anti-Austrian bloc: the tensions between Serb and Croat nationalism prevented their cooperation.⁵¹⁹ Serbian nationalism pushed for the development of a Greater Serbia that included all territories populated by Serbs. Since a large number of Serbs lived in territory claimed and populated by Croats, the two national movements had conflicting goals. This conflict was especially prominent in Bosnia where both Serbs and Croats competed for control.⁵²⁰ Second, prior to 1903, Serbia, for all practical purposes, was an Austrian ally. As a result of this alliance, Serbian nationalism posed little threat to the Austria.

The situation changed between 1903 and 1913.⁵²¹ In 1903, a coup in Serbia placed a new, anti-Austrian dynasty on the throne. The new Serbian government encouraged the Slavs living in the Habsburg Empire to look to Belgrade for support and leadership.⁵²² Serbia's position among the Habsburg Slavs was further helped by two factors. First, Serbian organizations and the Orthodox Church helped to organize the Habsburg Slavs and to instill in them a sense of nationalism.⁵²³ Second, Serbia's successes in the Balkan Wars increased the appeal of Serbia and Serbian nationalism to the Habsburg Slavs.⁵²⁴ Adding to these tensions was the mistreatment of the Serbs and Croats in the Empire.⁵²⁵ In the early 1900s, Hungarian agents used force to try to control the Slavs in the Empire. Attempts were made to force the Slavs living in Hungary to adopt the

⁵¹⁹Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, pp. 248-255. A third national movement, Illyrianism, also competed with these two nationalisms. Illyrianism was a pan-Slav movement that called for the creation of a Yugoslav state. On Illyrianism, see Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, pp. 76-93.

⁵²⁰Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, p. 254.

⁵²¹Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 462.

⁵²²For the most part, Serbia focused its attentions and activities on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁵²³Z.A.B. Zeman, *The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire 1914-1918: A Study in National and Social Revolution*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 23-31 discusses some of these organizations such as *Narodna Obrana* and the Black Hand.

⁵²⁴*Ibid.*

⁵²⁵Janko Pleterski, "The Southern Slav Question 1908-1918," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: Essays in Political and Military History 1908-1918*, edited by Mark Cornwall, (Exeter, England: University of Exeter Press, 1990), pp. 77-100.

Hungarian language and culture in their public lives, causing a backlash against the Hungarian authorities.⁵²⁶ Habsburg authorities also began to arrest and, sometimes, wrongly convict Serbs and Croats who they claimed were conspirators.⁵²⁷ As a result of the treatment of the Habsburg Slavs, the threats posed to their lives, and the increased Serbian support for the Serbs of the Habsburg Empire, the Serbs and Croats began to cooperate.⁵²⁸

With the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, nationalism became a greater problem. The annexation, combined with the treatment of the Bosnian Slavs and the support of the *Narodna Odbrana*, created a growing national movement among the young Slavs in Bosnia.⁵²⁹ These Slavs formed a group of loosely connected organizations, known as *Mlada Bosna* or “Young Bosnia,” which sought to incite revolutionary activity against the Habsburg Empire with the final goal of uniting all Slavs within a single Slav state.⁵³⁰ Over time, the leaders among this movement became more radical and began to come under the influence of the “Black Hand.”⁵³¹ The Bosnians were so tied up with Serbian nationalism that, during the Balkan Wars, many rushed to Serbia to help fight against the Turkish forces.

These changes increased the danger that Serbia presented to Austria-Hungary. Habsburg officials recognized that Serbia was actively supporting the Slavs in the Empire. They worried that either the Bosnians would revolt or that in the event of a war against Serbia the Bosnians would support Serbia. A member of the Austrian foreign ministry expressed this fear when he said, “all those familiar with the country had the impression that an explosion was imminent. Especially in the schools of Pan-Serb propaganda which had created such a state of chaos that the continuance of

⁵²⁶Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, pp. 220, 254-256.

⁵²⁷Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 463-465.

⁵²⁸Discussing this cooperation are Miller, *Between Nation and State*; Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States*, pp. 255-258; and, Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 463-464. This is not to say that tensions and disagreements did not exist between the Serbs and Croats. In the end, Serbian and Croatian nationalism were still incompatible.

⁵²⁹Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2: 92-112.

⁵³⁰For more details on “Young Bosnia,” see Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 175-178, 214-238.

⁵³¹According to Joachim Remak, many of the leaders of “Young Bosnia” were also members of the “Black Hand.” See his *Sarajevo: The Story of A Political Murder*, (New York, NY: Criterion Books, 1959), pp. 35-36.

regular instruction seemed almost impossible.”⁵³²

Russia also played a role in Austro-Serbian relations.⁵³³ On one hand, Russia’s support for Serbia increased the Serbian threat. Because Russia was a large Slav state with a strong pan-Slav press that called for Russia to support the Balkan Slavs against Austria, Vienna feared that Russia would support Serbia’s anti-Austrian goals. The danger, therefore, existed that Austria would not only have to confront Serbia but also the large Russian military. On the other hand, Serbia’s support for Russia also increased the danger that Austria confronted. Many Austrian leaders worried that Serbia would become a Russian puppet, providing St. Petersburg with a military base along Austria’s southern border. This fear helps to explain Austria’s opposition to a Serbian port on the Adriatic as the Kaiser acknowledged in a communication with Berchtold when he wrote “Russia knows exactly that Austria has declared she cannot tolerate a fusion between Serbia and Montenegro and will prevent it, lest by Serbia’s reaching the sea Russia were put into the position of receiving a port on the Adriatic.”⁵³⁴

As a consequence of the Serbian threat, Vienna feared and opposed Serbian expansion. This attitude can be seen by Vienna’s response to two situations: Serbia’s actions in Albania in the fall of 1913 and rumors of the union of Serbia and Montenegro. At the Conference of London in 1912-1913, the Great Powers agreed to Austria’s demand that an independent Albanian state be created, thereby depriving Serbia of an Adriatic port. Nevertheless, despite this agreement, the Serbian military continued to station forces in Albania in the fall of 1913.⁵³⁵ When Albanian forces revolted against Serbia’s leadership in western Macedonia and then retreated into Albania, Serbia compounded its violation of the Great Power agreement by undertaking an offensive operation into Albania proper in an attempt both to punish the rebels and to re-occupy strategically important areas

⁵³²Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 20.

⁵³³Lieven, *Russia and the Origins*, p. 68; May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, pp. 472-473; and, Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins*, pp. 115-119.

⁵³⁴Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 516. While Austria appears to have had this concern, it is interesting to note its unreasonableness. Russia lacked a strong navy with which to take advantage of a port on the Adriatic, and the navy that it did have—the Black Sea fleet—was bottled up in the Black Sea.

⁵³⁵Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins*, p. 152.

of Albania.⁵³⁶ With these actions, Belgrade demonstrated a desire to alter the borders, i.e. the rules, which the Great Powers had created.

These actions caused concern in Vienna. Serbia was flouting the decision of the Great Powers and the rules they created, as well as threatening Austria's interests. Statements made by Serbian politicians exacerbated this threat because they supported the view that Serbia wanted to force adjustments of the Serbo-Albanian border.⁵³⁷ When Austria tried to get the Great Powers to intervene in defense of their agreement, they refused, as a result of Russian opposition, to force Serbia to withdraw from Albania. The Austrian leadership, therefore, met on October 13th and decided to warn Serbia to respect the terms of the Conference of London.⁵³⁸ When Pasic received the warning, it went unheeded.⁵³⁹ Consequently, Berchtold issued an ultimatum to Belgrade on October 18th: withdraw its troops within eight days or suffer the consequences.⁵⁴⁰ This ultimatum had the desired effect, leading Serbia to withdraw its troops from Albania.

Austria's success was not without consequences.⁵⁴¹ Neither Pasic nor the Serbian people appreciated the humiliation Vienna had inflicted upon Belgrade. As a result, tensions increased. At the same time, the crisis increased Austria's ability to rely on military means to achieve diplomatic goals. The Concert of Europe had failed to enforce its decisions and to defend Austria's interests.⁵⁴² Instead, unilateral, Austrian, military threats had successfully achieved these goals. This

⁵³⁶Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, pp. 473-474.

⁵³⁷Ibid, pp. 474-475.

⁵³⁸Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins*, pp. 152-153.

⁵³⁹It is unclear why Pasic did not respond favorably to the warning. Albertini suggests two possible answers. One is that Hartwig, the Russian ambassador at Belgrade, supported Serbian intransigence. The other is that Pasic feared the reaction of the military and the Black Hand. As it was, Pasic and the military were competing for control over the newly acquired territories in Macedonia. He may have feared a coup if he also opposed them in Albania. Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 478, 484-485.

⁵⁴⁰Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins*, p. 153.

⁵⁴¹Ibid, pp. 154-155; Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 485-487; and May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, pp. 468-469.

⁵⁴²R.J. Crampton, "The Decline of the Concert of Europe in the Balkans," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 52 (July 1974): 493-519 discusses Austria and the failure of Concert diplomacy.

demonstrated the barren condition of the rules and increased the ability of those who advocated military solutions to influence future foreign policy decisions. Consequently, the likelihood that future threats to Austria's interests might be addressed in a similar way increased.

Austria also worried about the possibility that Serbia and Montenegro would unite.⁵⁴³ The Balkan Wars had increased Serbia's prestige in Montenegro while, at the same time, reducing the prestige of Montenegro's dynasty.⁵⁴⁴ The public and the politicians began to push for union with Serbia. Serbia was not adverse to the idea of Serbo-Montenegrin union. Since Montenegro bordered the Adriatic Sea, unification of the two states would provide Serbia with the desperately needed port. Although discussions began in 1914, movement towards union was extremely slow. In Montenegro, King Nicholas opposed unification because of the costs it would impose upon him and his dynasty. He, therefore, tried to satisfy domestic discontent through other means, such as seeking Great Power aid.⁵⁴⁵ Serbia, on the other hand, favored union to the point of disseminating propaganda in Montenegro.⁵⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Pasic feared that Serbo-Montenegrin union might provoke Austria and did not press the issue.⁵⁴⁷ He also did not press the matter because St. Petersburg, even though it supported unification, advised caution, fearing that unification would cause European complications, and possibly war.⁵⁴⁸

Berchtold believed that unification of the two Serb states would create a significant threat to the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, particularly since it would provide Serbia with direct access to the Adriatic.⁵⁴⁹ He, therefore, hoped that King Nicholas, with Austria's support,

⁵⁴³On Serbo-Montenegrin Union, see Hans Heilbronner, "The Merger Attempts of Serbia and Montenegro, 1913-1914," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 18 (October 1958): 281-291.

⁵⁴⁴Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 509-515; and Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, pp. 163, 174-175.

⁵⁴⁵Ibid, pp. 163-177.

⁵⁴⁶Heilbronner, "Merger Attempts," p. 290.

⁵⁴⁷Ibid, pp. 283-284.

⁵⁴⁸Ibid, pp. 285-286.

⁵⁴⁹Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, p. 163.

could prevent unification.⁵⁵⁰ At the same time, he recognized that Nicholas might fail and unification might become impossible to prevent. If this eventuality occurred, he would continue the policy of preventing Serbia from acquiring a port on the Adriatic and demand that the new state cede its coastline to Albania.⁵⁵¹

Vienna turned to its alliance partners—Italy and Germany—to gain support for this policy. Unfortunately for Austria this support was not realized. Rome opposed Austria’s policy for two reasons.⁵⁵² First, the union of Serbia and Montenegro did not pose a threat to Italy. Second, any Austrian gains along the Adriatic threatened Italy’s security. If Albania annexed Montenegro’s coastline, Austria and Albania would then share a border which would increase Austria’s ability to influence in Albania. Because Berlin worried that Italy would oppose Austria’s policy, which could threaten the cohesiveness of the Triple Alliance, Germany also refused to support it.⁵⁵³

6.3.2 Serbian Nationalism and the Assassination of Franz Ferdinand

Assassination was a popular strategy among the Bosnian youth. In fact, it was one of the central ideas of the nationalist organization known as “Young Bosnia.” Members of this organization had considered assassinating Habsburg officials, including the Emperor. Nonetheless, few attempts were planned and even fewer came to fruition.

In late 1913, a few members of “Young Bosnia,” led by Gavrilo Princip, decided to assassinate a Habsburg official.⁵⁵⁴ At the time, their target was General Potiorek, the Austro-Hungarian Governor of Bosnia, not the Archduke. With this assassination, they hoped to strike a blow for Bosnia and, possibly, incite the Slavs against Austrian rule. Despite this decision, no assassination was planned or attempted. Instead, Princip, and a few of his friends, went to Belgrade to continue his studies.

Planning for an assassination resumed in the spring of 1914. This time, however, the target

⁵⁵⁰Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 509-512; and Heilbronner, “Merger Attempts,” pp. 290-291.

⁵⁵¹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 516-518.

⁵⁵²Ibid, 1: 518-527; and Heilbronner, “Merger Attempts,” pp. 284-285.

⁵⁵³Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 516-518.

⁵⁵⁴Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 76-79; and Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, pp. 283-284.

was to be the Archduke. In March 1914, Austrian newspapers reported that Franz Ferdinand would be traveling to Bosnia in June to observe military exercises. How this information got to the assassins and whose decision it was to assassinate the Archduke is the subject of much controversy.⁵⁵⁵ Some scholars claim that the plan was hatched by Princip and supported by members of the “Black Hand,” and others claim that Apis, the leader of the “Black Hand” decided to assassinate the Archduke and used Princip and his friends to achieve this goal. What is clear is that Serbian and Slav nationalists planned and carried out the assassination.

It is also clear that leading members of the Serbian military had a role in the assassination. Apis, who was a colonel in the Serbian military and the leader of the “Black Hand,” and a few of his inner circle in the “Black Hand” provided the weapons used in the assassination and arranged for the assassins to be smuggled into Bosnia. Why did Apis support such a dangerous activity? In other words, what was his purpose for assassinating the Archduke? The main reason for this action seems to have been to further Serbian nationalist goals.⁵⁵⁶ Franz Ferdinand was the leading proponent of trialism, the idea of creating a tripartite, federal empire that would give the Slavs a greater level of political equality. With this policy, he hoped to gain the support of the Slav nationalities and weaken the grip that the Hungarians held on the Monarchy. If carried out, this policy posed the greatest threat to Serbian nationalism. By satisfying Slav desires for greater political power, the Archduke would reduce the intensity of their nationalism and their dependence on Serbia. Consequently, trialism probably would prevent, or at least delay, the union of the Slav lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with Serbia.⁵⁵⁷

The Serbian government was not totally unaware of the threat to the Archduke’s life. Rumors suggested that assassins from Belgrade would travel to Sarajevo and attempt to assassinate

⁵⁵⁵Discussing this issue are Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2:39-119; Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, pp. 285-314; MacKenzie, *Apis*, pp. 123-137; and Remak, *Sarajevo*, pp. 58-70.

⁵⁵⁶Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 86-88; and Remak, *Sarajevo*, pp. 56-57. Some have argued that the Archduke was the leader of the war party and that Apis feared that Austria was planning to attack Serbia. By assassinating the Archduke, he would accomplish two goals. First, the leader of the war party would be removed. Second, Franz Ferdinand’s death would throw Austria into chaos, thereby delaying the Austrian attack. While this argument may hold some merit, the evidence is limited. See Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 70-74

⁵⁵⁷Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 86-88; and MacKenzie, *Apis*, pp. 124-125.

the Archduke. At the time, Serbia was unprepared for the potential consequences of this action.⁵⁵⁸ Belgrade was still trying to incorporate the territories acquired during the Balkan Wars, which would take several years to accomplish. Serbia's position was further complicated by civil-military conflict over control in Macedonia. This conflict was so severe that Pasic, the Serbian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, feared a military coup. While these internal problems existed, Serbia would be in a weak position if Austria decided to retaliate against Serbia for the assassination.

Pasic, therefore, took these threats seriously enough to try to prevent the assassination from happening. He ordered the border guards to prevent the assassins from leaving Serbia. The border guards, however, were members of the "Black Hand." Instead of stopping Princip and his comrades from crossing into Bosnia, the guards helped them cross. Second, Pasic decided to warn Habsburg officials of the threat to Franz Ferdinand's life.⁵⁵⁹ He told the Serbian Minister at Vienna, Jovanovic, to warn the Austrian government of the risks if the Archduke went to Sarajevo. Jovanovic did not go to the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berchtold, but to Bilinski, the Austrian Finance Minister. At this meeting, which took place around June 5th, Jovanovic warned Austria that the Archduke's visit would arouse Serbians and one of them might shoot at the Archduke.⁵⁶⁰ He suggested that the visit ought to be delayed or that the security for the visit should be increased. Either because the warning was not detailed enough or because it was not communicated with sufficient urgency, Bilinski did not relay the information to Berchtold nor did he arrange for extra security for the Archduke's visit.

Thus, on June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand visited Sarajevo with limited security.⁵⁶¹ The first attempt to kill the Archduke failed, and, as a result, Gavrilo Princip had the opportunity to carry out his mission. Unfortunately, he succeeded.⁵⁶²

6.3.3 The Austrian Reaction to the Assassination of the Archduke

Because Franz Ferdinand was not popular with Austro-Hungarian political leaders, they did

⁵⁵⁸Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, pp. 386-388; and MacKenzie, *Apis*, p. 124.

⁵⁵⁹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, pp. 101-109.

⁵⁶⁰The Archduke's visit was scheduled for the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, a sacred day for all Serbs.

⁵⁶¹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 111-115; and Schmitt, *The Coming of War*, 1: 248-253;

⁵⁶²Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, pp. 315-324.

not want to seek revenge.⁵⁶³ Ferdinand had married a woman of unsuitable stature, forcing him to declare that his children could not succeed him to the throne. At the same time, his anti-Hungarian attitudes failed to endear him to the Hungarian leadership. As a result, his funeral was a quiet affair held without the honors due to one of his position. In fact, the Emperor went so far as to advise the Great Powers not to send high ranking dignitaries to the funeral.

Nonetheless, since the assassins were Bosnian Serbs, many people believed that the assassination demonstrated that Serbia posed a serious threat to Austria and Austria should take this opportunity to address it. Publicly, there were protests against Serbia and the Serbs. The newspapers also took advantage of the situation to blame Serbia for the crime.⁵⁶⁴

Most importantly, however, the Austro-Hungarian political leadership feared the Serbian threat to the Empire and believed that the time had come to settle it.⁵⁶⁵ Serbia and its propaganda threatened Austria-Hungary's existence, and the failure to respond to this threat might lead to increased threats from the subject nationalities and from their ethnic homelands. As usual, Conrad, the chief of the Austrian General Staff, was the most vocal proponent for an aggressive policy towards Serbia. Conrad had recognized the Serbian danger in 1908 and favored addressing it during the Bosnian Crisis. Aehrenthal, who was the Austrian Foreign Minister during the crisis, however, opposed such action. With the assassination, the problem returned with a vengeance, and Conrad again believed that the Monarchy needed to address the Serbian threat. In his memoirs, Conrad clearly states that nationalism was the reason for Austria's actions, not revenge. He wrote,

Two principles stood in sharp conflict: the preservation of Austria-Hungary as a conglomerate of different nationalities, presenting a unity to the outer world under a single sovereign; the rise of separate independent national states which would attract their co-nationals in Austro-Hungarian territory and bring the disintegration of the Monarchy.

The long smouldering conflict between these principles had, owing to the action of Serbia, assumed an acute form; a decision could no longer be postponed. That and not

⁵⁶³ Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 115-119; and Imanuel Geiss, ed., *July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War*, (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 55-56.

⁵⁶⁴ Serbian Government, *The Serbian Blue Book* [online], The World War I document archive, accessed April 14, 2000, <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/papers/serbbblue.html>, document numbers 8, 16.

⁵⁶⁵ The best discussion of this issue is Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 120-133. Also useful are Bridge, *The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers*, pp. 335-336; Geiss, *July 1914*, pp. 56-58; and Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins*, pp. 191-193.

expiation of the murder was the reason why Austria-Hungary was forced to unsheathe the sword against Serbia. That was what made the situation so serious. To take the side of Serbia was to will the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, or at least to work unwittingly for it.

Austria-Hungary cannot let the challenge pass with cool equanimity nor, after the blow on one cheek, offer the other in Christian meekness, neither is it a case for chivalrous encounter with 'poor little' Serbia, as she likes to call herself, nor for atonement for murder—what is now at issue is the strictly practical importance of the prestige of a Great Power, of one which till now by continual acquiescence and long suffering (therein lay its mistake) had given an impression of impotence and allowed its enemies within and without to grow more and more arrogant, so that these enemies resorted to increasingly drastic methods to bring about the disintegration of the ancient empire.

Any further yielding now after Serbia's deed of violence would unleash those tendencies within the empire which in the form of Southern Slav, Czech, Moscowphil, Roumanian propaganda and Italian irredentism are already shaking at the foundations of the historic structure. Thus the Hapsburg Monarchy is left no other device than to cut the Gordian knot....The Sarajevo outrage has toppled over the house of cards built up with diplomatic documents, in which Austro-Hungarian policy thought it dwelt secure, the Monarchy has been seized by the throat and forced to choose between letting itself be strangled and making a last effort to defend itself against attack.⁵⁶⁶

This time, his position was shared by most Austro-Hungarian leaders, particularly the two most important, the Emperor Franz Ferdinand and Foreign Minister Berchtold.⁵⁶⁷ They believed that the assassination represented an escalation of the Serbian threat to Austria. The Serbo-Austrian crisis over Albania had demonstrated the failure of diplomacy and the rules of the game; war would be necessary to resolve the issue.⁵⁶⁸

Despite the attitude of the majority of Austro-Hungarian leaders, two issues required resolution before Austria could act. First, Vienna needed to be certain of German support. St. Petersburg could not allow Vienna to defeat Serbia because it would destroy Russian influence in the Balkans. Therefore, if Austria attacked Serbia, Russia would respond by attacking Austria, presenting Vienna with a two-front war. To be successful, Austria needed Germany's support to deter Russia or, in the event of an Austro-Russian War, to help in fight. This support, however, was not certain. Even though Germany had supported Austria in past crises, Berlin had demonstrated

⁵⁶⁶Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 123.

⁵⁶⁷Ibid, p. 129; Bride, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, pp. 368-369; and Williamson, *Austria Hungary and the Origins*, p. 192.

⁵⁶⁸Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 167.

a lack of appreciation for Austria's position by frequently limiting Vienna's responses to the previous Balkan crises.⁵⁶⁹ Austria, therefore, sent Count Szogyeny to Berlin to see if Germany would support Vienna's position. Szogyeny delivered a letter from Emperor Franz Joseph and an attached memorandum that expressed Austria's view of the Balkan situation to the Kaiser.⁵⁷⁰ In his letter, the Emperor claimed that Russia was using Serbia to try to destroy the Triple Alliance and Austria-Hungary. He went on to claim that Russia, and its French ally, were trying to create a new Balkan League to help achieve this goal. He then asked that Germany help prevent this outcome which "will not be possible unless Serbia which is at present the pivot of Pan-Slavist policy is eliminated as a political factor in the Balkans."

Berlin expressed strong support for Austria.⁵⁷¹ Prior to the delivery of the letter, Tschiroschky, the German ambassador to Vienna, had advised caution. This view was not shared by the Kaiser. Upon receiving a telegram from Tschiroschky explaining the position he had taken with Vienna, the Kaiser noted

Who authorized him to do so? That is utterly stupid! It is not his business, since it is entirely Austria's own affair, what she intends to do. Later on, if things went wrong, it would be said: Germany was not willing! Will Tschirschky have the goodness to drop this nonsense! It is high time a clean sweep was made of the Serbs.⁵⁷²

When Szogyeny presented the Emperor's letter, Wilhelm, and later Chancellor Bethman-Hollweg, expressed strong support for aggressive Austrian action. But, they went even further and strongly suggested that Vienna promptly act while European opinion was still outraged by the assassination.⁵⁷³

One may wonder why Germany gave such strong support to Austria, particularly at this time and without proof that Serbia was involved in the assassination. Germany provided this support for

⁵⁶⁹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 155.

⁵⁷⁰Letter of Franz Joseph to the Kaiser, July 2, 1914, [online], The World War I Document Archive, accessed April 14, 2000, <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/frzwilly.html>.

⁵⁷¹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 133-145, 150-159.

⁵⁷²Quoted in *ibid*, 2: 138.

⁵⁷³The note in which Germany gave this support to Austria is commonly referred to as "the Blank Check."

three reasons.⁵⁷⁴ One reason was the belief that St. Petersburg lacked both the will and the capability to go to war for Serbia. The will was lacking because the Tsar was not likely to defend regicides. The capability was lacking because the Russian military was not prepared for war and neither of its allies—Britain and France—wanted war. Another reason was the belief among the military that Germany faced a closing window of opportunity with respect to Russia and France; they believed war was inevitable and held a “better now than later” view. The final reason, and the one most relevant to the disintegration of empires and war, was that the failure to support Austria would lead to the further disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. Because Austria was Germany’s only loyal Great Power ally and Europe had polarized into two competing blocs, any weakening of Austria-Hungary would have a detrimental impact on Berlin’s position in Europe.⁵⁷⁵ Jagow, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, expressed this opinion in a letter to the German Ambassador in London when he wrote,

Austria, whose prestige has suffered more and more from her failure to take resolute action, now scarcely counts any longer as a full-sized Great Power. The Balkan crisis further weakened her position. This recession in the Austrian power position has severely weakened our alliance group....

...We cannot and must not tie her hands now. If we did so, Austria (and we ourselves) could rightly reproach us with having deprived her of her last chance to rehabilitate herself politically. This would only hasten the process of gradual extinction and decay from within. Her position in the Balkans would be gone for ever. You will agree with me that a definite stabilization of Russian hegemony in the Balkans would indirectly be inadmissible to us. The preservation of Austria, and that Austria should be as strong as possible, is essential to us on domestic and foreign grounds...⁵⁷⁶

With the support of Berlin, only one issue prevented Austria from going to war against Serbia. The Austrian leadership also needed the support of Count Stephen Tisza, the Hungarian

⁵⁷⁴To understand the causes of the war, it is useful to understand why Germany supported Austria so strongly. This discussion is short, however, because it has little bearing on the relationship between the disintegration of empire and the causes of the Austro-Serbian War. Explaining the reasons for Germany’s position are Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 139-143, 149, 156-164; Geiss, *July 1914*, pp. 60, 71-72; James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, (New York, NY: Longman, 1984), pp. 46-47; and Lee, *Europe’s Crucial Years*, pp. 381-383.

⁵⁷⁵According to Joll, there was also the worry that the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire would lead the German-speaking Austrians to seek unification with Germany. Since these Austrians were, for the most part, Catholic, their incorporation would alter the balance between Protestants and Catholics, and put a serious strain on the German political system. Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, pp. 46-47.

⁵⁷⁶Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 157-158.

Prime Minister, who held veto power over any war; a power which he was prepared to exercise in order to prevent Austria from going to war against Serbia.⁵⁷⁷ Tisza opposed the war for two reasons. The first was the fear that the war would expand beyond Austria and Serbia. If this eventuality occurred, Austria would be in a difficult military position. The obvious concern was that Russia would attack Austria. Almost as important was the danger that Romania would join the fight against Austria. Even though Austria-Hungary and Romania were, on paper, allies, the relationship between the two states was anything but cordial.⁵⁷⁸ A large Romanian population lived in Hungary, most of whom were in Transylvania, where the Hungarian state limited their rights. Bucharest had taken up its diaphora's cause, but to no effect, which contributed to Austro-Romanian tension. The second reason Tisza opposed war was that he did not want Austria-Hungary to annex more Balkan territory. As it was, the Empire already had a large Slav population was demanding political power. If the war were to result in the annexation of more territory populated by Slavs, the demands would grow stronger and threaten the privileged position of the Hungarians in the Empire.

When the Council of Joint Ministers met on July 7th, Tisza expressed his opposition to an immediate Austro-Serbian war.⁵⁷⁹ Even though he agreed that Serbia's attitude and the investigation into the assassination suggested that Austria might need to take military action, he wanted Austria first to try diplomatic means to settle the issue. According to Berchtold, Tisza wanted

to formulate demands on Serbia and present an ultimatum if Serbia failed to meet them. The demands must be stiff but not impossible of fulfillment...Were our demands to meet rejection, then he, to, would be in favor of military operations, but he must from the outset emphatically state that any such operations, though they might result in a diminution of Serbia, must never aim at her destruction, because on the one hand this could never be conceded by Russia without a life and death struggle and because he himself as Hungarian Prime Minister never agreed to the annexation by the Monarchy of Serbia.⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁷For a discussion of Tisza's position, see Norman Stone, "Hungary and the Crisis of July 1914," in *1914: The coming of the first World War*, (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 147-164; and Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 126-133, 164-170, 175-177; Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years*, pp. 383-384; and Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the War*, pp. 192, 198-200.

⁵⁷⁸A useful discussion of the Romanian problem is Keith Hitchens, "The Nationality Problem in Hungary: Istvan Tisza and the Rumanian National Front, 1910-1914," *Journal of Modern History*, 53 (1981): 619-651.

⁵⁷⁹Discussing the meeting is Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 164-170. For a summary of the meeting, see Geiss, *July 1914*, pp. 80-87.

⁵⁸⁰Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 167.

During the next week, Tisza changed his mind and agreed to support those who favored war.⁵⁸¹ He changed his position for two reasons. First, he decided to support war because of Germany. Berlin clearly wanted Vienna to take action against Serbia and was willing to provide Austria with support, if necessary, against Russia and Romania. If Germany wanted war and was willing to help, Tisza would also support war. Second, Berchtold agreed that the Council of Ministers would pass a resolution stating that Austria would not seek to increase its territory, which addressed Tisza's concern about increasing the Monarchy's Slav population.⁵⁸² Once Tisza agreed to support the war policy, all that remained was to implement it.

6.3.4 Austrian Secrecy and the Triple Entente

By the middle of July, Vienna had decided to present Serbia with an ultimatum,⁵⁸³ although the Council of Ministers did not officially approve the text of the ultimatum until July 19th.⁵⁸⁴ Its leadership had planned to prepare a series of demands that would be presented to Belgrade. Belgrade would then have forty-eight hours to accept the demands or face the consequences. Vienna, however, would make these demands so extreme that Serbia would be certain to reject them. Once they were rejected, Vienna would go to war.

Despite the early decision upon what actions to take, Vienna waited until July 23rd to present the ultimatum. This delay occurred for two reasons.⁵⁸⁵ First, a large percentage of the Austrian military was on leave. Early summer was an important time for farming. To satisfy the Monarchy's agrarian interests, Austrian military leaders had approved leaves for a large percentage of the soldiers so that they could go home to help with the farming. Once the assassination occurred, it was too late to recall those on leave. This situation made it necessary to delay the war at least until late July when

⁵⁸¹Ibid, 2: 175-178; and Stone, "Hungary and the Crisis of July 1914."

⁵⁸²All Austria would ask for was a slight adjustment to the Austro-Serbian border.

⁵⁸³These decisions occurred before either the Emperor or Tisza had agreed to support this policy. Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 170-172.

⁵⁸⁴Ibid, 2: 254-258, 254-258.

⁵⁸⁵A nice discussion of this issue can be found in Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914," in *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War*, pp. 245-249.

these soldiers would return from leave.⁵⁸⁶ Second, Poincare, the French president, had scheduled a trip to Denmark, Sweden, and Russia.⁵⁸⁷ Since this trip was by boat, communication would be difficult while he was at sea. Vienna, therefore, decided to issue the ultimatum just after he left Russia. Leaders in Vienna hoped this timing would delay any joint Franco-Russian response.

Because of the delay between the Austrian decision to issue the ultimatum to Serbia and its presentation, secrecy became very important.⁵⁸⁸ If the Triple Entente became aware of Vienna's plan, they would have time to intervene. They could push for a negotiated settlement, or they could engage in military preparations that would reduce Austria's and Germany's first-move advantage.⁵⁸⁹ Austria, therefore, avoided telling the other powers of its plan. In addition, Vienna avoided taking provocative actions or making provocative statements. Conrad expressed this policy when he wrote "in the diplomatic field everything must be avoided in the nature of protracted or piecemeal diplomatic action which would afford our adversary time for military measures and place us at a military disadvantage."⁵⁹⁰ Consequently, Conrad and the War Minister went on leave on July 14th, not to return until the 22nd.⁵⁹¹

Russia had strong interests in the Balkans that Austria and Germany threatened. Most prominently, Russia's prestige and status as a great power were entangled with its position in the Balkans, particularly Serbia.⁵⁹² Any excessive humiliation of Serbia would weaken Russia. St.

⁵⁸⁶Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins*, pp. 199-200.

⁵⁸⁷Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 172-173; and John F.V. Keiger, *France and the Origins of the First World War*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 150, 152

⁵⁸⁸Geiss, *July 1914*, pp. 89-92; and Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "The Origins of World War I," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, edited by Robert I Rotberg & Theodore K. Rabb, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 239.

⁵⁸⁹On the importance of first-move advantages during the First World War, see Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War*, revised and expanded edition, edited by Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 59-108.

⁵⁹⁰Quoted in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 173.

⁵⁹¹Ibid.

⁵⁹²Lieven, *Russia and the Origins*, pp. 141-142.

Petersburg's position was particularly precarious because of the past humiliations Russia had suffered during the Bosnian Crisis. Compounding this problem were the increasing tension between Germany and Russia over Constantinople. Russia still considered Constantinople and the Straits to be essential for its security. In recent years, however, Germany had become a competitor for influence in the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁹³ This competition came to a head in October 1913 when a German general, Liman von Sanders, was to be put in charge of the of the reorganization of the Turkish army. This would provide Germany with a great deal of control over the Turkish army, which, in turn, threatened Russia's interests in Constantinople and the Straits.⁵⁹⁴ As a consequence of the Liman von Sanders affair, St. Petersburg came to believe that Germany was a greater threat than before. And, since Austria was Germany's weaker ally, Russia was more likely to oppose Austria in the belief that gains for Austria were also gains for Germany.

This is not to say that Russia believed in war at all costs. Russia understood the gravity of the situation and did not expect the assassination to go unanswered. Serbia would have to suffer some consequences for its actions. The Tsar, however, opposed any plans that would violate Serbia's sovereignty.⁵⁹⁵

If St. Petersburg had known what was planned, Russia might have warned Vienna and Berlin against their actions. Austria's secrecy, however, succeeded in limiting St. Petersburg's attempts to deter Austria.⁵⁹⁶ Rumors of Austria's plans reached St. Petersburg in mid-July, leading Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, to question the Austrian Ambassador to St. Petersburg. The ambassador succeeded in quieting Sazonov's fears. Yet, he came away from the meeting with the recognition that Russia would not accede to Austria's extreme demands.⁵⁹⁷

Impressions began to change between July 20th and July 23rd when Poincare arrived at St.

⁵⁹³On Germany and the development of its relationship with Turkey, see Frank Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance 1914-1918*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970).

⁵⁹⁴Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 1: 540-550, 2: 181-182; and Lieven, *Russia and the Origins*, pp. 46-48.

⁵⁹⁵Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices," p. 232.

⁵⁹⁶Lieven, *Russia and the Origins*, p. 140.

⁵⁹⁷Ibid, pp. 185-186.

Petersburg. Since the assassination, the French public, press and politicians had focused on domestic concerns rather than the Balkans.⁵⁹⁸ While in Russia, however, Poincare received several dispatches that caused serious concerns.⁵⁹⁹ Two were of significant importance. First, Austria was preparing to make extreme demands on Serbia. Second, Germany intends to support Austria and not mediate the crisis. As a result of this information, Poincare warned the Austrian Ambassador to St. Petersburg that Russia, with France, might support Serbia against Austria. Specifically, he said “Serbia has some very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an ally, France. There are plenty of complications to be feared!”⁶⁰⁰

Poincare also discussed the issue with Sazonov.⁶⁰¹ The information concerned Sazonov, leading him to send a telegram to the Shebeko, Russian Charge d’affaires in Vienna, on July 23. He told Shebeko to warn Berchtold that if Austria’s demands against Serbia were too extreme, there could be serious consequences. This information, however, did not reach Berchtold before the ultimatum was delivered to Serbia. Whether this information would have had any effect on Vienna’s actions is uncertain. Austria’s concerns about the Serbian threat and German support seemed to provide enough impetus for Vienna to carry out its plan.

Britain, the remaining entente power, also limited its diplomacy prior to the presentation of the ultimatum. Britain, like France, was involved in a domestic crisis when word of the assassination reached London.⁶⁰² Unlike Poincare in France, however, Grey, the British Prime Minister, recognized the dangers inherent in the crisis.⁶⁰³ Nonetheless, in mid-July, he did not believe an Austro-Russian conflict was very likely. He had learned through the British Ambassador

⁵⁹⁸Kreiger, *France and the Origins*, pp. 145-150.

⁵⁹⁹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 190-192.

⁶⁰⁰Quoted in *ibid*, 2: 193.

⁶⁰¹*Ibid*, 2: 194-195; and Kreiger, *France and the Origins*, p. 151.

⁶⁰²Zara S. Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), pp. 215-217.

⁶⁰³In early July, Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador at London, informed Grey of some of the thinking going on in Berlin and Vienna. This led Grey to recognize that serious trouble could arise, but he did not believe it to be very likely. Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 203-206.

to Vienna that Russia did not expect Austria to risk war with Serbia. Then, between July 15th and July 23rd, information reached Grey and the British Foreign Office that suggested that Austria's demands would be more extreme than originally expected.⁶⁰⁴ Grey offered two solutions: either a Conference could be held along the lines of the London Conference of 1912-13, which had helped prevent Great Power conflict during the Balkan Wars, or the Great Powers could mediate the dispute. Grey's attempts, however, failed for two reasons. First, it came too late. Second, the Kaiser refused to restrain Austria.⁶⁰⁵

6.3.5 The Austrian Ultimatum and the Serbian Response

On June 23rd, at 6 PM, Austria presented Belgrade with an ultimatum. Originally, Austria had planned to present the ultimatum an hour earlier, when the French President was scheduled to leave St. Petersburg. On the day of his departure, however, the Germans discovered that the President was leaving an hour later than expected and informed Vienna. Vienna relayed the information to its representative in Belgrade and ordered him to delay the presentation of the ultimatum until 6 PM.⁶⁰⁶

The ultimatum expressed Austria's position and demands.⁶⁰⁷ It stated that Belgrade had failed to live up to its obligations of March 31, 1909 when Serbia accepted Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and agreed to live "on a footing of good neighbourliness." The activities of the nationalist organizations, culminating in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, according to Austria, demonstrated Serbia's failure. The ultimatum went on to say that this failure requires formal assurances that Serbia will seek to prevent further speech and actions intended to separate territories from the Habsburg Monarchy. Austria then made ten demands:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Monarchy the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;
2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Obrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy;

⁶⁰⁴Ibid, 2: 206-212.

⁶⁰⁵Ibid, 2: 213-215.

⁶⁰⁶Kreiger, *France and the Origins*, p. 152.

⁶⁰⁷The text of the ultimatum can be found in Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 286-289.

the Royal Government will take the necessary measures to prevent the dissolved societies from continuing their activities under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia both as regards the teaching body and the methods of instruction, all that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service and the administration in general all officers and officials guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and of whom the Imperial and Royal Government reserves to itself the right to communicate the names and deeds to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against the accessories to the plot of 28 June who are on Serbian territory;

Organs delegated by the Imperial and Royal government will take part in the investigations relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tanksoć and of a certain Milan Ciganović, a Serbian State employee implicated by the findings of the preliminary investigation at Sarajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Serbian Authorities in the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss and severely punish the officials of the Sabac and Loznica frontier service guilty of having assisted the authors of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their crossing the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the outrage of 28 June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility towards the Austro-Hungary Monarchy;

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

Finally, Austria gave Serbia forty-eight hours to decide upon its response.

Clearly, Austria did not expect Serbia to accept these demands. In fact, Vienna went out of its way to make sure Belgrade would reject the ultimatum.⁶⁰⁸ Several of the demands, particularly points 2, 4, 5, and 6, infringed on Serbia's sovereignty, which would make it impossible for any independent state to agree to them.⁶⁰⁹ Vienna also did its best to prevent any negotiations from occurring. By giving Serbia two days to respond, Austria limited the time Belgrade could consult both within the government and with the friendly powers. Vienna further limited the ability to

⁶⁰⁸ Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 254-258 discusses how Vienna worked to phrase the conditions so that Serbia would have little choice but to reject them.

⁶⁰⁹ Geiss, *July 1914*, p. 168.

negotiate a compromise solution by not providing the powers with a copy of the note until the morning of July 24th, twelve hours after Serbia received Austria's demands.

When Serbia received the ultimatum, Pasic was not present to receive Austria's note. The civil-military conflict over Macedonia had created a great deal of political turmoil in Serbia, leading Pasic to call for new elections.⁶¹⁰ When the note arrived, he promptly returned to Belgrade in order to deal with the crisis.

The note presented Serbia with a dilemma. On the one hand, since several of the demands impinged on Serbia's sovereignty, no government in Belgrade could accept Austria's terms *in toto*.⁶¹¹ Even if the government accepted Austria's terms, implementation would be fraught with disagreements and conflict that could only be resolved through war. On the other hand, Serbia was still militarily and financially weak from its efforts during the Balkan Wars, which would make it difficult to resist an Austrian attack if Serbia rejected the ultimatum.⁶¹² Furthermore, the level of Russian support for Serbia was unclear. In the past, Russia had forced Serbia to accept Austrian demands, and it might occur now.

Thus, upon receiving the note, Serbia was in a difficult position: to accept and suffer the indignity or to reject and risk a war that Serbia could not win.⁶¹³ Prior to any consultations with the Powers, Serbia seems to have been leaning towards accepting Austria's terms in their entirety while expressing some reservations.⁶¹⁴ Before Belgrade responded, however, Serbia decided to appeal to the friendly Great Powers, namely the members of the Triple Entente. All three Powers gave the

⁶¹⁰On the domestic situation, see Dragnich, *Serbia, Nichola Pasic, and Yugoslavia*, 70-89. It is important to note that the evidence indicates that, aside from nationalism, the domestic situation in Serbia had no influence on Austria's decisions.

⁶¹¹Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 346-348.

⁶¹²*Ibid*, 2: 350-352.

⁶¹³The historical record about Serbia's position on the evening of July 24th is limited. Neither Russia nor Serbia possesses or has released, the documents necessary to determine whether Belgrade was leaning towards conciliatory actions or rejection. Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 347-361 presents some evidence and an argument that Serbia was planning to accept the ultimatum with some reservations as to point 6.

⁶¹⁴*Ibid*; and Geiss, *July 1914*, pp. 165-166.

same advise: accept those terms that Belgrade believed it could.⁶¹⁵

Russia, however, went further.⁶¹⁶ Upon learning Austria's terms, Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, was quoted as saying "C'est la guerre europeenne!"⁶¹⁷ He recognized that Austria's demands and its methods demonstrated that Vienna was prepared to go to extremes to achieve its goals with Serbia, and Russia could not give Austria a free hand. Sazonov informed that Austrian Ambassador, Szapary, that he saw what Austria was trying to do and warned him of the dangers. He then took three actions. First, he began to arrange for the military to prepare to mobilize against Austria. Second, he sought allied support from France and Britain. France wholeheartedly agreed to support Russia, while Britain advised restraint.⁶¹⁸ Third, St. Petersburg expressed its support for Serbia.⁶¹⁹ Sazonov told Belgrade that Serbia should accept those terms that were compatible with its sovereignty and reject those that were not. The Tsar supported Sazonov's policy when he wrote to King Alexander of Serbia that

So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our earnest wish we are not successful, your Highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia.⁶²⁰

With this support, Serbia was prepared to respond.⁶²¹ Instead of accepting the ultimatum with only minor reservations, Serbia accepted the note, for the most part, while rejecting point 6 outright, which gave Austria permission to participate in the investigation of those responsible for the assassination.⁶²² In addition, prior to presenting its response, Belgrade announced the mobilization

⁶¹⁵Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2: 339-34.

⁶¹⁶Discussing the Russian reaction are Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 290-294, 304-308; and Lieven, *Russia and the Origins*, pp. 140-145.

⁶¹⁷"This means a European war!" Quoted in *ibid*, 2: 290.

⁶¹⁸*Ibid*, pp. 295-296.

⁶¹⁹*Ibid*, pp. 353-358.

⁶²⁰*The Russian Orange Book, 1914*, <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/papers/orange.html>, document number 40. Also useful is document number 77.

⁶²¹On the Serbian response, see Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 361-372.

⁶²²Prior to Russia's advice, Serbia did not plan to reject this condition, only to express reservations about it. *Ibid*, pp. 358-361.

of its army and prepared to evacuate the capital, which was a short distance from the Austro-Serbian border.⁶²³ Five minutes before the deadline, Pasic personally delivered the Serbian response to the Austrian representative who, upon seeing that Belgrade had not accepted it without reservations, left Belgrade with his staff.⁶²⁴

6.3.6 The Failure of Peace Initiatives, the Austro-Serbian War of 1914, and Its Impending Escalation

Despite Vienna's decision to cut off diplomatic ties following Serbia's response to the ultimatum, Vienna did not immediately declare war. Austria would not be able to mobilize sufficient forces until August 12th.⁶²⁵ Therefore, Vienna planned to delay the declaration of war until the Austrian military was prepared to act.

This situation provided England with the opportunity to try to resolve the crisis before war erupted.⁶²⁶ Prime Minister Grey and his closest advisers decided to try to mediate the conflict. As it became clearer that the crisis could escalate into an Austro-Russian conflict, which, in turn, threatened the peace of Europe, Grey decided to intervene. He suggested that the four powers not involved in the crisis—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—ought to mediate the conflict. Unfortunately, Berlin did not approve of this idea, claiming that it would be inappropriate to force Austria to accept European dictates.⁶²⁷ Nonetheless, Germany agreed to communicate it to Vienna. Later, when Grey learned how far Serbia had gone to accept Austria's ultimatum, he decided to try a different tact. He asked Germany to persuade Austria to accept Serbia's response as the basis for negotiation,

Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, agreed to submit both proposals to Vienna;

⁶²³Ibid, p. 363.

⁶²⁴For the Austrian interpretation of Serbia's response, see *ibid*, pp. 364-371.

⁶²⁵Geiss, *July 1914*, pp. 226-227, document 86. Conrad claims to have told Berchtold that "Only when we have progressed far enough for operation to begin immediately—on approximately August 12" could Austria declare war.

⁶²⁶Discussing Britain's attempts are Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 329-340, 390-395, 410-424, 441-453; and Steiner, *Britain and the Origins*, pp. 222-224, 226-227.

⁶²⁷Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 393-395.

however, he was not sincere in his position.⁶²⁸ Germany did not want to prevent an Austro-Serbian crisis, but wanted to localize it.⁶²⁹ Successful diplomacy would prevent Vienna from gaining the public success needed to accomplish its goals. If he rejected these proposals outright, however, Germany might be blamed for any future war. On the other hand, if he supported them, Austria might accept one of them, which was not Germany's goal. Instead, when he communicated these proposals to Berchtold, he recommended that Austria reject them. Furthermore, while talking peace, German leaders were pushing Austria to go to war.⁶³⁰ They believed that if Austria acted quickly, they would be able to confront Europe with a *fait accompli*. Otherwise, the Triple Entente might have the time to resolve the crisis without war.⁶³¹

This pressure led Austria to declare war against Serbia on July 28th.⁶³² Militarily, Austria would not be prepared to attack until August 12th. Politics, however, dictated that Vienna make a public gesture to satisfy German demands. Thus, Austria declared the war on Serbia two weeks before mobilization was complete.

With Austria's declaration of war, the stage was set for the First World War. St. Petersburg could not allow Austria to act with impunity. If Russia did, then the consequences to its prestige and influence would be significant. Berlin, in turn, could not allow a further weakening of the Habsburg Empire. If Germany did, its position in Europe would be significantly weakened.

6.4 CONCLUSIONS

The cases in this chapter support the dissertation's argument that imperial disintegration causes the causes and conditions associated with war which, in turn, can lead to wars and crises. The

⁶²⁸Ibid, pp. 2: 441-453.

⁶²⁹What localization meant was not totally clear. Britain wished to prevent an Austro-Serbian conflict because of the dangers that it would escalate to a continental war, which Britain could not stay out of. Germany, on the other hand, was more concerned about a world war, not a continental war. The key for Germany was to keep Britain out of the war. See Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices," pp. 234-236, 238-239; Geiss, *July 1914*, pp. 236-238, documents 95 and 96; and Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 424-429.

⁶³⁰Albertini, *The Origins of the War*, 2: 453-460; Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1961), pp. 69-72; and L.C.F. Turner, *Origins of the First World War*, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), pp. 98-99.

⁶³¹Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery*, p. 523.

⁶³²On Austria's declaration of war see Albertini, *The Origins of War*, 2: 460-465.

changes that occurred as a result of the Ottoman Empire's decline and disintegration caused shifts in the rules of the game that contributed to the problems associated with all three cases. Between 1880s and the early 1900s, the Great Powers had few conflicts and disagreements over the Balkans. This, in part, resulted from the creation of a set of rules that sought to maintain the *status quo*. The Great Power support for the *status quo* also contributed to the long period of interstate peace between the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire. Changes in the balance of power—the growth of Russian power and influence in the Balkans and the growth of Serbia—and the growing concerns associated with Serbia and the continued disintegration of the Ottoman Empire contributed to Austria's decision to change the Balkan international order in 1908 by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Austria's actions helped convince the Balkan states that Austrian and Russian support for the international order had weakened considerably. By violating the rules of the game, Vienna demonstrated that Austria believed that the treaties and precedents that supported the order were outdated. Vienna's actions also convinced St. Petersburg that Russia could no longer depend upon Austria's good behavior; consequently, Russia began to support the Balkan states in their attempts to prepare for war in the Balkans. Seeing that the powers did not strongly support the existing rules of the game, the Balkan states believed that they could militarily act to satisfy their own interests without Great Power interference. Thus, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia prepared to go to war against the Turks.

Included in their preparations for war were negotiations of inter-Balkan alliances. The agreements they reached settled issues related to the allies' military commitments, when the war would begin, and where each state would attack. Unfortunately, the agreements failed to adequately address the division of territory after the war. Belgrade and Sofia negotiated an agreement that gave Bulgaria the greater part of Macedonia and Serbia a smaller portion of Macedonia with the assumption that Serbia would also make significant gains in Albania. Before the war began, Serbia was already beginning to question the division of territory. When the Great Powers intervened and refused to allow Serbia to acquire Albanian territory, an issue that the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement did not address, Belgrade demanded a larger share of the spoils in Macedonia. At the same time, Greece and Bulgaria tried and failed to arrange a division of the territorial gains. Since Athens and

Sofia had conflicting territorial claims, the Greco-Bulgarian agreement avoided the completely avoided issue. Consequently, they waited until after the war to determine who got what. Since they still held competing claims and neither side was willing to agree to any concessions, they were forced to use other means, namely war, to settle their disagreement.

These cases also support the power-based arguments. As the argument predicts, the balance of power tends to shift. Prior to Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia was a weak, divided state allied with Austria. In the early 1900s, Serbia began to develop a stronger state that was independent from Austria and allied with Russia. The growing power of Serbia and its alliance with Russia presented Austria with a window of opportunity during which Vienna could try to deal with the Serbian threat. Then, prior to the Balkan Wars, the Balkan states saw that their power had grown relative to Turkey, which provided them with the opportunity to satisfy their revisionist aims. In addition, the divisions among the Great Powers suggested that they would not intervene to prevent Balkan actions against Turkey. Prior to the Second Balkan War, a new constellation of power developed as the Balkan League fragmented and an anti-Bulgarian Greco-Serbian alliance formed. This new alliance combined with the losses that Bulgaria suffered in the First Balkan War gave Athens and Belgrade the confidence necessary to oppose Bulgaria.

Serbia's gains in the Balkan Wars increased Austrian fear of Serbia and closed the window of opportunity further. This shift in the balance of power forced Austria to try to settle the Serbian problem once and for all. Serbia recognized its weaknesses and would have conceded if not for the strong support provided by Russia, who was competing with Austria for power and influence in the Balkans. As a result, Serbia refused to completely capitulate to Austrian demands, leading to war.

The nationalism-based aspects of the argument also gains support from the cases in this chapter. As the Ottoman Empire disintegrated and the successor states gained their independence, ethnic groups were separated from their ethnic homeland: a large Serbian population lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians lived in Macedonia. This situation created the potential for nationalism to cause trouble. In 1908 and then again in 1914, Vienna worried about the threat Serbian nationalism posed to Austria-Hungary's existence as a unified, multi-ethnic state. To manage this threat, leaders in Vienna decided to try to weaken, and eventually destroy, Serbia. Nationalism also partly caused the Balkan Wars. Bulgarian, and to a lesser extent Greek and

Serbian, leaders worried about the suffering imposed on their ethnic brethren in Macedonia and sought to annex the territory populated by their diaspora. Consequently, they decided to go to war against the Ottoman Empire.

The cases provide significantly less support for the aspects of the argument associated with miscalculation and domestic politics. Miscalculation was clearly a problem throughout the period studied. During the Bosnian Crisis, Serbia miscalculated the level of Russian support, partly as a result of the mixed signals Russia gave to Serbia. It is unclear, however, what caused the divisions within Russia and whether they resulted from Russian attempts to manage the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. During the Balkan Wars power was miscalculated by Turkey and by Bulgaria. The Porte believed that the Turkish military would be able to field a larger army than it did. And, prior to the Second Balkan War, Sofia miscalculated both its capabilities relative to Greece and Serbia and the likelihood that these states would go to war against Bulgaria. Again, it is not clear why these miscalculations occurred. The key miscalculation that led to the Austro-Serbian War was the support of Russia. Neither Germany nor Austria recognized the importance that Russia attached to an independent Serbia.

Domestic politics is the most weakly supported argument in this chapter. Prior to the Bosnian Crisis, a coup occurred in Serbia. Instead of causing war, however, it helped cause peace as Serbia wished to avoid any conflict while weak. The same situation occurred prior to the Austro-Serbian War. Serbia was suffering from internal divisions between the military and the political leaders. As a result, leaders opposed war. Prior to the First Balkan War, Turkey underwent a coup as reformers sought to revitalize the Ottoman Empire. The instability that resulted contributed to the outbreak of war, but not by the use of diversionary tactics. Instead, the turmoil in the Ottoman Empire made it difficult for those in power to make the compromises necessary to prevent war. They knew that their opponents would use any compromise to try to throw them out of power.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

This conclusion summarizes the main argument and provides a brief survey of the cases. Then, it discusses what the results about the main theories this dissertation informs. Finally, it mentions several policy recommendations.

7.1 Main Argument

In this dissertation, I have argued that imperial disintegration and collapse increase security competition by causing causes and conditions associated with war. Disintegration and collapse creates situation in which new states form and must learn to deal with their domestic and international politics. At the same time, older states must deal with the new states and with the responses of other states to the new situation. As a result, the rules of the game becomes unsettled, power shifts, miscalculation of relative power and intentions becomes more frequent, nationalism becomes more of a problem, and domestic politics becomes more unsettled, all of which make international relations problematic and increase the likelihood of war.

The cases studies provide support for this argument. (See Table 7-1 for a concentrated presentation of the results of the case studies.) The Crimean War demonstrates that imperial disintegration causes shifts in the balance of power, miscalculation, and unsettled rules of the game. These problems, in turn, led to the Crimean War. French opportunism threatened Russian interests. St. Petersburg responded to France's actions with the expectation that both Britain and Austria would not oppose it. This expectation was based on two flawed premises. First, St. Petersburg believed that the Anglo-Russian rules of the game endorsed Russia's response. Second, St. Petersburg failed to recognize that its actions threatened Austria's interests; in other words, Russia's "defensive" actions created a security dilemma. As a result, Britain, along with France, supported Turkey. The Porte recognized that this support was temporary, leading to a window of opportunity. Consequently, the Russo-Turkish war began, and was quickly followed by British and French entry. As the crisis and war progressed, security dilemma dynamics led Vienna to oppose Russia.

TABLE 7-1: Summary of the Results

	CRIMEAN WAR	SERBIA IN THE 1860S
UNSETTLED RULES OF THE GAME	The weakening of the Ottoman Empire led Russia, Britain, and Austria to negotiate new rules of the game. Partly as a result of these negotiations, St. Petersburg wrongly believed that London and Vienna would not oppose its actions.	Rules of the game were not an issue during these crises.
POWER	The weakening of the Ottoman Empire provided France with the opportunity to achieve its goals at the Empire's expense. Constantinople's concessions to France wounded Russia's prestige. Since St. Petersburg did not believe that any of the Great Powers opposed its actions, Russia was willing to go to war against the Turks. Turkey's weakness forced Constantinople to avoid war until it gained British support. Since this was temporary, Turkey faced a window of opportunity.	Prince Michael built and reformed the Serbian military in the 1860s. This military was strong enough to convince Turkey that a war was not in its interests, but not strong enough to convince Serbia to go to war.
MISCALCULATION	Russia miscalculated the constellation of allies and, therefore, the balance of power.	Miscalculation clearly occurred since neither Turkey nor Serbia believed they could achieve their goals by war. But, this miscalculation was pessimistic, and contributed to peace.
NATIONALISM	Nationalism had no influence in this case.	Turkish interference in Serbian politics contributed to the growth of nationalism.
DOMESTIC INSTABILITY	In the periphery, the Ottoman Empire suffered from some resistance to its rule, but no clear competitor for the leadership of the empire existed.	Prince Michael of Serbia was secure in his position.

**TABLE 7-1: Summary of the Results
(continued)**

	SERBO-TURKISH WAR OF 1876	RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1877-78
UNSETTLED RULES OF THE GAME	Fear of the complications that would result from the war led Austria and Russia to negotiate an agreement about the post-war order. This agreement may have prevented Austro-Russian complications from occurring.	Vienna and St. Petersburg negotiated an agreement to keep Austria out of the war. These negotiations, however, ran into trouble because they were based on previous verbal agreements.
POWER	When the Bosnian revolt began, Serbia was militarily and diplomatically unprepared for war. Serbian leaders, therefore, delayed going war until they were better prepared. During the winter and spring of 1875/76, Serbia improved its military and diplomatic position, which convinced Belgrade that it could win a war.	Fear of an anti-Russian coalition led St. Petersburg to negotiate an agreement with Vienna before going to war. At the same time, the Porte rejected a negotiated settlement because it believed that the Great Powers were not united against Turkey.
MISCALCULATION	Divisions in Russia led Serbia to wrongly expect Russian support. Serbia also wrongly expect the Bulgarian revolutionaries to join in the war effort.	Russia expected to easily defeat Turkey as demonstrated by the initial rejection of Balkan support. But, once Turkish forces halted the Russian advance, St. Petersburg asked for support.
NATIONALISM	The mistreatment of Bosnian Serbs contributed to the growth of nationalism in Serbia.	Nationalism was not an issue.
DOMESTIC INSTABILITY	Public pressure for war led Prince Milan to fear a revolution if he did not cave to the public's demands. Nonetheless, he was able to delay war until Serbia was better prepared.	While there was resistance to Constantinople's attempts at reform, there seemed to be little to no threat of a revolt.

**TABLE 7-1: Summary of the Results
(continued)**

	SERBO-BULGARIAN WAR OF 1885	BOSNIAN ANNEXATION CRISIS OF 1908
UNSETTLED RULES OF THE GAME	Russia's decision to create a large Bulgarian state following the Russo-Turkish War violated its agreement with Austria, forcing the Great Powers to meet and alter the peace terms. Then, the failure of the Great Powers to compensate Serbia, as Serbia believed the rules required, forced Serbia to use other means to achieve its goals.	Austria and Russia had developed a set of rules to maintain the Balkan <i>status quo</i> , which both wished to alter in 1908. They reached a secret, oral agreement about the new Balkan order. They then disagreed about what this agreement actually said, leading to a crisis. At the same time, past secret Austro-Russian agreements helped justify Austria's actions and limit Russia's aggressiveness. How much these past agreements actually influenced these decisions is not clear.
POWER	Unification increased Bulgaria's power. Serbia opposed unification without compensation because it would alter the Balkan balance of power. This growth in power would occur in the future. In 1885, the Russian withdrawal of military support, the Turkish threat, and the general belief that Serbia was stronger than Bulgaria, led Serbia to expect victory.	During the five years prior to the crisis, Serbia had increased its independence and power, which threatened Austria. In 1908, Austria was confident that it was more powerful than Serbia. The Russian threat also concerned Austria because the annexation of the two provinces threatened Russia's interests in the region. Austria, however, was relatively confident that Germany would support it and that Russia would not go to war for Serbia.
MISCALCULATION	Bulgaria did not recognize that its actions posed a threat to Serbia, which, in turn, contributed to the growth of the Serbian threat to Bulgaria. Once the war began, Serbia did not expect Bulgaria to respond so quickly or to be as strong as it was.	St. Petersburg supported Serbia's demands for compensation and Serbia's preparation for war even though Russia lacked the capabilities to provide the support. Russian support contributed to Serbia's continued demands for compensation. Unfortunately for Serbia, Russia withdrew its support, forcing Serbia to cave to all of Austria's demands..
NATIONALISM	Bulgarians were divided between three territories—Bulgaria proper, Eastern Rumelia, and Macedonia, which created the potential for nationalism to lead to war. The mistreatment of Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire and Russian interference in Bulgarian domestic affairs strengthen Bulgarian nationalism. Bulgarian unification, however, did not lead to a Turco-Bulgarian War as the dissertation's argument might lead one to expect.	A large Serbian population lived in Austria, particularly Bosnia. This created two problems. First, Serbian nationalism sought to unify with these territories. Second, Serbian nationalism threatened the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.
DOMESTIC INSTABILITY	Milan was not a popular leader and he feared a revolution, but it is unclear how this fear influenced his decision making.	Domestic instability was not an issue during this crisis.

**TABLE 7-1: Summary of the Results
(continued)**

	FIRST BALKAN WAR	SECOND BALKAN WAR
UNSETTLED RULES OF THE GAME	The Bosnian Crisis and the Italo-Turkish War demonstrated that the Great Powers no longer supported the <i>status quo</i> .	The Serbo-Bulgarian alliance failed to take into account the loss of Albania, while the Greco-Bulgarian alliance did not specify a division of the spoils. Thus, the division of spoils became an issue of conflict.
POWER	The Balkan states were able to form an alliance due to common interests and Russian support. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire was weakened by internal rebellion, the Italo-Turkish War, and domestic instability.	Common interests and a common threat led Serbia and Greece to form an anti-Bulgarian alliance. Once the war began, Romania and Turkey recognized Bulgaria's weak position and joined the war.
MISCALCULATION	Turkey underestimated its capabilities.	Bulgarian military leaders thought that they were stronger than the Serbians and Greeks, failing to recognize the costs of the First Balkan War. At the same time, Bulgaria overestimated the level support Russia would provide..
NATIONALISM	Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs lived in Macedonia, which was still controlled by the Turks. Turkish mistreatment of Christians in Macedonia increased nationalism, particularly in Bulgaria.	Nationalism does not seem to have been a significant factor in this conflict.
DOMESTIC INSTABILITY	Competition for power in Constantinople limited the ability that the party in power had to make compromises that would either prevent war, or better prepare Turkey for war.	Public euphoria over Bulgaria's recent victories prevented Sofia from making any territorial concessions to the other Balkan states. Some Bulgarian leaders worried that to make concessions would lead to their assassination.

**TABLE 7-1: Summary of the Results
(continued)**

	AUSTRO-SERBIAN WAR OF 1914
UNSETTLED RULES OF THE GAME	The failure of the Concert of Europe to resolve the Albanian crisis diplomatically contributed to Austria's decision to use military means to solve its problems.
POWER	Serbia, and its Russian ally, were growing in power while the Austro-Hungarian Empire's power was declining. Thus, Austria faced a closing window of opportunity. Thus, Austria needed to deal with Belgrade before both Serbia and Russia were too strong. Contributing to Austria's decision was German support and the belief that Russia would not go to war.
MISCALCULATION	Austria, and Germany, failed to recognize the importance Russia placed in Serbia's independence. As a consequence, they did not realize that Russia would go to war over Serbia.
NATIONALISM	The growth of Serbian nationalism threatened Austria's survival.
DOMESTIC INSTABILITY	While there were civil-military divisions in Serbia, these divisions had little to do with decision-making.

In the 1860s, the Serbo-Turkish crises also appear to be associated with problems identified by the dissertation's argument. Nationalism, which partly gained strength as a result of Turkish abuses and Serbia's lack of independence, and shifts in the balance of power, which resulted from Ottoman decline and Serbian state-building, contributed to the crises. These crises never led to war, however, because of doubts about the balance of power. Belgrade doubted its capabilities and, just as importantly, the capabilities of its allies. Turkey, on the other hand, recognized the improved state of the Serbian military and favored compromise over war.

In the mid and late 1870s, two wars occurred. The first was the Serbo-Turkish War of 1875. Turkish abuses and the territorial division of Serbs between Serbia and Bosnia helped cause nationalism and exacerbate the potential problems it could cause. Despite the pressure of nationalism, war did not occur immediately. Serbian leaders recognized that Serbia was too weak to take on the Turks. They, therefore, took the next several months to prepare militarily and diplomatically for war. This preparation involved the purchasing of arms, the training of men, and negotiations with potential allies. The most important of these potential allies were Bulgaria and Russia. Unfortunately, the Russian government was divided between those who supported intervention and those who opposed it, leading Russia to send mixed signals. The Serbs chose to believe that Russia would support them and, in 1876, declared war on Turkey. Leaders in Belgrade also believed that Bulgarians would rise against their Turkish oppressors. The war was a complete failure for the Serbians. The Turkish military easily defeated the Serbian military and no allies came to Serbia's defense.

Following the Serbo-Turkish War, Russia was forced to intervene. Initially, Russia sought to use diplomacy to settle the Balkan problems. Diplomacy, however, failed because the Great Powers were unable to present Turkey with a united front. As a result, St. Petersburg's decided to use military force to resolve the dispute. In order to do this, Russia needed to know that the Great Powers would not unite to oppose its actions. To achieve this goal, St. Petersburg negotiated an agreement with Vienna. Austria agreed to remain neutral in exchange for the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and guarantees that Russia would limit the changes it would implement. With this agreement, Russian leaders were certain that the Great Powers would not unite against Russia and declared war in the expectation of a cheap, quick victory. They were wrong. The Turks put up

unexpectedly strong resistance, forcing Russia to ask its Balkan allies for help.

The Serbo-Bulgarian War originated from problems associated with nationalism, power, and miscalculations. In the Treaty of Berlin, which created the post-Russo-Turkish war settlement, the Great Powers created a Bulgarian state that did not include all territories populated and claimed by Bulgaria. Consequently, Bulgarian nationalism became a potential problem. Nationalism grew as the result of two factors related to the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. First, the newly independent Bulgaria lacked the institutions and personnel necessary to run the state. To help Bulgaria and its new leader, Prince Alexander, Russia provided personnel, particularly military personnel, to help run the government and the military. These Russians, however, were heavy-handed and interfered in Bulgarian domestic politics, which created resentment against Russian interference. Second, the poor living conditions that the Bulgarians still residing in the Ottoman Empire lived and the discrimination they endured led them to seek unification with Bulgaria. In 1885, as the result of national pressures, Bulgaria unified with Eastern Rumelia.

Belgrade, however, opposed Bulgarian unification because it would alter the balance of power in the Balkans. The post-unification military situation provided Serbia with a window of opportunity. To express its opposition to unification, St. Petersburg withdrew its military personnel from Bulgaria, thereby weakening Bulgaria. At the same time, Turkey moved troops to the Turco-Bulgarian border. Since Bulgarian leaders did not recognize the threat unification posed to Serbia, they stationed their troops along the Turkish border. Thus, Serbian leaders believed that Serbia had a power advantage that would last for a limited time. When Serbia attacked, they learned that they were wrong. After a brief initial success, the Bulgarian military quickly turned back the Serbian attack.

The cases from the early 1900s also show how the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire contributed to the outbreak of war. By 1908, Serbian nationalism was a growing problem, and not just to the Ottoman Empire. Austria was a large, multi-ethnic state in which a significant number of Serbians lived. Austria feared that as Serbia grew and Austria declined, an Austro-Serbian confrontation was inevitable. To address this threat and weaken Serbia, Austria decided to annex the Ottoman territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Since a large number of Serbians lived in these territories, Austria's actions threatened Serbia's national aims. Belgrade believed that

Russia supported Serbian opposition to Austria's actions, and, as a consequence, opposed Austria. Russia, however, was too weak to go to war. Vienna and Berlin, Austria's ally, knew this and eventually forced both Serbia and Russia to accept the annexation.

The Balkan Wars provide support for all the arguments presented in the dissertation. As a result of the division of Greeks, Serbs, and, most significantly, Bulgarians between their ethnic homelands and Macedonia, nationalism pushed these states towards war. The lack of Great Power support for the rules of the game led them to believe that the Powers would not intervene. Their alliance combined with Turkish weakness made them confident of victory, while domestic politics in Constantinople prevented the Porte from negotiating a diplomatic solution to its problems. The Balkan states quickly achieved victory against the Porte. Unfortunately, after their victory, the Great Powers prevented them from dividing the spoils of war as they had planned. They then squabbled over how to divide the Ottoman territory in Europe. As a consequence, Serbia and Greece negotiated an alliance against Bulgaria. Sofia, believing that Bulgaria's military was stronger than its enemies, attacked. Unfortunately for Bulgaria, its military was weaker and was quickly defeated.

Serbian gains from the Balkan Wars increased the threat that Serbia posed to Austria. At the same time, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was declining. Austria confronted a closing window of opportunity. Soon Serbia, and its ally Russia, would be too powerful. Austria, along with Germany, believed that they were strong enough to deter Russia from supporting Serbia. As a result, Serbia would be forced to concede or to suffer a humiliating defeat. They miscalculated. Russia could not afford to suffer the loss of power and of prestige that would occur if St. Petersburg did not support Serbia. As a result of Russia's support, Serbia refused to agree to Austria's demands, leading to war.

This discussion is not intended to say that imperial disintegration and collapse are the sole, or necessarily the most important, causes of all wars that result when empires disintegrate. Many issues and problems not associated with those addressed in this dissertation contribute to these wars. For this reason, the case studies discuss issues, although not completely, outside the realm of the dissertation's argument. Nonetheless, these cases demonstrate that imperial disintegration and collapse contributed to the outbreak of crises and wars. Without this prior event, some of these wars may not have occurred; others would not have taken the form that they did; still others would have not occurred when they did.

7.2 Theoretical Implications for the Causes of War

In addition to testing the dissertations argument that the decline and disintegration of empire causes the condition and causes of war, which can then cause crises and wars, this dissertation helps to improve our understanding of the validity of more general causes of war. These causes can be organized into four categories: regime theory, realism, nationalism, and domestic politics. The conclusions are interesting. First, power is clearly the most important issue that leaders confront when deciding upon war. If they do not believe that they are capable of defeating their adversaries, they are unlikely to go to war. Second, despite recent debates, regime theory may have something to offer those who study the causes of war. Third, domestic politics, particularly the diversionary theory of war which has gained so much popularity, does not seem to provide an important explanation of the causes of war.

7.2.1 Regime Theory and War

Regime theory looks at two issues: the origins of regimes and the consequences of regimes. The results of this dissertation informs both issues. On the subject of the origins of regimes, the cases suggest that power and the desire to avoid potential conflicts of interest contribute to the creation of regimes. Prior to the Crimean War, the Great Powers recognized they had competing interests in the Near East. If they did not address the issues associated with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, war might occur. Thus, they negotiated the Straits Convention and Russia sought agreements both with Austria and with Britain to develop rules to help manage the post-Ottoman order in the Balkans. In the 1870s, as the Balkan Crisis threatened to escalate to war, St. Petersburg negotiated a *modus operandi* with Vienna in order to prevent conflict between the two states. Between the late 1870s and early 1900s, this order remained intact, largely because no shifts in the balance of power threatened the Great Powers' interests and because no new issues developed that would force the Powers to alter the rules. Events changed the Balkan situation in the early 1900s. The growth of Serbian power and nationalism combined with the weakening of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire caused Vienna to seek to change the *status quo*. Consequently, the Balkan order collapsed. With this collapse, an institutional void developed. This void and the further weakening of the Ottoman Empire provided the Balkan states with the opportunity to create a new order that satisfied their interests. Conflicts of interests among Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia and

disagreements over the balance of power made it difficult for them to agree to new rules of the game.

As for the consequences of regimes, most political science research has focused on the international political economy. Little work addresses the relationship between regimes and security in general, and war in particular.¹ This dissertation presents limited evidence supporting the a causal relationship between regimes, or rather the weakness of regimes, and war. During the Crimean War, we see that ambiguous regimes contributed to St. Petersburg's miscalculation about London's response to Russia's actions against the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately for the regime argument, this factor seems to be one of several that influenced Russia's decision-making. Prior to the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, Austria and Russia developed a set of rules. These rules may have prevented an Austro-Russian war from developing, but it is difficult to find evidence for a non-event. During the Bosnian Crisis of 1908, Austria's violation of the rules as Russia saw them, helped cause the crisis. Following the First Balkan War, the lack of clearly spelled out rules to determine how the spoils of war were to be divided contributed to disagreement to the disagreements among the Balkan states that led to the Second Balkan War.

7.2.2 Realism and War

The dominant paradigm in international relations is realism with its focus on states and issues related to power. This dissertation provides strong support for realism. The current and future balance of power seem to have been essential issues for decision-makers. The Crimean War, for example, resulted partly from St. Petersburg's belief that the balance of power favored Russia, and London's and Paris's belief that Russian gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire would adversely effect them. Turkish actions also resulted from shifting power. In the 1860s, we again see concerns about the balance of power. In this case, both Serbia and Turkey believed that the balance of power did not bode well for either of them. As a result, they both avoided war. In the 1870s and 1880s, both Serbia and Russia went to war believing that they would win quickly and cheaply. Then,

¹For a critique of the relationship between regimes and war, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/5), pp. 5-49. Also useful is Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in *International Regimes*, pp. 173-194. Criticizing Mearsheimer's argument are Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory;" Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security;" John Gerard Ruggie, "The False Promise of Realism;" Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics;" and Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51, 52-61, 62-70, 71-81, and 82-93.

in the early 1900s, Vienna willingly initiated two crises—the Bosnian Crisis of 1908 and the Austro-Serbian War of 1914—because of concerns about Austria’s relative power and in the belief that Austria would not suffer from a war. Finally, the Balkan Wars provide evidence of the importance of power. Turkey’s decline and the Balkan alliance helped increase the Balkan states’ confidence. Belief in each sides power advantage also contributed to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War.

These cases also demonstrate that power is frequently miscalculated. Particularly problematic is the ability to judge alliances. Most of the cases demonstrate some miscalculation. In the Crimean War, Russia failed to recognize that Britain and Austria would support the Turks. In 1908, Serbia over-estimated Russian support. And, in 1914, Austria and Germany failed to recognize that Russia could not cave in to Austrian demands.

But, this is not all that these cases teach us about power and war. One problem with many arguments relating war to the balance of power is that they are one sided.² This dissertation presents two ways out of this dilemma. Windows of opportunity stays within the realist tradition. If the power advantage is temporary, concerns about the future limit the ability for states to resolve their problems peacefully. Turkish actions during the Crimean War support this explanation; knowing that British support was temporary, the Porte had to go to war before London withdrew its support. The other approach is to recognize that no one theory explains everything. Instead, we must use pieces of different paradigms. For example, during the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876, both sides expected victory, but only one could win. Serbia optimistically miscalculated its power. Aside from miscalculation, domestic politics can prevent the weaker side from making the concessions necessary to achieve an acceptable solution. Prior to the first Balkan War, for example, domestic politics limited the Porte’s ability to reach compromise solutions that could have either prevented war or allowed the Turks to be better prepared for war. This suggests that war will be more common when more causes of war are present.

7.2.3 Nationalism and War

Perhaps the most popular explanation for current conflicts is nationalism. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of empire has caused virulent nationalism to return in force. Nationalism appears to be an important phenomena in several of the cases in this dissertation. The Serbo-Turkish

²Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 6-12.

War of 1876 resulted, in part, from Turkish mistreatment of Bosnian Slavs which, in turn, spurred Serbian nationalism and pushed Serbia to engage in a war of unification. The First Balkan War was also a war of unification. All the Balkan states wanted to unite with their ethnic brethren still living under Ottoman rule.

We also see that nationalism threatens multi-ethnic states, thereby creating incentives for them to go to war to protect themselves. The clearest evidence of this comes from the Bosnian Crisis and the Austro-Serbian War. In both cases, Serbian nationalism threatened Austria's territorial integrity; any attempts by Belgrade to unite the Serbs with their ethnic homeland threatened Austria's territorial integrity. In order to prevent this from happening, Austria pre-empted Serbia.

But, these cases also suggest that nationalism alone rarely leads to war. When leaders believe that they will are not powerful enough to achieve their national goals, they are unlikely to go to war. This is clearly demonstrated by the Serbo-Turkish War and the Bosnian Crisis. In both cases, nationalism pushed Serbia to go to war, but Belgrade resisted. In 1875, Serbia waited until the military and diplomatic groundwork had been laid. In 1908, Belgrade took an aggressive position with Austria when it had Russian support. But, when Russia withdrew its support, and the Austrian power advantage became clear, Serbia conceded to Vienna's demands. Austria's actions in 1908 and 1914 also demonstrate that capabilities can supercede nationalism. Prior to 1908, Austria did not go to war to address the Serbian national threat. Serbia lacked a Great Power ally and, therefore, was too weak. Once Serbia improved its capabilities and gained a Russian ally, its nationalism became a greater threat to Austria.

7.2.4 Domestic Politics and War

Domestic politics also receives a great deal of cache among academics as a source of war. One of the most popular explanations is the diversionary war hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, leaders try to divert the public's attention from internal turmoil by creating an external threat. The cases in this dissertation provide absolutely no support for this argument. While domestic instability is rampant among successor states, leaders do not go to war to divert their attention.

In fact, the cases seem to provide more support for an alternative domestic politics hypothesis. Weak leaders follow the crowd instead of leading it. In other words, when leaders are

weak and insecure about their hold on power, they are more likely to act to satisfy the people's demands and blood lust. Thus, Prince Milan went to war against Turkey in 1876, in part, because the people demanded it. Prince Alexander of Bulgaria also accepted Bulgarian unification even though it could lead to war because the people wanted it. If he had not accepted their demands, he may have been overthrown.

7.3 Implications for Policy

What do the results of this dissertation suggest policy makers ought to do now? American policy makers receive a low score for their recent actions because they have failed to adequately consider the balance of power and how it is perceived by would be aggressors. First, more emphasis should be placed upon diplomacy to achieve Great Power unity. As this dissertation's cases indicate, when potentially aggressive leaders can convince themselves that they will not be defeated, they are more likely to go to war. This belief frequently develops when the Great Powers are divided. Thus, in recent years, Serbia willingly engaged in its aggressive, nationalist actions in large part because America failed to get Russia on board.

Even if unity is not achieved, American leaders need either to be willing to bear the costs of intervention or stay out of it. When leaders of successor states are able to convince themselves that no stronger power will intervene, they are more likely to go to war. Thus, America's refusal to intervene unilaterally and its unwillingness to use ground forces has undermined attempts to deter aggression.

Second, American leaders should recognize that power disparities make war more likely. Since successor states tend to have different capabilities, leaders ought to provide weaker states with support in developing the capabilities necessary for them to provide for their own defense. Included in this support is military training and supplies and support developing the political institutions necessary for self-rule and self-defense.

Third, even though nationalism alone rarely leads to war, leaders should avoid dividing ethnic minorities from their homeland. Thus, borders should be drawn to unite ethnic groups or people should be moved to help create more homogenous states. Fourth, given that mistreatment of ethnic diaspora can lead to nationalism, all aid should be conditional upon the proper treatment of minorities.

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