

# Mega-Project Politics: The Evolution of Lahore's First BRT Corridor

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
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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis asks how opportunities emerge for states in the Global South to undertake large-scale spending on public transport, particularly in cases where they have previously withdrawn from its provision. In recent years, such opportunities have emerged in the form of mass transit mega-projects, particularly BRT mega-projects. Most of the recent research on BRT adoption predominantly attributes these increasing investments to the changing nature of urbanization and associated increases in demand for public transport, as well as the political will shown by strong, committed local individuals. However, a limited number of scholars have pointed out that demand and political will are not sufficient explanatory variables, and have called for incorporating alternative explanations that pay greater attention to the processes, politics, and the relationships between different agents. This thesis heeds these calls and investigates how these processes and linkages converge to open a 'window of opportunity' that enables change to take place. Using the case of Lahore's first BRT corridor, this study shows that the window of opportunity opened in 2012 as the by-product of an idea under development for roughly two decades in Lahore. Further, it shows that the opportunity for the state to undertake large-scale infrastructure investment in public transport emerged not simply due to individual actors or purely technical reasons, but due to the inter-linkages between a number of agents and broader structural, technological, and historical forces at play. Hence, this thesis argues that it is essential to understand change not simply through individual-centric explanations, but to ground such explanations in the particular political-institutional context in which they are based. This approach can allow us to understand not only how opportunities emerge for states in the Global South to undertake large-scale spending on public transport, but also the reasons why these opportunities arise in the manner that they do. Further, it can allow us to situate the spaces through which more effective, equitable solutions can be imagined.

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# CONTENTS

	List of Acronyms	7
	List of Tables	8
	List of Figures	9
1	Introduction	10
2	Mega Projects and Urban Politics	14
3	Context	31
4	History of Mass Transit in Lahore	58
5	Analysis	89
6	Conclusion	105
	Epilogue	113
	References	118
	Appendix	125



## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADP	Annual Development Program
BRT	Bus Rapid Transit
CDGL	City District Government Lahore
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FUTS	Faisalabad Urban Transport Society
GOP	Government of Pakistan
GoP	Government of Punjab
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IIEC	International Institute for Energy Conservation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LRMTS	Lahore Rapid Mass Transit System
LDA	Lahore Development Authority
LRT	Light Rail Transit
LRTA	Lahore Regional Transport Authority
LTC	Lahore Transport Company
MTDF	Medium Term Development Framework
NFC	National Finance Commission
NORINCO	China North Industries Corporation
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECF	Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
P&D	Planning and Development Department (Punjab)
TD	Transport Department (Punjab)
HUD & PHED	Housing Urban Development and Public Health Engineering Department
C&W	Communication and Works Department (Punjab)
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz Group
PML-Q	Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid Group
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
PTA	Provincial Transport Authority
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf
TD	Transport Department (Punjab)
TEPA	Traffic Engineering and Transportation Planning Agency
TMA	Tehsil/Town Municipal Administration
TPU	Transport Planning Unit, Transport Department (Punjab)
UA	Union Administration

## **LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1 - Internal Organization of Political Parties.....	35
Table 2 - Majority in National and Provincial Assembly Elections since 1973.....	40
Table 3 - Estimated Daily Trips in Lahore, 2007 .....	51
Table 5 - Modes of Motorized and Non-Motorized Travel, 1991 .....	60
Table 6: Factors For and Against a Mass Transit Mega-Project in Lahore, 1989-1999 ....	92
Table 7: Factors For and Against a Mass Transit Mega-Project in Lahore, 1999-2008 ....	96



## **LIST OF FIGURES**

Figure 1 - Map of Pakistan.....	33
Figure 2 - Location map of Lahore .....	46
Figure 3 - Traffic conditions in Lahore .....	48
Figure 4 - Agencies responsible for Lahore's Transportation Planning & Development.....	53
Figure 5 - Proposed LRT Corridor on Ferozpur Road, 1991.....	61
Figure 6 - Long Term LRTMS Network Corridors .....	69
Figure 7 - Recommendation of RMTS and BRT lines .....	85

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

In February 2013, the Chief Minister of the Punjab province of Pakistan, Shahbaz Sharif, and Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister, Bekir Bozdag, inaugurated Pakistan's first Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridor in the city of Lahore. Completed in less than a year, the project had all the expected features of Shahbaz Sharif's urban development approach: it was quick, large-scale and modern. However, the BRT project was a novelty and a departure from the usual state policy of leaving urban public transport provision to the private sector – it was the first large-scale urban project developed by the state for the sake of public transport provision; The scale of this investment in the urban public transport sector was unprecedented. The cost of building this corridor in the provincial capital was more than four times the traditionally allocated annual public transport development budget for the entire province.<sup>1</sup>

What explains this massive and unprecedented undertaking in the public transport sector? More broadly, how does the opportunity emerge for states in the Global South to undertake large-scale spending on public transport, particularly in cases where they have previously withdrawn from its provision?<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The cost of the project was roughly PKR 30 billion (\$300 million), whereas the total allocations for public transport for the province for the years 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 were PKR 7.3 billion (\$73 million), and PKR 6.2 billion (\$62 million) respectively (GoP P&D, ADP 2011-12 & 2012-2013).

<sup>2</sup> I am particularly interested in this question from an equity standpoint as it is primarily low-middle income, working class groups who suffer from the deterioration of public transport partially caused by the state's withdrawal

Recent research on the opportunities for states to undertake large-scale spending on public transport suggests that these opportunities are largely in the form of mass transit mega projects. Further, particularly in the case of BRT mega projects, dominant explanations suggest that these opportunities arise due to two primary reasons: (i) the changing nature of urbanization and increases in demand for public transport, and (ii) the political will shown by strong local leaders.

Yet, a small number of researchers also point out that such explanations conceal more than they reveal about the processes through which change takes place. They point out that these explanations give the impression that change can take place simply through strong individual agents who get things done. Moreover, such explanations inadvertently support an approach that focuses on the end result and not on the processes used to achieve those results.

These authors suggest that opportunities for states to undertake large-scale spending on public transport need to be situated within their political and institutional contexts. Moreover, it is important to understand the particular ‘windows of opportunity’ that allow change to take place. These are specific time periods during which conditions become favorable for change. Unlike a focus on political will, the focus on the window of opportunity allows for an understanding of the conditions under which political will develops, and allows for a greater focus on the processes through which change takes place – not simply on the end results.

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from public transport provision. However, it is important to note that while in Lahore, the development of the BRT benefitted its working class/low-middle income groups; it may have benefitted them at the expense of the needs of the poorest in Lahore and in the rest of the province. Nevertheless, it is still a step away from large-scale infrastructure spending by the state – traditionally in the form of roads – that primarily benefits elite and upper-middle income groups.

Building on this work, the aim of this thesis is to explain how the window of opportunity opened for the state to undertake large-scale spending on public transport in Lahore in 2012. The thesis points out that in Lahore too, the usual explanations<sup>3</sup> suggested that this undertaking took place due to the same two reasons. First, the transport challenges in Lahore were on the rise and public transport was unable to keep up with the demand for it, and therefore the government had to act. And second, because the political will exercised by the Chief Minister, Shahbaz Sharif.

This thesis demonstrates that while both these explanations have their merits, they are insufficient and provide an incomplete account of this new development. Instead, it shows that this undertaking was the by-product of an idea under development for roughly two decades in Lahore; its progress over time can be divided into three distinct phases based on the regime type: (1) 1989-99 (interrupted democratic), (2) 2000-2008 (authoritarian), (3) 2008-2013 (democratic) as these regimes influenced the state's priorities and abilities to undertake large-scale spending on public transport.

Further it shows that within each phase, the opportunity for the state to undertake large-scale infrastructure spending on public transport emerged not simply because of an individual actor, or because of purely technical reasons, but because of the inter-linkages between a number of different agents, and broader structural, technological and historical forces at play.

Hence, this thesis aims to show that it is essential to understand change not simply through individual-centric explanations, but to ground such explanations in the particular context in

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<sup>3</sup> Offered in popular media and in the majority of the interviews conducted for this study.

which they are based. This understanding can thus allow us to understand not only how change takes place, but why change takes place in the manner that it does. Further, it can also allow us to situate the spaces through which more effective, equitable change can be imagined.

## **1.1 Thesis Structure**

This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 outlines theoretical debates on mega-project characteristics and drivers. It then focuses on BRT as a form of mega-project development, and highlights the debates and gaps in literature explaining BRT adoption globally. Based on these gaps, it explains the case study selection criteria and research methods used for this study, as well as the framework used to analyze the case. Chapter 3 provides the context. It is divided into two sections: Section 1 provides the political context, and Section 2 provides the context needed to understand the state of Lahore's transportation planning, particularly when the project was adopted. Chapter 4 provides a history of mass transit in Lahore over the three phases described above. Chapter 5 analyzes the developments during the three phases of the mass transit project using the framework developed in chapter 2. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the conclusion, and highlights the implications for future developments specifically in Lahore and more generally, for those interested in improving public transport provision.

## Chapter 2

### Mega-Projects and Urban Politics

Since the early 1990's in the wake of IMF/World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programs<sup>4</sup>, a number of states in the Global South<sup>5</sup> have been liberalizing and privatizing their economies. In keeping with these policies in the urban transport sector, many of these states have increasingly withdrawn from the direct provision of public transport<sup>6</sup> and have attempted instead to incentivize the private sector to take responsibility for its provision. Yet over the past decade they have also begun investing heavily in public transport through the development of mass transit mega projects. These have been financed either through Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP's), or entirely through public sector financing. This chapter attempts to understand why direct state involvement in urban public transport provision is increasingly taking place through mega project development in the Global South. For this purpose, the chapter begins by briefly outlining the theory on the characteristics and drivers of mega projects in general, and helps the reader understand the place of mega projects in urban politics. Then the focus shifts to the explanations provided for the adoption of BRT as a form of mass transit mega-project, which is being increasingly adopted in cities globally, especially in the Global South. Finally, it concludes

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<sup>4</sup> Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP's) were implemented particularly during the 1980s by a number of countries primarily to access World Bank/IMF loans. These aimed to 'improve balance of payment positions, cut the fiscal deficit, lower inflation and increase growth' (Zaidi 2005, p.318). They were also an important mechanism to promote economic liberalization (Zaidi 2005).

<sup>5</sup> The term Global South is used for 'developing' countries that are largely situated in the Southern Hemisphere. It primarily includes countries from Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

<sup>6</sup> Often to open up fiscal space and shut down loss-making public transport enterprises.

by developing a framework to test these explanations by focusing on the case of Lahore's first BRT corridor.

## **2.1 Mega-Projects Characteristics**

Mega projects might simply be defined by the scale and the amount of resources spent. However the scale and magnitude is not always a good enough indicator if one is to consider the different reasons and drivers behind mega projects. For this, Frick's (2008) definition/list of drivers is useful. Frick writes that mega-projects have six typical characteristics – the Six C's. Mega-projects are '*colossal* in size and scope,' and are extremely discernible in their landscape (p.240). They are *captivating*, as they 'generate a sense of awe and wonder in the project beyond its size and scope, and may also capture the imagination' of those who are typically not interested in projects in that sector (p.240). They are *costly* and these costs typically increase over the project implementation phase. They are *controversial*, as project participants negotiate funding and mitigating packages, engineering aesthetic design plans, and pursue construction,' (p.240). They are *complex* leading to increased risk. And finally, they are replete with '*control* issues related to who the key decision-makers are, what agency/agencies manage/operate the project, who the main project funders are and what restrictions they put on it,' (p.241).

Using the work of Leo Marx (1964; 2000) and David Nye (1994), Frick calls the experience of awe and wonder the 'technological sublime,' and states that this aim 'drives the design and funding process,' (p.239). Through the example of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge in California, Frick shows that the technological sublime can be used as a 'political tool to bolster position statements, increase public awareness, and/or fulfill personal interests,' (p.243). She

points out, though, that the sublime can also result in ‘creative design, engineering and public involvement,’ (p.259).

Similarly, according to Altshuler and Luberoff (2003), mega projects are ‘physical, very expensive, public,’ and signify public authority (p.2). They are either completely publically financed or in part. Moreover, they point out that business enterprises have been central to the development of mega projects and their prominence in urban development politics. In addition, according to Sangvai (1994) they have often been couched in nationalist rhetoric, and are used to represent the progress and development of the nation as a whole.

## **2.2 Mega Project Drivers in the Global South**

Cities in the Global South have particularly witnessed a surge in the development of mega projects towards the turn of the twenty-first century.<sup>7</sup> Ranging from dams to highways to mass transit systems, cities have adopted these projects in their bid to meet specific needs, modernize, stimulate economic growth, enhance competitiveness in the global economy – and in the case of transport mega projects – to also enhance connectivity.

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<sup>7</sup> Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) have looked at the surge of mega projects in American cities in great depth. They showed that mega-projects boomed in the 1950’s and 1960s, however, citizen group activities impacted their development in the following decade leading to an era of ‘do no harm,’ which continues even today. In this era, public investment in mega projects is on-going but has to minimize the disruption it causes. Similarly, Ardila and Salvucci (2001) claim that while earlier it was possible to proceed with large projects in U.S. cities, even if they had negative impacts on communities, projects now have to ‘create significant benefits for a large number of constituents,’ (p.116) and are not considered feasible if there is substantial opposition to the project. They attribute this shift to the empowerment of citizens and interest groups, particularly through environmental legislation. Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) also assert that the influence of local growth coalitions, which were associated with mega projects earlier, has declined. However, they have now found new ways to ‘pursue their traditional objectives of growth and economic competitiveness,’ (p.6). This trend shows, as Dimitriou (2011) states, that the challenges and resources in the ‘developing world differ significantly from those found in urban areas of the developed world,’ particularly as there is not the same type of pressure from citizen groups.



Douglass (2005) states that mega-projects have increased in cities around the world due to a number of reasons. Firstly, he claims, such projects have been pursued because of the ‘big fix,’ the tendency for globalization to produce global-size projects, with each new one increasing in size; Secondly, because of the ‘institutional innovations in syndicating loan packages,’ which encourage the involvement of the private sector and projects built on the ‘Build-Own-Operate-Transfer’ (BOT) basis; Thirdly, due to ‘globalization of law,’ which makes it simpler to operate projects from a distance; Fourthly, as a result of ‘technological innovations in very large structures’; Fifthly, because of ‘larger infrastructure demands for global flows’; Sixthly, because it is difficult to halt projects once they have begun – the ‘green light syndrome’; And lastly, due to the tendency to carry out inaccurate risk analysis (p.1). This point has also been explained in detail by Flyvbjerg (2005) who shows that project promoters tend to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits during the planning stage of mega-projects.<sup>8</sup>

Douglass (2005) also claims, using examples of countries in the Asia Pacific, that mega-projects have been increasingly adopted due to ‘the globalization of finance capital, the emergence of a broad based urban class of affluent consumers, intercity competition for global investment, and intentional world city formation,’ (p.2).

According to Harvey (2008), there has been a transformation in the scale of urban processes that have gone global, and large infrastructure projects, which are debt financed, are altering the terrain in cities. He states that these projects are developed due to capital’s search for surplus

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<sup>8</sup> Flyvbjerg (2005) shows that this can occur due to technical, psychological, and political-economic reasons. The problem may be due to technical reasons if inadequate forecasting models are used, it may be due to psychological reasons if planners have an optimism bias – the tendency to simply be optimistic and ignore other risks, or it may be due to political-economic reasons if planners and promoters overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs on purpose to increase the chances of their projects being approved.

value. Here, it should be stressed that the scale of urban processes has shifted at the turn of the century, often providing the justification for large-scale mega projects.

Thus, globalization, urbanization, the concept of the technological sublime, as well as the motivations of various stakeholders (such as business enterprises, international development institutions, state actors) help explain why mega-projects are increasingly being adopted in cities of the Global South.

### **2.3 Mega Projects & Urban Transport**

The impact of some of the drivers for mega projects in the cities of Global South, such as the globalization of law, of capital flows, increased connectivity and institutional interests, are also significant drivers for urban transport projects. However, most mega projects in cities of the Global South have typically been in the form of airports, or have been road-based in the form of elevated expressways/motorways/bridges/ring roads etc. In recent years though, these projects have increasingly included public transport projects in the form of rail transit systems and BRT systems. The adoption of BRT in particular has increased exponentially in cities globally over the past ten years (Flores & Zegras 2013): from limited examples in the late 1990's to over 150 in 2013 (Flores 2013).

It is pertinent to point out here that the shifts in the dominant paradigms of international development agencies are critical drivers for greater spending on public transport in the form of mass transit projects. Up until the mid-1990's the World Bank's urban lending, for instance, focused on the road-development paradigm; its investment centered heavily on road building

over rail, public transport and non-motorized transport solutions. In its report on the World Bank's transportation investments, the International Institute for Energy Conservation (IIEC) showed that between 1972-1981, roads comprised 32% of the Bank's urban transport lending, and this increased to 60% between 1983-1993. During the latter period, buses received 12%, commuter rail 5%, traffic management 9%, and technical assistance 14% of urban transport lending (IIEC 1996, p.55). However, with the increasing traction of the sustainability concept in the transport sector during the late 1990s, organizations such as OECD and the World Bank began incorporating sustainability principles in their lending practices (Zegras 2011). Subsequently, although the focus still remained on road development, a shift - albeit a slow shift - began towards more frequent lending for sustainable transport initiatives that often included mass transit systems. For instance, the ADB and the World Bank began investing more in rail-based mass transit projects, and subsequently in BRT projects in the 2000's (Mitric 2011).

Let's take a closer look at the characteristics and drivers of BRT systems - particularly as they represent increased state involvement in urban public transport.

## **2.4 BRT Characteristics**

BRT technology is premised on the idea of giving buses the characteristics of rail-transit modes, i.e. 'larger vehicles with multiple doors, dedicated right of way, electronic ticketing, dignified stations and institutional branding,' (Flores 2013, p.26). Although BRT systems may not traditionally be defined as mega projects given their lower costs vis-a-vis other mega-projects, they are similar to Frick's (2008) characterization of mega projects as they are captivating, controversial, complex and representative of control issues. Moreover, they are extremely

conspicuous and costly, particularly for governments in the Global South that have limited financial resources, and as stated by Flores (2013), ‘competing and more pressing expenditures priorities that make spending on public transit seem superfluous,’ (p.17-18).

## **2.5 BRT Drivers**

Three kinds of drivers for BRT are particularly of interest for this work: first, the role of the international class of policy experts who specialize in BRT systems; second, decision-makers and key-stake holders; and third, the political will shown by strong leaders.

### **2.5.1 BRT Drivers: International class of policy experts**

BRT’s global expansion is most often associated with the initial success of BRT systems in Curitiba<sup>9</sup> and Bogota<sup>10</sup>, after which, as Flores (2013) describes, the mayors who implemented these systems travelled globally and shared their experiences. They also invited government representatives and transport operators in different countries to visit their cities. This took place in conjunction with ‘non-governmental organizations and consultancy groups, as well as bilateral aid agencies, which prepared and circulated bus reform toolkits,’ (p.28). Moreover, simultaneously ‘international development agencies (such as the World Bank, the IADB and the ADB)’ began to support and promote such efforts,’ (p.29). Thus, a global professional network developed which played a key role in its expansion (Mohan et al. 2008). According to Sellers (2010), this ‘increasingly professionalized, international class of policy experts’ is one of the most important causes behind innovations and shifts in public sector actions (p.9).

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<sup>9</sup> Adopted in 1974.

<sup>10</sup> Adopted in 1999. See Gomez (2004) for a detailed analysis of the adoption in both Curitiba and Bogota.

### 2.5.2 BRT Drivers: Decision-makers and Key Stakeholders

According to Flores (2013), BRT also provided a ready-made solution that could be taken up by policy-makers to meet the rising demand for improved public transport caused by increasing urbanization; it allowed them to convert ‘the very complex challenge of public transportation reform into a set of manageable projects,’ in a fairly short period of time (Flores 2013, p.29). Wright and Fjellstron (2002) claim that it also offered administrators the ability to implement a modern transportation option within their political term period, and meet their personal needs of leaving a ‘lasting and conspicuous legacy,’ (Flores 2013, p.29).

Further, the successful implementation in Curitiba and Bogota demonstrated to a host of actors such as investors, developers, and private operators the viability of this option. Additionally, the work of committed local actors in different countries as well as ‘background similarities’ in donor and recipient countries propagated it further (Bell 2011, p.74).

Flores (2013) points out though, that in Mexico City and Santiago, despite the poor quality of transport services in both cities, transit users did not actively attempt to lay claims to the state and demand improved transport services. This is not to suggest that their experiences did not matter, but that those who had no other option largely believed that they did not have the power to demand better service, and those who did have an option chose to switch to other alternatives and not mobilize to demand improved public transport. Hence, much of the change came from ‘above.’

He adds that it is also important to note that while BRT has been adopted in numerous cities, most have not been able to replicate Curitiba's achievements. For this reason, it is important to understand the conditions under which these transportation projects are adopted and implemented locally.

### 2.5.3 BRT Drivers: Political Will

Much of the research on the adoption and implementation in different cities, however, focuses on individual-based explanations for this shift, and emphasizes the importance of charisma. In his analysis of policy processes leading to the introduction of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems in Jakarta, Seoul and Beijing, Matsumoto (2006) found that alongside lessons offered by Curitiba and Bogota, the role of international institutions, and the 1990s economic crisis, 'strong political will' was one of the primary components necessary for the introduction of BRT systems in these cities. In Seoul, Mayor Lee Myong-bak was re-elected based on his promise to develop a BRT system, and similarly in Jakarta, Governor Sutiyoso promised to facilitate the improvement of their public transportation system. Both Governor Sutiyoso and Mayor Lee Myong-bak showed strong leadership and followed through with their promises. However, it was unclear to Matsumoto why the Mayor of Beijing expressed commitment.

Similarly, according to Wright (2005), there exist many barriers to BRT, such as: political will, existing operators, institutional biases, lack of information, institutional capacity, technical capacity, financing, geographical/physical limitations. However, 'political will is by far the most important ingredient in making BRT work,' (p.5). In places where the will has been present,

leaders have ‘left a lasting legacy to their cities, and in the process, these officials have been rewarded with enormous popularity and success,’ (p.5).

Likewise, Carrigan and Hidalgo (2009) state that ‘strong leadership is fundamental for mitigating technical, economic, commercial, operational and political risks of BRT projects,’ (p.3). Political commitment allows for conflicts to be resolved between stakeholders, and prevents ‘unnecessary delays’ in obtaining approvals and licenses for the project (p.3). Moreover, such commitments increase the speed with which the project is planned and implemented.

## **2.6 Windows of Opportunity**

However, based on his work on the adoption of the BRT in Curitiba and Bogota, Ardila (2004) claims that the focus on political will and strong leadership calls for ‘apolitical processes with little participation of other actors beyond the strong leader and a few enlightened planners,’ (p.18). He shows that mayors in both Curitiba and Bogota were able to get their projects adopted not simply because of strong ‘political will,’ but because of the ‘space for government action that the planning teams helped build,’ through mediation between politicians and stakeholders (p.424).

Thus, he recommends that a new framework be used for analyzing such development. In this framework, the focus should not be on the individual but on the process. Thus the aim should be to understand the ‘minimal space for action,’ created by government agencies when they encourage interaction amongst planners, politicians and stakeholders. Moreover, it should seek to

understand any ‘windows of opportunity’ which present the ‘opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems’ (p.25).

Similarly, Rizvi and Sclar (2013) point out that the focus on political will, and ‘appropriate design standards, and the right institutional set up’ in BRT debates should be reconsidered and the planning debate should include (a) approach (strategy and tactics) and (b) timing (moment of action and duration) as these also impact design, institutions and leadership (p.213).

Likewise, according to Lindblom (1959, 1977), the process of change often takes place over a stretch of time, and decisions are impacted by the series of decisions made previously. Yet, timing is a crucial element in understanding change. For instance, elections may increase the responsiveness of politicians to the poor and marginalized. These moments may be called ‘formative moments’ or ‘windows of opportunity’ that have the ability to change future activities (Mohan et al. 2008, p.19). However, these moments can only be understood through a historical perspective.

Hence, overall, this literature points towards a need for greater understanding of the process and politics associated with the adoption of BRT projects on a local level - one that does not simply center on an individual level analysis but which is grounded in a political-institutional analysis. As stated by Evans (1995), change needs to be understood by exploring ‘explanations that go beyond the utilitarian calculations of individuals to the enduring patterns of relationships within which such calculations are immersed,’ (p.18).



Thus, explanations of shifts in state priorities, capacities, and responsiveness need to be grounded in understanding states as ‘historically rooted organizations, not simply a collection of strategic individuals,’ (Evans 1995, p.18). Hence, the adoption of urban public transport mega projects such as BRT need to also be analyzed by examining ‘the role of urban politicians and officials, political opportunity structures, and state actors,’ (Santamaria 2013, p.xxvii).

## **2.7 Framework**

Based on current explanations, there are a number of different factors that can explain how windows of opportunity open. These include structural conditions such as: (1) rising demand and the changing scale of urbanization (2) shifts in the dominant paradigms in international policy circles (3) technological innovations (4) national and regional politics (5) state of the economy (6) availability of finance. Moreover, they also include, agency-based factors such as the role of (i) political parties and political leaders (particularly through strong political will) (ii) bureaucrats (iii) international actors (iv) stakeholders such as civil society, citizen groups, business interest coalitions, existing transporters.

## **2.8 Case Study Method**

This paper uses the case study method to study the implementation of a public transport megaproject in Lahore in 2012. According to Gerring (2004), the case study method is the ‘intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units,’ (p.341). This method thus allows one to dig deeply into an analysis of the processes that result in the opening of windows of opportunities for particular projects, while identifying the operational linkages between different key variables.

In the following chapters, I will demonstrate that the opportunity for the state to undertake large-scale spending on public transport arose as a by-product of an idea under development for roughly two decades in Lahore; its progress over time can be divided into three distinct phases based on the regime type: 1989-99 (interrupted democratic), 2000-2008 (authoritarian), 2008-2013 (democratic) as these influenced the state's priorities and abilities to undertake such a project. These periods represent distinct units of analysis in my case study.

Hence, for my analysis, I will examine 5 structural variables over the three phases of the project. These include: (1) priorities of global actors, (2) priorities of political parties, (3) technological options, (4) availability of finance, and (5) degree of political competition. Further, given the agency-based explanations provided for the adoption of the BRT in the last period, I will also examine the (i) the role of the state-elite – particularly politicians and bureaucrats, (ii) commitment of a local champion with political will, and (iii) the type of international actors in influencing the opening of any windows of opportunity over these three phases.

However, the primary focus of my analysis will be on the immediate period preceding implementation – 2008-2013 – as that is the period when the phenomenon of interest, adoption of a public transport megaproject, became reality.

Finally, I acknowledge that there are many other variables – such as increasing demand or the state of the economy – that influenced the window of opportunity resulting in the adoption of the

BRT in 2012. However, they are beyond the scope of this study, and hence exogenous to my model.

## **2.9 Site and Data Collection**

This case study looks at the implementation of a public transport megaproject in Lahore in 2012 for a number of reasons. Firstly, it signifies a more direct role for the state as the provider of public transport – a role that it had increasingly handed over to the private sector over the past two decades. Secondly, this involvement has taken place through investment in a mass transit mega project. Thirdly, the adoption and development of the mass transit corridor in a short span of time is popularly associated with the political will and commitment shown by the Chief Minister, Shahbaz Sharif. Fourthly, Lahore’s BRT adoption meets Frick’s 6 C’s mega-project criteria.<sup>11</sup> Finally, there is very limited literature on the city’s development processes, and no formal study carried out of the BRT adoption in Pakistan.

The study derives many of its findings from fieldwork carried out in Lahore between January and February 2014 (See Appendix A). During this period, I conducted 20 semi-structured interviews, which were roughly 30-60 minutes each. I prepared for these interviews by using secondary literature and press coverage related to public transport provision and the adoption of BRT in Lahore, and later by updating my questions based on the responses I got during the fieldwork.

I interviewed government officials – working at the Transport department, the Punjab Metrobus

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<sup>11</sup> The project was particularly conspicuous as it included not only on a portion of the existing roads for plying buses, but an 8.3 km elevated corridor, two vehicular underpasses and a bridge.

Authority, Urban Unit, Lahore Transport Company – who were directly involved with the BRT project. I also conducted interviews with politicians – both from the party in power and the main party in opposition (PML-N and PTI respectively). Additionally, I spoke to bureaucrats and specialists who worked on the mass transit project for the previous government, as well as academics, architects, journalists, and lawyers.

Barring one interview conducted through Skype, all interviews were conducted in person. All respondents were given the choice of being anonymous, and only those who explicitly agreed to be quoted have been mentioned by name in this study. Professions have been used for the rest. Upon completion of fieldwork, I followed up with a few interviewees by asking for clarifications regarding some of the matters discussed. I also conducted an additional interview with the ex-Chairman of the Lahore Transport Company via phone.

While in Lahore, I attended a conference on Sustainable Urban Transport organized by the Urban Unit, which helped me gain an insight into the current debates and outlooks on sustainable urban transport in the country.

In addition, I collected copies of studies/presentations/minutes after many of the meetings. For my analysis, I used secondary literature including articles, books, donor reports, newspaper articles, and peer-reviewed studies. Finally, I viewed television coverage of public transport issues prior, during and after construction of the corridor to be cognizant of the debates and opinions in the popular media at the time.

## **2.10 Limitations**

Due to the limited time available for conducting fieldwork, and the busy schedules of officials at the Lahore Development Agency (LDA) and Traffic Engineering and Transportation Planning Agency (TEPA) – the executing agencies – I was unable to interview them despite repeated attempts to make appointments. In addition, due to the limited time, I was unable to interview contractors involved with construction and operations, as well as the users of the BRT, which could have provided a richer understanding of the shift in the state's role in the provision of public transport.

Further, fieldwork for this thesis highlighted the difficulties associated with obtaining accurate information as an 'outsider' to the institutions involved in the project's conception and implementation. Interviewees were extremely generous with their time; however, there were many instances when I knew I was not being told the entire story, when they remembered the sequence of events incorrectly, or when they simply did not want to elaborate on various topics. I thus, had to deal with misinformation as well as a lack of information. I attempted to uncover more by asking additional questions, framing them differently, or by asking other interviewees those questions, which was often helpful. I also used secondary sources, primary documents and journalistic accounts to corroborate what I was being told, and to fill in the gaps in my information. However, I was frequently discouraged by government officials from obtaining primary documents and was encouraged to ask them anything I needed to know in person – or alternatively to undertake a cumbersome procedure for obtaining them. In addition, I was told by many of my respondents that I would not find much in the primary documents as they had been crafted in a well thought-out manner to prevent 'what really happened' from getting out. For me,

these interactions raised the question of what a researcher can do in such cases, what kind of analyses are possible, and how much of the ‘knowledge’ we create is grounded in how things play out in reality. However, I found Evans (2005) description of his research strategy particularly illuminating – when describing his interviews, he stated: ‘obviously, participants offer accounts that are biased and self-interested, but the biases and self-interests are important evidence in themselves,’ (p.19). Hence, in my analysis, I attempted to disentangle the biases I learnt of while conducting fieldwork.

## **2.11 Summary**

This chapter has shown that states in the Global South have been increasingly investing in public transport through the adoption of mass transit mega projects. It has pointed to the characteristics and drivers of mega projects in general to understand why this may be the case. It found that this has been the case due to increasing globalization, urbanization, the role and motivations of various stakeholders, and the concept of the technological sublime. Building on these explanations, it has outlined explanations for the recent spread of BRT mega projects in cities of the Global South in particular. Through these explanations, it has shown that individual-centric reasons dominate current research on the topic. Yet, it is important to ground these explanations in their political and institutional context, and focus on the inter-linkages between different variables to understand how the opportunity emerges for states to undertake large-scale spending on public transport. For this purpose, it has highlighted that this thesis will be using the case study method to explain how the window of opportunity opened for increased state investment in public transport through the case of Lahore’s first BRT corridor.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Context**

This chapter provides the context necessary to understand how the window of opportunity opened for the Punjab government to undertake large-scale spending on public transport in the form of Lahore's first BRT corridor. It is divided into two sections. The first section provides a brief background of the country's politics to familiarize the reader with its legislative system, mainstream political parties, electoral trends and features, as well as the type of relationship that exists between politicians and bureaucrats. This section is particularly important for those who are unfamiliar with the country's politics, as knowledge of the political environment and of political parties is key to understanding decision-making processes, priorities of various actors, and their abilities to realize those priorities. Moreover, it is important as this context and the political actors described in it are often missing from research explaining the state of transport in Pakistan.

The second section provides an overview of the state of transport in Lahore particularly at the time the BRT was adopted, and familiarizes the readers with the primary actors involved with public transport provision and regulation.

## **3.1 Political Context**

### **3.1.1. Legislative System and History**

Pakistan is a federal republic. Its territories consist of the Islamabad Capital Territory, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), and four provinces: Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Punjab, and Sindh (See Figure 1).

The country is governed as a parliamentary democracy. Its legislative body – the parliament – consists of two houses: the National Assembly and the Senate. Additionally, each province has its own legislative body in the form of a provincial assembly. During elections voters choose candidates for the National and Provincial Assemblies for a period of 5 years. Seats in the National Assembly (342<sup>12</sup> in total) are allocated to the provinces, FATA, and the federal capital based on population. Being the largest province, Punjab has the largest number of seats, followed by Sindh, KPK, Balochistan, FATA, and the federal capital respectively.


In order to ‘form a government, political parties hope to secure a simple majority of 172 seats in the National Assembly,’ or to form coalitions if they are not able to do so (Mufti 2011, p.41). Upon assuming office, members of an electoral college<sup>13</sup> elect the President who is the Head of State. Moreover, members of the National Assembly elect the Prime Minister, and members of the provincial assembly members elect the Chief Minister for their respective provinces.

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<sup>12</sup> Of these, 272 are single member constituencies (12 from FATA, 2 from the federal capital, 148 from Punjab, 61 from Sindh, 35 from KPK, 14 from Balochistan), and 60 are reserved for women, while 10 are reserved for minorities.

<sup>13</sup> Consisting of members of the National Assembly, Senate and provincial assemblies.





**Figure 1 - Map of Pakistan**

Given its tumultuous political history, the country has witnessed such elections a limited number of times, and has seen governments complete their terms even fewer times; In the sixty-six years since its partition from India in 1947, Pakistan has had thirty-three years of direct military rule (1958-1971, 1977-1988, 1999-2008)<sup>14</sup>, and eleven years (1988-1999) of four successive

<sup>14</sup> Under Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf respectively.

governments being dismissed early by the sitting President<sup>15</sup> on charges of corruption. In fact, the elections in 2013 marked the first time in the nation's history that a transition was made from one civilian government to another.

### 3.1.2. Mainstream Political Parties

Although, political parties have been persecuted and sidelined by the military repeatedly, they have provided the motivation for various policies and projects adopted by the state when in power, and also serve as the 'pivotal intermediaries between the state and poor and marginalized groups,' (Mohmnand S. & Gazdar H. 2007 as quoted in Cheema & Bari 2012, p.7). Thus, in order to understand shifts in the state's role, it becomes important to understand the politics of the various parties. According to Mufti (2011), the internal organization of the parties is also important to understand. In our case this understanding particularly helps to gauge decision-making structures as well as the state's capacity to undertake various initiatives. She categorizes political party members<sup>16</sup> into three groups: party leaders, constituency politicians, and party workers<sup>17</sup>. (See Table 1).

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<sup>15</sup> Article 58 2(b) of Pakistan's constitution allowed the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve national and provincial assemblies if 'government of the federation could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution,' (8<sup>th</sup> amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan). It was added to the constitution under Zia-ul-Haq's military government (1977-1988), but removed under the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment passed during the PPP's term (2008-2013).

<sup>16</sup> For the PML-N, PML-Q and the PPP.

<sup>17</sup> It should be added that urban and rural constituency politician's work in different ways. Moreover, Constituency politicians are able to exercise patronage as they have more financing available for various development projects than local governments do (Mufti 2011).

**Table 1 - Internal Organization of Political Parties**

<b>Member Type</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>
<b>Party Leaders</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Founders of the party, or belong to the founder’s family</li> <li>• Central decision-makers within the party, hold key positions in the party and in the government - if the party wins</li> <li>• Assisted in decision-making by a small group of advisors often referred to as the ‘kitchen cabinet’ that may or may not consist of elected representatives</li> <li>• Represent the public face of the party</li> <li>• Hold great political power due to their strong financial positions, charm and familial legacy</li> </ul>
<b>Constituency Politicians</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participate in elections using the party’s ticket to increase their chances of winning in constituencies they have cultivated strong ties with over time</li> <li>• Interested in having access to state resources, and providing patronage to their constituents<sup>18</sup></li> <li>• Recruited into the party due to their strong likelihood of winning seats from their constituencies – not necessarily because they subscribe to party principles</li> <li>• Often from well-to-do backgrounds</li> </ul>
<b>Party Workers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individuals with limited financial resources</li> <li>• Hope to move up in the ranks of the party by faithfully supporting the party’s goals, programs, and policies</li> </ul>

Source: Mufti (2011)

Traditionally, two parties – the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) – have dominated the electoral landscape in Pakistan. These have played an important role in Punjab – of which Lahore is the capital – as well. Although, in recent years, two additional parties have become important particularly in the province: the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), which is a splinter party of the PML-N, and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), which has recently achieved prominence in the country’s politics. The following section provides a brief background to the history and priorities of these political parties.

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<sup>18</sup> She acknowledges that while leaders and constituency politicians are party workers as well, workers can be thought of as a separate category as well.

### 3.1.3 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)

PML-N, led by Nawaz Sharif, is a conservative political party – both in its religious and economic principles; the party ‘advocates the supremacy of Islamic law above all else,’ (Mufti 2011, p.50) and also aims to bring about economic growth in the country through de-regulation, privatization, foreign investment, and infrastructure development. Its motto is ‘Strong Economy – Strong Pakistan,’ (PML-N 2013). It takes credit for making Pakistan a nuclear power, and counts the development of a 6-lane motorway between the cities of Lahore and Islamabad as one of its greatest achievements (PML-N 2013). The party has a strong urban support base, and it particularly maintains links with ‘the conservative lobby of business groups, traders and middle class professionals,’ in the urban areas (Sethi 2013, p.1). The majority of its votes are drawn from urban and peri-urban Punjab. The party was able to establish its presence in urban Punjab starting from 1993 due to its support for visible urban projects such as the yellow cab scheme that provided loans to approximately 40,000 households for importing cabs, and through its focus on expanding employment through self-employment programs (Waseem 1994, PML-N 1993). It has particularly supported the development of policies and initiatives that have incentivized the private sector to provide public transport.<sup>19</sup>

Further, Lahore is particularly important for the party, as it is the home ground of the party leaders. Here, Nawaz Sharif’s brother, Shahbaz Sharif, who has served as the Chief Minister of Punjab three times, has been known for changing the city by widening boulevards, and building flyovers and underpasses in a fairly short period of time.

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<sup>19</sup> The following policies were developed during its term that focused on the privatization of public transport: Urban Public Transport Policy (1998), Public Transport in the Transport Sector (1999), National Transport Strategy (1999). The former two were developed in conjunction with the World Bank.

The party's 'current leadership entered politics by participating in military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq's parliament,' and hence has been a product of military rule (Mufti 2011, p.50). However, it has adopted an anti-military stance since military dictator, General Musharraf, overthrew the PML-N government in a coup in 1999 (Mufti 2011). The PML-N currently<sup>20</sup> holds the majority in both national and provincial assemblies.

### 3.1.4 Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

The PPP is a center-left party that has explicitly opposed the military's role in politics, and has been persecuted for doing so. It has traditionally been seen as a national party, however in recent years, and particularly after the 2013 elections, its support base has been increasingly confined to the province of Sindh.

The PPP was founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967 for the 'establishment of an egalitarian democracy,' and the 'application of socialistic ideas to realize economic and social justice,' (PPP 2013). It contested its first elections using the slogan '*roti, kapra, makan,*' (bread, clothing, shelter), and intended to represent and advance the interests of poor while also implementing an anti-imperialist agenda.

The party faced increasing opposition from the military establishment as well as industrialists and large landowners, particularly after it nationalized many industries and attempted to carry out land reforms during its first term. Its leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hung in 1988 under military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq's rule, for allegedly murdering a political opponent. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter, Benazir Bhutto, served as Prime Minister twice during the 1990's though

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<sup>20</sup> As a result of elections in 2013.

both times her government was dismissed early. She was assassinated in 2007 when she returned to Pakistan after many years of exile (Mufti 2011).

The Party is currently co-chaired by Benazir Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who served as President of Pakistan from 2008-2013, and by their son, Bilawal Bhutto. Over time, the party has become less radical, and has supported increasing privatization and other similar initiatives (Mufti 2011). This shift can also be seen in its approach towards public transport, which it initially prioritized through direct state involvement, but stepped away from over the years.<sup>21</sup> However, there seems to be an overall rethinking away from privatization as indicated by recent speeches and interviews given by Bilawal Bhutto<sup>22</sup>. Currently, the PPP holds a majority in the Sindh assembly, and no longer holds its position as the country's leading party.

### 3.1.5 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)

Cricketer turned politician, Imran Khan, leads the PTI, which aims to make Pakistan a 'self-reliant modern Islamic republic,' (PTI 2013). Through massive mobilization efforts prior to elections, and as a result of the 2013 elections, the party has established itself as competition for the PML-N and PPP, which have dominated politics traditionally. The party's support base is primarily urban, and it particularly appeals to the country's youth and upper-middle and middle classes. Its main slogan is 'change,' and it aims to bring about justice (*insaaf*) quickly and put an end to corruption. It currently holds a majority in the KPK provincial assembly and holds the highest number of seats in the Punjab provincial assembly after the PML-N (although the PML-

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<sup>21</sup> This shift can be seen over time in its manifestos from 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997.

<sup>22</sup> See, for instance: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/644121/personalisation-under-the-guise-of-privatisation/>, where he criticizes privatization as the 'only solution.'

N leads by a very large margin)<sup>23</sup>. Moreover, it can now claim to be the only party that has somewhat of a national support base given that after the 2013 elections ‘its vote attainment was spatially spread out, in rural and urban areas, and in three out of four provinces,’ (Javed 2013).

### 3.1.6 Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q)

PML-Q was formed as a splinter group of the PML-N after the PML-N was ousted from power in the 1999 coup. It is led by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, who belong to a prominent political family originally from Gujrat district in Punjab. PML-Q emerged as the dominant political party in the 2002 national and provincial assembly elections<sup>24</sup> that took place under military rule.

Ideologically, the PML-Q is very similar to the PML-N, given that most of its members were part of the PML-N before. Moreover, despite owing its ‘existence to the military-bureaucratic establishment,’ it prefers to be known as a successor of the original Muslim League party established by the country’s founder, Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Mufti 2011). While the party achieved importance in 2002, it no longer plays a dominant role in provincial or national level politics (Javed 2013).

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<sup>23</sup> The PML-N has a total of 315 seats in the provincial assembly (218 general, 32 independent, 58 women, 7 non-Muslims), whereas the PTI has a total of 29 seats in the provincial assembly (23 general, 5 women) (Election Commission of Pakistan 2013).

<sup>24</sup> Waseem (2006, p.25) calls these elections ‘civilianizing in character’ as they are held under military rule but are portrayed as civilian elections.

The following table summarizes the parties in majority since the 1973 elections.

**Table 2 - Majority in National and Provincial Assembly Elections since 1973**

<b>Elections</b>	<b>National Assembly Majority</b>	<b>Punjab Assembly Majority</b>
1973	PPP	PPP
1985 <sup>25</sup>	-	-
1988	PPP	IJI <sup>26</sup>
1990	PML	IJI
1993	PPP and allies	PML-N and PPP <sup>27</sup>
1997	PML-N and allies	PML-N
2002	PML-Q	PML-Q
2008	PPP	PML-N
2013	PML-N	PML-N

### 3.1.7. Electoral Trends and Features

According to Cheema and Bari (2012, p.8), the most significant feature of the electoral system in Pakistan is that it is ‘highly polarized in terms of areas, classes, and the groups that different political parties represent.’ This has a direct impact on policy preferences and ‘priority accorded to different groups and regions’ (Cheema & Bari 2012, p.8).

Relatedly, according to Mufti (2011), there are two key features of Pakistan’s electoral system. First, given that the number of seats in the National Assembly are proportional to the population of different provinces, and Punjab is by far the largest province in the country, elections in Punjab are key in determining which party has the majority in the National Assembly. Secondly, each province has its own set of electoral patterns.

<sup>25</sup> Political parties were banned from participating.

<sup>26</sup> The Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) was an alliance formed amongst conservative parties against the PPP (Nawaz Sharif was a member of the IJI as part of the PML, and became Chief Minister of Punjab after elections).

<sup>27</sup> The results were close - PML-N won 106 seats, and PPP won 94 seats. The PML-N won primarily from urban areas and the PPP from rural areas (Waseem 1994).



Within Punjab, there are four distinct regions: Center, North, South and West. Each region has a different 'socioeconomic profile and prevalent patterns of interparty competition and voting behavior' (Mufti 2011, p.81). Central Punjab, where Lahore is also located, is known to be 'the key to success in Pakistan's national politics' (Mufti 2011, p.81). It is the 'industrial and agricultural heart of the country. It is also the most urbanized and densely populated of the four regions in Punjab,' (Mufti 2011, p.81). Thus, 72 of the 148 seats in the National Assembly, and 143 of the 297 seats in the provincial assembly come from Central Punjab.

Further, as mentioned, while the PPP and PML have traditionally dominated the Punjab provincial assembly, after 1997, the PML-N began emerging as the dominant party in the province. However, the emergence of the PML-Q in 2002 elections and the PTI in 2013 elections brought new competition for the PML-N. Yet, as seen from the election results in 2013, it remains the dominant political party in the province. The PPP and the PML-Q no longer pose threats to it in Punjab.

### 3.1.8. Politician-Bureaucrat Relationship

Any discussion of urban politics is incomplete without an understanding of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are the personnel that are responsible for the 'day-to-day administration' of the state (Sajjad 2008, p.66). Given the post-colonial state's increasing 'centrality to almost all forms of social exchange,' bureaucrats wield enormous power in Pakistan<sup>28</sup> (Sajjad 2008, p.66). According to a number of scholars, the relationship between

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<sup>28</sup> Sajjad (2008) makes a distinction between bureaucrats by categorizing them as high and low bureaucrats. High bureaucrats have officer status, serve in key posts, and are often from urban/educated class, whereas low bureaucrats are 'low-level civil servants who do not enjoy officer status,' and are closer in composition to the 'popular classes' (p.70).

bureaucrats and politicians today can only be understood by analyzing a pre-Bhutto and post-Bhutto period (Sajjad 2008, Husain 2012, Cheema & Sayeed 2006).

Pre-Bhutto, in continuation of the privileged status of the colonial Indian Civil Service, high-level bureaucrats were responsible for the 'resource allocation and overall political direction of the new state' (Sajjad 2008, p.62). They belonged to an 'English educated, urbanized, propertied class' and were awarded with perks and privileges (Sajjad 2008, p.67). Moreover, they administered without any interference from politicians and, in fact, looked at politicians with much disdain. However, they served as partners of the military regime during the initial two decades after partition, and remained prime decision makers for allocating resources.

During resistance against the military government in the late 1960s, the bureaucracy was increasingly targeted as the actor responsible for unfair policies and programs that catered only to its own interests and ambitions (Sajjad 2008). In this context, Bhutto's government instituted reforms (such as lateral entry into the officer corps) to 'undermine the insular and autonomous nature of the high bureaucracy, and assert the authority of the political leadership over the administrative arm of the state' (Sajjad 2008, p.63). This backfired as it increased the politicization of the bureaucracy and led to interference by the political leadership in the setting of policies and programs. The interference reached a new level during General Zia's time as a number of military officers were recruited into the high bureaucracy.

According to Sajjad (2008, p.65), 'between 1988-99, the high bureaucracy became even more prone to politicization due to the highly unstable nature of each successive regime. In this sense

whatever remained of the high bureaucracy's autonomy was further eroded as both of the (extremely weak) mainstream political parties attempted to manipulate the administrative institutions to gain ascendancy over each other' (p.66). Thus, each new government appointed bureaucrats who were loyal to it. Moreover, transfers from one post to another in a short time became commonplace. Similarly, according to Husain (2012), the politicization of the civil service combined with the shifting priorities of different political parties worked to the detriment of the country's economy, as each time a new government came in, it attempted to either 'reverse or backtrack' the previous government's policies (p.14).

However, this has not meant that bureaucrats no longer hold power. They continue to do so just by virtue of being responsible for managing the state's resources as well as being responsible for managing increasing foreign aid flows (Sajjad 2008). Moreover, many of them form part of the political leaders' trusted group of advisors and are able to exert influence through that route.

Nevertheless, the composition of bureaucrats has roughly changed over time from those who were committed to be immune to political interests, to those who now aim to focus on the 'political needs of the time,' even if they maintain their disdain for politicians<sup>29</sup> (Burki 1994 as quoted. in Sajjad 2008, p.68).

### 3.1.9 Summary

This section has shown that Pakistan has had a particularly turbulent political history with repeated interference in politics by the military, as well as repeated early dismissals of

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<sup>29</sup> I experienced the disdain bureaucrats hold for politicians during fieldwork, as they often asked me why I wanted to speak to politicians in addition to speaking to them.

democratic governments. This has disrupted its transition towards democracy, and shaped the priorities of the state. In this light, the transition from one civilian government to another in 2013 represents a significant turning point in its history.

Yet, this history also explains how the bureaucracy – while remaining extremely powerful – has been increasingly politicized. Hence, transfers of bureaucrats – particularly high bureaucrats – are common based on the preferences of the political party in power, and there is increasing interference by political leaders in the type of policies and projects that are adopted. Moreover, bureaucrats often maintain a disdainful opinion of politicians, yet their first priority is to uncritically focus on implementing the needs of the governments in power. Although it is important to note that many are able to influence the decisions of political leaders as well.

Additionally, there are a number of key electoral trends and features that determine the type of policy preferences of various political parties, particularly as the electoral system is extremely divided in terms of the regions, income groups, types of constituents that the mainstream political parties stand for.

With this in mind, let's turn to describing Lahore's transport context which is needed to understand the how the opportunity arose for the state to undertake large-scale spending on public transport in 2012.

### **3.2 Transport Context: Lahore**

There has been considerable research done on the conditions of the urban transport sector in cities in the Global South, particularly in light of rapid population growth and increasing urbanization. Dimitriou (2011) and Vasconcellos (2001), for instance, point out that, notwithstanding great variations in local conditions, these cities share a number of characteristics, such as:


- Increasing motorization
- Preference for road-building over other forms of infrastructure development
- Increasing congestion
- Poor traffic management
- Growing environmental concerns
- Privatization of public transport
- Increasing attempts by the state to regulate public transport
- Inadequate supply of public transport vehicles
- Increasing demand for public transport
- Overcrowded and unreliable public transport travel
- Multiple agencies responsible for transportation planning and development
- Limited attention to the needs of Non-Motorized Transport (NMT)

Further they point out that class determines the type of transport mode used, with low-income groups predominantly using public transport and NMT to meet their travel needs, and higher income groups using cars and motorcycles. In light of these characteristics, this section provides

a brief overview of the particular state of Lahore’s transportation conditions to contextualize the state’s decision to develop the BRT corridor between 2012-2013.

### 3.2.1 Demographics

Lahore, as mentioned previously, is Punjab’s capital, and the second largest city in Pakistan. The city’s population has been growing at a rate of approximately 3% per annum (JICA 2012), with an estimated population of approximately 10 million people<sup>30</sup> (JICA 2012).



**Figure 2 - Location map of Lahore**

<sup>30</sup> Punjab is sub-divided into districts. Lahore district, parts of Sheikhupura District, and Parts of Kasur district make up the Lahore Metropolitan Area, which is under the Lahore Development Authority’s jurisdiction. The 10 million population mentioned above is based on JICA’s Lahore Urban Transport Master Plan study area which covers the whole of Lahore District, and part of Kasur and Sheikhupura Districts. It should be added here that under the LDA amendment bill 2013, the metropolitan area of Lahore is now known as ‘Lahore Division.’

### 3.2.2 Road Infrastructure

As a result of policies (often supported by international actors such as the World Bank) that have favored road development,<sup>31</sup> the city has ‘better road infrastructure than other major cities of the Punjab’ (JICA 2012, IPP 2012). It has wide roads, a number of underpasses<sup>32</sup> and flyovers, and a recently completed Ring Road<sup>33</sup> mega-project – a massive ‘circumferential arterial road’ (Imran 2010) around the city. In fact, large-scale infrastructure spending and mega-project development in the city has been in the form of roads.<sup>34</sup> However, some areas such as the city center, still suffer from neglect.

### 3.2.3 Motorization

In 2008, there were approximately 2 million vehicles registered in Lahore, with motorcycles comprising 56% of these, and cars a third (JICA 2012). It is important to note that just between 2001 and 2008, the number of motorized vehicles per 1,000 residents increased exponentially from 95 vehicles to 238 vehicles (JICA 2012). According to Imran (2010), this surge can be explained by ‘rapid population growth, housing development in the periphery of the city, unavailability of alternative transport, favorable policies for ownership of private vehicles, heavy investments in roads, and tax incentives to financial institutions for car leasing schemes,’ amongst other reasons (p.146).

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<sup>31</sup> For more details, see Imran (2009) and (2010) where he explains the biases of local and international agencies in promoting road development over public transport. Although it should be pointed out mainstream political parties in Lahore, particularly the PML-N have also supported road infrastructure over public transport provision.

<sup>32</sup> The cities underpasses have been built starting from the 1990s.

<sup>33</sup> See Imran (2010)


<sup>34</sup> Imran & Low (2007) show that large-scale spending on roads directly impacts financing available for public transport.

### 3.2.4 Environment

Partially as a consequence of vehicular emissions, the environment has deteriorated rapidly. Air quality in Lahore is more than 10 times the World Health Organization Standards in certain parts of the city, and is responsible for causing a number of health sicknesses amongst its residents (Imran & Low 2003; World bank 2006).

### 3.2.5 Traffic Conditions

The city suffers from congestion along arterial roads and in the city center. Moreover, it is victim to poor traffic management due to outdated traffic regulations and weak enforcement,<sup>35</sup> poor maintenance of physical infrastructure, weak management of drivers (often without licenses/training) amongst other reasons (JICA 2012). Further, it is impacted negatively due to the absence of infrastructure for non-motorized transport users.



**Figure 3 - Traffic conditions in Lahore**

Source: Kamila Hyat/IRIN

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<sup>35</sup> Although there have been attempts in the past to improve traffic management. See for instance, PML-Q's initiative in 2007: <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/lahore/29-Jun-2007/elahi-gives-formal-nod-to-traffic-wardens>.



### 3.2.6 Non-Motorized Transport

The largest share of trips in the city – approximately 45% of all trips made – are made by walking (JICA 2012). Yet, there are barely any provisions for road crossing for pedestrians. Infrastructure (side walks, bike lanes) for bicyclists and pedestrians is non-existent or extremely inadequate. As a result, the numbers of traffic fatalities per year have increased from 100 in 1990 to over 400 in 2007, with pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists disproportionately represented (JICA 2012).

### 3.2.7 Public Transport

Although there have been some improvements in the quality of buses in the city in recent years, Lahore's public transport services has not been able to keep up with the demand for it. It is overcrowded, unreliable and unsafe, and particularly so for women and the elderly (Imran 2010).

In Lahore, public transport consists of public buses (large and medium size), mini buses (delivery vans), mini-vans called wagons, auto rickshaws, qingqis (a motorcycle driven rickshaw), taxis, and horse drawn carriages and hand pull carts (JICA 2012). There are 494 buses on Lahore's streets (LTC 2014), an estimated 45,000 qingqis,<sup>36</sup> and between 66,000-80,000 rickshaws<sup>37</sup> (JICA 2012).

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<sup>36</sup> This is an estimate provided by the JICA Lahore Study. They state that 5,000 qingqis have route permits, and it is estimated that there are 40,000 more qingqis in the city. However, there has been no official count. The Lahore Transport Company began a registration drive in January 2014 though. According to the LTC CEO, they were attempting to find incentives for people to register their qingqis (Personal interview, 2014).

<sup>37</sup> 66,000 are registered with the Lahore District Registration Authority, but up to 80,000 may be operating in the city. Moreover, estimates of the number of wagons/minibuses are difficult to come by as most of these operate without licenses (JICA 2012).

### 3.2.8 Privatization of Public Transport

The primary public agency directly responsible for bus-based public transport – the Punjab Urban Transport Corporation – was disbanded in 1998 due to poor performance.<sup>38</sup> Particularly since the early 1990s, the private sector has been increasingly incentivized to provide public transport with the state taking a backseat.<sup>39</sup> As a result, currently, public transport in Lahore is run by the private sector, although the government has been attempting to increase its regulatory role in recent years.<sup>40</sup>

The privatization of public transport has also been supported by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank as it helped develop a number of policies for this purpose particularly in the 1990's.<sup>41</sup> Further, political parties such as PML-N and PML-Q have also pushed for this over time.

### 3.2.9 Class and choice of transport mode

As shown in the table 3, a significant percentage of trips are made using public transport. Overall, however, these trips are less than half the share of trips made by private vehicles (cars, motorcycles) – suggesting that those who can afford to do so have already moved to private modes of transport.

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<sup>38</sup> Haider and Badami (2007) state that the PUTC was draining public resources. However, they point out that the state's withdrawal from investment in public transport has impacted the mobility of millions of urban poor who cannot afford private vehicles.

<sup>39</sup> Imran (2009) and Imran & Low (2003) claim that this shift has largely occurred due to the influence of international development organizations and consultants who have repeatedly called for increasing private sector involvement in meeting public transport demand.

<sup>40</sup> According to Russel and Anjum (2001), the bureaucrats in government departments are responsible for the city's traffic conditions. They claim that the 'government bureaucracy itself has proved incapable of delivering effective regulation,' (Ibid, p.85) which has hindered private sector initiative.

<sup>41</sup> Such as the Urban Public Transport Policy (1998) and the Public Transport in the Transport Sector Development Initiative (1999).

**Table 3 - Estimated Daily Trips in Lahore, 2007**

<b>Mode</b>	<b>Trips (000)</b>	<b>Proportion</b>	<b>Proportion Excluding Walk</b>
Public Transport	3,409	19.3%	35.4%
Private Vehicles - Cars	2,894	16.4%	30.1%
Private Vehicles – Motorcycles/Bicycles	3,314	18.8%	34.5%
Mechanized Total (Excluding Walk)	9,617	54.5%	100%
Walk	8,050	45.5%	-
Total	17,667	100%	-

Source: TEPA (2007) as quoted in the Lahore Urban Transport Master Plan 2012

In its study on Lahore’s transport, the JICA (2012) team found that household income is positively correlated with household vehicle ownership. Hence, primarily those who do not own any vehicles, or those who ‘do not have any other choice’ use public transport in Lahore (JICA 2012, p.2-120). Consequently, it is the city’s working class that predominantly makes up the majority of public transport users.

Qadeer (1983) points out that this state – where those who can afford to do so have exited and found private solutions leaving behind those who have no other choice – is a recurring theme in areas of health, education, sewage and garbage disposal in Lahore. According to Cheema and Bari (2012, p.6) this is also because ‘political and social structures in Pakistan have increased the costs of collective action for poor, women, and the socially excluded.’ They point out that research has shown that higher consumption and educational levels are positively correlated to political engagement. Hence it is particularly difficult for the poor to organize and lay claims to the state by demanding better service.

However, according to Qadeer (1983, p.247), poor provision of certain services ‘works to the detriment of everybody, including the upper strata.’ Thus, in the case of transport, increasingly everyone suffers from the traffic jams and delays and deteriorating environmental conditions that have come to define everyday life in the city. Nevertheless, the upper classes are still better off given that cars are more comfortable, safer (in terms of accidents and crime), faster, and less exposed to pollution.

### 3.2.10 Provincial Agencies Responsible for Lahore’s Transportation Planning and Development

There are multiple institutions that are responsible for transport related matters in Lahore. At the provincial level, there are four primary departments responsible for transport planning and development. These include the Planning and Development Department (P&D), the Transport Department (TD), Housing Urban Development and Public Health Engineering Department (HUD and PHED), and the Communication and Works Department (C&W), (See Figure 4).

According to Imran (2010), Lahore’s transportation has suffered due to the overlapping jurisdictions of these departments, and due to their internal competition for road development.




Figure 4 - Agencies responsible for Lahore's Transportation Planning & Development

Source: Compiled by author

### 3.2.11 Planning and Development Department

The P&D department is the primary planning agency in the province, and all other departments report to it. The P&D department is responsible for developing a Medium-Term Development Framework (MTDF)<sup>42</sup> for the province, and for developing its Annual Development Plans (ADP).<sup>43</sup> It is also responsible for coordinating with international agencies and the Planning Commission at the federal level. The P&D's Project Management Unit – the Urban Unit<sup>44</sup> – researches urban issues and challenges, and develops policies for various sectors including urban transport. The aim of the Urban Transport Sector at the Urban Unit is to meet the provincial government's vision of developing cities in Punjab as engines of growth and sustainable development.

### 3.2.12 Transport Department

The Transport Department was established in 1987, and is the primary agency responsible for transport policy in the province. Recently, a Transport Planning Unit (TPU) was added to the department to assist with its engineering and policy management capacity. The TD is also responsible for the regulation of public transport and freight services. It has traditionally carried out this regulation by working with the Provincial Transport Authority (PTA), which in turn, works with Regional Transport Authorities that look after different administrative regions in the province 'to organize local route permits, transport fares, speed limits and parking for all passenger and freight services,' (Imran 2010, p.155). The Lahore Regional Transport Authority

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<sup>42</sup> The Medium Term Development Framework is a three-year policy framework that outlines the provincial government's development priorities over a three-year period.

<sup>43</sup> Annual Development plans are instruments used to operationalize the MTDF on an annual basis.

<sup>44</sup> Set up in 2006, and is now a company owned by the provincial government.

(LRTA) is one of the RTAs, however, the Lahore Transport Company (LTC), which was set up in 2009, has taken up most of its roles and functions.<sup>45</sup>

The LTC is a not-for-profit organization owned by the Government of Punjab that was set up for the improvement of urban public transport specifically in Lahore. It is now solely responsible for the provision, improvement, and regulation of public transport infrastructure in the city.<sup>46</sup> It was set up on a model developed in the city of Faisalabad in 1994, when government officials<sup>47</sup> set up the non-profit, Faisalabad Urban Transport Society (FUTS), which served as the primary regulatory body for public transport in the city,<sup>48</sup> and was able to enhance public transport performance.

### 3.2.13 Housing Urban Development and Public Health Engineering Department

Additionally, the HUD and PHED department is ‘responsible for establishing a comprehensive system of planning and development in urban areas under the Punjab Development of Cities Act, 1976’ (Imran 2010, p.157). The Lahore Development Authority (LDA), the city’s primary planning agency, is a subsidiary of the HUD and PHED Department. Moreover, Traffic Engineering and Transport Planning Agency (TEPA)<sup>49</sup>, which is responsible for developing Lahore’s transport plans and policies and implementing them, comes under the LDA.

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<sup>45</sup> According to a senior planner in the government this was done to reduce bureaucratic control and recruit professionals in Lahore’s public transport institutions (Anonymous, Personal Interview, 2014).

<sup>46</sup> This view was also expressed by Tasneem Noorani, ex-Chairman, LTC, who stated that the government’s inability to meet the concerns of private and foreign investors has hindered its ability to improve public transport provision through the private sector (Personal interview, 2014).

<sup>47</sup> At the time, Tasneem Noorani, served as Commissioner of Faisalabad division. Later he would become Lahore Transport Company’s first Chairman.

<sup>48</sup> For more details, see Russell and Anjum (2001).

<sup>49</sup> TEPA was set up in 1980 on the recommendations of the Lahore Urban Development and Traffic Study that had been prepared with World Bank assistance. TEPA remains separate from the Punjab Transport department as the latter was set up 7 years later in 1987.

### 3.2.14 Communication and Works Department

Finally, the Communication & Works (C&W) Department is responsible for the ‘construction and maintenance of all provincial roads and bridges,’ (Imran, 2010, p.157). It also includes the Highway Department, District Support and Monitoring Department, and Architecture Department. Along with TEPA, the C&W has been primarily responsible for the constructions of roads in Lahore.

### 3.2.15 Local Government Agencies

At the local level, the city has three administrative tiers, from largest to smallest: the city district<sup>50</sup>, tehsils or town,<sup>51</sup> and unions. The City District Governments Lahore (CDGL), Town Municipal Administrations (TMA’s), and Union Administrations (UA) are responsible for governing each of these tiers, and elected representatives and local and provincial government servants run them. Earlier, the LDA was a subsidiary of the CDGL, however, it now comes under the HUD and PHED as mentioned above. Therefore, the CDGL does not have influence on transport planning and provision as it used to. Similarly, the TMA’s were responsible for ‘urban service delivery,’ (Alam 2010, p.8) and road development in their areas, (Imran 2010) however many of their responsibilities have been taken over by the LDA and other new companies.

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<sup>50</sup> A City District is one where the population is greater than 1 million, economy ‘largely commercial or industrial, related to the service sector, and where non-agricultural employment exceeds sixty percent,’ as described in (Alam 2010, p.27).

<sup>51</sup> ‘Tehsil is a sub-district division made in rural areas where, in the case of urban areas, towns are the sub-district division,’ (Alam 2010, p.6).



Importantly, local government elections have not taken place since elected officials completed their term in 2009 as the PML-N government amended relevant legislation<sup>52</sup> to delay elections after coming to power in 2008.<sup>53</sup> Instead, it appointed ‘administrators’<sup>54</sup> in the place of elected bodies to manage the City District Government, the Tehsil Municipal Authorities, and Union Administrations (now practically defunct) (Alam 2010, p.17).<sup>55</sup> Therefore, for our purposes, the provincial departments and their subsidiaries are the key players in Lahore’s urban transport provision.

### **3.3 Summary**

This section has shown that Lahore suffers from many of the characteristics of other cities in the Global South, namely: increasing motorization, deteriorating environment, large-scale spending favoring roads (which are also the primary form of mega-projects in the city) over public transport, withdrawal of the state from public transport provision, multiple agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. Moreover, as in other cities, lower-income groups and working classes dominate NMT and public transport usage, and bear the brunt of the poor traffic conditions.

Given these conditions, how do opportunities arise for the state to undertake large-scale spending on public transport? Let’s turn to the history of Lahore’s mass transit system to understand this.

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<sup>52</sup> Punjab Local Government Ordinance.

<sup>53</sup> This may have been because it wanted to ‘monitor, and perhaps control, the expenditure of funds by the local governments elected during the tenure of the previous PML-Q coalition,’ (Alam 2010, p.18).

<sup>54</sup> Government Servants.

<sup>55</sup> The Supreme Court has now ordered all provinces to conduct elections by November 2014, and stated that the Election Commission of Pakistan should delimit the constituencies. However, the Punjab government has been dragging its feet on the issue.

## **Chapter 4**

### **History of Mass Transit in Lahore**

So far, we have seen that states in the Global South share a number of similar characteristics in urban transport, despite local differences. We have also seen that public transport has been increasingly privatized over the past two decades. Yet, there has also been large-scale spending on public transport by these states in recent years, and this spending has often taken the form of mass transit mega projects.

In a similar vein, in Lahore public transport has been increasingly privatized over the past two decades. And, here too, after many years of large-scale spending primarily on roads, the state decided to step in and invest heavily in public transport through the development of a mass transit mega project in the form of Lahore's first BRT corridor.

This chapter seeks to understand how this became possible. For this purpose it traces the history of the project. It finds that although the corridor was constructed and inaugurated in less than a year, it was the culmination of over twenty years of an idea under development. Moreover, its progress over time can be identified through three distinct phases based on regime type: 1989-1999 (interrupted democracy), 1999-2008 (authoritarian), 2008-2013 (democratic). This is because the project moved into different stages during each of these periods, and was impacted by the type of regime in place.

## **4.1 1989-1999: Priorities of Global Actors & Rapidly Shifting Political Party Priorities**

### **4.1.1 Comprehensive Study on Transportation System in Lahore, JICA, 1991**

A mass transit mega-project for Lahore was first conceptualized<sup>56</sup> in 1991 as a result of the Government of Punjab (GoP) requesting the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)<sup>57</sup> to complete a comprehensive study of the transportation system in Lahore.<sup>58</sup> The JICA study had two objectives (JICA 1991, p. I-1):

- ‘To formulate, in the first phase, a Master Plan to solve urban transportation problems in the Lahore Metropolitan Area’ toward the target year of 2010, with intermediate output at the year 2000, and;
- ‘To conduct, in the second phase, a Feasibility Study on a selected mass transit project and any other selected project.’

Started in mid-1990, the study was the ‘first attempt to apply modern transport planning techniques for travel demand analyses’ in the city (JICA 2012). At the time, the city’s population had swelled to approximately 5 million people, with 39% of all trips were made using motorized transport, and the majority, 61% made using non-motorized transport (See Table 4 for modes used within motorized and non-motorized transport).

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<sup>56</sup> The development of a mass transit system for Lahore in the form of a circular railway had also been suggested briefly in Lahore’s first Master Plan, (GoP, Housing and Physical Planning Department 1973) as a ‘long-range project,’ (p.81). However, it did not envision it as a ‘modern’ mass transit system (subway, light rail, metro, BRT etc), and is not relevant for purposes.

<sup>57</sup> JICA has established an office in Pakistan in 1983, and Japanese trade and Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Pakistan had been increasing due to the increased stability in the area after the end of the Cold War (Malik 2009).

<sup>58</sup> The provincial government requested JICA to complete this study in 1989.

**Table 4 - Modes of Motorized and Non-Motorized Travel, 1991**

Type	Mode	Percentage
Motorized Transport <sup>59</sup>	Private Transport	26
	Public Transport	13
Non-Motorized Transport	Walking	53
	Biking	7
	Horse-driven carriages	1

Source: JICA (1991)

Completed in 1991, the study recommended actions in the short-term (1992-1995), medium-term (1996-2000), and long-term (2001-2010). In the short-term, it recommended improvement and expansion of trunk roads, implementation of traffic management mechanisms in the city center<sup>60</sup>, bridge construction across River Ravi<sup>61</sup>, introduction of ‘higher capacity buses,’ as well as the construction of part of Lahore’s Ring Road<sup>62</sup> (p.10-4). In the medium-term, it recommended ‘improving Pakistan Railway<sup>63</sup> as an urban transport network’, completing the Ring Road, and ‘using bus priority measures along the public transport corridors,’(p.10-4). Finally, in the long run, along with improvements in traffic management and the development of a ‘mode interchange’ facilities<sup>64</sup> it recommended the use of an ‘effective and higher capacity public transport system’ – it particularly pointed to the development of a Light Rail Transit (LRT) system along 12.5 km of Ferozpur Road (See Figure 5), which it highlighted as the corridor

<sup>59</sup> Amongst motorized transport, private transport comprised of motorcycles, car/jeeps, vans/pick-ups, large trucks, and public transport comprised of taxis, rickshaws, institutional buses, and minibuses (JICA 1991).

<sup>60</sup> After assessing recommendations in World Bank’s Lahore Urban Development and Traffic Study, 1980


<sup>61</sup> A river that runs northwest of Lahore.

<sup>62</sup> The Ring Road was ‘identified as a circumferential arterial road in the first Master Plan for Greater Lahore to be implemented from 1965-1980,’ (Imran 2010, p.184). It was renamed ‘Southern Bypass in the Lahore Urban Development and Traffic Study in 1980 which was financed by the World Bank,’ (Imran 2010, p.184).

<sup>63</sup> The existing railway that until today has not been improved.

<sup>64</sup> LRT terminals and intercity bus terminals where commuters could change.

with the highest expected demand in the future<sup>65</sup> (p.10-4; 10-11). Although, according to a former senior bureaucrat, JICA's recommendations for a mass transit project were also linked to its interest in financing the project itself, and in providing the equipment necessary for construction (Anonymous, personal interview, 2014).



**Figure 5 - Proposed LRT Corridor on Ferozpur Road, 1991**  
Source: JICA (1991)

<sup>65</sup> It was the most expensive project amongst the projects recommended by the JICA study.

#### 4.1.2 Lahore Traffic and Transportation Studies, World Bank, 1993

Two years later, in 1993, JICA's study was reviewed and updated under the World Bank funded Lahore Traffic and Transportation Studies. These studies re-confirmed the need for the LRT on Ferozpur Road.

#### 4.1.3 Shifting Political Priorities and Institutional Flux, 1993-1999

According to Sibtain Fazal Halim, a senior bureaucrat at the time, soon after the completion of the World Bank-sponsored studies, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), the Japanese Government's financier for development projects, expressed interest in providing a soft loan of \$1.4 billion for the LRT project. However, before the terms could be negotiated – the PML-N government was dismissed early in 1993. The government that followed – the PPP – was interested in prioritizing a mass transit project for Karachi and not Lahore, as Karachi was Pakistan's largest city<sup>66</sup> (Halim, personal interview, 2014). It is likely that this was the case, as the PPP focused on a LRT project in Karachi<sup>67</sup>, and prioritized its development as part of the first phase of its Big Cities Renewal Program<sup>68</sup> in 1995. However, this did not mean that it did not focus on Lahore at all. In fact, in 1996, the PPP government initiated the second phase of the Big Cities Renewal Program in 5 other cities<sup>69</sup>, including Lahore, and focused on the development of the LRT there. According to journalistic accounts, in 1996, Benazir Bhutto even signed an agreement with the Japanese (Dawn 2004). However, the project suffered a setback as the PPP government was dismissed early in November 1996.

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<sup>66</sup> Karachi's population was approximately 5 million when the 1981 census was conducted, and it was growing at a rate of 4.96% per year. By the next census in 1998, it's population was close to 9 million (Hasan & Mohib 2003).

<sup>67</sup> Although it should be pointed out that a Light Rail Project for Karachi was conceptualized as early as 1987 (Awan 1997).

<sup>68</sup> This program included, amongst other projects, 'the construction and improvement of transit systems, roads and bridges, under-passes, fly-overs and bypasses,' (PPP 1997, p.29).

<sup>69</sup> These included Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Multan and Faisalabad

Yet, negotiations continued with the Japanese after the PML-N government was voted back into power in 1997. In fact, it appeared that an agreement was a real possibility in 1997 as the Economics Affairs Division<sup>70</sup> also became involved with the agreement at that time (Dawn 2001). Additionally, the OECF added it as a potential investment in its list of trade and investment partnerships in Pakistan (PAK-JAP 1997). However, in 1998, the PML-N government conducted nuclear tests that resulted in the country being subject to international sanctions. At this point, the Japanese government ‘froze all new loans and grants except for humanitarian aid’ to the country (BBC 2001).

According to Halim, this development severely strained relations with the Japanese. Yet, by 1999, as head of Lahore Development Authority, he had managed to engage OECF again in a dialogue. However, the negotiations bore no fruit because the Pakistan army, under General Pervez Musharraf, overthrew the PML-N Prime Minister in a coup in October 1999 (Personal Interview, 2014).

Nevertheless, it is likely that negotiations with JICA after the nuclear tests did not bear any fruit not just because a military coup happened in 1999, but because the Japanese did not actually lift sanctions against Pakistan until 2001 (BBC 2001).

In any case, under the new military regime (1999-2008), the LRT project, as envisioned in the JICA study, gradually entered a new phase in its development. Let’s turn to this new phase.

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<sup>70</sup> A federal agency that is ‘responsible for assessment of requirements, programming and negotiations of external economic assistance related to the Government of Pakistan, and its constituent units from foreign Governments and multilateral agencies.’ (EAD 2014).

## 4.2 2000-2008: Increasing Demand, Modernization, and Global Competitiveness

### 4.2.1 Lifting of Sanctions and Changing Urban Public Transport Requirements, 2000-2004

After the coup, the LRT project remained suspended until the Japanese government lifted sanctions against Pakistan in October 2001 (Dawn 2001). Between October 2001 and 2004, the government re-entered into negotiations with the Japanese as well as other investors<sup>71</sup> to finance the project. Progress on the project remained slow<sup>72</sup> despite the apparent interest from investors.<sup>73</sup> Yet, at this time, the government was also interested in expanding the LRT corridor, and in implementing it along a different route, which only included parts of Ferozpur Road.<sup>74</sup> Additionally, the Punjab Chief Minister, Pervaiz Elahi, as well as Lahore district Mayor,<sup>75</sup> Mian Amer Mahmood, were particularly interested in getting it implemented (Dawn 2004).

Their interest would get further impetus through the finalization of Lahore's new master plan<sup>76</sup> in 2004.<sup>77</sup> Claiming to be a 'follow-up to the JICA study,' the plan's transportation section reviewed developments since the study and made recommendations made on that progress (p.8-2). It estimated that Lahore's population in 2001 was approximately 7 million, and traffic had 'increased 1.5 times with average annual growth rate of 3.75%,' since 1990 (p.8-15). Similar to the JICA study, it also recommended short-run (first five years), medium term (subsequent five years) and long-term (last ten years) plans. In the short-run, it primarily recommended

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<sup>71</sup> Such as Interglobe, Nonolite (Railway Gazette 2002), the Chinese (Dawn 2004).

<sup>72</sup> Negotiations continued over 3 years with different investors before the proposal for a new feasibility study was handed in.

<sup>73</sup> According to journalistic accounts, there was interest from JICA and the Chinese in particular (Dawn 2004).

<sup>74</sup> See, for instance: <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/business/18-Aug-2002/lahore-transit-rail-project>, where it is suggested that a LRT corridor will be developed between Shahdara and the new Lahore airport (Daily Times 2002), or: <http://www.dawn.com/news/363919/lahore-another-feasibility-on-lrt-proposed>, where it is mentioned that the LRT project would be extended to Shahdara, or would be developed between Shahdara and Lahore airport (Dawn 2004).

<sup>75</sup> The city had a mayor at the time under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 (see chapter 3, section 2).

<sup>76</sup> Completed by NESPAK, a local engineering firm for LDA and TEPA.

<sup>77</sup> Approved for Lahore after six years of revisions.



construction and improvement of the road infrastructure in Lahore.<sup>78</sup> However, it made reference to the LRT in the medium-term, and recommended that a feasibility study be conducted for its development. It added that the CDGL had recently expressed interest in expanding the LRT project on ‘an expression of interest from an unknown trade group,’ however such proposals should be ‘reviewed critically through specialists before making any commitments and policy decisions,’ (p.21-14).

Interestingly, it also mentioned Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems for the first time in official documents. It stated:

*‘Parallel to LRT project proposed on Ferozpur Road Corridor, other corridors need to be planned for Bus Rapid Transits. In a recently completed Trans Millenio: Bogota’s Bus Rapid Transit System in Latin America, passenger carrying capacity to the tune of 360,000 passenger per day have been achieved with 162 articulated and 60 feeder buses. Proposed capacity improvements of road projects for Lahore thus need to be dovetailed for Bus Rapid Transits,’<sup>79</sup>* (p.21-14).

However, as we will see, BRT failed to catch the attention of policy-makers and consultants at the time, although the development of a rail-based mass transit system for the city particularly started gaining momentum.

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<sup>78</sup> In fact, the transportation component of its suggested short-run budget made up 43.06% of the total budget (Vol 3, p.2) Further, during this period, it suggested that 94.8% of the estimated transport budget be allocated for ‘road development, management and maintenance,’ and 5.2% for public transport terminals (LDA 2004 as quoted in Imran 2009, p.69; LDA 2004, Vol. 3).

<sup>79</sup> It is important to note that this was the only document I found during this period (2000-2008) that categorically referred to the BRT as a form of technology.

#### 4.2.2 From LRT to Medium Metro: Modernization & Competitiveness, 2004-2008

In line with the master plan's recommendations, in 2004, TEPA submitted a proposal to the P&D department to conduct a detailed feasibility study of the LRT project. It claimed that the previous pre-feasibility study had been completed almost over a decade ago, and the population as well as motorization had increased phenomenally over this period.<sup>80</sup>

Simultaneously, it appeared that the PML-Q government was interested in prioritizing this study as, in 2004, in his pre-budget policy address, the Chief Minister, Pervaiz Elahi, announced a new policy 'Punjab's Vision 2020' that would serve as a guiding vision for the province for the next 16 years. Under this vision, he mentioned that communication and transport services would be improved in Punjab through enhancement of 'inter city and urban transport, modernizing of urban and rural road networks, and development of mass transit networks for mega cities' (p.14).<sup>81</sup>

Hence, the following year, in 2005, the Punjab Government formed a project steering committee to look into a Rapid Mass Transit System (RMTS) for Lahore. According to a senior government bureaucrat involved with its planning, the aim was not just to stimulate growth but to modernize the city and use mass transit as 'a thinking shift, a project of urban renewal for the city,' (Anonymous, personal interview, 2014).

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<sup>80</sup> For instance, it claimed that 'motor vehicle ownership had increased from 52 to over 116 per 1,000 and cars from 13 to 35 per 1,000 inhabitants,' (Dawn 2004).

<sup>81</sup> His announced gelled well with the federal government's announcement in 2005 of a Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF) for the years 2005-2010. Under this framework, the federal government stated that policies over the next five years would focus on increasing the competitiveness of Pakistan's national economy. The framework claimed that the country could increase competitiveness through the 'development of infrastructure, human resource development, and technology,' (GOP, Planning Commission 2005, p.2). It stressed that infrastructure should be developed partly through the transportation and communication sector, particularly in metropolitan and mega cities (GOP, Planning Commission 2005, p.18).

To do so, the provincial government through the Transport Department, engaged MVA Asia – a Hong-Kong based consulting company – to conduct a feasibility study for this system for the year 2025. MVA Asia’s primary aim was to assess work carried out previously, and ‘develop a Lahore Rapid Mass Transit System (LRMTS) concept most appropriate and best suited to the city’s transportation requirements’ (MVA Asia 2006, p.2-3). Its aim was also to identify which corridor needed attention most urgently.

Completed in August 2006, the MVA study argued that it was essential to explore the option of a mass transit system for Lahore as the city had grown and expanded since the JICA study; population and employment trends had changed (the population was 7.5 million in 2003 and projected to increase to 10 million by 2010), incomes had risen, motorization had grown (there were more than 13.5 million motorized trips daily)<sup>82</sup>, and the public transport demand estimated for the LRT corridor in the 1991 study had exceeded ‘the capacity of any bus system,’<sup>83</sup> (p.2-2).

Hence, it developed a plan for a Long Term Network for Lahore consisting of four lines: Green, Orange, Blue and Purple, and recommended that each line be implemented in that same order (See Figure 6). Its priority line – the Green line – consisted part of the same corridor that the JICA study in 1991 had identified, however, it extended the corridor, and upgraded the line from an LRT to a Medium Capacity metro. It chose the same corridor as it was ‘busiest in terms of existing public transport demands,’<sup>84</sup> and its northern end linked to an upcoming ‘multi-modal

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<sup>82</sup> The study pointed out, as TEPA had in 2004, that motor vehicle ownership had increased from 52 to over 116 per 1,000 and cars from 13 to 35 per 1,000 inhabitants (MVA Asia, 2006, p.2-1).

<sup>83</sup> It is unclear why it refers to the LRT as a bus system, but perhaps by this it means that buses can’t cater to the demand on the corridor any more. The study also makes no reference to BRT hence this statement excludes that possibility as well.

<sup>84</sup> It forecasted that daily ridership in 2011 would be 211,000, and the ‘majority of the ridership (nearly 94%) would be drawn from existing bus passengers,’ while the remainder ridership would be drawn from cars and rickshaws.

terminal’ and southern end linked to neighborhoods that were likely to develop on the outskirts of the city in the future (p.5-9). Upon completion, it urged the provincial government to ‘proceed with the next phase LRMTS Priority Line Reference Design,’ as the next step (p.23-7).

In the meanwhile, in 2005, the provincial government began a conversation with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to finance the Green Line, and the ADB ‘commissioned a group of individual experts to review the MVA Asia Limited ridership forecasts, cost estimates, and analyze the economic and financial viability of the line’ (ADB 2008, p.27). According to Halim, the Chief Minister of the province, Pervaiz Elahi, had approached him earlier and asked him to re-engage the Japanese for the LRMTS. However, Halim found it difficult to do so as he had repeatedly gone back on his words with the Japanese over the past ten years, and had lost trust with them. He stated that the Chief Minister understood the problem and hence approached ADB instead<sup>85</sup> (Personal interview, 2014).

Soon after, in October 2006, the Punjab government ‘approved concept clearance for the project, and called for an early implementation of an efficient and effective RMTS for Lahore’ (ADB 2008, p.2). As the priority corridor, the Green Line would cover 27 km, out of which 11.6 km would be underground. The corridor was estimated to cost approximately \$2.4 billion and ‘attract a daily ridership of about 211,000 after opening, and rising to over 426,000 by 2021,’ (MVA Asia 2006, p.12-10). Upon completion, the provincial government also hired MVA Asia to conduct a feasibility study of the Orange Line.

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(Motorcycle diversion would be limited) (p.6-2). However by 2021, the ridership would go up to 426,000, but its primary ridership (approximately 92%) would still be from existing bus passengers. It is interesting to note that the JICA study in 1991 had forecasted that 231,000 passengers would travel on the LRT in 2010 (JICA, 2010, p.12-10).

<sup>85</sup> Both ADB and JICA have different terms and conditions attached to their loans, which may have also played into the government choosing to pursue the ADB.



**Figure 6 - Long Term LRTMS Network Corridors**

Source: MVA Asia (2006).<sup>86</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Green Line (27 km, 11.6 km u/g; 15.4 elevated), 22 stations (11 u/g; 10 elevated); Orange Line (27 km u/g, 20 km elevated), 26 stations (6 u/g; 20 elevated); Blue Line (~24 km, ~4 km u/g), 20 stations (3 u/g; 17 elevated); Purple Line (~19+km, ~4 km u/g), 14+Stations (4 u/g; 10+ elevated).

That same year, the provincial government hired Systra, the French parent company of MVA Asia, to complete the Priority Line Reference Design. At this time, the federal government's Vision 2030 document was also finalized, which stressed that mass transit systems would be introduced in big cities to reduce air pollution, cut down transit duration and the 'costs of doing business,' thereby enhancing the country's global competitiveness (p. 31; 67).

Systra's detailed study – a report consisting of almost 600 pages – was completed in June 2008. The report aimed at 2012 as the completion date for the Green Line, but also expected delays in the tendering process. It claimed that construction of the underground part of the green line would take approximately 54 months.<sup>87</sup> However, it suggested that it could prioritize opening the southern section of the line by the end of 2012 if the government required. The report also highlighted different financing options for the Green Line based on different public-private arrangements. Further, it highlighted two sources of funding: 1) funds from the budget of the P&D budget, or 2) Official Development Assistance (credit at favorable terms from the Asian Development Bank). It recommended that the second option be used.

In response, the government chose to pursue the second route, and in 2008, the ADB agreed to partially finance the LRMTS<sup>88</sup> project in phases. It approved 'a multi-tranche financing facility (MMF) loan of \$1 billion<sup>89</sup> towards the capital cost of the priority (Green) Line' (JICA 2012, p.6-4). It rationalized this investment by stating that 'insufficient and unreliable infrastructure and services were (i) adding to business and household costs, (ii) compromising Lahore's urban

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<sup>87</sup> However it suggested that the southern section of the line could be opened by the end of 2012

<sup>88</sup> The feasibility studies had thus far cost PKR .99 million (LRTMS Presentation 2010).

<sup>89</sup> To be paid over 32 years (and the infrastructure would have a life of 100 years) – (Iqbal, personal interview, 2014).

and natural environments, (iii) decreasing the city's global competitiveness when compared with other South Asian cities, and (iv) diminishing the quality of life of all of Lahore's citizens' (ADB 2008, p.4). However, it conditioned its financing on the Punjab government raising the rest of the capital cost; it suggested that in addition to its \$1 billion investment, the private sector provide \$1 billion, and the government finance the remaining amount on a Public Private Partnership (PPP) basis.<sup>90</sup>

Bureaucrats and planners involved with this project indicated that there was interest from the private sector and the project was ready to be launched. According to Iqbal, who worked for both MVA Asia and Systra, a very extensive process was followed to determine what type of mass transit system Lahore needed. He stated that the studies they completed over three years were conducted using the most sophisticated transport planning models. Moreover, in addition to the studies, over 150 technical reports, summaries, and presentations were prepared. Further, consultations were held with the public as well. Speaking about his planning approach, he added: 'I was trained to work this way, and this is what is important to me. I don't know much about politics, and I'm not interested in it either' (Personal interview, 2014).

Yet it was politics that was to partially shape the future of the Green Line project developed by Iqbal and his team. The PML-Q's term ended in November 2007, and a movement started to force General Musharraf to step down. At the end of the year, the PPP and PML-N decided to

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<sup>90</sup> The Systra study recommended that the government pay 'an output based subsidy for the government-funded part of capital costs, and a minimum revenue guarantee to attract a private operators' (p.22-10). It also recommended that the government seek funds from the ADB at favorable terms (22-11).

contest the next general elections.<sup>91</sup> Subsequently, in February 2008, elections were held in Pakistan, and the PML-N swept the Punjab provincial assembly elections – gaining a majority in the province. At the federal level, PPP emerged as the leading party.

This brings us to the third and final phase where the project was able to move from planning to implementation stages – albeit in the form of a BRT corridor, and not a medium-metro. The next section explores how this shift happened, and how the window of opportunity finally opened through which the state was able to undertake large-scale spending on public transport.

### **4.3 2008-2013: Shifting Political Priorities and the Move towards BRT**

#### **4.3.1 Shifting Political Priorities: Lapse of ADB loan, 2008-2009**

As mentioned in chapter 3, governments in Pakistan have a history of changing or partially implementing the policies adopted by the governments before them. Yet, interviewees of this study claim that the PML-N government was initially interested in continuing the LRMTS project. However, soon after coming to power, the PML-N government suspended negotiations with the ADB as it wanted to first look into an inquiry that had been initiated against selected Punjab Transport Department officers in July 2008 for the embezzlement of approximately PKR 400 million from ADB funds allocated for the establishment of the LRMTS (Sumra 2011, Khan 2008).<sup>92</sup> According to a senior planner involved with Lahore’s urban affairs, a bureaucrat close to the Chief Minister, Shahbaz Sharif, warned him that this corruption could be associated with the new government, and this warning particularly influenced his decision to suspend negotiations (Personal interview, 2014).

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<sup>91</sup> The party leaders had earlier thought of boycotting the elections as General Musharraf was still holding on to his position as President of the country.

<sup>92</sup> The officers in question were arrested and convicted soon after by the National Accountability Bureau.



However, according to bureaucrats who worked on the project during the PML-Q's term,<sup>93</sup> as well as a number of public officials currently working on Lahore's urban affairs, the Chief Minister also did not feel political ownership of the project, and did not want credit for it to go to the previous government (Personal interviews, 2014).

The following year, the provincial government let the ADB loan lapse in June 2009. According to the ADB's final report published in June 2009 – the Lapse of Validity of Loan Approval: 'the new government changed its investment priorities and RMTS was not one of them' (p.1). Moreover, the ADB 'could not find an investment bank interested in taking to the market a PPP for RMTS in Lahore' (p.1).

On its side, the provincial government stated that the capital cost was too high, the assumptions of the Systra study (such as GDP growth) were no longer valid<sup>94</sup>, and private sponsors<sup>95</sup> for the project were not interested due to the unfavorable business climate in the country caused by growing security concerns<sup>96</sup> (JICA 2012; Bukhari & Hassan, personal interviews, 2014).

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<sup>93</sup> A senior bureaucrat pointed out that other projects developed, such as Stroke Centers for Excellence, during the previous government's term were also not completed because they were thought of as Pervaiz Elahi's projects (Personal interview 2014)

<sup>94</sup> Specialists/Bureaucrats involved with the LRMTS study dismissed these concerns as they claimed that the study had also included a sensitivity analysis suggesting what was to be done if growth levels changed, for instance. They claimed that the government officials making such claims had not read the report in detail (Personal interviews, 2014).

<sup>95</sup> According to a blog written by Husain (2013) (a former employee of the Punjab Board of Investment and Trade), private sponsors were not interested because the provincial government did not address their concerns or prioritize the project, possibly seeing it as Pervaiz Elahi's project.

<sup>96</sup> There had been a number of terrorist suicide attacks in 2008-2009.

It should be added that, at this time, the government was also severely limited in its fiscal capacity due to worsening economic conditions from FY 2007-2008.<sup>97</sup> This capacity was severely constrained particularly after it had started a food subsidy program – Sasti Roti (cheap bread) scheme – in the province. According to Alam, a citizen advocate,<sup>98</sup> the government was slowly reaching its State Bank overdraft limit (Personal interview, 2014). In these conditions, transport investments were seen as superfluous amidst more pressing priorities.

Yet, the provincial government still appeared to be interested in implementing the LRMTS in Lahore; the Chief Minister and other government delegations continued to visit other countries between 2008-2009 to look for proposals that could reduce the capital costs of the LRMTS. According to Alam, Shahbaz Sharif was visiting other countries to bring in investment for a big public transport project: ‘He visited Iran twice, Turkey twice, China twice’<sup>99</sup> (Personal interview, 2014).

Interestingly, earlier, in September 2008, Enrique Peñalosa, the Mayor associated with developing Bogota’s BRT system that helped spark the BRT revolution globally, had visited Pakistan to participate in a dialogue conducted by the Urban Unit<sup>100</sup> on Sustainable Urban Transport options. During his visit, he presented the advantages of adopting BRT instead of rail, and also offered assistance to the provincial government in doing so. However, according to

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<sup>97</sup> See Gazdar (2011) for an explanation of the worsening economic conditions and increasing social protection spending.

<sup>98</sup> Also a lawyer, Environmentalist, Director at the Lahore Solid Waste Management Company, and Director of the Urban Unit at the time.

<sup>99</sup> Alam stated that he had been keeping an eye out for the Chief Minister’s activities at the time as he was part of a group opposing a road widening project in the city (Personal Interview 2014).

<sup>100</sup> Interviews with staff of the Urban Unit suggest that they had increasingly come to realize that BRT was a viable option for Lahore.

interviews with those present at that meeting, while some of the bureaucrats and planners were on board with the BRT idea, the Chief Minister was not particularly interested at the time.

Thus, so far, the development of a BRT corridor had not become an alternative option for the provincial government. This shift would begin to take place in 2010 - slowly opening the window of opportunity to make large-scale spending on public transport possible.

#### 4.3.2 From medium metro to BRT: 2010-2011

In January 2010, Shahbaz Sharif visited Turkey to see projects of civic amenities in Istanbul, and to discuss solid waste management and transport systems. Soon after his return, the provincial government re-engaged specialists and bureaucrats involved with the development of the LRMTS during the previous government's tenure to present a funding options analysis of the Green Line. In the meeting in January 2010, the provincial government bureaucrats raised many objections to the LRMTS proposed in the Systra study. These objections centered on its financial feasibility, high costs, and assumptions such as GDP growth levels. During this meeting, according to a high bureaucrat present at the meeting, Shahbaz Sharif expressed concern about the time it would take to operationalize the Green line,<sup>101</sup> and expressed worry about the increase in costs associated with his indecisiveness (Anonymous, personal interview, 2014). However, the specialists claimed that the green line was still financially feasible and ADB could be re-engaged. Yet, the provincial government urged them to continue exploring alternate sources of financing (Anonymous, personal interview, 2014).

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<sup>101</sup> For instance, he asked if it could be done in 2 years as opposed to 4 years.

In May 2010, a transport delegation led by Muhammad Yousaf, Secretary Transport<sup>102</sup> at the time, ‘visited Istanbul for an understanding of its transportation system and its possible replication in the metropolitan cities of Punjab,’ (GoP TD, November 3 2010, p.1). The delegation consisted of representatives of the Urban Unit, Transport Department, LTC, Finance Department, a member of the provincial assembly, and an environmentalist from the private sector.

In Istanbul, the delegation from Pakistan saw the BRT system, Metrobus, developed by Istanbul Electricity Tram and Tunnel<sup>103</sup> (IETT). This system had been initiated in 2007 through the development of an 18.3 km BRT corridor, and had rapidly expanded in 2008 and 2009 with an additional 11.3 km and 11.5 km each respective year. In fact, construction for the 11.3 km in 2008 was completed within 77 days, and construction for the 11.5 km in 2009 was completed in 5 months (Camkesen et al. 2013).

Upon seeing the BRT system, the transport delegation signed four MOU’s with IETT to provide ‘(i) consultancy/exchange of experts services for LRTMS, (ii) improve public transport system through electronic fare collection system and fleet management system in Lahore, (iii) develop, provide and manage an Intelligent Transportation System in Lahore, and (iv) assist with a detailed design of a BRT system in Lahore,’ (GoP TD, November 3, 2010).

Interestingly, that same month, the Chief Minister told the specialists involved with the LRMTS during the previous government’s tenure that their project was not feasible (Anonymous,

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<sup>102</sup> Of the Punjab Transport Department

<sup>103</sup> An Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality owned company

personal interview, 2014). This may have been because the government now had signed an agreement with the Turks for this purpose.

Subsequently, in early June 2010, the transport delegation that visited Turkey briefed the Chief Minister on its visit. During this meeting, a decision was made for the first time by the delegation representatives and the Chief Minister to develop a BRT system in Lahore. They agreed that this would be done through provincial funds with Lahore Transport Company leading the efforts (GoP TD, November 3, 2010). Interestingly, this also marked the first time that the provincial government had decided to finance large-scale public transport through its own funds. This may have been the case as BRT was a low-cost solution as compared to the LRTMS. However, it may have also been the case as there had recently been a drastic shift in the ‘public finance landscape of the country,’ which was to be effective July 1, 2010 (Nabi and Shaikh 2010, p.10).

Let’s backtrack three months to March 2010. During this month, the parliament passed the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment to the constitution,<sup>104</sup> (National Assembly 2010), and the President signed the 7<sup>th</sup> National Finance Commission (NFC) Award<sup>105</sup> (effective July 1, 2010) (Dawn 2010; Nabi and Shaikh 2010).

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<sup>104</sup> This entailed 97 amendments to the constitution that centered on federalism, provincial autonomy and judicial independence. It also included the repeal of article 58 2(b), which had given the President discretionary powers to dissolve the assemblies (see chapter 3). Its passing signified growing consensus amongst the political parties, and a maturity of politics in the country.

<sup>105</sup> The NFC award uses financial formulas to manage the distribution of financial resources to the provinces from the center.

The 18<sup>th</sup> amendment increased provincial autonomy by reducing the size of the federal government through the abolishment of the Concurrent List,<sup>106</sup> and devolution of 44 of the 47 items on the list to the provinces.<sup>107</sup> Further, it allowed the provinces the ‘right to raise domestic and foreign loans with the approval of the National Economic Council<sup>108</sup>,’ collect excise, oil and natural gas duties (Nabi and Shaikh 2010). Moreover, it fixed the minimum amount that would be given to the provinces through the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award.<sup>109</sup>

The 7<sup>th</sup> NFC award itself was agreed to after a period of 19 years as the provinces had not mutually agreed to a distributional formula since 1991. Under the award, ‘annual resource transfer to the province’ was to increase substantially: from ‘47.5%-56% for the first year to 57.5% for the remaining years,’ (Nabi and Shaikh 2010, p.9). Punjab in particular, was to receive ‘PKR 83 billion additional revenue in FY 2010-11,’ (Sabir 2010), and see a 24.4% increase in revenue in 2011-12 (Khan 2011, p.107).

Hence, the decision by the high bureaucrats and the Chief Minister may have been based on the increased fiscal space the provincial government now had. However, while a decision was made to develop a BRT in Lahore, the location of the BRT corridor was not decided, and a number of

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<sup>106</sup> The Concurrent List is the ‘document that gave joint responsibilities to the federal as well as provincial governments.’ (Nabi and Shaikh 2010, p.9).

<sup>107</sup> For instance, these included: Population Planning and Social Welfare, Tourism, Environmental Pollution and Ecology.

<sup>108</sup> The National Economic Council is a council that looks at the country’s economic conditions and advises the Federal and Provincial Governments develop plans accordingly. It consists of the Prime Minister, the Chief Minister, a member from each province nominated by the Chief Minister, and 4 other members nominated by the Prime Minister. It is mentioned under article 156 of the Pakistan constitution.

<sup>109</sup> It stipulated that National Finance Commissions in the future would not be able to reduce the amounts given to the provinces, but would only be able to ‘change the proportions allocated to the provinces,’ (Nabi and Shaikh 2010, p.9).

different corridors were suggested.<sup>110</sup> As a follow-up to the visit, the LTC team aimed to engage the IETT experts to develop a feasibility study for BRT lines. Perhaps as a result of inspiration from the Turkish model, the team also aimed to operationalize the first BRT line by September 2010 (GoP TD 2010a).

Soon after, though, in the summer of 2010, there were massive floods in the country - impacting approximately 20 million people. As a result the MOU signed for consultancy on the LRTMS was 'put on hold' (GoP TD, November 3, 2010, p.2).

Despite the agreements with the Turks, later that month, in June 2010, delegations from South Korea consisting of Dohwa Engineering, Korean Express Way, Korean Railroad Authority and Green PAKOR visited Lahore to discuss the establishment of a BRT system in the city.<sup>111</sup> The delegation returned on 31 August and stayed until 7 September 2010, surveying Multan Road and Ferozepur road for the construction of a BRT corridor (GoP TD, October 2010). Afterwards, in late October, a delegation from the GoP, led by Khawaja Ahmed Hassan, a senior PML-N politician, Chairman of the Lahore Solid Waste Management Company, and one of Shahbaz Sharif's closet aides, visited South Korea to see their transport projects (Personal Interview, 2014). In preparation, the delegation had drafted a number of MOU's prior to visiting, and one of them was an agreement for a detailed design on Ferozepur Road (38 km) between the Transport Department, Dohwa Engineering, Green Pakor and LTC (GoP TD, October 2010).

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<sup>110</sup> Multan Road (Thokar Niaz Beg-Chuburji-Railway Station-UET and Dera Gujran) corridor, Green Town-Kalma Chowk-Gulberg-Qartaba Railway Station corridor, the Lahore Ring Road & Northern Loop, or Mall Road – Lahore International Airport (GoP TD, 2010a, GoP TD, November 3, 2010).

<sup>111</sup> It is unclear whether they were invited or were visiting on their own accord.

According to Hassan, upon seeing the BRT corridors, ‘I was impressed. I was amazed to learn of the difficult process through which the BRT was built. For me, it was stunning to see how they had gone through this process. Upon returning, I told the Chief Minister that this is something that will help us out as far as Lahore is concerned. This is something that is do-able. We don’t need to bring in a train, we just need to have buses and we just need to have a dedicated corridor for that,’ (Personal Interview, 2014). The Chief Minister told him to pursue it further, but focus on other public transportation projects as well (Personal interview, 2014).

The following month, in early November, the Transport Department composed a internal note for the Chairman of the P&D Department in which it stated that the department had received a proposal from Ulasim – an engineering subsidiary company of the Istanbul Municipality – after a long waiting period. Under this proposal, Ulasim offered to develop a comprehensive design of a BRT system in Lahore for \$385,000. The Transport Department recommended to the P&D Department that the provincial government should only accept this proposal on a single source basis,<sup>112</sup> and if it chose to do so, it should ask Ulasim to design a BRT system either on Multan Road or on Green Town corridor. It added at the end: ‘the Ferozepur Road corridor is being entrusted to Green PAKOR, a Korean company on BOT basis,’ (GoP TD, November 3, 2010, p.3) offering no further explanation as to when this was decided.

Accordingly, later that month, the LTC floated a Request for Proposal (RPF) on PPP/BOT basis for a BRT system on Ferozepur Road and Multan Road (GoP TD, 2010b). However, that same year, the Chief Minister also met delegations from Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Canada, and Malaysia amongst other countries, to invest in BRT and RMTS in Lahore. It is puzzling why a distinction

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<sup>112</sup> Hence it asked the provincial government to offer a contract for BRT development only through Ulasim



was made in government documents between investment for the LRMTS and the BRT at this time – given that a BRT system was being conceptualized for the same corridors that the LRMTS had been conceptualized for (i.e. Ferozpur Road and Multan Road)!

In any case, towards the end of the year, in December, the Chief Minister was scheduled to visit Istanbul to finalize agreement on solid waste management. Prior to leaving, he was briefed by the Transport Department on the status of the agreements with the Istanbul municipality, and asked to assure the municipality that Punjab was extremely serious about implementing a BRT project in Lahore<sup>113</sup> (GoP TD, November 3, 2010).

According to Khawaja Ahmed Hasaan: ‘as luck would have it, he said you come with me. So I went with him and then we saw the state-of-the-art BRT there in Istanbul. Although I was moved initially in Seoul, to see this concept was unique and I thought this is the way forward. But that was it. The Chief Minister said, I’m here and you have to sit now with these people who designed this BRT, you have to sign a MOU with them, till you don’t do that, you are not moving. And you have just 24 hours for that’ (Personal Interview, 2014).

‘Seeing is believing,’ said Murtaza Bukhari, Project Director, TPU (Personal interview, 2014).

‘The Chief Minister got impressed,’ said Sibtain Fazal Halim (Personal interview, 2014).

According to Khawaja Ahmed Hasaan, an umbrella agreement was signed between the Transport Department and the Istanbul Municipality to proceed further with the development of Lahore’s

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<sup>113</sup> In the brief, the Transport department mentioned that the ‘Pak Turk Business Association in Lahore has also been engaged to take forward the MOU signed with IETT and Istanbul Ulasim,’ (GoP TD, November 3, 2010p.2).

BRT.<sup>114</sup> At the same time, a three-year agreement was signed between Lahore Waste Management Company and ISTAC, an Istanbul municipality waste authority, for Solid Waste Management Services in Lahore. This indicated the beginning of a new relationship between the two countries as there had not been collaboration of this type in the past.

That same month, Khawaja Ahmed Hasaan became Chairman of LTC, and the following month he announced publicly that Turkey will invest in Lahore's BRT (Tribune 2011; The News 2011; Dawn 2011). However, it was still unclear which corridor they would develop a BRT on.

In 2011, feasibility studies were awaited from the Koreans and other investors. However, simultaneously, negotiations with NORINCO had also reached an advance stage, and it seemed likely that they would finance a metro on the Green line corridor through a loan<sup>115</sup>. In fact, in July 2011, a MOU was signed between the Punjab Government and NORINCO to develop an altered version of the Green line on Ferozpur Road.<sup>116</sup> Moreover, the government even announced that a 'soft opening of the project'<sup>117</sup> would take place on 14<sup>th</sup> August 2011 – Independence Day for Pakistan, (Dawn 2011).

However, soon after, the Chinese requested for a sovereign guarantee from the federal government, which meant that the provincial government could no longer consider this option

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<sup>114</sup> According to Hassan: 'I sat with their engineering company. They said everything on their side is handled by the Mayor. He's the person who is responsible. So we had a meeting with the mayor – a very dynamic person. A do-er also. And he was kind enough. He said okay we'll sign an agreement and you can use that agreement for all companies we have in the metropolitan. So that agreement was signed and then things started off,' (Personal interview, 2014). (It is unclear how this is different from the agreements signed earlier in May).

<sup>115</sup> According to Halim this was a \$1.7 billion project (Personal interview 2014).

<sup>116</sup> I call this an altered version because in March 2011, the provincial government had constructed a flyover bridge at Kalma Chowk which changed the original design proposed by the Systra study for the Ferozpur road green line LRMTS corridor.

<sup>117</sup> Likely in the form of a groundbreaking ceremony.

(given the tense relations between the PPP and PML-N) (Halim, personal interview, 2014). According to Sibtain Fazal Halim, given that financing for a mass rapid transit system was not available immediately – ‘he (Shahbaz Sharif) ran out of time. There were 1.5 years left in his tenure. The thinking was let’s do something. Let’s do the bus. The bus will serve you for 8-10 years’<sup>118</sup> (Personal interview 2014).

According to Jehangir Tareen, a senior PTI politician, Shahbaz Sharif came under intense pressure to do something after October 2011 due to the PTI’s increasing popularity: ‘After the 30th October PTI jalsa (rally), Lahore’s fortune bloomed. So this would not have been there if Imran Khan’s jalsa had not happened on 30th October,’ (Personal Interview, 2014).

It is hard to say whether or not this was the case, but almost 1.5 years after the Transport Delegation’s initial visit to Istanbul, in December 2011/January 2012, Shahbaz Sharif and his team visited Istanbul to finalize and discuss investment by Turk companies in BRT, traffic management, solid waste management and other joint ventures.

On their return from Istanbul, they announced that the government would be developing a BRT corridor on Ferozepur Road with the help of the Turks. Subsequently, in January 2012, the Punjab government hired Ulasim to conduct a detailed BRT feasibility study and preliminary design for various Lahore BRT corridors, including Ferozepur Road, Multan Road and Canal Road at the cost of PKR 67.606 million (\$349,000).<sup>119</sup> However, as its first task, the provincial government asked Ulasim was to prepare a preliminary design and tender documents for the

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<sup>118</sup> Although he added that this was purely based on the city’s needs.

<sup>119</sup> Mentioned as Gr. Sr. No. 1671 as an ongoing scheme in the Annual Development Program 2012-13

BRT corridor to be built on Ferozepur road at a cost of \$207,000 (GoP TD, 15 September, 2012). As a result, Ulasim provided assistance with the initial design. It gave ‘its recommendations on where the bus stations should be built, what should be the distance between two stations along the route, the speed of buses at certain points, whether the tickets should be sold at counters or inside the buses and so on,’ (Ahmed 2012). It also trained engineers from the National Engineering Services of Pakistan (NESPAK), who then took over the design of the corridor from Ulasim and developed a detailed design of the corridor. For this, they used BRT Planning Guides, Systra’s study, trips to Turkey and Ahmedabad as aids (Ozair Shah,<sup>120</sup> Personal interview, 2014).

#### 4.3.3 Political will and the capacity to deliver: 2012-2013

In March 2012, one year before PML-N was to complete its term, construction for the BRT began. The project had the undivided attention of the Chief Minister, and the aim was to complete the project as soon as possible, especially before the end of the PML-N’s term. The same month, JICA finalized a new \$2 million Urban Transport Master Plan for Lahore. Interestingly, the Master Plan recommended the development of one RMTS line (Green), and seven BRT lines between 2012-2020 (See Figure 7). It also recommended that two BRT lines (Orange and Blue) be upgraded to RMTS by 2030. However, by this time, construction for a BRT corridor was already underway on the Green Line.

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<sup>120</sup> Now General Manager at Punjab Metrobus Authority



Source: JICA Study Team

**Figure 7 - Recommendation of RMTS and BRT lines**

Once construction started, the project polarized public opinion with critics commenting on the high expense, relative neglect of the needs of the rest of the province, harsh working conditions for laborers, negative impacts on the environment, damaging influence on heritage, and a lack of public involvement in the process; supporters expressed pride in the advanced bus system as a

partial solution to worsening traffic problems, an option which would provide relief to low-middle income groups.

Amongst divided public opinion on the project, and elections coming up in less than a year, developers continued work by using 8-hour shifts for its workers that continued over 24 hours for the next 11 months.<sup>121</sup> Explaining the construction process, Project Director, TPU, Murtaza Bukhari stated: ‘we had meetings daily. In the morning we had the main steering committee meeting that was chaired by the Chief Minister. In the evening we had the working committee meeting which had all the agencies that were working on site, this was chaired by Director General, Lahore Development Authority. In the meantime, during the day when it was needed, there would be a meeting on the problems that came up during construction. That was chaired by Hamza Shahbaz,<sup>122</sup> or other government representatives; Local MNA’s would come and report problems in their areas, and action was taken immediately to minimize the inconvenience to the public’ (Personal interview, 2014).

According to a bureaucrat involved with the project: ‘we would leave at night, or early morning. Even if there were an issue at 11 pm at night, the Chief Minister would make sure that we addressed the problem. We used to have buses of officials visiting the site and addressing problems on the spot. From Secretary Communication and Works to Chairman Planning and Development – everyone was involved. I wouldn’t use any other word than ‘missionary zeal’ to describe the Chief Minister’s involvement,’ (Anonymous, Personal interview, 2014).

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<sup>121</sup> It should be added that they were being paid a hefty premium to complete the project early.

<sup>122</sup> Shahbaz Sharif’s son and member of the PML-N.

Khawaja Ahmed Hassan stated: ‘we visited almost every day. It was God-speed. You couldn’t – nobody has seen anything like this in the past,’ (Personal interview, 2014). Another bureaucrat closely involved with project implementation added: ‘the Chief Minister’s decision removes all hindrances,’ (Personal interview, 2014).

Every day, reports were presented personally to the Chief Minister on the previous day’s progress and actions were taken accordingly. According to a member of the caretaker government after their term was over: ‘It seemed like the whole government was working on this one project’ (Personal Interview, 2014).

In December 2012, a new institution, the Punjab Metrobus Authority (PMA) was also set up to manage the project.

Upon completion in 2013, in a television interview,<sup>123</sup> Shahbaz Sharif stated: ‘this is an extremely modern service for the common people, the first of its kind. When has anyone spent so much time on a public transport project? This is a Pakistani mega-project. It’s for the poor who see the rich flying off in cars.’

#### **4.4 Summary**

This chapter has shown that the development of the BRT corridor in Lahore between 2012-2013 was in fact the by-product of an idea introduced over two decades ago. The nature of the project changed from LRT-Metro-BRT over three distinct periods distinguished by the regime type.

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<sup>123</sup> Conducted by Javed Chaudhry (2013) for Express News. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGRkwAI5ehY>

While there were multiple moments during this period when the window of opportunity could have opened for the state to undertake large-scale spending on public transport, a number of different factors over time prevented it from opening until 2012. In light of the framework developed in chapter 2, the next chapter examines the various factors that influenced why the window of opportunity opened (or stayed closed) over these three phases.



## **Chapter 5**

### **Analysis**

This chapter analyzes the developments detailed in the previous chapter based on the framework developed in chapter 2. It looks at the influence of 5 structural conditions and 3 agency-based variables in influencing the opening of windows of opportunity over the three phases of the project. The structural conditions include: (1) priorities of global actors (2) priorities of political parties (3) technological options (4) availability of finance (5) degree of political competition. The agency-based explanations include: (1) the role of the state-elite – particularly politicians and bureaucrats, (2) commitment of a local champion with political will, and (3) the type of international actors.

#### **5.1 Phase 1: 1989-1999**

##### **5.1.1 Priorities of Global Actors**

Although the World Bank confirmed the need for the LRT proposed by JICA, OECF was the only multilateral agency interested in prioritizing the development of a mass transit system in Lahore.

At its end, the World Bank prioritized road development over public transport, as well as the privatization of public transport. During this period, it played a dominant role in developing and supporting the country's transport policies, and had a great impact in determining the state's priorities associated with public transport.

### 5.1.2 Priorities of Political Parties

As seen from the policies and projects introduced by the PML-N government during this period, while the party supported work on the LRT during its stints in power, it primarily focused on road development and privatization of public transport as part of its transportation policy. Moreover, particularly in 1998, it prioritized nationalistic foreign policy concerns over domestic developmental concerns.

The PPP, on the other hand, expressed a keen interest in improving public transport. However, both PML-N and PPP prioritized infrastructure development based on their regional support base. For instance, the PML-N prioritized Lahore and the PPP prioritized Karachi.

### 5.1.3 Degree of political competition

Electoral competition primarily existed between PML-N and PPP. Both parties had particularly antagonistic relations with each other. This competition combined with political instability impacted the manner in which projects were continued when a new government took charge.

#### 5.1.4 Technological Options

LRT was a new form of technology (suggested by JICA) available for large-scale spending on public transport. However, it was also the most expensive option in JICA's 1991 comprehensive study on Lahore.

#### 5.1.5 Availability of Finance

Finance was available through an OECF loan, however the terms had not been finalized.

#### 5.1.6 Role of the State Elite

Although a number of high bureaucrats were closely involved in advancing work on the LRT project, there is insufficient evidence to determine the role they played in advancing it. However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, bureaucrats were transferred from one post to another each time a new government was elected into power, suggesting that they primarily focused on uncritically implementing the priorities of each political party.

#### 5.1.7 Commitment of a Local Champion with Political Will

Benazir Bhutto expressed an interest in the development of a LRT in Lahore during her second term (1993-1996). However, it appears that she was the only political leader interested in implementing the Lahore LRT project. Nevertheless, she did not take the role of a local champion either. Shahbaz Sharif was seen as a local champion with political will in Lahore (1997-1999), but for the development of roads and boulevards – not public transport provision.

### 5.1.8 Type of International Actors

Dominant international actors at this time included multilaterals and international development institutions.

### 5.1.9 Summary

Overall, during this phase, a number of factors shaped the ability of the state to undertake large-scale investment in public transport in the form of a LRT corridor (See Table 6). In theory, there were several key moments when the window could have opened: (i) prior to the dismissal of the PML-N government in 1993, (ii) prior to the dismissal of the PPP government in 1996, and (iii) prior to the nuclear tests carried out by the PML-N. A major push for an agreement on the project came through the Japanese government's involvement (through technology and finance) as well as the PPP's Big Cities Renewal Program. Yet, the project failed to proceed towards implementation stages due to the shifting priorities of each incoming government, political instability, absence of a local champion, road building priorities of global actors such as the World Bank, and finally and most importantly – the PML-N's decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998. It was this decision that effectively foreclosed on the possibility of the window of opportunity opening for the state to undertake large-scale spending on public transport over this decade.

**Table 5: Factors For and Against a Mass Transit Mega-Project in Lahore, 1989-1999**

<b>For</b>	<b>Against</b>
Priorities of global actor - OECF	Priorities of global actor – World Bank
Priorities of political parties – PPP <sup>124</sup>	Priorities of PPP <sup>125</sup>
Availability of Technology – LRT	Priorities of PML-N
Availability of Finance	Political Instability
	Absence of Local Champion

## 5.2 Phase 2: 1999-2008

### 5.2.1 Priorities of Global Actors

During this period, the OECF indicated some interest in financing the LRT after it lifted sanctions on Pakistan, however it no longer appeared to be interested in prioritizing such an investment. This may have been due to its experience during the previous decade. In fact, between 2001-2011, Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Pakistan in the Transport sector only focused on road development suggesting this was its priority now.<sup>126</sup>

At this time, the ADB, however emerged as the dominant global actor interested in financing mass transit in Lahore. This was primarily because it was in line with its priorities at the time to support sustainable economic growth, private sector development, development of urban areas, and organizational development.<sup>127</sup> This decision also represented the growing focus on sustainability, urbanization, and use of Public Private Partnerships in global policy circles.

<sup>124</sup> Particularly during 1996.

<sup>125</sup> Focus on Karachi between 1993-1995

<sup>126</sup> Projects funded included: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Emergency Rural Road Rehabilitation Project, East-West Road Improvement Project (N-70) (I), Rural Roads Construction Project (II), Indus Highway Construction Project (III), Kohat Tunnel Construction Project (II and III). See: [http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our\\_work/types\\_of\\_assistance/index.html](http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/index.html)

<sup>127</sup> It classifies the project under these headings.

### 5.2.2. Priorities of Political Parties

The development of a mass transit system in Lahore ranked high in the PML-Q's government. This was due to (a) growing motorization and increasing demand for public transport and (b) the potential of mass transit systems to bring about economic growth and increase city competitiveness.

### 5.2.3 Technological Options

There was a move from a LRT system towards a medium metro-based mass transit system (which was a technology that was more expensive than the LRT). BRT was mentioned in the Lahore Master Plan; however, it did not capture the interest of policy-makers. There was no reference to this technology in other government documents.

### 5.2.4 Availability of Finance

Finance was partially available through the ADB, although a substantial amount still had to be raised through the private and public sectors.

### 5.2.5 Degree of Political Competition

The PML-Q faced very little competition during its 2002-2007 term as the leaders of the PPP and PML-N were in exile due to the military regime, allowing it to work on the project (with the aim of modernizing the city) without many concerns about other political parties. However, political competition emerged soon after its term was over when the military regime was under threat, and the PML-N and PPP decided to contest elections in 2008. This increase in political competition

threatened continuation of the project, as it was now possible that a new party could alter the project based on its priorities and preferences.

#### 5.2.6 Role of the State Elite

There seemed to be a consensus amongst political leaders and high bureaucrats that a mass transit project was needed in Lahore. High bureaucrats particularly saw it as a vehicle for modernizing the city, and political leaders saw it as a tool to enhance economic growth.

#### 5.2.7 Commitment of a Local Champion with Political Will

The Chief Minister at the time, Pervaiz Elahi, as well as Lahore's District Mayor, Mian Amer Mahmood, showed a keen interest in having a mass transit project implemented in Lahore, and championed its cause.

#### 5.2.8 Type of International Actors

This phase included multilaterals like the previous phase, however it also included international consultants who specialized in transport consulting.

#### 5.2.9 Summary

During this phase, the window of opportunity could have opened for the state to undertake large-scale investment in public transport through a mass transit mega project. As shown in the table below, practically all of the various variables mentioned above had lined up for its implementation. However, shifts in the political environment in the form of increased

competition for the PML-Q, and the uncertainty associated with whether or not the state and private sector would partially finance the project, prevented this window from opening.

**Table 6: Factors For and Against a Mass Transit Mega-Project in Lahore, 1999-2008**

<b>For</b>	<b>Against</b>
Priorities of global actors – ADB	Uncertain finance commitment– Pvt. Sector, State
Priorities of political actors – PML-Q	Increasing Political Competition (2008)
Availability of technology – Medium Metro	
Availability of partial finance – ADB	
Low degree of political competition (2002-2007)	
Consensus amongst state elite	
Commitment of a local champion with political will	

### **5.3 Phase 3: 2008-2013**

#### **5.3.1 Priorities of Global Actors**

A wide range of global actors were involved in this phase. The majority of them included companies and delegations representing various governments that were specifically interested in developing a metro or a BRT in the city – increasing the chances of an agreement being made with one of them.

#### **5.3.2 Priorities of Political Parties**

As the party in majority in Punjab, the PML-N's priorities determined the future of the LRMTS project to a great extent. Upon coming to power, while it expressed interest in the development



of a mass transit mega project for Lahore, its first priority was to complete its term<sup>128</sup> – possibly explaining why it did not continue with the ADB project after the corruption scandal.

However, over time it prioritized the development of a mass transit mega project for Lahore. This may have been due to two reasons: (i) Lahore’s worsening traffic conditions, and/or (ii) the political importance it attached to Lahore (which, as we saw, is integral to the party’s place in local and national politics).

Yet, it did not prioritize the type of project it was interested in pursuing till the end of 2011. It pursued multiple types of projects, possibly in the hopes that it could finalize an agreement on at least one of them, or find one that it could complete within its term. Moreover, it only decided to seriously pursue a BRT project for Ferozpur Road with the help of the Turks at the end of 2011 suggesting that its first priority was to develop a metro on this corridor. Overall, however, its priorities provided the impetus for increased state involvement in public transport through a mega-project.

### 5.3.3 Availability of Finance

Finance for the Green Line was not available as the provincial government could not attract private investment for it. Further, finance was unavailable as the provincial government was unable to invest in the project itself due to its limited fiscal capacity.

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<sup>128</sup> Its 2008 manifesto centered on opposition to military interference – suggesting that such interference was its biggest fear.

However, the provincial government's fiscal capacity improved greatly after the passing of the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment and 7<sup>th</sup> NFC award in 2010 possibly explaining why it made the decision to finance a BRT project in Lahore through provincial funds for the first time that same year. The increased fiscal space, combined with a low-cost technology, apparently played an important role in opening the window of opportunity for the PML-N government to realize its goal of developing a mass transit mega project in Lahore in 2012.

#### 5.3.4 Degree of Political Competition

Political competition was increasing particularly after 2010 due to PTI's growing popularity. The PML-N was also under immense pressure to perform at the time, as this was the first time that it was completing its term, and needed to rally voters behind it.

Further, it is likely that the PTI threatened the PML-N's upper and upper-middle income constituents, causing the latter party to focus its energies on its low-lower middle income constituents, particularly through a project that would also attract the attention of other groups as well (similar to the concept of the technological sublime).<sup>129</sup>

Moreover, while the PPP was not particularly a threat for the PML-N in Punjab, relations between the PML-N and the PPP were extremely strained towards the end of the term. This national-local tension decreased chances of cooperation for development projects, and partly

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<sup>129</sup> According to Cheema, post-elections, there was a feeling amongst PML-N party leaders that upper- upper middle classes had deserted the PMLN during elections. Therefore it may have been possible that prior to elections, the party decided to focus more on securing the votes of its lower-middle income, working class constituents (Personal Interview, 2014).

explained why the provincial government and the federal government could not agree to give NORICO a sovereign guarantee for a metro on Ferozpur road.

Overall, unlike the previous phase, increasing political competition provided the motivation for the PML-N to undertake a large-scale, visible public transport project particularly in 2012.<sup>130</sup>

### 5.3.5 Technological Options

BRT emerged as an increasingly desirable, low-cost technological option for mass transit (in addition to metros) that could be implemented quickly. Unlike the previous phase, it caught the attention of policy-makers mid-way through the government's term.

It is valid to say, however, that if this technology did not exist, the state may not have been able to invest heavily in public transport and develop a mass transit project between 2012-2013. Yet, it was also not the primary determinant (or, at least, not the only) of the state's decision to undertake large-scale spending on public transport as it was interested in doing so through others technologies as well.

### 5.3.6 Role of the State Elite

State elite played a critical role in the decision to develop a BRT corridor in Lahore. This was because decision-making was based entirely within the state's institutional domain. Moreover, it was extremely centralized as there was a small group of elite who primarily held decision-

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<sup>130</sup> Interestingly, as mentioned earlier, during the previous phase, increased political competition threatened the project that the PML-Q government had developed as a new government could have had other priorities. Yet, during the third phase, political competition provided the impetus for the PML-N government to implement a project prior to completing its term as it could have suffered electorally if it didn't do so.

making power. This included the Chief Minister, party leaders and high bureaucrats. Ultimately, the Chief Minister made decisions, however, he was highly influenced by party leaders and high bureaucrats.

For instance, high bureaucrats played a critical role in the decision to develop a BRT corridor in Lahore and invest in a mass transit mega project – particularly after their visit to Turkey. Unlike traditional explanations, it was not the Chief Minister who decided to implement a BRT corridor in Lahore after his visit to Istanbul, but it was a number of high bureaucrats who did. The Chief Minister only made the final decision after their return.

Further political leaders such as Khawaja Ahmed Hassan also played an integral role in influencing the Chief Minister's decision to develop a BRT system in Lahore. Similar to the high bureaucrats, he was also influenced by an international visit to South Korea. Together, bureaucrats and political leaders built the minimum space for action that the government needed to proceed with the final decision to develop a BRT corridor in Lahore after the agreement with NORINCO fell through.

Thus, the state elite provided the motivation for the state to undertake large-scale investment in public transport. They were also influential in ensuring that the previous government's project not get implemented. Moreover, they saw the BRT as a ready-made option that they could implement quickly and relatively cheaply as compared to a metro. Further, it met their modernist aspirations and allowed them to meet increasing urban transport challenges. However, as

mentioned above, given that attempts were made to develop a metro on Ferozepur Road till mid-2011, it seems that building a metro for Lahore was their first priority.

### 5.3.7 Commitment of a Local Champion with Political Will

Shahbaz Sharif demonstrated political will for large-scale spending on public transport infrastructure particularly during the last three years of his term. However, this was also in response to the decisions and impressions of high bureaucrats, senior government officials and party leaders. Moreover, there was a long, protracted period of indecisiveness on his part before he took the final decision to invest heavily in public transport, and develop a BRT corridor at the end of 2011. Hence, while political will was important, it was not the most important (or, once more, at least not the only) factor in the push towards the decision to invest heavily in public transport.

However, the project could certainly not have been completed in eleven months without his political will. His decision to support the project as a high-priority endeavor facilitated the budget and administrative support that allowed the project to proceed fairly quickly. Further, his personal monitoring in the form of daily visits and meetings with different agencies/constituency politicians/involved developers to inquire about their progress further added pressure on those responsible for implementing the project, and ensured that it got done quickly.

### 5.3.8 Type of International Actors

This period involved a number of non-traditional international actors – particularly as compared to the previous two phases. There was a shift from engagement with multilateral organizations

towards engagement with delegations from various countries. This may have been because the state focused on improving bilateral relations with other countries, or because it did not want to meet the conditions of the multilaterals.

As shown, after the government let the loan with the ADB lapse, it initiated discussions for the development of a mass transit system with a vast range of delegations including those from China, Colombia, Iran, Malaysia, Abu Dhabi, Canada, Dubai, Turkey and South Korea.

Yet, ultimately it completed the project with the assistance of the Turkish government. It may have chosen to pursue them after the Chinese backed out because an agreement on BRT development was already in the works. However, it may have also been due to background similarities between the two countries, as well as background similarities between the two governments in power (AKD and PML-N). According to a senior government official, 'Turkey is the only country that has respect for Pakistanis,' and the 'feeling of being Muslim brothers' also helps this relationship (Anonymous, personal interview 2014). Further, according to Cheema, Shahbaz Sharif sees the AKD as a model to emulate and sees many similarities amongst the two governments, particularly the moderate Muslim factor (Personal interview 2014).

Interestingly, Alam pointed out that the development of this relationship may also be related to the Turkish mayor's own aspirations, as he is now able to point to Lahore and take credit for the development of a BRT corridor there in the period of 11 months (Personal interview, 2014). Further, the agreement made with the Istanbul municipality for solid waste management earlier

may have also indicated the profitability of the BRT venture for the Turks. A journalist interviewed for this study also suggested that profitability might have actually been a factor on both sides, as senior party leaders of the PML-N are believed to have shares in the Turkish company that is now operating the BRT in Lahore (Sumra, personal interview, 2014)!

Ultimately, Turks were involved in three ways: (i) the inspiration for the project partly came from Istanbul (ii), the Turkish company Ulasim assisted with the initial design, and (iii) a Turkish company - Platform - now runs the buses on the corridor.

Unlike in previous phases, when the government had to turn to multilateral organizations, the provincial government financed the entire BRT project; paying Ulasim for its service, and currently providing an operational subsidy to Platform for its services as well.<sup>131</sup>

### 5.3.9 Summary

During this phase, through the adoption of the BRT corridor, the state was able to undertake large-scale investment in public transport for a project that had been under development for over 20 years. The impetus for this type of state involvement came primarily from (a) the visions, outlooks and experiences of high bureaucrats and political party leaders<sup>132</sup> who were interested in a mega project for the city, and (b) PML-N's electoral aspirations and concerns with increasing political competition. However, several other factors enabled the window of opportunity to finally open: a) broader fiscal transformations in the federation structure of

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<sup>131</sup> According to Sumra (personal interview 2014) this may be because the involvement of an international actor pacifies the public's concerns regarding accountability. However, it may just be a way to strengthen bilateral relations further.

<sup>132</sup> See chapter 3 for a distinction between high and low bureaucrats, and political party leaders, constituency politicians and party workers

Pakistan (through the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC award) that enabled it to finance a large-scale investment in public transport, (b) new technology that could be implemented cheaply and quickly compared to previous mass transit projects,<sup>133</sup> and (c) development of bilateral relations with a new type of actor in the form of the Turkish government.

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<sup>133</sup> Although it should be added that the state may have undertaken large-scale spending on public transport through the development of a metro if the Chinese had not asked for a sovereign guarantee in 2011



## **Chapter 6**

### **Conclusion and Reflections**

This thesis asked how the opportunity emerges for states in the Global South to undertake large-scale spending on public transport, particularly in cases where they have previously withdrawn from its provision.

Chapter 2 showed that state involvement in large-scale public transport provision has increasingly taken place in cities of the Global South through the adoption of mass transit mega projects, and particularly through BRT mega projects. It pointed out that this change might first be understood by focusing on research that explains why in general mega projects have been increasingly adopted in cities of the Global South in recent years. It suggests that this has been the case due to increasing globalization, urbanization, the role of various stakeholders, and the concept of the technological sublime. Next, it looked at research explaining BRT adoption, in particular. This research tends to provide similar explanations, giving primacy to individual-centric explanations, focusing particularly on the role of strong leadership shown by a local actor as the key determinant of this recent change. However, the chapter pointed out that little research critically examines this somewhat convenient explanation, calling for greater attention to explanations that focus on processes, politics, and the relationships between various agents, which converge to open a ‘window of opportunity’ that enables change to happen. Building on this work, the chapter developed a framework to understand how such change might come about,

and presented the case study method to be used to explain how the window of opportunity opened for increased state investment in public transport through the case of Lahore's first BRT corridor.

Chapter 3 described the context necessary to understand how the window of opportunity opened for the Punjab government to undertake large-scale spending on public transport in the form of Lahore's first BRT corridor. In the first section, it focused on the political context, as this context is traditionally missing from literature explaining transportation challenges in Pakistan. Here, it showed that Pakistan has had a particularly turbulent political history with repeated interference in politics by the military, as well as repeated early dismissals of democratic governments. It pointed out that this has disrupted its transition towards democracy, and shaped the priorities of the state. In this light, the transition from one civilian government to another in 2013 represented a significant turning point in Pakistan's history.

Chapter 3 also introduced 4 mainstream political parties in Punjab (which are relevant in Lahore): the PML-N, PPP, PTI, and PML-Q. Further, it pointed out that a number of key electoral trends and features determine the type of policy preferences of various political parties, particularly as the electoral system is extremely divided in terms of the regions, income groups, and types of constituents that the mainstream political parties stand for. Lastly, it showed that bureaucracy in the country has been increasingly politicized, as a result of which bureaucrats often work with politicians in an uncritical manner.

The Chapter's second section introduced the reader to the range of government actors relevant to transport planning and provision in Punjab. It showed that Lahore suffers from many of the characteristics that other cities in the Global South suffer from, namely: increasing motorization, deteriorating environment, large-scale spending on roads (also the primary form of mega-projects in the city) over public transport, withdrawal of the state from public transport provision, and multiple agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. Moreover, it pointed out that, as is the case in other cities, lower-income groups and working classes dominate NMT and public transport usage, and bear the brunt of the poor traffic conditions.

In light of this context, Chapter 4 provides a detailed account of the history of mass transit in Lahore. It showed that the inauguration of the BRT corridor in 2013 represented the culmination of an idea under development for over twenty years. It showed that its progress over time was based on developments in three distinct phases linked to the regime type: 1989-1999 (interrupted democracy), 1999-2008 (authoritarian), 2008- 2013 (democratic). The project started as LRT project in the first phase, shifted to a medium metro in the second, and changed into a BRT project in the third, and was driven by various combinations of global and local actors during these three periods.

Chapter 5 analyzes the developments detailed in the previous chapter based on the framework developed in chapter 2 and examining the Lahore case in three distinct phases. In the first phase, the major push for an agreement on the project came through the Japanese government's involvement (through technology and finance) as well as the PPP's Big Cities Renewal Program. The project failed to proceed towards implementation due to the shifting priorities of each

incoming government, political instability, absence of a local champion, road building priorities of global actors such as the World Bank, and finally, and most importantly, the PML-N's decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998. It was this decision that effectively kept shut the window of opportunity for the state to undertake large-scale spending on public transport over this decade.

In the second phase, the window of opportunity cracked open for the state to undertake large-scale investment in public transport through a mass transit mega project. At this time the political priorities of global actors (the ADB) and the political parties (the PML-Q) aligned. Further, technology was available in the form of a medium metro, the degree of political competition was low, there were two local champions with political will, and partial financing was available. However, the shifts in political environment in the form of increased competition for the PML-Q, and the uncertainty associated with whether or not the state and private sector would partially finance the project, kept the window shut.

Finally, in the third phase, the political priorities of the PML-N in the face of increasing political competition as well as its deteriorating relationship with the PPP (that prevented it from giving NORINCO a sovereign guarantee) pushed it to make the final decision to undertake large-scale spending on public transport in the form of Lahore's first BRT corridor. However, it was able to do so due to the work previously done by high bureaucrats and political party leaders. Other factors helping to open the window of opportunity included: (a) broader fiscal transformations in the federation structure of Pakistan, and (b) availability of a technology, BRT, that could be

implemented cheaply and quickly compared to previous mass transit projects, and (c) development of bilateral relations with the Turkish government.

Thus, overall, the priorities of the PML-N, the priorities of global actors, the availability of finance, the heightened degree of political competition, availability of relatively low-cost technology, and a change in the type of international actor involved all resulted in increased state involvement in public transport provision. While political will played a role, in contrast to traditional explanations offered by other authors, it was actually more important during the implementation stages as opposed to the planning stages, when the priorities of the Chief Minister were particularly unclear.

Hence, while acknowledging that there are a host of explanations that suggest how the opportunities arise for greater state involvement in public transport, this thesis demonstrated that such opportunities, and the form that they take, depend on the interplay between a number of structural and agency-based factors, and hence cannot simply be explained through technical explanations, or as the work of individual actors.

An analysis of these factors is important to shed light on the processes that feed into the politics of decision-making. These processes offer insights into the type of agents who are responsible for determining the manner in which urban development takes place, and their motivations for doing so. For instance, this study has shown that, locally, decision-making on urban development in Lahore is primarily controlled by a small group of elites with particular visions about how the

city should be developed. This insight is useful as a starting point to develop strategies to widen the scope of decision-making.

Thus, planners and those interested in improving public transport provision need to step away from explanations centered on political will towards an exploration of the conditions under which political will develops. If all we are interested in is strong leadership, we lend ourselves towards an output-oriented approach that simply looks at the end results, possibly contributing towards extremely centralized decision-making that does not serve the long-term, broader interests of city dwellers.

As topics of further research, this thesis asks: are mass transit mega projects the primary way to meet additional demand for public transport in cities of the Global South, or does state involvement in public transport provision also need to take place through increased spending on, and regulation of, other forms of public transport? If so, how can this be included in the agendas of decision makers? Further, particularly during implementation processes, how are the decisions taken to develop large-scale mega projects actually exercised (see Epilogue to this Chapter).

In light of these findings, this thesis suggests that decision-making in Lahore will continue to be based amongst a small group of elite, and will determine the shape that the city takes unless there is increasing political competition or public pressure against these decisions. Further, given the PML-N's electoral success after developing the BRT corridor in 11 months, finishing projects quickly will increasingly be the norm. Additionally, political priorities will continue to shape the projects that are adopted, and projects with high political dividends will take primacy over

planning. Moreover, given political benefits associated with mega-projects, these will continue to be adopted.

Hence, additional research is needed to understand the types of agents who can promote increased accountability of state institutions. The work promoting BRT adoption, in particular, needs to do its part by moving beyond explanations that highlight political will and strong leadership as the primary means to explaining change and, ultimately, success.

In Lahore, there seems to be an increasing acknowledgement of the need to improve public transport as the latest transport master plan recommends the development of additional BRT corridors. This is a positive change. However, what is also needed is introspection into whether or not state involvement in public transport simply needs to take place through the development of mass transit mega projects, or also through support of other forms of public transport (for instance, through investments and operations of large buses, vans). Flores (2013) suggests that large-scale road-based public transport projects like BRT might strengthen the hand of the state in exercising more control over the rest of the privatized public transportation services. Time will tell if such a dynamic emerges in the case of Lahore.

Further, in the case of Lahore, there is also a dire need to connect work on decision-making with work that shows how decisions are operationalized on the ground. For instance, at the end of chapter 4, we saw that the project was able to get implemented not only due to the Chief Minister's political will, but also due to the use of party machinery, and the collaboration between bureaucrats-politicians-developers. Hence, future research needs to look at how this was

possible and what the motivations of the various agents were. Such an understanding is likely to shed light on the sustainability of large-scale initiatives in public transport, as well as other forms of large-scale infrastructure spending.



## Epilogue

In the 2013 elections, the PML-N emerged as the leading party by a wide margin. Its leaders attributed the quick development of the BRT as one of the primary reasons they were able to make electoral gains.

Once completed, the project reflected the PML-N's capacity to deliver and served as a good signaling device to voters that the party was a 'do-er.' Further, it resonated with the city's modernist aspirations and met the demands of those concerned with greater equity in transportation planning and provision. Its development represented the first time that a mega project had been built to directly benefit public transport users, and set off discussions about mass transit systems in the rest of the country. In addition, it established a new authority in the form of the Punjab Metrobus Authority that aims to develop such projects in the rest of the provinces as well. Involvement with the project also built the capacity of local institutions such as TEPA. Overall, the development of the project promises to potentially transform urban transport in Lahore and elsewhere.

While this thesis somewhat discounts the traditional arguments about the importance of political will in getting the window to open, the implementation phase of the BRT project shows the importance of political will. Specially, the Chief Minister's political will was particularly important in getting the project completed in 11 months, although he was aided by the use of party machinery, and a close politician-bureaucrat-developer nexus.

In this milieu, however, citizen voice – in the form of demands for improved transportation – was largely missing from the conception, planning and implementation stages of the BRT project. Further, when concerns were raised by those impacted by the project, these went largely unheeded. Moreover, a number of rules and regulations were bypassed in the planning and construction processes.

Although not particularly different from other projects implemented by the PML-N, it is telling to take a quick look at the manner in which rules and regulations were bypassed to complete the project in 11 months and the reasons given for them being that way by those involved with its implementation; it leaves us with a sense of the conditions through which political will is exercised. While not the focus of this thesis, these parting reflections offer a glimpse at the potential ‘dark side’ of political will, based on excerpts taken from personal interviews in the course of this research.

### **Feasibility Study**

Before construction began, no feasibility study was carried out for the project. According to Murtaza Bukhari, ‘As far as feasibility studies are done, we had the feasibility of LRT, which was feasible. So why would BRT not be feasible? The Systra study showed that a high cost system was feasible, so why would a low cost system not be feasible?’

Another planner involved in the development of the BRT stated: ‘No proper feasibility was done the way it should have.’ Yet, he stated: ‘yes, in many high profile projects (from a political perspective), many aspects get left out. But so many projects just don’t get done because of this.’

I'm not saying these things aren't necessary, but when they get hung up in undue delays, projects suffer.'

However, Jehangir Tareen, a member of an opposition party differed: 'How can you do something without a feasibility? For God's sake. This is public money we are spending. This is not their own money. They have responsibility to spend it in the most responsible manner which they haven't done.'

### **Construction**

During the construction process, the project was presented and delivered in 9 packages, with each package being developed as a separate project as and when it was ready. The planners involved in the process said that this was done to speed up the process and build the capacities of the different construction companies given that no one company had the expertise to build the entire project. Others stated that this was done to avoid having to get approval from the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC), at the federal level, which gives approval for projects over PKR 5 billion. According to Rafay Alam: 'to avoid delays due to the PPP-PML-N split, what they did is they stacked the project. It's a legal term.'

### **Environmental Impact Assessment**

Similarly, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the first two parcels of the project was carried out after construction had started. According to Halim, Project Director of the Punjab Metrobus Authority, while EIAs were conducted for each parcel, there was no EIA done for the entire project. However, according to a planner involved with the project: 'What can be assumed

about EIA? Now it's environmentally better. It has improved the environment of the particular area. This is a fact that can't be denied.'<sup>134</sup>

### **Land Acquisition**

Additionally, land acquisition was carried out overnight in some places to make way for the project.<sup>135</sup> According to Rafay Alam, 'people protested in north Lahore by the Ravi River as severance would occur and could affect them.' However, he explained, land acquisition is carried out by a small group of the Chief Minister's closest aides who 'go out and absorb the ill-will generated by the acquisition. So for example, they give someone's son-in-law a promotion in the policy, or offer a post in the government to them,' as a means to placate.

### **Design**

In the meanwhile, the local engineering firm, NESPAK, took over the design of the BRT corridor from Ulasim, and decided to build a portion (8.3 km) on an elevated route due to the congestion in the area below. According to Ozair Shah, Ulasim was not convinced about developing this elevated portion. However, 'we did not listen to their design. The overhead bridge was our suggestion.' Many variations of the design were prepared – the length of the corridor changed multiple times during the construction period from 38 to 32 to 30 to 27 km, and the stops were also changed repeatedly.

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<sup>134</sup> In September, a complaint was filed to the Environment Protection Department citing violations of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act of 2012.

<sup>135</sup> Some cases are still pending in court

## **Rules and Procedures**

When discussing the circumventing of the rules and procedures, Ozair Shah, General Manager of the Punjab Metrobus Authority stated: ‘Okay if you are book-ish and procedural then yes you are right. A lot of procedures were not followed. But what is important? The procedures or the end result?’

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## Appendix A: List of Interviews

No.	Name	Position	Organization
1	Khawaja Ahmed Hassan	Party Leader	Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz
		Chairman	Lahore Transport Company
		Chairman	Lahore Waste Management Company
		Vice-Chairman	Lahore Development Authority
		Director	Punjab Metrobus Authority
2	Sibtain Fazal Halim	Managing Director	Punjab Metrobus Authority
3	Dr. Murtaza Bukhari	Project Director	Transport Planning Unit, Transport Department
4	Ozair Shah	General Manager	Punjab Metrobus Authority
5	Jehangir Tareen	Party Leader	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
6	Ali Cheema	Professor	Lahore University of Management Sciences
		Founding Member	Center for Economic Research Pakistan (CERP)
7	Faisal Bari	Professor	Lahore University of Management Sciences
			Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS)
8	Khawaja Haider Latif	CEO	Lahore Transport Company
9	Rafay Alam	Lawyer	Saleem, Alam & Co.
		Director	Lahore Waste Management Company
		Director	Urban Unit
		Environmental Activist	-
10	Shaukat Ali	Secretary Transport	Transport Department

11	Rizwan Mehboob	Former District Coordination Officer (DCO) (Caretaker Govt. 2013)	City District Government Lahore
12	Mazhar Iqbal	Transport Specialist/Consultant	-
13	Tasneem Noorani	Ex-Chairman	Lahore Transport Company
14	Imran Muhammad	Senior Lecturer	Massey University
15	Anwar Hussain Sumra	Journalist	Express News
16	Anonymous	Architect	-
17	Anonymous	Planner	-
18	Anonymous	Senior Planner	-
19	Anonymous	Senior Bureaucrat	-
20	Anonymous	Bureaucrat	-