Notes on miscellaneous topics – II

Frege’s assertion sign
See the attached quote from Geach (from Kenny’s *Frege*).

The concept *horse*, and the grammatical predicate ‘is red’
See the attached excerpt from Kenny, *Frege*. A prize is available for an explanation of Kenny’s point.

The view of “On Sense and Reference”
According to the *Begriffsschrift* (§8), identity is a relation between *names*, not the *referents* of names (objects). According to the *standard interpretation* (see Beaney, 21-2), in “On Sense and Reference” Frege rejects his earlier *name view* in favor of the *object view*; identity is now taken to be a relation between objects, and the informativeness of identity statements is explained in terms of a difference in sense. According to Thau and Caplan, “What’s Puzzling Gottlob Frege?”, CJP 31, 2001, Frege *doesn’t* reject the name view in “On Sense and Reference”. Heck responds on behalf of orthodoxy (you can find this on his website), and Thau and Caplan respond to Heck (forthcoming).

The Mates Problem
In 1950, Benson Mates pointed out that (by way of criticizing Carnap) that instances of:

(1) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that \( D \), believes that \( D \).
(2) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that \( D \), believes that \( D’ \).
can apparently differ in truth value when the substituends for ‘D’ and ‘D’ differ only by synonyms (e.g. ‘the holiday lasted for a fortnight’, ‘the holiday lasted for a period of fourteen days’). This raises obvious problems for the view that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together.


**Mereology**

Mereology has one primitive, ‘is a part of’.

**Definition**

\( x \) overlaps \( y \) iff there is some \( z \) such that \( z \) is a part of \( x \) and \( z \) is a part of \( y \).

**Definition**

\( x \) is a fusion of some things iff \( x \) has all of those things as parts and every part of \( x \) overlaps one them.

The axioms of mereology are just three:

(Transitivity) If \( x \) is a part of \( y \), and \( y \) is a part of \( z \), then \( x \) is a part of \( z \).

(Unrestricted Composition) If there are some things, there is a fusion of those things.

(Uniqueness of Composition) Any fusion of some things is the only fusion of those things.

For more details and references, see Lewis, Parts of Classes. If Unrestricted Composition is true, there is an object that has G. E. Moore, \( \pi \), and my copy of Principia Ethica as parts, which might be thought counterintuitive. For an argument against Unrestricted
Composition, see van Inwagen, Material Beings. See also Rosen and Dorr, “Composition as a Fiction”, Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, ed. Gale.

“I falsely believe that p”

Analyticity, a priority, necessity

Contextualism
Stewart Cohen, “How to be a fallibilist,” in James Tomberlin, ed. Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988), 91-123
Soc. 96 (1996), 317-33

The suggestion that ‘Moore knows that he has a hand’ might express a true proposition on the Clapham Omnibus and a false one in a philosophy seminar was first made by
David Lewis in “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (see p. 247 of *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1).

**Weakness of will and akrasia**


**Personal identity**

Animalism (“I was once a fetus”): Olson, *The Human Animal*.


Relative identity (x is the same F as y, but x is not the same G as y): Geach, *Reference and Identity* (pro); Wiggins, *Sameness and Substance* (con).

Fission does not increase the number of people: Lewis, “Survival and Identity” (*Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1).


**Austin**

An influential anti-sense data paper is Barnes, “The Myth of Sense Data”, *PAS* 45, 1944/5 (reprinted in Swartz, *Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing*). For a recent sympathetic

Dreams are not experiences: Malcolm, *Dreaming* (a minor Wittgensteinian/verificationist classic).

Austin and “disjunctivism”: Thau, “What is disjunctivism?”, *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming.

The arguments from illusion and hallucination: Thau, ibid.; Smith, *The Problem of Perception*. 