Essence Without Fundamentality
Author(s)
Rayo Fierro, Agustin
Date Issued
November 2015
Journal
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher
UPV/EHU Press
Citation
Rayo, Agustin. “Essence Without Fundamentality.” THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30, 3 (November 2015): 349–363
Version
Final published version
Abstract
In Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Boris Kment argues that a single notion of essence can be used to play two distinct theoretical roles. He thinks there is an important connec- tion between essence and metaphysical necessity, on the one hand, and between essence and metaphysical explanation, on the other.
In this paper I will argue that it is not clear that a single notion of essence should be used to perform both these jobs. For whereas the project of giving metaphysical explanations requires a notion of essence that distinguishes between truths that are more or less “funda- mental” in a metaphysical sense, the project of shedding light on metaphysical necessity does not. Keywords: essence; fundamentality
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.14472
