Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
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Banerjee_Self-targeting.pdf
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1.74 MB
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Author(s)
Alatas, Vivi
Hanna, Rema
Purnamasari, Ririn
Wai-Poi, Matthew
Banerjee, Abhijit
Olken, Benjamin
Date Issued
March 2016
Journal
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Alatas, Vivi et al. “Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” Journal of Political Economy 124.2 (2016): 371–427. © 2016 by The University of Chicago
Version
Final published version
Abstract
This paper shows that adding a small application cost to a transfer program can substantially improve targeting through self-selection. Our village-level experiment in Indonesia finds that requiring beneficiaries to apply for benefits results in substantially poorer beneficiaries than automatic enrollment using the same asset test. Marginally increasing application costs on an experimental basis does not further improve targeting. Estimating a model of the application decision implies that the results are largely driven by the nonpoor, who make up the bulk of the population, forecasting that they are unlikely to pass the asset test and therefore not bothering to apply.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1086/685299
