Cancelling the Maxim of Quantity: Another challenge for a Gricean theory of Scalar Implicatures
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2859-6294-1-PB.pdf
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139.02 KB
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Adobe PDF
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86c26654b58f6707d9e1f7f4238d5605
Author(s)
Fox, Daniel
Date Issued
April 2014
Journal
Semantics and Pragmatics
Publisher
Linguistic Society of America
Citation
Fox, Danny. “Cancelling the Maxim of Quantity: Another Challenge for a Gricean Theory of Scalar Implicatures.” Semantics and Pragmatics 7 (April 28, 2014).
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Grice (1975) pointed out that the ignorance inferences normally
drawn when disjunctive sentences are uttered are cancelled when it is presupposed that speakers are not going to provide all of the relevant information that they have available (e.g., in the context of a treasure hunt). This argues that ignorance inferences depend on the maxim of quantity for their derivation. Here it is argued that the situation with Scalar Implicatures is different. This is expected by the grammatical theory of Scalar Implicatures, but not by standard Gricean or neo-Gricean alternatives. Keywords: Implicatures, Scalar Implicatures, ignorance inferences, Maxim of Quantity,
Exhaustification, Exh
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.3765/SP.7.5
