Repository logo
Log in(current)
Repository logoMIT Open ScholarshipDSpace@MIT
  1. Home
  2. MIT Libraries
  3. MIT Theses
  4. Graduate Theses
  5. On symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols

On symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols

Thumbnail Image
Download
Name

62326058-MIT.pdf

Description
Full printable version
Size

4.35 MB

Format

Adobe PDF

Checksum (MD5)

7c8597f69bf24c38db904cdd688b0b77

Author(s)
Patil, Akshay (Akshay R.)
Advisor(s)
Ronald L. Rivest and Ran Canetti.
Date Issued
2005
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
The universally composable symbolic analysis (UCSA) framework layers Dolev-Yao style symbolic analysis on top of the universally composable (UC) secure framework to construct computationally sound proofs of cryptographic protocol security. The original proposal of the UCSA framework by Canetti and Herzog (2004) focused on protocols that only use public key encryption to achieve 2-party mutual authentication or key exchange. This thesis expands the framework to include protocols that use digital signatures as well. In the process of expanding the framework, we identify a flaw in the framework's use of UC ideal functionality FKE. We also identify issues that arise when combining FKE with the current formulation of ideal signature functionality FSI,. Motivated by these discoveries, we redefine the FPKE and FsIG functionalities appropriately.
Description
Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-94).
Subjects
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Terms of Use
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Persistent DSpace Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33331
Repository logo
PrivacyPermissionsAccessibilityContact us
Repository logo
Notify us about copyright concerns.