Political economy of Ramsey taxation
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Acemoglu_Political economy.pdf
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217.72 KB
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Adobe PDF
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Author(s)
Acemoglu, Daron
Golosov, Mikhail
Tsyvinski, Aleh
Date Issued
December 2010
Journal
forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier B.V.
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, Mikhail Golosov, and Aleh Tsyvinski. “Political economy of Ramsey taxation.” Journal of Public Economics In Press
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies. We show that, as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens, the Chamley–Judd result of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than the citizens, the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long-run capital taxation.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.014
