Reply to Fine on Aboutness
Name
11098_2017_922_ReferencePDF.pdf
Size
184.2 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
c5cf44f21dfb491b11ee009fbd6ea17a
Author(s)
Yablo, Stephen
Date Issued
May 2017
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Yablo, Stephen. “Reply to Fine on Aboutness.” Philosophical Studies 175, no. 6 (May 29, 2017): 1495–1512.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
A reply to Fine’s critique of Aboutness. Fine contrasts two notions of truthmaker, and more generally two notions of “state.” One is algebraic; states are sui generis entities grasped primarily through the conditions they satisfy. The other uses set theory; states are sets of worlds, or, perhaps, collections of such sets. I try to defend the second notion and question some seeming advantages of the first.
Subjects
Meaning, Truth, Metaphysics, Intentionality, Propositions
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0922-5
