Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
Name
Ashlagi-2014-Free riding and part.pdf
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675.68 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
69c5222b0953786453587bc614c1b9c4
Author(s)
Ashlagi, Itai
Roth, Alvin E.
Date Issued
October 2014
Journal
Theoretical Economics
Publisher
The Econometric Society
Citation
Ashlagi, Itai, and Alvin E. Roth. “Free Riding and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange.” Theoretical Economics 9, no. 3 (September 2014): 817–863.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
As multi-hospital kidney exchange has grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals can choose to enroll only their hard-to-match patient–donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already been observed.
We show that as the population of hospitals and patients grows, the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully becomes low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individual rationality is high—in lost transplants. We identify a mechanism that gives hospitals incentives to reveal all patient–donor pairs. We observe that if such a mechanism were to be implemented and hospitals enrolled all their pairs, the resulting patient pools would allow efficient matchings that could be implemented with two- and three-way exchanges.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te1357
