The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission
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11098_2021_1627_ReferencePDF.pdf
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893.91 KB
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Checksum (MD5)
8d21ccee61457ee87634a7e4d7937f26
Author(s)
Spencer, Jack
Date Issued
March 2021
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Spencer, J. The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission. Philos Stud 178, 3819–3842 (2021)
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
This paper develops a form of moral actualism that can explain the procreative asymmetry. Along the way, it defends and explains the attractive asymmetry: the claim that although an impermissible option can be self-conditionally permissible, a permissible option cannot be self-conditionally impermissible.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01627-y
