Incentive schemes for Internet congestion management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing
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Amin_Incentive schemes.pdf
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304.07 KB
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Author(s)
Loiseau, Patrick
Schwartz, Galina
Musacchio, John
Amin, Saurabh
Date Issued
January 2012
Journal
Procceedings of the 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2011
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Citation
Loiseau, Patrick et al. “Incentive Schemes for Internet Congestion Management: Raffles Versus Time-of-day Pricing.” IEEE, 2011. 103–110.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
The Internet is plagued with congestion problems of growing severity which are worst at peak periods. In this paper, we compare two schemes that incentivize users to shift part of their usage from the peak-time to the off-peak time. The traditional time-of-day pricing scheme gives a fixed reward per unit of shifted usage. Conversely, the raffle-based scheme provides a random reward distributed in proportion of each user's fraction of the total shifted usage. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that both schemes can achieve an optimal level of decongestion at a unique Nash equilibrium. We provide a comparison of the schemes' sensitivity to uncertainty of the users' utilities.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2011.6120156
