Rents and economic development: the perspective of Why Nations Fail
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Rents-and-Economic-Development-2gxihve.pdf
Description
Accepted version
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2.19 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Acemoglu, K. Daron
Robinson, James A.
Date Issued
March 2019
Journal
Public Choice
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, "Rents and economic development: the perspective of Why Nations Fail." Public Choice 181, 1/2 (October 2019): 13–28 doi. 10.1007/s11127-019-00645-z ©2019 Authors
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We present the approach to comparative economic development of Why Nations Fail. Economic prosperity requires inclusive economic institutions—those which create broad based incentives and opportunities in society. Extractive economic institutions, which lack these properties, create poverty. Variation in economic institutions is created by differences in political institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are the result of political choices which arise under inclusive political institutions: a strong state and a broad distribution of power in society. When either of these conditions fails one has extractive political institutions that lead to extractive economic institutions. We relate our analysis to Tullock’s notion of ‘rent seeking’. ©2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/S11127-019-00645-Z
