Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China
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Author(s)
Distelhorst, Greg
Hou, Yue
Date Issued
May 2017
Journal
Journal of Politics
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Distelhorst, Greg, and Yue Hou. “Constituency Service Under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China.” The Journal of Politics 79, 3 (July 2017): 1024–1040 © 2017 Southern Political Science Association
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Why do nondemocratic regimes provide constituency service? This study develops theory based on a national field audit of China’s “Mayor’s Mailbox,” an institution that allows citizens to contact local political officials. Analyzing government responses to over 1,200 realistic appeals from putative citizens, we find that local service institutions in China are comparably responsive to similar institutions in democracies. Two key predictors of institutional quality are economic modernization and the intensity of local social conflict. We explain these findings by proposing a demand-driven theory of nondemocratic constituency service; in order to sustain the informational benefits of citizen participation, the responsiveness of service institutions must increase with citizen demand. We then offer supplementary evidence for this theory by analyzing the content of real letters from citizens to local officials in China. Keywords: authoritarian regimes; institutions; constituency service; responsiveness; China
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1086/690948
