Knowledge of Objective ‘Oughts’: Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle
Name
MUOKOOv3.pdf
Description
Accepted version
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171.44 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Spencer, Jack
Date Issued
May 2020
Journal
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
Muñoz, Daniel and Jack Spencer. “Knowledge of Objective ‘Oughts’: Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (May 2020) © 2020 The Author(s)
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for agents and advisors.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12702
