Efficiency loss in a class of two-sided market mechanisms
Name
163581717-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
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2.32 MB
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Author(s)
Neumayer, Sebastian James
Advisor(s)
John N. Tsitsiklis.
Date Issued
2007
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
This thesis addresses the question of how to efficiently allocate resources among competing players in convex environments. We will analyze the efficiency loss of certain two-sided market mechanisms involving both consumers and suppliers that are natural extensions of Johari's thesis. After gaining intuition about the mechanisms, we show that their worst case efficiency loss approaches 100%. We then introduce some supply-side market mechanisms in a network setting. In the market mechanisms we study, every player submits a bid which specifies a demand or supply function from a parameterized family. Then, the mechanism allocates resources so that supply meets demand.
Description
Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2007.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 57).
Subjects
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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