The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
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aer.20151425.pdf
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1.14 MB
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Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila
Agarwal, Nikhil
Pathak, Parag
Date Issued
December 2017
Journal
American Economic Review
Citation
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila et al. “The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match.” American Economic Review 107, 12 (December 2017): 3635–3689
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151425
