Mergers that harm sellers
Name
Hemphill Rose Mergers that Harm Sellers.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
431.46 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
2edda19235475d59c829dcdbadab1c23
Author(s)
Hemphill, C. Scott
Rose, Nancy L
Date Issued
May 2018
Journal
Yale Law Journal
Publisher
Cogitatio Press
Citation
Hemphill, C. Scott and Nancy L. Rose. "Mergers that Harm Sellers." The Yale Law Journal 127, 7 (May 2018): 1742-2203 © 2018 Cogitatio Press
Version
Final published version
Abstract
This Feature examines the antitrust treatment of mergers that harm sellers. We separately consider two mechanisms of harm, increased classical monopsony power and increased bargaining leverage. We show that lost upstream competition is an actionable harm to the competitive process. Our central claim is that harm to sellers in an input market is sufficient to support antitrust liability. We defend this conclusion against the contrary view that demonstrated harm to the merging firms’ downstream purchasers or final consumers is an essential element of any antitrust claim. Nor is it necessary for plaintiffs to demonstrate a reduction in the input quantity transacted. We further argue that claimed “efficiencies” premised on a reduction in buy-side competition are not efficiencies at all.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/feature/mergers-that-harm-sellers
