Financial reporting quality and uncertainty about credit risk among the ratings agencies
Name
828425011-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
4.69 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
fc38cb0404c4b2fb27408c2dec405fcd
Author(s)
Akins, Brian Keith
Advisor(s)
Joseph Weber.
Date Issued
2012
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
I study whether financial reporting quality resolves uncertainty about credit risk by examining how it affects disagreement between rating agencies. I find better reporting quality is associated with less uncertainty about credit risk as captured by disagreement about ratings between the agencies. Further, my results are consistent with reporting quality becoming more important in reducing uncertainty when an agency does not have access to private information. Finally, I examine whether SFAS 142, which ended goodwill amortization and requires managerial estimates to determine potential impairments of goodwill, affected uncertainty about credit risk. I find increased uncertainty between agencies about the goodwill account for firms with significant goodwill after the implementation of SFAS 142. I contribute to the literature on the role of reporting quality in debt markets and on debt market information intermediaries.
Description
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2012.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 46-53).
Subjects
Sloan School of Management.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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