Plutus : measuring message gossiping in P2P networks and providing incentives in cryptocurrencies
Name
1078785111-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
632.72 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
8770a49a9ed7085ef6f6ce4a039126a0
Author(s)
Hemo, Rotem
Advisor(s)
Yossi Gilad and Nickolai Zeldovich.
Alternative Title
Measuring message gossiping in P2P networks and providing incentives in cryptocurrencies
Date Issued
2018
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this thesis, we present Plutus, an efficient and game-theoretically proven incentive mechanism for Algorand, a proof-of-stake cryptocurrency. In order to operate, Algorand requires users to constantly propagate messages but has no mechanism to incentivize users to do so. Plutus solves this problem by keeping track of each message propagation path and rewarding the users who propagated messages using a lottery. We implemented a prototype of Plutus on top of Algorand to measure the performance and overhead of Plutus. Experimental results show that with Plutus, Algorand's block confirmation time increases by only 7% and that there is no penalty on Algorand's scalability.
Description
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2018.
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 47-48).
Subjects
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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