The Price of Anarchy Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs
Name
OR 367-03.pdf
Size
288.61 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
11c664c25f3af160aca58d9f858ce726
Author(s)
Perakis, Georgia
Date Issued
December 2003
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Operations Research Center
Series/Report no.
;OR 367-03
Abstract
In this paper we characterize the "price of anarchy", i.e., the inefficiency between user and system optimal solutions, when costs are non-separable, asymmetric and nonlinear, generalizing earlier work that has addressed "price of anarchy" under separable costs. The generalization models traffice equilibria, competitive multi-period pricing and competitive supply chains. The bounds established in the paper are tight and explicitly account for the degeee of asymmetry and nonlinearity of the cost function. We introduce and alternate proof method for providing bounds that uses ideas from semidenfinite optimization. Finally, in the context of nulti-period pricing our analysis establishes that user and system optimal soulutions coincide.
Subjects
System and User-Optimization,
Traffic Equilibrium,
Price of Anarchy.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center
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