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  4. Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

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Author(s)
Beath, Andrew
•
Christia, Fotini
•
Egorov, Georgy
•
Enikolopov, Ruben
Date Issued
July 2016
Journal
The Review of Economic Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Citation
Beath, Andrew, et al. “Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan.” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 83, no. 3, July 2016, pp. 932–68. © 2016 The Author
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This article explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes. We show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives selected by elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Persistent DSpace Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/118863
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/RESTUD/RDW018
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