Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
Name
SSRN-id2291187.pdf
Size
549.34 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
62b067cc25c9a0497cbfc8f228bf31db
Author(s) • • •
Beath, Andrew
Christia, Fotini
Egorov, Georgy
Enikolopov, Ruben
Date Issued
July 2016
Journal
The Review of Economic Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Citation
Beath, Andrew, et al. “Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan.” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 83, no. 3, July 2016, pp. 932–68. © 2016 The Author
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This article explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes. We show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives selected by elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/RESTUD/RDW018