The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching
Name
2ndRevision alexedit.pdf
Description
Submitted version
Size
869.29 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
bf139072433011430ca86fc81b316221
Author(s)
Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg
Date Issued
May 2020
Journal
Econometrica
Publisher
The Econometric Society
Citation
Deb, Joyee et al. “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching.” Econometrica, 88, 3 (May 2020): 917-964 © 2020 The Author(s)
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non‐uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record‐keeping or communication devices—including cheap talk communication and public randomization—are necessary.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16680
