Repository logo
Log in(current)
Repository logoMIT Open ScholarshipDSpace@MIT
  1. Home
  2. MIT Open Access Articles
  3. MIT Open Access Articles
  4. Matrix PRFs: Constructions, Attacks, and Applications to Obfuscation

Matrix PRFs: Constructions, Attacks, and Applications to Obfuscation

Thumbnail Image
Download
Name

2019-1085.pdf

Description
Accepted version
Size

413.8 KB

Format

Adobe PDF

Checksum (MD5)

3f19f710debbebbf09ea25039617154e

sword-2021-04-15T18:30:17.original.xml (130 B)
Original SWORD entry document
Author(s)
Chen, Yilei
•
Hhan, Minki
•
Vaikuntanathan, Vinod
•
Wee, Hoeteck
Date Issued
2019
Journal
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Citation
Chen, Yilei, Hhan, Minki, Vaikuntanathan, Vinod and Wee, Hoeteck. 2019. "Matrix PRFs: Constructions, Attacks, and Applications to Obfuscation." Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 11891.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
© 2019, International Association for Cryptologic Research. We initiate a systematic study of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) that are computable by simple matrix branching programs; we refer to these objects as “matrix PRFs”. Matrix PRFs are attractive due to their simplicity, strong connections to complexity theory and group theory, and recent applications in program obfuscation. Our main results are:We present constructions of matrix PRFs based on the conjectured hardness of computational problems pertaining to matrix products.We show that any matrix PRF that is computable by a read-c, width w branching program can be broken in time poly this means that any matrix PRF based on constant-width matrices must read each input bit ωc times. Along the way, we simplify the “tensor switching lemmas” introduced in previous IO attacks.We show that a subclass of the candidate local-PRG proposed by Barak et al. [Eurocrypt 2018] can be broken using simple matrix algebra.We show that augmenting the CVW18 IO candidate with a matrix PRF provably immunizes the candidate against all known algebraic and statistical zeroizing attacks, as captured by a new and simple adversarial model.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Persistent DSpace Link
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/137165
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36030-6_3
Repository logo
PrivacyPermissionsAccessibilityContact us
Repository logo
Notify us about copyright concerns.