Time pressure and honesty in a deception game
Name
1805.09841.pdf
Description
Accepted version
Size
293.86 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
a3d6b230bec7cca1b7be183d6af39781
Author(s)
Capraro, Valerio
Schulz, Jonathan
Rand, David G
Date Issued
2019
Journal
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
© 2019 Elsevier Inc. Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N = 1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SOCEC.2019.01.007
