An Empirical Model of the Medical Match
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Agarwal_An empirical.pdf
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720.98 KB
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Author(s)
Agarwal, Nikhil
Date Issued
July 2015
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Agarwal, Nikhil. “ An Empirical Model of the Medical Match † .” American Economic Review 105, no. 7 (July 2015): 1939–1978.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20131006
