Hazard Analysis of Complex Spacecraft Using Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis
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Leveson_Hazard analysis.pdf
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1.08 MB
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Checksum (MD5)
2050d807f950ed4b2229437382106ada
Author(s)
Ishimatsu, Takuto
Leveson, Nancy G.
Thomas, John P.
Katahira, Masafumi
Miyamoto, Yuko
Ujiie, Ryo
Nakao, Haruka
Hoshino, Nobuyuki
Fleming, Cody Harrison
Date Issued
February 2014
Journal
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets
Publisher
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Citation
Ishimatsu, Takuto, Nancy G. Leveson, John P. Thomas, Cody H. Fleming, Masafumi Katahira, Yuko Miyamoto, Ryo Ujiie, Haruka Nakao, and Nobuyuki Hoshino. “Hazard Analysis of Complex Spacecraft Using Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis.” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 51, no. 2 (March 2014): 509–522.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
A new hazard analysis technique, called systems-theoretic process analysis, is capable of identifying potential hazardous design flaws, including software and system design errors and unsafe interactions among multiple system components. Detailed procedures for performing the hazard analysis were developed, and the feasibility and utility of using it on complex systems was demonstrated by applying it to the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency H-II Transfer Vehicle. In a comparison of the results of this new hazard analysis technique to those of the standard fault tree analysis used in the design and certification of the H-II Transfer Vehicle, systems-theoretic hazard analysis found all the hazardous scenarios identified in the fault tree analysis as well as additional causal factors that had not been identified by fault tree analysis.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering Systems Division
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.2514/1.a32449
