Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Pathak_Incentives and.pdf
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Author(s)
Kojima, Fuhito
Pathak, Parag
Date Issued
June 2009
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Kojima, Fuhito, and Parag A. Pathak. 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets." American Economic Review, 99(3): 608–27.© 2009 AEA
Version
Final published version
Abstract
A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.608
