Strict robustness to incomplete information
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42973_2023_Article_136.pdf
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Author(s) • •
Morris, Stephen
Oyama, Daisuke
Takahashi, Satoru
Date Issued
June 21, 2023
Publisher
Springer Nature Singapore
Citation
Morris, Stephen, Oyama, Daisuke and Takahashi, Satoru. 2023. "Strict robustness to incomplete information."
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Abstract
We study a strict version of the notion of equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (Econometrica 65:1283–1309, 1997) that allows for a larger class of incomplete information perturbations of a given complete information game, where with high probability, players believe that their payoffs are close to (but may be different from) those of the complete information game. We show that a strict monotone potential maximizer of a complete information game is strictly robust if either the game or the associated strict monotone potential is supermodular, and that the converse also holds in all binary-action supermodular games.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Creative Commons Attribution
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-023-00136-3