Incentive-compatible surveys via posterior probabilities
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s0040585x97t989957.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
468.51 KB
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Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Cvitanić, J
Prelec, Drazen
Radas, Sonja
Šikić, H
Date Issued
2020
Journal
Theory of Probability and its Applications
Publisher
Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM)
Version
Final published version
Abstract
© by SIAM. We consider the problem of eliciting truthful responses to a survey question when the respondents share a common prior that the survey planner is agnostic about. The planner would therefore like to have a “universal” mechanism, which would induce honest answers for all possible priors. If the planner also requires a locality condition that ensures that the mechanism payoffs are determined by the respondents’ posterior probabilities of the true state of nature, we prove that, under additional smoothness and sensitivity conditions, the payoff in the truth-telling equilibrium must be a logarithmic function of those posterior probabilities. Moreover, the respondents are necessarily ranked according to those probabilities. Finally, we discuss implementation issues.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1137/S0040585X97T989957
