Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly
Name
bjps_axz032.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
762.94 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
12fd2de17f84947542ccd1bd49b5a812
Author(s)
Schoenfield, Miriam
Date Issued
August 2019
Journal
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Citation
Schoenfield, Miriam. “Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (August 2019) © 2019 The Author
Version
Final published version
Abstract
It seems like we care about at least two features of our credence function: gradational-accuracy (high credences in truths, low credences in falsehoods) and verisimilitude (in-vesting higher credence in worlds that are more similar to the actual world). Accuracy-first epistemology requires that we care about one feature of our credence function:gradational-accuracy. So if you want to be a verisimilitude-valuing accuracy-firster,you must be able to think of the value of verisimilitude as somehow built into thevalue of gradational-accuracy. Can this be done? In a recent article, Oddie has arguedthat it cannot, at least if we want the accuracy measure to be proper. I argue that it can.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/BJPS/AXZ032
