Robust comparative statics in large static games
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Acemoglu_Robust Comparative.pdf
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215.44 KB
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Adobe PDF
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Author(s)
Acemoglu, Daron
Jensen, Martin Kaae
Date Issued
December 2010
Journal
Proceedings of the 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2010
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, and Martin Kaae Jensen. “Robust Comparative Statics in Large Static Games.” IEEE, 2010. 3133–3139. Web. © 2010 IEEE.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We provide general comparative static results for large finite and infinite-dimensional aggregative games. In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, the average of the actions among the players). In large games, players take these aggregates as given. We derive comparative static results for large aggregative games, showing both how equilibrium aggregates and the behavior of each player change in response to various different types of changes in parameters. Our results can also be interpreted as comparative statics of ∈-equilibria in games in which there is a large but finite number of players, who still take their impact on aggregates into account in choosing their strategies. We illustrate how these results can be applied easily using two examples: (1) large single or multi-dimensional contests; (2) large beauty contests where each player's strategy is a probability distribution.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2010.5717147
