Antineutrino Detectors Remain Impractical for Nuclear Explosion Monitoring
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24_2020_2464_ReferencePDF.pdf
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Author(s)
Foxe, Michael
Bowyer, Theodore
Carr, Rachel
Orrell, John
VanDevender, Brent
Date Issued
March 26, 2020
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Fission explosions produce large numbers of antineutrinos. It is occasionally asked whether this distinctive, unshieldable emission could help reveal clandestine nuclear weapon explosions. The practical challenge encountered is that detectors large enough for this application are cost prohibitive, likely on the multi-billion-dollar scale. In this paper, we review several hypothetical use cases for antineutrino detectors as supplements to the seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and airborne radionuclide sensors of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s International Monitoring System. In each case, if an anti-neutrino detector could be constructed that would compete with existing capabilities, we conclude that the cost would considerably outstrip the value it might add to the existing monitoring network, compared to the significantly lower costs for the same or superior capability.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00024-020-02464-6
