Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth
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Johnson_Physicians treating.pdf
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Author(s) •
Rehavi, M. Marit
Johnson, Erin Metcalf
Date Issued
February 2016
Journal
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Johnson, Erin M., and M. Marit Rehavi. “Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8.1 (2016): 115–141. © 2016 American Economic Association.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treatment gap varies with providers' financial incentives. Consistent with induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes. (JEL D83, I11, J16, J44)
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140160